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This doctoral thesis deals with the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions, set 
out in sections 48 to 52 of the Consumer Protection Act, and the theoretical and practical 
problems involved. These provisions are compared to the German standard business terms 
legislation with regard to the respective scope of application of both regimes, their 
incorporation requirements, the content control, the interpretational control as well as their 
redress mechanisms. The objective is to provide clarity of the South African terms and 
conditions legislation and to find possible solutions regarding uncertainties in connection with 
the Act. Where oversights, ambiguities or interpretational or practical problems exist, the 
suggested recommendations to the existing provisions shall provide for possible solutions and 
more certainty. 
The most important findings of this thesis are that the content control performed according to 
the Act offers a similar level of protection to the German regime. Despite this comparable level 
of protection for individual consumers, the lack of an abstract challenges mechanism and the 
application of a particular-personalised approach are an obstacle for effective consumer 
protection and the eradication of unfair terms. The introduction of a supra-individual 
generalised approach and an abstract challenges mechanism would thus tremendously enhance 
consumer protection with regard to mass contracts. 
What is more, an 'open' content control as performed in the German regime is preferable to an 
approach where the interpretational control takes place after the content control, or where both 
controls are merged.  
A streamlining of the complicated South African enforcement mechanism and the amendment 
of some procedural provisions would be beneficial too. It is also demonstrated that the German 
approach is more proactive than the South African regime in this regard.   
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INTRODUCTION 
I. Problem statement 
With the Consumer Protection Act of 68 of 2008,1 South Africa has aligned itself with 
international guidelines on consumer protection.   
With regard to the country's challenges concerning poverty, illiteracy, discrimination and other 
forms of inequality that are still part of everyday life of many South Africans, the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s intention was 'to create and promote an economic environment that 
supports and strengthens a culture of consumer rights and responsibilities.'2 
The right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions, set out in sections 48 to 52 of the 
Act, is one of the most important innovations of this statute. The legislator recognised the 'need 
to legislate against contractual unfairness, unreasonableness, unconscionability or 
oppressiveness in all contractual phases' and that South Africa would become the exception, 
with a deficient law of contracts in comparison to countries which recognise and require 
compliance with the principle of good faith in contracts.3 Consumer protection and terms and 
conditions legislation have developed rapidly since the Act came into force. This gives an idea 
of how important it is, not only for consumers but also for businesses, to keep abreast with 
these developments. 
Although Part G of the Act already had existing legislation as a model, for instance, the law of 
the European Union,4 some of its provisions raise questions which cannot be resolved merely 
by taking into account the purpose of the Act (section 3) or the interpretational provisions 
(section 2).  
This applies, for instance, to the South African incorporation requisites with regard to notices 
required only for certain terms and conditions (section 49). In contrast, the German regime 
applies a very formalistic approach by which standard terms of any type must be incorporated 
in the agreement. This has obviously consequences for consumer protection, which will be 
analysed in this thesis. 
                                                             
1 Hereafter also referred to as 'the Act' or 'CPA'. 
2 Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill 2008 at 80. 
3 GN 1957 in GG No. 26774 of 9 September 2004, ch 3.4.3.  
4 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
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Furthermore, the structure and formulation of the South African 'blacklist' of section 51 and 
the general clause of section 48 differ from their German counterparts and other regimes. 
Clauses that fall under the greylist of regulation 44(3) are presumed to be unfair, unlike § 308 
BGB which applies evaluative elements instead in order to assess the fairness of a clause. These 
differences will be discussed in detail. 
The Act applies a particular-personalised approach where standard terms are assessed against 
the backdrop of an individual consumer's situation, whereas §§ 305 et seq. BGB apply an 
abstract-general approach by which the courts assess the given standard terms' fairness within 
a setting that is detached from individual consumers. The consequences of these different 
approaches will be presented. 
An abstract-general approach makes institutional actions possible. This thesis deals with the 
question of whether the tools provided by the Act, such as class actions, can be a substitute for 
an abstract challenges mechanism. 
Germany opted for an 'open' content control, which has consequences for the order of the 
various controls, among other things. This concept is alien to South African law. On the other 
hand, the purposive construction of the Act is not applied in Germany. The ramifications in 
both regimes will be analysed. 
Lastly, the redress mechanism of the Act is very complex, with various judicial and 
administrative institutions involved. It will be discussed whether this mechanism is consumer-
friendly and whether the South African legislator had other options than such a complicated 
enforcement system. 
Under section 2(2)(a), the court, the Tribunal or the National Consumer Commission may take 
into account appropriate foreign and international law when interpreting the Act. This provision 
is hence the pivotal point for the relevance of this thesis and makes a comparison with the 
German regime interesting. 
Germany has a long tradition of standard business terms legislation, which is codified today in 
§§ 305 to 310 of the Civil Code (BGB)5 and the Injunctions Act (UKlaG).6 Over the years, this 
field of law has generated a vast body of judicial decisions as well as extensive legal literature. 
                                                             
5 BGB = Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
6 UKlaG = Unterlassungsklagengesetz. 
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In this thesis, the relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the BGB shall be 
discussed and compared with each other. Thus, the research for this thesis involves principles, 
jurisprudence, literature and developments in the South African and German terms and 
conditions legislation. The objective is to provide clarity of the South African regime, to find 
possible solutions and to make recommendations with respect to oversights, uncertainties, 
practical problems, or even gaps, in connection with the Act.  
The research involved is not only an academic exercise but of practical relevance for both 
consumers and industries. For consumers, it is crucial because the relevant provisions of the 
Act might not necessarily provide for adequate consumer protection with regard to the 
particularities of South Africa. What is more, it is in the businesses’ interest to have certainty 
about the compliance with the Act as suppliers have to adjust their trading practices and revise 
their contracts and standard terms.  
Moreover, this thesis could promote further research and directly and indirectly be a source for 
other practitioners and jurisprudence against the backdrop of section 2(2)(a) in order to develop 
the law.  
 
II. Theoretical framework 
Advantages of the comparative method and methodology 
In order to understand the shortcomings of a piece of legislation, the comparative law offers a 
valuable tool. It enables to take both the perspective within the given national laws by 
presenting, in a first step, reports on the status quo of the given pieces of legislation (Parts I 
and II). These reports on the South African and the German regimes will present an overall 
picture of standard business terms legislation and legal solutions to practical problems by 
statutory rules or decisions in these two countries. 
The second step consists of a comparison of both regimes by taking a perspective that is 
detached from the terminology of the national laws. Here, the underlying legal concepts are 
analysed in a more abstract way. The comparison of both regimes applies the principle of 
functionality, which means that the solutions that will be presented will be stripped of their 
national doctrinal background7 (Part III).  
                                                             
7 Zweigert and Kötz Comparative Law 44. 
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In instances where the compared acts, namely the Consumer Protection Act and its regulations, 
on the one hand, and the BGB and the UKlaG, on the other, do not offer a comparable solution 
to a given problem or concept, the solution will be searched in other 'sources of law' in a broader 
sense, such as other pieces of legislation, the case law, custom, trade usage or social practice.8 
Although the author of this thesis is a German lawyer, he willingly avoids an approach where 
the comparative work starts from a particular question or legal institution in German law in 
order to compare it with another regime, and to draw conclusions and proposals for the German 
law. The reverse approach seems more fruitful and attractive as it gives new insights and forces 
the author to take another perspective from the outset. 
As under section 2(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, appropriate foreign and international 
law may be considered when interpreting the Act, a comparison with another regime is called 
for by the Act itself. The insights given by such a comparison shall therefore also be valuable 
from a practical point of view, e.g., for future cases and amendments to the existing law, where 
necessary. 
This thesis contains both a macro- and a microcomparison9 of the South African and German 
legislation because not only specific technical/legal problems in the area of terms and 
conditions are analysed, but also the overall picture and the dispute resolution procedures. This 
macrocomparison is necessary because only by analysing the underlying mechanisms as well 
as the enforcement procedures, an understanding of the effectiveness of consumer rights is 
made possible. Without such a comparison, the picture would be incomplete. 
What is more, a comparison without sociological considerations would be purely theoretical 
and not take into account the realities of both countries.10 Especially South African legislation 
cannot be fully understood without consideration of the country's historical burden of 
Apartheid. 
Comparative law and history of law are 'wood from the same trunk' since the historical 
development of a piece of legislation is essential for its analysis and understanding.11 Hence, 
the presentation of the South African and German parts will be preceded by an historical 
overview pertaining to the analysed pieces of legislation. Only when considering sociological 
                                                             
8 Zweigert and Kötz Comparative Law 35 and 36. 
9 See Zweigert and Kötz Comparative Law 4. 
10 Zweigert and Kötz Comparative Law 10 and 11. 
11 Zweigert and Kötz Comparative Law 8. 
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and historical elements in a comparative law thesis, the 'vulnerability' especially of South 
African consumers and the objectives of the German BGB provisions, for instance, can be fully 
understood. 
 
Finally, in order to achieve a better understanding of certain topics and a more complete 
overview of how specific questions can be dealt with, not only the German legislation, but also 
the legislation of the United Kingdom,12 Austria,13 Australia,14 to name but a few, as well as 
international guidelines15 will be discussed. 
 
Reasons for the choice of the German regime as a comparative legislation 
In its report, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)16 conducted research that implied an 
international legislative comparison, including the European Directive on Unfair Contract 
Terms17 and Germany.18  
A comparison with the German legislation on standard business terms is valuable because 
Germany was the first country in Europe to identify the issue of standard terms and to address 
this field systematically. What is more, the German Standard Business Terms Act19 had an 
enormous impact on the drafting of the European Unfair Terms Directive, notably with regard 
to the control of the price-performance ratio and the lack of a distinction between pre-
formulated and individually negotiated terms.20  
                                                             
12 For instance, the Office of Fair Trading Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008). 
13 Konsumentenschutzgesetz (KSchG) of 1 October 1979. 
14 Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010). 
15 For instance, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the United Nations Guidelines 
for Consumer Protection, 1999, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) Model 
Laws. 
16 SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 
(1998). 
17 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
18 German legislation is analysed thoughout the document. See at 13, point 1.17 (jurdicial action of the courts), 
point 1.18 (consumer organisations and institutional actions), at 18 (private legislation opposed to administrative 
control), at 53 (good faith), at 91 (declaration of discontinuance of unfair practices), at 106, point 2.4.2.2 (powers 
of German courts), at 132 (fairness), at 140 (general clause and good faith), at 175 et seq (individually agreed 
terms), at 190, point 2.8.3.4 (changed circumstances after the conclusion of the contract), or at 202, point 2.9.2.17 
et seq (interpretation of contracts). 
19 AGB-Gesetz or AGBG = Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen. 
20 Brandner/Ulmer BB 1991, 701 et seq. 
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§§ 305 et seq. BGB – which contain the former AGBG provisions – are the culmination of a 
long judicial evolution, from the BGH's 1956 landmark decision with regard to good faith21 to 
a long chain of court decisions that were later seen as a 'highly commendable performance of 
German jurisprudence'.22 The significance of these highly developed provisions cannot 
sufficiently be accentuated because they offer the 'control instrument' in an economy geared 
towards mass consumption, rationalisation, anonymisation and profit maximisation.23 The 
model character of the German provisions in this area makes a comparison with the South 
African regime valuable.   
 
Hypotheses on the undertaken research 
The underlying hypotheses of this thesis are the following: 
The level of protection of the Consumer Protection Act lags behind the German regime and is 
unsuited for mass contracts and the eradication of unfair terms. This is because in many 
respects, the Act does not conform to internationally recognised standards with regard to: 
- the particular-personalised approach of the Act that is diametrically opposed to the 
abstract-general approach of §§ 305 et seq. BGB; 
- a missing abstract-challenges mechanism, unlike in the German regime that provides 
for institutional actions; 
- the South African blacklist and the general clause which vary tremendously from 
internationally recognised standards as laid down in the German provisions; 
- the complex redress mechanism of the Act with its various judicial and administrative 
institutions, unlike the much more streamlined German enforcement procedure. 
In order to limit the scope of this thesis, certain topics, although interesting, cannot be covered 
in detail. This applies, for instance, for procedural aspects in terms of chapters 5 and 6 of the 
Act, or provisions in §§ 305 BGB et seq. that do not have an equivalent norm in South African 
legislation. 
  
                                                             
21 BGHZ 22, 90 et seq. 
22 Zweigert and Kötz Rechtsvergleichung 329. 
23 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 9. 
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III. Conceptual framework 
Consumer 
The term 'consumer' is broadly defined in section 1 of the Act as the counterpart of the supplier. 
Section 3 qualifies consumers as 'vulnerable', whereas section 22(2) refers to 'ordinary' 
consumers. The 'average consumer', a concept used in international practice, such as the EU 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD),24  seems to be inexistent in the Act.  
Hence, these abstract constructions of the image of a consumer vary in the different regimes. 
In European consumer policy, the 'active and critical information-seeker' has been influential 
because of the essential role of information and transparency in EU legislation.25 On the other 
hand, the concept of the 'passive glancer', predominant in the Nordic countries, considers that 
consumers typically just glance at advertisement and do not base their decision to contract on 
thoroughly gathered or presented information.26 
On the other hand, the BGB does not refer to 'consumers' at all, with the exception of § 310(3) 
which was inserted due to European legislation. Instead, it refers to the 'other party'. 
This begs the question whether these different concepts of the quality of consumers are 
congruent and interchangeable, or if they need to be distinguished from each other. As the 
purposes set out in section 3 have to be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the Act, 
the image that the Act has of a consumer is inherently linked to the question of the level of 
protection of the Act, and whether it conforms to international standards. 
Standard business terms / terms and conditions 
The Act does not contain a definition of 'terms and conditions', unlike § 305(1). From the 
German definition one can conclude that standard business terms are designed for mass 
contracts in order to facilitate transactions of the same kind with many clients. 
Although the pieces of legislation discussed in this thesis aim to curtail 'private legislation'27 in 
the form of standard terms and the unfettered shift of risks onto consumers,28 legislation in this 
field is complex, overarching and characterised by many pitfalls. The legislator has to insure 
                                                             
24 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2005. 
25 See, e.g., Pippig Augenoptik GmbH & Co KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft Case 44/01 [2003] ECR I-
3095 at 55, where the ECJ defines the consumer as someone 'who is reasonably well informed and reasonably 
observant and circumspect.' 
26 Eiselen and Naudé ‘Introduction’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 26. 
27 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 369. 
28 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 1. 
 8   
 
not only a high level of protection for consumers, but also that the economy is not unnecessarily 
burdened with strangling restrictions that are an obstacle for mass transactions. 
In any event, standard business terms legislation must tackle the inherent structural inequality 
between the parties that could be exploited by suppliers when drafting their terms and 
conditions.29 An analysis of the South African provisions and their comparison with the 
German regime might reveal such weaknesses. 
Unfairness 
Unlike the Consumer Protection Act, many regimes do not use words such as 'unfair' in their 
general clauses or black- or greylists but rather require some imbalance between the parties' 
rights and obligations.30  
Although the Consumer Protection Act uses terms such as 'unfair, unreasonable or unjust', the 
Act not only does not contain any definition of these words, the South African legislator chose 
even more synonyms for ‘unfair’, such as ‘inequitable’ or ‘unconscionable’. The use of 
different words makes their construction difficult. With regard to section 2(2), a comparison 
with German law, especially the general clause of § 307 with its concretisations could thus be 
very helpful in order to define the concept of 'unfairness'.  
Good faith 
The rationale of standard business terms legislation is to protect consumers from terms that do 
not sufficiently take into account the consumer's interests. The fact that the supplier must 
temper the furtherance of its own interest in order to consider the consumer's interests is also 
consistent with the bona fides principle, which is an important principle both in South African 
and German contract law.31 
Both regimes apply the principles of public policy and good faith concurrently with their 
standard business terms legislation. Besides, in both countries, standard business terms 
legislations cannot be seen in isolation but in synergy with other provisions and the common 
law. The latter especially applies to South Africa. However, the evolution especially of the 
bona fides standard was different in both regimes. 
                                                             
29 Naudé ‘Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 10. 
30 See, e.g., §§ 307(1) 1st sent. BGB or 879(3) ABGB (Austria). 
31 Naudé ‘Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
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As opposed to South African case law with its exceptio doli defence, German courts relied 
instead on codified principles, such as good faith (§ 242) and public policy (§ 138). The guiding 
function of the ius dispositivum for the specification of the principle of good faith was a 
milestone in German jurisprudence.32 
The difference in tackling unfairness in both countries is certainly based on the fact that the 
principles of good faith and public policy are codified in the BGB, whereas in South Africa, 
they have been developed by the courts. According to the SCA, the principle of good faith is 
not a principle capable of independent application, but an underlying value informing the rules 
and principles of the law of contract.33 As such, the principle of good faith cannot directly 
nullify an otherwise valid contractual provision or its enforcement.34  The evolution and the 
assessment especially of the principle of good faith will hence be a topic of this thesis. 
Ubuntu 
In South African contract law, not only concepts such as good faith and public policy play a 
role, but also constitutional values, such as Ubuntu, a philosophical concept found in Southern 
Africa focusing on people's allegiances and relations with each other.35 Vice versa, public 
policy is informed by the concept of Ubuntu.36 The rather flexible concept of Ubuntu could 
thus be an appropriate principle to inform the law of contract, as its foundation is a certain 
invariable focus on the greater good, the interest of the community and dignity.37 Even in a 
legal context, it is often necessary to revert to philosophical and other concepts in constitutional 
law, such as dignity. It will therefore be examined in this thesis if Ubuntu is a valuable 
contribution to the concept of fairness with regard to terms and conditions. 
 
 
IV. Chapter overview 
In Part I of this thesis, the relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act shall be 
discussed. Chapter 1 contains a short introduction and a historical overview in which the 
development of the South African consumer protection regime, from the unfettered application 
                                                             
32 BGHZ 41, 151 et seq.  
33 Brisley v Drotsky para [22] and [23], confirmed in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) at 
40H-41A. 
34 Pretorius 2003 THRHR 643. 
35 See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 185 note 93, with further references. 
36 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 185. 
37 Mokgoro 1998 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 16, 18 et seq. 
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of the principle of freedom of contract to the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act, will 
be presented. In chapter 2, the scope of application of the Act and the incorporation 
requirements for terms and conditions will be analysed in the context of some South African 
idiosyncrasies in order to contrast them later with the German regime, especially concerning 
specific formal requisites. Chapter 3 deals with the content control and the mechanism of the 
so-called black- and greylists and the general clause. This chapter is particularly important 
because of numerous peculiarities of the South African regime as opposed to the German 
legislation, e.g., as regards the structure and wording of sections 51 and 48 as well as regulation 
44(3). This chapter is followed by a discussion of the interpretational control (chapter 4) in 
which it will be shown, for example, that despite many similarities with the German regime, 
the Act has a different approach in the form of purposive construction. In the final chapter 5 
of Part I, the complex redress mechanism of the Act and the institutions involved will be 
explained. 
Part II deals with the German legislation. In the introduction and historical overview 
(chapter 1), the courts' contribution in the field of standard business terms, the subsequent 
legislation of the AGBG and the influence of EU law will be presented. This chapter is followed 
by a discussion of the national and international scope of application (chapter 2). The analysis 
of the incorporation control in chapter 3 contains the formalistic approach in terms of the 
incorporation requirements in German law, together with the exclusion of surprising terms and 
the priority of individually agreed terms. In the discussion of the interpretational control 
(chapter 4), the importance of the order of the different controls as well as of an 'open' content 
control will be demonstrated. In the following chapter 5 on content control, the rich body of 
German jurisprudence in this field will be presented within the triad of strictly prohibited 
clauses, prohibited clauses with an evaluative element and the general clause. Finally, in 
chapter 6, the enforcement mechanism, especially in the form of the institutional action, shall 
be discussed. 
Both Parts I and II will already contain some comparative perspective and suggest possible 
amendments to the Act. 
A comprehensive comparison of both regimes by analysing the findings of Parts I and II will 
be presented in Part III. The objective of this chapter is the highlighting of the differences 
between the two regimes and the assessment of possible solutions. The comparative study will 
also enter into the question of where the German standard business terms legislation provides 
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more consumer-friendly and effective solutions that could be applied to the South African 
regime too.  
Finally, Part IV will contain the Conclusion (I.) and Recommendations (II.) for the 
Consumer Protection Act, followed by an Overall Conclusion (III.). Possible solutions for 
unresolved questions in terms of the South African regime will be presented in this Part.  
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PART I – THE RIGHT TO FAIR, JUST AND REASONABLE 





The South African law of contract has undergone a remarkable development in the last few 
decades. As the absolute application of the pacta sunt servanda principle, according to which 
agreements must be honoured, produced hugely unfair results, the courts mitigated this 
principle, inter alia by the application of the exceptio doli defence, in order to apply the abstract 
values of fairness and equity into substantive law. After the abolition of this defence by the 
much-criticised Bank of Lisbon decision, the courts applied other concepts, such as the 
principle of good faith, the concept of public policy and constitutional considerations in order 
to ensure fairness in the law of contract. The Consumer Protection Act finally created a legal 
framework to ensure equity and established the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and 
conditions in section 48 to 52. This framework applies only to consumer contracts, i.e., 
contracts between a consumer and a supplier,38 but not to commercial contracts where both or 
all parties are contracting in the course of their respective businesses. The Act considers also 
small businesses whose asset value or annual turnover does not exceed a certain threshold as 
consumers,39 so that under this statute, ‘consumers’ are not only natural persons.40 As 
commercial contracts are thus treated only those which are contracted between companies 
whose asset value or annual turnover exceeds the abovementioned threshold.  
In this chapter, the scope, the application and the problems inherent to the legal framework of 
sections 48 to 52 of the Consumer Protection Act as well as provisions that cause problems in 
terms of their comprehension, application and interpretation will be discussed. The South 
African Law Commission has recognised in its report41 the need for legislation against 
unfairness, unreasonableness and unconscionability in the field of contract law. The reasons 
                                                             
38 Section 1 of the Consumer Protection Act defines 'consumer agreement' as an agreement between a supplier 
and a consumer other than a franchise agreement. Provisions preceded by the word 'section' or 's' are those of 
the Consumer Protection Act (also referred to as the 'CPA' or the 'Act'), and provisions preceded by '§' 
are those of the German BGB, save where otherwise indicated. 
39 Section. 5(2)(b). 
40 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 437. 
41 SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 
(1998) at (xiv). 
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for the intervention of the legislature in terms of the Consumer Protection Act and the 
considerations contained in section 48 et seq. can only be fully understood against their 
historical background. Therefore, first, an overview of the development of aspects related to 
fairness and equity in South African contract law will be given. This shall contribute to the 
understanding of the modern South African contract law and consumer protection regime. 
Then, the scope of application of the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions, the 
formal requirements for written consumer agreements as well as the obligatory notice for 
certain terms and conditions will be discussed, before the so-called ‘black-’ and ‘greylists' and 
the general unfairness standard of section 48 of the Act will be examined in detail. In another 
chapter, the interpretational control will be presented. Finally, the last part of this chapter will 
deal with the enforcement procedures which are at the consumer’s disposition. In this part, also 
the institutions that are competent to deal with these questions will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:  FROM THE ABSOLUTE APPLICATION OF 
THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND PACTA SUNT 
SERVANDA TO THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
 
 
1.  Freedom of contract 
Freedom of contract has been an absolute principle in South African law in the nineteenth 
century.42 According to this principle, parties should be able to enter into agreements without 
any intervention by the State or courts43 because any intervention was regarded as paternalistic 
and inconsistent with the parties’ freedom of contract. Party autonomy, coupled with the 
sanctity of contracts (pacta sunt servanda), was therefore the ‘sacred cow’44 – or the ‘hallowed 
basis’, as Pretorius puts it more elegantly45 – of South African contract law. The principle of 
freedom of contract goes back to the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, when philosophers, lawyers, 
sociologists and economists postulated the philosophy of laissez-faire. According to this 
philosophy, individuals should be free to enter into contracts.46 
This however led often to unfair outcomes. Hahlo illustrates the problem with absolute freedom 
of contract as follows: 
'Provided a man is not a minor or a lunatic and his consent is not vitiated by fraud, mistake or 
duress, his contractual undertakings will be enforced to the letter. If, through inexperience, 
carelessness or weakness of character, he has allowed himself to be overreached, it is just too 
bad for him, and it can only be hoped that he will learn from his experience. The courts will not 
release him from the contract or make a better bargain for him. Darwinian survival of the fittest, 
the law of nature, is also the law of the market-place.'47 
The strict application of the pacta sunt servanda principle was certainly reasonable at a time 
when the parties were in an equal position when negotiating the terms of an agreement on an 
individual basis. This equality of bargaining power was hardly ever achieved, however.48 
When companies gradually imposed standardised and not individually negotiated contract 
terms, jurisprudence felt a need 'to protect the poor and the ignorant'49 so that the principle of 
                                                             
42 This is applicable for both civil law and common law jurisdictions. See Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70. 
43 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 353. 
44 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 232 (CC) para [15] and the discussion of this case under para 4.1 of this 
chapter. Except where otherwise indicated, references to chapters or paragraphs refer to those within the 
Part of this thesis in which they appear. 
45 Pretorius 2004 THRHR 183. 
46 Aronstam 1979 THRHR 21-22. 
47 Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70. 
48 Aronstam 1979 THRHR 22. 
49 Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70. 
 15   
 
freedom of contract had to be mitigated in order to protect consumers. Although in consumer 
contracts, some parts are negotiated between the supplier and the consumer as, for example, 
the definition of the main subject matter or the price, large parts are not as they are incorporated 
in the standard terms and conditions (‘small print’). Therefore, the consumer is often 
confronted with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ situation towards the supplier. Even though consumers 
can shop around for the ‘best’, i.e., the most advantageous terms and conditions, they will most 
probably refrain from this possibility because the transaction costs would be too high.50 It 
would cost much time to compare the terms of conditions of different suppliers, and for 
laypersons, they are often difficult to compare because of their different wording and structure. 
Therefore, the strict application of this principle – which is still today a cornerstone of South 
African law of contract – has been curbed gradually by jurisprudence or lawmaking.51 This 
was achieved by introducing the concept of fairness. Examples include ticket contracts,52 
restraints of trade53 and cases of misrepresentation,54 duress55 and undue influence,56 where 
consensus had been improperly obtained. In this regard, the exceptio doli defence played an 
important role in order to prevent inequitable outcomes. 
2. The exceptio doli generalis in South African law of contract 
2.1   The development of the exceptio doli generalis 
South African courts gradually applied the exceptio doli generalis from the late nineteenth 
century in order to adopt some equitable doctrines from English law like estoppel, rectification 
and the right to rescind a contract induced by innocent misrepresentation.57 It was regarded as 
                                                             
50 Naudé 2009 SALJ 508. 
51 Hahlo 1981 SALJ 71. 
52 Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (A). 
53 Magna Alloys & Research (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
54 Bayer South Africa Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 (A). 
55 Broodryk v Smuts 1942 TPD 47. 
56 Hofer v Kevitt 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA). See Stoop LLD thesis 2012 at 72. The appeal court did not recognise 
‘commercial bribery’ as a ground for rescission in Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 
719 (SCA). See Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 110. 
57 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 27. See United South African Association Ltd v Cohn 1904 TS 733; Waterval 
Estate and Gold Mining Co Ltd v New Bullion Gold Mining Co Ltd 1905 TS 717; McDuff and Co Ltd v 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment 1924 AD 573; Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282; Estate 
Schickerling v Schickerling 1936 CPD 269; Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (A); Allers 
v Rautenbach 1949 (4) SA 226 (O); Venter v Liebenberg 1954 (3) SA 333 (K); North Vaal Mineral Co Ltd v 
Lovasz 1961 (3) SA 604 (T); Von Ziegler and Another v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 
399 (T); Hauptfleisch v Caledon Divisional Council 1963 (4) SA 53 (K); Otto en ‘n Ander v Heymans 1971 (4) 
SA 148 (T); Paddock Motors (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 (A); Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v 
Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 436 (T); Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W); Arprint 
Ltd v Gerber Goldschmidt Group South Africa (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 254 (A). Some of these cases will be 
discussed below. 
 16   
 
an equitable defence which allowed a defendant to face a claim for performance when there 
was something unconscionable about the plaintiff’s endeavour to enforce the contract or a 
contractual provision.58 Nonetheless, courts were sceptical from the beginning about the utility 
of this defence and whether the exceptio doli actually was part of South African law or not 
because it was not clear if it had been adopted in Roman-Dutch law.59 As the modern South 
African law of contract has its roots in Roman-Dutch law, which itself is based on Roman law, 
it is important to understand the historical background of the exceptio doli. Therefore, it is 
necessary to depict its coming into being and its development. 
2.1.1 Roman law 
The legal system in about 380 BC was known as the ius civile. It applied to Roman citizens, 
was underdeveloped and characterised by its strict formalism,60 which led to a high degree of 
legal certainty. On the other hand, as this formalistic approach left no room for interpretation 
of an individual case, the outcomes were often inequitable,61 especially in cases where a party 
was a victim of fraud or compulsion.62 In 367 BC, the function of the praetor was created.63 
Over time, the praetor became the main source of law during litigation. By virtue of his 
political power (imperium), he could introduce a new legal remedy by way of an edict 
(magistratuum edicta).64 Although the praetor technically did not create new law, the edicts 
enjoyed legal protection (actionem dare) and were in effect often the source of new legal rules. 
While the edicts of his predecessor did not bind a praetor's successor, he did take rules from 
edicts of his predecessor that had proved to be useful. Thus, over time, parallel to the civil law 
and supplementing and correcting it, a new body of praetorian law emerged (edictum 
translatitium).65  
                                                             
58 Glover 2007 SALJ 449. 
59 Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173 and 174. Viljoen is of the opinion that the exceptio doli seemed to be an established 
defence. However, its exact and precise limits had to be determined.  
60 See Britannica s.v. 'Roman law' at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-law#ref469058. All websites last 
accessed between 16 and 20 August 2020, except where otherwise indicated. 
61 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 143. The adherence to strict formalism was reasonable in the early stage of 
Roman law, when Rome was a small community. See Hahlo 1981 SALJ 71. 
62 Lewis 1990 SALJ 30. 
63 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
64 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. The law introduced by the praetors is referred to as ‘ius honorarium’. 
See Oxford Classical Dictionary s.v. 'ius honorarium' at https://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/ 
acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-8053. 
65 See TheLaw.com Dictionary s.v.  'edictum translatitium' at https://dictionary.thelaw.com/translatitium-edictum. 
In addition, the praetors considerably extended the concept of contract by giving an actio in factum (an action 
given by the praetor on the facts of the case alone where no standard civil law action was applicable (see 'Glossary 
of Roman law' at http://thelatinlibrary.com/law/glossary.html) or praescriptis verbis (an action given when the 
foundation of an action is a bilateral transaction for reciprocal performances which do not conform to the typical 
and recognised species of contracts - see Berger Dictionary of Roman Law 334) in certain circumstances falling 
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Although the praetor could introduce the principle of good faith during the negotiation phases 
of contracts, he did not have the discretion to insert the principle of good faith in any stipulatio, 
the most important contract-type in Roman law,66 consisting of questions and answers.67  
In order to avoid inequities, the exceptio doli was established in 66 BC,68 and the principle of 
good faith (bona fides) was introduced into the stipulatio. This defence was created 'so that a 
person should not by reason of the subtlety of the civil law, and contrary to the dictates of 
natural justice, derive advantage from his own bad faith.'69 The exceptio doli was originally 
intended only for bonae fidei contracts but gradually extended to stricti iuris contracts.70  
In the case of negotia stricti iuris, the parties were bound to the strict wording of the contract, 
regardless of the possibility that the content of the agreement was against the bona fides 
principle. The parties could expressly stipulate in the formula that they had to act under this 
principle though.71 Hence, a judge could also in actiones stricta iudicia take into consideration 
any conduct that did not meet the requirements of the bona fides standard and therefore exercise 
a discretionary power.72 The defence was the exceptio doli specialis (or praeteriti), according 
to which the counterpart had not acted in good faith when concluding the agreement (in 
contrahendo), for instance on grounds of fraud or intimidation.73  
On the other hand, when the parties concluded a negotia bonae fidei agreement, they were 
required to do what was reasonable and expected of them.74 The courts did in fact not take into 
                                                             
outside the ten classes of contract laid down in the Institutes (mutuum, commodatum, depositum, pignus, stipulatio, 
litteris, emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas, mandatum. See Christie Law of Contract (2006) 5. 
66 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. According to Gaius (around 160 AD), contractual obligations arise from 
an act (re), from words (verbis), from writing (litteris) or from consent (consensu). Contrary to modern law, where 
a contractual obligation arises from an agreement between the parties, in Roman law, the adherence to strict 
formalism was, besides consensus, the requisite for any enforceable contractual obligation. Therefore, in 
stipulatio, for instance, a ‘verbal’ (verbis) contract, the parties had to conform to certain formulae in order to 
create an obligation. See Christie Law of Contract (2006) 5. If the parties did not comply with the form, there was 
no contract. If, on the other hand, there was compliance with the form but no agreement, there would be a contract 
nonetheless. See Lewis 1990 SALJ 30. Only with regard to sale (emptio vendito), hire (locatio conductio), 
partnership (societas) and mandate (mandatum) the informally declared consensus was sufficient in order to create 
an obligation, without any additional formalism or transfer of a thing. Only in 472, the formal requirements for 
the stipulatio were abolished, and consensus between the parties was sufficient to conclude such a contract. See 
Pretorius 2004 THRHR 181.  
67 Lewis 1990 SALJ 30. 
68 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
69 Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 535 – hereafter Zuurbekom. 
70 Christie Law of Contract (2006) 271, Aronstam Consumer Protection 170. Most contracts were introduced by 
the praetor and therefore were negotia bonae fidei. See Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
71 Aronstam Consumer Protection 171. This was done by inserting the words ‘ex fide bona’. See 
Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
72 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145, Aronstam 1979 THRHR 30. 
73 Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173, Lambiris 1988 SALJ 646. 
74 Aronstam 1979 THRHR 29. 
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account what the parties had promised but any conduct which was deemed to fall short of the 
required bona fides standard.75 The defence for this type of agreement was the exceptio doli 
generalis (or praesentis) which the defendant could raise when the plaintiff acted contrary to 
good faith, either during the negotiations of the contract itself or during the action.76  
In practice, the Romans made no distinction between these two defences and simply used 
indiscriminately the term exceptio doli.77 The most notable difference concerning the exceptio 
doli in the context of iudicia stricti iuris and iudicia bonae fidei was that it had to be expressly 
pleaded in the former, whereas in the latter, the court took equity aspects into account ex 
officio.78  
In classical Roman law, dolus was synonymous with mala fides (contrary to good faith). 
Therefore, good faith became a requirement for the stipulation under the exceptio doli.79 
Gaius,80 who formulated81 the exceptio doli, although the praetor Aquilius Gallus had created 
this exception,82 stated that the advantages of the exceptio doli were twofold. On the one hand, 
it would be raised as an exception to dolus83 which had already occurred, and, on the other, to 
dolus occurring during litis contestatio.84 In other words, the exceptio doli had the effect that a 
claim could be defeated if the defendant had acted contrary to the requirements of good faith 
at the moment the contract was concluded, or at the moment of enforcing the action.85  
The exceptio doli operated as a general equitable defence or a general reserve clause which 
enabled the defendant, without specifying the defence, to set up any fact before the court in 
                                                             
75 Aronstam Consumer Protection 171. 
76 Aronstam Consumer Protection 171, Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
77 Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173, referring to Zuurbekom 536; Aronstam 1979 THRHR 28. 
78 Lewis 1990 SALJ 32. 
79 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
80 Gaius’ classification of contracts laid down in his Institutes became the most influential in Roman law and was 
the basis for teaching of Roman law until it was replaced by Justinian’s Institutes in the 6th century AD. Justinian 
adopted the same classification, though. According to this classification, Roman private law distinguishes between 
the law of persons, the law of things and the law of actions (I 1.2.12). See Christie Law of Contract (2006) 3. 
81 The form of the exceptio doli was: 'si in ea re nihil dolo malo factum sit neque fiat'. See Aronstam Consumer 
Protection 169. 
82 Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173. 
83 There was dolus when the plaintiff knew, for instance, because of his fraud or intimidation, that his suit was 
inconsistent with good faith. See Aronstam Consumer Protection 169. 
84 Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173, referring to Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) 
Ltd 1977 (2) SA 436 (T) at 438. In Justinian’s system, the litis contestatio consisted in the statements made by the 
parties before the magistrate respecting the claim or demand, and the answer or defence to it. Afterwards, the 
cause was ready for hearing. In a more general sense, litis contestatio meant the contesting of the suit, or pleading 
the general issue. See definition of 'litis contestatio' in http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
litis+contestatio. 
85 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 145. 
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order to secure a judgement in his favour.86 It was an extensive defence which could be raised 
against any action which was ‘contra aequitatem naturalem’.87 As the formulary procedure 
was an obstacle for the affluent Rome and perceived as a burden for commercial transactions, 
it was abolished. All contracts were from then on recognised to be of good faith, so this defence 
fell away 88 because the judge was obliged to decide if the contract in question was negotiated 
and performed bona fides.89 The defendant was free to raise an exceptio doli on the grounds of 
fraud though.90 
2.1.2 Roman-Dutch law 
Despite the existence of the exceptio doli in Roman law, its existence in Roman-Dutch law has 
never been entirely clarified.91 Some authors suggest that the exceptio doli was applied in 
Roman-Dutch law, but only impliedly, namely as a requirement of good faith, which itself was 
a requisite of any contract.92 Others assert that the exceptio doli has never been received in 
Roman-Dutch law because no reference can be found in Roman-Dutch literature.93 Coetzee J 
stated in the Aris Enterprises case94 that the exceptio doli had already served its purpose by the 
time of Justinian and was no longer needed after that.95 The reason for the absence of references 
of the exceptio doli in Roman-Dutch literature could be that the parties had to perform their 
agreement in good faith.96 There was thus no need for a defence like the exceptio doli as the 
courts themselves could investigate whether the parties had concluded or fulfilled their contract 
in good faith.97 From the 12th century onwards, German nations tried to abolish all unnecessary 
                                                             
86 Aronstam Consumer Protection 169, Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173. 
87 Aronstam Consumer Protection 172. 
88 Glover 2007 SALJ 450. 
89 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 27. 
90 Van Zyl Roman law 385. 
91 Roman-Dutch law became the law of the land when Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape in 1652. Therefore, 
the principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda became the foundation of the South African law of 
contract (Pretorius 2004 THRHR 185). Roman-Dutch law, contrary to Roman law, treated every serious and 
deliberate agreement as a contract because of the influence of the canon law and the ius gentium (the law which 
applied to foreigners, i.e., non-Romans. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. ‘Römisches Recht’) and the 
traditional Germanic respect for the sanctity of promises. See also Christie Law of Contract (2006) 6-7 and 
Pretorius 2004 THRHR 182 who stresses the role of the Church in terms of the religiously required obligation to 
honour agreements. 
92 Aronstam Consumer Protection 173, Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173. See also Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 
150. 
93 Aronstam Consumer Protection 173, Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173, both  referring to Simon van Leeuwen, 
Johannes van der Linden, D G van der Keessel and Cornelius van Bynkershoek; Glover 2007 SALJ 450. 
94 Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 436 (T) – hereafter Aris 
Enterprises v Waterberg Koelkamers. See para 2.2.6 of this chapter. 
95 Aris Enterprises v Waterberg Koelkamers 437H-438A. Lewis (1990 SALJ 32) states that the exceptio doli fell 
away in the 4th century AD as there was no need for it as a special defence after the formulary system of procedure 
was replaced. 
96 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 12, Aronstam Consumer Protection 172. 
97 Aronstam Consumer Protection 172. 
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formalities. Instead, the consensus of the parties was considered the essential element of an 
agreement.98 Even though all contracts were regarded as bonae fidei, this principle was far 
from generally being accepted.99  
Despite the abovementioned differing viewpoints in terms of the question of whether the 
exceptio doli was part of Roman-Dutch law, it was applied by South African courts – within 
the principles of pacta sunt servanda and freedom of contract, which became the cornerstones 
of the South African law of contract100 – since the late 19th century.101 Unfortunately, its limits, 
scope of application and requisites varied from case to case.102  
2.2   The application of the exceptio doli generalis in South African law 
The Appellate Division assumed that the exceptio doli was available in modern law if otherwise 
the plaintiff’s remedies 'would cause some great inequity and would amount to unconscionable 
conduct on his part'.103 
The following court rulings provide examples of how inconsistently the judiciary applied the 
exceptio doli defence. 
2.2.1 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 
In the Weinerlein case,104 the court had to consider the nature and scope of the exceptio doli. 
According to the court, the exceptio doli could apply in cases where the enforcement of a right 
would cause some great inequity and would be tantamount to unconscionable conduct.105 
Wessels JA relied on passages from the works of Donellus106 and Vinnius.107 He argued that 
Donellus submitted that as a general proposition, a claim might be supported by a strict 
interpretation of the law,108 but as an exception, it cannot be supported in a case against a 
                                                             
98 Aronstam Consumer Protection 172. In Roman law, the consensus became more and more important, but not 
for all types of contract. See Pretorius 2004 THRHR 182. 
99 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 148. It seems that in France, in the Netherlands and in Germany, scholars of 
authority adhered to the distinction between contractus bonae fidei and stricti iuris until codification solved this 
question. 
100 Pretorius 2004 THRHR 185. 
101 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 27. 
102 See list of decisions in note supra and the list provided in Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 151. 
103 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 27, Aronstam Consumer Protection 181. 
104 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 285 – hereafter Weinerlein. In this case, the question was whether 
a contract of sale of land, which was required by statute to be in writing, could be rectified to reflect correctly the 
prior oral agreement of sale between the parties. 
105 Weinerlein 292, Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 173.  
106 Donellus De Jure Civ. bk 22 c. 6, n. 3, vol. 5 at 1509-10 
107 I 1.4.13. 
108 Donellus De Jure Civ. bk.23, cc.n.3, vol 5 1509-10. See Weinerlein 292. 
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particular adversary, where to do so would be inequitable and unjust. Otherwise, the party could 
put, under the cloak of the law, a fraudulent claim.109 
2.2.2 Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 
In the Zuurbekom case,110 Tindall JA held that 'it must be shown (as the very name exceptio 
doli indicates) that in the circumstances of the particular case the enforcement of the remedy 
in question [interdict] by the plaintiff would cause some great inequity and would amount to 
unconscionable conduct on his part.'111 Tindall J admitted though that he 'cannot profess to be 
clear as to the exact limits of the defence known as the exceptio doli.'112 
In the following years, the courts applied the exceptio doli by following especially the dicta of 
the Weinerlein and Zuurbekom cases.113 Nevertheless, the scope of the exceptio doli and the 
requisites of its application were still uncertain.  
2.2.3 North Vaal Mineral Co Ltd v Lovasz 
In North Vaal v Lovasz,114 Jansen J pointed out that the exceptio doli is not a substantive 
defence distinct from other legal principles but a result arrived at by the application of these 
other principles.115 He was of the opinion that the exceptio doli could usefully operate as a 
defence to a claim only when that claim had ‘run the gauntlet’ of the tests of error, fraud, duress 
or estoppel and had still survived. However, the exceptio doli could not be based upon what a 
particular court considered harsh, unfair, unjust or inequitable because this would have led to 
an equitable jurisdiction which the court does generally not possess.116 
                                                             
109 Weinerlein 292. 
110 Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (A) – hereafter Zuurbekom. 
111 Zuurbekom 537, Aronstam Consumer Protection 181. 
112 Zuurbekom 535. 
113 Aronstam Consumer Protection 175. 
114 North Vaal Mineral Co Ltd v Lovasz 1961 (3) SA 604 (T) – hereafter North Vaal v Lovasz. 
115 North Vaal v Lovasz 607F-G. Hawthorne/Thomas (1989 De Jure 151) are of the opinion that Jansen J did not 
doubt the existence of the exceptio doli in South African law, but rather criticised its scope of application.  
116 North Vaal v Lovasz 607H. Aronstam (Consumer Protection 176) points out that Tindall JA contradicts himself 
when stating that the exceptio doli only exists when inter alia the enforcement of a right would cause great inequity 
and the plaintiff’s conduct would amount to unconscionable conduct (608D). 
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2.2.4 Von Ziegler and Another v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 
In Von Ziegler,117 the court was of the opinion that the exceptio doli operates only within well-
known and defined limits such as fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, justifying rescission or 
rectification.118 
2.2.5 Paddock Motors v Igesund 
In Paddock Motors v Igesund119 Jansen JA somewhat restricted the scope of application of the 
exceptio doli. He stated that in modern law, all contracts were regarded as being bona fides and 
that the exceptio doli could not be utilised in order to alter the terms of a valid agreement 
concluded between the parties.120 He explained that uncertainty and scepticism existed in 
respect of seeing the exceptio doli as a separate substantive legal concept in modern law and 
that the precise limits of application of this defence have remained unclear.121 He suggests that 
the exceptio doli applies where a contract requires being in writing because it can be considered 
analogous to a negotium stricti iuris.122  
Aronstam criticised this restrictive interpretation. In his opinion, the exceptio doli was implied 
in the contract as an element of good faith. He argued that the field of operation of this 
institution had not been narrowed down, but it was unnecessary to expressly plead it because 
good faith was a requirement for the conclusion of a contract.123 What is more, he criticised the 
analogy between negotium stricti iuris and the contract required by law to be in writing. 
Although in both agreements, compliance with formalities is a prerequisite for their validity, 
in Roman law, formalities by themselves created the contract. On the other hand, in South 
African law, consensus is required as well.124 
2.2.6 Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 
Only in 1977, in the Aris Enterprise case,125 the question of whether the exceptio doli was part 
of South African law was raised for the first time. Coetzee J, as a single judge, argued that the 
exceptio doli was not part of the Roman-Dutch law, and that it had already served its purpose 
                                                             
117 Von Ziegler and Another v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 399 (T) – hereafter Von 
Ziegler. 
118 Von Ziegler 409D-E. 
119 Paddock Motors v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 – hereafter Paddock Motors v Igesund. 
120 Paddock Motors v Igesund 28E. 
121 Paddock Motors v Igesund 27G. 
122 Paddock Motors v Igesund 28D. 
123 Aronstam Consumer Protection 179. 
124 Aronstam Consumer Protection 179. 
125 Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 436 – hereafter Aris 
Enterprises v Waterberg Koelkamers. 
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by the time of Justinian and was no longer needed.126 After praising the benefits of the exceptio 
doli in Roman law, he states that 'in a fully developed system of law such an instrument has no 
meaningful raison d’être and is a superfluous anachronism.'127 However, Coetzee J was bound 
by the decision of the Full Bench in Otto en ‘n Ander,128 where the existence of the exceptio 
doli in South African law was assumed. 
2.2.7 Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 
Also in Rand Bank v Rubenstein,129 the court declared itself to be bound to accept the existence 
of the exceptio doli. In this case, the court applied the defence to a set of facts where the 
agreement in question was not unfair, but rather the attempt to apply it to a situation, which 
arose subsequently, and which was regarded as unfair.130 The facts of this case appeared to 
Botha J 'to be tailor-made for the application of the general defence of the exceptio doli.” 
Botha J stated that the application of broad considerations of fairness and justice was almost 
an everyday occurrence in a court of law. He held that if the bank had succeeded in converting 
the right acquired into a remedy in respect of a later unforeseen event, the outcome would 
undoubtedly be an injustice or inequity towards the defendant.131 
As has been shown above, despite the fact that the exceptio doli had been applied in numerous 
cases, there was great uncertainty about the exact requirements and its exact field of 
application. Viljoen correctly maintains that assuming the exceptio doli as a distinct and 
substantive defence would necessitate the determining of its limits, requisites and field of 
operation.132 However, the courts were never seizing the opportunity to define the limits and 
requirements for the application of the exceptio doli defence precisely. 
2.3   The abolition of the exceptio doli generalis by the Bank of Lisbon case 
The answer to the questions of whether the exceptio doli had its place in South African law, 
and if so, of whether it had to be qualified as a distinct legal defence, of whether it was part of 
                                                             
126 Aris Enterprises v Waterberg Koelkamers 437H-438A. 
127 Aris Enterprises v Waterberg Koelkamers 438A-B. 
128 Otto en ‘n Ander v Heymans 1971 (4) SA 148 (T). In this case, Marais J stated that the exceptio doli, though 
not sharply defined, is a remedy which will be granted to a party if the court believes that an impermissible 
injustice would otherwise result and that actual fraud is not a requisite or element of the exceptio doli (at 155). 
129 Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W) – hereafter Rand Bank v Rubenstein. In this case, Rand 
Bank attempted to use the suretyship for a purpose for which it was never intended by relying on the wide wording 
of the deed of suretyship. 
130 Van der Merwe/Lubbe/Van Huyssteen 1989 SALJ 236. 
131 Rand Bank v Rubenstein 215D-H. 
132 Viljoen 1981 De Rebus 174. 
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the element of bona fides, and of whether it was an equitable remedy giving the judge 
discretion, was given in the much-criticised Bank of Lisbon decision. 
2.3.1 The majority decision 
In the Bank of Lisbon case133 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held – by rejecting 
dicta of the three Appellate Division decisions on which reliance had often been placed in the 
past, favouring the recognition of the exceptio doli as binding134 – that the parties have to adhere 
to the terms of a (written) contract, and that they could not claim the exceptio doli generalis135 
because it was not part of South African law and therefore could not be used as a defence.136 
Joubert JA, after an extensive historical depiction of Roman law, argued that the exceptio doli 
was 'a superfluous, defunct anachronism' which had to be 'bur[ied]'.137 According to the judges, 
equity or the application of good faith could not override a clear rule of law, such as the pacta 
sunt servanda principle.  
2.3.2 The minority judgment by Jansen JA 
In the minority judgment, Jansen JA held that the principles of freedom of contract and pacta 
sunt servanda were not absolute and that the exceptio doli formed a substantive defence against 
contractual unfairness.138 In addition, the common law maintained the principle that it will not 
readily dissolve an agreement unless there are factors of public policy, such as fraud, duress or 
undue influence.139 
                                                             
133 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) – hereafter Bank of Lisbon. In this case, 
the respondents handed signed suretyships to the lender bank and passed mortgage bonds on their properties in 
order to secure overdraft facilities. After payment of the full amount of the loan, the respondents claimed the 
redelivery of all securities from the bank. Despite full payment of the loan, the bank refused the redelivery because 
it intended instituting a claim for damages against the respondents for breach of another contract between the 
parties. The Bank asserted that it was entitled in terms of the loan contract to retain the abovementioned securities. 
However, the respondents retorted that the conduct of the bank was contrary to the view of the society of what is 
right or wrong in the requirements of good faith. Therefore, the common-law remedy of the exceptio doli generalis 
would apply.  
134 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282; Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 1 SA 514 (A) 
and Paddock Motors (Pty) v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16 (A). 
135 In fact, the respondents (the applicants) raised the replicatio doli generalis, but as Jansen JA states at the 
beginning of his minority decision (611G), the underlying principles of this defence are the same as for the 
exceptio doli generalis. The difference between the two defences is that the exceptio doli is raised by the plaintiff 
rather than the defendant. See Lewis 1990 SALJ 27. 
136 Bank of Lisbon 617A-B. 
137 In order to emphasise the image of a ‘burial’ of the exceptio doli generalis, Joubert JA used the phrase 
‘Requiescat in pace’ (let it rest in peace) (607A-B). 
138 Bank of Lisbon 617F-G. 
139 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 168. 
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Jansen JA was of the view that the principles of the exceptio doli were part of the Roman law 
and were received in Roman-Dutch law.140 He feared that the abolition of the exceptio doli 
would leave a vacuum which the principle of good faith would not be able to fill entirely 
because it had not yet absorbed the principles of the exceptio doli, and the concept of contra 
bonos mores had not yet specifically been applied in this field.141  
2.3.3 Criticism 
The majority ruling was severely criticised by the legal fraternity 'for its positivist and overly 
scholarly method of historical reasoning'142 and regarded as an 'unfortunate judgment'143 as it 
lacked an in-depth discussion of general policy considerations or the responsibility of a court 
to ensure justice.144 Van der Merwe, Lubbe and Van Huyssteen legitimately pointed out that 
the majority decision, while accepting that contracts are bonae fidei, rejected the exceptio doli 
and at the same time denied that bona fides has developed to fulfil the function of the exceptio. 
They asked what then was the meaning and function of bona fides.145 Kerr opined that the 
statements in the Bank of Lisbon case about the absence of the exceptio doli in Roman law and 
Roman-Dutch law were incorrect and that those concerning modern law should be re-examined 
because the exceptio doli defence was available in South African law.146 What is more, the 
facts of the Bank of Lisbon had striking similarities with those of the Rand Bank147 case where 
the court in question decided that the facts of the case were ‘tailor-made’ for the general 
application of the exceptio doli.  
Despite the criticisms, in the following years, there was much uncertainty about the application 
of the exceptio doli, and litigants sought other ways on how to resist the enforcement of 
unconscionable contracts, e.g., by the use of principles such as good faith, public policy, boni 
mores and constitutional values.148   
                                                             
140 Bank of Lisbon 617E. 
141 Bank of Lisbon 616C. 
142 Christie Law of Contract (2006) 12. 
143 Domanski 1995 SALJ 165. 
144 Christie Law of Contract (2006) 12, Lewis 1990 SALJ 29. 
145 Van der Merwe/Lubbe/Van Huyssteen 1989 SALJ 241-242. 
146 Kerr 1991 SALJ 585, 586. 
147 Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W).  
148 Domanski 1995 SALJ 166, Forsyth/Pretorius 1993 SA Merc LJ 184, Glover 2007 SALJ 450. It seems that only 
Kerr defends the minority opinion of Jansen JA in terms of the exceptio doli’s right to exist (Kerr 2008 SALJ 241; 
1991 SALJ 583). The Constitutional Court was faced with an attempt to revive the exceptio doli for the first time 
in The Crown Restaurant CC v Gold Reef City Theme Park (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 16 (CC), but without success 
for the applicant. Lewis (1990 SALJ 29), referring to the Bank of Lisbon case, states that the exceptio doli had its 
merits as a device for the achievement of an equitable result in particular circumstances, i.e., the use of a contract 
for an end that was not intended when it was concluded. She underlines though the importance of ‘look[ing] 
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3. The principles of public policy and good faith 
Although the legal fraternity mourned somehow the abolition of the exceptio doli years after 
the Bank of Lisbon decision, all efforts to resuscitate it in subsequent rulings failed.149 It became 
clear that the existing principles to ensure a certain degree of fairness and reasonableness, like 
the principle that agreements must be obtained properly, the concept of legality, or the rules of 
interpretation, were not sufficient in order to ensure justice.150 One can argue with good reason 
though that the abolition of the exceptio doli was not to be lamented as 'the half-life of the 
exceptio doli from 1925 to 1988 showed it to be so entangled in its history that it was not a 
satisfactory instrument for modern courts to use'.151  
The Supreme Court of Appeal consistently held that the bona fides principle does not constitute 
an independent substantive ground that will allow a court to intervene in a contractual 
relationship. It therefore preferred a contextual, rather than a normative standard of bona fides. 
In other words, good faith operates only as an informing principle which shapes the nature and 
content of specific doctrines (such as public policy).152  In the years after the Lisbon case, 
public policy therefore assumed its role as a remedy in the law of contract.153  Public policy is 
the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, as manifested in public opinion 
at a particular time.154 This principle supersedes the pacta sunt servanda maxim if a contract 
is perceived as incompatible with general social norms and customs.  
The presentation of the following cases depicts the differing views and arguments in favour 
and against the different possibilities of how to fill the gap left by the exceptio doli. 
3.1   Magna Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis 
In Magna Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis155  the court had to deal with restraints of 
trade and established the principle that a restriction of trade is enforceable unless the court is 
convinced that it is unreasonable and contrary to public policy.156 Public policy is the general 
sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, as manifested in public opinion at a 
                                                             
forward rather than back’ and seeking for other solutions, such as a different approach to interpretation of 
contracts. 
149 Barnard 2006 Stell LR 394. 
150 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 274-275. 
151 Christie Law of Contract (2006) 13. 
152 Glover 2007 SALJ 451, Pretorius 2003 THRHR 643. 
153 Domanski 1995 SALJ 166. 
154 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 177, Christie Law of Contract (2006) 17. 
155 Magna Alloys & Research (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) – hereafter Magna Alloys. 
156 A restraint of trade is an agreement by which someone is restricted in its freedom to carry on its trade, 
profession, business or other economic activity. See Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 183. 
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particular time.157 The court held that restraints of trade are to be treated like other contract 
terms. They are therefore are enforceable, except where they are contrary to public interest. 
However, freedom of contract is, according to this decision, the principle.158 In order to 
determine if a restraint of trade is contrary to public interest, one has to enquire about the 
reasonableness of the restraint. This is done first, according to the court, by assessing if it is 
reasonable or not for the parties (inter partes). If so, this is an indication that it could also be 
reasonable or not in terms of public interest. Factors to be considered for the determination of 
reasonableness are, among others, the nature and the period of the restricted activity, and the 
particular interests.159  
3.2   Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 
In the Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes160 case, the court held that it had the power to refuse the 
enforcement of contracts that were against public policy or contrary to good morals (‘bonos 
mores’). In order to define the term ‘public policy’, the courts took several considerations into 
account. Smalberger JA pointed out that agreements which are clearly adverse to the interests 
of the community because they are contrary to law or morality or to social or economic 
expedience will not be enforced on the grounds of public policy.161 He argued that public policy 
should adequately consider the doing of simple justice between man and man.162 Nonetheless, 
he held that the power of the court to declare agreements contrary to public policy should be 
exercised sparingly and only if there is no doubt. In his opinion, a contract is not necessarily 
contrary to public policy because it offends one’s personal sense of propriety and fairness.163  
Although the decision was silent about good faith, one can interpret the court’s ruling as 
allowing this principle to reassert its influence indirectly through the requirement of legality.164 
Smalberger JA’s approach to weighing the pacta sunt servanda principle against 'simple justice 
between man and man' was criticised as being too imprecise and only one of several 
                                                             
157 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 177, Christie Law of Contract (2006) 17. 
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159 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 186. See Magna Alloys & Research (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd 
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163 Sasfin v Beukes para [12]. 
164 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 28. 
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considerations in order to determine public interest, like inequality of bargaining power and 
the nature and ambit of the obligations involved.165 
3.3   Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 
The first case which revived the concept of good faith was Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike 
Afrika Bpk v Saayman.166  
Olivier JA based his decision on the principle of good faith and opined that the contract was 
concluded in a manner which was against the bona fides principle.167 He submitted that bona 
fides should be applied to all agreements because public policy would require so. Although he 
underlined the close link between bona fides and public policy, he saw this principle more as 
an independent basis for repealing an agreement.168 He stated that it was the function of bona 
fides to give expression to the community’s sense of what is fair, just and reasonable.169 
The Saayman case is remarkable because it underlines the role of the principle of good faith in 
South African contract law. Olivier JA made use of this principle not in order to declare invalid 
an unfair contractual term, but because he found that the bank had not acted in good faith during 
the conclusion of the contract, a suretyship. What is more, it was the first time that the principle 
of good faith was mentioned to entitle a party to rescind a contract in circumstances where 
actions based on misrepresentation, duress and undue influence could not be used.170  
Van der Merwe believes that the principle of good faith would seem to be particularly 
appropriate to ensure substantive justice.171 
3.4   Brisley v Drotsky 
In Brisley v Drotsky172 though, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not follow the arguments 
brought forward by Olivier JA in the Saayman case. According to the SCA, the principle of 
                                                             
165 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 189. 
166 Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Beperk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) – hereafter Saayman. 
In this case, a frail, 85 year old woman had signed a suretyship in favour of a company owned by her son. In his 
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172 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) – hereafter Brisley v Drotsky. 
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good faith is not a principle capable of independent application ('free-floating'), but an 
underlying value informing the rules and principles of the law of contract.173 For this reason, 
the principle of good faith cannot directly nullify an otherwise valid contractual provision or 
its enforcement.174 In other words, good faith operates only as an informing principle which 
shapes the nature and content of specific doctrines, such as public policy.175  Therefore, the test 
is if the clause in question is contrary to public interest, and not if its enforcement would be 
contrary to good faith. Unfairness is thus a component for determining if a clause is against 
public policy. Public policy is entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996176 and the 
values that it enshrines,177 like human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.178 The court accepted good faith as a fundamental 
principle of the law of contract which is expressed in the specific rules and principles.179 
The court’s rationale was heavily based on Hutchison’s discussion180 on the Shifren principle181 
according to which a non-variation clause is of force and effect unless the parties agreed in 
writing to depart from specific clauses of their contract.182 In his article, Hutchison also 
suggests that the principle of good faith is not ‘free-floating’, and that its direct application of 
this maxim would amount to a resurrection of the exceptio doli.183 In his view, good faith is 
rather a concept with a creative, controlling and legitimating function which operates indirectly 
through other rules and doctrines.184 
3.5   Safcol v York Timbers 
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Appeal gave judgment in the matter between South African 
Forestry Co Ltd ('Safcol') and York Timbers Ltd.185  
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21 (SCA) at 40H-41A. 
174 Pretorius 2003 THRHR 643. 
175 Glover 2007 SALJ 451, Pretorius 2003 THRHR 643. 
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178 See Art 1 of the Constitution. 
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185 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) - hereafter Safcol v York Timbers. 
In terms of two contracts which were concluded more than 30 years ago, Safcol was obliged to supply York with 
saw logs at stipulated prices. According to the contracts, the parties could seek a revision of the stipulated prices 
in the future. If the parties were unable to reach agreement on the new prices, the party seeking revision could 
approach the Minister of Forestry. If the Minister was of the view that an agreement was not possible, the matter 
could be referred to arbitration. Over many years, York had however frustrated Safcol's attempts to approach the 
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In this case, it had to be decided whether York Timbers had breached the contract concluded 
with Safcol by its various attempts to avoid any price increase by frustrating Safcol’s attempts 
to approach the Minister, and consequently to refer the dispute to arbitration.  
Safcol argued that the implied terms imposed an obligation on York Timbers to act in 
accordance with the dictates of reasonableness, fairness and good faith when Safcol exercised 
its rights with regard to the price revision clauses of the contract.186 York Timbers upheld that 
these contentions were in conflict with Brisley v Drotsky187 and Afrox Healthcare Bpd v 
Strydom.188 In these cases, the SCA held that these values do not constitute independent 
substantive rules that courts can employ to intervene in contractual relationships.189 Hence, the 
court rejected Safcol’s argument as being contrary to its previous rulings.190  
However, the court held that 
'[w]hile a court is not entitled to superimpose on the clearly expressed intention of the 
parties its notion of fairness, the position is different when a contract is ambiguous. In 
such a case, the principle that all contracts are governed by good faith is applied and 
the intention of the parties is determined on the basis that they negotiated with one 
another in good faith.'191 
This means that the court will seek an equitable interpretation in order to find out the parties’ 
intention where the wording of an agreement is ambiguous.192 
4. Constitutional aspects 
4.1   Barkhuizen v Napier 
In Barkhuizen v Napier,193 a decision awaited with suspense because of the constant theoretical 
tension about the influence of the Constitution on contract law,194 the Constitutional Court had 
to decide if a time-limitation clause in a short-term insurance policy was constitutional in terms 
of section 34 of the Constitution which grants the right to access to the courts. The clause 
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increase agreed upon was in 1994. While other sawmills, which were also supplied by Safcol, paid a price increase 
every year between 1994 and 1998, York was still paying 1994 prices.  
186 Safcol v York Timbers at [26]. 
187 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
188 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA). 
189 Safcol v York Timbers at [27]. See also discussion on Brisley v Drotsky, para 3.4 above. 
190 Safcol v York Timbers at [31] 
191 Safcol v York Timbers at [32] 
192 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
193 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007(5) SA 323 (CC) – hereafter Barkhuizen v Napier. 
194 Glover 2007 SALJ 453. 
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prevented an insured claimant from legal action if summons was not served on the insurance 
company within the time limits set out in the provision.  
The court based its decision on the considerations of reasonableness and fairness. To determine 
‘fairness’ the court held that first, one has to ask whether the clause itself is unreasonable. If it 
is reasonable, one has to ask in a second step whether one should enforce it in the light of the 
circumstances of the particular case which prevented compliance with the clause.195 According 
to the court, the reasonableness of a clause has to be determined by weighing-up public policy 
on the one hand, which requires that parties are generally bound to the pacta sunt servanda 
principle, and the specific fundamental right involved in a case, on the other. In the present 
case, this was the right to seek judicial redress.196 The court held that the pacta sunt servanda 
maxim could be mitigated if the implementation of certain clauses would result in unfairness 
or would be unreasonable for being contrary to public policy.197 According to Ngcobo J, 
unequal bargaining power is a factor, which alongside other factors, plays a role in the 
consideration of public policy. This especially applies in a society as unequal as the South 
African.198 The court held that the application of the pacta sunt servanda principle is subject 
to constitutional control.199 Thus, the courts have to 'employ [the Constitution’s] values to 
achieve a balance that strikes down the unacceptable excesses of freedom of contract, while 
seeking to permit individuals the dignity and autonomy of regulating their own lives.'200 
In the following, academia commented on Barkhuizen v Napier. The question was how this 
case would have to be interpreted for subsequent cases. Glover, Kerr and Sutherland even 
discussed a resurrection of the exceptio doli.  
Although the Constitutional Court did not mention the exceptio doli, Glover201 considered the 
exceptio doli being back for different reasons. First, he saw a congruence between the 
Constitutional Court’s formulation of the defence and the formulation of the exceptio doli in 
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other cases, like Weinerlein202 and Zuurbekom.203 Second, in his opinion, the role the majority 
in Barkhuizen v Napier conferred to the good faith principle would be in favour of the exceptio 
doli. Lastly, the advantage of the possibility to use the jurisprudence of the cases which dealt 
with the exceptio doli would provide greater clarity about the criteria for this defence in the 
future.204 Glover himself admits the weakness of these arguments though, and that the 
Constitutional Court chose rather public policy than the exceptio doli in order to determine the 
reasonableness of a specific clause, and that good faith will be a principle embedded in the 
principle of public policy.205 
Kerr206 found it remarkable that despite the discussions of public policy, fairness, 
reasonableness and simple justice in the Barkhuizen v Napier case no reference was made to 
the exceptio doli.207 He stated that the majority of the Barkhuizen v Napier case did not refer 
to the known common-law principles or develop any existing principles. Instead, the majority 
merely concentrated on underlying constitutional values and the facilitation of a broader field 
of operation of these values.208 On grounds of the Constitutional Court’s reference to ‘fairness’ 
and ‘unfairness’ he suggested instead a ‘defence on unfair conduct (at the time action is 
brought)’ – which is, it is suggested, nothing else but a periphrasis for the exceptio doli – instead 
of the application of public policy in the light of constitutional considerations.209 This would 
have the advantage that the courts had not to identify public policy and that the contract may 
continue in a reasonably modified form instead of being terminated.210  
This interpretation as to a resurrection of the exceptio doli defence seemed to be confirmed by 
Bredenkamp and Others v Standard Bank of South Africa211 where the High Court granted an 
interim interdict. In this case, the plaintiffs and later appellants sought relief against the bank’s 
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enforcement of its right to cancel their accounts because such cancellation was unfair and 
invalid for being unconstitutional.212 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that Barkhuizen v Napier213 was authority for 
the proposition that a party could not impose a term on another party, where the provision 
would operate unfairly, and that a clause could not be enforced in an unfair manner.214 It 
rejected however the idea of an overarching requirement of fairness in the law of contract and 
stated that fairness was not a free-standing requirement for the exertion of a contractual right.215  
Sutherland216 emphasises the importance of Barkhuizen v Napier because of the central role 
the Constitution plays when interpreting concepts such as public policy. In his opinion, the 
Constitution can serve as an essential promotor for reform of contract law, and it is central to 
ensure the harmony of legislative projects.217 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld this jurisdiction. In Maphango v 
Aengus Lifestyle Properties, it held that  
'(…) a court cannot refuse to give effect to the implementation of a contract simply 
because that implementation is regarded by the individual judge to be unreasonable and 
unfair.'218 
In this case, the court nonetheless assessed whether the cancellation of the agreements was 
unreasonable and unfair.219 
In African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC,220 the same 
court held that  
'(…) our Constitution and its value system does not confer on judges a general 
jurisdiction to declare contracts invalid on the basis of their subjective perceptions of 
fairness or on grounds of imprecise notions of good faith.'221 
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The question is how this jurisprudence is compatible with Barkhuizen v Napier, according to 
which public policy precludes the enforcement of unfair contractual provisions. Hutchison 
believes that one must read this case in context. Only where constitutional values and principles 
are at stake – here the constitutional right of access to the courts – the question of fairness or 
reasonableness becomes relevant.222 
It is not entirely clear whether the Constitutional Court will agree with such a limited role of 
considerations of contractual fairness because in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,223 the court put forward the central role of good faith in South 
African contract law and the desirability of taking constitutional values, such as Ubuntu – 
which includes the ideas of humanness, social justice and fairness – into account within the 
law of contract.224 
4.2   Views on the development of the case law 
Nowadays, it would be idle to discuss whether the Bank of Lisbon decision was right or not 
because the legislator has intervened in the meantime. Instead of ‘abolishing’ the exceptio doli 
entirely (those who opine that this defence never was part of South African law would say that 
there was nothing to abolish), the courts could have used their liberty to extend its availability 
in South African law.225 However, they never did that. Based on the overview of case law 
above, it becomes clear that the courts applied the principles of public policy and good faith 
inconsistently, without developing a homogeneous jurisprudence.226 Christie suggests that the 
concept of public policy is a sufficiently flexible and tested concept to achieve the outcomes 
which could be achieved by the bonos mores concept, but in a more predictable way.227 
Unfortunately, the courts never developed this concept sufficiently either.228 Domanski calls 
public policy 'a somewhat nebulous and arbitrary defence, whose boundaries are not clearly 
                                                             
222 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 32. 
223 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) – hereafter Everfresh 
v Shoprite. 
224 Everfresh v Shoprite para [71]. 
225 Lambiris 1988 SALJ 647. 
226 Aronstam (Consumer Protection 182) makes an interesting suggestion in that the principles of duress, undue 
influence, error, fraud and estoppel are all based on a common principle, i.e., ‘inequality of bargaining power’. 
Therefore, the courts could have developed applied considerations of equity to deal with harsh and unconscionable 
contracts and regulate contracts on the basis of these principles. 
227 Christie Law of Contract (2006) 17. 
228 A further development of the concept of public policy would have had the advantage that no comparative law 
considerations would have been necessary, as it is internationally recognized that the notion of public policy is 
defined by each country. See Art V 2 (b) Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards 1958 and Art 36 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985. 
 35   
 
defined.'229 After all, it is generally accepted that a judge is more than a bouche de la loi, as 
Hawthorne and Thomas point out, and that finding the law forms an essential part of the 
judiciary’s task.230 The same applies to the concept of good faith which is, according to Van 
der Merwe, an appropriate principle which has to be developed in order to ensure substantive 
justice.231 Forsyth and Pretorius submit (in the context of a surety) that the requirement of boni 
mores has been applied to provide a perhaps unsuitable defence and that its limits are at least 
as uncertain and unpredictable as the exceptio doli.232 Unfortunately, jurisprudence did not 
develop – as Lewis and other authors had hoped – any doctrine of unconscionability in order 
to strike down contracts that operate harshly against a party on the ground that they are contra 
bonos mores. To some extent, this would have ameliorated the problem resulting from the Bank 
of Lisbon ruling that South African courts had no equitable jurisdiction.233  
Legal intervention would probably have been superfluous if the courts had constructively 
developed the abovementioned principles. As this did not happen, legislation was inevitable 
and necessary. 
5. The Consumer Protection Act 
Having the abovementioned development without any doubt in mind, the Law Commission 
recognised in its report the 'need to legislate against contractual unfairness, unreasonableness, 
unconscionability or oppressiveness in all contractual phases',234 i.e., the coming into existence 
of a contract, its execution and its enforcement. The Law Commission was of the opinion that 
the issue of unfair contracts or terms had to be addressed 'in a more fundamental and less 
fragmentary way than ad hoc reform to specific Acts',235 and that although voluntary codes of 
conduct should be encouraged, they could not replace proper legislation.236 In its report, the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) conducted research that also implied an international 
legislative comparison and benchmarking study including various countries. 
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The guidelines published in this report were harshly criticised. Some writers feared that the 
proposed legislation would open the doors for a paternalistic approach, even though the 
common law provided the courts with the principles needed to encounter unfairness.237 This 
criticism concerned the making of a contract, unfair agreements and contract terms and the 
enforcement of them. With respect to the making of a contract, the critics brought forward that 
the common law already curbed unfairness in the case of misrepresentation and fraud, duress, 
undue influence, mistake, illegality and unenforceability. Even inequality of bargaining power 
could be tackled by the common law by developing it further because rules relating to duress 
were not cast in stone and could be extended further by the judiciary.238 As to unfair contracts 
and contract terms, the critics argued that under common law, and even during the application 
of the exceptio doli generalis, the basis of the law of contract was to enforce terms or 
agreements upon which the parties had agreed. Any intervention by the courts would be 
paternalistic, jeopardise the parties’ freedom of contract and be inconsistent with the historical 
development of South African contract law. According to this argumentation, the pacta sunt 
servanda principle already had been mitigated by common law in the case of unreasonable 
restraints of trade, or unreasonable terms in a contract that was signed without being read.239 
Otherwise, every agreement could be challenged in a later stage. This would harm the conduct 
of business, personal trust and the persons’ respect for the law.240 In respect of unfair 
enforcement of contracts, the classical sphere of the ‘late’ exceptio doli, the critics admitted 
that the common law did not have this situation under control. Nonetheless, some authors 
suggested other solutions than legislative intervention, like relaxing the rules for the 
construction of contracts by allowing evidence of surrounding circumstances in order to 
investigate the parties’ real intentions,241 or relying on the courts' discretionary power to refuse 
an order of specific performance.242  
With respect to the allegations above, it is submitted that the contrary is true: Not a well-defined 
legal framework has a negative impact on business and personal trust, but legal uncertainty and 
missing mechanisms to assure general fairness. What is more, the solution suggested in terms 
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of the unfair enforcement of contracts, such as more flexible rules for the interpretation of 
contracts, is certainly a reasonable approach, but hardly sufficient. 
In its Draft Green paper of 2004,243 the DTI finally proposed that general provisions against 
unfair contracts be inserted into consumer law rather than enacting separate unfair contracts 
legislation. The objective of such a law should be to establish the rights and responsibilities of 
the parties, to promote the use of plain language in consumer agreements and to give examples 
of unfair contract provisions through guidelines that build on international precedents.244 The 
Law Commission recognised that South Africa would become the exception, with a deficient 
law of contracts in comparison to countries which recognise and require compliance with the 
principle of good faith in contracts.245 The Draft Green Paper indicated that many countries, 
also in Africa, had adopted a rights-based approach to consumer protection and recommended 
the implementation of a comprehensive consumer protection regime as well as the creation of 
an infrastructure for the regulation of the consumer goods and services market.246 
Existing consumer protection provisions were fragmented, outdated and often incorporated in 
legislation that was merely incidental with the protection of consumers. In addition, as South 
Africa had become a democratic state, the values reflected in the existing legislation were no 
longer applicable, especially at the expense of consumers and small businesses. General rules 
of law regulating the most basic consumer rights of information, disclosure, fairness and 
transparency, for instance, did not exist. Discriminatory conduct and unfair market practices 
were hence a daily – and unsanctioned – occurrence.247  
In 2006, the draft Consumer Protection Bill was published for public comment. It was 
extensively revised after the consideration of many submissions.248 
This Bill was published together with a Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer 
Protection Bill in 2008.249 According to this Memorandum, '[c]urrently contracts are regulated 
in terms of the common law. The Bill aims to codify and improve on the common law by 
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addressing unfair contract terms and provide consumers with remedies in the case of breach of 
contract.'250 
As consumer protection is part of the functional areas of concurrent national and provincial 
legislative competence,251 the procedure prescribed in section 76(1), (2) of the Constitution had 
to be observed. In order to ensure a broad agreement on the Bill and to deal with potential 
constitutional concerns, initial consultation was conducted with provinces before the 
parliamentary procedure.252 
The Consumer Protection Act 69 of 2008 was signed into law on 24 April 2009. Most of its 
provisions, such as the regulations containing a list of terms that are presumed to be unfair,253 
took effect on 1 April 2011.254 
Under section 121, the Act repeals parts of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1941,255 the Business 
Names Act of 1960,256 the Price Control Act 1964,257 the Sale and Service Matters Act of 
1964258 and the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices Act) of 1988.259 On the other 
hand, other important statutes have not been repealed,260 like the National Credit Act of 
2005,261 the Long-Term Insurance Act of 1998,262 the Short-Term Insurance Act of 1998263 
and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 2002.264 
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The Consumer Protection Act regulates unfairness in contracts and constitutes the legislature’s 
first general intervention by introducing a comprehensive legal framework dealing with 
unfairness for judicial evaluation of consumer to business contracts.265  
Chapter 2 of Part G of the Act deals with the right to fair, just and reasonable terms and 
conditions. Its title is somewhat misleading though, since Chapter 2 Part G has a much broader 
scope of application than terms and conditions. Under the Act, the courts have now the ability 
to consider any factors that might be helpful while determining whether standard provisions 
are fair.266 A court has now the discretion to make any order that it considers just and reasonable 
in the circumstances.267 
The Act implicitly prohibits unfair conduct during the negotiation phase. Especially in the 
South African context, where a large part of the population is illiterate or almost illiterate and 
inexperienced in business matters, legislative intervention in this field was of utmost 
importance. After all, terms and conditions are the basis of nearly every transaction. It is 
suggested that there is a psychological effect both on consumers and on businesses: Consumers 
are more aware of their rights and will ultimately conduct more self-confidently, and businesses 
are constrained to change their policies and review their standard terms. Having also in mind 
that South Africa has eleven official languages, and that there will always be a different 
understanding in a particular language and within various contexts, the courts will probably 
consult international law too.268 In numerous civil law countries, such as Germany,269 the 
codification of consumer protection rules is the norm. Despite the codification of this regime, 
the courts have the needed flexibility to interpret standard terms from case to case. 
Furthermore, the object of the court is the application and, where necessary, the development 
of the law in order to achieve justice. Therefore, a generalising approach is necessary, where 
values or principles such as ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ are a given concrete content when 
applied in a particular case. One therefore must distinguish between the application of certain 
common-law mechanisms on the one hand, and the application of 'open' terms, on the other. 
When common-law mechanisms are applied in order to avoid unjust outcomes, like the 
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exceptio doli and the principles of good faith and public policy, there is the problem that these 
concepts are somehow imprecise as the judiciary did not define their nature, foundation and 
exact scope of application, especially with regard to the exceptio doli generalis. On the other 
hand, ‘open’ terms like ‘fairness’, ‘conscionableness’ and ‘reasonableness’ have to be given a 
concrete meaning on a case-to-case basis within a well-defined legal framework. In this 
context, some of the abovementioned cases, where the principles of public policy and good 
faith have been applied (albeit not homogeneously) might be helpful in that respect. It remains 
to be seen how the courts give a meaning to these terms. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Without any doubt, the application of the principle of freedom of contract to standard term 
contracts is theoretical because in reality, the parties do not have equal bargaining power and 
autonomy. Consumers are often confronted with a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ situation, and the 
transaction costs for comparing different standard provisions are too high.  
The strict application of the principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda resulted 
in often unfair outcomes, especially for the consumer. In order to mitigate unfair results, the 
exceptio doli defence was applied in South African law from the late 19th century. This defence 
had been created in Roman law and served as an equitable defence for the plaintiff when he or 
she argued that the enforcement of the contract in question was unconscionable. Despite its 
application in South Africa, many authors contested the reception, and consequently, the 
existence of the exceptio doli in Roman-Dutch law.  
As we have seen, over the years, the courts applied this defence without precisely defining its 
very nature, scope and application. The courts never came further than applying it in 
circumstances where the enforcement of a right would cause great inequity and would be 
tantamount to unconscionable conduct. It was also applied as a ‘default’ defence, when error, 
fraud, duress or estoppel did not apply, or within defined limits such as fraud, misrepresentation 
or mistake. In another case, the exceptio doli was only applied in the context of written contracts 
and considered analogous to a negotium stricti iuris. In the famous Rand Bank v Rubenstein 
decision, the court applied the exceptio doli directly to the agreement, but to a situation which 
came into being after the conclusion of the contract that was considered unfair. 
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The incoherent application of the exceptio doli defence came suddenly to an end in 1988 with 
the very criticised Bank of Lisbon decision where it was held that this defence, despite its 
former application, was not part of South African law and had to be 'bur[ried]'.  
Regrettably, the mechanisms developed by case law after the abolition of the exceptio doli, 
such as the principles of public policy and good faith, as well as the consideration of 
constitutional aspects, did not lead to a homogeneous case law. Although the courts had 
numerous opportunities to create and define an overarching concept of ‘fairness’ or ‘equity’ in 
contract law, they let pass them. Almost no attention was paid to fairness during the negotiation 
of a contract, and only three instances were formally recognised in which contracts may be 
rescinded for procedural unfairness: misrepresentation (or fraud), duress and undue influence. 
These were not sufficient to ensure fairness in other circumstances, however. 
According to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the bona fides principle is not an independent 
substantive ground that will allow a court to intervene in a contractual relationship. It therefore 
preferred a contextual, rather than a normative bona fides standard. Good faith would thus only 
operate as an informing principle with regard to specific doctrines, such as public policy.  In 
the years after the Lisbon case, public policy therefore assumed its role as a remedy in contract 
law that supersedes the pacta sunt servanda maxim.  
When enquiring whether a contractual term or the enforcement of a contract was against public 
policy, the courts applied a reasonableness test. Factors taken into account for this test were, 
e.g., the nature and the period of the restricted activity (in the case of restraints of trade), the 
particular interest and those of the community, the compliance with legal requirements, or 
social or economic expedience. The notion of simple justice between man and man played a 
crucial role in this context. 
While the close link between public policy and good faith was admitted, in the Saayman 
decision, the SCA saw the principle of good faith more as an independent basis for repealing a 
contract. In Brisley v Drotsky, however, the court held that the principle of good faith was not 
‘free-floating’, but only informing other principles of the law of contract. In Safcol v York 
Timbers, it was stated that in a case where a contractual term is ambiguous, the principle that 
contracts are governed by good faith can be applied, and the intention of the parties can be 
determined on the basis that they have negotiated in good faith. 
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Finally, in Barkhuizen v Napier, the Constitutional Court gave an answer to the Constitution’s 
influence on contract law and linked public policy considerations with specific fundamental 
rights. Constitutional values, such as Ubuntu, also play an essential role. Besides, the court 
held that the pacta sunt servanda maxim is subject to constitutional control. The Constitution 
is seen as a promotor for reform of contract law and as central to ensure harmony of legislation. 
A consequence of this inconsistent case law was that the legislator intervened more 
fundamentally by enacting the Consumer Protection Act which aims the consumer’s protection 
in all contractual phases. In the forefront, some authors criticised legislative intervention for 
fear of a ‘paternalistic’ approach which would jeopardise the principle of freedom of contract, 
or that case law (sic) could be a better solution. Others suggested more flexible rules for the 
construction of contracts. The case law would not have been a solution because in decades, no 
equity jurisprudence had been developed, and the other suggested solutions were insufficient. 
Despite this criticism, the Law Commission recognised that South African consumer protection 
was far behind international standards and developments.  
The Consumer Protection Act introduces a comprehensive legal framework dealing with 
unfairness. Sections 48 to 52 deal with unfair terms and conditions. The courts can now 
consider any factors while determining whether standard terms are unfair, and have the 
discretion to make any order that it considers just and reasonable in the circumstances. 
The Consumer Protection Act is a game-changer considering the South African context with 
many different cultures and millions of inexperienced and formerly discriminated consumers. 
Open concepts such as ‘fairness’ and ‘reasonableness’ give the courts the flexibility needed in 
order to find a just outcome for each case. 
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CHAPTER 2 – APPLICATION OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT AND 
INCORPORATION OF CONTRACT TERMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In order that the Consumer Protection Act applies, the contract terms must be incorporated, 
that is included in such a way that the courts recognise them as valid. This is done by threshold 
requirements that must be met in order to consider them as part of the contract.270 Inversely, 
provisions that have not been incorporated in the contract are considered not written. 
Unfortunately, the Act in general, and sections 48 to 52 in particular, are not structured 
logically.271 Usually, the enquiry of standard terms may typically272 be divided into three main 
categories. These are incorporation control, content control (or ‘substantive control’) and 
interpretation control.273 
In order to enjoy the protection of sections 48 to 52, one has therefore to examine first whether 
the terms in question fall under the ambit of the Act. This so-called ‘incorporation test’ consists 
of the question of whether the standard provisions fall under the scope of application of the 
Act, and whether other conditions required by the Act have been met in order to incorporate 
them into the contract. 
As mentioned above, Part G of Chapter 2 is not structured logically, and provisions pertaining 
to the incorporation of contract terms and those concerning content control are presented in an 
unstructured way. Section 48 contains the general prohibition against unfair terms and 
conditions and thus refers to content control. Section 49 concerns formal requirements for the 
incorporation of specific terms, such as plain language and signing or initialling. Section 50 
requires that written contracts be written in plain language and contain an itemised breakdown 
of the consumer’s financial obligations, which are formal requirements as well. On the other 
hand, section 51 provides a list of prohibited terms and therefore refers to the content control. 
For the sake of a better understanding, these provisions will be presented and examined in a 
more structured way. 
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First, the scope of application of the Act will be examined in order to determine in which 
instances this statute actually applies. Then, other requirements, such as notices required for 
certain terms and conditions and written consumer agreements will be discussed in detail. The 
requirements set out in these provisions must be met in order to include the terms and 
conditions into the contract. 
1.  The application of the Consumer Protection Act and interaction with other norms 
As discussed above,274 the Act does not repeal all statutes related to consumer protection.275 
What is more, under section 2(8), other legislation applies in conjunction with the Act.276 If 
there is any inconsistency between a provision of the Consumer Protection Act and a provision 
of such a statute, the provision of both acts apply concurrently, to the extent that it is possible 
to apply and comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without contravening the 
second.277 Although the Act is relatively comprehensive in terms of consumer protection, it is 
not an overarching consumer protection statute. 
That is because according to section 2(10), consumers still have the right to rely on rights they 
may have under the common law. Because of the common-law principle of freedom of 
contract, the parties can exclude most of the residual rules of the common law of contract by 
agreement.278 This applies, for instance, to so-called exemption clauses which exclude or limit 
the liability of a party, e.g., for misrepresentation or breach of contract, or to voetstoots clauses 
excluding the seller’s liability for latent defects in the thing sold.279 On the other hand, and 
contrary to common law, the Act mostly affords rights that cannot be derogated, alienated or 
waived by the consumer. Hence, the Act grants a higher level of protection to consumers. 
Although the courts have developed some principles to strike down unfair exemption 
clauses,280 in most cases, the consumer will therefore rather refer to the Act’s protection than 
to common-law rules. 
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Section 69(d) provides that a consumer may seek to enforce any rights in terms of the Act, by 
approaching a court with jurisdiction over the matter, if all other remedies available to that 
person in terms of national legislation have been exhausted. The argument can be made that a 
consumer who has rights in terms of the common law and the Act must first exhaust the dispute-
resolution process regulated in the Act before addressing common-law courts. This argument 
is contrary to section 2(1) though, according to which the Act must not be interpreted in a way 
that would preclude the consumer from exercising a common-law right. Hence, the consumer 
should have the freedom of choice as regards the applicable dispute-resolution mechanism. 
In the following, the mechanisms according to which the Act applies will be further examined. 
2. Scope of application of the Consumer Protection Act 
As Part G of Chapter 2 of the Consumer Protection Act contains no special provisions 
concerning its scope of application, sections 5 and 6 apply. 
2.1 Territorial scope of application 
In terms of section 5(1), the Act applies to transactions for the promotion, the supply of goods 
or services and the goods and services themselves, occurring within South Africa unless one 
of the exceptions of subsection (2) apply, or the application is exempted under subsections (3) 
and (4).  
The scope of ‘occurring within the Republic’ is unclear as other statutes, like the National 
Credit Act, use the formulation 'having effect within South Africa', which is not used in the 
Consumer Protection Act at all. The DTI’s Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy 
Framework281 does not explicitly mention the territorial scope of application of the Act and 
does therefore not use any of the earlier mentioned formulations. Instead, it refers generally to 
'South Africa'. According to the Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection 
Bill282 '[t]he Bill will apply to most transactions in the ordinary course of business between 
parties within the Republic'. The National Credit Act uses the phrase 'having effect within (the 
Republic)' only once, and in the same sentence with 'within the Republic' (section 4(a)). 
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282 Point 3.2 at 82. 
 46   
 
Otherwise, the formulation 'within the Republic' is used throughout the entire National Credit 
Act.283 
The formulation 'within the Republic' is also used in section 1 for the definition of ‘producer’ 
as well as in sections 5(1)(a), (b) and 5(5). In addition, it is used in Schedule 1 ('Amendment 
of laws') with regard to section 126A(5)(b) of the National Credit Act. This has clearly practical 
reasons as this provision deals with 'a computer programme originating within the Republic'. 
The formulation 'having effect within' would have made no sense here. The same applies to 
sections 4(4)(a) ('principal office within'), 11(4)(d) ('area within') and 50(1) NCA ('activity at 
any place within'). Section 16(1)(c) NCA ('consumer credit activity within') is no exception as 
it would be difficult for the National Credit Regulator to monitor socio-economic patterns 
outside the Republic.  
At first glance, the fundamental difference between 'within (South Africa)' and 'having effect 
in (South Africa)' seems to be that in the first case the parties have both to be physically present 
in South Africa for the conclusion of the transaction, whereas in the second case they may 
conclude their transaction while one or all parties to the contract might be outside South Africa, 
even though the transaction produces legal effects in South Africa.  
This could mean that the scope of application of the Act is narrower than the one of the National 
Credit Act as it applies only in instances where all parties are physically present in South Africa 
when entering into an agreement. Such a construction would have significant consequences for 
businesses having their place of business or headquarters outside of South Africa.  
Under section 5(8)(a), the Act applies irrespective of whether the supplier resides or has its 
principal office within or outside South Africa, however. In such cases, questions of 
international private law concerning the choice of law and the enforcement arise. 
Furthermore, this begs the question when a transaction within the Republic ‘occurs’ as 
‘transaction’ includes the agreement itself as well as the delivery of goods and the performance 
of services.284 In other words, the transaction can ‘occur’ several times. If, for instance, a sales 
contract has been concluded outside South Africa but the delivery of the goods takes place 
within the country, the transaction still occurs within the Republic. 
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It is submitted that for the application of the Act, a simultaneous physical presence of both the 
consumer and the supplier during the conclusion of the agreement is not necessary for the 
Application of the Act, and that it is sufficient that the supply of the goods or the performance 
of the services takes place in South Africa. 
Another problem is the determination of the moment of conclusion of the agreement in the case 
of electronic transactions. According to the information theory, a contract is concluded when 
the offeror is informed of the acceptance of the offer.285 Section 22(2) of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA)286 provides that '[a]n agreement concluded 
between parties by means of data messages is concluded at the time when and place where the 
acceptance of the offer was received by the offeror'. Moreover, under section 23(b) ECTA, a 
data message is received when the complete message enters an information system designated 
or used for that purpose by the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by 
him. This refers to the receipt theory, however. As it is difficult to determine the place of 
contract for electronic transactions, section 23(c) ECTA provides that a data message must be 
regarded as having been sent from the originator’s usual place of business or residence and as 
having been received at the addressee’s usual place of business or residence. 
Since today many websites are merely platforms of advertisements,287 and the content therein 
cannot be regarded as an offer made by the given supplier but as an invitatio ad offerendum, 
the buyer will thus be the offeror under sections 22(2) and 23(c) ECTA.288 
It is common in international transactions that standard terms contain a clause providing that 
the law of a particular country will apply. Such a provision cannot supplant the mandatory 
application of the Act to transactions occurring within South Africa but only have effect on the 
consumer’s rights that are not regulated in the Act. In addition, such clauses will be presumed 
to be unfair if the consumer was a resident of South Africa at the time of the conclusion of the 
agreement, and he or she was entering into the agreement for purposes wholly or mainly 
unrelated to his or her business or profession.289 
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2.2 Material scope of application 
Section 48 contains an enumeration of prohibited actions ('must not') and refers to content 
control rather than the material scope of application of section 48 et seq. 
For this reason, section 5(1) applies for the determination of the material scope of application 
of the Act.  
In order to have a better understanding of the ambit of the Act, it is important to discuss some 
definitions of section 1 in detail beforehand to which section 5 refers to, and their application 
with respect to section 5. 
a)  Definitions and their application in section 5 
aa) Transaction 
‘Transaction’ is defined in section 1 as an agreement between the parties, in respect of a person 
acting in the ordinary course of business, for the supply of goods or services in exchange for 
consideration,290 the actual supply of those goods,291 or the performance of the services agreed 
upon.292 This means that once-off transactions are not considered transactions under the Act.293  
The expression ‘ordinary course of business’ might sometimes be challenging to interpret with 
regard to the supplier. The definition of ‘transaction’ in section 1 of the Act mentions ‘ordinary 
course of business’ but does not define it. A translator whose ‘ordinary business’ is the 
translation of texts and their delivery within a certain deadline might happen to sell one of the 
assets he uses to perform his services, e.g., a computer, for various reasons, such as the purchase 
of a new device. One could put forward that the sale of the computer this person uses 
professionally is performed in the ‘ordinary course of business’. It is submitted that this point 
of view would go too far because this kind of sale is not part of the translator’s business or 
‘ordinary’ in the sense of ‘usual’. This view is supported by the fact that ‘business’ is defined 
as the continual marketing of any goods or services, which means that there has to be a certain 
degree of regularity. ‘Continual’ is defined in dictionaries as 'of regular or frequent recurrence, 
often repeated, very frequent',294 or 'forming a sequence in which the same action or event is 
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 49   
 
repeated frequently'.295 This excludes exceptional sales, for instance. These would therefore 
not fall into the ambit of the ‘ordinary course of business’. 
In AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Biddulph and Another,296 the court held that 'even a 
single, isolated activity, enterprise or pursuit' suffices for a more purposive interpretation of ‘in 
the course of the business’. It adopted this purposive interpretation297 in order to protect the 
insured. In the context of the Act, courts might also tend to apply such a wide interpretation for 
the sake of consumer protection. However, one cannot ignore that the legislator chose the 
wording ‘ordinary course of business’ which narrows the margin for a broad construction.298 
A purposive interpretation may be justified on a case-to-case basis though because consumers 
may not always know whether the supplier acts in its ordinary course of business.299 It is 
therefore submitted that consumers must inform themselves to a reasonable degree. This means 
that they must at least gather some prima facie information about the ‘ordinary’ business of the 
supplier. On the other hand, consumers cannot be expected to research the ambit of a supplier’s 
license or the business purpose, for instance. Consumers who purchase goods from a big 
company are likely to know the purpose of the given enterprise. This might be not the case for 
smaller entities though.  
In the context of this assessment, it is recommended that the courts also consider the 
surrounding circumstances. In many cases, a business which sells goods that are not covered 
by its purpose – e.g., old office equipment or furniture which was used in the company – might 
not be much interested in making a profit out of this sale, but simply wants to get rid of those 
items. This is particularly the case where the goods have already been written off and do not 
appear in the books anymore. In such a case, it would be disproportionate to afford the 
protection of the Act to consumers and to treat the company as if it had dealt in the ordinary 
course of business. 
In summary, a wider, purposive construction of ‘ordinary course of business’ is likely to be the 
exception because of the word ‘ordinary’ which requires a certain extent of regularity, as well 
as a lack of need for consumer protection in most cases. This especially applies where used and 
already written-off goods are sold. On the other hand, the lack of the protection of the Act is 
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balanced by the fact that the consumer will purchase those goods at a lower price that reflects 
the condition of the items. 
Section 5(6)(a) widens the definition of ‘transaction’ considerably 'for greater certainty' 
concerning the supply of goods or services in the ordinary course of business by a club, trade 
union, association, society or other collectivity to its members, irrespective of whether the 
member has to pay a consideration for the supply, or an economic contribution to become or 
remain a member. Therefore, the free supply of T-shirts with the logo of a trade union to its 
members is regarded as a ‘transaction’ in terms of the Act. At first sight, this seems to be an 
over-protection of the consumer, because it raises the question of why a consumer who did not 
have to pay a consideration should be protected in terms of the Act. The reason is that each 
consumer should be granted protection under sections 53 to 61, for instance, against faulty 
products which cause damage to the consumer. 
Furthermore, section 5(6)(b) to (e) extends the definition of ‘transaction’ to franchise 
agreements. The reason for the protection of the franchisee is that franchise agreements are 
often concluded between a large franchisor and a smaller juristic person who can easily be 
overreached. Contrary to other consumers, who are excluded from the protection of the Act if 
they reach a specific asset value or annual turnover,300 this limitation does not apply to 
franchises. 
The transaction must be made in exchange of consideration. ‘Consideration’ is defined in 
section 1 as anything of value given and accepted in exchange for goods or services, such as 
money, property, a ticket, labour, barter or other goods or services, any other thing, 
undertaking, promise, agreement or assurance. De Stadler correctly points out that the 
agreement by one party to accept a donation cannot be construed as consideration.301 Not only 
would such a broad interpretation render every reference to consideration in the Act 
meaningless, but this would eventually also mean that a mere declaration of intent, which is 
the basis of bi- and multilateral contracts, would serve as consideration. 
It is suggested that goods which are allegedly given ‘for free’ according to advertisements 
promising that one will receive ’x amount for free’ if one buys a particular product, must be 
regarded as given in the exchange of consideration.302 The part which is given ‘for free’ is part 
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of a product which is given in the exchange of consideration. In reality, this part is not free of 
charge because only the margin of the supplier is concerned. In any event, such labelling of a 
product falls under section 5(1)(b) as it fulfils the conditions of ‘promotion’ of a good.303 
Section 5(6)(a) provides that it is irrelevant whether the goods are supplied for fair value 
consideration or otherwise by a club, trade union, association, society or other collectivity. 
Since according to the definition of ‘consideration’, the apparent or intrinsic value of the 
consideration is never relevant, it is somehow inconsistent that the legislator refers to the ‘fair 
value’ consideration in section 5(6)(a). This could mean that the consideration requirement has 
not completely been relaxed and that where a club hands out goods free of charge to its 
members, this must be considered a transaction.304 It is suggested that this argument goes in 
circles with the first sentence in section 5(6) because this provision already provides 'for greater 
certainty' which arrangements must be regarded as transactions. The phrase 'whether for fair 
value consideration or otherwise' in section 5(6)(a) must thus be read as 'in any circumstances, 
and irrespective of whether there is consideration' because it simply means that arrangements 
by clubs and associations to their members which are covered by this provisions are 
transactions, and that their members are protected by the Act. 
As section 5(8)(b) provides that it is irrelevant if a supplier operates for profit or not, the Act 
will also apply to non-profit or charitable organisations. These organisations should therefore 
not accept any form of ‘consideration’ from the public, as otherwise the Act applies.305 
The supply of goods or services has to be performed to certain ‘persons’ (members of a club 
or an association and so forth) so that section 5(6) does not only concern the material306 but 
also the personal scope of application. 
bb) Goods and services 
The promotion and the supply of goods or services307 and goods or services that are supplied 
or performed in terms of a transaction to which the Act applies, irrespective of whether any of 
those goods or services are offered or supplied in conjunction with any other goods or services, 
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or separate from any other goods or services,308 also fall into the material scope of application 
of the Act. 
It is crucial to determine whether a particular product has to be defined as a good or as a service 
because the client’s remedies differ in both cases. If products are defective as regards the supply 
of a service, sections 55, 56 and 61 apply, whereas in case of a sub-standard service, section 
54 applies. What is more, section 61 according to which the consumer may claim for harm 
caused by defective goods, does not give the same rights in case of harm caused by sub-
standard service delivery.309 
The definition of ‘goods’ in section 1 covers a wide range of tangible and intangible products, 
such as consumables, furniture, clothing, literature, data, information encoded on a medium, 
as well as legal interest in immovable property, and even utilities. The latter are provided by 
the State or parastatals (Egoli Gas, Eskom…), so that these particular suppliers may be held 
liable.310The list is not exhaustive and hence open to other items.311 
The definition of ‘service’ in section 1 is also extensive. Like the definition of ‘goods’, it is not 
limited312 and includes: 
(a) any work or undertaking performed by one person for the direct or indirect benefit 
of another. This is a far-reaching catch-all provision which aims to include all kinds of different 
services. Paragraphs (b) to (g) can thus be regarded as examples of services which fall under 
paragraph (a);313 
(b) the provision of any education, information, advice or consultation (with exceptions 
concerning the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act);314  
(c) any banking services, financial services, or the undertaking, underwriting or 
assumption of any risk by one person on behalf of another (with exceptions concerning the 
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Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act,315 the Long-term Insurance Act316 and the 
Short-term Insurance Act);317  
Intermediary banking or related financial service, undertaking, underwriting or assumption of 
risk as well as advice are not included in the definition of ‘services’ to the extent that the service 
is regulated by the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act318 or the Long-Term 
Insurance Act319 or Short-Term Insurance Act.320 Therefore, these services are excluded from 
the application of the Act.321 
The Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act322 came into effect on 28 February 
2014. This statute exempts the banking industry, the long- and short-term insurance industry, 
the pension fund industry, collective investment schemes and securities from the application 
of the Act. It intends to introduce a more stringent consumer protection framework for the 
financial services sector referred to as ‘Treating Consumers Fairly’. This list does not mention 
the National Credit Act, which means that the Consumer Protection Act even applies if goods 
or services are sold or provided in terms of a credit agreement;323 
(d) the transportation of an individual or any goods. This concerns the transportation of 
persons or goods (freight) by bus, taxi, train, or aeroplane; 
(e) the provision of (i) any accommodation or sustenance, (ii) any entertainment or 
access to it, (iii) access to any electronic communication infrastructure, (iv) access, or the right 
of access, to an event or to any premises, activity or facility, or  (v) access to or use of any 
premises or other property in terms of a rental.  
According to this definition, the provision of food and drinks in a restaurant are regarded as a 
service. The food or drinks themselves are goods though. The provision of accommodation 
includes hotels, B&Bs, hostels and so forth. It is submitted that the accommodation in a 
sleeping car of a train also falls under this definition. Besides, it is subject to paragraph (d) as 
it concerns the transportation of individuals.  
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Regarding the provision of entertainment or similar intangible products, one must distinguish 
between the person performing (e.g., musician), and the person giving access to the 
entertainment (e.g., event manager). Under the Act, both will be considered service 
providers.324 ‘Access to any electronic communication infrastructure’ refers to 
telecommunications and television networks, wireless application networks and similar service 
providers. Access, or the right of access, to any event or to any premises, activity or facility 
refers to owners of casinos, bars, theme parks, swimming pools, shopping malls etc.; 
(f) a right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over or in connection with, any land 
or other immovable property, other than in terms of a rental. The letting of immovable property 
is a service, whereas granting access to moveable property could either be a service or fall 
under the definition of ‘goods’.325 De Stadler argues that the exclusion of rental is inconsistent 
as it is included in paragraph (e) of the definition of ‘service’.326 This differentiation between 
‘rental’ on the one side, and ‘right of occupancy’ and ‘power or privilege over or in connection’ 
with land or other immovable property, on the other, could mean, it is suggested, that not only 
substantive rights, such as a rental, which are based on a contractual agreement under the law 
of obligations but also rights in rem, such as servitudes (the right of abode, for instance), have 
to be understood as services in terms of the Act. The enumeration under (f) therefore expands 
the definition of ‘service’ beyond rentals and does not restrict it, as De Stadler suggests. This 
would mean that also the beneficiary of a servitude is protected by the Act vis-à-vis the other 
party, i.e., the creator of the servitude, and that the Act not only covers transactions based on 
the law of obligations, but also certain transactions in rem. It is nonetheless somehow 
disconcerting that a 'right' (of occupancy) should be a service. In terms of legal methodology, 
this is a dubious qualification which can only be explained by the legislature’s wish to expand 
the definition of ‘service’ to certain in rem rights; 
(g) rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable in 
terms of section 5(6)(b) to (e), irrespective of whether the person promoting, offering or 
providing the services participates in, supervises or engages directly or indirectly in the service. 
The inclusion of 'rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement' into the definition of 
‘service’ is also disconcerting and could mean that a franchisor has to comply with the 
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provisions of the Act set out in section 5(6)(b) to (e) when entering in such an activity. If this 
were the case, point (g) would be superfluous. 
The phrase 'irrespective of whether the person promoting, offering or providing the services 
participates in, supervises or engages directly or indirectly in the service' means that a person 
who does not participate directly in the provision of a service is still liable as a service provider. 
This applies to intermediaries, such as travel agencies, which do not themselves provide hotel 
rooms or excursions. The consumer thus does not have to engage in a complicated and 
expensive process in order to determine who is accountable because all parties of the supply 
chain can be held liable.327 Despite the strange formulation of point (g), the inclusion of 
intermediaries to be held liable for service delivery is probably the reason for the existence of 
point (g). 
cc) Promote 
Section 1 defines the verb ‘promote’ with a wide array of other verbs, such as (a) advertise, 
display or offer to supply any goods or services, to all or part of the public for consideration; 
(b) make any representation that could reasonably be inferred as expressing a willingness to 
supply any goods or services for consideration; or (c) engage in any other conduct that may 
reasonably be construed to be an inducement or attempted inducement to a person to engage in 
a transaction. The abovementioned actions have to take place in the ordinary course of 
business.  
Briefly, these actions describe any activity that supports or encourages the publicising of a 
product or venture to increase sales or public awareness.328  
‘Public’ in paragraph (a) also comprises an individual because also other sections in Chapter 2 
Part E refer to individual consumers. Furthermore, other provisions referring to direct 
marketing comprise individual consumers as regards promotions.329 
Paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘promote’ ensures that promotors cannot circumvent the 
application of the Act if another supplier undertakes the actual supply. This means that the 
promotor does not necessarily have to undertake the actual transaction with the consumer in 
order that the Act applies.330 
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The phrase ‘any other conduct’ in paragraph (c) is an all-catch clause which ascertains that a 
supplier by any conduct, such as displaying or making a product available without making any 
statement about it, cannot escape the application of the Act.331 
The promotion ‘within the Republic’ under section 5(1)(b) seems to be problematic, 
considering cross-border advertising and new media, such as the internet. As the actual 
promotion in these cases does not necessarily take place ‘within the Republic’, it is therefore 
sufficient that the ultimate transaction itself does in order to apply the Act. One could also 
argue that section 5(1)(b) only applies to promotions which take place within South Africa, 
with no regard to the place where the ultimate transaction takes place. 
The second argument is more convincing when reading section 5(1)(b) entirely. Otherwise, 
section 5(1)(a) referring to transactions within the Republic would have less meaning. What is 
more, section 5(1)(b)(i) clearly operates in cases where a supplier expected the Act not being 
applicable, e.g., because he or she was reasonably of the opinion that the consumer would be a 
juristic person with an asset value or annual turnover above the threshold of section 5(2)(b). 
Such a case is imaginable where the consumer became a juristic person only after the 
transaction. Then, the Act would still not apply in terms of section 5(1)(b)(i), however. 
dd) Goods or services which are supplied or performed 
The supply of goods and the performance of services in terms of section 5(1)(c) is another step 
of the ‘supply chain’ to which the Act applies, besides the promotion of goods or services and 
the transaction. It emanates from the definition of ‘consumer’ that not only the party of a 
consumer agreement is protected by the Act but also the end-user, recipient or beneficiary. In 
order that the Act applies to the goods or services mentioned in section 5(1)(c), it must be 
applicable to the transaction. This is not the case, for instance, with donations because these do 
not involve any consideration.332 In cases where a consumer purchases a good from a supplier 
and then gives this good as a gift to another person, this person must however be regarded as a 
beneficiary in terms of the definition (c) of ‘consumer’, although there was no consideration 
between the consumer and the beneficiary. 
It is not entirely clear what 'irrespective of whether any of those goods or services are offered 
or supplied in conjunction with any other goods or services, or separate from any other goods 
or services' means. This phrase could mean that suppliers cannot circumvent the application of 
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the Act by separating certain goods or services – to which the Act applies – from other goods 
or services supplied. It could also mean that the supplier will not be able to argue that the goods 
and services supplied under a single transaction are subject to the provisions on either goods 
or services. In any event, such an argument cannot be maintained in terms of section 54(1)(c) 
and 61(2) according to which the supplier of a service in conjunction with certain goods is also 
considered the supplier of these goods.333 
ee) Goods supplied in terms of an exempt transaction 
Section 5(1)(d) merely confirms that transactions which are exempted from the application of 
the Act still enjoy the protection of sections 60 and 61. These provisions govern safety 
monitoring and recall as well as liability for harm caused by unsafe goods. 
The fact that the words ‘exemption’ and ‘exempt’ are used not only in the context of section 
5(2)(c) but also for other kinds of exemptions, which technically speaking are exceptions,334 
could be interpreted in favour of a more comprehensive construction of ‘exemption’ / 
’exempt’.335 
Despite the vast scope of application of the Act, there are situations where it is not applicable. 
In these cases, there is no exemption in terms of section 5(1)(d) or 5(5) and the Act is not 
applicable as a whole. This is the case, for instance, for transactions with consumers who are 
juristic persons with an annual turnover exceeding the threshold of section 5(2)(b). 
ff) Terms and conditions 
It is remarkable that neither section 1 nor section 48 et seq. contain a definition of ‘terms and 
conditions’. One would expect that a statute dedicating an entire part to unfair contract terms 
and containing a section with definitions would define this term. 
In dictionaries, ‘terms’ are defined as 'stipulated or agreed requirements, conditions with regard 
to payment or agreed conditions under which a dispute is settled',336  and terms and conditions 
                                                             
333 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 73. 
334 See para 2.2 b) cc) below. 
335 De Stadler argues in that way as the words ‘exemption’ and ‘exempt’ would not appear in section 5(2), but in 
subsection (3) and (4). However, these words do appear in section 5(2)(c) in relation to exemptions granted by 
the Minister. This does not weaken her argumentation, however. See De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen 
(eds) CPA Commentary para 73. 
336 Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. ‘terms’. 
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are '[g]eneral and special arrangements, provisions, requirements, rules, specifications, and 
standards that form an integral part of an agreement or contract.'337  
In other words, terms and conditions are provisions between the parties of an agreement that 
form an integral part of the latter. 
In section 1, a definition of ‘terms and conditions’ with the following (or similar) wording 
should therefore be included: 
'Terms and conditions” means any general and special arrangements, provisions, 
requirements, rules, specifications and standards contained in an agreement 
between a consumer and a supplier, irrespective of their denomination, content 
and presentation.' 
This definition would cover all kinds of standard terms and ascertain a uniform application of 
the Act and fairness control. It would also remove all ambiguities of whether certain terms and 
conditions are part of an agreement. Subsidiary agreements, side letters and other arrangements 
would be included. Suppliers would thus not be able to circumvent the application of the Act 
by ‘swapping out’ certain terms and applying other ‘creative’ contract design measures. 
b) Exceptions 
Section 5(2) contains several exceptions in which the Act does not apply. 
aa) Goods and services promoted or supplied to the State 
The Act does not apply to transactions in terms of which goods or services are promoted or 
supplied to the State, i.e., where the State is a consumer.338  
Section 1 defines only the term ‘organ of state’ in referral to section 239 of the Constitution.339  
In the final draft of the Act, the words ‘organ of state’ have been removed without any further 
explanation in the parliamentary records.340 ‘State’ and ’organ of state’ are not synonymous, a 
view which is supported by the fact that both terms are used in section 81(2)(b)(ii), and ‘organ 
of state’ appears in section 5(8)(c). According to Holeni v Land and Agricultural Development 
                                                             
337 The Business Dictionary online: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/terms-and-conditions.html s.v. 
‘terms and conditions’. 
338 Section 5(2)(a).  
339 Pursuant to s 239 of the Constitution ‘organ of state’ means: (a) any department of state or administration in 
the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or (b) any other functionary or institution (i) exercising a 
power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial officer. 
340 Both ‘State’ and ‘organ of state’ can still be found in the original draft of the Consumer Protection Bill, 
s 5(2)(a). See GenN 418 in GG 28629 of 15 March 2006. 
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Bank of SA,341 the Constitution distinguishes between the two concepts, even if it does not 
define the term ‘State’ (nor did the court in its ruling). In Mateis v Ngwathe Plaaslike 
Munisipaliteit en Ander,342 the court held that ‘State’ was an amorphous juristic-political 
concept without a fixed meaning that has to be interpreted according to the piece of legislation 
in which it appears. 
De Stadler believes that based on the abovementioned cases and the definition of ‘organ of 
state’ in the Constitution, the concept of ‘State’ has a more limited meaning.343 She contends 
that ‘State’ only includes departments of state at the national, provincial and local level, but 
not other institutions exercising public functions. Therefore, parastatals would have to be 
considered consumers, even though they are most likely excluded from the application of the 
Act because of their annual turnovers or asset values. She admits though that this interpretation 
would not explain why both terms are listed in section 81(2)(b)(ii).344 
The legislature should therefore clarify this question, either by inserting a definition of ‘State’ 
in the Act, or by deleting the term in section 81(2)(b)(ii). One should nonetheless keep in mind 
that this problem is of minor importance. In most cases, the distinction between these two 
concepts should have no practical impact for the reasons mentioned above. 
As the term ‘State’ is not defined, it is unclear if companies or other entities, of which the State 
is a shareholder or member, are included in this exception.345 
One could argue that only companies or other entities in which the State holds more than 50 
per cent of the shares or votes are excluded from the ambit of the Act. An argument for this 
opinion is that under this threshold, the State has not that much influence on the company or 
entity in question. 
On the other hand, this is not true where the State as a shareholder has less than 50 per cent of 
the shares or votes but is the biggest shareholder in comparison to minor shareholders. In this 
case, it has more influence than small shareholders who might ultimately have different 
interests. 
                                                             
341 Holeni v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of SA 2009 (4) SA 437 (C) at 442B-C. 
342 Mateis v Ngwathe Plaaslike Munisipaliteit en Ander 2003 (4) SA 361 (SCA) at 367F. 
343 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 79. 
344 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 79. 
345 See Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 3 note 52. 
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Besides, in entities where the State is a shareholder, it can exercise its influence by other means, 
e.g., by passing specific laws or granting exemptions. It is therefore submitted that in any case 
where the State has any direct influence by the holding of shares, irrespective of their number 
or percentage, the company or entity in question should not afford the protection of the Act. 
bb) Turnover and asset value threshold  
The Act does neither apply when a consumer is a juristic person346 whose asset value or annual 
turnover equals or exceeds the threshold value determined by the Minister under section 6.347 
The Minister of Trade and Industry has by notice determined the monetary threshold at R 2 
million.348 It is not necessary that the juristic person equals or exceeds its annual turnover and 
asset value. The word ‘or’ in this section indicates that only one of both is sufficient for 
excluding the application of the Act. 
The reason for the exemption of transactions involving the State and large businesses is that 
they do not require the protection offered by the Act as they benefit from the flexibility of 
operation in an unregulated market.349 
The Act is essentially consumer protection law, with an extended understanding of what 
constitutes a consumer. It therefore aims at protecting small businesses that are similarly 
vulnerable as natural persons. The Act hence assumes that entities that are not juristic persons 
deserve the same protection as other consumers. This approach considers the socio-economic 
realities in South Africa. The application of turnover and asset thresholds to juristic persons 
excludes companies that do not need protection and assures that the majority of companies who 
need protection are actually protected. This has the consequence that a sole proprietorship-
                                                             
346 The definition of ‘juristic person’ in s 1 goes further than the common law definition, where partnerships and 
trusts are not considered juristic persons. 
347 Section 5(2)(b) CPA. In terms of section 2(5), despite the periods of time set out in section 6, each successive 
threshold determined by the Minister in terms of that section continues in effect until a subsequent threshold in 
terms of that section takes effect. Unfortunately, this provision is completely out of place as it is located within 
the interpretational provisions. It would have been better and more logical to insert it into section 6 instead. 
348 GG No. 34181 of 1 April 2011. This threshold has not been changed since. In its comment letter of the threshold 
determination of 29 October 2010, the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) criticises that 
the threshold of R 2m does not correspond to domestic and international practice as normally there tends to be a 
ratio of 1:2 between assets and turnover due to the practical relationship between the two in terms of size in 
average businesses. Moreover, SAICA believes that a single level threshold is far too simple at it would 
unintentionally jeopardise many small businesses, such as used car dealers or small new car dealerships which 
need protection from large business and vehicle manufacturers with which they interact. Therefore, a matrix 
threshold structure, such as used in the National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 which takes into account the 
nature of the business would be necessary. See 'Consumer Protection Act, No. 68 of 2008' at 
https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/Legislation/ConsumerProtectionAct/tabid/1911/langua
ge/en-ZA/Default.aspx under 'Legislation/Submissions and comments' (no longer available). 
349 See Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill, 2008, point 3.2 at 82. 
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consumer with a sizeable annual turnover exceeding the threshold is protected by the Act, 
whereas a company, i.e., a juristic person, with a similar annual turnover is excluded from its 
protection. 
Item 2 of the Schedule in GN 294350 defines the annual turnover as the gross revenue of the 
juristic person from income in, into or from the Republic. Certain transactions are expressly 
included and certain amounts excluded from this calculation. The asset value is defined as the 
gross asset value of the juristic person without the deduction for liabilities or encumbrances. 
The valuation of the annual turnover or asset value of the juristic person has to be made, 
according to section 5(2)(b), at the time of the transaction. As ‘transaction’ is defined in 
section 1 as an agreement or the supply or performance of services, the time of the conclusion 
of the agreement may differ from the time of the supply or the performance. This problem 
primarily exists in ongoing supply or service agreements like, for example, the regular delivery 
of beer to a restaurant. It is suggested that in these cases, the supplier has to determine the 
consumer’s asset value or annual turnover at least from time to time in order to comply with 
the Act. This is very difficult in cases where the information is not available though.351 This 
approach is also impractical for high volume transactions where the sold product itself has a 
relatively low value which does not justify such an investigation. As the Act is silent over these 
questions, it is proposed that a reasonable standard must be applied. The supplier must therefore 
make reasonable efforts to determine the consumer’s asset value or turnover. If the latter 
refuses to give such information, or this information is not available otherwise, and there is no 
indication that the threshold is too high in terms of section 5(2)(b), the supplier cannot be 
blamed and that the Act does not apply. In such case, the Act should only apply where the 
threshold is not met as it aims to protect consumers and not suppliers. This would also be 
consistent with the wording of section 5(2)(b). 
A warranty or declaration that the juristic person’s asset value or turnover does not exceed the 
threshold mentioned above raises concern. Such a clause might directly or indirectly purport 
to set aside or override the effect of the Act in terms of section 51(b)(iii), which means that the 
clause would be void. In addition, it could be unfair under section 48. Otherwise, it has to meet 
                                                             
350 In GG 34181 of 1 April 2011. 
351 See De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 84. 
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the requirements of section 49(3) to (5) as it is an acknowledgement of fact for purposes of 
section 49.352  
What is more, the Act itself is silent over the question in which manner information on the 
annual turnover or asset value will be obtained. It is important though to have a fair basis in 
order to determine whether a business is ‘small’ enough to afford the protection of the Act. 
According to Item 4(a), the calculation has to be based on the company’s audited financials for 
the relevant period.353 If it has no audited financials, the statement must be prepared in 
accordance with South African Generally Accepted Accounting Standards. De Stadler argues 
that this approach is not practical because it might be too costly for smaller companies, 
especially for businesses with a high volume of small transactions. She suggests that the 
legislator should have included a section according to which the asset value or annual turnover 
of a company that is mentioned in a credit agreement should be stated as such by the juristic 
person who wants to determine if it is above the threshold or not.354 
This might be a more practical approach, but not all juristic persons conclude credit 
agreements. Especially small businesses work on a cash-in-cash-out basis. Most of them file 
tax returns, however. It is therefore suggested that a combination of these two suggestions 
might be the best solution. 
In item 4 of General Notice 294 should thus be added the following addition under (c): 
'If audited financial statements are not required by law and therefore not available, for 
the determination of the annual turnover or the asset value, the most current tax return 
or balance sheet355 is used as a basis for the calculation of the assets or turnover. If the 
juristic or natural person356 has concluded a credit agreement during the relevant 
                                                             
352 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 87. 
353 GN 294 in Government Gazette 34181 of 1 April 2011. 
354 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 8. 
355 In its comment letter of the threshold determination of 29 October 2010, SAICA argues that any reference to 
'balance sheet' should be avoided as the names used in the financial reporting standards have changed and the term 
'balance sheet' is no longer commonly used. Instead, one should refer to the value of the juristic person's assets as 
reflected in the financial statements. See 'Consumer Protection Act, No. 68 of 2008' at 
https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/Legislation/ConsumerProtectionAct/tabid/1911/langua
ge/en-ZA/Default.aspx under 'Legislation/Submissions and comments' (no longer available). In the above-
mentioned suggested addition, a reference to 'financial statements' could create confusions with the term 'audited 
financial statements'. The use of 'financial statement' instead of 'balance sheet' is defendable though. 
356 As mentioned above, also non-juristic persons whose annual turnover or asset value exceeds the threshold of 
s 6 should be treated like juristic persons. 
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period for its business, the turnover or the asset value mentioned in this credit 
agreement is used as a basis for this calculation.'357 
cc) Exemptions granted by the Minister 
The Act does not apply to transactions falling within an exemption granted by the Minister in 
terms of subsections (3) and (4).358 It is regrettable that the legislator mentioned these 
exemptions within a provision dealing with exceptions as technically exceptions and 
exemptions are not identical and should be clearly separated.359 De Stadler distinguishes 
between ‘automatically exempted transactions’ and ‘application by regulatory authorities’.360 
Although this distinction is materially correct, it perpetuates the legislator’s ambiguous 
terminology. For the sake of a more structured discussion, the exemptions will be discussed 
further below.361 
dd) Credit agreements under the National Credit Act 
Excepted are also transactions which constitute a credit agreement under the National Credit 
Act. The goods and services that are subject of the credit agreement are not excluded from the 
scope of application of the Consumer Protection Act though.362 This means that a product that 
has been purchased by the consumer on credit (for which the National Credit Act applies), is 
subject to the Consumer Protection Act. A credit provider will not be able to exclude its 
liabilities under sections 56(2) and 61 CPA, or the common law, without invoking section 51 
CPA. This results, on the one hand, from section 90(2)(c) NCA which provides that a 'provision 
of a credit agreement is unlawful if (…) it purports to waive any common law rights that may 
be applicable to the credit agreement'. On the other hand, section 90(2)(g) NCA provides that 
a provision which 'purports to exempt the credit provider from liability, or limit such liability, 
for (…) any guarantee or warranty that would, in the absence of such a provision, be implied 
in a credit agreement' is unlawful. For these reasons, the decision in MFC (a division of 
                                                             
357 This corresponds to SAICA's view in its comment letter of the threshold determination of 29 October 2010 
where it points out that most companies and close corporations that will request protection under the Act will not 
apply IFRS as they will not fall within the audit threshold as prescribed by the Companies Act 71 of 2008. They 
will use the alternative accounting frameworks to prepare their financial statements instead. See 'Consumer 
Protection Act, No. 68 of 2008' at https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/Legislation/ 
ConsumerProtectionAct/tabid/1911/language/en-ZA/Default.aspx under 'Legislation/Submissions and comments' 
(no longer available).  
358 Section 5(2)(c). See para 2.2 c) in this chapter. 
359 An exception is granted by law, whereas an exemption requires an intervention by an authority, e.g., in a certain 
case or in special circumstances or for specific businesses (‘industry-wide exemptions’). See, e.g., 'Exception v 
Exemption' at https://oilpatchwriting.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/exception-vs-exemption/. 
360 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 13, 16. 
361 See para 2.2 c) in this chapter. 
362 Section 5(2)(d) CPA. 
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Nedbank Ltd) v Botha,363 in which the court held that the bank was not a supplier and could 
exclude liability, was erroneous. 
The provision of services by credit providers fall under the scope of application of the 
Consumer Protection Act. This becomes clear when reading the definition of ‘service’ in 
section 1 where other service providers are excluded, but not credit providers. The same applies 
to the promotion of credit, which is not excluded by section 5(2)(d). Credit marketing is 
regulated in sections 74 to 77 NCA which overlap with the right to fair and responsible 
marketing of the Consumer Protection Act.364 As the provisions of the National Credit Act and 
the Consumer Protection Act complement each other in terms of promotion, they apply 
concurrently pursuant to section 2(9) CPA.365 
The application of the Consumer Protection Act may be excluded by the Financial Services 
Board Act366 as amended by the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, however.367 
Although the definition of ‘financial services legislation’ and ‘financial institution’ does not 
refer to credit providers, it refers to 'a bank as defined in section 1(1) of the Banks Act368 (…), 
a mutual bank as defined in section 1(1) of the Mutual Banks Act369 (…), or a co-operative 
bank as defined in section 1(1) of the Co-operative Banks Act370 (…), which deals with trust 
property as a regular feature of its business.' Pursuant to section 28(2)(b)(i) of the Financial 
Services Board Act, the Act does not apply to 'any functions, act, transaction, goods or services' 
which are subject to these acts or 'any person that performs an activity regulated under a law 
referred to in' these acts.371 One can infer from the wording of this provision that only activities 
governed by the statutes listed in the definition of ‘financial services legislation’ are excluded. 
As the National Credit Act is not included in this list, the Consumer Protection Acts still applies 
in the credit industry, as limited by section 5(2)(d) CPA.372 
                                                             
363 MFC (a division of Nedbank Ltd) v Botha 6981/13 [2013] ZAWCHC 107 (15 August 2013). The court  
incorrectly held that the respondent (Botha) could not return the vehicle he had purchased in terms of an instalment 
agreement with the bank to the supplier (the dealership) against a refund of the purchase price because ownership 
of the car vested in the credit provider which had paid the purchase price, and not Botha. However, s 56(2) CPA 
provides that a consumer can return the defective good to the supplier, as according to s 56(1) CPA there is an 
implied provision that the producer, importer, distributor and retailer each warrant that the goods are safe and of 
good quality pursuant to s 55 CPA. 
364 Chapter 2 Part E CPA (ss 29 – 39). 
365 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 96. 
366 97 of 1990. 
367 45 of 2913. 
368 94 of 1990. 
369 124 of 1993. 
370 40 of 2007. 
371 Paragraph (c) of the definition of ‘financial institution’ in the Financial Services Board Act. 
372 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 92. 
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It is disputable whether so-called ‘incidental credit agreements’ must be qualified as credit 
agreements under the National Credit Act.373 Pursuant to section 5(2) NCA, the parties to an 
incidental credit agreement are deemed to have made that agreement on the date that is 20 
business days after the supplier first charges a late payment fee or interest. This could mean 
that before the expiration of this period, an incidental credit agreement is not considered a credit 
agreement in terms of the NCA. Section 5(2)(d) CPA excludes only credit agreements in terms 
of the National Credit Act though. Furthermore, the parties had not the intention to enter into 
a credit agreement at the time when the transaction was concluded. Hence, incidental credit 
agreements are not excluded from the scope of application of the Act.374 
What is more, credit advertising and marketing is not excluded either from the ambit of the 
Consumer Protection Act. On the other hand, there is a legislative duplication because also the 
National Credit Act regulates credit advertising375 and marketing.376 In this case, section 2(9) 
CPA in terms of which the provisions of both Acts apply concurrently, applies to the extent 
that it is possible to apply and comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without 
contravening the second.377 If this is not possible, the provision which extends the greater 
protection to the consumer prevails.378  
ee) Employment contracts 
Furthermore, transactions pertaining to services to be supplied under an employment contract 
are excluded from the application of the Act.379 The Act does not distinguish between unlimited 
and fixed-term employment contracts. It is therefore submitted that all types of employment 
contracts are excluded from the application of this statute. 
                                                             
373 Pursuant to s 1 NCA, an incidental credit agreement means an agreement, irrespective of its form, in terms of 
which an account was tendered for goods or services that have been provided to the consumer, or goods or services 
that are to be provided to a consumer over a period of time and either or both of the following conditions apply: 
(a) a fee, charge or interest became payable when payment of an amount charged in terms of that account was not 
made on or before a determined period or date; or (b) two prices were quoted for settlement of the accounts, the 
lower price being applicable if the account is paid on or before a determined date, and the higher price being 
applicable due to the account not having been paid by that date. 
374 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 310. See also De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 95. 
375 See ss 76, 4(7) NCA. 
376 See ss 74, 75 and 77 NCA. 
377 Section 2(9)(a) CPA. 
378 Section 2(9)(b) CPA. 
379 Section 5(2)(e) CPA. 
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Independent contractors are not regarded as employees in terms of the Labour Relations Act,380 
which defines ‘employee’ as any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for 
another person, or the State and who receives or is entitled to receive, any remuneration. 
De Stadler argues that the wording of section 5(2)(e) might have some unintended 
consequences where an employee purchases a service from her employer at a discount which 
is based on the contract of employment. Then, the employee would have no recourse against 
the employer if she received sub-standard service.381 It is suggested that the phrase 'services to 
be supplied under an employment contract' must be read as ‘services to be supplied under an 
employment contract by an employee’.382 Thus, only services supplied by the employee in 
terms of the employment contract are excluded under section 5(2)(e). The reason for this 
exemption is not to put too much burden on the employer/employee relationship in terms of 
the fulfilment of the contract. Therefore, in the example above the Act applies. 
ff) Collective bargaining agreements 
Transactions giving effect to a collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of section 
23 of the Constitution and the Labour Relations Act, 1995,383 or to a collective agreement384 as 
defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995385 are also excluded from the 
application of the Act. 
c) Exemptions 
As mentioned above, the Minister386 may grant an exemption in terms of sections 5(3) and (4). 
Section 5(3) concerns industry-wide exemptions from one or more provisions of the Act if 
those provisions overlap or duplicate a regulatory scheme in terms of any other national 
legislation or any treaty, international law, convention or protocol. The competent regulatory 
authority must apply for such an exemption.387 This means that an individual supplier may not 
apply. ‘Regulatory authority’ is defined as an organ of state or entity established in terms of 
                                                             
380 66 of 1995. 
381 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 102. 
382 Emphasis added. 
383 Section 5(2)(f) CPA. 
384 Section 5(2)(g) CPA. 
385 66 of 1995.  
386 According to the definition in s 1, ‘Minister’ means the member of the Cabinet responsible for consumer 
protection matters. 
387 Section 5(3). 
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national or provincial legislation responsible for regulating an industry, or sector of an 
industry.388 
The Act is intended to offer a default regime of consumer protection. Its purpose is not to over-
ride industry-specific laws that contain more specific consumer protection schemes. If the 
National Consumer Commission advises that the specific industry scheme protects consumers 
at least as much as the Consumer Protection Act, the Minister may grant an exemption.389 
The Minister, after having received the advice of the National Consumer Commission,390 
makes the exemption public in the Government Gazette.391 The Commission may grant an 
exemption only to the extent that the relevant regulatory scheme 'ensures the achievement of 
the purposes of this Act at least as well as the provisions of this Act'.392 
Subsections (3) and (4) must be read together as both provisions regulate the conditions of an 
industry-wide exemption as well as the procedure to be followed by the Minister. Therefore, 
the conditions for such an exemption are the following: 
- One or more provisions of the Act overlap or duplicate a regulatory scheme in terms of 
any other national legislation or any treaty, international law, convention or protocol 
(section 5(3)(a) and (b); 
- the relevant regulatory scheme ensures the achievement of the purposes of the Act at 
least as well as the provisions of the Act (section 5(4)(a)); and 
- the exemption is subject to any limits or conditions necessary to ensure the achievement 
of the purposes of the Act (section 5(4)(b)). 
The procedure for granting an industry-wide exemption is the following: 
- A regulatory scheme has to apply to the Minister for an exemption (section 5(3)); 
- the Minister has to receive the advice of the Commission (section 5(4)); and 
- the Minister has to publish the exemption in the Government Gazette (section 5(4)). 
Such exemptions may be granted permanently or temporarily.393 
                                                             
388 See definition of ‘regulatory authority’ in s 1. 
389 Section 5(4). See Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill, 2008, point 3.2 at 82.  
390 See definition of ‘Commission’ in s 1. 
391 Section 5(4). 
392 Section 5(4)(a). 
393 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 436 note 31. So far, the Minister has exempted fixed-term bank deposits from 
the application of s 14, which means that fixed-term agreements may be terminated on 20 business days’ notice 
instead of 40 business days’ notice at least. See s 14(2)(c) (GN 532 in GG 34399 of 27 June 2011), as well as the 
pension fund industry, the collective investment schemes industry and the security services industry until 31 
March 2012 (GN 533 in GG 34400 of 27 June 2011). These industries are now exempt in terms of the Financial 
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Interestingly, the application must be directed to the National Consumer Commission and not 
to the Department of Trade and Industry. Unfortunately, the National Consumer Commission 
Rules394 do not give much guidance in terms of the substantive requirements for an application. 
Rule 17 merely provides that the Commission will request further information where the 
application is incomplete or lacks specificity in regard to the industry or sub-industry to which 
it applies and that the applicant has to respond to the request for further information within 20 
business days. Furthermore, rule 17(4) provides that the Commission must advise the Minister 
within a reasonable time after having received the application. 
However, in the case of goods supplied within South Africa and the existence of an exemption 
according to section 5(2) to (4), sections 60 and 61, which deal with the safety of goods, apply. 
d) Application of sections 60 and 61 
The Act also applies to goods that are supplied in terms of a transaction that is exempt from 
the application of the Act, but only to the extent provided for in section 5(5). This provision 
refers to section and 60 (safety monitoring and recall) and 61 (liability for unsafe goods).395  
This means that the buyer of a good has recourse against the supplier. This principle goes up 
the entire supply chain. The buyer can hence be the retailer, and the supplier can be the 
distributor or the producer, for instance. As the liability is joint and several, this protects 
retailers and distributors who have recourse against a link upwards the supply chain.396 
This application of joint and several liability begs the question of whether the parties can 
exclude the liability provided in section 61 contractually. One could argue that such an 
exclusion is not possible as under section 51(1)(b)(ii), a supplier must not make a transaction 
or agreement subject to any term or condition if it directly or indirectly purports to avoid a 
supplier’s obligation or duty in terms of the Act. A contravention against this stipulation would 
make the term void pursuant to section 51(3). On the other hand, the exclusion of the extended 
liability is possible because section 51 specifically refers to 'a transaction or agreement'. 
According to this argument, it would be difficult to see how section 51 can be applied to 
transactions which are explicitly excluded from the scope of application of the Act, e.g., when 
                                                             
Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013. In addition, the Minister has deferred the application of parts 
of the CPA to low- and medium-capacity municipalities as defined in the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act 56 of 2003 pursuant to item 2 of Schedule 2 to the CPA (see GN 221 in GG 34116 of 14 March 
2011 and GN 898 in GG 34724 of 31 October 2011). 
394 GN 533 in GG 34400 of 27 June 2011. 
395 Section 5(1)(d). 
396 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 112, 113. 
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the consumer is the State or a juristic person with a turnover or asset value exceeding the 
threshold set out in section 5(2)(b).397 
The last argument seems to be more convincing because section 5(5) only refers to sections 60 
and 61, making their application a de iure exception. It could be argued that if the legislature 
had wished the application of other provisions in terms of section 5(5), it would most probably 
have explicitly referred to them. This argument does not consider the common-law requirement 
according to which contracts must be lawful, however. Hence, it could be brought forward that 
anything done in direct contradiction to an express or implied prohibition in a statute is 
presumed to be void ab initio.398 Therefore, the application of section 61 could prevent the 
parties from excluding the liability because it possibly implies that the liability it imposes 
cannot be excluded contractually. This is a question of statuary interpretation though.  
Section 4(3) provides that the Act must be interpreted purposively, i.e., the meaning that best 
promotes the spirit and purpose of the Act and will best improve the realisation and enjoyment 
of consumer rights must be preferred . One of the purposes of the Act mentioned in section 3 
is the protection of vulnerable consumers, and not of significant juristic persons or the State, 
which is why these persons are excluded per se from the protection of the Act by section 5(2). 
On the other hand, it would be unfair if a retailer were left without recourse against its 
distributor or producer who has undoubtedly more control over the product quality within the 
supply chain than the retailer and is able to assess the risk and to insure itself against these 
risks. In terms of the distribution of risk for defective goods, an exclusion of liability under 
sections 60 and 61 thus seems not desirable in the light of a purposive construction.399 
Once the Act covers an agreement, all contractual terms are subject to a fairness enquiry. In 
other words, all negotiated terms, e.g., those concerning the price or the definition of the main 
subject matter, as well as non-negotiated terms are covered by the Act and may be challenged.  
The Consumer Protection Act therefore has an extensive material scope of application as it 
applies to most transactions, as well to the promotion and the supply of goods and services 
occurring within South Africa.  
                                                             
397 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 114, 115. 
398 Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99 at 109; Metro Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross 1986 (3) SA 181 
(A) at 188A-B. 
399 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 116. 
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2.3 Personal scope of application 
The Act chooses the terms ‘supplier’400 and ‘consumer’401 and applies to transactions between 
consumers and suppliers to the extent that no exception or exemption under section 5 applies. 
a) Consumer 
One of the most significant weaknesses of South African law, before the Act came into effect, 
was the absence of a uniform definition of a ‘consumer’.402 Contrary to other pieces of 
legislation, where a consumer is defined as a natural person who is acting for purposes that are 
not related to his or her trade, business or profession,403 or where the definition of a ‘consumer’ 
provides differentiated levels of control for natural and juristic persons,404 the South African 
legislature sought to define consumers broadly as individuals who purchase goods and services 
as well as third parties who act on behalf of the consumer.405 However, the definition of 
‘consumer’ in section 1 does not require that the third party acts on behalf of the consumer. 
This means that also those consumers are protected who had no knowledge of the transaction, 
and who end up being the users or beneficiaries of the goods or services. As small businesses 
are also vulnerable, they were granted protection from unfair contract terms too. The definition 
of ‘consumer’ contains the word ‘person’. In section 1, ‘person’ includes a juristic person, such 
as a partnership or association, a body corporate, or a trust.406 Section 5(2)(b) also regards 
juristic persons as consumers. 
A consumer, in respect of any particular goods or services, is defined in section 1 as  
- a person to whom those particular goods or services are marketed in the ordinary course 
of the supplier’s business,407 or  
- a person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary course of the 
supplier’s business, unless the transaction is exempt from the application of the Act by 
section 5(2) or (3),408 or  
- if the context so requires or permits, a user of those particular goods or a recipient or 
beneficiary of those particular services, irrespective of whether he was a party to a 
transaction concerning the supply of those goods or services,409 and  
                                                             
400 E.g., in s 48(1) in pr. 
401 E.g., in s 48(1)(c). 
402 GenN 1957 in GG 26774 at 25. 
403 See art 1 Directive 1999/44/EC. 
404 This is the case under the Australian Consumer Law. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 437 note 42. 
405 GenN 1957 in GG 26774 at 25. 
406 See s 1 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
407 Section 1, definition of ‘consumer’ (a). 
408 Section 1, definition of ‘consumer’ (b). 
409 Section 1, definition of ‘consumer’ (c). 
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- a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement, to the extent applicable in terms of 
section 5(6)(b) to (e).410  
 
It is unclear if bystanders also afford the protection of the Act when they suffer harm as a result 
of unsafe goods. Goods are unsafe if they, due to a characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, 
present an extreme risk of personal injury or property damage to the consumer or to other 
persons.411 What is more, section 61(5) which prescribes the forms of ‘harm’ for which a 
supplier may be held accountable under section 61, refers to injury death or illness of any 
natural person412 and damage or loss of any property and does not limit it to harm to consumers 
or their property. Therefore, bystanders seem also to be covered by the protection of the Act.413 
This is astonishing as the producer, importer, distributor or retailer of goods is liable without 
proof of negligence on the part of the supplier, for any harm caused by the goods.414 There is 
no room for the law of delict, however, as a fault (negligence or intention) is not required.415 
As users of goods and recipients or beneficiaries of services are considered consumers in terms 
of the Act as well, these persons do not need to conclude their transactions directly with the 
given supplier.416 Therefore, the recipient of a gift is also regarded as a consumer and does not 
need to approach the donor in case of a defective good. Instead, he or she can directly approach 
the supplier.417 The same applies for the beneficiary of a service which is paid for by a friend 
or family member, e.g., a professional gardening service. Although such an extensive definition 
of ‘consumer’ grants broad protection to a ‘consumer’ (who is not a party to a transaction), this 
begs the question of whether this might not create problems between the user/recipient and the 
donor/service purchaser. It often seems more desirable to solve problems directly between the 
person who is a party of a transaction and the supplier, rather than between the end consumer 
benefiting from the concerned good or service and the supplier. What is more, the phrase 'if the 
context so requires or permits' in the definition of ‘consumer’ is imprecise insofar as it does 
not give any indication for the exact requirements, because something that might be legally 
required or permitted might not necessarily be required or permitted from a social perspective. 
                                                             
410 Section 1, definition of ‘consumer’ (d). 
411 Section 53(1)(d). Emphasis added. 
412 Emphasis added. 
413 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 36. 
414 Melville Consumer Protection Act 98. 
415 See Van Huyssteen et al Law of Contact 42. 
416 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 7. 
417 Although there is no consideration in terms of a gift, the CPA nevertheless applies as there is consideration 
between the supplier and the consumer (donor). 
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Although B2B contracts are included in the ambit of the Act, the definition of ‘consumer’ is 
silent about the question of whether the Act also affords protection to small businesses or 
individuals who purchase products for business purposes. The wording of the definition of 
‘transaction’ suggests that only the supplier is to market or supply his or her products 'in the 
ordinary course of (his or her) business', but that the consumer has to purchase these products 
‘privately’. In addition, the existence of a threshold means that the Act extends to small 
businesses when they make routine purchases or purchases of minor value for their professional 
activity. Van Eeden correctly reminds that there is no doctrinal necessity for the restriction of 
consumer protection legislation to a personal context.418 The Act therefore applies to both B2C 
and B2B contracts. 
Irrespective of the threshold contemplated in section 5(2)(b), the protection of the Act extends 
also to businesses whose annual turnover or asset value is above this threshold, in terms of 
product recalls and claims for harm caused by defective products.419 
The legislator also included franchisees as they are often exposed to unfair practices. A 
franchisee may challenge all terms of the franchise agreements, irrespective of the size of the 
franchisee in terms of its turnover or asset value.420 
De Stadler criticises that the Act does not use the term ‘consumer’ throughout the Act and 
creates unnecessary uncertainty by also using the term ‘person’.421 What is more, the definition 
of ‘consumer’ – like many other definitions of the Act – is not self-explanatory and contains 
many cross-references to other definitions (‘person’, ‘goods’, ‘services’, ‘transaction’), which 
refer themselves to other definitions. It would have been beneficial if certain cross-references 
had been avoided by merely rephrasing some definitions.  
b) Supplier 
A supplier is a person who markets any goods or services.422 ‘Market’ as a verb means to 
promote or supply any goods or services.423 To promote means to advertise, display or offer to 
supply goods or services to all or part of the public for consideration, to make any 
representation that could reasonably be inferred as expressing a willingness to supply goods or 
                                                             
418 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 43. 
419 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 8; ss 53-61. 
420 Section 5(6)(b)-(e) and 7. De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 9. 
421 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 38. 
422 Section 1, definition of ‘supplier’. 
423 See definition of ‘market’ in s 1. 
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services for consideration, or to engage in any other conduct that may reasonably be construed 
to be an inducement or attempted inducement to a person to engage in a transaction.424 
For the application of the Act, the supplier must provide the goods or services in the ordinary 
course of his or her business.425 
To supply, concerning goods, includes sell, rent, exchange and hire in the ordinary course of 
business for consideration, or in relation to services, to sell the services, or to perform or cause 
them to be performed or provided, or to grant access to any premises, event, activity or facility 
in the ordinary course of business for consideration.426 
The word ‘includes’ in the definition above means that activities such as selling, renting and 
hiring are not exclusive, but only examples with respect to goods, whereas selling or 
performing services, causing them to be performed or provided and so forth in relation to 
services are exclusive. This means that no other activities are meant to be included in the 
definition of supplying services. 'To grant access' could mean that third parties are involved, 
for instance, agents selling tickets for spectacles.427 
The supplier must provide the goods or services in exchange for a consideration because 
‘transaction’ is defined in section 1 as an agreement, the supply or the performance of services 
for consideration.428 
In terms of section 5(8)(c), the Act applies irrespective of the supplier’s legal nature. It 
therefore applies to individuals, juristic persons, partnerships, trusts, organs of state, entities 
owned or directed by an organ of state, persons contracted or licensed by an organ of state to 
offer or supply any goods or services, or public-private partnerships.429 Furthermore, it does 
not matter if the supplier operates on a for-profit or non-profit basis and if it is required or 
                                                             
424 See definition of ‘promote’ in s 1. 
425 See also definition of ‘promote’ in s 1 which also requires a consideration. ‘Business’ means the continual 
marketing of any goods or services (s 1, definition of ‘business’), whereas ‘market’ as a verb means to promote 
or supply any goods or services (s 1, definition of ‘market’). 
426 See definition of ‘supply’ in s 1. 
427 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 315. 
428 ‘Consideration’ is defined in s 1 widely and includes anything that has a value (money, checks, property, tickets 
etc.), but also labour, barter or other goods or services, loyalty credit or award, coupons or other right to assert a 
claim, or any other thing, undertaking, promise, agreement or assurance, irrespective of its apparent intrinsic 
value, or whether it is transferred directly or indirectly, or involves only the supplier and consumer or other parties 
in addition to the latter. 
429 Section 5(2)(a) excludes the application of the CPA in cases where goods or services are promoted or supplied 
to the State. However, when the State is the supplier, the CPA applies. 
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licensed in terms of any public regulation to make the supply of the particular goods or services 
available to all or part of the public.430 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Contract terms must be incorporated in the contract in order to be applicable in terms of the 
Act, and other conditions required by the Act must have been fulfilled. Unfortunately, the 
illogical structure of Part G of Chapter 2 does not facilitate the ‘incorporation test’ and does 
not clearly distinguish between incorporation control, content control and interpretational 
control. 
As other legislation applies in conjunction with the Act, some other statutes apply concurrently 
with the Act where possible in cases of inconsistency between the given pieces of legislation. 
Consumers still may rely on common law rights because of the principle of freedom of contract. 
Nonetheless, the parties cannot derogate from rights that are afforded by the Act as it grants a 
higher level of protection to consumers. Therefore, it is likely that in most cases consumers 
will choose the Act’s protection rather than the application of common law rules. 
Under section 2(1), the Act must not be interpreted in a way that would preclude the consumer 
from exercising a common-law right. Consumers should thus have the choice in terms of the 
applicable dispute-resolution mechanisms which exist under the Act and the common law. 
As the phrase ‘occurring within the Republic’ in section 5(1) is not clear and differs from other 
pieces of legislation, such as the National Credit Act. The Act applies irrespective of whether 
the supplier resides or has its principal office within or outside the Republic. A simultaneous 
physical presence of the parties in South Africa is not necessary. Furthermore, a transaction 
can ‘occur’ several times, namely at the time of the conclusion of the agreement or the delivery 
of the goods or services. The determination of the moment of conclusion of the agreement is 
particularly difficult for electronic transactions. Sections 22(2) and 23(c) ECTA solve this 
problem because it is the buyer who will be the offeror in cases where websites consist of 
platforms of advertisements. In other cases, the usual place of business or residence is regarded 
as the place where the data message has been sent and received. 
                                                             
430 Section 5(8)(d). 
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Clauses providing that the law of a particular country will apply cannot supplant the mandatory 
application of the Act and will be presumed to be unfair in most cases. 
The material scope of application of the Act covers every transaction occurring within South 
Africa unless it is exempted under section 5(2) to (4). The transaction must be made in the 
ordinary course of business, which excludes once-off transactions. A purposive interpretation 
on a case-to-case basis might be justified, and consumers must inform themselves to a 
reasonable degree if their supplier acts in its ordinary course of business. Section 5(6) expands 
the definition of ‘transaction’ to clubs and other associations, irrespective of whether their 
members have to pay a membership fee. The reason for this expansion is the application of 
sections 53 to 61 in case of defective goods. 
Franchise agreements, irrespective of the franchisee’s turnover or asset value, are included in 
the definition of ‘transaction’ in terms of section 5(6)(b) to (e) because large franchisors could 
otherwise overreach small franchisees. 
A further condition of ‘transaction’ is the existence of consideration, which is defined very 
broadly in section 1. Goods of which a certain amount is given ‘for free’ should be considered 
being given for consideration as the free part only concerns the supplier’s margin and not the 
consumer’s consideration. Non-profit organisations should be careful not to accept any 
‘consideration’ in order to avoid the application of the Act. 
As the consumer’s remedies differ from whether goods or services are supplied, it is important 
to distinguish clearly between these two categories. Both definitions in section 1 are 
comprehensive and not exhaustive. The definition of ‘goods’ concerns all possible tangible and 
intangible products. The definition of ‘service’ is more complicated and less clear. This is 
because of the interplay between the Act and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act, the Long-term Insurance Act and the Short-term Insurance Act as well as the Financial 
Services Laws General Amendment Act. The latter excludes specific industries, but not the 
application of the National Credit Act. Thus, the Act applies to goods or services sold in terms 
of a credit agreement. 
What is more, the definition of ‘service’ includes rentals and certain in rem rights in connection 
to immovable property. The legislator’s legal qualification might be an over-protection of the 
consumer and is problematic in terms of the qualification of in rem rights as services. 
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The reason why the rights of a franchisee are mentioned in the definition of ‘service’ seems to 
be the liability of intermediaries. The consumer is therefore not obliged to engage in a 
complicated process in order to determine the liable person. 
With regard to the definition of ‘promote’, in the case of cross-border advertising and new 
media, section 5(1)(b) seems to apply only to promotions taking place within South Africa, 
irrespective of the place of the ultimate transaction. 
Regrettably, the Act does not provide for a definition of ‘terms and conditions’, which would 
ascertain a uniform application of the Act and avoid the circumvention of the Act by specific 
contract design measures. 
Section 5(2) contains several exceptions for the application of the Act. Although the term 
‘State’ is not defined, it seems that ‘State’ has a more limited meaning than the concept of 
‘organ of state’. The legislator should clarify this question. This would also answer the question 
of whether companies where the State is a shareholder afford protection. Nonetheless, 
wherever the State is directly involved, even as a minority shareholder, no protection should 
be afforded. 
Another exception in section 5(2) concerns juristic persons whose asset value or annual 
turnover equals or exceeds a certain threshold. Large sole proprietorship-consumers with a 
significant turnover are not excluded, however. This is the consequence of the purpose of the 
Act that defines 'consumers' widely, and reflects the socio-economic reality in South Africa. 
The valuation of the turnover or asset value has to be made at the time of the transaction. This 
moment is difficult to determine as a transaction may happen several times. This applies 
especially to ongoing supply or service agreements. For practical reasons, it is justified in these 
cases that the supplier determines those values at least from time to time in order to comply 
with the Act. Where such information is not available, the Act should nevertheless apply in the 
limit of its scope of application as it aims to protect consumers and not suppliers. A warranty 
or declaration that the asset value or turnover is not met is not a viable solution. 
The calculation of the annual turnover or asset value is based on official standards. This is 
problematic for small companies in terms of the costs involved. Instead, the consideration of 
the numbers in a credit application and/or the company’s tax return could be used. 
Credit agreements under the National Credit Act are exempted from the application of the Act. 
This does however not apply to the goods and services which are subject of the credit 
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agreement. In any event, a credit provider cannot exclude its liabilities in terms of sections 
56(2) and 61 or the common law. In terms of credit marketing, there is duplication with 
provisions of the National Credit Act, so that section 2(9) CPA applies. As the National Credit 
Act is not included in the statutes listed in the definition of ‘financial services legislation’ of 
the Financial Services Board Act, the Consumer Protection Act is applicable to a certain extent 
in the credit industry. Its application is however excluded to a certain extent in terms of the 
Financial Services Board Act which does not refer to credit providers but to banks, mutual 
banks and co-operative banks. 
Incidental credit agreements are not qualified as credit agreements under the National Credit 
Act, which is why they are not excluded from the ambit of the Consumer Protection Act. The 
same applies to credit advertising and marketing, where section 2(9) CPA is applicable, i.e., 
the provisions of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act apply concurrently 
where possible. Otherwise, the provision which affords the greater protection applies. 
As the Act does not distinguish between unlimited and fixed-term employment contracts, it 
should apply to both. It does not apply to independent contractors who are not regarded as 
employees in terms of the Labour Relations Act. Because section 5(2)(e) aims to not put too 
much a burden on the employer/employee relationship, the phrase 'services to be supplied 
under an employment contract' should only refer to services supplied by employees. 
Consequently, the Act applies where an employee receives sub-standard services by his or her 
employer at a discount. Collective bargaining agreements or collective agreements are also 
exempted from the application of the Act. 
The Act shall not override industry-specific regulations with specific consumer protection 
schemes. This is why the Minister may grant a permanent or temporary exemption in terms of 
section 5(3) and (4). The substantive requirements for such an exemption are not drafted out 
though, which gives much room for discretion. 
Despite the existence of exemptions (or exceptions) contained in section 5, there is a joint and 
several liability in terms of safety monitoring and recall and liability for unsafe goods under 
sections 60 and 61. A contractual exclusion of liability in terms of section 61 seems not to be 
possible, as otherwise the weakest link in the supply chain (the retailer) would be left without 
recourse against the upwards links of the chain, although the latter have more control over the 
quality of the product and can take insurance against specific risks. 
 78   
 
The personal scope of application of the Act is extensive and comprises not only consumers to 
whom goods and services are marketed or who enter into a transaction with a supplier, but also 
persons who are not necessarily a party to the agreement as well as franchisees. The definition 
of ‘consumer’ is therefore very broad. 
The phrase 'if the context so requires or permits' in the definition of ‘consumer’ is imprecise 
and gives no indication with respect to the requirements. Bystanders seem also be covered by 
the Act, which means that the Act introduces liability without the requirement of any 
negligence. As the legislature also wanted to protect small businesses, B2B contracts afford 
the protection of the Act too. This also applies to routine purchases or purchases of minor value 
for professional purposes. As the definition of ‘consumer’ contains the word ‘person’, juristic 
persons are regarded as consumers. 
Unfortunately, the Act does not apply the term ‘consumer’ systematically and often replaces it 
by ‘person”. What is more, the definition of ‘consumer’ contains many cross-references which 
could have been avoided. 
In the case of product recalls and claims for harm caused by defective products, the threshold 
in terms of section 5(2)(b) is irrelevant. 
A supplier has to provide the goods or services in the ordinary course of its business, 
irrespective of its legal nature and of whether it operates on a for-profit or non-profit basis. In 
any event, there must be a consideration for the supplier’s provision of goods or services. 
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3. Notice required for certain terms and conditions 
When entering into an agreement, the consumer should not be affected by a notice or provision 
that limits his or her rights or that could be unexpected.431 For this reason, section 49 provides 
that the supplier has to draw the consumer’s attention to certain notices and provisions in a 
manner and form that satisfies the formal requirements of section 49(3) to (5).432 Section 49 
therefore has a warning function and must be discussed in the context of the incorporation 
control. 
Although the word ‘notice’ appears recurrently in the Act, section 1 does not contain a 
definition of this term. The reason might be that the Act uses this word within different contexts 
and meanings.433 In the context of section 49, 'notice' means a written notification or another 
form of information in writing to the consumer. Kirby correctly states that because of a lack of 
a separate definition of ‘notice’, section 22(1) creates the first criterion in respect of plain and 
understandable language, namely, that it applies to legally prescribed notices or visual 
representations (representation or documents which are required to accompany goods or 
services when the consumer acquires such goods or services).434 
3.1 Material requirements  
It is uncertain why at the beginning of section 49(1), the plural of ‘consumer’ (‘notice to 
consumers’) is used, as opposed to ‘provision of a consumer agreement’ in the same sentence. 
This could mean that the legislator wanted to include different communication methods, like 
entry tickets or notice boards because these are intended for a multitude of consumers. Van 
Eeden435 argues in this way concerning section 58(1) which refers to section 49. The fact that 
the wording of section 58(1) correlates rather with section 49(2) as both provisions concern 
activities or facilities that are subject to certain risks, and not a limitation or assumption of risk 
or liability, an exemption clause or an acknowledgement of fact as in section 49(1) does not 
                                                             
431 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 357. 
432 Meumann White Attorneys 'A summary of the consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008' at: 
https://meumannwhite.co.za/news-details/25. 
433 Apart from the abovementioned meaning of ‘notice’ which appears also for instance in the definitions of 
‘apply’, ‘clearly’, ‘display’, ‘prescribed’, ‘price’ (a), ‘this Act’ and in ss 3(1)(b)(iv), 4(4)(b), the word has another 
meaning in ss 5(4) and 12(2), as there it means a notice in the gazette, which is a public announcement. In s 7(2) 
the written notice to the franchiser means the formal declaration to end the franchise agreement; the same meaning 
of ‘notice’ can be found, for example, in Schedule 2 item 6(2) CPA. Sections 100 and 101 deal with compliance 
notices, i.e., formal orders of the Commission. 
434 Kirby 'South Africa: Clearly clear? Plain and understandable language in terms of the Consumer Protection 
Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+Plain+ 
And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act. 
435 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 179; Consumer Protection Law 247. 
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weaken this argument because section 58(1) in fine refers to 'the attention of consumers'436 and 
to section 49. Therefore, it is imaginable that the legislator had notices to a multitude of 
consumers in mind and chose to use ‘consumer’ in the plural form. 
The formulation 'must be drawn to the attention of the consumer' (in the singular form) could 
be understood as an emphasis of the fact that each consumer’s attention must be drawn to the 
risks mentioned above, even if a large number of consumers is affected by the notice. In other 
words, these notions must be visible for every single consumer in the sense of section 49(4)(a). 
Section 49(1)(a) to (d) contains the cases in which the supplier has to draw the consumer’s 
attention to certain circumstances which will be discussed in the following. 
a) Limitation or assumption of risk or liability, imposition of an obligation or 
acknowledgement of a fact 437 
If an agreement contains provisions that limit the supplier’s or someone else’s risk or liability, 
constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer, impose an obligation on the 
consumer to indemnify the supplier or any other person for any cause, or is an 
acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer, the supplier must draw the consumer’s attention 
in the prescribed form and manner.438 
Typical clauses that have such an effect are exemption clauses, indemnity clauses and clauses 
stating that no representations were made.439 
Synonyms for ‘exemption clauses’ are ‘exclusionary clauses’, ‘exception clauses’ or 
‘disclaimers’.440 These clauses are contractual terms which have the objective to limit, alter or 
exclude the liability, obligations or remedies of a party to the contract that normally originate 
from an agreement.441 The importance of exemption clauses should not be underestimated as 
they serve as a planning instrument to achieve an acceptable distribution of the risk.442 
                                                             
436 Emphasis added. 
437 Section 49(1). 
438 Section 49(1). 
439 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 357. 
440 Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 496. 
441 Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 496. 
442 Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 497. 
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aa) Limitation of the supplier’s liability or risk443 
Terms that limit the supplier’s liability are known as disclaimers or exclusion of liability. They 
limit any claim of the consumer against the supplier444 or limit the amount of a consumer’s 
claim against the supplier, even if the consumer’s actual damages exceed this amount.445 
Provisions by which the consumer is held liable for the loss of or damage to goods before those 
were delivered to the consumer fall in this category too. Such a clause does not contravene 
section 19(2)(c), however. The latter provides that goods will remain at the supplier’s risk until 
they are delivered as this provision allows that the parties may agree differently. 
bb) Assumption of risk or liability by the consumer446 
This category comprises warranties that are more limited than those under the common law.447  
cc) Consumer’s obligation to indemnify448 
These are terms by which the consumer bears the burden of liability or risk that would normally 
be borne by the supplier. Typical formulations of such clauses are, for instance, 'hold harmless 
against' or 'bear the risk of' or 'indemnity'.449 
dd) Acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer450 
In this category fall terms by which the consumer acknowledges that the contract embodies the 
entire agreement between the parties or that no representations were made before its 
conclusion. A term or condition that falsely expresses such an acknowledgement is void in 
under sections 51(1)(g)(i), 51(3) as it falls in the category of ‘blacklisted’ terms.451 
Provisions by which the consumer acknowledges that he or she has read and understood the 
terms of an agreement fall within this category too because this precludes the consumer from 
alleging that he or she signed the agreement under a mistaken belief.452 
                                                             
443 Section 49(1)(a). 
444 E.g., by voetstoots clauses which provide that the buyer/consumer buys a good ‘as is’. 
445 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 118. 
446 Section 49(1)((b). 
447 As to implied warranties, see s 56(1). 
448 Section 49(1)(c). 
449 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 119. 
450 Section 49(1)(d). 
451 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 119. 
452 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 119. 
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b) Risk of an unusual character or nature453 
If a provision or notice concerns any activity or facility that is subject to any risk of an unusual 
character or nature,454 the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be expected to 
be aware or notice, or which an ordinarily alert consumer could not reasonably be expected to 
notice or contemplate in the circumstances,455 or that could result in serious injury or death,456 
the supplier must specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk to the 
attention of the consumer in the prescribed form and manner.457 A public swimming pool with 
an entirely covered slide (‘tube’) preventing natural light from coming through, which has a 
stroboscope (high frequency flashing light), and where the user gains a speed of 60 to 80 km/h 
can be harmful because of the risk of epilepsy for certain users (stroboscope effect). Therefore, 
the supplier (manager) has to draw the fact, nature and potential effect of that risk to the users. 
It is not clear what exactly the formulation 'in addition to subsection (1)' at the beginning of 
section 49(2) means. Either it could mean that the conditions of subsection (1), e.g., the 
supplier’s limitation of liability, have to be fulfilled cumulatively with the conditions of 
subsection (2), for instance, an activity of an unusual character for which the supplier wishes 
to limit his liability. Or it could simply mean that the supplier has to call the consumer’s 
attention to the risks mentioned in subsection (2), irrespective of whether there is a limitation 
of the supplier’s liability. The formulation 'if a provision or notice concerns any activity or 
facility that is subject to any risk' speaks for this viewpoint as it does not refer to subsection (1). 
It is submitted that it is rather unlikely that the legislator had in mind to require that the 
conditions of both subsections (1) and (2) have to be met cumulatively as this would limit the 
scope of section 49 and its protective and warning function. Section 49(2) must thus be 
understood in the sense that the supplier must not only draw the consumer’s attention to 
exemptions mentioned in section 49(1) (if any) but also to the risks mentioned in section 49(2), 
irrespective of whether there is a limitation or assumption of risk or liability. In addition, the 
fact that section 49(2) repeats that the requirements of subsections (3) to (5) must be met, also 
speaks for this solution. In this context, the fact that subsection (1) requires that the ‘formal 
requirements’ of subsections (3) to (5) must be met, whereas subsection (2) merely refers to 
‘requirements’ has no meaning since subsections (3) to (5) exclusively concern formal 
                                                             
453 Section 49(2). 
454 Section 49(2)(a). 
455 Section 49(2)(b). 
456 Section 49(2)(c). 
457 Section 49(2). 
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requirements.458 Moreover, where it refers to material requirements (e.g., ‘begins to engage the 
activity’), those are inseparably linked to the formal requirements. 
The first possibility, for instance, a notice limiting a risk or liability of the supplier, in addition 
to a dangerous activity under subsection (2) to which the supplier draws the consumer’s 
attention, will be the most recurrent situation. It is improbable that a supplier providing for 
dangerous activities (e.g., parachuting) will not limit its liability. It is conceivable though that 
a supplier – intentionally or not – merely warns the consumer of the dangers without limiting 
its liability. In this case, section 49(2) still would make sense as that risk or danger has to be 
drawn to the consumer’s attention in plain language (so he or she understands the risk), in a 
conspicuous manner and form which is likely to attract his attention (so he or she actually takes 
notice of it), and before he or she engages in the activity (so he or she still can change his or 
her mind). Furthermore, the consumer has to be given an adequate opportunity to receive and 
comprehend the provision or notice.  
3.2 Formal requirements  
Section 49(1) in fine sets out that the supplier must specifically draw the fact, nature and 
potential effect of the risk to the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies 
the requirements of section 49(3) to (5).459 
a) Plain language 
According to section 49(3), the provision, condition or notice contemplated in subsection (1) 
or (2) has to be written in plain language, as described in section 22.460 
Section 22(1) regulates that notices, documents or visual representations which are required in 
terms of the Act or other law be produced in plain and understandable language as well as in 
the prescribed form, if any. 
Efforts to make legal documents more understandable date back to 1425, when a commission 
was appointed 'to see and examine the bulkis of law of this realme (…) and mend the laws that 
need amendment'. In the 16th century, Edward VI wished 'that the superfluous and tedious 
                                                             
458 Emphasis added. 
459 Gibson and Hull Everyone’s Guide to the CPA 163. 
460 Generally, there is no requirement that an agreement has to be in writing, but s 49 imposes this obligation. 
What is more, according to s 50(1), the Minister may prescribe categories of consumer agreements that are 
required to be in writing. These issues will be discussed at a later stage. 
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statutes were brought into one sum together, and made more plain and short, to the intent that 
men might better understand them.'461 
Under the common law, courts were limited to objective factors when setting aside a contract, 
such as structure, layout, wording and language. The only applicable common-law basis for 
setting aside a contract was misrepresentation or mistake. The court would consider if the error 
was iustus, i.e., if a reasonable person in the given situation would have been similarly 
misled.462 The doctrines of caveat subscriptor463 and pacta sunt servanda often led to an 
unsuccessful outcome for the consumer. Subjective factors such as the sophistication of the 
consumer, or his or her home language were difficult to utilise in this framework, even though 
courts were increasingly taking into account structure and wording of a contract when 
evaluating whether an error was iustus.464 Thus, the common-law principles are insufficient in 
order to address the problem of standard terms that are intelligible to most consumers.465 
The plain language requirement is inseparably linked to the problem of standard terms as the 
contents of standard provisions are hidden from the consumer due to many factors, such as 
access, print, language, legal jargon and psychological factors.466 
Section 22 is stipulated under the umbrella right of information and disclosure. When 
interpreting this provision, certain purposes set out in section 3 must be given effect. Section 
3(1)(b)(iv) aims to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of consumers by 
reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages experienced in accessing any supply of goods or 
services by consumers whose ability to read and comprehend written documents is limited 
                                                             
461 Office of the Scottish Parliamentary Counsel ‘Plain Language and Legislation Booklet’ (Feb. 2006) at 1 
('Drafting matters! guidance) at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/02/17093804/0. See also Gouws 
2010 SA Merc LJ 79. 
462 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 454. 
463 According to the caveat subscriptor principle, the parties are bound to the terms of an agreement when it is 
reduced in writing as signature signifies assent thereto. The burden is therefore placed on the consumer who has 
to protect himself by understanding the terms before signing it as he will be bound to their ordinary meaning. The 
CPA shifts the burden of ‘understanding’ to the supplier in terms of ss 22 and 50. However, the common-law 
principle of caveat subscriptor remains in existence, but the burden in terms of understanding the agreement has 
been shifted from the consumer to the supplier. See Tennant/Mbele 2013 De Rebus 17. Examples where the caveat 
subscriptor principle was held against the consumer under the common law: Van Vuuren v Kloppers Diskontohuis 
(Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 1053 (O), Die Trust Bank van Afrika Beperk v Du Toit 1961 (3) SA 36 (T), George v 
Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (AD), Bhikagee v Southern Aviation (Pty) Ltd 1949 (4) SA 105 (E), Burger 
v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571. 
464 Newman 2012 Obiter 638. Examples for this doctrine: Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lötter 1989 (1) SA 585 
(C); Diners Club (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn 1990 (2) SA 870 (C); Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Livingstone 1995 (4) SA 
493 (W); Roomer v Wedge Steel (Pty) Ltd 1998 (1) SA 538 (N); Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
2007 (4) SA 572 (W); Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). These cases served as guidelines when 
s 22(2)(a)-(d) CPA was drafted. 
465 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 379. 
466 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 45. 
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because of low literacy, vision impairment or limited fluency in the language in which the 
representation is produced, published or presented.  
Another purpose of the Act is improving consumer awareness and information, and 
encouraging responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour.467  This enables 
consumers to compare products and prices, which has a positive effect on the efficiency of 
markets.468 Informed consumers are enabled to compare prices and to shop around so that 
markets become more effective by competition. Eventually, prices might decrease.469 
Documents that are presented in a clear and understandable language also promote consumer 
confidence, empowerment and the development of a culture of consumer responsibility, which 
is another purpose of the Act.470 
It can thus be said that the plain language requirement in section 22 serves transparency and 
procedural fairness471 and makes the consumers’ rights accessible to them. Without procedural 
fairness, there is an information asymmetry between the supplier and the consumer.472 
Procedural fairness concerns the process of contracting itself by improving the conduct of the 
‘potential bargaining process’,473 whereas substantive fairness refers to the content of the 
agreement itself.474 Transparency is achieved by understandable language, a clear structure of 
the document, readability and adequate opportunity for reflection.475 Inversely, a right which 
is not accessible is equivalent to a non-existing right.476 Therefore, plain language is a valuable 
tool to promote procedural fairness proactively as it enhances disclosure and the consumers’ 
understanding of the content of an agreement.477 
Documents written in plain language are not only beneficial for consumers and their 
understanding of the document but also for suppliers. This is true because a document written 
in plain language increases the consumer’s confidence in the supplier and avoids litigation 
because the consumer is aware of its obligations and will less likely breach the contract. 
                                                             
467 Section 3(1)(e). 
468 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 530. 
469 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
470 Section 3(1)(f). 
471 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 531. 
472 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 377. 
473 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 377. 
474 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
475 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
476 Stoop and Chürr 2013 PELJ 545. 
477 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 329, 330. 
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Section 22 concerns only written documents and visual representations but not oral 
agreements.478 Barnard is hesitant about this question though and points out that the courts will 
have the final say about this.479 It is submitted that the wording in section 22 is unambiguous 
as it concerns only notices, documents or visual representations, i.e., written documents. What 
is more, section 22(2)(d) concerns illustrations, headings or other aids to reading, which by 
nature only apply to written texts in a broader sense and graphical illustrations. For practical 
reasons, the application of section 22 to oral agreements also seems to be difficult. The 
assessment of whether the plain language requirements are met seems impossible ex post facto, 
save if they are recorded on tape (which would be very unusual).  
Interestingly, section 22 CPA has a broader ambit as section 64 NCA because not only 
documents but also notices and visual representations are included.480 
Although section 22 does not apply to the Consumer Protection Act – or other statutes – itself, 
it is regrettable that the legislature did not tend to make this statute more accessible by writing 
it in plain language. This does not only apply to consumers and suppliers but also to lawyers 
who struggle to understand the provisions and the structure of the Act.481 
Unfortunately, section 22 – as the rest of the Act – is far from being written in plain language. 
This is not only because section 22 does not offer any help in the understanding of what plain 
language is, save some abstract specifications as regards the content, the organisation, the 
vocabulary or the use of illustrations,482 or because of the lack of guidelines published by the 
Commission.483 Above all, it is because the structure of the Act is unfortunate and not 
accessible for most consumers.484 The language itself of the Act is complicated and far from 
being understandable for most people.485 The numerous cross-references between sections486 
                                                             
478 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 531.  
479 Barnard J 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 11. 
480 The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 was the first statute that required that documents be drafted in plain 
language. Besides the CPA, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 also defines in its s 6(4) and (5) plain language 
concerning the drafting of a prospect, notice, disclosure or other document that does not have a prescribed form.  
481 See De Stadler 'In search of the plain language standard' Consumer Law Review (Juta) April 2012, 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review-april-2012-1/ (no longer available). 
482 Section 22(2)(a)-(d). 
483 See s 22(3) and (4). 
484 The CPA is divided into 6 chapters and 2 schedules. The chapters themselves are divided into different parts 
containing 122 sections, with probably far more than a thousand subsections, which themselves are subdivided 
into further subdivisions. What is more, the headings of the various parts, chapters and sections are not always 
understandable at first sight. For instance, the consumer’s right to choose (Part C) contains provisions such as s 15 
(pre-authorisation of repair or maintenance services) or s 14 (expiry and renewal of fixed-term agreements). 
485 Examples are 'conspicuous' (ss 25(1)(b), (2), 49(4)(a)), 'import' (s 22(2)), or 'unconscionable' (heading of s 40). 
486 Section 58(1)(c) for example refers to s 49, which itself refers further to s 22, which again refers to guidelines 
it subsections (3) and (4) which do not exist yet… 
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and even between definitions and sections487 frustrate a reasonable reading flow. Finally, the 
fact that there are too many open questions, uncertainties, unfortunate or ambiguous 
formulations and unintentional omissions488 does not facilitate the reading of the Act either.  
Coertse argues that the reading of the Act is 'cumbersome (…) and requires undue effort'.489 
Others, like Bekink and Botha assert that it is debatable whether pieces of legislation should 
be drafted to be understandable by the general population.490 This viewpoint misconceives 
however the fact that statutes like the Consumer Protection Act which elevate plain language 
to a fundamental consumer right491 have to be accessible to consumers so that they can exercise 
their rights. Otherwise, these rights are being ‘administrated’ in an ebony tower where only 
legally trained persons can fully understand them. This cannot be the purpose of fundamental 
consumer rights, however. This is also Coertse’s opinion.492 This right seems not to be 
enforceable though because there is no evidence in the Act or the Constitution that such a right 
exists for statutes. Nevertheless, the legislature should aim to make statutes more accessible to 
the public, irrespective of whether or not they enshrine fundamental consumer rights. 
aa) Meaning of ‘plain language’ 
A document or visual representation is in plain language if the requirements of section 22(2) 
are met. This means that consumers must not only be able to understand the content of the 
document but also its meaning and effect, i.e., the legal consequences, and its express and 
implied meaning.493 Unfortunately, the legal consequences are not always apparent from the 
text as they are often implied. Therefore, consumers have to be explicitly informed of these 
implications before the plain-language requirement is fulfilled.494 
Section 22(2) (a) to (d) contains a list of criteria which have to be taken into account when 
considering if a document is in plain language. These are the context, comprehensiveness and 
                                                             
487 See definitions of 'alternative dispute resolution agent' in s 1 (b) referring to s 82(6), 'clearly' referring to s 22, 
'consumer' (b) referring to ss 5(2) and (3) concerning exemptions of this definition (sic), 'price' (a) referring to 
s 23 and so forth. 
488 These will be discussed in this thesis as far as they concern its subject. 
489 Coertse 2014 De Rebus 28. 
490 Bekink and Botha 'Statute Law Review' at https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/3430/1/ 
Bekink_Aspects%282007%29.pdf (this pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for 
publication in Statute Law Review following peer review seems no longer available). 
491 See heading of s 22, where the word ‘right’ is used. 
492 Coertse 2014 De Rebus 28. 
493 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 534, De Stadler 'In search of the plain language standard' Consumer Law Review (Juta) 
April 2012 at https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review-april-2012-1/ (no longer 
available); Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 10. 
494 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 106. 
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consistency of the document,495 its organisation, form and style,496 the vocabulary, usage and 
sentence structure,497 as well as the use of any illustrations, examples, headings or other aids 
to reading and understanding.498 
Gouws prefers the term ‘features’ in terms of section 22(2)(a) to (d), as opposed to ‘criteria’,499 
and Redish suggests that standards, contrary to guidelines, are rigid, measurable and do not 
require judgement.500 These distinctions seem however not to have any practical relevance 
because it is evident that the ‘criteria’, ‘features’ or ‘standards’ set out in section 22(2) are not 
sufficient in order to determine what ‘plain language’ actually means. 
Gordon and Burt correctly point out that the definition contained in section 22(2) not only deals 
with grammar and wording but also is about the content, structure, design and style of the 
document, and has therefore been lauded internationally.501 The definition is too broad and 
imprecise however and does not give much direction to suppliers.502 The objective of plain 
language is, according to Stoop, to address technical and archaic vocabulary, passive voice 
constructions, complicated sentences and poor organisation.503 According to Gouws, plain 
language is direct and straightforward, and designed to deliver its message to the reader clearly, 
effectively and without undue effort. This is achieved by avoiding any obscurity, unnecessary 
words and complex sentences.504 
In the following, section 22(2)(a) to (d) will be discussed in detail in order to give more 
meaning to the expression ‘plain language’. 
(i) Context, comprehensiveness and consistency 
'Context' means the circumstances around the agreement to be taken into consideration when 
the consumer reads the document. One can thus take into consideration previous experience.505 
Gordon and Burt use the following example: A consumer who is subscribing a DVD rental 
                                                             
495 Section 22(2)(a). 
496 Section 22(2)(b). 
497 Section 22(2)(c). 
498 Section 22(2)(d). 
499 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 89. 
500 Redish 2008 Clarity 32. 
501 Gordon/Burt Without Prejudice 60. 
502 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
503 Stoop Int. J. Private Law 330. 
504 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 81. 
505 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 534, Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 333. 
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contract very likely knows what a DVD is, as it is unlikely that he or she would not be in this 
context if he did not.506 
The context too in which a clause can be found must be taken into account. In Royal Canin 
South Africa v Cooper,507 a suretyship obligation was contained in a sentence which started 
with an acknowledgement that the standard terms have been read and understood. The court 
was of the opinion that the document was misleading. In Diners Club v Thorburn, the court 
held that the inclusion of certain terms within the context of the contract turned it 'into a trap 
containing onerous clauses which would not reasonably be expected by the other party'.508 
'Comprehensiveness' means that the document should contain all information necessary to 
understand the contract. In order to assess the comprehensiveness or completeness of a 
document, its content must be taken into account so that consumers can make an informed 
choice.509 
Stoop believes that comprehensiveness not only refers to the content of the document but also 
how it is written.510 It is suggested though that this rather refers to other requirements, such as 
consistency, organisation, form and style, vocabulary, usage and sentence structure and 
illustrations, examples, headings or other aids to reading and understanding.511 
'Consistency' means that the terminology and the style used in the document must be the same 
throughout the entire document. The consistent use of terminology, headings and the sentence 
structure have to be taken into consideration.512 
(ii) Organisation, form and style 
The organisation, form and style of a document concern its structure in respect of the use of 
highlighted information (text boxes, bold…), the paragraph structure and the fond type.513 
Newman distinguishes between typographical and linguistic readability. The former concerns 
the physical legibility (font size, colours, layout, headings),514 whereas the latter refers to ‘legal 
                                                             
506 Gordon/Burt Without Prejudice 59. 
507 Royal Canin South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Cooper 2008 (1) SA 644 (SECLD) – hereafter Royal Canin South Africa 
v Cooper. 
508 Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn 1990 (2) SA 870 (C) – hereafter Diners Club SA v Thorburn. 
509 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 534; Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13. 
510 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13. Stoop correctly points out in para 
14 that the way of how a document is written is a question of consistency. 
511 See discussion below. 
512 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 535. 
513 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 333. 
514 Newman 2010 Obiter 738, Newman 2012 Obiter 637. 
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language’ which is often deterrent for consumers to read a contract.515 In other words, legibility 
is the ease with which the given document is read.516 In order to meet this requirement, no 
small print should be hidden, and important information should be mentioned at the top of a 
document, for instance.517 
These requirements played an important role in various court rulings. In Diners Club SA v 
Livingstone,518 the court stated: '(…) a series of conditions in incredibly small print, not 
designed to be read without the aid of magnifying equipment'.519 In Mercurius Motors v 
Lopez,520 the court analysed the variation in font size and format and its impact on the 
consumer’s attention to exemption clauses.521 In this decision, the Supreme Court had to decide 
on contract terms which were printed and located in a way that the consumer did not necessarily 
pay attention to them. It held that the standard form misled the consumer because it was unclear 
and confusing.522 The court also decided that an exemption clause that undermines the very 
essence of a contract should be brought to the attention of the client and not by way of an 
inconspicuous and barely legible clause that refers to the conditions on the reverse side of the 
page in question.523 
Newman correctly points out that suppliers invest a lot of time and money for their advertising. 
They want to attract new customers by using sophisticated techniques, such as certain font 
types in big sizes or contrasting colours. Besides, Naudé correctly argues that companies send 
out signals in advertising that contracting with them would be a positive experience and that 
the customer can trust the supplier.524 Only when drafting agreements, the same suppliers seem 
to forget about all these techniques which are aimed to attract the consumers’ attention.525 
(iii) Vocabulary, usage and sentence structure 
'Vocabulary, usage and sentence structure' refers to the readability of the document by using 
short sentences, no jargon or the active voice.526 
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The extension of the plain language requirement to headings is particularly interesting in this 
context because many contracts excluded the headings from interpretation. Section 22(2)(d) 
now prohibits a drafter from doing so.527 
With regard to the term ‘plain language’, it is suggested that not the information contained in 
a document is made understandable but the language expressing this information, which 
ultimately leads to the understanding of the content. De Stadler is of the view that the term 
‘plain language’ is misleading, and it would be better to speak of ‘understandable language’ 
instead.528 She equates ‘plain’ with ‘simple’, which could lead to the misconception that 
drafting a document in plain language would mean ‘dumbing down’ the document.529 
Remarkably, the heading of section 22 is entitled 'Right to information in plain and 
understandable language'. The legislator did not use the formulation 'simple and 
understandable language' or simply 'understandable language' in the provision itself though. 
A look in a dictionary reveals that ‘plain’ has the following meanings: 'not decorated or 
elaborate; simple or basic in character', or 'easy to perceive or understand; clear', or '(of written 
or spoken usage) clearly expressed, without the use of technical or abstruse terms'. The 
following examples are given: 'An insurance policy written in plain English', or 'I think the 
candidates need to be very specific and speak in plain English'.530  
De Stadler correctly concludes that ‘plain language’ means ‘clear’ or ‘understandable’ 
language. The adjectives ‘plain and understandable (language)’ used in the heading of section 
22 are therefore a tautology531 and not two adjectives with different meanings. 
Stoop asserts that plain language leads to effective communication and has nothing to do with 
anti-intellectual or anti-literary documents. Instead, it leads to clearer and often more accurate 
writing.532 This viewpoint illustrates the objective of the plain language requirement. The 
legislator did not intend to oversimplify the language of documents but rather make them more 
understandable so that the parties can communicate effectively. 
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528 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 105. 
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Newman gives some excellent examples of terms and conditions which have been redrafted by 
suppliers. Nedbank, for instance, changed clause 2.5 of its conditions from 
'Ownership of the card vests in the bank and the cardholder shall surrender the card to 
the bank…' 
into: 
'We are the owners of the card and, when your card account is closed for whatever 
reason, you must give the card back to us…' (now clause 2.7). 
Furthermore, Nedbank also changed clause 2.2 from 
'By retaining and/or using the card, the cardholder accepts all the terms and conditions 
herein contained and such acceptance shall be deemed to have taken place in 
Johannesburg' 
into: 
'2.2 If you do not want the card, you must destroy it immediately without using it and 
also notify us in writing thereof. 
2.3 By keeping and/or using the card you accept all the terms and conditions of use.' 
These examples illustrate that a sentence that formerly was written in words belonging to a 
high register level can be made more understandable by replacing words, such as ‘vest’ (with 
the misleading preposition ‘in’), ‘surrender’ and ‘deemed’, and by splitting it up in more 
digestible pieces. It seems however difficult to further ‘simplify’ this sentence without 
sacrificing its meaning. Plain language is not baby talk after all.  
(iv) Use of illustrations, examples, headings or other aids to reading and understanding 
Besides the language itself, also the visual presentation of a document (organisation, form and 
style, illustrations, headings or other aids to reading and understanding) must be considered 
when assessing if the plain-language requirement is met. These techniques aim to make the 
document more inviting and understandable.533 Therefore, devices such as charts, real-life 
examples, headings structuring the text and making it more ‘digestible’ help consumers to 
understand the document better and make it more readable. As a result, ‘plain language’ is not 
only about words, but also about how a text is laid out.534 
A visually appealing document with a well thought out design and layout can significantly 
contribute to its comprehensibility. Besides, an appealing and well-structured layout empowers 
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the readers (consumers) to read selectively and to find clauses easily they are looking for.535 In 
Dlamini v Standard Bank,536 for example, the court outlined the necessity of a comprehensible 
presentation as follows:  
'For lawyers and laypersons alike, the form of the Bank’s standard agreement is an 
unappetising formidable read. For a labourer like Mr Dlamini who did not read, write 
or understand English there might just as well have been no written agreement at all'.537 
The wording of section 22 is unfortunate because it seems to apply the ‘plain language’ 
requirements also to visual representations, like photos, illustrations, drawings or sketches. 
Doubtlessly, the caption belonging to such a visual representation, wherever it can be found 
(under, above, beside or on the visual representation) must meet the requirements of section 
22(2). As a visual representation itself, e.g., an illustration, is technically speaking not drafted 
in a language, the term ‘plain language’ in section 22 must thus be read as ‘clearly’ or 
‘understandable’. Hence, the plain-language requirement could be interpreted in the context of 
the phrase 'understand the content, significance and import'.538 The term ‘plain language’ in 
section 22 is therefore not only misleading but also too narrow. That is why section 22(2) 
should have been drafted as follows:  
'For the purposes of this Act, a notice or document is in plain language and a visual 
representation is understandable if it is reasonable to conclude…' 
How a document is structured and organised can hugely contribute to its comprehensibility. 
Ruth Baitsewe makes some interesting suggestions that probably almost everyone who 
regularly deals with different kind of texts has experienced. She gives some examples of how 
a text can be structured in order to empower the reader (consumer) to read selectively, such as 
descriptive headings that help to seize the information in the text, a table of contents for a better 
navigation within longer texts, text boxes that highlight important information, or a legible font 
type539 and size. One should also opt for enough white spacing between paragraphs and capital 
                                                             
535 Ruth Baitsewe 'Plain Language: More than just ‘plain’ words' Consumer Law Review (Juta) June 2012 at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-database_jun-2012-1-1-1-1-1-1 (no longer available). 
536 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 (1) SA 219 (KZD) – hereafter Standard Bank of South 
Africa v Dlamini. This case dealt, among other issues, with the plain language requirements. The court held at 
paras [48]-[50] that strictly interpreted neither s 63 nor s 64 NCA assist an illiterate person, but positively 
interpreted the plain language provisions of the NCA embody the right of the consumer to be informed by 
reasonable means of the material terms of the document he signs. In addition, the supplier bears the onus to prove 
that he took reasonable measures to inform the consumer of the material terms of the agreement.  
537 Standard Bank v Dlamini para [53]. 
538 Section 22(2). 
539 The drafter of a document should keep in mind that not only the font size, but also the font type can contribute 
to a better legibility. Some argue that the readability of longer texts is facilitated by the use of serif fonts, such as 
Times New Roman, rather than sans serif fonts, such as Arial. The opinions on this question differ, and drafters 
will be well advised if they try out different font types in order to decide which one is best suited. On the legibility 
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letters (only to highlight important words).540 De Stadler gives other examples, especially for 
the design of forms, but also for terms and conditions, such as avoiding the centring and full 
justification of texts, ensuring sufficient contrast between the text and the background colours, 
and choosing lines over blocks.541 
This discussion has however only a limited impact on section 49(3) because section 49(3) 
provides that the 'provision, condition or notice (…) must be written in plain language'. As a 
matter of fact, a notice, for instance, may contain visual representations, but the notice itself 
that limits the supplier’s liability or concerns a risky activity, is rather a written document. 
bb) Meaning of ‘ordinary consumer’ 
Section 22(2) demands that 'an ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the (…) 
document (…) is intended' is able to understand the document. This definition is somewhat 
flexible as it takes the specific market with the targeted consumers into account. The ‘ordinary 
consumer’ is thus a consumer who is ‘ordinary’ in a specific market. In other words, not only 
lawyers and consumer protection specialists should be able to understand the agreement in 
question, but also ‘ordinary’ consumers. This is a recent phenomenon in South Africa.542  
The phrase 'for whom the notice, document or visual representation is intended' indicates that 
the supplier must know its target audience in advance.543 
Nowadays, consumer and market research specialists can define typical consumers for certain 
products. It is submitted though that this flexible approach has its limits because certain 
products cannot be limited to a specific class of consumers because the consumers and their 
respective markets are too heterogeneous. For instance, a loan agreement is typically concluded 
both by wealthy and business-experienced people (who prefer paying interests that may be 
lower than the interests paid out for a specific investment) as well as by poor and inexperienced 
consumers (who have no other choice than financing certain goods with a loan). 
                                                             
and readability of font types, see 'It's about legibility' at http://www.fonts.com/content/learning/fontology/level-
4/fine-typography/legibility. 
540 Ruth Baitsewe 'Plain Language: More than just ‘plain’ words' Consumer Law Review (Juta) June 2012 at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-database_jun-2012-1-1-1-1-1-1 (no longer available). 
541 De Stadler 'Plain language tip: 10 ways to design better forms' Consumer Law Review (Juta) June 2015 at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review-june-2015/ (no longer available). 
542 Kirby 'South Africa: Clearly clear? Plain and understandable language in terms of the Consumer Protection 
Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+Plain+ 
And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act, Gordon/Burt 2010 Without 
Prejudice 60. 
543 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 533. 
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On the other hand, the flexible approach makes sense as the complexity of a contract may 
differ, depending on the complexity of the product or service.544 Terms for the sale of a 
hairdryer can be much ‘simpler’ than terms for the sale of a luxurious car or a life insurance 
policy, for example. What is more, a more flexible approach makes it possible to take into 
consideration all possible relationships between consumers and suppliers and leaves much 
discretion to persons who are responsible for interpreting the provisions of the Act, like the 
National Consumer Commission.545 
This fact is however balanced by the requirement that the ‘ordinary consumer’ only has to have 
'average literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer of the relevant goods or 
services.'546 This means that in any case, the document must be drafted rather for inexperienced 
and unsophisticated consumers than for well-educated ones with experience.547  
In this context, it is crucial to understand the South African population in terms of education. 
According to recent data (2017), 95 % of South Africans age 15 and over can read and write.548 
Regardless of statistical errors, this is an increase of over 5 % in comparison to 2012.549 One 
should nevertheless bear in mind that a considerable number of South Africans are functionally 
illiterate and their reading and writing skills are inadequate to manage daily living and 
employment tasks that require reading skills beyond a basic level. The average level of 
education in South Africa is equal to Grade 7.550 The 2001 census revealed that over one third 
(33.9 %) of South African adults aged 20 or older are functionally illiterate.551 According to 
other sources, the average literacy level in 2012 was 89 %.552 Despite these somehow 
contradictory data,553 one gets a clear picture of the level of education in South Africa. Most 
                                                             
544 De Stadler 'In search of the plain language standard' Consumer Law Review (Juta) April 2012 at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review-april-2012-1/ (no longer available). 
545 Kirby 'South Africa: Clearly clear? Plain and understandable language in terms of the Consumer Protection 
Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+Plain+ 
And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act. 
546 Section 22(2). 
547 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 105, Barnard 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 5. 
548 See Unesco eAtlas of Literacy at https://tellmaps.com/uis/literacy/#!/tellmap/-601865091. 
549 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 533 citing World Bank 2012 http://worldbank.org (no longer available). 
550 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 87. 
551 Aitchison and Harley 2006 Journal of Education 93. 
552 Mail & Guardian article 'SA adults lag behind in global literacy stakes' (article cited by Barnard J 2014 Tex. 
J. Cons. & Comm. Law 5 – http://bit-ly/XeZSOw (no longer available). See also Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and 
Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
553 Aitchison and Harley lament the fact that statistical data on literacy and adult basic education is still unreliable, 
confused and self-contradictory, but more often simply absent, due to, among other factors, misleading claims of 
the Department of Education. See Aitchison and Harley 2006 Journal of Education 99. 
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South African consumers are not only unable to understand business and legal documents554 
(which is not uncommon either in developed countries) but also ‘basic’ written information. 
Having this in mind, the best way to cater for the plain language requirement is, according to 
Kirby, to adopt the view of an officious bystander and to apply a test of objective 
reasonableness on whether or not the consumer concerned is confronted with plain language.555 
‘Officious bystander’ is a term given to a person who looks on but has nothing to do with the 
activity that is in progress,556 who is a disinterested party or third person.557 Although this 
position tries to objectivise the reasonableness and has undeniable advantages, it is submitted 
that it does not go far enough because it does not adopt the consumer's view.  
Better protection could be achieved by taking the view of an ‘objective observer’ in the position 
of the party to whom the document is intended, i.e., the consumer.558 Although in German civil 
law, this method is used for the interpretation of declarations of intent that have to be received 
by the other party,559 such as a notice of declaration, it would also achieve equitable outcomes 
for South African consumers. This approach seems more suitable in order to determine whether 
a supplier complies with the plain language requirement as it takes an objectivised position in 
the role of the consumer. 
Section 22(2) not only speaks of an 'ordinary consumer' but the latter must also be 'of the class 
of persons' for whom the document in question is intended. This seems to suggest that there 
are different ‘types’ (classes) of ordinary consumers and that it is necessary to determine the 
average literacy of a particular class of consumers, and not the average literacy of consumers 
generally, e.g., by considering official data from Statistics South Africa.560 The threshold to 
                                                             
554 Gordon/Burt 2010 Without Prejudice 60. 
555 Kirby 'South Africa: Clearly clear? Plain and understandable language in terms of the Consumer Protection 
Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+Plain+ 
And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act. 
556 See 'Bystander' at http://thelawdictionary.com/bystander.  
557 See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/bystander. 
558 In German: ‘Objektiver Dritter in der Person des Empfängers‘ or ‘objektiver Empfängerhorizont‘. 
559 Pursuant to the so-called ’normative interpretation‘, a declaration of intent which has to be received by the 
other party (empfangsbedürftige Willenserklärung) is to be interpreted according to §§ 133, 157 BGB. § 133: 
'When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to ascertain the true intention rather than adhering to 
the literal meaning of the declaration.' § 157: 'Contracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking 
customary practice into consideration.' 
560 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 88. 
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meet concerning the language used in the given document is therefore low for the consumer 
but high for the supplier.561  
Some authorities suggest that suppliers would have to draft several sets of the document in 
question in order to cater to different target audiences.562 Stoop and Chürr suggest that suppliers 
must consider that they have to draft the documents for people with 'minimal experience as a 
consumer of the relevant goods or services'. This means that suppliers should focus on 
consumers with the least experience, and not the average consumer.563 It is submitted that the 
legislator does not expect suppliers to do so because a version that caters for consumers with 
the least experience also caters for other consumers. Suppliers then avoid the daunting task of 
drafting different sets of contractual documents. The example of Nedbank’s redrafted terms 
and condition mentioned above illustrates this well. Moreover, the assessment of the 
intellectual capacities and the experience of a consumer within seconds or minutes requires 
psychological skills that the supplier’s representatives often do not have. Often it is not possible 
to ‘classify’ people with regard to their education or sophistication. Many people move around 
in different social classes and adapt accordingly. Even though market research tools are quite 
sophisticated, one cannot always conclude a consumer's level of sophistication or experience 
from the fact that he or she purchases a particular product or service. Although sophisticated 
consumers aim for a certain market segment, this is not always true vice versa because 
ultimately, ‘market’ is also defined by the purchasing power, which does not necessarily 
correlate with a consumer’s sophistication. What is more, most products and services are 
designed for a multitude of different consumers. On the other hand, a rather sophisticated 
consumer can be naïve in terms of aspirational marketing and ‘blind’ for objective arguments 
as long as he or she aspires to get certain brands or products. It is also difficult to assess an 
average literacy of an ordinary consumer belonging to a particular class of consumers, as 
opposed to assessing the average literacy of a consumer in general by relying on statistical 
data.564  
Drafting documents which suit all consumers also avoids other difficulties that arise when 
supplying a document that had been drafted for another class of persons to a consumer.  
                                                             
561 Kirby ' South Africa: Clearly clear? Plain and understandable language in terms of the Consumer Protection 
Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+Plain+ 
And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act. 
562 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 533, Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 334, Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen 
(eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
563 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 533. 
564 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 88. 
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Suppliers will most likely not take any chances and will tend to give a ‘simpler’ version in 
order to be covered.  
The problem of posting documents or visual representations on a supplier’s e-commerce 
website could also be resolved by just posting one version catering for all consumers. Usually, 
suppliers do not have sufficient data on consumers in terms of their literacy and sophistication. 
Even though the Electronic Communication and Transaction Act565 does not contain any plain 
language requirements, the Consumer Protection Act also applies to transactions bought online, 
as long as the transaction occurs within South Africa.566 
Furthermore, it is a legitimate interest of both parties that suppliers do not incur extra costs that 
the consumers ultimately have to bear. Drafting several sets of documents which have to be 
updated now and then, is a time-consuming and costly undertaking. 
If suppliers only have to draft one single set of their documents which can be easily understood 
by all consumers, the argument that in the absence of any class distinction a situation may arise 
where a consumer with literacy skills that exceed the average level of literacy of an ordinary 
consumer may escape contractual liability based on non-compliance with section 22567 is not 
valid anymore. A document that is understandable for all consumers always meets the plain 
language requirements and does therefore always comply with section 22. 
The wording of section 22(2) leads to confusion. This is not, as Gouws criticises, because one 
must take into account different types of agreements the consumer intends to conclude, but 
because of the premise that the supplier has to ‘assess’ the different classes of consumers when 
drafting a document. It would have been more understandable to choose a different wording 
for section 22(2) that encompasses all classes of consumers: 
'…if it is reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer with minimal 
literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer…'568 
Barnard contends that section 22 has to be interpreted in the light of section 3, by taking the 
purpose and policy of the Act into consideration.569 In her opinion, it is not sufficient to 
consider ordinary consumers of a particular group since there is another group which needs 
special protection, i.e., vulnerable consumers. Vulnerable consumers are, according to section 
                                                             
565 25 of 2002. 
566 See s 5(1)(a).  
567 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 88. 
568 Emphasis added. 
569 Barnard 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 5. 
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3(1)(b), persons with a low income, persons living in remote, isolated or low-density 
population areas or communities, minors, seniors or other similar vulnerable consumers as well 
as persons whose ability to read and comprehend any advertisement, agreement, instruction 
and so forth is limited because of low literacy, vision impairment or limited fluency in language 
in which the document is produced, published or presented. 
This means that suppliers must take into account vulnerable consumers in general when 
drafting their documents. 
Another possibility is to consider each group of vulnerable consumers (low-income persons, 
minors, seniors, uneducated persons, etc.) as a separate group of ‘ordinary consumers’. 
Consequently, suppliers would need to set up different documents for each group of vulnerable 
consumers.570 In practice, suppliers would have to draft multiple versions of documents for the 
same product. 
It is my submission that the first point of view is more convincing. Not only would it be 
challenging to draft separate documents for different groups of vulnerable persons with all the 
problems involved,571 but also because of the different levels of education and understanding 
within these groups. In addition, a person might belong to different groups at the same time 
(e.g., a working senior with a low income and literacy difficulties living in a remote area). 
Therefore, when assessing whether the plain language requirements in respect of ordinary 
consumers of the class of persons for whom the document is intended are met, the question has 
to be asked if the concerned consumer is ‘vulnerable’ in the sense of section 3(1)(b)(iv) and if 
the supplier’s documents meet the plain language standard. It is suggested that in most cases, 
the ‘vulnerable consumer’ will be congruent with the ‘ordinary consumer’. Therefore, 
vulnerable consumers are automatically considered when drafting a document for ordinary 
consumers because the supplier mostly targets a specific market. Besides, as stated above, a 
document written in plain language already considers both vulnerable and ordinary consumers. 
Barnard suggests substituting the notion of ‘ordinary’ consumer with ‘average consumer’ in 
order to be in keeping with international practice, such as the EU Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (UCPD).572 The UCPD's benchmark is the average consumer who is reasonably well 
informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. Social, cultural and linguistic factors are 
                                                             
570 Barnard 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 12. 
571 See discussion above. 
572 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2005 – hereafter referred to as 
‘UCPD’; Barnard 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 12. 
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taken into account by the UCPD.573 The ‘average consumer’ is not defined in the Directive, but 
article 5 contains an ‘average consumer test’, which, according to the Commission, is not a 
statistical test. The UCPD aims to strike the right balance between consumer protection and 
the promotion of free trade in an openly competitive market. For this reason, the notion of 
‘proportionality’ plays a crucial role. Measures taken in order to protect consumers, such as the 
prohibition of claims that might deceive only very naïve or credulous consumers, would be 
disproportionate. Factors such as the cultural, linguistic and social consumer background as 
well as the circumstances in which the given product is sold must be taken into consideration.574 
It is suggested that the substitution of ‘ordinary consumer’ by ‘average consumer’ in the Act 
would not bring any material advantages. The ‘ordinary’ consumer of a certain group of 
persons is nothing else than an ‘average’ consumer, even though the Act also includes minors, 
seniors and low-income groups and goes further than the UCPD. The UCPD balances this by 
applying the principle of proportionality and factors such as the cultural and social background 
of the targeted consumers. In a South African context, this is achieved by taking into 
consideration a consumer with average literacy skills and minimal experience. Given the lower 
educational level in South Africa, the solution of the Act seems to be adequate for South Africa. 
Barnard also suggests that the abovementioned distinction between different classes of 
consumers is contrary to the preamble to the Act according to which the indifferences of 
consumers based on illiteracy and other forms of social and financial inequalities must be 
eradicated.575 This argument does not consider the fact that the distinction between different 
classes of consumers is not made in order to discriminate consumers but in order to enable 
them to make informed choices.  
It is my submission that the argument of discrimination is therefore only valid where a 
consumer is handed out a document which was intended for a more sophisticated consumer. In 
this case, there is discrimination because the consumer will not be able to understand the 
document like a more educated person. This problem does however not exist if a supplier’s 
documents are drafted for all classes of consumers, by setting up only one set of documents.576 
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574 Barnard 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 6. 
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s 3(1)(iv). See also Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 88. 
576 See discussion above. 
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cc) 'Without undue effort' 
The consumer must be able to understand the content, significance and import of the document 
'without undue effort'.577 ‘Without undue effort’ is not defined in section 1, but the word 
‘undue’ implies that the consumer must at least make some effort  to ensure that he or she has 
understood the document. The degree of this effort depends on the circumstances, the price of 
the product and its complexity.578 The enumeration in section 22(2)(a) to (d)579 is an indication 
of what must be considered in this regard. De Stadler argues that the consumer may seek 
independent advice in cases where one can expect a more considerable effort to understand the 
terms.580 It is suggested though that this advice cannot go further than assisting the consumer. 
If it were necessary to explain the terms of the agreement, this would be contrary to the purpose 
of sections 49(3) and 22 because the document in question must be self-explanatory in order to 
be in plain language.  
Stoop and Chürr, as well as Gordon and Burt, contend that the consultation of a dictionary or 
the assistance of an advisor already means that the consumer makes an ‘undue effort’.581 This 
point of view is too strict because the complexity of a contractual document increases 
automatically with the complexity of the underlying agreement. With the complexity of the 
transaction involved (e.g., a purchase of a smartphone, as opposed to a building contract), the 
complexity of the underlying contract changes. Complex contracts cannot be legally sound 
without legal terms, and consumers can be expected to seek assistance in such a case. In 
addition, limited assistance or the consultation of a dictionary seem to be unavoidable in cases 
where the document is not drafted in the consumer’s first language, or in a language where he 
or she has a rather limited vocabulary. As mentioned above, this assistance must have its limits 
though because the objective of plain language is that consumers understand the content, 
significance and import of the document by merely reading it.582 On the other hand, the supplier 
cannot be expected to ‘explain’ every single word or concept in a complex contract. If 
consumers have to seek legal advice before signing an agreement, this can be qualified without 
doubt as ‘undue effort’, however. 
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Furthermore, when purchasing consumables or every-day items, the consumer cannot be 
expected to be as vigilant as while purchasing a more expensive and complex product. Whether 
or not the effort is undue depends therefore on the complexity of the product too. 
There could be undue effort though if the consumer is referred to additional terms or different 
documents which are not included in the contract. A phrase such as ‘terms and conditions 
apply’ on an invoice may be acceptable regarding the plain-language requirement if those 
standard terms are easy to access and it is clear where they can be found. It goes without saying 
that also in this case, such external documents to an agreement have to be written in plain 
language too.583 Under different circumstances, the reference to external documents may not 
fulfil the requirements of section 22(2) though, e.g., if the documents are difficult to access. It 
is submitted that this is the case where internet access is necessary. In South Africa, a 
considerable part of the population, especially in rural areas, is excluded from such access for 
technical and/or financial reasons. Difficult access to external documents would be contrary to 
the preamble of the Act according to which the Act recognises the necessity to '(…) fulfil the 
rights of historically disadvantaged persons and to promote their full participation as 
consumers.'584 The requirements are therefore only met if consumers can access the 
abovementioned external documents in the shop (e.g., in the form of a notice or printed 
document) or if they are sent to them by post speedily and before they sign the contract. It is 
also in the supplier’s interest to present external documents at its place of business because 
otherwise, the consumer might change his or her mind and not conclude the contract as section 
49(4)(a) and (b) requires that the notice must be drawn to the consumer’s attention before he 
enters into the agreement.585  
The same applies to terms such as ‘to the extent permitted by law’ by which the supplier wants 
to prevent the clause from being illegal because it contradicts the Act.586 It cannot be expected 
by ‘ordinary consumers’ though that they know what is permitted by the applicable legal 
regime. Such terms thus infringe section 22(2). 
dd) Consumer-centric approach 
The objective of section 22(2) is to protect consumers from incomprehensible terms and 
conditions and from those that contain legal consequences that 'ordinary consumers are not 
                                                             
583 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 106. 
584 Preamble of the CPA (a). See also Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 354. 
585 Section 49(4) will be discussed later in detail. 
586 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 106. 
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able to detect. For this reason, the drafter of a document must take into account that the 
document is not only intended for the supplier but also for the (weaker) consumer. In other 
words, suppliers have to adopt a consumer-centric approach when drafting a document and ask 
themselves which clauses are really necessary to balance the parties' needs, if the document is 
understandable for consumers, and if they will be able to find specific information in order to 
know their rights and obligations.587 
In Standard Bank v Dlamini588 the court held that 'non-disclosure of (…) [the consumer`s right 
to receive a refund] violates the right of consumers to education and information (…). The 
Bank`s selection of what parts of section 121 NCA it should record in the agreement and what 
it should exclude is deliberate and deceptive.'589 In this case, the agreement was not meeting 
the plain-language requirements but was guided by the operational requirements of the bank. 
Thus, the bank's approach was not consumer-centric.  
The Act does not require suppliers to inform consumers of their rights. Section 32, which grants 
a 5-day cooling-off period for sales contracts that have been concluded by direct marketing is 
the only exception in the Act. This provision can be interpreted in that the legislature would 
have provided for other disclosure obligations if he had wanted to.590 Nonetheless, Standard 
Bank v Dlamini is interesting and somehow innovative as it recognises that the emphasis of the 
consumer’s obligations in a contract while obscuring his rights is 'deceptive and misleading' as  
'[i]nstead of informing the consumer of th[e] right [to rescind credit agreement],591 the 
bank pitches it as an onerous bundle of obligations on the consumer to pay the bank the 
costs of renting and recovering the vehicle. Projecting the consumer’s obligations whilst 
understating his rights discourages rescission which is the consumer’s statutory 
right.'592  
This argument reminds of section 41 under which a supplier must not, by words or conduct, 
directly or indirectly express or imply a false, misleading or deceptive representation 
concerning a material fact to a consumer,593 fail to disclose a material fact if that failure 
                                                             
587 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 107. 
588 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Dlamini 2013 (1) SA 219 (KZD). This case concerned the National Credit 
Act which grants consumers a right to information in plain and understandable language. The NCA defines ‘plain 
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amounts to a deception,594 or fail to correct an apparent misapprehension on the part of a 
consumer, amounting to a false, misleading or deceptive representation.595 
What is more, the judgment is a reminder of the consumer's right to make 'informed choices',596 
which is not possible if the consumer is deceived and mislead.  
One has to bear in mind though that ‘plain language’ is aimed not only to protect consumers 
but also to ensure the right balance between consumer protection and the supplier’s legitimate 
interests.597 This is because the objective of the law of contract is to protect all the parties of an 
agreement and to consider their mutual interests.598  
ee) Choice of language 
Contrary to section 63(1) NCA, which provides that a consumer is entitled to receive any 
document that is required in terms of the National Credit Act in an official language that the 
consumer reads or understands, to the extent that this is reasonable, the Consumer Protection 
Act does not contain a similar provision. In the final draft of the Consumer Protection Act, a 
provision that at least one language of the region where the transaction took place should be 
used in the document provided to the consumer, was removed.599 
If South African suppliers were required to draft their contractual documents in all or several 
official languages,600 this would entail a disproportionate financial burden for them. Unlike 
credit providers, rather small suppliers often do not have the same financial possibilities.601 
Therefore, nearly all contractual documents in South Africa are written in English at least, 
which is regarded as the lingua franca.602 
                                                             
594 Section 41(1)(b) CPA. 
595 Section 41(1)(c) CPA. 
596 Standard Bank v Dlamini para [34]. See ss 3(e)(ii) NCA ('providing consumers with adequate disclosure of 
standardized information to enable them to make informed choices') and 3(e) CPA ('improving consumer 
awareness and information and encouraging responsible and informed consumer choice and behaviour'). 
597 Kirby 'South Africa: Clearly clear? Plain and understandable language in terms of the Consumer Protection 
Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+Plain+ 
And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act. 
598 Otherwise, mechanisms of the law of contract, such as remedies for breach, voidness due to mistake and so 
forth come into play. 
599 In s 26 of the Second Discussion Draft, this provision can still be found. The reason for the removal of this 
provision was that the industry made submissions that this requirement would have been too onerous – see 
Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 537 referring to the submission of Business Unity South Africa in BUSA 2006 
(www.busa.org.za – this information is no longer available). 
600 Section 6(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
601 This was also the position of the Business Unity South Africa Consumer Protection Bill Submissions by 
Business Unity South Africa (May 2006) 45-46 at http://www.busa.org.za/docs/Final%BUSA%20 
Submissions%20%20Consumer%20Protection%20Bill.pdf (no longer available). 
602 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 536. 
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As section 22(2) does not contain any obligations in respect of the use of a particular (official) 
language,603 a consumer may be handed out a document drafted in a language that he or she 
does not understand, although the plain-language requirement is met. This is because section 
22(2) only requires that an 'ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the notice, 
document or visual representation is intended' can understand the document. This provision 
does however not require that a specific consumer must be able to understand the document. 
If the consumer had to consult a dictionary or seek advice because he or she does not understand 
the language in which the document is drafted, this would be an 'undue effort' without any 
doubt. This is different from the situation where he or she understands the given language, but 
not well enough to avoid looking up individual words or seeking assistance. 
It is not clear if foreigners who are permanent residents of South Africa, and who do not 
understand one of the eleven official languages, can be considered 'ordinary consumer[s] of the 
class of persons for whom the notice, document or visual representation is intended'.604 
Although, under section 6(5)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, other languages than the official 
ones are promoted, it is my submission that such a condition would be very impractical and too 
much a financial and organisational burden for suppliers. 
On the other hand, the Act does not require that a document be drafted in an official language, 
but only in plain language. It is thus imaginable that suppliers with a specific target audience 
coming from abroad (tourists, immigrants) might be willing to draft their contractual 
documents in other than the official languages. In this case, it is to the supplier’s advantage if 
it translates its documents in the language(s) of its target audience.605 
Consumers have a certain degree of protection, however. Section 40(2) provides that a supplier 
must not knowingly take advantage of the fact that a consumer was substantially unable to 
                                                             
603 It is interesting to note that reg 41 provides that English and Zulu for purposes of s 92(4) be used by the 
Commission. Reg. 41 CPA refers to ss 6(3) and 4 of the Constitution which provide that the national government 
and provincial governments have to use at least two official languages for the purpose of government.  
Interestingly, reg. 41 CPA refers to the Zulu language as 'isiZulu' which is the Zulu and not the English spelling. 
Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. 'Zulu' defines 'Zulu' as 'the Bantu language of the Zulus'. See also 
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulu-language: 'Zulu (isiZulu in Zulu) is the language of the Zulu people…'. When 
the two aforementioned website was accessed again on 21 March 2020, the addition 'or isiZulu' had been added 
meanwhile. Section 6 of the Constitution (both in the English and Afrikaans version) also spells Zulu, Xhosa and 
other official (African) languages in their respective way, i.e., not in English or in Afrikaans. This does however 
not apply to other languages commonly used by communities in South Africa according to s 6(5)(b)(i) of the 
Constitution, like German, Greek, Portuguese and so forth. Those are written in the English or Afrikaans spelling 
and not as 'Deutsch', 'português' and 'ελληνικός' for instance. 
604 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 334, Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
605 See also in this sense Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 537. 
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protect its own interests because of illiteracy, ignorance or inability to understand the language 
of an agreement. 
Hence, the supplier has to ascertain in these cases that the consumer understands the agreement 
fully by providing additional explanations and information, or an interpreter, or even a (written) 
translation of the document.606 Otherwise, the agreement may be challenged under section 
40(2).607 
It is therefore beneficial for suppliers to draft and/or translate their documents into the 
languages spoken by their respective target audience.608 
ff) Guidelines for the drafting of contractual documents 
As the criteria set out in section 22(2) serve rather as a framework than as a plain language 
standard,609 sections 22(3) and (4) provide that the Commission may publish guidelines for 
methods of assessing whether a notice, document or visual representation satisfies the plain 
language requirements. So far, no such guidelines have been published, and suppliers should 
take a proactive approach in order to comply with the requirements of section 22.610 
One approach consists of in-house style guides and other scrutiny measures. Although such an 
informal assessment is difficult to regulate, it ensures at least the consistency and other 
requirements of legal documents. Gordon and Burt suggest that suppliers develop their own 
evaluation methods concerning a plain language enquiry. They recommend research and user 
testing throughout the rewrite process so that a best practice and terminology can be achieved 
gradually.611 
Another approach consists of a formal enquiry. As section 2(2)(a) provides that when 
interpreting or applying the Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered, 
the law of other countries can – and should – be consulted for the achievement of a plain 
language standard. 
                                                             
606 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 112. 
607 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 536, Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
608 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 22. 
609 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 330. 
610 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 332. 
611 Gordon/Burt 2010 Without Prejudice 60. 
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 Stoop and Chürr612 refer to the law of the US states of Pennsylvania613 and Connecticut614 
which provide general and objective standards for plain language, such as the use of short 
words, paragraphs and sentences as well as the avoidance of foreign or Latin words or cross-
references. Especially in Connecticut, this approach has been even more objectified by 
prescribing the average number of words per sentence or paragraph, the average number of 
syllables per word or the minimum typeface. These provisions also provide for visual 
guidelines for the type size, line length and spacing between paragraphs, for example.  
This objective approach has the advantage that computer software programmes can be used in 
order to assess whether the given criteria are fulfilled. Shorter words are not necessarily better 
understood by consumers though. Stoop gives an excellent example: while relatively longer 
words like ‘homeowner’ are mostly understood, shorter words such as ‘estoppel’ or ‘tort’ are 
not.615 This is because the length of a word does not correlate with its technicality or speech 
register. Besides, different languages follow different rules. In some languages, longer words, 
such as composite words, are hardly avoidable. If they are split up in their different parts, 
comprehensibleness and good style might suffer because the sentence structure gets too 
complicated. Language is a complex subject which cannot be reduced to mere statistics. 
A third approach consists of readability tests run by a computer where mathematical equations 
calculate the readability of a document. The Flesch reading ease test is used in most software 
packages such as MS Office.616 These tests are of limited use with regard to complex and 
technical texts though. This is because even if a text ‘succeeds’ in a readability test because the 
abovementioned criteria are fulfilled, this does not mean that the text is sufficiently accurate in 
a legal context. Legal language is very technical and difficult to understand and does not 
necessarily become more understandable by the mere use of shorter sentences or words. 
Furthermore, readability formulas are based on the assumption that all consumers are alike, 
whereas the Act prescribes that an 'ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the 
document is intended (…) must be able to understand the contents without undue effort'.617 In 
                                                             
612 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 539. 
613 Pennsylvania Plain Language Consumer Contract Act (Pa Stat Ann Tit 73 (1997)). 
614 Connecticut General Statutes, 2009 (Conn Gen Stat s 42-152). 
615 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 338. 
616 Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 29. This test was proposed in Flesch 
1948 J. Appl. Psychol. 221. The formula for the Flesch test is: 206.835 – 1.105 (total words / total sentences) – 
86.6 (total syllables / total words). A high score indicates easy reading (few words per sentence and few syllables 
per word), whereas a lower score indicates more difficult reading.  
617 Section 22(2). 
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the South African context, readability tests are therefore not an ideal solution in the pursuit of 
plain language.618 
For the elaboration of guidelines, the Commission should thus take into consideration an 
objective approach which is suitable for the South African environment. The Commission 
should keep in mind that different languages function within different sets of rules, structures 
and cultures. This applies even more to languages having different roots, like English (an Indo-
European/West Germanic language)619 and Zulu (a Niger-Congo/Southern Bantoid/Bantu 
language),620 for instance. A simple example makes this clear: The English sentence 'He is 
working', consisting of three words, can be expressed in Zulu by 'Uyasebenza', in only one 
word! Hence, an objective word-count in different languages would lead to very different 
results. Newman’s recommendation that the average sentence length should be 22 words and 
that an average paragraph should not consist of more than 75 words621 may be valid for English; 
for other languages, using compound words and different grammatical structures, the word 
count in a similar document might be very different. Furthermore, the guidelines should also 
provide for instructions with regard to illustrations, examples, headings and other aids 
mentioned in section 22(2).622 
Barnard suggests general guidelines which could be adjusted to fit into a specific industry code. 
Whenever such an adjustment is not possible, the courts will have their final say.623 It is 
suggested that this alone is not sufficient. The Commission should also consider separate 
guidelines for each type of documents (contracts, notices, visual representations) in order to 
take into account their different purposes. Instead of a classical approach, the headings could 
have the form of questions, such as 'What am I buying?' instead of 'Object of the contract', or 
'What do I have to do if I am not happy with my printer?' instead of 'Remedies'. De Stadler 
legitimately points out that the use of a parallel structure of headings, i.e., the same grammatical 
structure in a particular section of a document, is beneficial in this regard. Only when 
describing a different level of headings within a document, one should change the grammatical 
structure of the (sub-)heading.624  
                                                             
618 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 542. 
619 See 'English language' at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_language. 
620 See 'Zulu language' at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulu_language. 
621 Newman 2012 Obiter 644.  
622 Stoop 2011 Int. J. Private Law 337. 
623 Barnard J 2014 Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law 11. 
624 De Stadler 'Plain language tip' Consumer Law Review Newsletter (Juta) June 2014 at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review_01-jun-2014-2/ (no longer available). 
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Although plain language contributes to the fact that consumers can make informed choices, 
one has to consider that a plain (understandable) text is not sufficient. The suppliers’ texts of 
the same category (e.g., quotations and contracts) within the same industry also have to be 
comparable. A consumer who wants to rent a car and compare not only prices, for example, 
but also wants to know what services are part of the contract (e.g., insurance, motorisation of 
the given category, included distance that can be driven without paying a supplement) is often 
confronted with a multitude of different terms depending on the supplier, and information 
which is difficult to find. Comparability would therefore also help consumers better understand 
what they are buying, and allow them to shop around more easily. In this sense, Barnard is 
certainly right as to general adjustable guidelines for specific industries. 
Therefore, consumers would benefit if for certain document types of individual branches the 
documentation would be standardised with respect to their presentation and terminology.  
As discussed above, the definition of ‘plain language’ in section 22 involves not only the 
grammar and wording but also the structure, content, style and design of the document. This 
enables consumers to make informed choices on the base of a transparent document. The 
requirement of plain language is therefore elevated to a fundamental consumer right. The 
Commission should provide for guidelines to drafters as to what exactly is expected from 
them.625 Without any guidelines, a certain number of otherwise avoidable jurisprudence is to 
be expected. As long as the Commission has not published such guidelines, courts will have to 
deal with the rather broad definition of ‘plain language’ in section 22, apply their discretion, 
and interpret agreements incoherently. 
It is also regrettable that section 22(3) and (4) are discretionary provisions, that the publication 
of guidelines is not compulsory for the Commission, and that the legislator has not given more 
guidance for the drafting of documents in plain language. As long as no guidelines have been 
published, the legislator (and the Commission) leaves it to the suppliers to determine what 
‘plain language’ means. The ‘private legislation’ of companies which Naudé puts forward in 
the context of one-sided imposition of standard terms has thus not been completely abolished 
yet.626 Consumers will not only find it difficult to assess if certain documents are ‘plain’, and 
therefore will refrain from any action against suppliers.  
                                                             
625 See also Louw LLM dissertation 137. 
626 See Naudé 2006 Stell LR 369. 
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The courts have established a vast body of common-law jurisprudence as regards interpreting 
the plain language requirement. Newman states that it would be unfortunate if courts were 
obliged to consider other jurisdictions in order to fill the gaps which the Act has left, or even 
created. It is suggested that other jurisdictions may only serve as guidance, but can never be a 
substitute to own rules. The given context and historical backgrounds are too different. Only 
comprehensive guidelines could therefore remedy this problem. 
Plain language empowers consumers to make informed choices. One should however not forget 
that the consumers’ empowerment can eventually only be achieved by education. In order to 
ensure a fair market with empowered consumers, the legislature must therefore tackle the South 
African problems inherited from the past, not only by providing formal requirements such as 
plain language but also by ascertaining that young South Africans are sufficiently educated to 
understand more complex mechanisms and concepts. This can only be done by reforming the 
South African educational system, hiring well-trained and motivated teachers and providing 
the financial means to schools.627 The introduction of the plain language requirement into the 
Act is undoubtedly a crucial step which must be welcomed, but it is not sufficient. 
gg) Legal consequences of non-compliance of section 22 
It is not entirely clear what the legal effects of non-compliance with the plain language 
requirement are. 
In terms of section 51(1)(a)(i), a supplier must not make a transaction or agreement subject to 
any term or condition if its general purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of the 
Act. Pursuant to section 3(1)(b)(iv), one of the purposes of the Act is to promote and advance 
the social and economic welfare of consumers by 'reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages 
experienced in accession any supply of goods or services by consumers whose ability to read 
and comprehend any [document] is limited because of low literacy, (…) or limited fluency in 
the languages in which the [document] is produced, published or presented.'  
                                                             
627 With respect to the state of the South Africa education system, see the following examples: BusinessTech of 5 
January 2015: 'SA’s ‘real’ matric pass rate: 42%' at http://businesstech.co.za/news/general/76561/sas-real-matric-
pass-rate-41/; Daily Maverick of 8 January 2015: 'Africa Check: Can you really pass matric with a 30% average? 
The claim is misleading' at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-01-08-africa-check-can-you-really-pass-
matric-with-a-30-average-the-claim-is-misleading/#.VeWY9Mvovcc; Mail&Guardian of 8 March 2013: 
'Forgotten schools in the Eastern Cape left to rot' at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-08-00-forgotten-schools-of-
the-eastern-cape-left-to-rot; The Sunday Times (South African paper version) of 11 October 2015 at 17: 'Solving 
SA’s maths crisis is more complex than we think' by Karin Brodie. 
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What is more, section 51(1)(b)(i)-(iii) states that a supplier must not make a transaction or 
agreement if it directly or indirectly purports to (i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in 
terms of the Act, (ii) avoid a supplier’s obligation or duty in terms of the Act, or (iii) set aside 
or override the effect of any provision of the Act. The consumer has the right that the agreement 
be written in plain language as section 50(2)(b)(i) provides that if a consumer agreement is in 
writing, the supplier must provide the consumer with a free copy which must satisfy the plain 
language requirements of section 22.  
It is my submission that this also applies to exemption clauses under section 49 which must be 
written in plain language (section 49(3)) since a notice which does not meet the plain language 
requirements deprives a consumer of a right in terms of the Act (section 51(1)(b)(i)). 
If the purposes of the Act are not met in terms of sections 51(1)(a)(i), 3(1)(b)(iv), the agreement 
or provision is void under section 51(3) to the extent that it contravenes section 51.628 
Nonetheless, the plain language requirement is only one of several factors that the court must 
take into account according to section 52(2) when considering whether a term is unfair and, 
therefore, void. Hence, voidness is not necessarily a consequence of non-compliance with the 
plain language requirements in terms of section 22. 
This begs the question of whether there is any relation between the abovementioned 
stipulations in terms of a lex specialis or a lex generalis. The answer to this question is 
important in order to know which of the provisions mentioned above takes precedence. 
Both section 51(1)(a)(i), referring to section 3(1)(b)(iv), and section 51((1)(b)(i)-(iii), referring 
indirectly to section 50((2)(b)(i), regulate that an agreement is void per se if the plain language 
requirements or another consumer right are not met. Section 51 deals with prohibited clauses, 
the so-called ‘blacklist’, whereas section 52 deals with the powers of the courts concerning the 
right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions. In other words, the abovementioned 
provisions can all be found in Part G of the Act. Section 52 is a procedural provision though, 
whereas section 51 is of substantive nature. Hence, there cannot be a lex specialis-lex generalis 
relationship between them, and none of these provisions takes precedence over another. 
Although the Act does not expressly say that other types of clauses or agreements are void if 
they are not written in plain language, it is likely that the courts will easily declare null and 
                                                             
628 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 90 and 91. 
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void clauses that do not meet the plain language requirements. This is because the purpose of 
the Act must be considered when interpreting ambiguous provisions. The primary purpose of 
the Act is to protect vulnerable consumers. After all, plain language is a factor that the courts 
always will have to consider when assessing standard clauses. For this reason, the use of plain 
language seems, in fact, to be required in all interactions between suppliers and consumers.  
The role of the Commission and the other redress entities will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. 
Section 22 also plays an indirect role629 in terms of sanctioning a supplier’s unconscionable 
conduct,630 a supplier’s false, misleading or deceptive representation,631 or whether a contract 
term must be considered unfair.632 In these cases, the court must consider the factors mentioned 
in section 52(2)(a) to (j) to ensure fair and just conduct and standard provisions. Under section 
52(2)(g), the court must consider the extent to which any documents relating to the transaction 
or agreement satisfied the requirements of section 22. If the court holds that these requirements 
are not met, it may find that the document or agreement in question is unfair.633 
b) Drawing the consumer’s attention in a conspicuous manner and form 
Whenever any of the conditions set out in section 49(1)(a) to (d) are met, the supplier must 
draw the consumer’s attention concerning the fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice 
in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert 
consumer, having regard to the circumstances.634 This must be done before the consumers enter 
into the agreement, begins to engage in the activity or enters or gains access to the facility635 
or is required or expected to offer consideration for the transaction or agreement.636 
Although subsection (4) only refers to subsection (1), it is submitted that the requirements of 
subsection (4) also apply to subsection (2). Otherwise, the warning function of section 49 
would be thwarted. There is no reason for not applying subsection (4) to subsection (2) as 
consumers must be informed of the risks they face in a manner and at a time according to 
subsection (4). 
                                                             
629 See De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 111. 
630 Section 40. 
631 Section 41. 
632 Section 48. 
633 For a more detailed discussion, see ch 3 (general clause). 
634 Section 49(4)(a). 
635 Section 49(4)(b)(i). 
636 Section 49(4)(b)(ii). 
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'Draw[ing] to the attention of the consumer' means that the agreement itself must be self-
explanatory and written in plain language, and not that the consumer is entitled to further 
explanations beyond the contract.637 
The phrase '[t]he fact, nature and effect' in section 49(4) indicates that the supplier has to 
ascertain that the consumer does not only have a superficial awareness of the risk but that the 
supplier must ascertain that the consumer has an adequate understanding and appreciation of 
the implications of the risk.638 
The requirement that the supplier must, according to section 49(4), draw the consumer’s 
attention to the potential effect of the risk means that clauses which exclude liability in a 
manner that is not comprehensible for a consumer, such as ‘the supplier’s liability is excluded 
as much as is allowed by law’ or which state that the exclusion of liability does not affect the 
consumer’s statutory rights, are ineffective. Consumers who are not specialised in consumer 
protection law are most likely not able to understand the legal consequences of such clauses.639 
The supplier has the same obligation under section 49(2), i.e., if a provision or notice concerns 
any activity or facility that is subject to any risk.640 
aa) Conspicuous manner and form 
Under section 49(1) and (4)(a), the supplier must draw the consumer’s attention to the effect 
on its risk or liability or its risk linked to an activity or facility in a conspicuous manner and 
form. Drawing someone’s attention requires more effort than informing someone. 
‘Inform[ing]’ means 'to give information',641 whereas ‘drawing someone’s attention to 
something’ means 'to attract someone to notice or focus on someone or something'642 or 'direct 
someone's attention'643. 
The supplier can draw the consumer’s attention in different ways, by using specific formatting 
techniques, placing the text close to the ‘core terms’ of the agreement, such as the payment 
terms, or adjacent to the signature space in order to ascertain that it is read, and/or using 
formulations such as ‘the following terms limit your ability to bring a claim against us…’.644  
                                                             
637 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 112. 
638 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 247. 
639 De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
640 For a more detailed discussion on s 49(2) see below. 
641 Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. 'inform'. 
642 Definition from The Free Dictionary by Farlex: https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/ /draw+attention+to. 
643 Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. 'draw'. 
644 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 120. 
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From the discussion above it becomes clear that the consumer’s attention is only drawn 
conspicuously to the risks involved if the concerned information can be clearly distinguished 
from the rest of the document. 
This has to be done with an ‘ordinarily alert consumer’645 in mind. This means that the (not 
legally trained) consumer is one who is aware of the importance of the notice as a legal 
document and pays attention when reading it. In doing so, the circumstances646 have to be taken 
into account. It will depend on the complexity of the product, its price and other factors when 
defining an ordinarily alert consumer.647  
Concerning section 49(2)(b), which refers to an ordinarily alert consumer faced with a 
provision concerning a risky activity or facility, it is suggested that the 'ordinarily alert 
consumer' must be defined by considering the surrounding circumstances, such as the nature 
and complexity of the given activity or facility. 
The wording of the phrase ‘ordinarily alert consumer’ in sections 49(4)(a) and 49(2)(b) is 
somewhat misfortunate because it reminds of the concept of the ‘ordinary consumer’ in section 
22(2). These are two completely different concepts, however. First, the ‘ordinary consumer’ is 
mentioned in the context of the plain language requirement, whereas the ‘ordinarily alert 
consumer’ is mentioned in respect of the limitation of risk of the supplier of which the 
consumer’s attention must be drawn to. Second, ‘ordinary’ in section 22(2) is an adjective and 
thus refers directly to ‘consumer’, whereas ‘ordinarily’ is an adverb referring to ‘alert’. This 
means that the consumer must be ordinarily alert, and not ordinary. In other words, the 
consumer must be ordinarily vigilant in the given circumstances.  
Naudé suggests that it should generally not be sufficient to print the exemption clauses on the 
reverse side of a document, even if specific formatting techniques are used. She argues that 
most consumers would not be willing to turn, not to mention to read, the reverse side, having 
implicitly in mind that these terms are invariable and presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.648 
For this reason, most consumers would act on the assumption that they cannot negotiate those 
terms. In addition, the ‘transaction cost’ by reading these assumed cumbersome terms would 
                                                             
645 Section 49(4)(a). 
646 Section 49(4)(a). 
647 See discussion above (‘Without undue effort’). 
648 The expression ‘take it or leave’ it appears already in Instone v A Schoeder Music Publishing Co Ltd 1974 1 
WLR 1308: '(The terms) have been dictated by that party whose bargaining power, either exercised alone or in 
conjunction with others providing similar goods or services, enables him to say: "If you want theses goods or 
services at all, these are the only terms on which they are obtainable, Take it or leave it" (…)'. 
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be too high for the consumer. It is true that the content of standard contracts is usually 
determined unilaterally by the supplier, and that the consumer can accept the contract or walk 
away. The freedom of contract is therefore only theoretical so that it is easy to exploit the co-
contractant with the weaker bargaining position.649 Eiselen legitimately argues that the 
mechanism of unilateral drafting of standard terms and how they are included in contracts is 
the real foundation of the problem of standard-form contracts where consumers have little or 
no margin for negotiation.650 Gouws argues that these terms are not only non-negotiable but 
also one-sided as they favour the supplier and leave no possibility for consumers to bargain 
with the supplier.651 On the other hand, if exemption clauses are printed close to the primary 
terms, consumers are likely to notice and also read them. Naudé suggests that printing 
exemption clauses on the front page, near the primary terms, should be sufficient.652 
This point of view is correct because it protects the consumer sufficiently and is also in the 
supplier’s interest. This contributes to the information of the consumer and avoids litigation. 
Consumers are usually focused on the core terms of an agreement. A notice that is placed close 
to the main terms is very likely to catch the consumer’s eye. Even if clauses written in plain 
language are not negotiable either, at least the consumer is able to understand their import.653 
bb) Prescribed moment 
The supplier has to attract the consumer’s attention before the earlier of the time at which the 
consumer concludes the transaction or agreement, begins to engage in the activity or enters or 
gains access to the facility or is required or expected to offer consideration.654 By choosing 
such an early moment, the legislator aims to ensure that the consumer is aware of its duties and 
risks before taking action. Otherwise, the warning function of section 49 would be thwarted. 
It is thus not sufficient to bring an exemption clause in terms of section 49(1) to the consumer’s 
attention after the moments mentioned above.655 The requirements of section 49(4)(b) would 
not be fulfilled if, e.g., a white-water rafting organiser calls the consumer’s attention who has 
booked in advance to an exemption clause when the consumer is already on-site. A payment 
                                                             
649 Stoop 2008 SA Merc LJ 497. 
650 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 251. 
651 Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 81. 
652 Naudé 2009 SALJ 508, 509, De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. In 
the same sense: Newman 2012 Obiter 637. 
653 Gouws 2010 SA MercLJ 82. 
654 Section 49(4)(b). 
655 Naudé 2009 SALJ 509. See also De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
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in advance, before the consumer was told about the exemption clause is not permitted either 
anymore under section 49(4)(b). 
cc) Signing or initialling 
If the provision concerns an activity or facility mentioned in section 49(2)(a) to (c), the supplier 
must also have signed or initialled the consumer the provision by which the latter assents to it. 
There is no such obligation in terms of section 49(1). The legislature probably wanted to 
differentiate between the circumstances mentioned in section 49(1) and those indicated in 
section 49(2). The latter concern a limitation of the supplier’s liability in situations that might 
be dangerous for the consumer, whereas section 49(1) ‘only’ concerns legal consequences. 
The supplier is dispensed with this obligation if the consumer acts in a manner consistent with 
acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision.656 
The consumer does not need to sign the warning itself, but only the provision or notice.657 It is 
however not clear in which manner the consumer has to act for dispensing the supplier with its 
obligation to have signed the provision or notice. De Stadler suggests that if the provision or 
notice is sufficiently clear and prominent so that a reasonable consumer would have seen and 
understood it, one can assume that he or she accepted the risk by continuing using the 
product.658 
It is not entirely clear though why the legislator introduced the additional formal obligation of 
signing or initialling in the case of risky activities or facilities, which does not exist in terms of 
section 49(1) if it renounces this obligation in situations that can be difficult to prove. It might 
indeed be difficult to proof whether the consumer acted in a manner consistent with 
acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision. A 
consumer might well use a risky product without being aware of the risks. 
Naudé argues that the initialling or counter-signing of exemption clauses can be a double-edged 
sword. This formality may strengthen the supplier’s position because he or she could ultimately 
argue that they are always fair. She goes further by stating that clauses excluding or limiting 
the supplier’s liability for bodily injury or death caused negligently could be unfair, irrespective 
of whether they are signed or initialled by the consumer. This is because they might have come 
                                                             
656 Section 49(2) in fine. 
657 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 121. 
658 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 120. 
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to the consumer’s attention only when all arrangements have already been made. An employee 
who is admitted in a private hospital and is confronted with an exemption clause is very 
unlikely to look out for another hospital. This person is also unlikely to delay his or her 
operation in order to compare the other hospitals’ terms and conditions. What is more, this 
employee will already have made all kinds of arrangements to leave work and to organise 
around the stay in the hospital during the initially planned period.659  
Naudé argues further that this situation causes a structural inequality because the term is 
contrary to the agreement’s main purpose, i.e., the provision of medical care. This ultimately 
involves the patient’s fundamental right to live and bodily integrity. Therefore, such an 
exemption clause would be substantively unfair. According to Naudé, this also applies to cases 
where the consumer knew about the term or could have found better terms elsewhere. 
Furthermore, consumers cannot protect themselves against a healthcare supplier’s negligence, 
and will often not be insured against bodily harm or even death.660 
This is why exemption clauses relating to bodily injury or death are often prohibited in some 
European countries,661 or at least are held unfair (greylisted).662 § 305c BGB provides that 
provisions in standard business terms which in the circumstances, in particular with regard to 
the outward appearance of the contract, are so unusual that the other party to the contract with 
the user need not expect to encounter them, do not form part of the contract. The South African 
common law already recognises such a principle. In Constantia Insurance Co v 
Compusource663 the court held that an adhering party would not be bound by an unusual 
contract term to which it did not and could not reasonably have been thought to agree. 
In Naudé’s and Lubbe’s opinion, a contract clause is unexpected or surprising where it purports 
to vary the consequences of the contract in a manner contrary to the essence of the agreement 
by undermining the reciprocity between the essential obligations envisaged by the parties.664 
                                                             
659 See Afrox Healthcare Bpd v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) – hereafter Afrox Healthcare v Strydom. 
660 Naudé 2009 SALJ 510, 511. 
661 § 309 no. 7 lit. a): '[Even to the extent that a deviation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the following 
are ineffective in standard business terms:] a) (Injury to life, body or health) any exclusion or limitation of liability 
for damage from injury to life, body or health due to negligent breach of duty by the user or intentional or negligent 
breach of duty by a legal representative or a person used to perform an obligation of the user.' 
662 Item (a) of the Annex of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
referring to its Article 3 (terms are to be regarded as unfair):  'Terms which have the object or effect of: (a) 
excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death of a consumer or personal 
injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or supplier.' In this regard, see also the related 
discussion on reg 44(3)(a) in ch 3. 
663 Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) para [19] – hereafter Constantia 
Insurance Co v Compusource. 
664 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 454. 
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For the determination of the ‘essence’ of the contract, the obligations that are essential in the 
light of the underlying contractual purpose must be examined. In the parties' minds, the nature 
of the policy considerations with regard to each sub-type of contract must be considered.665 
It is therefore not only doubtful that the consumer is sufficiently protected by waiving an 
obligation which has a warning function such as initialling or signing the notice or provision. 
It can also be doubted that the signing or initialling itself fulfils its protective function. 
It is recommended that the legislator redraft section 49(2) by omitting the phrase 'or otherwise 
acting in a manner consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and 
acceptance of the provision.'   
In order to strengthen the consumer’s position, the following sentence, which follows the 
example of § 305c BGB, should be inserted in section 49(2) in fine:  
'A provision or notice which in the circumstances, in particular with regard to 
the outward appearance of the contract, are so unusual that the consumer need 
not expect to encounter them, are not valid.' 
This would apply irrespective of whether the provision or notice is drafted in plain language 
because such a provision or notice would be so surprising that one cannot expect a normally 
alert consumer to encounter it. 
c) Adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend the provision or notice 
In addition, the supplier must give an adequate opportunity to the consumer in the 
circumstances to receive and comprehend the provision or notice as contemplated in section 
49(1).666 Unfortunately, the Act does not contain any definition of ‘adequate opportunity’. In 
any event, the supplier should be able to prove that the consumer was not confronted with a 
document that he or she had to sign under any form of pressure.667 Otherwise, the agreement 
could be declared void under section 52(4)(a)(ii). 
Section 49(5) does not require that the consumer be given an adequate opportunity before the 
conclusion of the contract. It should therefore be sufficient if consumers are granted a cooling-
off period. If any form of pressure had been put on the consumer during the conclusion of the 
                                                             
665 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 459. 
666 Section 49(5). 
667 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 178. 
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agreement, the cooling-off period can be an adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend 
the term.668 
The question is how ‘adequate opportunity’ can be defined in order to apply this concept to 
every single case. ‘Opportunity’ means ‘a favourable (or appropriate) time or set of 
circumstances for doing something’,669 or ‘a good position, chance, or prospect, as for 
advancement or success’.670 This means that the consumer must have the opportunity to receive 
and understand the provision or notice. This opportunity must be adequate, i.e., sufficient, 
acceptable, satisfactory or suitable.671 ‘Adequate’ is thus time-related and also refers to the 
surrounding circumstances. 
Under section 49(5), the circumstances must be considered when assessing whether the 
consumer had an adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend the notice. It is striking that 
the circumstances are already considered when defining ‘opportunity’, and that ‘adequate’ also 
refers to the surrounding circumstances (otherwise, this word would not make any sense here). 
It is suggested that this only underlines the necessity to consider the surrounding circumstances, 
and not to apply the concept of ‘adequate opportunity’ in an abstract way.  
On the one hand, it will depend on the type of contract the consumer enters into. A purchase 
agreement on a radio containing a limitation clause typically requires less reflection than a life 
insurance policy with complex clauses and often life-long implications. On the other hand, the 
type of consumer must also be taken into consideration. An alert consumer who is used to more 
complex transactions can be expected to comprehend the implications of a particular notice 
quicker than a more vulnerable and inexperienced consumer.  
Therefore, ‘adequate opportunity’ can be defined as the possibility given to a consumer to 
receive and understand a term in consideration of the surrounding circumstances. 
Even if section 49(5) does not refer to section 52(2) (nor does section 52(1) mention or refer to 
section 49), it is submitted that some considerations contained in section 52(2) could be used 
by analogy672 for the determination of the circumstances and whether the consumer had an 
adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend the agreement.673 The following 
                                                             
668 De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
669 Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. ‘opportunity’. 
670 See 'Opportunity' at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/opportunity. 
671 Adjectives taken from http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/adequate?s=t. 
672 Such an analogous application could be justified to achieve substantial coherence within the Act. 
673 Only ss 52(2)(f) and (i) are difficult to apply by analogy to the considerations concerning the adequate 
opportunity requirement. This is because the consideration whether the consumer was required to do anything that 
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considerations could be taken into account: The (fair) value of the goods or services,674 the 
nature of the parties,675 the circumstances of the transaction or agreement that existed or were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct of transaction occurred or agreement was 
made676 the conduct of the supplier and the consumer,677 whether there was any negotiation 
between the parties,678 the extent to which the documents in questions satisfied the plain 
language requirement,679 whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of 
the existence and extent of any particular provision,680 and whether the goods were 
manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the consumer.681  
One must keep in mind though that the common-law rules of incorporation of terms have not 
been amended by section 49 and still apply. The party alleging the contract bears the onus of 
proving what the contractual terms are, even if this means proving that a term alleged by the 
counterparty was not incorporated into the contract.682 If the supplier can show that it took 
reasonably sufficient measures to bring the provisions of the contract to the consumer’s notice, 
it does not matter whether the consumer read the terms of an agreement to which it has assented 
to or not.683 The idea behind this is that the supplier can rely on these measures and that the 
consumer has actually read these terms, even if this is not the case. The consumer’s signature 
under the document may be used to establish that there was reasonable reliance of consensus 
under the common law.684 This does however not apply to surprising terms, unless they were 
                                                             
was not reasonably necessary for the legitimate interests of the supplier pursuant to s 52(2)(f) has no correlation 
to the adequate opportunity requirement. And for practical reasons, the circumstances under which the consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a different supplier in terms of s 52(2)(i) are 
merely hypothetical and cannot be taken into consideration either in terms of s 49(5). 
674 Section 52(2)(a). The value is often – but not always – an indication of the complexity of the good or service, 
and the complexity of the underlying agreement. 
675 Section 52(2)(b). This applies to the experience and sophistication of the parties, especially of the consumer. 
676 Section 52(2)(c). Where and when was the agreement concluded? In what situation was the consumer at this 
time, and so forth? 
677 Section 52(2)(d). This concerns the question of whether any pressure was put on the consumer when signing 
the agreement, or if the supplier behaved unfairly. 
678 Section 52(2)(e). 
679 Sections 52(2)(g) and 22. This requirement is already a requirement set out in s 49(3), but could also be 
indirectly taken into account in terms of s 49(5) in order to assess whether the consumer was confronted with an 
illegible document which was difficult to understand. 
680 Section 52(2)(h). Was the notice in question surprising? 
681 Section 52(2)(j). If so, another standard should be applied, as the supplier has an interest to protect himself 
from certain liabilities, especially when he followed the consumer’s orders. 
682 Stocks & Stocks (Pty) Ltd v TJ Daly & Sons (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 754 (A); Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) 
Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
683 Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 2011 (4) SA 72 (SCA). 
684 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 41; Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun 
Couriers 2007 (2) SA 599 (SCA).  
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specifically pointed out to the consumer when he or she contracted685 (although it is arguable 
in this case that they were not surprising anymore). 
3.3 Legal consequences in case of non-observance of section 49 
Section 49 itself is silent about the legal consequences in case of a violation of this provision. 
The consequences of non-compliance are not clear. 
Section 52(4) sets out that if a person alleges at court that an agreement, a term or condition, 
or a notice is void under the Act or failed to satisfy the requirements of section 49, the court 
may severe the provision or notice from the agreement, or declare it to have no force or effect.  
The court may make an order if a provision or notice is void in terms of any provision of the 
Act, severing any part of the agreement,686 or alter it to the extent required to render it lawful, 
or declaring the entire agreement void.687 
Naudé correctly reminds that non-compliance with section 49 will have no extra-judicial effect. 
A court cannot be required to pronounce the term as having no force or effect because of the 
limitations of judicial control. This is particularly true with regard to the costs, risk and effort 
of litigation to consumers.  
The fact that litigation can be very time-consuming and costly might contribute to the supplier's 
conduct in terms of which it might easily accommodate a consumer by not insisting on the 
provision in question because otherwise, the court might strike it down. Naudé therefore 
legitimately suggests that in the event of non-compliance with section 49, the supplier may not 
rely on the contract term, and the consumer would only need to approach a court in the event 
of a dispute as to whether the supplier did actually comply with section 49. 688 
A provision that complies with section 49 does not prevent a court to qualify it as unfair in 
terms of sections 48 and 52. Section 49 merely sets out preliminary incorporation requirements. 
Terms might still be struck down within the content (or substantive) control.689 A notice 
excluding the supplier’s liability for bodily injuries or death may still be unfair under section 
48 as it is greylisted in regulation 44(3)(a).690 Hence, the supplier will have to bring forward 
                                                             
685 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
686 Section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa). 
687 Section 52(4)(a)(i)(bb). 
688 Naudé 2009 SALJ 509; De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
689 De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. Content control will be discussed 
in ch 3. 
690 Regulation 44(3) CPA: 'A term of a consumer agreement subject to the provisions of subregulation (1) is 
presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of (a) excluding or limiting the liability of the supplier for 
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good reasons why the exclusion of this liability is not unfair, even if the consumer signed or 
initialled the term in question.691 
4.  Written consumer agreements 
The Consumer Protection Act does not require all consumer contracts to be in writing. 
However, in terms of section 50(1), the Minister may prescribe categories of consumer 
agreements that are required to be in writing. Non-compliance with the formalities prescribed 
in an applicable statute usually leads to the invalidity of the transaction in question, save if the 
applicable legislation provides otherwise.692 Since the Act does not contain such a provision, 
the general rule could apply in terms of which the written form becomes a formal requirement 
for the validity of the agreement.693 Where the law requires the written form, the statute must 
be interpreted to determine whether the legislator intended the written form to be constitutive 
though. If it is not clear, the presumption prevails that the legislature did not want to change 
the common law more than necessary. Most authorities take the stand that the written form in 
the Act is not constitutive and that non-compliance does not render the agreement void.694 
Section 50 itself provides that if a consumer agreement is in writing, it is applicable irrespective 
of whether the consumer has signed it or not. Hence, the signature is not an incorporation 
requirement. What is more, under section 52(2)(g), non-compliance with the plain language 
requirement does not nullify the agreement per se, but is merely a factor to be taken into 
account by the court.695 The wording of section 50(2) '[i]f a consumer agreement (…) is in 
writing' is a clear indication that the written form is no requirement for validity unless 
prescribed by the Minister. 
For these reasons, the requirements of section 50 are part of the incorporation control. 
Before discussing the provision of section 50, it is worthwhile having a look at the common 
law of contracts in order to better understand the formal requirement of the written form and 
the developments in jurisprudence in this field. 
                                                             
death or personal injury caused to the consumer through an act or omission of that supplier subject to section 61(1) 
of the Act; (b) (…)'. 
691 De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
692 Pursuant to s 5(1) of the Credit Agreement Act 75 of 1980, credit agreements had to be in writing. Section 5(2) 
provided that credit agreements which did not comply with this requirement should not merely for that reason be 
invalid, however. 
693 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8.  
694 As a general rule, only alienation of land, suretyship and executory donations require the written form in order 
to be valid and enforceable. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 115 and 161 et seq., Christie and Bradfield Law 
of Contract (2011) 134. 
695 695 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9.  
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4.1 Common law 
In South African contract law, writing is a constitutive or formal requirement only for certain 
legal acts but not a general requirement.696 The most important agreements for consumers that 
need to be in writing are agreements for the sale of land,697 suretyships698 and executory 
donations.699 According to the Act, also franchise agreements need to be in writing to be 
valid.700 Otherwise, there is no requirement in common law according to which an agreement 
has to be in writing.701 Employment contracts, for instance, do not need to fulfil any written 
form requirements in order to be valid. The same applies to credit agreements. Section 93(1) 
of the National Credit Act requires a credit provider to deliver a copy of the document recording 
their agreement. Non-compliance with this formality does not invalidate the consumer 
agreement, however.702  
Different policies require specific formalities, and as statutes have different objectives, the 
formality provisions have to be interpreted accordingly.703 Van Eeden's argument that the 
signature on a written document not only indicates that the parties have read and understood 
its content, have consented to the terms above their signatures and agreed to them does not 
apply to all cases.704 Consumers too often sign contracts without having read, not to mention 
understood their content.705 In some instances, such as the alienation of land,706 the general 
object of the formal requirement of the written form and the parties' signature is not the 
protection of the parties. It is rather directed 'against uncertainty, disputes and possible 
malpractices'.707 The written form is a constitutive requirement here. The same applies to 
suretyships708 were the writing requirement also has the purpose of bringing the clauses of the 
agreement to the surety's attention that contains onerous obligations in the case of the debtor's 
                                                             
696 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 159. 
697 Section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
698 Section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956. 
699 Section 5 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956. 
700 Section 7(1)(a) CPA. 
701 Christie Law of Contract 115. 
702 Christie Law of Contract 134. On the other hand, under s 5(1)(a) of the (now repealed) Credit Agreements Act 
75 of 1980, all credit agreements had to be in writing. 
703 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 160. 
704 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 169. 
705 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 162. 
706 See s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
707 Neethling v Klopper en Andere 1967 (4) SA 459 (A) at 464E. See Christie Law of Contract 116. 
708 See s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act. 
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non-performance.709 The purpose of the written form for executory donations of anything but 
land is to make sure that the donor is serious about the conclusion of the contract.710 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom711 that, as a rule, a 
contracting party has no legal duty to inform the other party about the content of their proposed 
agreement.712 In other words, the common law does not know any notification or transparency 
requirements. Six years later, in Mercurius Motors v Lopez,713 the court decided though that an 
exemption clause by which the liability for negligence of a car dealer was limited ‘should be 
clearly and pertinently brought to the attention of a customer (…), and not by way of an 
inconspicuous and barely legible clause that refers to the conditions on the reverse side of the 
page in question.’714 The courts trod this path of consumer protection already earlier. In Dlovo 
v Brian Porter Motors Ltd,715 the court found that a supplier must not confuse or mislead the 
signatory by the form of the document by including an essential clause in a document which, 
by its heading or nature, could not be expected to contain such a provision.716 Other cases 
decried small print of a relevant clause717 or placing such a clause where nobody expected it.718 
These cases show a clear shift towards consumer protection as regards transparency and 
consumer information made possible by clearly visible and understandable clauses. 
a) Non-variation clauses 
Written agreements, compared to oral agreements, have obvious advantages, such as the 
simplification of the burden of proof, the avoidance or limitation of subsequent disagreements 
about the contractual provisions, and the opportunity for the parties to consider their positions 
and duties contemplated in the contract before signing it.719 Once an agreement has been 
concluded in writing, the parties will be entitled to cancel it orally, unless they have provided 
                                                             
709 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 162. 
710 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 163. 
711 2002 (6) 21 (SCA). 
712 Afrox Healthcare v Strydom 2002 (6) 21 (SCA) at 41. 
713 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
714 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) at 578. 
715 1994 (2) SA 904 (C). 
716 See also Fourie v Hansen 2001 (2) SA 823 (W). 
717 Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A) at 318C, Kempston Hire (Pty) Ltd v 
Snyman 1988 (4) SA 465 (T) at 467B-C, 468 G-H, Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Livingstone 1995 (4) SA 493 (W) 
at 495I-496A, Fourie v Hansen 2001 (2) SA 823 W at 833. 
718 Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lötter 1989 (1) SA 585 (C) at 590B-592C, Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Forbes Waterproofing v Government of the United Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA) at 20. 
719 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract (2011) 109 and 113. 
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for certain formalities for cancellation. By a so-called non-variation clause,720 the parties can 
prescribe writing as a formal precondition for variation of the contract. When it is worded 
widely enough, no part of the contract, including the non-variation clause itself, may be varied 
in any way other than in writing.721  
For years, the validity of non-variation clauses was debated, and both sides put forward the 
pacta sunt servanda principle. One side argued that the effectiveness of such a clause would 
amount to an unjustifiable invasion of the parties’ freedom to change their minds and alter the 
provisions of their contract.722 The other side asserted that not giving effect to a seriously 
intended and commercially useful clause would in itself constitute an unjustifiable limitation 
of the fundamental principle that the parties to a contract are free on any term, provided that it 
is not immoral, contra bonos mores or against public policy.723 The validity of non-variation 
clauses was finally decided in SA Sentrale Ko-operatiewe Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren724. 
The Appellate Division held that such a clause was not against public policy and that the parties 
could not amend their agreement orally if the clause entrenched both itself and all the other 
contractual provisions against oral variation. According to the court, the purpose of such a 
clause was to prevent disputes and problems of proof. Furthermore, it operated in favour of 
both parties, and giving effect to the clause was in line with the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, by which agreements must be enforced in the public interest if they are freely and 
seriously concluded.725 The court put forward that the parties still could exercise their freedom 
of contract since they were still able to freely vary their agreement, provided that they complied 
with the formal requirements they had agreed upon.726 As this so-called Shifren principle often 
led to unfair results,727 it was challenged in Brisley v Drotsky.728 The court, however, reaffirmed 
its earlier decision in Graanmaatskappy v Shifren by referring to an analogy where the 
legislature or parties to a contract prescribe writing as a formal requirement for an agreement.729  
                                                             
720 The wording of a non-variation clause is more or less the following: ‘No variation of this agreement shall be 
of any force or effect unless reduced to writing and signed by the parties to this agreement‘. Formulation from 
Hutchison et al Law of Contract 165. 
721 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 131, Hutchison 2001 SALJ 720. 
722 Forsyth/Francis 80 SALJ 395. 
723 See Hutchison 2001 SALJ 720, with further references. 
724 1964 (4) SA 760 (A) – hereafter referred to as ‘Graanmaatskappy v Shifren’. 
725 Graanmaatskappy v Shifren at 767. 
726 Graanmaatskappy v Shifren at 767. 
727 For instance, where a party orally agrees to a modification of the contract, and the other party relies on this 
oral agreement, and then the first party later cancels the contract on this ground, relying on the non-variation 
clause. 
728 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
729 Brisley v Drotsky at 11. 
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Another argument put forward was 'legal certainty' or 'commercial reliance and social certainty' 
which ultimately avoids litigation.730 Nonetheless, courts tend more and more to abolish the 
‘slavish’ application of the Shifren principle in order to mitigate its harsh outcomes, by putting 
forward the argument that non-variation clauses must be interpreted restrictively as they 
ultimately curtail freedom of contract.731 Some commentators investigated the reference to 
waiver and estoppel made by the court in the Shifren case, but this approach seemed too 
technical and complicated.732 A waiver could be construed though where the creditor implicitly 
agreed not to enforce its right to cancel after the debtor did not fully perform his or her 
obligation (pactum de non petendo),733 or where the creditor agreed not to cancel without due 
warning that in future it would insist on strict compliance with the contract.734 In Miller & 
another NNO v Dannecker,735 the court did however not construe a waiver because the plaintiff 
did rather suspend its right to receive payment of the defendant's instalments concerning a 
franchise business than abandon them. Although many commentators mention waiver and 
estoppel in these cases, they have not been successful in any reported decision yet. On the other 
hand, in cases where the right waived is based on a term inserted only for the benefit of the 
waiving party,736 or where an accrued right flowing from a breach of contract is waived (e.g., 
the right to cancel the contract),737 an oral waiver might be construed despite the presence of a 
non-variation clause in the agreement.738  
Another approach invokes the notion of bona fides directly, especially in cases where good 
faith is closely connected to public policy and the community’s sense of what is fair, just and 
                                                             
730 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) at 140. 
731 Randcoal Services Ltd v Randgold and Exploration Co Ltd 1998 (4) SA 825 (SCA) at 841F; Barclays Western 
Bank Ltd v Ernst 1988 (1) SA 243 (A) at 253. In this sense, any legal act which does not amount to a variation of 
the contract is thus not affected by the non-variation clause, such as an informal cancellation of the contract which 
extinguishes the agreement rather than varying it. See Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) 
156. 
732 Hutchison 2001 SALJ 722. See Tager 1976 SALJ 423 and the authors quoted at 435. See also Van Rensburg 
2015 De Rebus 32. 
733 In Impala Distributors v Taunus Chemical Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 (3) SA 273 (T), Hiemstra J denied 
the qualification of a pactum de non petendo as a variation of the contract. He instead implied that it was a waiver. 
Lubbe and Murray Contract at 730 note 4) however do not qualify a pactum de non petendo as a waiver, as the 
first does not extinguish the legal consequences of a transaction, but only suspends the capacity to enforce it. 
734 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 168. 
735 Miller & another NNO v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C). 
736 Hutchison 2001 SALJ 728 et seq is however of the opinion that such a reasoning would be artificial. This 
argument is also recognised by Nestadt J in Van As v Du Preez 1981 (3) SA 760 (T). 
737 In such a case, the waiver does not affect the terms or the underlying contractual obligations, and therefore 
does not constitute a variation. 
738 Hutchison 2001 SALJ 726. 
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reasonable.739 The Supreme Court of Appeal has however rejected the Constitutional Court's 
interpretation in Barkhuizen v Napier as authority for the view that fairness is a freestanding 
requirement for the exercise of a contractual right, although the Supreme Court of Appeal 
enquired whether the cancellation of the contract was unreasonable and unfair.740 
b) Parol evidence rule 
The importance of the written form in common law is also stressed by the parol evidence rule. 
According to this rule, extrinsic evidence which discloses an ambiguity and clarifies it or adds 
to the written terms of the agreement that appears to be whole is inadmissible. The rationale of 
this common law rule is that extrinsic evidence of past agreements or terms should not be 
considered when interpreting that writing because the parties had decided to ultimately leave 
them out of the contract when reducing their agreement to a single and final writing.741 
                                                             
739 Miller & another NNO v Dannecker 2001 (1) SA 928 (C) at 938D-929B; Nyandeni Municipality v Hlazo 2010 
(4) SA 261 (ECM), GF v SH 2011 (3) SA 1 (GNP); Steyn and Another v Karee Kloof Melkery (Pty) Ltd and 
Another (GSJ) (2009/45448) [2011] ZAGPJHC 228 (39 November 2011) 
 (Peter AJ). Hutchison 2001 SALJ 722. 
740 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA) at 483-7; Maphango v Aengus 
Lifestyle Properties 2011 (5) SA 19 (SCA) at 26-7. 
741 For an explanation of the parol evidence rule, see Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257 et seq. See also Union 
Government v Vianini Ferro Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 47; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) 938. 
Since the strict application of the parol evidence rule leads to certain difficulties, such as the distinction between 
background circumstances and surrounding circumstances, the courts had become less reluctant to consider the 
broad context in which the contract came into existence and allowing extrinsic evidence. Some authorities, 
especially after the case KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) were taking 
the view that the court would abandon the aforementioned distinction as soon as it is presented with an adequate 
opportunity, and at least one author, namely Wallis, was of the opinion that this distinction had no validity 
anymore. See Wallis 2010 SALJ 674-675. Finally, in Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun 
Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA), the SCA held at para [12] that the distinction 'between permissible 
background and surrounding circumstances, never very clear, has fallen away. Interpretation is no longer a process 
that occurs in stages but is 'essentially one unitary exercise'. Accordingly it is no longer helpful to refer to the 
earlier approach.' See also National Health Laboratory Service v Mariana Lloyd-Jansen van Vuuren (20044/2014) 
[2015] ZASCA 20 (19 March 2015). In the last decade there has been a development, and the courts no longer 
apply this distinction and allow all evidence in order to determine the meaning of a word or phrase, since the 
relevance of evidence cannot be determined before the end of a case, which of course defies the purpose of the 
parol evidence rule. Before, the distinction between background and surrounding circumstances could probably 
only survive, according to Harms DP in KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd,741 because it was 
widely ignored by trial courts. For the recent development see Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General 
Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 2008 (5) SA 1 (SCA); KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 
and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA); Natal Joint Municipality Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 
(SCA); Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA); Bothma-
Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA); Airports 
Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd  2019 (2) BCLR 165. 
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c) Caveat subscriptor principle 
With respect to the common-law principle caveat subscriptor,742 the parties are bound to the 
terms of an agreement when it is reduced to writing and they have signed it as signature 
signifies assent thereto,743 even if a party did not read it744 or was willing to consent to it.745  
This rule has sometimes been considered a rebuttable presumption that someone who signs a 
document knows what it contains.746 The onus to prove that the document was not signed animo 
contrahendi is ordinarily not upon the signatory, however.747 This does not apply to cases 
though where it is evident from the nature of the document that it embodies a contract, or where 
the circumstances clearly indicate that the document was meant to be a contract. In cases where 
a document is ex facie a bilateral agreement, but in reality is, for instance, an invoice,748 the 
person alleging that the document was signed animo contrahendi has the burden of proof.749  
The caveat subscriptor rule therefore protects not only the reliance interest of the other party 
but also commercial relationships which would be impossible if a party could escape from its 
duties by simply not searching the implications of a contract.750 The need for legal and 
commercial certainty is balanced in situations of iustus error as regards the content of the 
contract, its nature or the identity of the parties, or in situations where a party unreasonably 
relied on the appearance of consensus based on the fact that the contract was signed. In these 
cases, the party can escape its liability. The same applies to cases of misrepresentation, duress, 
undue influence or commercial bribery.751 In recent years, the scope of exceptions to the caveat 
subscriptor rule was significantly widened by the courts, beginning with Du Toit v Atikinson’s 
Motors Bpk,752 and other cases allowing to escape the application of the principle because of 
unusual or unexpected contract terms.753 
                                                             
742 Latin for ‘let the signatory beware’. A case where the classical approach of the caveat subscriptor rule is well 
demonstrated is George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A). 
743 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 181. The caveat subscriptor rule is usually traced back in South African 
law to Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571. Originally, it derived from English law where it 
can be traced back to Parker v South Eastern Railway (1872) 2 CPD 416. 
744 Eiselen 2011 PELJ 13. 
745 Nortje 2011 SALJ 741.  
746 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 181. 
747 Stocks & Stocks (Pty) Ltd v TJ Daly & Sons (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 754 (A). 
748 This was the case in WJ Lineveldt (Edms) Bpk v Immelman 1980 (2) SA 964 (O). 
749 Gordon Wilson (Pty) Ltd v Barkhuizen 1947 (2) SA 244 (O) at 248. 
750 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 239. 
751 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 239. Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A); 
Van Wyk v Otten 1963 (1) SA 415 (O). 
752 1985 (2) SA 893 (A). 
753 See, e.g., Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes Waterproofing v Government of the United Kingdom 
2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA); Fourie v Hansen 2001 (2) SA 823 (W); Dlovo v Brian Porters Motors Ltd t/a Port 
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If a person signing a contract is bound to the terms above its signature, this begs the question 
of whether this is also applicable in cases where a contractual document merely refers to terms 
and conditions which are not contained in the contract itself. As mentioned above, the caveat 
subscriptor rule is sometimes expressed as a rebuttable presumption that the signatory knows 
what the given document contains.754 Under the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent, the signatory 
is bound by the document if its co-contractor is reasonably entitled to assume that the other 
party was signifying his or her intention to be bound by it by signing the document. Thus, the 
signatory is, not bound by the contractual terms if he or she did not know that the document 
contained such terms,755 or where the other party undertook no steps to draw the other party's 
attention to their existence.756 This also applies where the supplier did not explain the nature 
of unlimited deeds of suretyships.757 From these cases, one cannot deduct though that the other 
party always must expressly warn its counterpart of the content of the document before signing 
it.758 As discussed earlier, under section 49(1), a notice that limits the risk or liability of the 
supplier or any other person must be drawn to the consumer's attention. The courts deal with 
the question of whether one can reasonably interpret the signature as an acceptance of the 
conditions on a case-to-case basis.759 In cases where the signatory has not read the document 
but indicates expressly or impliedly that he or she wants to be bound to the contractual terms, 
the courts already decided that the signatory is bound by the contractual clauses.760 
                                                             
Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 518 (C); Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A); 
Van Wyk v Otten 1963 (1) SA 415 (O). 
754 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 181. See Burger v Central South African Railways 1903 TS 571; SAR 
v Merchiston Plains Black Wattle Co Ltd 1921 NPD 165; SAR & H v Conradie 1922 AD 137; Industrial and 
Mercantile Corpn v Anastassiou Bros 1973 (2) SA 601 (W) at 604-605. See also Graaf-Reinet Municipality v 
Jansen 1917 CPD at 604 610; Knocker v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1933 AD 128 at 132; Trans-Drakensberg Bank 
Ltd v Guy 1964 (1) SA 790 (D) at 794C; Glen Comeragh (Pty) Ltd v Colibri (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 210 (T) at 
215; Stiff v Q Data Distribution (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 336 (SCA) at 340; Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd 2007 (4) SA 572 (W). 
755 Van Wyk v Otten 1963 (1) SA 415 (O). 
756 Payne v Minister of Transport 1995 (4) SA 153 (C) 159E-161C.  
757 Davids v ABSA Bank Bpk 2005 (3) SA 351 (C) 370-371, 
758 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA).  
759 In Homes Fires Transvaal CC v Van Wyk 2002 (2) SA 375 (W) 381 and Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of the United Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA) it was held that a faxed document of which the reverse 
side containing conditions was not faxed, did not bind the other party. On the other hand, in Africa Solar (Pty) 
Ltd v Divwatt (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 681 (SCA), it was stated that if the fax referred to terms and conditions on 
the reverse side of the document (which had not being faxed), the signatory could have asked for a copy of that 
other page. 'By not doing so he indicated that he was nevertheless prepared to contract on the basis of the 
appellant's standard conditions.' 
760 Goedhals v Massey-Harris & Co 1939 EDL 314; Bhikhagee v Southern Aviation (Pty) Ltd 1949 (4) SA 105 
(E); Mathole v Mothle 1951 (1) SA 256 (T); George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A); Glenburn Hotels 
(Pvt) Ltd v England 1972 (2) SA 660 (RA); Moshal Gevisser (Trademarket) Ltd v Midlands Paraffin Co 1977 (1) 
SA 64 (N). 
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Apart from cases of misrepresentation, fraud, illegality, duress, undue influence and iustus 
error, one has to keep in mind that only a reasonable person can rely on the doctrine of quasi-
mutual assent. This leads to the conclusion that the caveat subscriptor rule must not be applied 
in cases which present an inconsistency between an advertisement, which led to the conclusion 
of the contract, and the contractual terms.761 The same applies to representations made during 
the negotiations, and which are inconsistent with the terms of the actual contract,762 or where 
the form of the document is confusing or misleading for the signatory, where an essential clause 
of a document is surprising considering the heading or nature of the document,763 where an 
important clause is in small print764 or where a clause is tucked away where it is not obvious.765 
The principle according to which a contract can only bind a party if it has not been misled in 
respect of the nature of the document or its content leads to the conclusion that the signatory is 
not bound by a document containing unexpected terms that he or she had not read.766 
d) Unsigned documents: 'Ticket cases' 
The so-called 'ticket cases' are an example where it is practically impossible to obtain a 
signature from each customer. These cases concern transactions where a great number of 
customers conclude the same kind of transaction with the same supplier, e.g., for a sports event, 
or passenger transportation. Obtaining a signature from each client would cause delays and 
raise costs. Since no signature is required, the caveat subscriptor rule needs to be replaced so 
that the parol evidence rule can operate. The term 'ticket cases' is too narrow because these 
cases not only involve tickets but all transactions where a supplier places a document that 
contains or refers to its standard terms, and that is not intended to be signed, before the client.767  
The ticket cases beg the question when a consumer is bound by the terms although it has not 
signed anything. In any case, the principles mentioned above do not apply where the supplier 
is unable to prove that the terms contained in a document were legible.768 In situations where 
                                                             
761 Shepherd v Farrell's Estate Agency 1921 TPD 62; Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A). 
762 Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A). 
763 Dlovo v Brian Porters Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 518 (C) 526F; Fourie v Hansen 2001 
(2) SA 823 (W) 833. 
764 Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A) 318C; Kempston Hire (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 
1988 (4) SA 465 (T) 467B-C 468G-H; Dlovo v Brian Porters Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 
518 (C) 526F; Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Livingstone 1995 (4) SA 493 (W) 495I-496A; Fourie v Hansen 2001 
(2) SA 823 (W) 833. 
765 Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lötter 1989 (1) SA 585 (C) 590B-592C; Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Forbes Waterproofing v Government of the United Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA) at 20. 
766 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 185 et seq. 
767 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 186 and 187. 
768 Primesite Outdoor Advertising (Pty) Ltd v Salviati and Santori (Pty) Ltd 1999 (1) SA 868 (W) at 879D. In this 
case, the document transmitted by fax contained minute print. 
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the consumer has read the provisions contained in such a document and enters into a contract, 
it is not necessary to prove that he or she actually has understood the terms.769 It is also not 
necessary that the customer reads a second document (e.g., the railway regulations) to which 
the first document (e.g., the train ticket) refers.770 If it is not possible to prove whether the 
consumer has read the document, he or she will nevertheless be bound to the terms contained 
or referred to herein if the supplier did what was reasonably sufficient, necessary or possible 
to draw the customer's attention to the clauses in question.771  
If the supplier can, on the basis of quasi-mutual assent, assume from the consumer's conduct 
that he or she has either read and assented to the terms or is prepared to be bound by them 
without reading them, the supplier can go ahead with the contract. This is regularly the case 
where the supplier's document itself was sufficient to draw a reasonable consumer's attention 
to its content. Then, the supplier has no obligation to reinforce it with other means, such as 
posters or a public address system.772 
The question when a supplier's steps are sufficient to draw the consumer's attention to the terms 
contained in a document (ticket) was dealt with in early cases, such as Central SAR v 
McLaren773 (a case based on English law) and has since evolved as follows: If the consumer 
knows that the document in question contains terms without reading them, he or she is bound 
to them. If the consumer does not know that terms are printed on the ticket, he or she is only 
bound if the supplier took reasonable steps to draw the attention of a reasonable consumer to 
those terms, no matter if they are printed on the ticket, or the ticket simply refers to them.774  
Whether or not these steps were sufficient has to be decided on a case-to-case basis. The nature 
of the given document will be the most relevant factor. The less likely the document is expected 
to contain contractual provisions, 'the more specific and positive must the steps be which are 
                                                             
769 Some court cases stating the contrary refer to outmoded English or Roman-Dutch ideas according to which 
true consensus is necessary for every contract, or refer to s 4 of the English Carriers Act 1830, or simply deal 
carelessly with this issue. Cases in which was decided that the customer also needs to understand the terms: Naylor 
v Munnik 1859 (3) S 187 at 191, Owens v Ennis & Co 1890 (3) SAR 233; Zeederberg v Frank 1894 (1) OR 118 
at 122; Davis v Lockstone 1921 (AD) 153 at 167. Cases where it was decided that it was sufficient that the 
consumer reads the terms: Essa v Divaris 1947 (1) SA 753 (A) 763; Hughes v SA Fumigation Co (Pty) Ltd 1961 
(4) SA 799 (C) 803-804. 
770 Central SAR v James 1908 (TS) 221 at 226. See also the particular case of Sanso Properties Joubert Street 
(Pty) Ltd v Kudsee 1976 (4) SA 761 (A), where the document referred to did not become part of the contract. 
771 Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (A) 991I-992A; Jacobs v Imperial Group 
(Pty) Ltd 2010 (2) All SA 540 (SCA) at [9]. 
772 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 187. 
773 1903 (TS) 727.  
774 King's Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Wakeling 1970 (4) SA 640 (N) at 643E; Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of the United Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA) at 188. 
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taken to bring this to the attention of the other party'. On the other hand, in the case of carriage 
tickets and bills of lading, long-established usage has created a situation where a contracting 
party will be considered to know of the existence of such clauses on the relevant document, or 
at least of a reference to them.775 The same applies to the ECTA776 which provides that 
contractual provisions which are incorporated into an agreement and that are not in the public 
domain are regarded as having been incorporated into a data message if such information is 
referred to in a way in which a reasonable person would have noticed the given reference and 
incorporation, provided that the information is accessible in a form in which it may be read, 
stored and retrieved by the other party.777 Thus, a consumer is justified to ignore a document 
which does not appear to him, as a reasonable person, to be of a contractual nature.778 The same 
applies if the consumer receives the document only after the contract has been concluded,779 or 
where there is a combination of both factors.780 The documents need not necessarily come into 
the consumer's possession though. If an auctioneer, for example, refers to the printed conditions 
of sale and makes them available for inspection,781 or the terms are posted at all entrances of a 
venue, and the conditions of admission were published in all the local newspapers, this shall 
be sufficient.782  
e) Exemption clauses 
Exemption or exception clauses, are part of nearly every single contract because suppliers aim 
to protect themselves from certain risks. Nonetheless, there are limits to this kind of clauses, 
and the courts draw on public policy to define what is allowed and what is not.783 An exemption 
clause is against public policy if it is shown that it contravenes 'some fundamental principle of 
justice or of general statutory law, or that it is necessarily to the prejudice of the interests of the 
                                                             
775 King AJ in Bok Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v Lady Land Ltd 1982 (2) SA 565 (C) at 569E-G.  
776 25 of 2002. 
777 Section 11(3) ECTA. 
778 See Central SAR v McLaren 1903 TS 727 (cloakroom ticket taken as a voucher to identify property); Dyer v 
Melrose Steam Laundry 1912 TPD 164 at 167-168 (laundry list taken for checking items and prices); Frocks Ltd 
v Dent and Goodwin (Pty) Ltd 1950 (2) SA 717 (C) (warehouse invoice containing conditions limiting the liability 
of the bailee); Micor Shipping (Pty) Ltd v Treger Golf and Sports (Pty) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 709 (W) (invoice with 
reference to 'standard trading conditions'); Sun Couriers (Pty) Ltd v Kimberley Diamond Wholesalers 2001 (3) 
SA 110 (NC) at 133 (dispatch note which required the consumer to enter the addresses of the sender and receiver).  
779 Reynolds v Donald Curry & Co 1875 NLR (1) 14; WJ Lineveldt (Edms) Bpd v Immelman 1980 (2) SA 964 (O). 
780 Roseveare v Auckland Park Sporting Club 1907 TH 230; R v Thompson 1926 OPD 141 at 143 (programme 
bought inside racecourse after the conclusion of the contract for admission at the gate). 
781 Slabbert Verster & Malherbe (Noord Vrystaat) (Edms) Bpk v Gellie Slaghuise (Edms) Bpk 1984 (1) SA 
491 (O). 
782 Davidson v Johannesburg Turf Club 1904 TH 260 at 265. On the contrary, in Weiner v Calderbank 1929 TPD 
654 it was decided that the notice with letters six inches high at a prominent position in a parking garage was not 
sufficient. On nearly similar facts, in King's Car Hire (Pty) v Wakeling 1970 (4) SA 640 (N), such a notice was 
held sufficient though. 
783 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 191. 
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public'.784 Thus, any exemption from liability for fraud is prohibited, which means that the law 
does not recognise contracts by which a consumer binds itself to fraudulent provisions, conduct 
or misrepresentations of the other party.785 A supplier can only be exempted from fraud 
committed by its employees or agents if the supplier does not benefit from the fraud. This is 
the case when the employee or agent has committed a theft, for instance. The reason is that the 
risk of a theft is independent from the fact that the employer has inserted an exemption 
clause.786  
The principle of public policy must be applied to cases where the parties have fully discussed 
the exemption clauses and the consumer has understood them as well as in cases where a 
consumer has signed the clause without reading it, e.g., on a ticket. Christie rightly suggests 
that in circumstances where the supplier would benefit from the dishonesty, for the application 
of the principle of public policy, the supplier must at least act dishonestly. Where this 
requirement is not fulfilled, the other party can only defend itself by arguing that one could not 
reasonably expect to find such a clause in the document.787 
4.2 Consumer Protection Act 
As discussed earlier, under section 50(1), the Minister may prescribe categories of consumer 
agreements that are required to be in writing. So far, the Minister has not prescribed any of 
such categories.788 
The term ‘consumer agreement’ is defined in section 1 as ‘an agreement between a supplier 
and a consumer other than a franchise agreement’. The exclusion of franchise agreements from 
consumer agreements is somehow counterbalanced by section 7(1)(a) under which franchise 
agreements have to be in writing.789 
                                                             
784 Mason J in Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775 at 784-785. 
785 Wells v SA Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69 at 72. 
786 Cloete J in Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Rennies Group Ltd 1997 (4) SA 91 (W) 99E-G. See also Government 
of Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
787 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 192. 
788 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
789 See reg 2 CPA. 
 134   
 
a) Consumer’s signature not required 
According to section 50(2)(a), if a consumer agreement between a supplier and a consumer is 
in writing, whether as required by the Act790 or voluntary, the agreement applies irrespective 
of whether or not the consumer signs the agreement.791  
If a provision of the Act requires a document to be signed or initialled, that signing or initialling 
may be effected in any manner recognised by law, including by use of an advanced electronic 
signature or an electronic signature, as defined in the ECTA.792 This is in keeping with the 
principle of functional equivalence according to which formal requirements are also met by 
electronic means.793 According to the definition contained in section 1 ECTA, "'electronic 
signature' means data attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data and 
which is intended by the user to serve as a signature'.794 The supplier must take reasonable steps 
to prevent the use of a consumer’s electronic signature for any purpose other than the signing 
or initialling of the particular document that the consumer intended to sign or initial.795 Under 
section 12 of the ECTA, a requirement in law that a document or information must be in writing 
is met if the document or information is in the form of a data message and is accessible. This 
does not apply to alienations of land and long-term leases of immovable property in excess of 
twenty years.796 Floyd is of the view that section 12 should not only apply to formalities 
required by statute but also to those required by the parties because this provision states that 
                                                             
790 Insofar, the wording here is incorrect, as strictly speaking, a consumer agreement that has to be in writing 
pursuant to s 50(1) is not an agreement which is in writing because this formal requirement is ‘required by the 
Act‘, but because of a regulation of the Minister who has been authorised to do so in terms of s 50(1) of the Act. 
791 Section 50(2)(a). 
792 Section 2(3) CPA. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.  
793 Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 23. 
794 This definition was largely inspired by article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001, 
read with article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law of Electronic Commerce, 1996. Both the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws of 1996 and 2001 and the ECTA embody the principle of functional equivalence, i.e., electronic 
communications (and signatures) have the same legal effect and protection as physical communications and 
signatures. The South African definition contains a subjective element though, since the data must be intended by 
the user to serve as a signature. This requirement corresponds to traditional physical signatures which also need 
the parties' intention and complies therefore with the principle of media neutrality. What is more, the ECTA 
provides in its s 13(3)(a) another requirement contained in the aforementioned two Model Laws: 'Where an 
electronic signature is required by the parties to an electronic transaction and the parties have not agreed on the 
type of electronic signature to be used, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if (a) a method is used 
to identify the person and to indicate the person's approval of the information communicated; (…)'. See Eiselen 
2014 PELJ 2811 and 2813-2814. See also Eiselen 2002 VJ 306. It should be noted that the two aforementioned 
UNICITRAL Model Laws on Electronic Commerce of 1996 and 2001 have the objective to standardise and 
facilitate the response of domestic legal systems to the challenges of electronic commerce. They have 
subsequently served as a model for domestic legislation in many countries. On the other hand, the United Nations 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 2005 (UNECIC) provides 
solutions and harmonising rules on electronic communications of international transactions and thus aims at 
establishing legal certainty. See Eiselen FS Kritzer 107. 
795 Section 2((4) CPA. 
796 Section 4(4) read with Schedule 2 ECTA. 
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writing is a 'requirement in law' (and not by law) in both cases.797 This argument is convincing. 
Otherwise, the legislature would have chosen another formulation. What is more, there is no 
reason why the parties' prescribed formalities should be treated differently in these cases. 
According to section 4(3) ECTA, read with Column B of Schedule 1, the ECTA does not apply 
to various sections of certain statutes, such as the Wills Act,798 the Alienation of Land Act,799 
the Bills of Exchange Act800 or the Stamp Duties Act.801 An electronic signature is data attached 
to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data which is intended by the user to serve 
as a signature.802 An advanced electronic signature is a signature which results from a process 
that has been accredited by the Accreditation Authority803 after an application has been 
properly made and a fee paid.804 Section 13 ECTA distinguishes signatures required by law 
and those merely required by the parties to the transaction. In cases where a signature is 
required by law, that signature must meet the requirements of an advanced electronic 
signature.805 Where the parties require an electronic signature, and they have not agreed on the 
type of electronic signature to be used, that requirement is met in relation to a data message, if 
the data message sufficiently identifies the person and indicates his or her approval.806 The fact 
that a consumer has not signed the document does not mean though that a contract has not been 
established,807 with the exception of the abovementioned cases where a written document is a 
formal requirement for the validity of the agreement.808 The two foundations for contractual 
liability under the common law are that either the supplier would have to prove that agreement 
was reached on all the provisions set out in writing, or that the consumer reasonably relied on 
that an agreement was reached.809 
                                                             
797 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 163. 
798 7 of 1953. 
799 68 of 1983. 
800 34 of 1964. 
801 77 of 1968. 
802 Definition of ‘electronic signature’ in s 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act. 
803 As yet, the LAW Trusted Third Party Services (Pty) Ltd ('LAWtrust') and the South African Post Office have 
been accredited in 2011 and 2013, respectively. See Eiselen 2014 PELJ 2816. 
804 Definition of ‘advanced electronic signature’ in s 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
read with s 37. 
805 Section 13(1) ECTA. 
806 Section 13(3) ECTA. See Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 25. 
807 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 175, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 241. 
808 Note that a notice in terms of s 49 must be signed or initialled by the consumer, unless the consumer acted in 
a manner consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision 
(s 49(2) in fine). 
809 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 19 et seq. 
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In most transactions, a written agreement would be too burdensome for the parties. All-day or 
other regular transactions would not be imaginable if the written form were required. When an 
agreement is in writing though, irrespective of whether the written form is required by the Act 
or voluntarily, some authors suggest that there could be a danger of abuse by the supplier 
because the customer does not need to sign the agreement. This could afford an opportunity to 
fraudulent suppliers to insert, delete or alter certain clauses afterwards. Besides, fraudulent 
suppliers could pretend that an agreement has been concluded, whereas it was not.810 Situations 
in which suppliers abuse the fact that the consumer does not have to sign the agreement would 
hence be imaginable.811 Melville does unfortunately not further elaborate her view.812 Jacobs, 
Stoop and van Niekerk argue that a supplier could pretend that an agreement had been 
concluded.813  
The requirement of a signature could create more problems than it solves, however. This 
experience could already be made from the English Statute of Frauds of 1677, which created a 
legion of litigation. The requirement of writing or signing would simply be out of touch with 
everyday life. In South Africa, section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act814 caused an extensive 
body of jurisprudence as to the validity of subsequent oral alterations to the written (and signed) 
contract.815 The written formality required for suretyships also serves as an example of how 
formalities may create unnecessary problems by the mere possibility to 'plead the statute'.816 In 
Northern Cape co-op Livestock Agency Ltd v John Roderick & Co Ltd,817 it was held that the 
contract of surety only has to contain the essential elements in order to be valid, such as the 
identity of the parties, the name of the principal debtor, the nature of the debt guaranteed and 
the guarantee's extent. The omission of other material terms could be rectified. In First 
Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bisset,818 the court regarded it as well settled though that 
only the material terms of an agreement of suretyship need to be in writing and allowed the 
omission of other provisions only on the basis that they were not material. 
                                                             
810 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 358. 
811 Melville Consumer Protection Act 74. 
812 Melville Consumer Protection Act 74. 
813 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 358. 
814 68 of 1981. 
815 Against any legal effect of an oral variation: Schoeman v Botha 1968 (1) SA 637 (T); Da Mata v Otto 1971 (1) 
SA 763 (T) 772; Kovacs Investments 724 (Pty) Ltd v Marais 2009 (6) SA 560 (SCA); For legal validity: Sinclair 
v Viljoen 1972 (3) SA 579 (W) 582; Kaplan v Fountain Park (Pty) Ltd 1972 (4) SA 193 (T) 196; Barnard v 
Thelander 1977 (3) SA 932 (C) 940. 
816 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 114. 
817 1965 (2) SA 64 (O) at 69-71. 
818 1978 (4) SA 491 (W) at 495H. 
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The fact that no written contract and signature is necessary (except in terms of section 50(1)), 
also facilitates situations where a consumer contacts a call centre in order to conclude a contract 
(e.g., a hotel booking). Usually, those phone calls are recorded, and the consumer has to 
confirm at the end of the conversation that the call centre representative’s summary of the terms 
and conditions (which usually only contains the core terms) is correct. After the consumer’s 
confirmation, an agreement has been concluded. This kind of conclusion of a contract is very 
advantageous for suppliers, and in some extent also convenient for consumers. In terms of 
proof or the necessary time for consideration, the consumer might be in a disadvantageous 
position, however. The cooling-off period granted by section 16 might mitigate this problem 
in terms of goods because the rescission period for goods only starts after delivery. For services, 
this period already starts on the date on which the agreement was concluded.819 Section 44 
ECTA contains a similar provision for electronic transactions.  
The problem with service agreements concluded over the phone is that the consumer does not 
have a written document at hand that allows to study the contract before the service is rendered. 
The supplier, on the other hand, has contracted speedily and at minimum costs. A solution 
could consist in sending the client a copy of the transaction via mail, fax or e-mail that he or 
she needs to sign and send back to the supplier.820 This problem does not exist in terms of the 
ECTA though where the consumer can print out all needed information or make a screenshot. 
It is noteworthy that the National Credit Act affords much better protection against fraudulent 
changes in agreements than the Consumer Protection Act. Even though the consumer’s 
signature is not required for all credit agreements,821 any changes to such an agreement or a 
document recording a credit agreement are void, unless after the change is made, the consumer 
signs or initials next to the modification, and it is recorded in writing and signed by the parties. 
Oral modifications are recorded electromagnetically and subsequently reduced in writing.822 
Although not all (initial) credit agreements need to be in writing, this provision affords better 
protection because the supplier cannot rely on presumed orally made modifications. 
That the consumer need not sign the agreement means that the supplier still has to prove that 
the agreement was concluded on all the provisions set out in writing, or that there was 
reasonable reliance of agreement on the part of the consumer, if the supplier wishes to rely on 
                                                             
819 Section 16(3)(a). 
820 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 242. 
821 See s 93 read with s 2(3) NCA. The NCA distinguishes in s 93 between small, intermediate and large credit 
agreements. 
822 See s 116 NCA. 
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the contract.823 It is suggested that this might cause practical problems because it will be 
difficult for suppliers to prove the validity of the agreement as there might not exist sufficient 
documentation or other evidence to do so. The same applies vice versa, namely in cases where 
the consumer wants to rely on the agreement and prove that a particular clause has been agreed 
upon, because in contract law, the asserter bears the onus of proof.824  
II order to strengthen the consumer’s position and to preclude a supplier’s attempt to avoid its 
obligations by arguing that the consumer had not signed the agreement, Naudé suggests to 
reword section 50(2)(a) so that the consumer may rely on the agreement if it is in writing, 
irrespective of whether he or she has signed it.825 Consequently, this provision would only 
operate to the benefit of the consumer because the supplier would not be able to rely on an 
unsigned document on the basis of this paragraph alone if the consumer denies having agreed 
on all the clauses in the written agreement.826 
b) Free copy or free electronic access to a copy 
Pursuant to section 50(2)(b), the supplier must provide the consumer with a free copy, or free 
electronic access to a copy. This does not prove the existence of certain provisions of an 
agreement or an agreement itself though as the consumer would not be able to prove if a 
contract has been concluded or not by presenting an unsigned copy.  
What is more, it is not clear what ‘free electronic access’ means. ‘Free’ in this context could 
mean ‘free of charge’ or ‘unobstructed’.827 As the provision uses the adjective ‘free’ also in the 
context of ‘free copy’, and section 93 NCA provides that the credit provider must deliver to 
the consumer, without charge, a copy of the document that records their agreement, it is 
submitted that the legislator meant ‘free of charge’. However, the ‘electronic access’ could 
inflict some practical problems because it is not clear where this access has to be granted. It 
could have to be granted either on the premises of the supplier, which would be the most 
convenient solution for the supplier as he or she could give the consumer easily ‘free’ access 
to a copy. In this case, the supplier could provide the consumer with a printed copy right away 
which he or she could read anywhere. Alternatively, it could mean that the ‘electronic access’ 
                                                             
823 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. South African contract law provides 
a number of theories, such as the will theory, the declaration theory and the reliance theory in order to determine 
if the parties actually have concluded a valid agreement. See Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 
19-45 and Christie Law of Contract (2005) 1. 
824 See Van Huyssteen et al. Contract Law 100. 
825 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
826 Naudé 2009 SALJ 514. 
827 See, for instance, the definition of ‘free' in http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free. 
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has to be granted from anywhere. This could be problematic though for consumers who have 
no internet access.828 Suppliers could benefit from this provision also in this case by giving 
systematically access only to electronic copies, which is a problem for vulnerable consumers. 
Section 50(2)(b) does not contain any provision in terms of which the electronically accessible 
copy has to be printable. It is possible today to upload documents which are not printable but 
only visible on screen.829 This has the disadvantage that the consumer can read the document 
only on a screen of an electronic device. This is obviously more burdensome, especially with 
wordy consumer agreements, even if they are written in plain language.830 If necessary, the 
consumer could make a screenshot though and print it out. 
Van Eeden believes that the formulation ‘free electronic access to a copy’ implies that the copy 
must be printable.831 One could argue that free electronic access to a website or a PDF 
document itself is not a ‘copy’ yet but only an electronic representation of the document, and 
that only after having printed out the document it becomes a copy. Section 65 of the National 
Credit Act is unambiguous in this regard because the document has to be made available to the 
consumer through one or more of the means mentioned in this section, for instance ‘by 
printable web-page’.832 This means though that a new obstacle is created for the consumer if 
he or she is not able to print the document because there is no access to a printer. The consumer 
can download the document or make a screenshot, however. In South Africa, people with 
internet access mostly use their smartphones for this purpose and do not necessarily have a 
computer or printer.833 In addition, ‘free electronic access to a copy’ does not mean ‘free 
                                                             
828 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 358. 
829 For instance Google Books (https:/books.google.com). 
830 Especially reading a long document on a smartphone can be very tiresome, not only when it becomes necessary 
to enlarge the document and to reposition the page constantly because the screen is too small to show a line 
entirely. 
831 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 176 note 39, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 242 note 116. 
832 Section 65(2)(a)(iv) NCA. Emphasis added. 
833 According to a study produced by Orange Horizons on the provision of wi-fi in Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha 
(two townships near Cape Town), 94 % of respondents said that they primarily connected to the internet with their 
smartphone. See http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/internet%20access-010715.htm#.VzA7j751SII (no 
longer available). According to the General Household Survey report from Statistics South Africa (2013), 40.9 % 
of South African households have at least one member who either used the internet at home or had access to it 
elsewhere. However, only 10 % of households had internet access at home. That means that 30 % of online 
connections are either done at work (16 %), school/university (5.1 %) or at an internet cafe (9.6%). In metropolitan 
areas far more households have internet access at home (16.4 %), compared with households in rural areas (2 %) 
and in urban areas (9.2 %). Cell phones offer more access for rural households – 17.9 % of rural households go 
online using mobile devices, with a total of 30.8 % of South African households using mobile devices in order to 
get connected to the internet. See https://www.webafrica.co.za/blog/general/latest-statistics-south-african-
internet-penetration/ (no longer available). 
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printing’. This being said, section 65 NCA only requires that the web page be printable, and 
not that the consumer must technically be equipped in order to print out the web page.  
Section 19(1) ECTA considerably extends the meaning of 'copy' by including a data 
message.834 In this regard, no 'materialised' copy is necessary. What is more, section 15 ECTA 
gives data messages the same evidential weight as other documents.835 
This does not prevent suppliers from providing the consumer with a free (hard)copy, of course, 
as an additional service. 
Interestingly, section 65 NCA is much more consumer-friendly in terms of the form a document 
has to be communicated to the consumer:  
‘(a) (…) the document [must be made] available to the consumer through one or more 
of the following: (i) in person at the business premises of the credit provider, or at any 
other location designated by the consumer but at the consumer’s expense, or by ordinary 
mail; (ii) by fax; (iii) by email; or (iv) by printable web-page; and (b) deliver it to the 
consumer in the manner chosen by the consumer from the options made available in 
terms of paragraph (a).’  
The National Credit Act therefore not only offers more options with respect to the 
communication of a document. The consumer can also choose which of them he or she prefers. 
This 'choice' seems to be rather theoretical though as, in practice, the supplier will mostly 
persuade the consumer to assent to a form which will suit the supplier, i.e., an electronic form. 
Naudé correctly points out that provisions with the object or effect that consumers are bound 
by terms for which they did not have the opportunity to consider should always be regarded as 
unfair under section 48.836 This view is legitimate because of two factors set out in section 52, 
namely the extent to which documents relating to the agreement satisfied the requirements of 
                                                             
834 Section 19(1) ECTA: 'A requirement in a law for multiple copies of a document to be submitted to a single 
addressee at the same time, is satisfied by the submission of a single data message that is capable of being 
reproduced by that addressee.' 
835 This is insofar interesting as in some legal systems the question of whether 'cyberwriting' is to be considered 
writing is still not settled. The argument against an equivalence is that words written on a computer screen do not 
constitute writing without being processed by transfixing the given information on a physical support, such as a 
CD-ROM, hard disc or other storage medium. What is more, cyber-writing has lost much of its original evidential 
value as it does not exist in a fixed form, unless coupled with other safeguards that ensure that the information 
contained remains unchanged. Eiselen is of the view that cyber-writing should be accepted as writing in law. In 
terms of the ECTA, this question is however settled in s 15. See Eiselen 2002 VJ 308. Indeed, at the beginning of 
the internet era, questions pertaining to the validity of an electronic agreement, the intervention of electronic 
agents on one or both sides of an agreement, time and place of contracting, formalities, incorporation of standard 
terms by so-called 'shrink-wrap' or 'click-wrap', as well as jurisdiction and applicable law were raised. See Van 
der Merwe et al ICT Law Chapter 6 at 4. This was the reason why the UNICITRAL Model Law of Electronic 
Commerce came into being in 1996, and in 2001 the UNICITRAL Model Law of Electronic Signatures followed. 
836 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
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section 22837 and whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
existence and extent of any particular contractual clause.838 Naudé rightly states that the fact 
that the contract contains a clause by which the consumer confirms having read and understood 
the agreement does not prevent another clause from being surprising and thus being unfair in 
terms of section 48.839 A clause such as ‘contract terms shall be made available to the consumer 
in a manner which gives him a real opportunity of becoming acquainted with them before the 
conclusion of the contract, with due regard to the means of communication used’840 would 
contribute to more transparency and should be inserted into the Act. 
The question is though if this unbalanced provision – which is clearly in favour of the supplier 
– is counterbalanced by section 52.841 In terms of this provision, the court is entitled to make 
an order under section 52(3) if the Act does not otherwise provide a remedy sufficient to correct 
the relevant unfairness, and after it has considered the principles, purposes and provisions of 
the Act. According to section 52(2)(h), the court must also consider whether the consumer 
knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any particular 
contractual provision that is alleged to have been unfair with regard to any custom of trade and 
any previous dealings between the parties. 
It is submitted that section 52 cannot entirely counterbalance the shortcomings of section 50(2) 
for the following reasons. First, although the court has to consider whether the consumer knew 
or should reasonably have known the existence of a particular provision contained in the 
agreement, the court still may rule against the consumer who, despite any custom of trade or 
previous dealings between the parties, was not aware that a particular clause existed. The 
consumer is still the weaker party in a consumer agreement and should not bear the 
consequences of a shortcoming of a provision in the Act. Second, it is difficult to apprehend 
why a consumer should first have to go to court in order to prove that he or she agreed – or did 
not agree – to a particular clause. This would be time-consuming, costly, and the outcome could 
be against the consumer. Third, section 52(2)(h), according to which the court has to take into 
account customs of trade and previous dealings between the parties, reads more like a provision 
for B2B agreements. Business professionals know the customs of trade and can take into 
                                                             
837 Section 52(2)(g) CPA. 
838 Section 52(2)(h) CPA. 
839 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
840 This provision was set out in the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Consumer rights COM (2008) 614 Final which was supposed to replace the Unfair Terms Directive and other 
pieces of legislation. 
841 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 175. 
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account previous dealings with the same partner. Vulnerable consumers will hardly be in the 
position to do so when concluding an agreement, however.  
For the abovementioned reasons, an ex post facto assessment by the court can hardly 
counterbalance the shortcomings of section 50(2). 
aa) Plain language  
The copy must satisfy the plain language requirements of section 22.842 This is the case if 'it is 
reasonable to conclude that an ordinary consumer843 of the class of persons for whom [the 
document] is intended, with average literacy skills844 and minimal experience845 as a consumer 
of the relevant goods or services, could be expected to understand the content, significance and 
import of [the document] without undue effort.'846 Aspects, such as the context, 
comprehensiveness and consistency847 of the document, its organisation, form and style, the 
vocabulary, usage and sentence structure,848 but also aids used in the document to assist the 
consumer in the understanding,849 must be taken into account.850 
bb) Financial breakdown 
Furthermore, the copy must contain an itemised breakdown of the consumer’s financial 
obligations.851 It is submitted that such a breakdown not only has to itemise all financial 
obligations but also has to present the consumer’s financial duties chronologically until the end 
of the agreement (i.e., the payable instalments and their due dates). This is particularly crucial 
for long-term agreements.852 Only then, the consumer would be fully aware of its financial 
obligations. Unfortunately, the legislator did not make more precise provisions for such a 
                                                             
842 Section 50(2)(b)(i). As regards the requirements of s 22 see ch 2 para 3.2.a). 
843 This means that not only experts, such as lawyers, should be able to understand the document, but rather the 
supplier's 'target audience'. See Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7. 
844 In the assessment of the 'average literacy skills', the South African context is to be taken into account. See 
Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
845 The drafter of the contract has to focus on first-time consumers of the given goods or services, and not just on 
the average consumer. See Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
846 Section 22(2). 
847 This means that the circumstances, i.e., the how and when consumers read the document, have to be taken into 
consideration, and that the document must be complete. In addition, the terminology and structure must be 
consistent. See Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary paras 12-14. 
848 This means that there must be no hidden small print, and refers to the structure of the document. The general 
readability is also a factor (short sentences, active voice, no technical jargon). See Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé 
and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary paras 15 and 16. 
849 These are devices which make the contract more inviting, as well as certain techniques for the communication 
of complex information. See Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. 
850 Section 22(2)(a)-(d). See Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
851 Section 50(2)(b)(ii). 
852 For credit facilities in terms of the NCA see s 8(3) read with ss 107 et seq NCA. 
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breakdown as it did for the National Credit Act.853 Although a credit agreement usually runs 
over a much more extended period than other consumer agreements, and the amounts at stake 
are often higher, in other consumer contracts too, consumers bear financial obligations over a 
longer period, e.g., in the context of a fixed- or long-term agreement,854 and their financial 
obligations might change during the duration of the contract. Certain types of agreements, 
especially cell phone contracts, often have substantial economic implications for households 
and individuals, particularly when they do not have any upper limit in respect of data 
consumption so that the consumer might incur a significant economic damage. It is unfortunate 
that these contracts are often edited in a very intransparent fashion so that consumers do not 
understand what costs they might incur. It would thus have been advantageous in terms of 
transparency if the legislator had provided for guidelines concerning the supplier’s obligations 
in terms of such financial breakdown (e.g., the periodicity, paid and outstanding instalments 
until the end of the contract and other costs). A detailed and precise breakdown of data and 
voice consumption could prevent displeasing surprises. 
In addition, the breakdown should be comprehensive and contain positions such as taxes, 
especially VAT, and other charges which the supplier might convey to other entities, such as 
SARS, so that the consumer’s financial obligations are fully reflected.  
Despite the confusing insertion of section 50(2)(b)(i) in terms of the plain language requirement 
for the copy, this requirement applies in any event (section 22(1)(b)) to the free copy and the 
financial breakdown. Even if it will mostly consist of numbers, it would be desirable if its 
terminology and definitions contained herein were written in plain language as well. Otherwise, 
it could miss its target. 
Interestingly, the legislator, by requiring a financial breakdown, shifted the burden to protect 
itself to the supplier as now the supplier must ensure that the consumer understands the terms 
of the agreement, especially in terms of the financial obligations involved. However, the 
consumer might still be bound to the contract in terms of the caveat subscriptor rule.855 
                                                             
853 See ss 108 to 115 NCA. 
854 See s 14. 
855 Tennant/Mbele 2013 De Rebus 17. 
 144   
 
c) Record 
If a consumer agreement is not in writing, the supplier has to keep a record of transactions 
entered into over the telephone or any other recordable form.856 It is not sure if this provision 
includes electronically concluded contracts. According to section 4(4) ECTA, read with 
Schedule 2, the ECTA does not apply only to certain types of electronic contracts.857  
Section 50(3) might thus apply to these contracts. At first sight, it is astonishing that the 
legislator spells this requirement out in section 50 as good commercial practice requires that 
any commercial activity with clients be recorded for purposes of bookkeeping or taxes.858 
Section 26(2) provides that ‘[a] supplier of goods or services must provide a written record of 
each transaction to the consumer to whom any goods or services are supplied’. This also 
includes the electronic form in terms of section 12 ECTA. The agreement mentioned in section 
50(3) must however be distinguished from the terms and conditions of the given agreement 
under section 50(2)(b),859 as well as the sales record in section 26(2). The latter merely reflects 
the commercial activity, e.g., in the form of a till slip. In other words, the record is no 
representation of any kind of the terms but rather comparable to a memo, report or minutes.860 
Interestingly, the legislator did provide more details as regards records concerning 
intermediaries861 and auctions.862 For goods or services, section 26(2) applies. Here, a supplier 
must provide a written record of each transaction to the consumer to whom any goods or 
services are supplied. Insofar, it is actually not surprising that section 50(3) does not refer to 
section 26 as the ‘sales record’ in section 26 is not the same as the ‘record of transactions’ 
mentioned in section 50(3), although both can be contained in a single document.863  
Naudé is of the view that the Act does not contain any provision entitling the consumer to 
access this record directly in terms of section 50(3) and that the consumer has to log a complaint 
                                                             
856 Section 50(3). The legislator probably chose a wide formulation in order to include other possible technological 
developments, such as voice recognition or agreements concluded by means of an automated device, such as a 
robot. 
857 This applies to agreements for alienation of immovable property and those for the long-term lease of 
immovable property in excess of 20 years as provided for in the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
858 See also Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 334. 
859 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 241. 
860 Contrary to the CPA, the NCA distinguishes clearly between the (credit) agreement and the ‘document 
recording a (credit) agreement’ in section 116: ‘Any change to a document recording a credit agreement or an 
amended credit agreement (…)’. Furthermore, a credit provider must maintain records of all applications for 
credit, credit agreements and credit accounts in the prescribed manner and form and for the prescribed time. See 
s 170 NCA read with reg 55 and 56 NCA. Such a record only contains information prescribed in s 26(3) CPA. 
861 Regulation 10 read with s 27(3)(b) CPA and reg 9(2) and (3) CPA. 
862 Regulation 31 read with s 45 and reg 18 to 33 CPA. 
863 Contrary to ‘transaction‘, ‘sale‘ is not defined in s 1 CPA. In any event, a sale is a transaction according to this 
definition. 
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to the NCC which can summon the supplier to furnish it with a copy of such record or to inspect 
it.864 However, section 26(2) provides that the supplier of goods or services must provide a 
written record of each transaction to the consumer. It is therefore submitted that the consumer 
has such a right to directly access the record. It would be incomprehensible if section 26 would 
not apply to section 50. It is my submission that denying such direct access would be contrary 
to section 2(1), read with section 3(1)(d) and (e). 
In any event, this record only needs to meet the requirements of section 26(3), such as the 
supplier’s details,865 the date of transaction,866 the delivery address,867 a name or description of 
the goods or services supplied or to be supplied868 and the price.869 The sales record must also 
contain a reference to the terms and conditions because otherwise, it could be considered unfair.  
The supplier may send an unsigned document to the consumer via e-mail, ordinary mail or fax 
which confirms the terms and conditions of the agreement, but the consumer is very dependent 
on the supplier for the integrity of the document as he or she does not have ready access to the 
recording.870 After all, this document could only be an excerpt of the agreement or even contain 
provisions the consumer never consented to. Unlike section 93 NCA, according to which the 
supplier has to deliver a copy of the ‘document that records their agreement’ to the consumer, 
section 50(2)(b) CPA requires that the supplier provide the consumer with a ‘copy (…) of the 
terms and conditions of that agreement’. Despite the different wording of the two sections 
mentioned above, the legislator's intention was the same in both cases, i.e., to provide the 
consumer with a copy of the entire agreement. Otherwise, the supplier would give the 
impression to the consumer that the provided copy reflects the entire agreement, and the 
supplier might be estopped from relying on the terms and conditions not sent to its counterpart.   
d) Timeframe 
Section 50(2) does not contain a timeframe for the supplier during which it has to deliver the 
free copy of the agreement or provide a free electronic copy to the consumer. An unreasonably 
long delay could constitute conduct contrary to the purposes and policy of the Act in terms of 
section 4(5), which could lead to an administrative fine under section 112. Van Eeden suggests 
that the Minister should specify by regulation the time period for the delivery of a copy to the 
                                                             
864 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7; s 102(1)(b) CPA. 
865 Section 26(3)(a). 
866 Section 26(3)(c). 
867 Section 26(3)(b). 
868 Section 26(3)(d). 
869 Section 26(3)(e) to (i). 
870 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 175. 
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consumer in order to strengthen its position and give less latitude to the supplier.871 The Act 
does not empower the Minister to do so, however. According to regulation 120(1)(a), the 
Minister may make any regulations expressly authorised or contemplated elsewhere in the Act, 
Section 50(1) only gives the Minster the right to prescribe categories of consumer agreements 
that are required to be in writing, but not to prescribe further formalities or deadlines.   
4.3 Non-compliance with section 50 
Some authors are of the view that in South African common law, non-compliance with 
statutory formalities results typically in the nullity of the agreement, except if the applicable 
piece of legislation provides otherwise.872 This was the case, for instance, for the Credit 
Agreements Act,873 in terms of which credit agreements had to be in writing, but which 
specifically provided that an agreement, which was not in writing and signed by the parties to 
the contract, was not necessarily invalid.874 This view misconceives however that in South 
African law, freedom of form is the point of departure, unless the law or the parties require 
otherwise.875 In cases where the law requires the written form, the given statute must be 
interpreted to determine whether the legislature intended the written form to be constitutive. If 
it is not clear, the presumption prevails that the legislature did not want to change the common 
law more than necessary. Most authorities take the stand that the written form in the Consumer 
Protection Act and the National Credit Act is not constitutive and that non-compliance does 
not render the agreement void.876 The wording of section 50(2) '[i]f a consumer agreement (…) 
is in writing' is a clear indication that the written form is no requirement for validity unless 
prescribed by the Minister. 
According to section 52(2)(g), non-compliance with the plain language requirements does not 
render the agreement void per se, but is merely one of the court’s factors to be considered when 
assessing the fairness of an agreement under section 48. On the other hand, courts might easily 
strike down contract terms which are not written in plain language.877 
                                                             
871 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 176, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 243. See also Naudé 
‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
872 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 147. See, e.g., Milner Street Properties (Pty) Ltd v Eckstein 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 1315 (SCA), Pretoria East Builders CC v Basson 2004 (6) SA 15 (SCA). See 
also Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
873 75 of 1980. 
874 Section 5(2) Credit Agreements Act. 
875 See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 161. 
876 As a general rule, only alienation of land, suretyship and executory donations require the written form in order 
to be valid and enforceable. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 115 and 161 et seq, Christie and Bradfield Law 
of Contract (2011) 134. 
877 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
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As mentioned above, the Act does not provide a timeframe as to when the supplier must furnish 
the consumer with a copy, which means that it is not clear at which moment one can speak of 
non-compliance. Common sense would suggest that the contract must be provided at the latest 
at the time of performance, i.e., the delivery of the given goods or services. It is clear that a 
supplier who did not keep a record of an agreement which is not in writing cannot rely on the 
agreement. This solution might be unfair vis-à-vis consumers who have no control over 
whether or not the supplier kept a record. Therefore, Naudé suggests that the legislator’s 
intention was not to invalidate the entire contract and that the consumer’s ‘version’ should 
simply be preferred.878 It is submitted though that even if this viewpoint protects the consumer, 
it leads to legal uncertainty and too much leeway.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
Section 49 has a warning function to protect consumers who should not be surprised by notices 
or provisions limiting their rights. Therefore, the supplier has to draw the consumer’s attention 
to any limitation of risk or liability or other circumstances mentioned in section 49(1). 
The fact that section 49(1) uses the plural form of ‘consumer’ could mean that the requirements 
of section 49 also apply where a notice is intended for a multitude of consumers. Typical 
clauses for section 49(1)(a) to (d) are exemption or indemnity clauses. 
Under section 49(2), the supplier has to draw the consumer’s attention also to any dangerous 
activity or facility. The formulation '[i]n addition to subsection 1' is not clear because it could 
mean that the requirements of subsection (1) and (2) have to be fulfilled cumulatively. This 
would limit the scope of protection of section 49 though. In order to achieve better protection 
for consumers, subsection (2) should thus also apply to cases where there is no exclusion of 
liability in terms of subsection (1).  
In order to comply with section 49, the supplier must set up the notice or provision in plain 
language. This is a milestone in South African law as the common-law principles are 
insufficient in this respect. This is also due to the doctrines of caveat subscriptor and pacta 
sunt servanda. Only in cases of misrepresentation or mistake, a court could set aside the terms 
of a contract. The interpretation of section 22 has to be done by taking into consideration the 
                                                             
878 Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
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purposes of the Act (section 3). Therefore, agreements which are drafted in plain language 
serve transparency and procedural fairness, empower consumers, increase the consumer’s trust 
and avoid litigation. Ultimately, also suppliers benefit from plain language. 
The plain language requirement concerns only written documents, not only for practical 
reasons (proof) but also because of the unambiguous wording of section 22. The Act does not 
define the meaning of ‘plain language’. Section 22(2) only contains a list of criteria to be taken 
into account, and which concern the wording or grammar of a document, its content, structure, 
design and style. With regard to the requirement of ‘context’, also the circumstances around 
the agreement and previous experience can be taken into consideration. In order to be 
‘comprehensive’, the document must contain all relevant information and be ‘consistent’ in 
terms of terminology and style. ‘Plain language’ means clear and understandable, and not over-
simplified language. More importantly, when drafting their documents, suppliers have to adopt 
a consumer-centric approach. 
The Act makes use of the somewhat flexible approach of the ‘ordinary consumer’ of the class 
of persons for whom the document in question is intended. This approach takes into account 
the fact that most South Africans are functionally illiterate and inexperienced in business 
matters. Therefore, the ordinary consumer is one with ‘average literacy skills and minimal 
experience as a consumer’. 
In order to assess whether the plain language requirement is met in terms of the ‘ordinary 
consumer’, it is suggested to adopt an objectivised view that also considers the consumer’s 
position, such as the view of an ‘objective observer’, which is used in German civil law. 
The formulation according to which the consumer has to be ‘of the class of persons’ for whom 
the document is intended leads for many authors to the conclusion that suppliers have to draft 
several sets of documents. The legislator only requires though that the consumer of the class 
of persons to whom the document is intended understands the document. Hence, it should be 
sufficient to draft only one set of documents that comply with the plain language requirement, 
and which is understandable for all consumers. This would be more practical, cost saving and 
have numerous other advantages. 
As section 22 has to be interpreted in the light of section 3, the ‘vulnerable consumer’ must be 
taken into consideration. It is submitted that suppliers have to take vulnerable consumers into 
account in general, and not within the context of different classes of ordinary consumers. This 
would be in line with the viewpoint above concerning the drafting of only one set of documents 
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in plain language. In most cases, the concept of the ‘vulnerable’ and the ‘ordinary’ consumer 
will be congruent. The substitution of the notion of ‘ordinary consumer’ with ‘average 
consumer’ such as in the UCPD would not take into account South African reality though. 
The enumeration contained in section 22(2)(a) to (d) is only an indication of what must be 
considered when assessing whether a consumer has to apply an ‘undue effort’ for the 
understanding of the document. As the document in question has to be self-explanatory, the 
consumer must not be compelled to search for external advice that goes beyond a certain degree 
of assistance. In addition, some contracts need to be more complicated due to the complexity 
of the underlying agreement. The reference to external documents is only not an ‘undue effort’ 
if they are easily and swiftly accessible.  
The language of the Act has also been discussed. It is far from being ‘plain’, and the structure 
of the Act is not very accessible. Statutes that elevate plain language to a fundamental consumer 
right should be written in plain language too. Otherwise, it is difficult for consumers to exercise 
their rights because of the lack of accessibility, even though it seems that this is not an 
enforceable right. 
Contrary to section 63 of the National Credit Act, section 22 of the Consumer Protection Act 
does not provide that a document must be written in an official language or that the consumer 
must be able to understand the language in which the document is written, as long as it is 
written in plain language. Consumers have a certain degree of protection under section 40(2), 
however. 
Unfortunately, the Commission has not yet published guidelines in terms of section 22(3) and 
(4) for methods of assessing whether a document meets the plain language requirements. 
Therefore, suppliers should take a proactive approach by adopting in-house style-guides, which 
will lead gradually to best practice. The consideration of foreign law in this regard is not always 
suited for the situation in South Africa. The objective approach consisting of readability tests 
has many disadvantages. Instead, the Commission should publish separate guidelines for each 
type of documents and provide for guidelines that make the supplier’s texts of the same 
category comparable so that consumers are able to shop around easily. 
Such guidelines would also end the suppliers’ ‘private legislation’ and avoid unnecessary 
litigation. In the long term, making informed choices is not only about plain language but also 
about education. The legislature must thus tackle this problem from various angles and 
ultimately reform the South African educational system. 
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The legal implications of non-compliance of the plain language requirements have also been 
discussed. Section 51(1)(a)(i) provides that the supplier must not defeat the general purpose or 
effect of the Act, such as the promotion and advancement of social and economic welfare. 
Besides, consumers have the right that an agreement be in writing, and this right must not be 
waived or deprived in terms of sections 51(1)(b)(i) and 50(2)(b)(i). Otherwise, the agreement 
or term is void under section 51(3). The plain language requirement is only one factor in terms 
of section 52(2) that the courts will take into consideration in the fairness enquiry. They will 
nevertheless always consider the plain language requirement in order to protect consumers.  
Section 22 also plays an indirect role as regards a supplier’s unconscionable conduct, or a false, 
misleading or deceptive representation, or the enquiry of whether a term is unfair. Then, the 
court must consider the factors mentioned in section 52(2).  
According to section 49(4)(a), the supplier must draw the consumer’s attention in a 
conspicuous manner and form, having regard to the circumstances mentioned in subsections 
(1) and (2) so that the consumer has an adequate understanding and appreciation of the 
implications. ‘In a conspicuous manner and form’ means that the information has to be 
distinguishable from the rest of the document, having an ‘ordinarily alert consumer’ in mind. 
The ordinarily alert consumer is a consumer who is ordinarily vigilant in the given 
circumstances. The supplier has to attract the consumer’s attention before the latter takes any 
action in order that the warning function of section 49 can fully operate. 
In terms of section 49(2), the consumer must sign or initial the provision which warns him or 
her about specific risks. The dispensation of these requirements contained in this provision 
raises concern as it entails difficulties in terms of proof. Furthermore, the initialling or signing 
of exemption clauses can be a double-edged sword because suppliers might argue that their 
clauses are always fair. Exemption clauses relating to bodily injury or death are therefore often 
prohibited in some EU countries. In order to achieve better consumer protection, the legislator 
should delete the phrase 'or otherwise acting in a manner consistent with acknowledgement of 
the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision'. It should also provide that a 
provision or notice which is so unusual that it cannot be expected by the consumer is invalid. 
Regrettably, the Act does not provide further information in respect of the meaning of 
‘adequate opportunity’ to receive and comprehend the notice under section 49(5). A cooling-
off period after the conclusion of the agreement should be sufficient though. The circumstances 
have also to be taken into account when considering if the consumer had an adequate 
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opportunity. This will depend, among other things, on the type of contract and the type of 
consumer as well. Some considerations contained in section 52(2) could be used as a guideline 
for this assessment. 
The legal consequences in case of non-observance of the requirements of section 49 are not 
clear. The court may severe the provision or notice from the agreement or declare it to have no 
force or effect under section 52(4). It can also make an order and severe any part of the 
agreement, or alter the contract in order to render it lawful. 
Non-compliance with section 49 will have no extra-judicial effect because of the limitations of 
judicial control. The most time- and cost-effective solution might therefore be that the supplier 
simply does not rely on the suspicious contract term, and the consumer only needs to approach 
a court when there is a dispute in terms of section 49. 
A term that complies with section 49 still can be nullified as unfair, unreasonable or unjust 
according to sections 48 and 52. 
In South African contract law, an agreement does not necessarily need to be in writing in order 
to become valid, with some few exceptions. The parties’ signature under a contract has several 
functions: facilitating proof, avoid unnecessary disputes or legal certainty. Since statutes which 
require the written form have different objectives, the formality provisions must be interpreted 
according to these objectives. A party's signature does not indicate that the party has read and 
understood the document and consented to its terms because often consumers sign a contract 
without even having read it. 
The Shifren principle confirms the validity of non-variation clauses and contributes to legal 
certainty. Nonetheless, the courts tend more and more to abolish the strict application of this 
principle when it leads to unfair results, e.g., by putting forward bona fides and public policy. 
Another approach is to construe a waiver or estoppel, although there have been no reported 
cases so far in this regard. A distinction must be drawn between a waiver and a simple 
suspension of the other party's rights. A waiver could be construed in cases where the right 
waived is founded on a term which operates exclusively to the benefit of the waiving party.  
The parol evidence rule is another common-law principle according to which a party to a 
written contract cannot present extrinsic evidence as the contract is regarded to be as a whole. 
With respect to the caveat subscriptor rule, the parties' signatures entail their obligation to be 
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bound to their agreement since it signifies assent thereto. Only in specific cases, this principle 
does not apply. 
An exception of the caveat subscriptor rule are the 'ticket cases'. Consumers are bound if they 
have read the terms contained on the given document and indicate that they want to go ahead 
with the contract; understanding the contractual content is not necessary then. In any case, 
where the supplier can deduct from the consumer's conduct that the latter has either read the 
document and assented to it or is prepared to be bound by it without having read it, the supplier 
can expect that the contract has been concluded, especially when he or she has drawn the other 
party's attention to its content. 
Exemption clauses do not bind the consumer if they exempt the supplier from liability for fraud. 
In cases where a supplier does not benefit from its employees' or agents' fraudulent conduct, 
the supplier can rely on its exemption clause. The principle of public policy should not operate 
where the supplier does not act dishonestly. Then, the other party's defence can only be that a 
reasonable person could not expect to find the given terms in the contract. 
Under section 50(1), the Minister may prescribe certain categories of consumer agreements 
that need to be in writing in order to be valid. So far, the Minister has not made use of this 
provision. The consumer’s signature is not required when both parties set up a written 
agreement, whether as required by the Act or voluntary. Signing or initialling may be effected 
in any manner recognised by law. Some statutes however exclude electronic signatures, which 
in most cases are valid if the conditions of the ECTA are met. This is in line with the principle 
of functional equivalence. If a legal provision requires a signature, and this signature can be 
done electronically, it must be an advanced electronic signature. 
Most transactions, especially in day-to-day transactions, do not require being in writing or 
signed. When a transaction is in writing, some authors suggest that situations are imaginable 
where fraudulent suppliers alter the agreement afterwards, or where they pretend that no 
agreement has been concluded. Requiring a signature would however create other problems 
and be disproportionate. Jurisprudence had to solve many problems caused by the formalities 
set out in the Alienation of Land Act, for instance. The Consumer Protection Act's objective is 
to facilitate transactions. The risks of abuse by a supplier are mitigated by the cooling-off 
period granted by section 16 of the Act and by section 44 of the ECTA. 
The fact that the supplier must provide the consumer with a free copy or free electronic access 
to a copy causes other difficulties. It is not clear where the supplier has to grant access to a free 
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electronic copy. There could be practical difficulties where the consumer does not have internet 
access. The Act does not require that the electronic document be printable. A solution could 
consist of a screenshot which is printed out. In terms of section 19(1) of the ECTA, the term 
‘copy’ is considerably extended by including a data message, which has the same evidential 
weight as hardcopies (section 15 ECTA). The best protection would be achieved if the supplier 
provided the consumer with a hardcopy which could also be available online. Even if the 
consumer has a choice as regards the mode of communication of a document, like in section 
65 of the National Credit Act, the supplier will 'convince' him or her in a more or less subtle 
way to opt for electronic communication.  
According to Naudé, a term which a consumer could not consider should always be unfair 
under section 48. Unfortunately, section 52 cannot entirely counterbalance the shortcomings 
of section 50 as the court might still decide in favour of the supplier, and it is difficult to 
understand why the consumer should bear a costly and time-consuming lawsuit first in order 
to enforce his or her rights. 
The financial breakdown of the consumer’s obligation must be itemised and should contain all 
payable sums, including taxes and other charges, and a chronological overview. Unfortunately, 
the legislator did not provide for a more detailed provision as to the financial breakdown. This 
would be beneficial for consumers who often have unpleasant surprises when receiving their 
cell phone bills or other invoices for their long-term agreements. 
The record of transactions entered into over the telephone or any other recordable form should 
be directly accessible to the consumer in terms of section 26. What is more, this record must at 
least contain a reference to the terms and conditions of the agreement.  
Section 50(2) does not provide for a timeframe within which the supplier has to deliver a free 
(electronic) copy of the contract to the consumer. The Minister is, contrary to a certain view, 
not empowered to specify a period by regulation.  
Some authors suggest that non-compliance with section 50 renders the agreement void. This 
point of view misconceives that in South Africa freedom of form is the point of departure unless 
the law or the parties require otherwise. If the law requires the written form, it shall only be 
constitutive if one can determine from an interpretation of the statute in question that the 
legislator intended the written form to be constitutive. The wording of section 50(2) indicates 
that writing is not constitutive for the validity of the agreement unless the Minister prescribes 
otherwise.  
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CHAPTER 3 – CONTENT CONTROL 
 
1. Introduction 
As mentioned before, with regard to contractual terms, one can distinguish between three levels 
of fairness control: The first level, the incorporation control, has already been discussed further 
above. The second level, dealing with the so-called content – or substantive fairness879 – 
control, is the subject of the present chapter. Finally, in a third stage, the interpretational control 
comes into play. This control mechanism will be discussed at a later stage.  
1.1   The raison d'être of content control 
Incorporation and content control obviously do not exist next to each other without a certain 
inter-relation. Content control is first of all justified where unfair non-negotiated terms other 
than core terms are part of a contract880 because non-negotiated standard terms cannot be 
qualified as ‘the proper expression of the self-determination of both parties’,881 which is the 
prerequisite for enforcing agreements as the parties then have expressed their freedom of 
contract. With regard to non-negotiated terms, a proper evaluation and balancing of the 
consequences of the transaction usually does not occur. As a result, where a party (mostly the 
supplier) effectively claims freedom of contract for it alone, whereas the other party (usually 
the consumer) has no influence on the wording of non-negotiated terms, the aforementioned 
‘balancing’ is purely formalistic and meaningless, and there is no real freedom of contract.882 
What is more, the transaction costs for the consumer, i.e., the time and effort to read the 
standard terms and to find a person with authority to negotiate within the supplier’s 
organisation, are too high. Most consumers will thus accept any terms without reading them, 
save the core terms.883 This also applies to well-informed and sophisticated customers in a 
competitive market.884 Less sophisticated consumers often tend to understand standard terms 
as ‘official’ and invariable, and therefore do not try to read or understand them. For both, 
                                                             
879 ‘Substantive fairness‘ is sometimes used in a wider context. For instance, Collins 1994 O.J.L.S. 246 includes 
price control, core terms control and sub-standard quality: ‘The law may be concerned about unfair bargains, 
under which the consumer receives poor value for money. The quality or quantity of the goods or services supplied 
by the trader is lower than the consumer reasonably expected, though a strict construction of the terms of the 
contract would not put the trader in breach. The objective is to ensure fair prices and the fulfilment of legitimate 
expectations, and the evil is the rip-off of the consumer.’ Content control in terms of the Act is not concerned 
about the quality or quantity of goods though, but concentrates on the terms and conditions of an agreement. 
880 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 365. 
881 Zimmermann New German Law of Obligations 206. 
882 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 366, Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 143 and 147, Lewis 2003 SALJ 348. 
883 This might even apply to international sales contracts. See Eiselen 2011 PELJ 16. 
884 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 367, Rakoff 1983 Harv LR 1226. 
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sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, standard terms are more or less presented on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis which only leaves two options: either the acceptance of all terms as 
presented by the supplier, or not concluding the transaction.885 According to Harker, the second 
option is a mere ‘fictious alternative’,886 which is certainly true in most cases because 
consumers most likely know that elsewhere they will find terms with the same content. Strictly 
speaking, from a procedural fairness point of view, one may say that the use of a long and 
burdensome list of non-negotiated terms already means that there is procedural unfairness 
because the consumer will most likely not read it.887 For all these reasons, incorporation control 
– which procedural fairness is part of – and content control cannot be regarded separately.  
As discussed above, the fact that suppliers use standard contracts refrains consumers from 
exercising their autonomy because the supplier is in a better bargaining position.888 What is 
more, the consumer is unlikely to read the small print as he or she assumes that the contract is 
presented to him or her is invariable.889 Hence, the use of provisions on unfair contract terms 
contribute to the consumer's actual, informed consent to adverse terms and to his autonomy. It 
ultimately protects the consumers' right to equality because it protects them from abuse.890 
Suppliers tend to take advantage of the existing ‘information asymmetry’ and the structural 
inequality between themselves and their consumers, irrespective of whether the consumer is 
sophisticated, meaning educated, or unsophisticated. Sachs J points out in his minority 
judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier891 that one-sided clauses do not affect ‘only the indigent and 
the illiterate who in practice remain ignorant of everything the document contains; the fact that 
consumer protection is especially important for the poor does not imply that it is irrelevant for 
                                                             
885 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 368, Harker 1981 SALJ 17. 
886 Harker 1981 SALJ 17. 
887 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 375. 
888 Eiselen 2011 PELJ 2. 
889 In the same sense: Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. 
890 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9 and 10. 
891 Barkhuizen v Napier (2007) (5) SA 323 (CC). 
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the rich.’892 Therefore, content control protects the true autonomy of consumers, by forcing 
their counterparts to obtain informed consent to onerous provisions in a fair manner, instead of 
hiding them in small print.893 In addition, as already discussed, the consumer’s transaction costs 
involved when reading complex standard terms in small print are too high, and it is therefore 
unlikely that the consumer will focus on other things than the core terms. Moreover, it will be 
difficult to negotiate most terms and take much effort to find someone who is authorised to 
negotiate about standard terms.894 Strictly speaking, it is the very nature of standard terms to 
be ‘employed without variation in all transactions of a similar kind’.895 The suppliers’ 
advertising which tends to suggest that the consumer’s experience with the supplier will only 
be a positive one, also contributes to consumers’ behaviour, especially if they take for granted 
‘information’ contained in advertising. Most unsophisticated consumers will thus assume that 
standard terms are ‘official’.896 
Even in a market with many competitors and products, suppliers will most likely tend to offer 
disadvantageous terms because consumers will focus more on the core terms, especially the 
price, when shopping around, than on the small print. Suppliers therefore have no incentive to 
offer better and fairer standard terms.897 
Because of the parties’ unequal bargaining power, the fact that a consumer signed a standard 
terms contract does not mean that he or she actually agreed to the given terms. Naudé therefore 
correctly points out that the existence of standard term contracts can only be justified by the 
fact that they allow an efficient contracting process (especially for the supplier) and provide 
                                                             
892 Barkhuizen v Napier at para [149]. Sachs J’s equations indigent and/or illiterate = poor, and consequently 
educated = rich can only be explained from a stylistic point of view as he probably did not want to repeat the same 
nomenclature. As a matter of course, in modern South Africa, as in other countries, being rich does not necessarily 
mean being educated, and conversely, being poor does not necessarily mean being uneducated or unsophisticated 
(e.g., students or educated people without a job corresponding to their education). Unfortunately, the high 
unemployment rate sadly contributes to this phenomenon. From 2000 until 2017, the average unemployment rate 
was 25.41 %, with an all-time high of 31.20 % in the first quarter of 2003 and a record low of 21.50 % in the 
fourth quarter of 2008. South Africa's unemployment rate held steady at 29.1 % in the fourth quarter of 2019, 
unchanged from the previous month's 11-year high, as the number of unemployed people dropped only by 8,000 
to 6.7 million. Employment increased by 45,000 to 16.42 million from 16.38 million in the prior period, likely 
influenced by the festive season. The expanded definition of unemployment, including people who have stopped 
looking for a work, was 38.7 %, up slightly from 38.5 % in the previous quarter. Also, the youth unemployment 
rate dropped to 58.1 % from 58.2 % in the previous period. See ‘South Africa Unemployment Rate’ 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate (accessed on 19 June 2017 and 16 March 
2020)). 
893 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 15. 
894 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
895 Harker 1981 SALJ 16. 
896 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 44; Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 13. 
897 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. 
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the supplier with a control mechanism over his low-skilled salespersons. In complex company 
structures, the efficient use of expensive high-skilled workers in the management and legal 
departments makes it possible that lowly paid and less trained workers are able to conclude 
agreements with customers in a controlled fashion.898 She also argues that the public interest 
in maintaining the businesses’ legitimate interest to organise themselves does not make the 
inclusion of unfair terms legitimate and that therefore an efficient content control is 
necessary899 It has to be recalled though that the use of standard terms contracts is also in the 
consumers' interest, even though they are in a weaker bargaining position and suppliers tend to 
overreach consumers. What is in the supplier’s interest does not necessarily have to be adverse 
to the consumer. In a modern economy, it is unimaginable that each time a consumer enters a 
shop to purchase an item or orders a service, he or she has to negotiate each provision of the 
contract with the supplier.900 First, this would be too time-consuming. Second, in our complex 
societies with their highly complex legal systems, consumers (and even suppliers or their 
representatives) would not be able to understand the implications of specific provisions which 
would certainly more than once lead to unfair outcomes and unequal treatments between 
different consumers.901 Third, from an economic point of view, such an approach would 
discourage most businesses from concluding any transaction because it would not be 
worthwhile negotiating from scratch every single time. Ultimately, competition would suffer, 
and the consumer would end up with less choice and probably higher prices.  
Content control is also in the public interest. Society would have to shoulder much higher costs 
if the risks and obligations involved were not borne by the party which is best able to prevent 
or bear risks from an economic point of view.902 More than often, suppliers can easily and 
relatively inexpensively minimise risks and subscribe to an insurance policy. Conversely, 
shifting risks and obligations onto the consumer, often without his knowledge, is economically 
counterproductive and destroys trust. Hence, the removal of unfair terms is likely to increase 
consumer confidence and trust, and ultimately economic activity. Consequently, the number of 
burdensome and costly legal procedures will decrease.903  
                                                             
898 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 370, Rakoff 1983 Harv LR 1223. 
899 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 370, Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 15. 
900 See also Harker 1981 SALJ 16. 
901 In the same sense Harker 1981 SALJ 16. 
902 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 371. 
903 Griggs 2005 CCLJ 49, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 361. 
 158   
 
1.2   The advantages of black- and greylists 
The use of black- and greylists as opposed to the use of merely a general clause has non-
negligible advantages and provides for an efficient redress system.904 Suppliers confronted with 
black- and greylists are more likely to change their policies and terms and conditions for the 
benefit of the consumer.905 Furthermore, these lists promote self-imposed control by suppliers 
themselves.906 With blacklists, suppliers and consumers have immediate certainty as to what 
the agreement may contain.907 A system based solely on a general clause or on court-made 
rules under the common law, such as the requirement of legality,908 or interpretation as well as 
the Constitution, is burdensome in terms of costs and effort, and most consumers would rather 
accept unfair terms than going to court.909 This is particularly important in the light of the 
relatively small amounts in issue in consumer contracts.910 With the certainty and proactive 
effect of blacklists, expensive court actions are less likely to be necessary in order to fight 
unfair terms.911 What is more, a judge-made system is always reactive, rather than proactive, 
and has only a limited effect because the judgment has only an inter partes effect. Judicial 
control thus always comes too late.912 Black- and greylists also allow negotiating with suppliers 
who do not comply with the relevant legal provisions, which also avoids litigation.913 Since 
judgments of lower courts are not reported, they will most likely be ignored by other 
businesses, so they cannot (re)act accordingly.914 Many consumers might even not know that 
they can challenge certain unfair terms so that proactive control is even more important with 
regard to effective consumer protection.915 Furthermore, consumer protection legislation is 
more predictable if properly structured.916 The inclusion of a term in a greylist means that the 
supplier carries the burden of proof regarding the fairness of a term. If the supplier is not able 
to give such evidence, the court will most probably declare the term as unfair.917 
                                                             
904 See Section 3(1)(h). 
905 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 451. 
906 Naudé 2009 SALJ 520. 
907 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 317, Sharrock Judicial control 138. 
908 Pursuant to the requirement of legality, contracts may not be enforced insofar as they are contrary to public 
policy. See Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
909 See Naudé 2006 Stell LR 362. 
910 Naudé 2007 SALJ 132. 
911 Naudé 2009 SALJ 520. 
912 Naudé 2007 SALJ 132. 
913 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 451. 
914 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3, Naudé 2007 SALJ 132. 
915 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 317, Sharrock Judicial control 139, Naudé 2007 SALJ 132. 
916 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 381, Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
paras 7 and 18.  
917 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 451, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 3. 
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If there were no black- or greylists, the courts would have to develop painstakingly the common 
law in order to provide any predictability as to what is fair. What is more, for judges, it is easier 
to refer to lists when motivating their decisions as those provide for guidance.918 In a nutshell, 
black- and greylists provide for predictability at an early stage for suppliers, consumers and 
consumer protection organisations, and are a rather inexpensive tool. The re-writing of standard 
terms is definitely less expensive than litigation on a regular basis with individual consumers, 
even though standard terms have to be updated now and then.919 
Based on Naudé's arguments, the ‘area of conflict’ between the supplier’s and the consumer’s 
interests can only be solved by introducing mitigating factors which give more weight to the 
consumer’s interest. Fairness standards contained in black- and greylists as well as the use of 
a general clause seem therefore be an ideal solution to balance the parties’ interests and will 
ultimately lead to an overall fairness improvement of standard terms for consumers. 
1.3   The approach of the Act 
The Consumer Protection Act contains several provisions in sections 48 to 52 (Chapter 2 Part 
G) and in regulation 44 which provide for content control. However, content control is not 
limited by the provisions of the Act as section 2(10) provides that no provision of the Act must 
be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the 
common law. Contract terms which are contrary to public policy are thus still void under the 
common law. The common-law rules on interpretation of contracts do also apply in terms of 
the Act,920 and the common-law rule according to which a surprising term must be pointed out 
to the other party before one can assume reasonable reliance of consensus on that term also still 
finds application.921 Besides, there are other pieces of legislation containing consumer 
protection provisions which are (still) applicable, such as the Constitution,922 the Rental 
Housing Act923 or the Conventional Penalties Act.924  
In order to determine whether a term is fair, the Act distinguishes between terms that are 
considered to be unfair per se under section 51 (‘blacklist’), and terms which are presumptively 
                                                             
918 Naudé 2007 SALJ 132. 
919 Naudé 2007 SALJ 132-133. 
920 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
921 See Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA). 
922 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
923 50 of 1999. 
924 15 of 1962. 
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unfair pursuant to regulation 44 (‘greylist’). Furthermore, section 48 contains a general clause 
with some guidelines for the fairness enquiry.925 
The South African legislature chose, unlike other legal systems,926 to include into the fairness 
enquiry not only terms contained in so-called standard-term contracts but also negotiated 
terms,927 including the core terms (price, subject matter of the contract, warranty etc.).928 The 
reason for this choice could be that many South Africans are more vulnerable than consumers 
in other countries are, given their low level of education and bargaining power. 
As discussed further above in detail, the Act covers a wide range of agreements which are 
subject to a fairness assessment. Hopefully, the courts, when deciding whether a term is fair or 
unfair, will clearly distinguish between negotiated, non-negotiated and core terms as the 
consumer is always aware of negotiated terms and core terms (which are of primary interest), 
as opposed to non-negotiated terms that are hidden in small print.929 The same applies to the 
price, which is part of the core terms. As long as it is prominently mentioned in the terms and 
conditions, payable in circumstances that the consumer reasonably expected, and its calculation 
is not surprising, there is no reason why courts should interfere unless the price is obviously 
adverse to the consumer or gives an excessive advantage to the supplier.930 Section 48(1)(a)(i) 
expressly prohibits unfair prices. The courts should also not interfere with the main subject 
matter because the consumer can be expected to be aware of it (usually the price and the main 
subject are the first things a consumer looks at). Furthermore, for excessive pricing control, the 
competition authorities are competent. These are more qualified in terms of empirical market 
and pricing analysis.931 In case of market failure, i.e., where in a specific market with only few 
                                                             
925 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 449. 
926 See §§ 305-310 BGB where the protection is limited to B2C contracts and non-negotiated, i.e., standard terms. 
These are terms pre-formulated for more than two contracts which one party to the contract (the user) presents to 
the other party upon the entering into of the contract. See § 305(1) BGB.  
927 The concept of 'non-negotiated terms' is wider than the one of 'standard terms'. Pursuant to art 3(2) of the 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, '[a] term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated 
where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of 
the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.' In terms of § 305(1) BGB, '[s]tandard 
business terms are all contract terms pre-formulated for more than two contracts which one party to the contract 
(the user) presents to the other party upon the entering into of the contract.'  
928 Naudé 2009 SALJ 531, Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 5, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 364. 
929 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 364, Naudé 2009 SALJ 533, Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen 
(eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
930 According to the common law, a court may set aside a price set by a third party appointed by the parties for 
that purpose as long as it was manifestly unjust. See Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 1994 (3) SA 449 (C); Van Heerden v Basson 1998 (1) SA 715 (T). 
931 See s 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 which prohibits a dominant form to charge an excessive price to 
the detriment of consumers, that is a price for a good or service which bears no reasonable relation to the economic 
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suppliers all of them charge excessive prices, not the courts exercising jurisdiction under the 
Act but rather the competition authorities should interfere.932  
Finally, consumers can be expected to know the core terms and shop around in order to find 
more advantageous terms or to bargain. What is more, it would create uncertainty if courts 
invalidated agreements merely on the basis that the agreed price exceeds the market value.933 
Naudé is of the opinion that the Act goes too far by including core terms into the fairness review 
because the stricter common-law and constitutional control mechanisms, such as the 
requirement of legality and the principles concerning undue influence and misrepresentation 
as well as section 40 on unconscionable conduct would still provide for sufficient control over 
unjust core terms.934 Naudé's view is correct because of the reasons mentioned above. Core 
terms do not deserve the same treatment as other terms, especially non-negotiated ones.  
Furthermore, terms that merely reflect legal provisions, so-called declaratory clauses, should 
have been excluded from the fairness review.935 Because of the inclusion of declaratory clauses, 
ordinary courts can indirectly attack the legal provision itself on the basis of fairness. This is 
however a constitutional question for which only the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction.936 
The Act applies to B2C contracts as well as to certain B2B contracts as long as the latter fall 
under the scope of the Act in terms of section 5.937 B2B contracts falling under the Act are 
agreements for the supply of goods and services to juristic persons which do not exceed a 
maximum turnover or asset value, or to any business which is a non-juristic person.938 On the 
other hand, regulation 44 only applies to contracts between for-profit suppliers and natural 
persons acting for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to their business, but not to B2B 
agreements.939 There are however no compelling reasons for including certain B2B contracts 
in the fairness review. Contrary to B2C contracts, B2B agreements are more diverse and require 
                                                             
value of that good or service and is higher than that value. This must be determined by empirical analysis. 
Concerning the elements in order to determine such a price see Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and 
Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Another [2007] CPLR 37 (CT).  
932 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
933 Naudé 2009 SALJ 533. 
934 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. 
935 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. This is the case, for example, in Germany. § 307(3) BGB: 'Subsections (1) and (2) 
above, and [§§] 308 and 309 apply only to provisions in standard business terms on the basis of which 
arrangements derogating from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing those legal provisions, are agreed.' 
936 See s 167(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
937 Naudé 2009 SALJ 531. Franchises fall under the scope of the Act irrespective of their annual turnover or asset 
value. See s 5(6) and (7). 
938 Section 5(2). In terms of s 1, partnerships or associations, trusts and bodies corporate are regarded as juristic 
persons for the purpose of the Act. 
939 Regulation 44(1). 
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a more flexible treatment, whereas B2C contracts are more or less consistent with regard to the 
consumer's inexperience, lacking sophistication, commercial dependence and bargaining 
power. Certain clauses, such as mandatory arbitration clauses, are particularly unfair vis-à-vis 
a consumer, but suitable in many B2B contracts. What is more, B2C lists often have a positive 
effect on B2B contracts, especially in favour of small businesses. Lists do therefore not 
necessarily need to apply to B2B contracts as well.940 
It is hence arguable if B2B contracts deserve the same treatment as B2C contracts in terms of 
the fairness review, especially concerning negotiated terms. Naudé is of the view that only 
standard terms in B2B contracts should have been subject to a fairness enquiry simply on the 
basis that they are unfair, and that the Act should have provided for the possibility to challenge 
a term that was initially presented as one of the supplier's written standard terms and has not 
subsequently been changed in favour of the small business. Then, in Naudé's view, small 
businesses would be able to challenge a particular standard term that was not negotiated, even 
though if others were subject to negotiation. For the negotiated terms in B2B contracts, the 
stricter common-law control mechanisms are sufficient for the negotiated terms in her 
opinion.941 Naudé's differentiation is correct because the legislator's approach undeservingly 
treats negotiated and non-negotiated terms in B2B contracts in the same way. 
The blacklist does not make provision for regular updates. It would be beneficial if it provided 
that the Consumer Commission regularly review the list of prohibited terms and make 
recommendations to the Department of Trade and Industry based on case law. This may 
ultimately result in better effectiveness of the Act and the blacklist. However, the Act provides 
that the Consumer Commission must make recommendations to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry from time to time for achieving the progressive transformation and reform of 
consumer law.942 Stoop argues that for the blacklist to stay relevant and in keeping with 
developments in commercial practice, the Act should oblige the Consumer Commission or the 
Department of Trade and Industry to regularly update or review the blacklist.943 Stoop certainly 
means by updating and reviewing that the Commission and the DTI make recommendations in 
this regard944 as otherwise, the separation of power would not be observed. Indeed, updates of 
                                                             
940 Naudé 2007 SALJ 139 and 140. 
941 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. 
942 Section 94(c). 
943 Stoop LLD thesis 102. 
944 See ss 92-98. 
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the blacklist ─ unlike updates of the greylist of regulation 44(3) which can be carried out by 
the executive branch ─ can only be effected by Parliament.  
The title of Chapter 2 Part G of the Act is 'Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and 
conditions'. As in this context, the terms ‘fair’, ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’ are more or less 
congruent without a real distinguishable difference in meaning, for brevity’s sake, they will be 
expressed in the following by the term ‘fair’, except where a distinction seems necessary. 
In the following discussion on content control, also the views of the former Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT)945 will be depicted. The OFT was a not-for-profit and non-ministerial 
government department of the United Kingdom, established by the Fair Trading Act 1973, and 
enforced both consumer protection and competition law and acted as the UK's economic 
regulator. It was closed down on 1 April 2014, and its responsibilities passed to several 
different organisations. Since the OFT's work is still valuable both in the UK and for 
comparative law purposes, its views will be rendered throughout the following discussion. 
2. Prohibited transactions, agreements, terms and conditions 
Section 51 contains a so-called 'blacklist' of prohibited terms. If an agreement contains any of 
these forbidden clauses, the supplier will not be able to enforce them since he or she will 
otherwise conduct in a prohibited manner.946 Section 51(1) must thus be read in conjunction 
with the definition of ‘prohibited conduct’ in section 1, which is defined as an act or omission 
in contravention of the Act.947 Section 51 CPA was largely inspired by section 90 NCA.948 The 
underlying principle of section 51 is that the supplier may not ask the consumer to contract out 
of the Act by accepting terms that directly or indirectly waive or restrict a consumer’s rights 
under the Act as those terms are void.949 Section 51(3) expressly states that any transaction or 
agreement, provision, term or condition or notice to which a transaction or agreement is 
purported to be subject, is void to the extent that it contravenes section 51. What is more, the 
fact that the term in question constitutes prohibited conduct may entail remedies and sanctions 
                                                             
945 The OFT's goal was to ensure the well-functioning of markets for consumers by ensuring healthy competition 
between fair-dealing businesses and prohibiting unfair practices such as rogue trading, scams and cartels. Under 
the provisions of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) 
was established on 1 April 2014, and many of the functions of the OFT and the Competition Commission were 
combined. See 'Office of Fair Trading' at https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-fair-trading and 
Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Office of Fair Trading'. 
946 Opperman and Lake Understanding the CPA 78. 
947 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 262. 
948 34 of 2005. 
949 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 115, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 450. 
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in terms of the Act.950 The use of a blacklist implies the pre-emptive control of fairness because 
the terms contained in the list are rendered ineffective irrespective of how and when they are 
used. The main reason for prohibiting terms is the idea that consumers should be given absolute 
protection where specific substantive interests or irreducible rights are involved.951 
The prohibitions contained in section 51 apply to all agreements covered by the Act, i.e., also 
to franchise agreements,952 contrary to regulation 44. 
The prohibitions of section 51 will be discussed in the following. 
2.1  Section 51(1)(a) and (b) 
Section 51(1)(a) and (b) prohibits any transaction or agreement subject to any term or condition 
if its general purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of the Act, mislead or deceive 
the consumer, or subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct.953 Prohibited are also terms which 
directly or indirectly purport to waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of the Consumer 
Protection Act, avoid a supplier’s obligation or duty regulated therein, set aside or override the 
effect of any provision, or authorise the supplier to do anything unlawful, or fail to do anything 
that is required in terms of the Act.954 
The legislator chose different verbs in order to cover all possible actions that could be contrary 
to section 51(1)(a) or (b): 'defeat the purposes and policy of the Act',955 'set aside or override 
the effect of any provision',956 'do anything that is unlawful in terms of this Act',957 or 'fail to 
do anything that is required in terms of this Act'.958 The practical difference between these 
verbs seems to be minimal or non-existent in this context though as setting aside or overriding 
                                                             
950 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 262. 
951 Stoop LLD thesis 94. 
952 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
953 Section 51(1)(a)(i)-(iii). See Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 359. It seems that provisions which mislead 
or deceive the consumer, or subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct would be in any case void under the 
common law. See Government of Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & Weavers 1978 (2) SA 794 (A) 803; 
Reeves and Another v Marfield Insurance Brokers CC and Another 1996 (3) SA 766 (A) 775. 
954 Section 51(1)(b)(i)-(iv). 
955 Section 51(1)(a)(i). 
956 Section 51(1)(b)(iii). Already before the CPA came into effect, in Bafana Finance v Makwaka and Another 
2006 (4) All SA 1 (SCA) it was held that '[a]n agreement whereby a party purports to waive the benefits conferred 
upon him by an Act of Parliament will be contra bonos mores, and therefore not enforceable if it can be shown 
that such agreement would deprive the party of protection which the Legislature considered should, as a matter of 
policy, be afforded by law' para [10].  
957 Section 51(1)(b)(iv)(aa). 
958 Section 51(1)(b)(iv)(bb). Emphasis added. 
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the effect of a provision, or failing to do anything that is required by law is necessarily doing 
something that is unlawful, for example. 
Naudé therefore correctly maintains that section 51(1)(a) and (b) is unnecessarily complicated. 
This is certainly true because the (unnecessary) enumeration of actions in this provision could 
have been formulated more concisely. The legislator simply could have provided that any term 
or notice which directly or indirectly waives or restricts the consumer’s rights under the Act, 
or contravenes the Act in any other way, shall be void.959 Black- or greylists should be drafted 
in a simple and clear language so that consumers, consumer advisers and businesses who are 
not lawyers can understand them.960 What is more, Stoop correctly argues that section 51(1)(a) 
is too imprecise. This is mainly because the list is linked to the purpose and policy of the Act. 
This interrelation makes it difficult to determine whether a term is prohibited or not. This 
provision provides that a supplier must not make a transaction or contract subject to any terms 
or condition if its general purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of the Act, 
mislead or deceive the consumer or subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct. First, the 
purpose and policy of the Act are drafted in broad and general terms, which makes it difficult 
to determine whether a term or its purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of the 
Act. Second, whether the purpose or effect of a term is to mislead or deceive is a subjective 
question. No guidance is given in order to determine whether the purpose or effect of a term is 
to mislead or deceive a consumer. Third, the Act does not define ‘fraudulent conduct’. The 
wording of paragraph (a) of section 51(1) is therefore too wide and too vague.961  
Apart from the verbose formulation of section 51(1)(a) and (b), it is suggested that these 
provisions serve as a ‘general clause’ within section 51. Hawthorne argues that ‘[s]ection 51 
works from the general to the specific’.962 Hence, when assessing whether a term falls under 
section 51, one should first refer to the subsequent paragraphs, and then, when none of these 
provisions seem to fit, to section 51(1)(a) and (b). The reason why these two paragraphs have 
not been integrated into the ‘general clause’ of section 48 is that section 51 contains prohibited 
contract terms, whereas section 48 gives discretionary power to the courts when assessing a 
term's fairness. 
                                                             
959 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
960 Naudé 2007 SALJ 146. 
961 Stoop LLD thesis 98 and 99. 
962 Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 363. 
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It is not clear though why section 51 contains prohibitions that are already listed elsewhere in 
the Act, or provisions which fall under section 51(1)(a) or (b). These will be discussed further 
below. 
2.2   Sections 51(1)(c)-(j) and 51(2) 
The enumeration of certain prohibitions in section 51(1)(c) to (2)(c) provides for a checklist 
for suppliers and consumers. A more general wording would not have been possible here, also 
because black- and greylists may evolve gradually, and new prohibitions might be included in 
the future.  
Section 51(1)(c) et seq. contains more specific prohibitions. Those can be divided into the five 
following categories: 
a) Exemption clauses in terms of gross negligence etc. 
Prior to the Consumer Protection Act, agreements often contained so-called waivers or 
exemption clauses by which the consumer agreed to waive the protections provided by the law, 
or to exempt the supplier’s liability for losses he or she might otherwise be liable for. The Act 
has banned the use of certain of these clauses.963 Even though they are not prohibited outright, 
the legislature imposed additional validity requirements. Exemptions for gross negligence have 
been outlawed by the Act though.964 
Under section 51(1)(c)(i), a supplier may not use exemption or indemnity agreements or terms 
that limit or exempt him or her from liability for any loss attributable to the gross negligence 
of the supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier. This includes direct or 
indirect losses. It is prohibited, e.g., to exclude the supplier’s liability for defective goods or to 
pay for any harm caused to the consumer’s person or property by those defective goods. 
Since section 61 already regulates the liability for damage caused by defective goods, one 
might ask if section 51(1)(c) is not superfluous. ‘Harm’ in terms of section 61(1) is defined in 
section 61(5), inter alia, as ‘any loss of, or physical damage to any property irrespective of 
whether it is movable or immovable’. In other words, ‘loss’ in terms of section 51 and ‘harm’ 
in section 61 are congruent. Section 51(1)(c)(i) excludes the possibility for suppliers to limit or 
exempt their liability for gross negligence, whereas section 61 makes them answerable for any 
                                                             
963 Melville Consumer Protection Act 78. 
964 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 449, Naudé 2010 SALJ 515, Gibson and Hull Everyone’s Guide to the CPA 
163. 
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harm ‘irrespective of whether the harm resulted from any negligence’.965 Section 61 introduces, 
according to Van Eeden, a ‘modified negligence liability’ which cannot be seen as an 
unqualified strict liability model but rather as a regime which seeks to strike a balance between 
fault and no-fault liability.966 Wrongfulness is thus still required under section 61.967 Gross 
negligence is therefore not necessarily a condition for the application of section 61. Section 61, 
as opposed to section 51(1)(c)(i), does even not require a contractual nexus between the 
consumer and the supplier. This is confirmed by section 61(3) which provides that the 
‘supplier’s’ (in the broad sense of subsection (1)) liability is joint and several.968 Furthermore, 
the personal scope of application of section 61 is expanded in that ‘supplier’ comprises also 
other members of the supply chain, such as the producer, the importer, the distributor or the 
retailer (in fact, section 61 avoids the word ‘supplier’),969 whereas section 51(1)(c)(i) sticks to 
the definition of the term ‘supplier’ in section 1. In addition, although section 61(1) and (2) 
expands the personal scope of application to all members of the supply chain, it does not 
expressly mention ‘person[s] acting or controlled by the supplier’, unlike section 51(1)(c)(i). 
Moreover, section 51(1)(c) has a broader ambit as it does not only apply to defective goods or 
sub-standard services. Hence, a supplier is also answerable in terms of section 51(1)(c) before 
the actual delivery of any goods or services. This is the case, for instance, where a supplier 
comes to the consumer’s house in order to establish a quotation970 for a new built-in kitchen, 
and by this occasion breaks an antique chair he or she took from the dining room when standing 
on it while measuring, instead of taking a ladder (this non-professional conduct clearly can be 
regarded as gross negligence). This becomes clear when reading the definitions of ‘supplier’ 
(a person who markets any goods or services) and ‘[to] market’ (to promote or supply any 
goods or services), read with the definition of ‘promote’, as the establishment of a quotation 
certainly is a ‘conduct in the ordinary course of business that may reasonably be construed to 
be an inducement or attempted inducement to a person to engage in a transaction’.971 Hence, 
section 51(1)(c)(i) shifts forward the supplier’s liability compared to section 61. 
The prohibition of exemption clauses in terms of gross negligence does however not mean that 
the exemption of ordinary negligence is always permitted, even if the requirements of section 
                                                             
965 Emphasis added. 
966 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 392. 
967 Barnard 2012 De Jure 480. 
968 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 370, Barnard 2012 De Jure 480. 
969 The word ‘supplier’ was included in the Consumer Protection Bill in the provisions for strict liability, but the 
legislator chose finally to omit it in the final Act. See Barnard 2012 De Jure 481. 
970 The Consumer Protection Act uses the word ‘estimate’. See for example the definition of ‘estimate’ in s 1. 
971 See definition of ‘promote’ (c) in s 1. 
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49 are met.972 The exemption of ordinary negligence will be discussed in the context of 
section 48. 
Section 51(1)(c)(i) does not prohibit exemption clauses per se. It offers however a clear 
framework to the benefit of the consumer as to what is permitted and what is not. Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,973 where an exemption clause provided that the patient 'absolve[s] 
the hospital and/or its employees and/or agents from all responsibility (…) for damages or loss 
of whatever nature (…) whatever the causes are, except only with the exclusion of intentional 
omission974 by the hospital, its employees or agents' would therefore not be permissive 
anymore.975 The same applies to Mercurius Motors v Lopez,976 where the exemption clause 
stated: 'I/we acknowledge that Mercurius shall not be liable in any way whatsoever or be 
responsible for any loss or damages sustained from fire and/or burglary and/or unlawful acts 
(including gross negligence)977 of their representatives, agents or employees'.978 The exemption 
clause in Naidoo v Birchwood979 would also be prohibited: 'The guest hereby agrees (…) that 
the Hotel shall not be responsible for any injury to, or death980 of any person or the loss or 
destruction of or damage to any property on the premises, whether arising from fire, theft, or 
any cause and by whomsoever caused or arising from the negligence (gross or otherwise)981 or 
wrongful acts of any person in the employment of the Hotel.'982 
                                                             
972 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5.  
973 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
974 Emphasis added. 
975 The SCA was of the view that an exemption clause excluding gross negligence is contrary to public policy, but 
the respondent had not alleged gross negligence as such, and therefore this consideration was not taken into 
account in this matter. Instead, the respondent put forward the unequal position between the parties 
(hospital/patient), that the exemption clause had the effect of exempting the hospital and its employees from 
properly carrying out their duties, that the clause was in conflict with the constitutional right of access to 
healthcare, that it was contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable for being unreasonable, unfair and 
contrary to the principles of good faith. 
976 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
977 Emphasis added. 
978 In this case, the SCA decided in favour of the respondent, as in the court's view, the consumer had been misled, 
as the appellant had not drawn its attention to the exemption clause in the contract of deposit which was printed 
on the reverse side of the repair order form, under a carbon copy that had to be detached to reveal the terms and 
conditions. Furthermore, it held that the respondent failed to take reasonable steps to secure the vehicle, as it had 
not put in place adequate processes to ensure that the keys of the vehicles were not left in the vehicle overnight. 
The exemption clause therefore dealt with the very essence of the contract of deposit. 
979 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ). 
980 The exclusion of liability for death will be discussed below in terms of reg 44(3)(a). 
981 Emphasis added. 
982 The court held that a term in a contract that is inimical to the values enshrined in the Constitution is contrary 
to public policy and therefore unenforceable. To deny a hotel guest judicial redress for injuries he or she suffered 
in exiting the hotel gate because of the negligent conduct of the hotel (not properly maintaining the gate, not 
warning the guest) offends against the notions of justice and fairness. 
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Naudé argues that the prohibition of exemption clauses as regards gross negligence is 
precarious unless exemption clauses dealing with ordinary negligence are greylisted.983 
Clauses exempting ordinary negligence are often unfair as well, even though they might be 
initialled or signed. Naudé sets forth that the burden of persuading a court why the consumer 
should bear the risk of any harm caused by the supplier's negligence should be borne by the 
business, and not by the consumer. Such clauses should therefore be greylisted. In addition, 
businesses would more likely consider whether they exclude liability for negligence, instead 
of providing the consumer with a choice to conclude the agreement at a higher price without 
the exemption clause.984 It is my submission though that clauses exempting gross negligence 
should always be considered unfair and therefore outlawed. Consumers often do not 
comprehend the implications of exemption clauses. Thus, at least the most drastic clauses in 
terms of the degree of negligence, i.e., the exemption of gross negligence, should be 
blacklisted. Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom985 would probably be decided in favour of the 
patient today. Furthermore, contracting at a higher price without the exemption clause is not 
always an option for South African consumers who often do not have the necessary financial 
freedom. 
What is more, the assumption of risk or liability by the consumer for a loss in terms of 
subparagraph (ii) is prohibited.986 It is submitted that ultimately, the assumption of a risk or 
liability leads de facto to an exemption of liability of the supplier as cases are imaginable where 
the consumer will be discouraged by having to prove first the supplier’s gross negligence.  
Any obligation to pay for damages to goods displayed by a supplier due to an agreement or 
term imposing such an obligation is also prohibited in terms of section 51(1)(c)(iii). This does 
not apply however to loss or damage resulting from the consumer’s gross negligence or 
recklessness, malicious behaviour or criminal conduct.987 In other words, so-called ‘you-break-
it-you-buy-it’ policies are no longer permissible without qualification.988 
                                                             
983 Naudé 2009 SALJ 523, Naudé 2007 SALJ 157. 
984 Naudé 2009 SALJ 523. 
985 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
986 Section 51(1)(c)(ii). 
987 Sections 51(1)(c)(iii), 18(1). Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 318, Sharrock Judicial control 140, Hawthorne 2012 
THRHR 364. 
988 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 117. 
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b) Transfers of the consumer’s claim against the Guardian's Fund 
Agreements or terms and conditions purporting to cede or set off a consumer’s right to claim 
against the Guardian Fund989 are prohibited in terms of section 51(1)(f). This surprising 
provision shows the importance the legislator lays on the protection of the Guardian's Fund. 
Suppliers are therefore not able to ‘cash in’ funds administered by the Master of the High Court 
which the consumer has a right to claim, e.g., in his quality as an heir.  
c) False acknowledgements 
Section 51(1)(g) prohibits terms which falsely express an acknowledgement by a consumer 
that no representations or warranties were made before the agreement was concluded, or that 
the consumer has received goods or services or a document that is required by the Act to be 
delivered to the consumer. This provision is hence a 'deeming provision' as it deals with 
fictional declarations and fictional receipts of documents, goods or services.990 
The reason for outlawing the acknowledgements mentioned in section 51(1)(g)(i) is that the 
exclusion of liability for words which do not appear in a standard-form contract can lead to the 
result that consumers are misled with impunity. Consumers typically rely on oral statements 
given by suppliers, but suppliers (or their agents) often embellish the contract's content to their 
benefit, so that there is room for bad faith.  
According to Naudé, the wider formulation of the European Unfair Terms Directive's Annex991 
in terms of which 'limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments 
undertaken by his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular 
formality' may be regarded as unfair,992 is to be preferred since it is able to catch more terms 
aimed at achieving the same effect.993 This view is correct as the EC Directive does not contain 
any time limit ('before the agreement was made'), and prohibits the introduction of formalities 
in order to make the supplier liable. 
                                                             
989 The Guardian's Fund falls under the administration of the Master of the High Court. It is a fund created to hold 
and administer funds which are paid to the Master on behalf of various persons known or unknown, for example, 
minors, persons incapable of managing their own affairs, unborn heirs, missing or absent persons or persons 
having an interest in the moneys of a usufructuary, fiduciary or fideicommissary nature.  Each Master has its own 
Guardian's Fund. The purpose of the Guardian’s Fund is to protect the funds of minors, persons lacking legal 
competence and capacity, known or unknown, absent as well as untraceable heirs. See 'Guardians and Custodians' 
at http://www.justice.gov.za/master/guardian.html. 
990 Naudé 2007 SALJ 161. 
991 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
992 Item (n) of the Annex read with Art 3(3) of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
993 Naudé 2009 SALJ 523, Naudé 2007 SALJ 160. 
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The wording of this section requires that the term falsely express an acknowledgement. The 
word ‘falsely’ however is unfortunate, because what the section seeks to prohibit is an actual, 
not a false, acknowledgement of a non-existing – or ‘false’ – fact.994 Hence, the mere 
incorporation in a contract of an acknowledgement is not per se prohibited. Van Eeden 
correctly contends that the inclusion of such an acknowledgement amounts to prohibited 
conduct if in fact such representations or warranties have been made, or the consumer has not 
received goods, services or a document required by the Act.995 Although this section does not 
expressly prohibit the supplier from excluding its liability in terms of pre-contractual 
representations or warranties, such a prohibition seems to be implied since the purpose of this 
section is to ensure that a consumer may always rely on such representations or warranties. 
Therefore, both, entire agreement clauses,996 to the extent that they exclude additional 
warranties, as well as no-representations clauses997 are prohibited.998 Entire agreement clauses 
weaken the supplier's incentive to choose its words more wisely and to make sure that its agents 
do so.999 
Section 51(1)(g)(ii) prohibits acknowledgements in terms of which the consumer has received 
goods or services, or a document that is required by the Act to be delivered to the consumer. 
The exclusion of such terms clearly aims to exclude cases where the supplier has actually not 
delivered, but the consumer is barred from his rights because he had acknowledged delivery. 
Here again, Naudé correctly argues that a more comprehensive formulation, such as contained 
in § 308 no. 5 BGB, would have caught more cases because the latter states that 'a provision 
by which a declaration by the other party to the contract with the user, made when undertaking 
or omitting a specific act, is deemed to have been made or not made by the user unless a)  the 
other party to the contract is granted a reasonable period of time to make an express declaration, 
                                                             
994 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 318, Sharrock Judicial control 141. 
995 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 264 note 261. 
996 Clause stating that the document in question is the sole record of the contract and no reliance may be placed 
on any warranties, promises, undertakings and conditions not contained in this document. Sometimes referred to 
as ‘integration clause’. Example: 'This Agreement reflects the entire agreement between the parties. Each of the 
parties acknowledges that, in entering into this Agreement, it does not do so in reliance on any representation, 
warranty or other provision except as expressly provided in this Agreement, and any conditions, warranties or 
other terms implied by statute or common law are excluded from this Agreement. Neither party will have any right 
or remedy arising from any undertaking, warranty or representation not included in this document.' Example 
from Hutchison et al Law of Contract 410. 
997 Clause excluding liability for pre-contractual representations made by or on behalf of the other party. 
998 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 319, Sharrock Judicial control 141. 
999 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 14.1.1 and 14.1.3 at 61 – hereafter referred to as 'OFT'. 
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and b)  the user agrees to especially draw the attention of the other party to the contract to the 
intended significance of his behaviour at the beginning of the period of time' is ineffective.1000 
Documents with regard to section 51(1)(g)(ii) only concern those which are required by the 
Act, such as the original copy of notices containing warnings of risks related to hazardous or 
unsafe goods in terms of section 58(4), or a notice in terms of section 49.1001 § 308 no. 6 BGB 
is much stricter in this regard as it simply blacklists 'a provision providing that a declaration by 
the user that is of special importance is deemed to have been received by the other party to the 
contract'.1002 
Regulation 44(3)(c) provides in its greylist that a term is presumed to be unfair if it has the 
purpose or effect of limiting the supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by 
his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular condition which 
depends exclusively on the supplier. Naudé is of the opinion that regulation 44(3)(c) will catch 
more types of terms aimed at achieving the same effect and that the provision of section 
51(1)(g) should rather have been greylisted instead of prohibited outright. She correctly 
mentions that the absolute prohibition of section 51(1)(g), which is also applicable to B2B 
contracts, prevents two businesses from negotiating and expressly agreeing on a term to the 
effect that their written agreement will be the sole record of their transaction and that no party 
would be able to rely on alleged representations or warranties not recorded in the written 
agreement.1003 In her opinion, such negotiated terms are not problematic and play an essential 
role in enhancing predictability.1004 On the other hand, this predictability is achieved only at 
the price of excluding the consumer's right to redress for misrepresentations.1005 
                                                             
1000 Naudé 2007 SALJ 161. 
1001 In terms of s 49, in most cases it will be sufficient to draw the consumer's attention in a conspicuous manner 
and form by putting a note at the entrance of a venue. Where a consumer books an adventure trip over the telephone 
and asks to be sent information by the post, such a notice will have the form of a written document to be handed 
out to the consumer. 
1002 Naudé 2007 SALJ 161. 
1003 Naudé 2009 SALJ 523. 
1004 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. See also Naudé 2007 SALJ 160 
where Naudé already mentioned this issue before the enactment of the greylist in reg 44. De Stadler is of the same 
opinion as regards the greylisting of this term, without substantiating further. See De Stadler Consumer Law 
Unlocked 117 note 91. 
1005 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 14.1.4 at 61 and 62. 
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The fact that the provision has been included in section 51 rather than greylisted also 
protects small businesses and franchisees, which are often exploited by larger firms. Those 
would be excluded under regulation 44(1).1006 
d) Forfeiture of money to the supplier  
Section 51((1)(h) provides that clauses which require the consumer to forfeit money to the 
supplier if the consumer exercises any right in terms of the Consumer Protection Act, or to 
which the supplier is not entitled, are prohibited.  This includes, for example, a deposit which 
the supplier has to pay back to the consumer if the consumer cancels an advance booking in 
terms of section 17(2), or the price which the supplier has to refund if the consumer returns a 
defective good in terms of section 56(1). 
It is important to note that unlike forfeiture clauses, the listing of penalty clauses in this list 
would be unnecessary because the Conventional Penalties Act1007 already deals with this kind 
of clauses.1008 
Section 51(1)(h) has to be interpreted in that a forfeiture clause is valid unless the forfeiture is 
prohibited by the Act or another law. The understanding that it is invalid unless the law allows 
explicitly the forfeiture clause would invalidate too many clauses and would not be consistent 
with the presumption of statutory interpretation that legislation does not alter the existing law 
more than necessary.1009 It is further submitted that the negative formulation of subparagraph 
(ii) ('is not entitled') speaks for this point of view, meaning that a prohibitive provision in the 
Act or any other law is required in order to invalid the term in question. Such a law would be, 
for example, the Conventional Penalties Act.1010 
e) Unfair enforcement clauses 
Section 51(1)(i) and (j) prohibits five types of enforcement clauses. Experience shows that the 
blacklisting of such clauses has induced businesses to delete or revise such unfair terms.1011 
                                                             
1006 Regulation 44(1) read with the definition of ‘consumer agreement‘ in s 1. 
1007 15 of 1962. 
1008 Naudé 2007 SALJ 162. 
1009 Du Plessis Re-interpretation 252, Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
See also Naudé 2009 SALJ 524. 
1010 See, for instance, s 2(1) and (2) of the Conventional Penalties Act. 
1011 This is the case in the UK where the Office of Fair Trading listed such terms in its Unfair Contract Terms 
Guidance (2008) in Group 18. 
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aa) Authorisation to enter premises in order to repossess goods 
In terms of section 51(1)(i)(i), transactions or agreements which express authorisation for any 
person acting on behalf of the supplier to enter the consumer’s premises in order to take 
possession of goods to which the agreement relates are prohibited. 
The rationale behind the blacklisting of such terms is that they seek to permit sanctions which 
generally have to be authorised by court order.1012 
It is astonishing that only ‘persons acting on behalf of the supplier’ are included, and not the 
supplier itself. This is probably an unintended loophole. It is submitted that section 51(1)(i)(i) 
also includes the supplier itself because otherwise, the supplier could simply ignore this 
provision and legal actions and act on its own. This provision should therefore be amended 
accordingly. 
Strictly speaking, a bailiff or sheriff does not act on behalf of the supplier, but on behalf of the 
State (court) which issued a repossession order. Thus, it is submitted that section 51(1)(i)(i) 
does not exclude legal actions following a non-payment of the consumer. Otherwise, there 
would be an over-protection for the consumer who could just not pay for goods and keep them. 
In terms of section 4(3)(c) of the Rental Housing Act,1013 the tenant’s rights against the landlord 
include his or her right not to have his or her possessions seized, except in terms of law of 
general application and having first obtained an order of court.1014 This provision makes clear 
that despite the tenant’s (consumer’s) debt against the landlord (supplier), the landlord cannot 
simply enforce his lien1015 but needs an order or court to do so. 
 
It is submitted that this provision aims to prevent the supplier from stipulating in advance any 
enforcement in the form of repossession and taking action himself, by circumventing legal 
action.  
bb) Undertaking to sign documents relating to enforcement 
An undertaking to sign in advance documents relating to enforcement of the agreement, 
irrespective of whether such documentation is complete or incomplete at the time it is signed, 
                                                             
1012 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.3.2 at 74. 
1013 50 of 1999. 
1014 Emphasis added. 
1015 A lien is the right to possess or hold onto the personal property of the tenant until he has paid his debt, or the 
tenant’s right to hold onto the leased dwelling until she or he is compensated for the improvements made. See 
‘Withholding of property: Time crucial for parties’ by Sayed Iqbal Mohamed at 
www.ocr.org.za/weekly_column2011/Withholding%20of%20Property.pdf (no longer available). 
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is prohibited in terms of section 51(1)(i)(ii). This provision aims to protect the consumer who 
otherwise could be a victim of a supplier who proceeds too swiftly in terms of enforcement 
measures. A supplier who wants to enforce his rights must hence undertake the necessary steps 
after the consumer is in default, and cannot ‘prepare’ any enforcement in advance. 
cc) Consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement 
Section 51(1)(i)(iii) invalids any consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to 
enforcement of the agreement, except to the extent that is consistent with the Act. ‘Costs’ are 
defined as ‘generally signifying the sum of money a court orders one party in proceedings to 
pay another party as compensation for the expense of litigation incurred.1016 The supplier shall 
not be able to determine in advance a value of costs in terms of enforcement as otherwise, the 
consumer could be liable for higher costs than the actual costs of the enforcement. In other 
words, the supplier shall not be better off in terms of the enforcement than before. 
In cases where the parties reach a settlement before the affair is decided in court, such 
settlement actually might contain a provision with respect to liability for costs. According to 
Van Eeden, such a provision might be subject to section 51.1017 This view is correct. Although 
such a settlement cannot be qualified as a 'transaction' in terms of the Act,1018 it is however an 
'agreement', i.e., 'an arrangement or understanding between or among two or more parties that 
purports to establish a relationship in law between or among them',1019 since a settlement 
reached between the parties can be qualified as such. 
dd)  Deposit of certain documents with the supplier 
It is also prohibited to stipulate a provision in terms of which the consumer agrees to deposit 
an identifying document or device, such as an identity document, credit or debit card, bank 
account or ATM access card, or any similar identifying document or device.1020 This provision 
aims to prevent that the consumer is inhibited for further transactions by depositing an identity 
document or a device by which it can pay for other goods or services. Otherwise, the consumer 
would not be able to act normally in his daily life as for many transactions – not only in the 
private sector but also in the public sector – one has to present an ID or pay with a card. Section 
51(1)(j)(i) also prohibits temporary possession of the abovementioned documents or cards, 
                                                             
1016 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 283, Weiner v Broekhuizen 2001 (2) SA 715 (C) at 724H-
I. 
1017 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 283. 
1018 See the definition of 'transaction' in s 1, read with s 5(6). 
1019 See definition of 'agreement' in s 1. 
1020 Section 51(1)(j)(i). 
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except for identification, or to make a copy thereof1021 which is expressly mentioned in section 
51(2)(b)(i).  
This provision overrides the decision in De Beer v Keyser and others1022 in which the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that a clause in a standardised loan agreement by which the borrower is 
required to surrender his ATM card and PIN to the lender, is enforceable. 
ee) Provision of a PIN to access an account 
In terms of section 51(1)(j)(ii), it is prohibited to enter an agreement in terms of which the 
consumer must provide a personal identification code or number in order to access an account.  
The idea behind this provision is not new. Already in terms of a regulation of the Minister 
concerning the Credit Agreements Act1023 the use of personal information, such as PIN codes 
and bank cards as security for any money lending transactions or as collection arrangement, 
was prohibited.1024 Contraventions constituted an offence under a regulation of the Minister.1025 
The rationale behind this kind of provision is that the supplier shall not be able to access the 
consumer’s account in order to withdraw any amounts as a deposit or other security to enforce 
the execution of the contract. 
To ‘provide’ in terms of section 51(1)(j)(ii) means to ‘disclose’ a PIN which is not the same as 
to ‘enter’ a PIN into a machine in order to conclude a transaction. It is therefore prohibited to 
ask a consumer to reveal his PIN directly.1026 This differentiation is expressly mentioned in 
section 51(4) in terms of which this section does not preclude a supplier to require a personal 
identification code or number in order to facilitate a transaction that in the normal course of 
business necessitates the provision of such code or number.1027 It is somehow astonishing that 
the legislator chose to put the contents of subsection (4) in an own subsection, and did not insert 
it directly into subsection (1)(j)(ii), or structurally more consequently, into subsection (2)(b)(ii). 
Furthermore, according to section 51(2)(b)(ii), a supplier may not request a consumer to reveal 
any personal identification code or number contemplated in subsection (1)(j)(ii).  
                                                             
1021 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
1022 De Beer v Keyser and others 2002 (1) SA 827 (SCA). 
1023 75 of 1980. 
1024 R6959 Government Gazette 20145 of 13 December 2000. 
1025 See Vessio LLD thesis at 186. 
1026 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
1027 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 262. 
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It is suggested that the term ‘personal identification code or number’ has to be interpreted 
widely and also includes any credit or debit card number and other information contained on 
and/or in a card (e.g., in the chip or magnetic stripe), such as the card verification value code 
(CVV), the account number, and so forth. The phrase 'personal identification code or number' 
speaks for this view because not only the PIN (personal identification number), but also any 
code which is linked to the holder of the card is comprised. Otherwise, the protection of section 
51(1)(j)(ii) and (2)(b)(ii) would fall short because with that information it is possible to 
conclude further unauthorised transactions online, sometimes even without being in possession 
of the card.  
New payment methods, such as payments with a QR code or with a mobile phone, as well as 
future payment methods are covered by subparagraph (i) because it includes 'any similar 
identifying document or device'. The phrase 'or any similar identifying document or device' is 
wide enough to catch also other methods than those described, such as contactless payment 
systems, i.e., credit cards and debit cards, key fobs, smart cards or other devices, including 
smartphones and other mobile devices, that use radio-frequency identification (RFID) or near 
field communication (NFC) for making payments. With these systems, a signature or PIN is 
typically not required.1028 
f) Other provisions not falling into the categories mentioned above 
Section 51(1) contains two more categories which do not fall into the abovementioned scheme.  
aa) Offer prohibited in terms of negative option marketing 
Under section 51(1)(d), a transaction or agreement is prohibited if it results from an offer 
prohibited in terms of section 31, i.e., in the form of negative option marketing.1029 ‘Negative 
option marketing’ shifts the decision of whether to purchase a good or service from the 
consumer to the supplier. If the consumer wishes not to buy, he has to contact the supplier and 
cancel the order.1030 
                                                             
1028 See ‘Contactless Payments Are Here to Stay. Here’s How to Set Them Up on Your Phone' at 
https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/money/credit-cards/how-to-use-contactless-payments (article updated on 18 
June 2020). 
1029 In terms of s 31(1), a supplier must not (a) promote any goods or services; (b) offer to enter into or modify an 
agreement for the supply of any goods or services; or (c) induce a person to accept any goods or services or to 
enter into or modify such an agreement, on the basis that the goods or services are to be supplied, or the agreement 
or modification will automatically come into existence, unless the consumer declines such offer or inducement. 
1030 See Nichols Kastner Attorneys-at-Law 'Negative option marketing' at http://www.nka.com/ 
investigation/negative-option-marketing-3 (no longer available). 
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Section 51(1)(d) is simply a restatement of section 31(2) according to which those transactions 
are void. Such terms are terms which conclude or modify an agreement for the supply of goods 
or services on the basis that the goods or services will be supplied, or the agreement or 
modification will automatically come into existence unless the consumer declines the offer 
(negative option marketing). In terms of the common-law, an offeree’s failure to respond to an 
offer does not amount to acceptance, even if the offeror has stipulated that he will take the 
offeree’s silence to be acceptance.1031 Provisions allegedly ‘agreed to’ by the consumer 
adopting negative option marketing are therefore prohibited.  
It is not clear why the legislator restated this provision in section 51(1). A reason might be the 
wish to provide for a ‘checklist’ of prohibited terms. If this were the case, however, the 
legislator should also have included the wording of section 39(1)(a) into the list of section 51(1) 
according to which an agreement is void if the consumer is subject to an order of a court holding 
the consumer to be mentally unfit and the supplier knew, or could reasonably have determined, 
that the consumer was the subject of such an order. Either the legislator forgot to ‘complete’ 
the list in section 51(1), or section 51(1)(d) appeared in the list inadvertently. 
bb)  Supplementary agreement 
In terms of paragraph (e), an agreement must not be subject to any term if it requires the 
consumer to enter into a supplementary agreement, or sign a document, prohibited by 
subsection (2)(a). According to section 51(2)(a), a supplier may not directly or indirectly 
require or induce a consumer to enter into a supplementary agreement, or sign any document, 
that contains a provision contemplated in subsection (1).  
The interplay between these two provisions is quite circular and therefore, unfortunate. Instead 
of cross-referencing these two subsections, the legislature merely could have provided that the 
supplier must not induce a consumer to enter into a supplementary agreement, or sign a 
document, that contains an unlawful provision in terms of the Act. 
Obviously, the legislator’s objective by inserting this provision is to avoid any circumvention 
of the protective provisions of section 51 stipulating prohibited terms in a supplementary 
agreement, e.g., a side-letter. 
                                                             
1031 Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A) 422: ‘Quiescence is not necessarily acquiescence 
and one party cannot, without the assent of the other, impose upon that other a condition to that effect.’ 
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2.3  Avoidance of circumvention in terms of section 51(2) 
The objective of section 51(2) is to prevent the supplier from circumventing the provisions 
contained in section 51(1).1032 
As discussed above, in terms of section 51(1)(e), a supplier may not require a consumer to enter 
into a supplementary agreement or sign a document according to which the consumer enters 
into an agreement that contains a prohibited term according to section 51(1). Sub-agreements 
or side letters which contain provisions that are prohibited in terms of section 51(1) are 
therefore not allowed.  
The provision of section 51(2)(b) could indeed have been integrated into section 51(1)(j) rather 
than inflating section 51(2). It seems though that the legislator wished to group all the 
provisions referring to the prohibition of circumvention of subsection (1) in a different 
subsection. This might be commendable from a structural point of view; it complicates the 
reading of section 51 unnecessarily, however. The substantial difference between a term or 
condition which ‘expresses an agreement by the consumer’1033  and the prohibition directed 
towards the supplier ‘to request or demand a consumer’1034 to do something is that in the first 
case, the content is part of the supplier's terms and conditions, whereas in the second case, the 
request or demand is not, but takes another form, e.g., an oral request. To ‘request’ and to 
‘demand’ in section 51(2)(b) are synonymous to a large extent, except that ‘request’ refers to 
a more polite way of demanding something. This differentiation can be disregarded in this 
context though. The same applies to section 51(2)(b)(ii) according to which a supplier may not 
demand a consumer to reveal any personal identification code or number contemplated in 
subsection (1)(j)(ii).  
The purpose of section 51((2)(c) is to prevent any circumvention of the provisions contained 
in subsection (1) by forbidding the supplier to authorise any other person to do anything on 
behalf or for the benefit of the supplier. In other words, the term ‘supplier’ is extended to other 
persons. These persons do not have to be necessarily employees of the supplier ('any other 
person').1035 
                                                             
1032 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 117. 
1033 Section 51(1)(j). 
1034 Section 51(2)(b). 
1035 Emphasis added. 
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2.4  Legal consequences in terms of  prohibited terms 
Under section 51(3), a purported transaction or agreement, provision, term or condition of a 
transaction or agreement, or notice to which a transaction or agreement is purported to be 
subject, is void to the extent that it contravenes section 51. 
In terms of section 52(4), if a person alleges that a term etc. to which a transaction or agreement 
is purportedly subject, is void in terms of the Act, the court may declare the entire agreement 
void or sever the contravening term and declare it void or alter it to the extent required to render 
it lawful, if it is reasonable to do so having regard to the transaction, agreement, provision or 
notice as a whole.1036 The court may also make any further order that is just and reasonable in 
the circumstances with respect to that agreement, provision or notice, as the case may be.1037  
Hawthorne argues that the factors listed in section 52(2) should also apply in terms of the 
court’s considerations when considering the total context of the transaction.1038  
Although section 52(2) applies, inter alia, to transactions or agreements that are unfair in terms 
of section 48, and not to forbidden terms under section 51, this view is convincing. Section 
52(2) provides, besides other factors and circumstances that the court may consider, a valuable 
tool for the appreciation of the ‘transaction, agreement [or] provision (…) as a whole’ in terms 
of section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa). The factors listed in section 52(2) mostly concern the transaction or 
agreement as a whole.1039 It seems that they concern only in one case individual provisions, 
namely in subparagraph (g). Although subparagraph (g) concerns the plain language 
requirement of section 22 for documents relating to the transaction or agreement, it is my 
submission that it also covers individual provisions contained herein. 
Hawthorne is also of the opinion that section 52(3)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) also should apply.1040 In 
terms of these provisions, a court may, when it determines that a transaction or agreement, in 
whole or in part, is unfair, make an order (i) to restore money or property to the consumer, (ii) 
to compensate the consumer for losses or expenses relating to the transaction or agreement, or 
the proceedings of the court, and (iii) requiring the supplier to cease any practice, or alter any 
practice, form or document, as required to avoid a repetition of the supplier’s conduct.  
                                                             
1036 Section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa) and (bb). 
1037 Section 52((4)(b). 
1038 Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 365. 
1039 See ss 52(2)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j). 
1040 Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 365 and 366. 
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This point of view seems to be problematic at first sight because the prerequisite for a court 
order under subsection (3) is that the court ‘determines’ that a transaction or agreement was 
unfair. If a provision is void in terms of section 51, it is not necessary though that the court 
‘determines’ this invalidity as in terms of section 115(1), if a provision or an agreement has 
been declared by a provision of the Act to be void,1041 it must be regarded as having been of no 
force or effect at any time, unless a court has declared that the relevant provision of the Act 
does not apply to the impugned agreement or provision. In other words, the provision in 
question does not become void because the court has determined so but is void per se. 
Under section 52(4)(b), the court may make any further order that is just and reasonable in the 
circumstances concerning that agreement or provision, as the case may be. It would be 
incomprehensible why a court when issuing an order in terms of section 52(4)(b), should not 
refer to an order regulated in section 52(3)(b) if it is of the opinion that this order is just and 
reasonable in the circumstances. What is more, Hawthorne’s viewpoint is laudable as it is an 
incentive for suppliers to cease any illegal practice in terms of the prohibited terms contained 
in section 51. Although the restoration of money or property or the compensation of the 
consumer for losses or expenses are individual measures with a limited financial impact on 
suppliers, they ultimately can serve as a deterrent since no business wants to lose money that 
once has been 'earned'. Besides, these measures are valuable as the consumer’s position is being 
restored to its previous one. The most powerful impact on businesses will have orders though 
which require the supplier to cease or alter any illegal practice because those can affect the 
supplier's business model and regular earnings. 
 
2.5  Conclusion  
Content control is especially justified for non-negotiated terms because of the imbalance 
between the supplier’s and the consumer’s expression of freedom of contract and autonomy. 
Usually, standard terms are forced upon consumers whose transaction costs to read the terms 
for every single transaction would be too high, or they understand them as invariable. For this 
reason, content control also has a procedural fairness aspect and is inter-related with 
incorporation control. Besides the Consumer Protection Act, other pieces of legislation, such 
as the Rental Housing Act or the Conventional Penalties Act, but also the Constitution and the 
common law ensure consumer protection. Finally, the application of common-law rules on 
                                                             
1041 Emphasis added. 
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interpretation contributes to consumer protection. Content control is in the public interest with 
regard to the reduction of the costs for the society. From an economic point of view, it would 
not make any sense if the risks and obligations involved were not be borne by the party best 
able to cope with them, e.g., by taking insurance. Lastly, the removal of unfair terms increases 
consumer confidence and trust, enhances economic activity and decreases costly legal actions. 
As discussed in terms of the content control, the advantages of black- and greylists are 
numerous. They have a deterring effect on suppliers, put consumers in a better bargaining 
position, give guidance, have a proactive effect, and provide predictability for all economic 
actors, to name but a few. Hence, they provide for an efficient system of redress.  
Content control in terms of the Act is threefold as the Consumer Protection Act contains a so-
called blacklist with outright prohibited terms, regulations with terms presumed to be unfair 
(greylist) as well as a general clause. 
The South African legislator chose to include not only non-negotiated terms but also negotiated 
ones, comprising the core terms, as well as B2B contracts in the content control (with the 
exception of regulation 44 which is only applicable to B2C agreements). It would have been 
wiser to accept only those terms in B2B contracts which have not been changed in favour of 
the small business, instead of treating all terms identically. It is to be hoped though that the 
courts will make a distinction between negotiated, non-negotiated and core terms since 
consumers deserve less protection for negotiated terms and core terms, such as the price and 
the main subject matter of the contract. Courts should not interfere with excessive price control 
as the competition authorities are competent in this field. These have more expertise than the 
courts.  
Section 51 contains prohibited terms (blacklist) and implies a pre-emptive fairness control. 
Under section 51(1) ─ a provision which is unnecessarily verbose and serves as a sort of 
‘general clause’ within section 51 ─ any term or notice which directly or indirectly waives or 
restricts the consumer’s rights under the Act or in any other way contravenes the Act is void. 
Section 51(1)(c) to (2)(c) contains further prohibited terms and provides a ‘check-list’ for 
suppliers and consumers. Section 51(1)(c)(i) prohibits exemption clauses with regard to gross 
negligence of the supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier. Although 
'harm' in section 61(1) and 'loss' in section 51(1)(c)(i) are congruent, the latter provision does 
not require a contractual nexus between the consumer and the supplier and requires gross 
 183   
 
negligence, whereas wrongfulness is not a condition for the application of section 61. In 
addition, the personal scope of application of section 61 extends to other members of the supply 
chain, whereas section 51(1)(c)(i) also covers persons acting or controlled by the supplier. 
Lastly, section 51(1)(c)(i) shifts forward the supplier's liability as he or she is also responsible 
before the actual delivery. For these reasons, the insertion of section 51(1)(c)(i) was not 
superfluous; both provisions have different applications. 
The blacklisting of exemption clauses for gross negligence and the greylisting of clauses 
dealing with ordinary negligence begs the question of whether the former should not rather be 
greylisted as well. Also exempting ordinary negligence can be unfair, even if the clauses in 
question have been initialled or signed. According to Naudé, the burden of risk of harm caused 
by the supplier's negligence should be borne by the supplier itself, and not by the consumer. 
This could be achieved by greylisting such clauses. Then the business could offer a choice 
between contracts with an exemption clause and those without, which would be reflected in 
different prices. In the South African socio-economic context, consumers often do not have a 
real choice and would instead opt for lower prices, however, i.e., an agreement with an 
exemption clause for gross negligence. 
Also prohibited are clauses containing the assumption of risk or liability by the consumer for 
a loss contemplated in subparagraph (ii) as those often have the same impact as the exclusion 
of liability. 'You-break-it-you-buy-it' clauses are also prohibited. 
Acknowledgements by consumers that falsely express that no representations or warranties 
were made before the agreement was concluded are prohibited as well. Entire agreement 
clauses, to the extent that they exclude additional warranties, and no-representation clauses are 
not allowed under this clause. This indeed serves better consumer protection but does not go 
far enough. The EU Unfair Terms Directive's formulation is more comprehensive, does not 
contain any time limit and is thus a more consumer-friendly provision. The provision in the 
Act also includes acknowledgements concerning goods or services, or documents which are 
required by the Act to be delivered to the consumer, so that the consumer is no longer barred 
from claiming those goods, services or documents because of a 'false' acknowledgement. The 
blacklisting of section 51(1)(g) also protects small businesses which would be included if this 
provision would be greylisted instead. Indeed, a greylisting would enhance predictability in 
terms of B2B contracts, but exclude consumers from claiming their right to redress for 
misrepresentation. 
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Certain forfeiture clauses, e.g., concerning deposits or refunds, have also been outlawed by the 
Act. Unfair enforcement clauses, such as the authorisation to enter the consumer’s premises in 
order to repossess goods, undertakings to sign documents relating to enforcement, the consent 
to a predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement, the deposit of certain documents 
with the supplier or the provision of a PIN to access an account are prohibited. The rationale 
of these provisions is manifold: The supplier is not allowed to exercise any self-administered 
justice, the supplier is prevented from taking enforcement measures too swiftly, or taking 
advantage in terms of the costs, consumers shall not be inhibited in their daily lives because 
they have deposited their bank card or a similar document with the supplier, or the supplier 
shall not be able to access the consumer's bank account with the consumer's PIN. New 
technologies, such as the payment with a QR code or contactless payment systems, or future 
payment methods, are included in this provision. Subparagraph (i) should be interpreted 
widely, so that any personal information on a bank card, for instance, falls under this provision. 
Offers prohibited in terms of negative option marketing (a simple restatement of section 31(2)) 
as well as supplementary agreements which aim to circumvent the protection afforded in 
section 51 are also prohibited. Supplementary agreements by which the objectives set out in 
section 51 could be circumvented are forbidden in terms of section 51(2) too. The integration 
of this clause in section 51(1) would have been beneficial for a better understanding of section 
51, though. 
A term which contravenes section 51 is void. A court may declare the entire agreement void or 
sever the contravening term and declare it void or alter it to the extent required to render it 
lawful. The factors contained in section 52(2) are a valuable tool for the appreciation of the 
whole transaction in terms of section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa). Furthermore, section 52(3)(b)(i), (ii) and 
(iii) should also be applicable in terms of section 51 as the court may, according to section 
52(4)(b), make any further order that is just and reasonable in the circumstances. Such an order 
also could have a deterrent effect on suppliers. 
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3.  Terms presumed to be unfair 
3.1   Overview 
Regulation 44(3) of the Consumer Protection Act contains a so-called ‘greylist’ of terms. 
Contrary to the terms of the so-called blacklist in section 51, which are prohibited outright, the 
terms in the greylist are merely presumed to be unfair. Such a presumption means that the 
supplier, if the term in question is challenged, has to prove that the term is fair under the specific 
circumstances; otherwise, the term will be considered unfair. Hence, there is a shift of the onus 
since usually the consumer would have to prove that a specific term is unfair, which is the case 
for terms contained in section 51.1042 
Regulation 44 is of limited application and applies only to consumers who entered into the 
transaction for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to their business or profession.1043 If 
consumers are acting for the purposes of their businesses, the legislator assumes that they have 
specialised knowledge about the goods or services they are buying and therefore do not afford 
the same protection as other consumers.1044 Since regulation 44 only applies to consumer 
agreements as defined in section 1, franchise agreements are also excluded from the ambit of 
the regulation.1045 
The list contained in regulation 44(3) is indicative,1046 which means that terms that are 
presumed to be unfair may still be fair in the particular circumstances of the case.1047 Thus, 
there is an interplay between regulation 44 and the ‘unfairness standard’ of section 48. 
What is more, the list is non-exhaustive,1048 i.e., that non-listed terms may still be unfair in 
terms of section 48.1049 The Consumer Protection Act itself does not contain a ‘greylist’.1050 
The Law Commission had initially not in mind to integrate such a list but proposed twenty-six 
‘factors instead’ to be taken into consideration whether a contract or term is unreasonable, 
unconscionable or oppressive under the general clause.1051 The fact that a greylist has finally 
                                                             
1042 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 122. 
1043 Regulation 44(1). 
1044 Opperman and Lake Understanding the CPA 69. 
1045 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
1046 Naudé is of the opinion that the term ‘indicative’ is too cryptic and should be replaced by a simpler word. See 
Naudé 2006 Stell LR 381 note 115. 
1047 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 267, Naudé 2007 SALJ 129. 
1048 Naudé is of the view that also the term ‘non-exhaustive’ is too cryptic and should be replaced by a more 
understandable word. See Naudé 2006 Stell LR 381 note 115. 
1049 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 267. 
1050 See Naudé 2007 SALJ 130. 
1051 Section 2 of the Bill proposed by the SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) (1998). See Naudé 2007 SALJ 128. 
 186   
 
been ‘included’ into the content control by means of regulation 44 is an important step in order 
to have a well-balanced content control mechanism as will be shown below. It is important to 
note that because of their more ‘open’ nature the provisions contained in the greylist have to 
be interpreted in the light of the general clause of section 48 and any guidelines intended for 
their application.1052 A greylist is also crucial because a blacklist is unable to cover all unfair 
or potentially unfair terms.1053  
Regulation 44 was issued by the Minister under section 120(1)(d),1054 according to which the 
Minister may make regulations relating to unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms. The 
parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry agreed, after submission to 
Parliament, that a greylist should be inserted in order to protect consumers, and in the 
following, it obtained an undertaking from the DTI that a greylist would be included in the 
regulations instead of being inserted into the Consumer Protection Act.1055 Section 120(1)(d) 
was included in the final version of the Consumer Protection Bill in response to a submission 
to Parliament that a greylist would be essential for proactive and effective reactive control of 
unfair terms.1056 The mechanism adopted by the legislator, according to which the Minister 
may make regulations relating to unfair contract terms is coherent with the principle adopted 
in Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and others1057 that Parliament is not allowed, in an act, to delegate to the 
Executive the power to amend the Act itself. 
The greylist in regulation 44(3) and the exceptions in regulation 44(4) are largely inspired by 
the list of the EC Unfair Contract Terms Directive1058 and the similar lists in the EC Proposal 
for a Consumer Rights Directive.1059 In addition, some items are based on Australian Consumer 
Law,1060 the German Civil Code1061 and the South African Law Commission’s list of relevant 
                                                             
1052 Naudé 2007 SALJ 130. 
1053 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 321, Sharrock Judicial control 144. 
1054 See wording of subreg 44(1). 
1055 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
1056 Naudé 2009 SALJ 521. See para 1 of Naudé’s submission to Parliament, available at 
www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/080826proftjakiesub.doc. 
1057 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) paras [51]-[62]. 
1058 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
1059 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COM (2998) 614 
Final, submitted on 8 October 2008. 
1060 Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010. 
1061 §§ 308 and 309 BGB. 
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factors in their proposed Bill on the Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or 
Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms of 1998.1062 
Despite the structural disruption caused by the fact that the greylist is not included in the 
Consumer Protection Act but takes the form of a regulation, this approach has the advantage 
that no act of Parliament ─ unlike any modifications of the blacklist contained in section 51 ─ 
is required in order to add, remove or update the list. Under section 94(c), the Commission 
must report from time to time to the Minister with recommendations for achieving the 
progressive transformation and reform of law contemplated in this section.1063 In terms of 
flexibility and the fact that South Africa has practically no experience with greylists, a 
regulation, compared to an act of parliament, is a valuable tool because in the future, changes 
to the greylist might be necessary. Naudé contends that it would be better if the greylist were 
included in the Act itself as it would have greater legitimacy then and be more prominent and 
accessible, especially for non-lawyers. She points out that this list would not necessitate 
frequent amendments as lists from other legislation, such as the greylist of the EC Unfair Terms 
Directive of 1993 has been very steady in the course of time.1064 It is my submission though 
that unless courts have not formed out a substantial jurisdictional body in terms of presumed 
unfair terms yet, and future amendments have not been undertaken, the current place of the 
greylist is justified. What is more, it remains to be seen if the South African government, with 
its often inflationary approach of enacting mutually superseding (and contradictory) laws and 
amendments by the intermediary of Parliament, will change its policy and adopt a more 
comprehensive approach in the future which sees the legislative body more holistically. 
Consumer protection legislation would undoubtedly benefit from such a change of policy.  
3.2   Advantages of greylists 
The general advantages of lists in consumer protection legislation, such as self-control, cost-
effectiveness, predictability and their general effect have been already discussed above. 
Compared to blacklists, greylists offer a number of further – or better: complementary – 
advantages. They empower consumer protection bodies to take preventive action during the 
negotiations with businesses which use unfair terms, for instance, which deflects costs, risk 
and effort of litigation for consumers, not to speak of the shift of the onus of proof from the 
                                                             
1062 Section 2 of the Bill proposed by the SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) (1998). 
1063 See also s 98. 
1064 Naudé 2009 SALJ 521. 
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consumer to the supplier.1065 It would be difficult, even impossible for consumers to bring 
evidence as to why a term is unfair because only a business can bring the evidence as to what 
are the business reasons for the insertion of a particular term, and proof that the term in question 
is fair. In the absence of such proof, it will be difficult for courts to decide whether a term is 
unfair.1066 A blacklisting of terms is therefore not always necessary because the greylisting is 
already dissuasive enough in many cases.1067 Furthermore, greylisting rather than blacklisting 
a term might increase the chance of self-imposed control in a wider range of clauses and 
strengthen the powers of administrative bodies or consumer organisations.1068 Naudé is of the 
opinion that greylists offer many advantages over blacklists, particularly in a country like South 
Africa with practically no experience of the general control of unfair contract terms.1069 This is 
without a doubt true in general. One should not forget that blacklists offer, even in an 
inexperienced country in terms of consumer protection, the unquestionable advantage to ban 
right away specific terms which cannot be fair under any circumstances. Thus, a combination 
of black and greylists as well as a general clause seems to be the best and most flexible option. 
Although subregulation (2)(b) states that the list is not exhaustive, it would be advantageous if 
new items were inserted from time to time, if necessary. Judges could then rely on a quite 
extensive and regularly updated ‘checklist’, the newly inserted provisions would deter 
suppliers, and the protection of consumers would be extended since all economic actors would 
have more certainty of what is presumed to be unfair. The Minister is given guidance on what 
terms could be included in regulation 44(3) by section 48, read in conjunction with section 
3.1070 
As compared to a mere list of 'factors', a greylist is more precise than a list of factors, like the 
one proposed by the Law Commission, although those factors can be taken into consideration, 
especially if the greylist is not exhaustive.1071 A greylist has furthermore the advantage of 
                                                             
1065 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3, Naudé 2009 SALJ 520 and 521. 
1066 This was a problem in Napier v Barkhuizen (2007) (5) SA 323 (CC), since there was a lack of evidence on 
the business reasons for the particular term, which is why the court was reluctant to declare the term as being 
contrary to public policy. See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [9]. 
1067 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 321, Sharrock Judicial control 144. 
1068 These arguments are also contained in the Law Commissions Report where the insertion of guidelines is 
justified, para 2.6.4, at 168: 'The Commission supports the view that no preventative action is possible without 
guidelines and that informed self-control by drafters of standard and model contracts, action by representative 
bodies, negotiations with a view to settling disputes, etc., are all heavily dependent upon there being a large 
measure of predictability regarding the question of what will be acceptable and what not in regard of contracts.' 
See also Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
1069 Naudé 2007 SALJ 137. 
1070 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
1071 See reg 44(2)(b). 
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emphasising suspicious terms1072 and offers more guidance for consumers and suppliers than a 
list of factors. 
There have been many objections against greylists, however, especially during the ongoing 
discussion of whether or not a greylist should be part of South African consumer protection 
legislation. One argument against a greylist referred to the apprehension that the courts might 
stick to greylists too much and regard unlisted terms as unimpeachable as they could consider 
themselves bound to the list. Consequently, consumers would be afforded less protection.1073 
This argument is not valid however if the greylist is well drafted so that judges understand from 
the outset that it is merely a guideline and open to other terms; this means that it has to be spelt 
out clearly that the list is non-exhaustive,1074 which is the case in terms of regulation 44(2)(b). 
In other words, also other terms may be unfair for purposes of section 48. Furthermore, 
subregulation (2)(a) indicates that the list is indicative only, so that a term listed therein may 
be fair because of the particular circumstances of the case.  
In addition, a clearly drafted greylist is not to be equated with ‘a mechanical application of 
precedent’, and does not preclude a ‘real value judgment instead of claims of neutrality’, as 
Barnard puts it, who favours legislation which is as open-ended as possible.1075 
Furthermore, in the absence of any greylist, judges with a more conservative mindset might 
not vigorously use the open standard in a general clause, without any further and more direct 
indications as to when they must have good reasons not to pronounce a clause unfair.1076 By 
serving as a ‘guideline’ a greylist therefore simplifies the judges’ task to reach a decision.1077 
By and large, the aversion against greylists is not convincing, and the advantages of the 
inclusion of such a list outnumber the disadvantages by far. As Van Eeden correctly argues, 
the threefold structure for tackling unfairness, i.e., the interplay of section 51, regulation 44 
and section 48, 'supports a contractual regime where the consumer and the supplier are held to 
their respective obligations, and makes a significant start in the pursuit of striking a balance in 
consumer contracts.'1078 
                                                             
1072 Naudé 2007 SALJ 137. 
1073 Naudé 2007 SALJ 134. 
1074 Naudé 2007 SALJ 134-135. 
1075 Barnard LLD thesis 240. 
1076 Naudé 2007 SALJ 134. 
1077 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 321, Sharrock Judicial control 144. 
1078 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 267. 
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3.3   Structure and scope of regulation 44 
According to regulation 44(1), regulation 44(3) is only applicable for consumer agreements 
between suppliers operating on a for-profit basis and acting wholly or mainly for purposes 
related to his or her business or profession, and individual consumers who entered into the 
agreement for purposes wholly or mainly unrelated to their business or profession. A term is 
presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of a term listed in subregulation (3), and 
does not fall within the ambit of subregulation (4). 
The legislator chose the term ‘individual consumer(s)’ in order to underline the fact that the 
protection is limited to natural persons.1079 It is submitted that the inclusion of the plural form 
could mean that it intended to include also groups of consumers composed of individuals 
joining for a once-off transaction. This would be the case, for instance, where several 
individuals privately purchase a camping car from a car dealer. 
Since South Africa has no experience in generalised unfair terms legislation, the legislator 
decided that the greylist should find no direct application to suppliers who are not 'businesses' 
or 'professionals', or to any B2B-transactions covered by the Act.1080 In such cases, section 48 
applies, and the consumer has the onus of proof.1081  
It is furthermore suggested that the distinction made by the legislature between ‘business’ and 
‘profession’ in regulation 44(1) could mean that not only businesses in the sense of companies, 
but also freelancers who do not operate in the context of a formal company, are included. In 
terms of the definition of ‘business’ in section 1 (i.e., the continual marketing of any goods or 
services), this distinction is superfluous though because free-lancers are included in the 
definition of ‘business’. 
Hence, subregulation (1) regulates the personal scope of application (supplier operating on a 
for-profit basis and acting at least mainly for business-related purposes/consumer acting at least 
mainly for business-unrelated purposes), but also partly the material scope of application 
(consumer agreement), whereas subregulation (3) regulates the material scope of application 
and contains a list of terms presumed to be unfair. 
                                                             
1079 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
1080 See s 5(6)(a). 
1081 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
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Since only consumer agreements (B2C contracts) fall into the ambit of regulation 44, its scope 
of application is narrower than that of the Act itself. Thus, regulation 44 does not apply to 
franchise agreements.1082 As discussed before, South Africa has no experience in an 
overarching consumer protection legislation, which is the reason for the legislator’s decision 
not to include B2B contracts into the ambit of regulation 44, at least at the initial stage.1083 
Naudé points out correctly that the exclusion of B2B contracts from the ambit of regulation 44 
does not mean that a court may not use the list contained therein as a guideline in relation to 
section 48, especially for smaller, unsophisticated businesses vis-à-vis bigger companies. The 
reasoning behind this idea is that smaller businesses are often comparable to individual 
consumers in terms of their vulnerability. Therefore, regulation 44 might also have a ‘reflective 
effect’ in terms of B2B contracts where smaller businesses are involved, especially if the 
transaction has no relation to the small business's core expertise, or where it had not much 
bargaining power.1084 
Natural persons who order goods or services that are intended to serve for a future (i.e., not 
current) business, e.g., concerning a home working scheme, are currently excluded from the 
ambit of regulation 44 as they do not purchase those goods or services for purposes wholly or 
mainly unrelated to their business or profession. At the time of the purchase they are 
nevertheless comparable to vulnerable consumers, and they should afford the protection of 
regulation 44. Naudé thus favours an amendment of the wording of regulation 44. The current 
distinction between a consumer who purchases an item for private use, such as a computer, and 
who decides at a later stage to establish a business and to use the good in question for business 
purposes then, and someone who at the time of the purchase has not established his business 
yet, but buys goods or services intending to establish a business, is artificial. Especially in 
South Africa, where many people are unemployed and decide to work on a freelance basis, 
using their personal affairs, this distinction draws a line where no line should be. Therefore, 
Naudé’s view is laudable and correct. 
It is recommended that the Minister open up the application of regulation 44 to small businesses 
as they are entirely comparable to individual consumers in terms of their vulnerability. This 
also applies to franchisees. Their exclusion from the ambit of regulation 44 by forwarding the 
                                                             
1082 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 267. See also ‘consumer agreements’ in s 1 which 
expressly excludes franchise agreements. 
1083 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
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argument that South African courts do not have much experience in terms of consumer 
protection is not valid. As discussed before, the interplay between a blacklist, a greylist and a 
general clause is a well-balanced mechanism which ensures fairness. Barring small businesses 
and franchisees from the scope of application of regulation 44 disturbs this balance 
unnecessarily and prevents courts from gaining valuable experience in this field. Finally, there 
is no reason to apply thresholds under section 5(2)(b) only in terms of provisions contained in 
the Act, but not to regulation 44. These thresholds ensure that only vulnerable individuals and 
businesses afford protection. In my opinion, the problem in South Africa is not only a lack of 
experience in consumer protection questions but also a lack of consumer protection per se. For 
the reasons mentioned above, the distinction in terms of the personal scope of application made 
between the Act and regulation 44 should be abolished. 
According to subregulation (2)(a), the list in subregulation (3) is indicative only, so that a term 
listed therein may be fair in view of the particular circumstances of the case.  
Naudé contends that the term ‘indicative’ in subregulation 44(2)(a) should be deleted as it 
might be confusing.1085 In her opinion, the wording of subregulation 44(3) according to which 
the terms listed herein ‘are presumed to be unfair’ should be sufficient in order to avoid any 
confusion. She refers to European legislation which had let to some confusion in some Member 
States in terms of the term ‘indicative’ due to the absence of a clear presumption of unfairness 
for terms contained in the Directive's1086 list. In this regard, it is suggested that the problems 
experienced in Europe will not necessarily appear in South Africa because in Europe, the effect 
of the black and the greylist was not clear in an early stage. The current wording of 
subregulation 44(2)(a) gives guidance to judges. What is more, ‘indicative’ is strictly speaking 
not necessarily congruent with ‘presumed to be’. The rebuttable presumption triggered by the 
latter formulation means that the court has to consider the terms contained in the list in 
subregulation 44(3) unfair unless there is an indication to the contrary, whereas 'indicative' 
refers to a more black-and-white scheme 'fair/unfair'. Eventually, 'indicative' also means that a 
term contained in the list might also be fair. The current wording can serve as a guidance and 
a reminder to judges and should therefore be kept in the current state.  
                                                             
1085 In an earlier publication, Naudé was of the opinion that the term ‘indicative’ is too cryptic and should be 
replaced by a simpler one. See Naudé 2006 Stell LR 381 note 115. 
1086 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
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Naudé also asserts that some of the terms listed in regulation 44(3) will never be fair and that 
therefore the qualification that they may be fair in the particular circumstances of the case, 
should be deleted.1087 This would deprive some guidance ─ and a reminder ─ for judges, 
however. One must not forget that most terms listed may be fair in the particular circumstances, 
and the deletion of the qualification contained in regulation 44(2) would be misleading in my 
view. 
According to subregulation (2)(b), this list is non-exhaustive, so that other terms may also be 
unfair for purposes of section 48. The legislator considered it necessary to insert this provision 
in order to avoid that non-lawyers consider subregulation 44(3) exhaustive and cast in stone.1088 
Subregulation (2)(c) makes clear that a term which falls within the scope of subregulation (4) 
remains subject to sections 48 to 52. Subregulation (4) contains a list of exceptions from the 
application of subregulation (3) for certain suppliers and transactions. 
Although the Act does not apply to credit agreements which fall in the ambit of the National 
Credit Act, the 'goods and services that are the subject of the credit agreement are not excluded 
from the ambit of the [Act]'.1089 Section 92(2)(g) of the National Credit Act prohibits clauses 
purporting to exempt the credit provider from liability or limit such liability for an act, omission 
or representation by a person acting on behalf of the credit provider, or any guarantee or 
warranty that would, in the absence of such a provision, be implied in a credit agreement. Item 
(b) of regulation 44(3) does not apply to exemption clauses in credit agreements. If these 
clauses exclude common-law warranties, they are void per se, and a presumption in terms of 
regulation 44(3) does not apply. Therefore, credit providers are still liable in terms of the 
common-law 'warranties', for instance, the warranty against eviction, or the warranty against 
latent defects.1090 
Furthermore, according to subregulation 2(d), the regulation does not derogate from provisions 
in the Act or other law in terms of or in respect of which a term of an agreement is prohibited, 
which is the obvious statement that the provisions of the Act take precedence over the 
regulations.1091 This means that if the Consumer Protection Act affords non-derogable rights 
                                                             
1087 See reg 44(2)(a) in fine. Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
1088 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
1089 Section 5(2)(d). 
1090 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13. 
1091 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
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or remedies to a consumer, the presumption of regulation 44(3) does not apply, and the non-
derogable right or remedy takes precedence. 
Terms will not be regarded as unfair if they are required by legislation, a rule of law or 
international conventions to which South Africa is a party. This principle also applies to cases 
in which a term is required by, or incorporated as a result of a decision of a competent authority 
acting within its statutory jurisdiction or any of its functions, provided that the authority is not 
itself a party to the given contract), or terms that are required by legislation or a rule of law.1092 
Regulation 44 does not expressly contain this internationally accepted principle, contrary to the 
legislation of other countries.1093   
Finally, it should be reminded that terms to which the exceptions in regulation 44(4) are 
applicable are still subject to the fairness enquiry of sections 48 to 52.1094 
3.4   Analysis of contract terms that are presumed to be unfair 
The items in regulation 44(3) can be grouped into seven categories which will be discussed in 
the following. Suppliers do not need to draft their terms exactly as the items contained in 
regulation 44(3). This results from the phrase by which they merely need to have ‘the purpose 
or effect of’ a listed term.1095 Therefore, one need not to stick to the wording of a term, but 
rather to its purpose or effect.  
In the following, the various items listed in regulation 44(3) will be discussed in detail.  
3.4.1   Exemption clauses for the limitation or exclusion of the supplier’s legal liability, 
and similar terms by which the consumer gives up existing rights 
Terms excluding or limiting liability, also referred to as exemption clauses or disclaimers, may 
appear in different forms. When assessing whether an exemption clause is fair, one has to keep 
in mind that the parties' rights and duties under a contract cannot be considered evenly balanced 
unless both parties are equally bound by their respective contractual obligations and the legal 
provisions. Terms which undermine the value of such obligations by putting obstacles for the 
consumer in terms of his or her redress, when the supplier has not complied with its obligations, 
are suspicious in terms of fairness. An exemption clause by which one party is allowed to act 
                                                             
1092 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. 
1093 See para 1(1) of Schedule 3 (Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission 
Unfair Terms in Contracts - Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com 
No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)(2005). 
1094 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
1095 Regulation 44(3) 1st sent. in fine. Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
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unreasonably or negligently without consequences is likely to be considered unfair when 
liability for breach of 'implied' terms that the law presumes is excluded, especially if such terms 
do not reflect what a reasonable person would have agreed.1096 
Some suppliers bring forward arguments which are supposed to justify the use of over-
extensive claimers, which however are not valid. One argument is that the term in question is 
intended only to deal with unjustified demands. However, the effect of a term, and not just the 
intention behind it, has to be taken into consideration. As such terms not only concern 
unjustified demands but also have an effect on justified ones, they are likely to be unfair. A 
second argument is that a particular term does not actually operate by excluding liability. Thus, 
a term which has the effect of an unfair exemption clause will be unfair, irrespective of its form 
or mechanism. This is the case for terms which 'deem' things to be the case, for example. 
Thirdly, statements declaring that the consumer's statutory rights are not affected are unfair if 
no explanation is given in terms of what the statutory rights are. In this regard, the supplier 
does not have to include every single detail of information about the rights it is referring to in 
a single document. This could be unhelpful as the consumer will most likely not read (or 
understand) lengthy terms and conditions.1097 An executive summary or other forms of written 
guidance could be very valuable though in this context.1098 Otherwise, terms that merely refer 
to statutory rights etc. are too technical and unclear as regards their practical effect and cannot 
be understood by non-lawyers. The same applies to exclusions 'so far as the law permits' or 
terms providing that liability is excluded to the extent permitted by the Consumer Protection 
Act or the Regulations.1099 The assessment of whether a term is unfair requires the 
                                                             
1096 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 1.1-1.3 at 13 and 14. 
1097 This problem has already been discussed on various occasions. How far this can go is shown by several 
experiments in Britain which aimed to sensibilise consumers: Purple, a Wi-Fi-provider, offered its allegedly 
advantageous services. In its terms and conditions the consumer obliged him- or herself to various, rather 
disgusting activities, such as cleaning public toilets for 1,000 hours, or emptying sewage pipes barehanded. More 
than 22,000 people agreed to these terms and conditions. Furthermore, the London IT security firm F-Secure 
offered in 2014 a free of charge internet access in return of the user's first-born child. Six Brits agreed to these 
terms and conditions. In 2010, the game producer Gamestation modified its terms and conditions to the effect that 
its customers had to cede their right of ownership of their souls. 7,500 clients agreed. These, admittedly rather 
funny experiments point out to the fact that most consumers just do not read terms and conditions. Pursuant to an 
online survey of the German Institute for Trust and Security (Institut für Vertrauen und Sicherheit), only 20 % of 
consumers admitted reading terms and conditions, although 86 % would like to know their content. This, at first 
sight contradictory result only shows that terms and conditions still are often not very legible and/or too long. See 
Süddeutsche Zeitung of 17 July 2017 '22 000 Menschen willigen ein, Klos zu putzen' at 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/agbs-menschen-willigen-ein-klos-zu-putzen-1.3589917. 
1098 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 9.4 at 50. 
1099 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.5-1.7 at 14 and 15 (slightly adjusted). 
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consideration of many factors, including the circumstances in which it is used. Only trained 
lawyers are able to ensure this kind of work.1100 
Terms excluding problems with the supplier's subcontractor have to be viewed as if the problem 
goes back to the supplier's own fault since consumers have no influence on or contractual rights 
against them.1101 
a) Excluding or limiting liability for death or personal injury 
Pursuant to item (a) of regulation 44(3), terms excluding or limiting the liability of the supplier 
for death or personal injury caused to the consumer through an act or omission of that supplier 
subject to section 61(1) are presumed to be unfair. 
Regulation 44(3)(a) refers to injury or death caused by a reason other than a defective good, 
e.g., harm caused by sub-standard service delivery, as it is not permitted in terms of section 61 
to exclude liability for harm caused by defective, unsafe or hazardous goods or those that suffer 
from a product failure. Since already regulation 44(2)(d) provides that regulation 44 does not 
derogate from provisions in the Act or other law in terms of or in respect of which a term of an 
agreement is prohibited, the referral to section 61 is somehow confusing and should be deleted 
according to Naudé.1102 On the other hand, serves as a valuable reminder within the ─ 
admittedly ─ very confusing structure of the Act. 
The almost similar item (a) of the Annex of the Council Directive1103 served as a model for this 
item. 
Section 51(1)(c)(i) blacklists terms that purport to limit or exempt a supplier from liability for 
any loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross negligence of the supplier or any person 
acting for or controlled by the supplier. Read together with regulation 44(3)(a), the latter only 
refers to exemption clauses excluding liability which is not based on gross negligence and 
which does not fall into the ambit of section 61.1104  
In the view of the aforementioned non-derogable right in terms of section 61(1), Van Eeden 
correctly alleges that the presumption of unfairness in terms of regulation 44(3)(a) does not 
apply to the exclusion or limitation of liability for 'harm' in terms of section 61(5), i.e., death 
                                                             
1100 In the same sense see OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.8 at 15. 
1101 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.9 at 15. 
1102 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
1103 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
1104 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
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or personal injury caused to the consumer other than by virtue of an act or omission of the 
producer, importer, distributor or retailer subject to section 61(1), illness of any natural person, 
any loss or physical damage to any movable or immovable property, or economic loss resulting 
from the death of, or injury to any natural person.1105  
Pursuant to section 49(2)(c), in the case of activities or facilities that are subject to any risk that 
could result in serious injury or death, the supplier must specifically draw the fact, nature and 
potential effect of that risk to the attention of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies 
the requirements set out in section 49. This means that the consumer must, inter alia, sign or 
initial the provision in question. The wording of this provision indicates that as long as the 
supplier has fulfilled the formal requirements of section 49, a clause excluding its liability for 
injury or death is deemed to be fair.1106 However, the exclusion of the supplier’s liability simply 
by having initialled or signed the clause in question seems to be too oppressive with regard to 
the consumer’s fundamental right to life. It could therefore be contrary to public policy. Hence, 
such a clause will be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(a) unless the supplier is able 
to convince the court why such a provision is fair in the given circumstances.1107 
In Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another,1108 the court held that the exclusion of 
liability for damages arising from negligence causing the death of another might be contrary to 
public policy because of the high value that the common law and the Constitution place on the 
sanctity of life. Unfortunately, the court did not answer the question of whether this clause was 
against public policy. As the consumer may still exercise his or her common-law rights under 
section 2(10), courts might decide that clauses excluding or limiting liability for bodily injury 
or death are contrary to public policy or unconstitutional. However, in the past the common 
law set the bar very high.1109 The unfairness standard of the Act is likely to be fulfilled more 
easily than the one which indicates that a term is against public policy or unconstitutional.1110 
Besides, the greylisting of clauses that exclude injury or death is an indication in that sense 
because in court rulings that were rendered before the Act came into force, the party alleging 
                                                             
1105 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 280. See s 61(5) CPA. Otto correctly asserts that in terms 
of s 61(5), only the economic consequential loss will be claimable to the extent that it was caused by ‘harm’ as 
set out in paras (a)-(c), i.e., damages caused due to the death, injury or illness of any natural person or the loss or 
damage due to the movable or immovable property. See Otto 2011 THRHR 541. 
1106 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1107 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1108 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) 518. 
1109 See, e.g., Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) and Durban’s Water Wonderland v Botha 
and Another 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
1110 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
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that such a clause is contrary to public policy carried the risk of non-persuasion. In other words, 
the Act shifted the onus from the consumer to the supplier.1111 Consumers are often not able to 
bring evidence which is by nature within the business’s knowledge. In Barkhuizen v Napier,1112 
for instance, the consumer could not bring sufficient evidence on the business reasons for the 
term in question which contributed to the court’s decision not to declare as invalid the given 
clause, which now would be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(a). 
In Swinburne v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd,1113 the obiter dictum stated that if the exemption 
clause in the lease in question did extend to personal injury, it may arguably have been contrary 
to public policy due to several factors, including the fact that ‘the constitutional right to bodily 
integrity ought to be given weight in consideration of the impact of public policy on this type 
of clause’ and that the term in that agreement of adhesion where the tenant had practically no 
bargaining power, was in fine print. This obiter is, it is suggested, an indication in the sense 
that the courts are well aware of the weight of the fundamental right to bodily integrity in 
consumer contracts and are ready to strike down terms that infringe that right. It is highly 
unlikely that a decision like Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom1114 would have the same outcome 
today in the light of the Act and its regulations, notably regulation 44(3)(a).1115  
In Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel,1116 the court decided whether a clause that exempted the hotel 
from claims for bodily injury of a hotel guest by a hotel employee's negligence was lawful. The 
court decided that such a clause could not be enforced in the particular circumstances, even if 
it is not objectively unreasonable and contrary to public policy. According to the court, to deny 
a guest judicial redress for injuries he sustained while exiting through the hotel gates, which is 
not supposed to be an inherently dangerous activity, offends against notions of justice and 
fairness. Exemption clauses that exclude liability for bodily harm in hotels and other public 
places generally have the effect, according to Heaton-Nicholls J, of denying a claimant judicial 
redress and thus should be contrary to public policy. Interestingly, the court distinguished 
between clauses concerning inherent dangerous activities, such as in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom1117 and Durban’s Water Wonderland v Botha and Another,1118 and those which do not 
                                                             
1111 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
1112 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
1113 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZN). 
1114 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
1115 Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 367. 
1116 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ). 
1117 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
1118 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA). 
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comprise dangerous activities, such as exiting a hotel gate. The court’s arguments can also be 
applied to regulation 44(3)(a), which means that a clause such as put forward by the hotel 
would be unfair.  
Naudé correctly asserts that despite the unfortunate wording of section 49(2)(c), this provision 
still makes sense as it could relate to clauses warning the consumer to take adequate precautions 
against the risk of injury or death that should be specifically pointed out and initialled or 
signed.1119 Hence, section 49(2)(c) has a warning function, irrespective of whether the supplier 
is liable for injury or death of its customer, and questions of liability have to be dealt with 
separately. 
Terms which exclude or limit any liability for death or personal injury should rather be 
blacklisted than greylisted where the supplier is at fault, and simple negligence should be the 
threshold. This is the case in many European countries.1120 Disclaimers in which suppliers 
exclude or limit their liability for any reason would thus be outlawed right away.1121 The fact 
that the limitation or exclusion of the supplier’s liability for any loss attributable to gross 
negligence is blacklisted under section 51(c)(i), and that the limitation or exclusion of its 
liability for death or personal injury – unless it concerns section 61(1) – is merely presumed to 
be unfair is a systemic weakness that the legislator should correct. This applies especially in 
the light of the common law and the Constitution which attributes a very high rank to the 
sanctity of life. The OFT took the stance that no contractual term can legally exclude liability 
for death or injury caused by negligence in the course of business and that such terms should 
be banned in consumer contracts.1122 
Naudé asserts that in a developing country such as South Africa, the outright prohibition of 
excluding or restricting liability for companies could have an adverse impact on those 
businesses. Businesses in developing countries often cannot afford insurance. If they sign an 
insurance policy, they must include their price in the end-price for their customers. A business 
                                                             
1119 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
1120 See §§ 309 no. 7 lit. a) BGB, 6(1) no. 9 Austrian KSchG, s 2(1) UK Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. See 
Naudé 2009 SALJ 524. 
1121 Disclaimers as those from Durban’s Water Wonderland would therefore be unlawful: 'The amenities which 
we provide at our Waterworld (Amusement Park) have been designed and constructed to the best of our ability 
for your enjoyment and safety. Nevertheless we regret that the management, its servants and agents, MUST 
stipulate that they are absolutely unable to accept liability or responsibility for injury or damage of any nature 
whatsoever whether arising from negligence or any other cause howsoever which is suffered by any person who 
enters the premises and/or uses the amenities provided.' Disclaimer taken from Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer 
Protection Law 279 and 280. Emphasis added. 
1122 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.10 at 16. 
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which is not insured can have far-reaching effects in terms of tourists coming from abroad 
visiting South Africa because medical costs and loss of income are likely to be higher overseas. 
Hence, she suggests that suppliers who offer services to overseas tourists should insure against 
higher claims coming from such tourists and include their higher costs in their quotes. 
Otherwise, they should insist on adequate travel insurance that covers the given activities, or 
ask the tourist to agree to the exemption clause.1123 
This could nevertheless imply practical problems in terms of the necessary distinction between 
South Africans – who, despite lower medical costs in comparison to overseas tourists, often 
cannot afford certain medical treatments – and overseas tourists. In addition, asking for special 
insurance well in advance excludes the possibility that tourists book certain activities 
spontaneously as they might not know about specific touristic offers in advance. 
Another problem, especially in developing countries, could arise when permitting the 
limitation or exclusion of liability because this gives no incentives to businesses to maintain 
their premises or equipment in save conditions. This could lead to even higher risks for 
consumers. 
A balance between the supplier’s and the consumer’s interests is however achieved by using 
adequate warnings of the risks involved, not only in the terms and conditions but also on the 
supplier’s premises. Such warnings should make clear that consumers need to take sensible 
precautions but do not have the effect of limiting or excluding the supplier’s liability. This 
requirement is already set out in section 49(2),1124 but can even go further, by warning 
consumers not only generally about the risks involved (e.g., the warning of the general risks 
involved when parachuting), but also point out which group of persons are more likely exposed 
to risks (e.g., elderly persons, individuals suffering from a severe medical condition, or persons 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs). Disclaimers should however not exclude the supplier’s 
liability for death or personal injury, but should only have the effect of preventing the consumer 
from suing the supplier for damages to their own property caused by their own carelessness.1125 
In order to be efficient, consumers should be informed well in advance, e.g., while booking an 
adventure trip, or when buying tickets for any other hazardous activity. This solution would 
not only avoid detrimental effects on businesses who cannot afford insurance but also allow 
                                                             
1123 Naudé 2007 SALJ 156, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 24. 
1124 This stance is also taken by the OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.12 at 16. 
1125 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.11 at 16. 
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consumers to participate in dangerous activities1126 and take adequate insurance. For more 
spontaneous activities or activities, the tourists did or could not book in advance, suppliers 
should provide for the possibility for tourists to take insurance at their premises by handing out 
insurance policies. If this is not possible, they should refer to a nearby insurance broker or 
online offers where consumers can subscribe to an adequate insurance policy.   
Naudé contends that it may be appropriate not to strike down clauses limiting liability for 
personal injury if the supplier can show that it provides a potentially dangerous activity, that 
insurance is impossible to provide because of the costs involved, and that the consumer has 
been warned well beforehand in terms of his or her need for an insurance subscribed by him- 
or herself.1127 This point of view overlooks though that these factors do not necessarily affect 
the supplier's liability. Its liability is only triggered in cases where it acted at least negligently. 
The fact that a supplier could not obtain any insurance should not make someone's life 
negotiable, however. A supplier offering potentially dangerous activities or facilities and who 
maintains its equipment properly will not be held liable for a consumer's accident,  due to the 
consumer's negligence or fault (e.g., in case of the consumer's improper conduct during the 
activity or not sufficient training). Regulation 44(3)(a) is merely applicable in cases where the 
supplier is liable because of its own act or omission. It is my suggestion that the greylisting of 
this item sends a wrong signal in that someone's life can be negotiable in some cases. As already 
mentioned, this should be corrected by blacklisting this item. 
Furthermore, as Naudé argues, for non-profit suppliers, such as schools, exemption clauses 
might be fair in terms of section 48 (regulation 44(3) is not applicable for not-for-profit 
organisations under regulation 44(1). Otherwise, parents who often take part in school trips in 
order to oversee students would not be willing to volunteer anymore. As schools cannot afford 
adequate insurance against certain risks involved in school trips, those trips would not be 
possible anymore without volunteering parents. Parents sending their children to such school 
trips should be advised well in advance of the risks and to sign an adequate policy.1128 
In this regard, the same arguments as mentioned above apply, i.e., schools should not be able 
to exclude or limit their liability, but rather take over the parents' liability on school trips. 
                                                             
1126 See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 25. 
1127 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 25. 
1128 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 25. 
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It should be noted that competition on the South African insurance market is not sufficiently 
efficient yet with regard to more affordable insurance premiums. Insurance companies are thus 
able to charge relatively high premiums in order to have a high-profit margin. The weak 
economy and the loss of existing clients should however contribute to more competition.1129 
This applies at least in functioning and competitive markets. Insuring against certain risks 
should hence be no longer an obstacle to get cheaper insurance. Another, more effective 
solution would consist of group policies between the Department of Basic Education (DBE) or 
the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) and insurance companies offering 
competitive contracts. In this kind of contract, parents who wish to participate in school 
activities do not have to be named in the original policy. The latter merely provides that a 
certain number of parents will be insured against certain risks and for a certain number of 
activities throughout the academic year. Before the beginning of the activity in question (e.g., 
a school trip), the school would simply have to give to the insurer the personal details of the 
parents involved. This would certainly be an interesting market for insurance companies in the 
face of the number of contracts throughout South Africa. Another solution would be that the 
DBE or the DHETH act as self-insurer by renouncing to subscribe to an insurance policy with 
an insurance company and paying damages caused by parents themselves. Parents supervising 
students on school trips and other activities act on behalf of the State as usually, these activities 
would fall to teachers. They should thus not bear any adverse repercussions in terms of liability. 
Because of economic and other reasons, in the current political climate, the political will does 
not seem to exist for such solutions, however. 
b) Exemption clauses in respect of breach 
In terms of regulation 44(3)(b), a provision is presumed to be unfair if it excludes or restricts 
the legal rights or remedies of the consumer against the supplier or another party in the event 
of total or partial breach by the supplier of any of the obligations provided for in the agreement. 
This includes the consumer’s right to set off a debt owed to the supplier against any claim 
which the consumer may have against the supplier. 
A similar provision can be found in item (b) of the Annex of the EC Unfair Terms Directive.1130 
                                                             
1129 KPMG: Business unusual - The South African Insurance Industry Survey 2016 at 23. See 'Business unusual 
– 2016 South African Insurance Industry Survey' at https://home.kpmg.com/za/en/home/campaigns/ 
2016/07/2016-south-african-insurance-survey.html. 
1130 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
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The ambit of this regulation might be limited, as Van Eeden points out, by defining the 
supplier’s obligations narrowly because the latter is free to do so.1131 This also means a 
contrario that this regulation covers the supplier’s obligations which have been stipulated in 
the contract. 
Non-derogable rights which are afforded under other legislation do not fall under the scope of 
regulation 44(3)(b). This is, for instance, the case for certain tenants’ rights under the Rental 
Housing Act1132 that cannot be excluded by contrary agreement.1133 Such legislation must be 
considered lex specialis to the Act. The Consumer Protection Act itself also prohibits that the 
supplier imposes certain terms which restrict the consumer’s right to cancel the agreement after 
a breach. Under section 19(6)(c), the consumer is entitled to cancel the agreement without 
penalty if the supplier tenders the delivery of goods or the performance of services at a location, 
on a date or at a time other than as agreed. Section 54(2) sets out that the consumer may require 
to remedy any defect or to refund the consumer if the supplier fails to perform a service 
correctly. A provision under which the consumer has to give the supplier the occasion to re-
perform its service before cancelling the contract would therefore be void.1134 Pursuant to 
section 56(2), the consumer may return sub-standard goods within six months after delivery, 
and the supplier must either repair or replace them, or refund the consumer the price the latter 
had paid. 
On the other hand, in cases where the Act or other legislation does not prohibit a term restricting 
the consumer’s right to cancel, the common law permits a party to immediately cancel a 
contract in case of a ‘material positive malperformance’ (defective performance) by the other 
party. It is nevertheless common to provide for an ultimatum procedure. Such a procedure 
brings certainty as to whether there should be a right to cancel. It may also serve the policy 
goal to rather upheld contracts than strike them down.1135 Hence, if the consumer’s rights under 
provisions such as sections 19(6)(c), 54(2) and 56(2) are not affected, the term is reciprocal 
and does not grant an unduly long period for cure of the supplier’s breach, such terms may be 
considered fair.1136 Broad cancellation clauses should always be qualified, and the supplier 
                                                             
1131 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 278. 
1132 50 of 1999. 
1133 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 27. 
1134 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 33. 
1135 A typical ultimatum clause would be: 'Upon breach of contract by either party, the other party must give the 
breaching party seven days' notice to remedy the breach, otherwise the contract may be cancelled by notice in 
writing'. 
1136 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 34. 
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should explicitly inform the consumer of his or her rights to cancel in terms of the provisions 
of the Act. By doing so, the generalised cancellation clause undoubtedly only applies to 
situations not specifically regulated by the Act. Clauses such as 'this does not affect your 
statutory rights' are not sufficient because consumers typically cannot understand legal jargon 
and do not know what their statutory rights are.1137 
‘Breach’ means failing to perform any term of a contract, written or oral, without a legitimate 
legal excuse.1138  
Item (b) includes, inter alia, exemption clauses purporting to deprive the consumer of the right 
to claim damages under section 61 for bodily injury, death or damage caused to property and 
resultant economic loss caused by defective goods, unless the defences provided for in section 
61(4) are available to the supplier, or purporting the supplier’s liability in the case of over-
booking or over-selling in terms of section 47. 
The Consumer Protection Act does however not provide for a comprehensive law of contract. 
This is why certain exemption clauses do not fall under the ambit of regulation 44(3)(b), e.g., 
in respect of claims for damages for loss caused by defective services,1139 pure economic loss 
caused by defective goods,1140 and loss caused by defects in the goods of which the retailer 
could not reasonably have been aware.1141 The loss must not be attributable to gross negligence 
of the supplier though because otherwise, section 51(1)(c) is applicable. In terms of section 
2(10), no provision of the Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from exercising 
any rights afforded in terms of the common law. Furthermore, section 56(4) provides that the 
implied warranty regulated by this section, and the right to return goods are each, in addition 
to any other implied warranty or condition, imposed by the common law, the Act or any other 
public regulation. These ‘savings provisions’ ascertain that the common-law rights and 
                                                             
1137 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 35. OFT Unfair Contract Terms 
Guidance (2008) para 2.8.4 at 35 and 36. 
1138 See http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=93. 'Breach' can also be defined as a civil wrong that 
may give rise to a duty to pay damages as compensation. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 39. 
1139 Section 55 is only applicable to goods, but not to services. 
1140 Section 61(5) only refers to economic loss resulting from death, personal injury or illness of a natural person, 
loss or damage to property, but not to pure economic loss. However, the word ‘includes’ in s 61(5) creates, 
according to Naudé, some confusion. It is suggested that the wording in s 61(5)(d) is unambiguous as it only refers 
to ‘any economic loss that results from harm contemplated in paragraph (a), (b) or (c)’. See Naudé ‘Regulation 
44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 27 note 3. Emphasis added. 
1141 Unlike under the common law ‘Pothier rule‘, according to which a trader who publicly professes to have 
expert skill and knowledge in relation to the goods sold is liable for all foreseeable loss, including consequential 
loss, caused by a latent defect which existed in the goods at the time of the agreement of sale, s 61(4)(c) gives the 
retailer or trader this defence against the liability pursuant to s 61. 
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warranties are still applicable.1142 They must however comply with the formal requirements of 
section 49 and may be unfair under section 48.1143 
The reason for greylisting terms exempting from liability for breach is that the legislator wants 
to make sure that the parties’ rights and obligations be evenly balanced with respect to the 
contract and the background law, i.e., the terms implied by law. Since in consumer contracts it 
is usually the supplier who inflicts its terms on the consumer, it is only logical that the supplier 
has to convince the court that its contractual terms are fair as greylisted terms are presumed to 
be unfair. The supplier therefore has to bring evidence that it has legitimate reasons for limiting 
or excluding its liability in terms of breach.1144 Possible arguments could include the 
prohibitive cost for insurance, especially where the consumer can insure itself, the fact that the 
goods or services are inherently dangerous, that there is a high risk of failure to the knowledge 
of the consumer,1145 or that the goods were manufactured to the special order of the 
consumer.1146 Another factor to be taken into account in the fairness enquiry is the price for 
which the consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from another 
supplier.1147 If other suppliers offer an equivalent product at a comparable price, but without 
any exclusion of liability for breach, while being profitable, the supplier’s exclusion of liability 
for breach is likely to be unfair. On the other hand, if suppliers offer goods or services at a 
higher price because the contract does not contain an exemption clause, and the same goods or 
services at a lower price, but with the exemption clause, this may be an indication that the term 
is fair. The 'premium' price may not be excessively high though, and the consumer has to be 
informed in advance of the available options.1148 
Interestingly, when assessing the fairness of a particular term, the court also has to consider 
whether the consumer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of 
any particular provision that is alleged to have been unfair, having regard to any custom of 
trade and any previous dealings between the parties.1149 This is peculiar because it means that 
the consumer’s knowledge or supposed knowledge of a particular term which it gained in 
                                                             
1142 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 27 note 6. 
1143 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 28. 
1144 Section 52(2)(f) which refers to the legitimate interests of the supplier as one factor in the assessment of the 
fairness of a term. 
1145 Section 52(2)(c) which refers to the ‘circumstances of the transaction (…) that existed or were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time that the conduct or transaction occurred’. 
1146 Section 52 52(2)(j). 
1147 Section 52(2)(i). 
1148 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 30. 
1149 Section 52(2)(h). 
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previous dealings with the supplier is taken into account. It is suggested that this factor can 
lead to unfair outcomes because knowledge of an allegedly unfair term cannot make it fair, 
although the consumer agreed to it in previous dealings with the supplier. One could construe 
this provision in the sense that knowledge of the term in question could serve merely as a 
‘warning’ or information to the consumer as regards the existence of the term. This ‘warning’ 
or information did not necessarily exist in previous dealings with the supplier though.  
Other factors which should be taken into consideration in the fairness review are the 
consumer’s interests. This concerns questions such as the feasibility to insure itself against the 
risk,1150 or procedural factors such as the extent of negotiations between the parties, or codes 
of conduct1151 for the particular sector which stipulate, for instance, that the supplier has to take 
reasonable care in supplying services. Then, a supplier who excludes its liability for breach is 
unlikely to convince a court that this provision is fair.1152 
Sharrock takes the view that the inclusion of far-reaching exemption clauses could be justified 
if the supplier acquired the product in question from another supplier who excluded its liability 
for any deficiencies in the product.1153 According to section 5(5), the Act is however applicable 
to any goods that are supplied within South Africa to any person in terms of a transaction that 
is exempt from the application of the Act, and the importer or producer, distributor or retailer 
of those goods, respectively, are nevertheless subject to sections 60 and 61. In terms of section 
61, liability for injury or property damage and resultant economic loss caused by defective 
goods cannot be excluded contractually by any supplier in the supply chain, and the consumer 
can sue any supplier in the supply chain for damages under section 61.1154 The producer, 
importer, distributor or retailer of any goods is liable, without proof of negligence on the part 
of the supplier of the goods, for any harm caused by the goods.1155 As regards liability which 
is not covered by section 61 – such as pure economic loss – but by the common law, it might 
be unfair to pass such risks onto consumers in the terms and conditions without warning them 
in advance. This applies especially where the supplier could easily insure against the risk 
without significantly increasing the price, and where he or she did not try to secure a right of 
                                                             
1150 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.1 at 72, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and 
Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 39. 
1151 See also s 52(2)(h)(i) which takes into account customs of trade. 
1152 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 31. 
1153 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 311 note 96, Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 132 note 96. 
1154 See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 31. 
1155 Melville Consumer Protection Act 98. 
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recourse against his own supplier.1156 What is more, the supplier should only be able to exclude 
its liability in terms of breach where it is not at fault. Problems with its own suppliers or 
subcontractors should be treated as its own fault because the consumer had no influence on the 
supplier’s choice of its own suppliers and no recourse against them.1157 The same rationale can 
be found where a company excludes its liability for errors caused by the company’s IT. Here 
again, the consumer has no influence and no choice than accepting the supplier’s technology. 
Thus, terms under which a supplier seeks to shift a risk onto the consumer which the supplier 
is better able to handle, or risks within the supplier’s control, should be considered unfair under 
section 44(3)(b).1158  
Item (b) also concerns terms under which a party forfeits a right to recover a performance if it 
should exercise any remedy and terms which exclude all conditions and warranties. A term 
stipulating that the consumer has to bear its expenses in connection to the transport of a 
defective good could be prohibited by section 54(2). This provision does not prohibit terms 
under which the consumer has to bring the defective good to the supplier’s place of business if 
the consumer exercises this right under section 54. However, a term under which the consumer 
has to do so at his or her own expense falls under regulation 44(3)(b) because it excludes the 
consumer’s common-law right to claim damages for breach by the supplier in cases where the 
consumer can show that it acted reasonably by incurring costs in transporting the goods for the 
repair, which would have been avoided had the service been properly performed.1159 In cases 
though where the supplier is a small business, and the consumer could bring the goods easily 
to the supplier's shop, the consumer should not be allowed to have them brought back by a 
transport service supplier.1160 
It is advisable that suppliers rather draft their exemption clauses narrowly and exclude liability 
merely for losses where the supplier is not at fault or that were not foreseeable when entering 
into the contract.1161 
                                                             
1156 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 31. 
1157 The UK Office of Fair Trading takes this view. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.9 
at 15. 
1158 See for the UK 'Terms regarding the responsibilities and liabilities of insurance comparison websites for 
providing their service' at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/Regulated/uct/library/comparison_websites.shtml 
(no longer available). 
1159 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
1160 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
1161 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 36. 
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Regulation 44(3)(b) in fine also includes the right of the consumer to set off a debt owed to the 
supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against the supplier. By operating a 
set-off (compensatio), the parties may extinguish their contractual and other debt. Set-off may 
be regarded as a form of payment.1162 In order to be able to operate a set-off, both debts must 
be reciprocal, i.e., the parties must each other owe a debt. Furthermore, the debts must be 
liquidated which is the case when it is evident that it is due and to what amount (cum certum 
est an et quantum debeatur). Furthermore, it must be capable of easy and speedy proof.1163 
This is notably the case where the plaintiff admits a debt,1164 or a debt is of the amount of a 
fixed rate for rendering a certain service,1165 or in the case of a bank overdraft and bank 
charges.1166 In all these cases, an easy and speedy proof, a concept which leaves the court some 
discretion of whether a particular debt is capable of compensatio, is possible. The debt must 
also be due. This is not the case before the time for payment has not arrived, or where the debt 
is contingent or subject to a suspensive condition which has not been fulfilled yet.1167 However, 
certain debts cannot be set-off, such as alimony, debt on a true contract of depositum, or taxes 
due to the fiscus, i.e., SARS.1168 Besides, statutory prohibitions against set-off exist.1169  
The rationale behind the greylisting of clauses restricting set-offs is that consumers might 
believe that they have no choice but to pay in full, even if something is wrong with the 
purchased product or service. These clauses have the effect that consumers first have to obtain 
justice in court, which is costly. Moreover, they cause delays, and the outcome is uncertain. As 
a result, consumers might give up their claim, which is equal to a deprivation of their rights.1170  
The clause must not necessarily use the word ‘set-off’. It is sufficient that it has the effect to 
exclude or restrict a set-off. This is namely the case where the consumer is requested to pay 
promptly and in full and without deduction as soon as the supplier decides that its part of the 
transaction as finished.1171 A restriction of the consumer’s right to set-off a claim also exists 
where a clause subjects set-off to penalty, i.e., when a consumer does not pay the full contract 
                                                             
1162 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 494. 
1163 Treasurer-General v Van Vuren 1905 TS 582 at 589. 
1164 Smith v Morum Bros (1877) 7 Buch 20. 
1165 Whelan v Oosthuizen 1937 TPD 304. 
1166 Bain v Barclays Bank (DC&O) Ltd 1937 SR 191. 
1167 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 496. 
1168 See Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 497, with further references. 
1169 Barret v R 1926 NPD 96 at 98-99, Fourie v Swiegers 1950 1 SA 369 (C). 
1170 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.2 at 28. 
1171 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.3 at 28. 
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price when demanded. Such a penalty can take the form of a loss of guarantee rights or of a 
right to a discount.1172 
It is submitted that regulation 44(3)(b) must be interpreted widely so that also clauses by which 
suppliers may require full payment before they have delivered the agreed service, such as the 
installation, are unfair. Fully or nearly fully paid suppliers have no incentive to do their work 
properly, and consumers are deprived of their possibility to set-off with regard to the service 
in question.1173 What is more, in the presence of such a clause, the consumer bears the risk if 
the supplier becomes insolvent. This wide interpretation is covered by the wording of item (b) 
which not only covers set-offs in terms of funds (mutual debts), but the consumer’s debt owed 
to the supplier and its claim against the supplier. A ‘claim’ can take any other form and does 
not only concern monies. A clause by which full payment is required before delivery might be 
fair though if the monies are held on a deposit account of a specialised and neutral third party 
and will not be released until the parties have resolved their dispute by an independent 
adjudication.1174 
There is nothing to say against so-called ‘stage-payment’ arrangement by which the consumer 
pays a certain sum every time a certain stage of the delivery of goods (e.g., a certain number 
of goods) or of the service has been reached, provided that the consumer may keep a retention 
allowing it to exercise its right to set-off its claim.1175 
c) Entire agreement and formality clauses 
Under regulation 44(3)(c), a term is presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of 
limiting the supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his or her agents or 
making his or her commitments subject to compliance with a particular condition which 
depends exclusively on the supplier. 
In contract law, an entire agreement clause1176 is a clause in a written contract that declares the 
contract to be the complete and final agreement between the parties.1177 The reason for 
greylisting such clauses is that the consumer’s rights to redress for misrepresentation and 
breach of obligation should not be excluded, particularly in contracts where a salesperson will 
                                                             
1172 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.6 at 29. 
1173 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.8 at 30. 
1174 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.10 at 30. 
1175 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.10 at 30. 
1176 Also referred to as integration clause, merger clause or entrenchment clause. 
1177 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 410. 
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necessarily make statements about the product. Suppliers and their agents should weigh their 
words carefully.1178 Suppliers shall not be able to disclaim responsibility by using an entire 
agreement clause, i.e., by stipulating that their liability accepted orally is excluded, as good 
faith demands that each party to a contract should be bound by its agreement and by any other 
statements which help secure the other party’s agreement.1179 
It is obvious that such a term is vulnerable to manipulation by the supplier because its 
performance is subject to discretion.1180 Clauses specifying the circumstances in which a 
contractual obligation may not be observed might be fair, however. This is not the case though 
where these circumstances are effectively under the supplier’s control.1181 
An example for such a clause is a provision by which an employee or agent who negotiated the 
contract has no authority to make any promise or statement on behalf of the business, or a term 
providing that an employee or agent may not give undertakings according to which the goods 
will meet the consumer’s particular needs unless such an undertaking is given in a writing 
authorised by Head Office.1182 Such clauses lessen the seller’s incentive to weigh its words 
carefully and to make sure that its employees and agents act in the same manner.1183 
The reason often brought forward by the defendants of entire agreement clauses is that they 
achieve certainty as to what statements are binding on the parties. This is however only done 
at the price of the unacceptable exclusion of the consumer’s right to redress for 
misrepresentation and breach of obligation.1184 
Contrary to the blacklisted term under section 51(1)(g), regulation 44(3)(c) has a broader scope 
of application as its objective is to prevent consumers from relying on representations that were 
not expressly included in the agreement and signed by the parties.1185 
According to Naudé, the wording of item (c) should be interpreted broadly, so that 
‘commitments’ include representations and oral undertakings as well as those made by a 
supplier who is a sole trader. ‘Compliance with a particular condition’ should also include 
                                                             
1178 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 14.1.1-14.1.8 at 61. 
1179 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 284 and 285. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance 
(2008) paras 14.1.1 at 61 and 14.1.3 at 62. 
1180 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 276 and 277. 
1181 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.3-3.3 at 37. 
1182 Examples from Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 43, with further 
references. 
1183 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 14.1.3 at 61. 
1184 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 14.1.4 at 61-62. 
1185 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 43. 
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compliance with formality requirements for variations. This view is correct as the legislator 
chose a ‘catch-all’ provision by using words such as ‘commitment’ (instead of ‘transaction’) 
and ‘condition’ (instead of narrowing down the scope of application by adding words like 
‘material’ or ‘formal’). In order to achieve a clearer formulation, the wording should be 
amended though, as Naudé suggests, in order to include 'commitments undertaken by the 
supplier or his or her agents'.1186  
Naudé correctly maintains that the phrase 'commitments subject to compliance with a particular 
condition which depends exclusively on the supplier' is not as clear as the EC Directive's 
formulation1187 which refers to terms 'limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect 
commitments undertaken by his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with 
a particular formality'.1188 The Directive's formulation makes it clear that a requirement that 
both parties sign a variation is not excluded from the ambit of the provision. Item (c) should 
therefore be amended accordingly. 
Formality and entire agreement clauses often overlap. When referring to subsequent variations 
of the contract, a formality clause is also called a ‘non-variation clause’.1189  
The greylisting of formality clauses, including non-variation clauses, is particularly important 
in consumer and standard form contracts as consumers often do not read the terms and 
conditions and therefore are not aware of such a clause. Regulation 44(3)(c) corrects the strict 
application of the Shifren principle, according to which parties are bound by their written 
agreements.1190 As discussed in detail further above, the Shifren principle often led to unfair 
outcomes because a party (mostly the supplier) could act contrary to the reliance it had created 
by its oral agreement to amend the contract by simply denying that it had given such an oral 
agreement.1191 In contract law, fair results can be achieved by applying the parol evidence rule, 
however,1192 which assumes a coherent contractual document usually containing all the terms 
                                                             
1186 Emphasis added for the suggested amendment. 
1187 Item (n) of the Annex to the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts. 
1188 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 44. 
1189 A typical formulation for a non-variation clause would be: ‘No variation of this agreement shall be of any 
force or effect unless reduced to writing and signed by the parties to this agreement‘. Formulation from Hutchison 
et al Law of Contract 165. 
1190 See SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 1964 (4) SA 760 (A). This decision was later affirmed 
in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
1191 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 47. 
1192 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257, Union Government v Vianini Ferro Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 
47, Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) 938. The parol evidence rule is a substantive common law rule in contract 
cases that prevents a party to a written contract from presenting extrinsic evidence that discloses an ambiguity and 
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of the agreement. Since the strict application of the parol evidence rule leads to some 
difficulties, such as the distinction between background circumstances and surrounding 
circumstances, the courts have become less reluctant in recent years to consider the broad 
context in which the contract was concluded and now allow extrinsic evidence.1193  
The OFT took the stance that an entire agreement clause might be fair if the consumer is clearly 
and unmistakably warned that the law favours written terms as long as the clause does not 
undermine the court’s power to consider other (oral) statements where necessary. This has to 
be appropriately highlighted, clearly drafted, and the consumer must have an adequate 
opportunity to read the clause before signing the agreement. The effect of such a warning might 
be stronger even if the consumer is encouraged to ask questions.1194 
d) Limiting the supplier’s vicarious liability for his agents 
Greylisted under regulation 44(3)(d) are also terms which limit, or have the effect of limiting, 
the supplier’s vicarious liability for its agents. 
Section 25(1)(i) of the Australian Consumer Law1195 contains a similar provision. 
Vicarious liability is a form of a strict, secondary liability that arises under the common law 
doctrine of agency – respondeat superior –, the responsibility of the superior for the acts of 
their subordinate, or, in a broader sense, the responsibility of any third party that had the ‘right, 
ability or duty to control’ the activities of a violator.1196 There must be a particular relationship 
between the two individuals involved, e.g., the employer and employee, or the principal and 
agent.1197 
                                                             
clarifies it or adds to the written terms of the contract that appears to be whole. However, there are a number of 
exceptions to this general rule, including for partially integrated contracts, agreements with separate consideration, 
to resolve ambiguities, or to establish contract defences. 
1193 Some authorities, especially after the case KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 (4) SA 
399 (SCA), were taking the view that the court will abandon the aforementioned distinction as soon as it is 
presented with an adequate opportunity, and at least one author, namely Wallis, is of the opinion that this 
distinction has no validity anymore. See Wallis 2010 SALJ 674-675. Finally, in Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) 
Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA), the SCA held at para [12] that the 
distinction 'between permissible background and surrounding circumstances, never very clear, has fallen away. 
Interpretation is no longer a process that occurs in stages but is 'essentially one unitary exercise'. Accordingly it 
is no longer helpful to refer to the earlier approach.'  
1194 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 14.1.6-14.1.8 at 62. See also Van Eeden and Barnard 
Consumer Protection Law 284 and 285.  
1195 Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010. 
1196 See Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Vicarious_liability'. 
1197 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 284 and 285. See § 831 BGB which deals with the 
responsibility for vicarious agents: ‘(1) A person who uses another person to perform a task is liable to make 
compensation for the damage that the other unlawfully inflicts on a third party when carrying out the task. Liability 
in damages does not apply if the principal exercises reasonable care when selecting the person deployed and, to 
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This is restated in section 113(1) by which the employer is jointly and severally liable with the 
employee or agent.1198 Section 113(1) however applies only to the joint and several liability in 
terms of the Act, e.g., the liability under section 61. Hence, item (d) applies to terms limiting 
the supplier’s vicarious liability under the residual common-law rules, such as liability for 
damages caused by pure economic loss that were caused by defective goods which is not 
covered by section 61.1199 
Moreover, as opposed to section 113(1) which covers the supplier’s (principal, employer) 
vicarious liability for its employees or agents, regulation 44(3)(d) seems to apply only to 
agents, and not to employees. According to the definition of 'vicarious liability’, also third 
parties, such as subcontractors and agents, are covered. For this reason, terms limiting the 
supplier’s liability for problems with its subcontractors should be treated in the same way as 
clauses concerning the supplier’s liability for its employees or the supplier itself because the 
consumer has no choice with respect to the subcontractors and has no recourse against them.1200  
Vicarious liability of the employer is given where the employee fulfils three requirements. 
First, a particular relationship, e.g., employment, is necessary at the time when the delict is 
committed. Second, the delict must have been committed by the employee, and third, the latter 
must act within the scope of its employment when committing the delict or must have been 
engaged in any activity reasonably incidental to it.1201 
For this reason, clauses stating that the supplier only acts on behalf of another person will most 
likely be unfair in terms of item (d). Furthermore, the Act's definition of ‘supply’ in relation to 
services means to sell, to perform or to cause the services to be performed or provided etc.1202 
Therefore, the apparent supplier with whom the consumer concluded a contract will also be 
                                                             
the extent that he is to procure devices or equipment or to manage the business activity, in the procurement or 
management, or if the damage would have occurred even if this care had been exercised. (2) The same 
responsibility is borne by a person who assumes the performance of one of the transactions specified in 
subsection (1) sentence 2 for the principal by contract.’ 
1198 Section 113(1) provides: ‘If an employee or agent of a person is liable in terms of this Act for anything done 
or omitted in the course of that person’s employment or activities on behalf of their principal, the employer or 
principal is jointly and severally liable with that person.’ 
1199 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 48. Because of the word 'includes' 
in s 61(5), this is not clear, though. 
1200 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.1 at 72. 
1201 F v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Institute for Security Studies and Others as Amici Curiae) 
2012 (3) BCLR 244 (CC). 
1202 See s 1 s.v. ‘supply’ (b). Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 49. 
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subject to the remedies granted to consumers in terms of late and defective provision of services 
(by another supplier on whose behalf the apparent supplier contracted with the consumer).1203 
The rationale behind item (d) and for shifting the burden of proof from the consumer to the 
supplier is that rights and obligations especially under a standard contract are generally not 
evenly balanced unless the parties are bound by their contractual duties and the terms implied 
by law. Thus, the supplier has to bring forward legitimate reasons for the limitation of its 
liability so that there is a fair balance between the parties’ rights and obligations.1204 
Van Eeden argues that section 51(1)(c)(i) only prohibits the limitation or exemption of the 
supplier’s gross negligence and that a disclaimer relating to liability based on the employee’s 
or agent’s negligence may be considered fair.1205 The wording of section 51(1)(c)(i) seems to 
contradict this view as it expressly prohibits disclaimers relating to the gross negligence of the 
supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier.1206 However, a limitation (not 
an exclusion) of the supplier’s vicarious liability for simple negligence for its agents might be 
fair under regulation 44(3)(d). 
The OFT maintained that 'no term should shield a business from liability where its employees 
fail to provide as good a standard of service as they are reasonably able'.1207 Hence, it is more 
appropriate that the supplier takes the risks that are within its control, that the consumer cannot 
be expected to know about, or against which the supplier can insure more cheaply than the 
consumer.1208 
e) Indemnity clauses 
Pursuant to regulation 44(3)(e), a term is presumed to be unfair if it forces the consumer to 
indemnify the supplier against liability incurred by it to third parties. 
This means that the consumer cannot be forced by the supplier to assume liability for 
obligations that the supplier has under the Act, such as a claim for harm caused by defective 
goods under section 61.1209  
A typical example of an indemnity clause is the following: 
                                                             
1203 See ss 19 and 54. Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 49.  
1204 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary paras 48 and 29. 
1205 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 284 and 285. 
1206 Emphasis added. 
1207 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.2.9 at 22. 
1208 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.1 at 72. 
1209 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 50. 
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'The consumer shall indemnify the supplier against all liabilities, costs, expenses, 
damages and losses suffered or incurred by the supplier arising out of or in connection 
with [the relevant breaches].'1210 
Such a term can be regarded as an inappropriate transfer of risks to the consumer.1211 Unless 
the consumer can insure easily against such risk, the argument often put forward by suppliers 
that these terms enable them to contain prices is not acceptable. If the consumer cannot find 
appropriate insurance, he or she pays more overall or goes unprotected against the risk in 
question.1212 In general, a supplier should not make its consumer its insurer.1213 The rationale 
behind item (e) is thus the same as for item (b), i.e., the fair balance between the parties' rights 
and obligations.1214 
Contrary to item (a), item (e) also applies to terms in respect of liability for illness of any natural 
person, any loss of, or physical damage to movable or immovable property as well as economic 
loss resulting from the death of, or injury to any natural person.1215 
Terms including the words ‘indemnify’ or ‘indemnity’ (as in the example above) belong to the 
legal jargon and infringe sections 50 and 22.1216 Especially not legally trained consumers 
cannot see that it is simply a ‘hold harmless’ provision, and could construe those words in a 
way that implies a threat that legal and other costs that the supplier incurred are transferred.1217 
f) Restricting the right to rely on the statutory defence of prescription 
Under item (f), a term of a consumer agreement is presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose 
or effect of excluding or restricting the consumer's right to rely on the statutory defence of 
prescription. 
Prescription in the legal sense is a maximum period of time within which specific claims may 
be brought in a court of law. After this period, the creditor is no longer able to enforce its 
debt.1218 
                                                             
1210 Example (slightly modified for the purposes of this section) from 'Legalese: Golden rules for drafting 
indemnities' at http://www.trinityllp.com/legalese-golden-rules-for-drafting-indemnities. 
1211 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.7 at 73. 
1212 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.3 at 72. 
1213 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.3 at 72. 
1214 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary paras 50 and 29. 
1215 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 281. 
1216 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 50. 
1217 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 281. 
1218 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 286 and 287. For a broader definition in other jurisdictions, 
see Duhaime’s Law Dictionary at http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prescription.aspx. 
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§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) contains a somewhat similar, but narrower provision.1219 
In South Africa, the Prescription Act1220 provides a general framework for prescriptions. 
Pursuant to section 11(d) of the Prescription Act, the period of prescription of debts shall be 
three years in respect for any other debt which is not mentioned in section 11(a) to (c) of the 
Prescription Act, i.e., claims in connection with contracts prescribe after three years. 
In common law, there has been an interesting development in the last decades as regards the 
question of whether it is possible to waive the protection offered by the Prescription Act. In 
Nedfin Bank Bpd v Meisenheimer and others,1221 the court referred to Murray & Roberts (Cape) 
v Upington Municipality1222 and held that the objective of the provisions of the Prescription 
Act was to establish certainty between individuals, i.e., the creditor and the debtor, and to 
promote the individual interests of the debtor where the creditor has failed to take timeous steps 
to enforce debt. Therefore, it would be possible to waive the protection offered by the 
Prescription Act validly. In Ryland v Edros,1223 the court did not follow the obiter of Nedfin 
Bank Bpk v Meisenheimer and others and decided that extinctive prescription serves at least in 
part for the interest of the public, and not only for the interest of the individuals involved. An 
agreement to renounce prescription in advance is therefore not valid. In ABSA Bank Bpk h/a 
Bankfin v Louw,1224 the court ruled that a debtor may validly agree to extend the prescription 
period after prescription has started to run as long as the institution of prescription is not 
completely negated. Four years later, the Supreme Court of Appeal did however not answer 
the question in De Jager en andere v ABSA Bank Bpk1225 whether or not a term that renounces 
in advance the statutory right to rely on prescription was contrary to public policy.  
Van Eeden sticks to the wording of regulation 44(3)(f) according to which waivers of the right 
to rely on prescription are 'only' presumed unfair in consumer agreements.1226 Naudé, on the 
other hand, argues that despite the greylisting of these terms, they should never be regarded as 
fair. As regulation 44(2)(d) provides that '[t]his regulation does not derogate from provisions 
                                                             
1219 Pursuant to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff), even to the extent that a deviation from the statutory provisions is 
permissible, 'the limitation of claims against the user due to defects in the cases cited in [§] 438 (1) no. 2 and 
[§] 634a (1) no. 2 is made easier, or in other cases a limitation period of less than one year reckoned from the 
beginning of the statutory limitation period is attained' is ineffective. 
1220 68 of 1969. 
1221 1989 (2) All SA 226 (T) at 230. 
1222 1984 (1) SA 571 (A) at 578F-H. 
1223 1996 (4) All SA 557 (C) at 576-577. 
1224 1997 (3) SA 1085 (C) at 1089. 
1225 2001 (3) SA 537 (SCA). 
1226 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 286 and 287. 
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of the Act or other law in terms of (…) which a term of an agreement is prohibited', a court is 
likely to decide that this kind of terms will always be void and contrary to public policy.1227 
The Prescription Act does not expressly prohibit terms under which the renouncement of 
prescription by a party is prohibited.1228 It is suggested though that the Prescription Act 
promotes certainty not only for the parties but also for the general public.1229 This objective 
would be jeopardised if the debt itself continued to exist as a natural obligation as it was the 
case in the earlier Prescription Act of 19431230 which only provided for weak prescription.1231  
Therefore, Naudé’s view is convincing. Although the deletion of item (f) is not necessarily 
mandatory in order to avoid misunderstandings (because of the interplay between regulations 
44(3)(f) and 44(2)), it should nevertheless be deleted and instead inserted in section 51. 
g) Modifying the normal rules regarding the distribution of risk 
By virtue of regulation 44(3)(g), terms which have the purpose or effect of modifying the 
normal rules regarding the distribution of risk to the detriment of the consumer are presumed 
to be unfair. 
The rationale behind this item is that the supplier is more likely than the consumer to have an 
appreciation of the risks linked to particular goods or services.1232 The argument that such a 
provision likely raises the price for products or services is not legitimate because the fair 
distribution of risks will also re-distribute the costs. Otherwise, the consumer will 
disproportionately bear the risk and have to re-purchase the item in case of its deterioration or 
loss. 
In order to be able to apply item (g) correctly, it is necessary to establish the meaning of ‘normal 
rules’. A first approach consists in conducting a survey of the rules regarding risk adopted in a 
particular industry or market segment. This approach would be contrary to the purposes and 
policy of the Act though because it would entrench the status quo.1233 This is because industry-
made or supported rules serving as benchmark or reference for consumer protection are mostly 
an unsatisfactory solution because they may be unfair themselves. 
                                                             
1227 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 51. 
1228 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 51. 
1229 See also Hutchison et al Law of Contract 389. 
1230 18 of 1943. 
1231 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 387 and 389. 
1232 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 278, OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 
18.2.1 at 72. 
1233 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 278 and 279. 
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The second approach consists in the application of the reasonableness test in section 48(2) 
which negates reasonableness of a term if it is excessively one-sided or inequitable, is based 
on a false, misleading or deceptive representation, or the agreement was subject to a term or 
condition, or a notice in terms of section 49(1), and the latter is unfair, or the fact, nature and 
effect of that term, condition or notice was not drawn to the consumer’s attention according to 
section 49.1234 This approach has certainly some advantages and would be coherent with the 
policy of the Act. It seems however that the legislator had a more specific conception of the 
meaning of ‘normal rules’ in item (g) in mind as it chose the phrase ‘normal rules regarding 
the distribution of risk’.1235 The idea behind the reasonableness test in section 49(2) does 
certainly include the assessment of the distribution of risk, but its general objective is to assure 
fairness in general, and not only risk distribution. 
A third approach is more general in terms of the law of contracts and considers the naturalia 
of an agreement in the absence of express terms.1236 Naturalia are unexpressed provisions of 
the contract which the law imports therein, without reference to the actual intention of the 
parties.1237 The intention of the parties is however not totally disregarded as the parties’ actual 
or presumed intention has been implied because any honest party entering into a particular type 
of contract would want to include such a term.1238 Such implied terms1239 may derive from the 
common law, trade usage or custom, or statute.1240 In the latter case, the legislator may use its 
overriding power to nullify or control any attempt by the parties to exclude a term implied by 
statute or common law in their contract.1241 This approach is convincing as regards the 
determination of the ‘normal rules regarding the distribution of risk’. 
For instance, one of those implied terms – or naturalia – is the common-law rule under which 
the risk of destruction or damage to sold goods rests on the purchaser when the parties agreed 
                                                             
1234 See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 278 and 279. 
1235 Emphasis added. 
1236 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 278 and 279. 
1237 See Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 531. 
1238 Christie Law of Contract 166 and 167. 
1239 Some authors prefer the nomination ‘residual rules’ (Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 370 et seq), others 
use ‘implied terms’ and ‘residual rules’ indiscriminately (Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 52). Already Corbett AJA in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial 
Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) qualified the term ‘implied terms’ in certain contexts as a misnomer. Christie 
(Law of Contract 166) remembers the Latin origin of the word ‘implied’, which comes from implicare (to fold 
into), and is of the opinion that the traditional usage should therefore be retained as an implied term is ‘folded into 
the contract’ by law. It is suggested that the nomination is secondary, and that all proposed terms are well 
established, so that they all can be used without causing confusion. Section 19(2)(c), for instance, uses the term 
‘implied (condition)’. 
1240 Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) at 531. 
1241 Section 51 CPA and s 90(2) NCA contain such statutory provisions. See Christie Law of Contract 167. 
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that the seller has to deliver goods at a place other than the place of sale or manufacture. 
According to this common-law ‘risk rule’, the risk passes from the supplier to the consumer as 
soon as the price and the merx are established and all suspensive conditions are fulfilled, i.e., 
the contract is perfecta. The physical control over the merx is still on the supplier’s side though, 
which means that disputes between the parties with respect to the cause of a damage are very 
likely.1242 It will be difficult for the consumer to prove that the supplier took reasonable steps 
in order to avoid any damage to the goods, which makes this common-law rule unfair.1243 In 
the absence of any statutory provision, this would be a ‘normal rule regarding the distribution 
of risk’ in terms of regulation 44(3)(g). 
Section 19(2)(c) modifies the aforementioned ‘risk rule’ nonetheless insofar as, unless 
otherwise expressly provided or anticipated in an agreement, it is an implied condition of every 
transaction for the supply of goods or services that goods to be delivered remain at the suppliers 
risk until the consumer has accepted delivery. This means that the risk is linked to the physical 
control over the goods.1244 
Terms under which the risk passes onto the consumer before delivery will thus be presumed to 
be unfair under regulation 44(3)(g). The supplier could bring forward, e.g., that its term 
according to which the consumer has to bear the risk before delivery is fair when the consumer 
is in breach, for instance, because he or she did not accept the delivery on the agreed date 
without any valid reason.1245 
It is unclear whether section 54(1)(d) has to be understood in that the supplier will always carry 
the risk of any destruction or damage to the goods while they are in its possession. Under this 
provision, when a supplier undertakes to perform any services for or on behalf of a consumer, 
the latter has the right to the return of any property or control over any property of the consumer 
in at least as good a condition as it was when the consumer made it available to the supplier for 
the purpose of performing such services. In other words, the supplier has to return the 
consumer’s goods in at least as good a condition as it was before, after having performed its 
service (e.g., repairs). If this provision would have to be applied without any exceptions, a term 
                                                             
1242 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 53. 
1243 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 53. 
1244 The principle that the risk should generally run with physical control can also be found in art 66-69 CISG. 
1245 See s 19(2)(a)(i) CPA. Art 69 of the CISG, art 142(3) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law COM(2911) 635 final, as well as the European 
Draft Common Frame of Reference provide for an earlier transfer of risk than delivery in cases where the 
consumer breaches its obligation to take delivery. 
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stating that the risk for such damage on the consumer would be prohibited by section 51(1)(b)(i) 
because it would waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of the Act. In terms of section 
65(2), when a supplier has possession of any property belonging to the consumer, the supplier 
must exercise the degree of care, diligence and skill that can reasonably be expected of a person 
responsible for managing any property of another person. Thus, the Act provides that the 
supplier is liable for damage to the goods by negligence, whereas it does not specifically 
provide that the supplier is also liable for other loss caused by unforeseen, unavoidable events, 
such as vis maior or casus fortuitus. 
Since section 54 does not provide for a claim for damages and section 65 already deals with 
liability for loss caused by the supplier's negligence concerning the consumer's goods, the 
courts will probably not interpret section 54 in that this provision creates peremptory liability 
for loss caused by supervening impossibility of performance. The maxim inclusio unius est 
exclusio alterius, meaning that the specific inclusion of one implies the exclusion of the other, 
speaks for this point of view. Hence, a supplier of services who can prove that the consumer's 
goods were damaged by unforeseeable and unavoidable events will probably escape liability 
as under the common law.1246 
The following example illustrates that the supplier must be able to exclude the risk of 
unforeseeable damages to the property of the consumer, or those that are not under its control:  
A consumer brings a wooden chair with a loose leg, which is still under 
warranty, for repair to the company from which he had bought it. Both parties 
agree that the company’s carpenter, an employee of that company, will have to 
finish his repairs after the consumer has returned from his 3-week holidays 
abroad. The carpenter puts the chair meanwhile in another room because he 
wants to start the repairs in two weeks’ time so that they will be finished by the 
third week. When taking the chair to his workshop in order to start working on 
it, he realises that meanwhile, termites had eaten up part of the chair. It is 
established afterwards that his client had problems with termites at his home 
before leaving, and that the company’s premises had not been infested with 
termites. 
It is evident that the supplier cannot be held liable for the fact that it is unable to return the item 
in the same condition as it was before because the damage was unforeseeable (at least for the 
company) because of an inherent defect of the item. 
                                                             
1246 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 57. 
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In addition, section 54 does not provide for a claim of damages, and section 65 already deals 
with liability for loss caused by the negligent handling of the consumer’s goods.1247 In these 
cases, the supplier should be able to escape liability, and a term providing that unforeseen or 
unavoidable events do not fall under the supplier’s liability should be fair under item (g). 
Section 18(1) escapes the assessment of regulation 44(3)(g). Since it provides that despite any 
statement or notice to the contrary1248 a consumer is not responsible for any loss or damage to 
any goods displayed by a supplier, unless the consumer acted in gross negligence or 
recklessness, malicious behaviour or criminal conduct, it is an underogable provision. The 
rationale behind this provision is that it would be unfair to transfer this risk of damage onto 
consumers as they have no control over how such goods have been displayed. The display itself 
could be not stable and secure, or already damaged. Displayed goods often serve as ‘samples’ 
to be presented to potential clients. It is not rare that displayed goods already have some wear 
and tear because clients often try out the products they wish to buy. This is coherent with 
section 19(5) according to which consumers must be granted the opportunity to examine the 
goods to ascertain whether the goods correspond with the sample or description on the basis of 
which they were bought.1249 It would be unfair to hold the consumer liable by merely putting 
a notice by which the supplier passes the risk onto its customers. 
3.4.2 Terms granting the supplier unilateral powers and rights 
a)   Price increase clauses 
Terms allowing the supplier to increase the price agreed with the consumer when the agreement 
was concluded without giving the consumer the right to terminate the agreement are presumed 
to be unfair by virtue of regulation 44(3)(h).  
                                                             
1247 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 57. 
1248 Emphasis added. 
1249 De Stadler ‘Section 18’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
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The grey- or blacklisting of price increase clauses is ubiquitous in other legislation, such as the 
EC Directive on unfair contract terms,1250 the German BGB,1251 the Austrian KSchG1252 or the 
Dutch BW.1253 
The reason for greylisting price increases is that the initially stipulated price between the parties 
– a core term – is usually all consumers reasonably expect to pay. They are also unlikely to 
focus on terms that allow for price increases.1254 The OFT notes that ‘if a contract is to be 
considered balanced, each party should be sure of getting what they were promised in exchange 
for providing the ‘consideration’ they agreed to provide.1255 Therefore, clauses under which 
suppliers can unilaterally increase their prices without giving their consumers the possibility to 
cancel the agreement are usually unfair. This especially applies when the clause does not 
contain clear indications as regards the modus operandi for the calculation of the new price and 
the events triggering the price increase. Clauses which refer to precise events might be unfair 
too, especially if the consumer is less able to anticipate and control the relevant factors than 
the suppliers. Clauses allowing for price increases because of ‘increased labour or material 
costs’, or indicating ‘costs as a result of industrial dispute’, 'external factors beyond the 
supplier’s control’ or ‘price increases by the supplier’s subcontractors’ should be qualified as 
unfair. This applies particularly if they do not allow the consumer to cancel the agreement. In 
addition, the consumer is less able in these cases to control and anticipate such changes than 
the supplier.1256 On the other hand, increases in VAT are entirely beyond the supplier’s control 
and not unfair under regulation 44(3)(h) as they apply to everyone, are publicly known and 
verifiable.1257 
                                                             
1250 According to item (l) of the Annex of the Directive, terms that 'provide[…] for the price of goods to be 
determined at the time of delivery or allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price 
without in both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too 
high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded' may be unfair. 
1251 § 309 no. 1 BGB: '[A] provision providing for an increase in payment for goods or services that are to be 
delivered or rendered within four months of the entering into of the contract [is ineffective]; this does not apply 
to goods or services delivered or rendered in connection with continuing obligations.' 
1252 § 6(2) no. 4 KSchG: Provisions by which 'the entrepreneur is entitled, on demand, to payment of a 
consideration higher than that originally specified for a performance which has to be rendered by him within two 
months of entering into the contract' are not mandatory. Official translation of the Austrian Federal Chancellery 
available at https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer=ERV_1979_140. 
1253 Article 6:236(i) BW: '[A] stipulation which gives the user the right to increase the agreed price within three 
months after the conclusion of the contract, unless the counterparty is contractually entitled to rescind the contract 
in the event that the user exercises this right' is unreasonably burdensome for the consumer. 
1254 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 61. 
1255 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 12.1 at 57. 
1256 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 12.3 at 67, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen 
(eds) CPA Commentary para 61. 
1257 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 62. 
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It is suggested that the consumer should be able to cancel the agreement without any penalty 
or inconveniences. Otherwise, any obstacle would make the consumer reconsider his or her 
position and eventually convince him or her not to cancel (e.g., because this would be too 
complicated in terms of ‘red ink’ or formalities, or the penalty would come close to the price 
to be paid if the contract would have been pursued). In this case, the supplier could circumvent 
item (h) and de facto increase its prices at will. 
It is furthermore submitted that a clause giving the consumer the right to cancel the agreement 
in terms of item (h) should be drafted as unambiguously as possible and that the possibility to 
cancel the agreement should be ‘physically’ linked to the price increase clause and not hidden 
elsewhere. At least there must be an apparent reference in the price increase clause to the 
applicable cancellation clause. Therefore, clauses permitting a cancellation without expressly 
referring to a price increase after the conclusion of the agreement should be considered unfair 
because the consumer cannot be expected to assess the agreement like a lawyer. This is also a 
question of plain language in terms of section 22. 
This does however not mean that suppliers are totally bound to their previously agreed prices 
and have no flexibility. The OFT argued that where the supplier specified the level and timing 
of any price increases (within narrow limits), or where increases were linked to a relevant 
published price index, such price increase clauses might be fair.1258 
According to the OFT, a price variation clause is not necessarily fair because it is not 
discretionary. This is the case, for instance, where the supplier reserves a right to increase its 
prices in order to cover increased costs it experienced.1259 In such a case, the rise in costs is 
beyond the supplier’s control.  
Regulation 44(4)(b) provides for some exceptions in which item (h) does not apply. This is the 
case for transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments or other products or 
services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index or a 
financial market rate that the trader does not control, or to an agreement for the purchase or 
sale of foreign currency, traveller’s cheques or international money orders denominated in 
foreign currency, or a price fluctuation clause, where lawful, but the method by which prices 
vary must be explicitly described. 
                                                             
1258 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 12.4 at 58. 
1259 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 12.3 at 67. 
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These exceptions are legitimate because they are beyond the supplier’s control when operating 
in uncertain markets which contain variable pricing elements. This is certainly the case of 
‘fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the trader 
does not control’ but also of ‘money orders denominated in foreign currency’ and ‘price index 
clauses’.1260 It should be emphasised that clauses mentioned in subregulation (4)(b) are likely 
to be fair, such terms remain subject to sections 48 to 52 according to regulation 44(2)(c).  
Naudé correctly asserts that price increase clauses without the possibility to cancel the 
agreement may be valid if the factors for price increases are brought to the consumer’s 
attention, such clause is prominent, and there is actual and informed consent to it. This is the 
case when the price increase is calculated in a way the consumer reasonably can expect.1261 
The exception contained in regulation 44(4)(b)(iii) speaks for this point of view.  
Other countries outrule price increases before a certain period has elapsed. § 309 no. 1 BGB 
prohibits price increases within four months after the conclusion of the contract, for 
instance.1262 Naudé contends that such a definite time scale seems unwise, and prefers the 
approach of greylisting.1263 On the other hand, such a fixed time scale gives certainty to the 
consumer, and is not too long for the supplier so that it can adjust its prices when necessary. 
Since section 5(2)(d) excludes the application of the Act for credits which are governed by the 
National Credit Act, price increase clauses in such credit agreements, e.g., for interest and fees, 
are not covered by regulation 44(3).1264 
b)   Unilateral variation clauses 
Under regulation 44(3)(i), clauses enabling the supplier to unilaterally alter the terms of the 
agreement, including the characteristics of the product or service are presumed to be unfair. 
                                                             
1260 See reg 44(4)(b)(i)-(iii). 
1261 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 62. 
1262 Other countries chose different time scales: 2 months (§ 6(2)(4) Austrian KSchG), or 3 months (art 6:236(i) 
Dutch BW). 
1263 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 60 note 3. 
1264 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 63. 
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The EC Directive on unfair contract terms contains two similar items,1265 as well as §§ 308 
no. 4 BGB and 6(2) no. 3 KSchG.1266 In the two latter cases, however, an alteration clause is 
fair if the consumer can reasonably expect such an alteration.1267 
The reason for greylisting such terms is that a contract can be considered balanced only if both 
parties are bound by their obligations as agreed. If one party can alter the terms unilaterally, 
this balance is disturbed in favour of the party which alters the terms.1268 Otherwise, a consumer 
could be forced to accept increased costs, reduced benefits or other commercial reasons.1269 A 
simple corrective for this disturbed balance could be the right to cancel the agreement1270 and 
to claim compensation.1271 It is my suggestion though that the legislator did not insert the 
phrase 'without giving the consumer the right to terminate the agreement' as it did in item (h) 
because it wanted to put the bar higher for the supplier. Contrary to item (h), it is thus not 
necessarily sufficient to give the consumer the right of cancellation in order to make a variation 
clause fair. 
It is further submitted that even if the consumer agrees to certain variations, this does not 
necessarily make them fair because often he or she cannot ascertain if the changes are made 
because of mandatory requirements or purely for commercial reasons. 
As the price is also a term, even a core term, of any agreement, it is submitted that subregulation 
44(3)(h) is lex specialis to subregulation 44(3)(i). 
Pursuant to regulation 44(4)(c), paragraph (i) of regulation 44(3) does not apply to a term under 
which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to alter the interest rate payable by the 
consumer, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where there is a 
valid reason, provided that the supplier informs the consumer immediately thereof, and the 
                                                             
1265 Pursuant to item (j) of the EC Directive, terms may be ineffective that 'enabl[e] the (…) supplier to alter the 
terms of the contract unilaterally without a valid reason which is specified in the contract', and according to item 
(k), terms may be ineffective that 'enabl[e] the (…) supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided'. 
1266 KSchG = Konsumentenschutzgesetz (Austrian Consumer Protection Code). 
1267 § 308 no. 4 BGB: '[T]he agreement of a right of the user to modify the performance promised or deviate from 
it, unless the agreement of the modification or deviation can reasonably be expected of the other party to the 
contract when the interests of the user are taken into account' [is ineffective]. § 6(2) no. 3 KSchG: The consumer 
shall not be bound by a stipulation whereby 'the entrepreneur may unilaterally alter or vary the performance to be 
rendered by him, unless the consumer may be reasonably expected to accept the alteration or variation, particularly 
because it is negligible and factually justified'. 
1268 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.1 at 52. 
1269 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.2 at 52. 
1270 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 271. 
1271 Naudé 2007 SALJ 151. 
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consumer can dissolve the agreement at the earliest opportunity. Furthermore, this provision 
does not apply to a transaction in transferable securities, financial instruments and other 
products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or 
index or a financial market rate that the trader does not control, as well as to an agreement for 
the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller’s cheques or international money orders 
denominated in foreign currency, and a term under which the supplier reserves the right to 
unilaterally alter the conditions of an open-ended agreement, provided that he forthwith 
informs the consumer thereof and the latter can dissolve the agreement immediately. 
The reasons for these exemptions of the application of item (i) are similar to those discussed 
under item (h), i.e., they concern factors beyond the supplier’s control. However, the wording 
of regulations 44(4)(b) and (c) is not identical. Firstly, regulation 44(4)(c)(i) applies to terms 
concerning financial services offered by a supplier and interest payable by a consumer. Item 
(b) does not contain such a provision. It is suggested that the legislator wanted to distinguish 
between the price payable for specific products or services for which the price is the 
consideration for this product or service, and the ‘price’ payable for financial services in the 
form of interest.  
Secondly, regulation 44(4)((c)(iv) applies to open-ended agreements, i.e., contracts of 
indeterminate duration,1272 a provision which is not found in regulation 44(4)(b). As a 
consequence, a clause by which the supplier reserves the right to alter the conditions of an 
open-ended agreement unilaterally is not greylisted, whereas a clause by which he or she may 
increase the price agreed upon in an open-ended contract when the agreement was made, 
without giving the consumer the possibility to cancel the agreement, is greylisted. Therefore, 
suppliers seem to be able to alter the conditions of an open-ended agreement more easily than 
the price payable for such an agreement. However, the fact that the supplier must inform the 
consumer of the alteration in advance and that the consumer has the right to cancel the 
agreement immediately puts both items on the same level of the 'obstacles' the supplier has to 
overcome to make such a clause fair.1273 It is furthermore suggested that ‘conditions’ in 
regulation 44(4)(c)(iv) is equivalent to ‘terms of the agreement’ in regulation 44(3)(i) and does 
not include price alterations, which are already covered by item (h). It should also cover the 
‘characteristics of the product or service’ mentioned in item (i). The formulation 'including the 
                                                             
1272 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 64. 
1273 Regulation 44(4)(c)(iv)(aa) and (bb). 
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characteristics' in item (i) speaks for this broad interpretation. What is more, the legislator 
would probably have chosen only one of the expressions of regulation 44(3)(i) if he had wished 
a more restrictive application of regulation 44(4)(c)(iv). 
Several types of long-term agreements are excluded from the application of the Act. These are, 
e.g., employment contracts1274 and long-term insurance contracts.1275 
Thirdly, regulation 44(4)(b)(iii) refers to price-indexation clauses, a provision that cannot be 
found in item (c) of regulation 44(4). The reason for this provision is evident because regulation 
44(4)(b) refers to price increases set out in regulation 44(3)(h), whereas there is no need for 
such a price-index clause in item (i) of subregulation (3) as the latter refers to the terms of an 
agreement, including the characteristics of a product or service. When interpreted widely, the 
price payable is also part of the terms of an agreement, but here item (h) of subregulation (3) 
is lex specialis to item (i) of the same subregulation. 
The discussion above is of theoretical nature though because since 28 February 2014, 
transactions, functions or acts subject to Financial Services Board Legislation have been 
excluded from the scope of application of the Act.1276 
An example for regulation 44(3)(i) is a term by which the supplier, for commercial reasons, 
reserves the right to deliver a flat-screen TV with different technical characteristics (e.g., a 
plasma instead of an LED screen) or with different loudspeakers, rather than a term granting 
the supplier that right in cases where the ordered television set is no longer available on the 
market and giving the consumer the possibility to terminate the contract without penalty or 
charge if he chooses not to accept the variation of the terms in question. 
The second alternative in the example mentioned above is likely to be fair in terms of regulation 
44(3)(i) because it has a restricted effect. It can thus not be used to change the balance of 
advantage under the contract. Such a term is narrow enough if it allows a modification in the 
wording of the terms to reflect changes in the legal requirements, or new industry standards 
and codes of practice. In addition, the reason for the exercise of such a variation must be clearly 
                                                             
1274 See s 5(2)(e). 
1275 Schedule 2 item 10 read with s 1 s.v. 'service' (c)(ii). 
1276 Section 28 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 as amended by s 66 of the Financial Services Laws 
General Amendment Act 45 of 2013, read with GN 120 in GG 37357 of 28 February 2014. 
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spelled out and specifically ensure that the supplier cannot take advantage of them. The supplier 
must also give notice of any variation and grant a right of cancellation without penalty.1277 
The OFT takes the view that a ‘reasonableness qualification’, i.e., terms which allow 
amendments only ‘when reasonable’, are generally too extensive to save a variation clause. 
This applies unless it will be apparent to a consumer what amendments under what 
circumstances the wording allow. This is the case, according to the OFT, ‘where fair-minded 
persons in the position of the consumer and supplier would be likely to share a common view 
as to what would be “reasonable” – for example, where a “reasonable charge” clearly means a 
charge sufficient to meet specific open-market costs.’1278 Where on the contrary, the criteria 
for the determination of reasonableness are imprecise or aim to protect the supplier’s 
commercial interests, it will be able to change the bargain to the detriment of the consumer 
solely on the basis that it wants to protect its profit margins.1279 Interestingly, the OFT referred 
to a common view of the consumer and the supplier, and not only to the consumer’s view. It is 
suggested that this position narrows down the application of ‘reasonableness qualifications’ 
and ensures a fair balance between the parties’ interests. 
For instance, at the OFT's initiative, the clause 
'The University may change any of these regulations from time to time as it sees 
fit.' 
was redrafted as follows: 
'The University may change any of these academic and other Regulations in 
order to assist the proper delivery of education, and these changes will normally 
come into effect at the beginning of the next academic year. The University 
reserves the right to introduce changes during the academic year when it is in 
the interests of students.' 
The redrafted clause has narrowed down the scope of alteration, which can only be effected 
when reasonable motifs exist. 
Naudé is of the opinion that the wording of the provisions of the greylist of the EC Proposal 
for a Consumer Rights Directive that are equivalent to regulation 44(4)(c)(i)(aa) and (bb) is 
                                                             
1277 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.3 at 52. 
1278 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.5 at 53. Open-market costs are those which originate 
in the absence of tariffs, taxes, licensing requirements, subsidies, unionisation and any other regulations or 
practices that interfere with the natural functioning of the free market. See 'Investopedia' s.v. 'open market' at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open-market.asp. 
1279 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.4 at 53. 
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preferable to the current South African provision. The main difference between these two 
provisions is that the words ‘immediately’ and ‘at the earliest’ opportunity’ have been 
interchanged by the South African legislator. Unfortunately, Naudé does not give any reason 
for her view, but correctly points out that the current wording only has a limited practical 
impact because of the exclusion of transactions or acts subject to the Financial Services Board 
Legislation from the ambit of the Act since 28 February 2014.1280 
In terms of regulation 44(3)(i), also unilateral alterations of the characteristics of the product 
or service fall under this provision as the consumer should receive what he has bought, and not 
merely something similar.1281 Variation clauses allowing minor technical amendments which 
do not affect the performance of the product, or amendments required by law should not be 
considered unfair.1282 As long as the consumer understands that other terms allow for other 
amendments than the ones above and entirely agrees to them, those should be fair. This applies 
under the condition that the contract clearly spells out what kind of variations might be made 
in what circumstances and to which extent. It is submitted that in spite of terms respecting those 
considerations, terms should be considered unfair if the products or services are substantially 
different from what the consumer has ordered.1283 This is most likely the case where the 
supplier’s terms allow the delivery of another car model than ordered or even the same car 
model but with another motor (e.g., diesel instead of petrol). It is proposed that a product or a 
service is substantially different if the difference is so significant that a bystander would 
consider the concerned product or service so different from the one which the consumer had 
contracted so that one reasonably cannot speak of the same product. This has to be assessed on 
a case-to-case basis because for more personal objects, changes that could be qualified by 
outsiders as minor could be substantial for the consumer in question. A client who wants to add 
a specific train model to her model railway where all trains are made of metal will perceive a 
plastic train as substantially different, even if it has the same size and colour, the same technical 
specifications and is the exact replica of the original train. The OFT stated that ‘[c]onsumers 
are legally entitled to expect satisfactory quality in goods and services, but this does not mean 
that it is fair to reserve the right to supply something that is not what was agreed but is of 
equivalent standard or value.’1284 A statement of reasons can in no circumstances justify 
                                                             
1280 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 66. 
1281 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 70. 
1282 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.3 at 54. 
1283 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance paras 11.5 and 11.6 at 55. 
1284 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.2 at 54. 
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making the consumer pay for a product or service materially different from what he or she 
agreed to purchase.1285 What is more, the possibility for the consumer to cancel an agreement 
with substantially altered terms does not make it fair. The consumer should not be in the 
situation where he or she has to choose between accepting the given product or service which 
he or she had not agreed to initially, or refusing it and suffering the inconvenience of not getting 
what he immediately needed, just because it is more convenient for the other party not to supply 
what was initially agreed.1286 
The formulation in the Austrian KSchG covers this sort of situations because variation clauses 
are not binding on the consumer 'unless the consumer may be reasonably expected to accept 
the alteration or variation, particularly because it is negligible and factually justified'. This is a 
much better formulation that the one in the BGB where a variation is of no effect 'unless the 
agreement of the modification (…) can reasonably be expected of the [consumer] when the 
interests of the [supplier] are taken into account'. Item (i) of regulation 44(3) should be 
amended accordingly. 
It is arguable if also improvements of a product or service are a unilateral alteration of 
characteristics of a product or service under regulation 44(3)(i). After all, improvements cannot 
be unfair at first sight. The wording of this provision covers all kinds of alterations, however, 
and does not provide for any distinction between alterations which simply make the product or 
service different from what was ordered and those which improve or worsen the product or 
service in question. In most cases though, terms allowing for a change for the worse will most 
likely be unfair. This is the case, for example, where a supplier changes the material of its 
toasters from metal to plastic in order to protect its margin.  
It is suggested that one solution could consist in taking a more subjective stance, for instance, 
by distinguishing between visible and non-visible improvements which could affect what the 
consumer had in mind when ordering the product.  
Example:  A consumer has ordered a new flat-screen TV. In a first scenario, the supplier’s 
terms allow the delivery of another TV set of which the exterior is made of 
another material, e.g., aluminium instead of PVC. Aluminium is certainly a 
better product than PVC in terms of robustness and value. However, it changes 
                                                             
1285 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.6 at 55. 
1286 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.7 at 55. 
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the exterior of the TV to an extent that the consumer might be disturbed, because 
it would not fit with his other multi-media devices which are all made of PVC, 
or for other reasons related to his or her taste (the same applies to the example 
above, only that a metal train is delivered instead of a plastic one, and all other 
miniature trains of the consumer are of plastic). In a second scenario, the 
supplier’s terms allow the delivery of the same TV model but it is equipped with 
more technical options and more USB ports.  
In this case, terms allowing for visible improvements were considered unfair if the contract 
does not set out clearly what kind of variations might be made in what circumstances and to 
which extent. On the other hand, improvements that are not or barely visible would be fair as 
it would not be reasonable to reject an improved product where the alterations are (almost) 
invisible. 
This solution is quite unsatisfactory though as it does not take into account the supplier's 
interests. Therefore, it is recommended that the stance of the BGB and the KSchG is taken. 
Hence, the alteration (improvement) of the characteristics of the product or service is 
considered fair if the consumer should reasonably expect it. The EC Directive's formulation 
achieves the same purpose by requiring a 'valid reason' for the alteration. This corresponds with 
the 'reasonableness' requirement in § 308 no. 4 because where a modification of the 
performance is reasonable, there is a 'valid reason' for it.1287 Contrary to item (j) in the EC 
Directive, this 'valid reason' needs not to be specified in the contract if the alteration concerns 
the characteristics of the product or service. A balancing test between the supplier's and the 
consumer's interests ensures a fair consideration of the parties' interests though and should 
therefore apply.1288 If the supplier does not produce plastic trains anymore, for instance, or the 
kind of plastic has been outlawed, the consumer can be expected to accept the alteration.  
c)  Determination of conformity and right of interpretation 
According to regulation 44(3)(j), a term is presumed to be unfair if it gives the supplier the 
right to determine whether the goods or services supplied are in conformity with the agreement 
or gives the supplier the exclusive right to interpret any term of the agreement.1289 
Item (m) of the EC Directive on unfair contract terms contains a similar item. 
                                                             
1287 Stoffels AGB-Recht 329. The BGH also sometimes refers to a 'valid reason', e.g., in BGH NJW 2005, 3420 
(3421). 
1288 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 para 22 et seq. 
1289 Item (m) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 has the 
same wording as reg 44(3). 
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The rationale of the greylisting of such a term is that if a supplier reserves the right to decide 
whether it has fulfilled his or her obligations set out in the agreement, it can unfairly refuse to 
acknowledge that it has not fulfilled them.1290 The effect of such clauses is comparable to 
provisions that unfairly exclude liability for unsatisfactory goods and services.1291 
The wording of this item could be misunderstood as by the determination whether or not there 
is conformity with the agreement, a broad interpretation must be applied. ‘Conformity’ not 
only applies to the quality of the goods or services and their description in the agreement or 
according to section 18(3) but also to the question of whether the supplier has fulfilled all its 
other obligations under the contract, which is a question of breach.1292 The corresponding 
provision in the Australian Consumer Law providing that ‘a term that permits, or has the effect 
of permitting, one party unilaterally to determine whether the contract has been breached or to 
interpret its meaning’ is unfair is therefore preferable.1293 For lawyers, the term ‘conformity’ 
in this context is unlikely to pose any problems. As stated further above, the Consumer 
Protection Act should nonetheless be written in plain and understandable language in order to 
be accessible for non-lawyers. 
In any event, a term which provides that the supplier has the final decision whether the goods 
or services supplied are in conformity with the agreement would be contrary to sections 18(3), 
or section 55 or section 56, read with section 51(1). These provisions grant non-derogable 
rights pursuant to section 51. When a consumer purchases goods solely on the basis of a 
description or sample, or both, these goods must conform to their description or sample, and 
the goods delivered must in all material respects correspond to that which an ordinarily alert 
consumer would have been entitled to expect based on the description or on a reasonable 
examination of the sample.1294 According to sections 55 and 56, the consumer has the non-
derogable right to demand quality service and safe, good quality goods. 
An example of such a greylisted term would be a clause which gives the supplier the right to 
carry out its own tests or inspections in order to determine whether the client’s complaint is 
well-founded. Such terms would be a restriction of the consumer’s right to declare a dispute as 
                                                             
1290 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 294. See also OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance 
(2008) para 13.1 at 59. 
1291 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 13.2 at 59. 
1292 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 71. 
1293 Section 25(1)(h) of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010). 
Such a term is not greylisted in terms of the Australian legislation but unfair per se. 
1294 Section 18(3). 
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to whether the supplier has performed its part of the agreement. In this case, the supplier would 
be the judge in its own affair and confer a judicial authority which normally is performed by 
the courts.1295 On the other hand, a term providing for independent inspection or testing for the 
final decision whether or not the supplier was in breach of contract would most probably be 
considered fair. This applies under the condition that the consumer has not to bear the costs for 
such inspection if it was well-founded.1296 Compulsory arbitration clauses may be unfair under 
regulation 44(3)(x) though unless such arbitration is provided for by the Act or other 
legislation. This means that a clause by which the supplier has the right to construe the contract 
unilaterally may be fair if disputes must be referred to an accredited industry ombud.1297  
A term which does not give the supplier the exclusive right to determine whether it is non-
compliant with the terms of the agreement may be considered fair, e.g., if it refers the dispute 
to an accredited industry ombud. It is however suggested that such a term should be formulated 
in a fashion that does not give the supplier the final decision. Otherwise, it would be able to 
circumvent paragraph (j) of regulation 44(3) by simply agreeing on an intermediary step, i.e., 
the ombud's intervention, without being obliged to follow its decision. Unlike section 25(1)(b) 
of the Australian Consumer Law1298 mentioned above which declares terms unfair that permit 
one party unilaterally1299 to determine whether the contract has been breached or to interpret 
its meaning, regulation 44(3)(j) does not contain any adjective or adverb, such as 
‘unilateral(ly)’, ‘exclusive(ly)’ or ‘final(ly)’, in terms of the determination of whether the 
supplier was in breach. Only in terms of the interpretation of the agreement, terms that give the 
supplier the exclusive1300 right of interpretation are greylisted. Item (j) should thus be amended 
as follows: 
‘(j) giving the supplier the final or exclusive1301 right to determine whether the goods 
or services supplied are in conformity with the agreement or giving the supplier the 
final or exclusive right to interpret any term of the agreement’1302 
A term giving the supplier the exclusive right to construe any term of the agreement is 
presumed to be unfair because it deprives the consumer of the possibility of recourse of an 
                                                             
1295 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 293 and 294. 
1296 Example from OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 13.3 at 59. 
1297 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 74. 
1298 Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010. 
1299 Emphasis added. 
1300 Emphasis added. 
1301 Emphasis added for a better understanding of the proposed amendment. 
1302 Suggested changes emphasised. 
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impartial adjudicator.1303 Otherwise, the supplier could interpret the term in a way that is 
advantageous for it. It is submitted that the same arguments as presented above apply to the 
interpretation of the terms, which is why the aforementioned suggested change of paragraph 
(j) should also include the interpretation. One should note that terms referring the matter to an 
independent arbitrator or expert, or compulsory arbitration clauses which involve sums below 
or above a certain threshold may be unfair. This is the case in the United Kingdom where the 
threshold is currently at GBP 5,000.1304 The South African Arbitration Act1305 does not contain 
such a provision. However, it should be considered to assess unfairness under section 48 (2)(b), 
especially when relatively small sums trigger high arbitration costs.1306 
d)  Unequal termination rights 
A term allowing the supplier to terminate the agreement at will where the same right is not 
granted to the consumer is potentially unfair in terms of regulation 44(3)(k).1307 
The EC Directive on unfair contract terms contains a similar item.1308 
The reason for greylisting such terms is their excessive one-sidedness, which is a criterion for 
unfairness in section 48.1309 In the view of the OFT, '[f]airness and balance requires that 
suppliers and consumers are on an equal footing as regards rights to end and withdraw from a 
contract.'1310 This does not mean that merely the absence of reciprocity is the only factor that 
makes such terms potentially unfair.1311 In most cases, the consumer, although having an equal 
right to cancel the contract, might suffer adverse consequences in the case of a termination by 
the supplier. This is the case, for instance, where he or she is unable to purchase easily similar 
goods or services after a cancellation by the supplier. A high-quality catering service preparing 
exotic food and a special wedding cake for a very exclusive wedding which cancels its 
agreement with its clients a couple of days before the event is very unlikely easily replaceable. 
                                                             
1303 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 294. 
1304 Section 1991 of the UK Arbitration Act, 1996. 
1305 42 of 1965. 
1306 See discussion on item (x) infra. 
1307 This item is based on the wider item (f) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 which also encompasses clauses allowing the supplier to cancel the contract for any 
breach. This item greylists clauses 'authorising the (…) supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis 
where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the (…) supplier to retain the sums paid for 
services not yet supplied by him where it is the (…) supplier himself who dissolves the contract'. 
1308 According to item (f) of the EC Directive, terms 'authorising the (…) supplier to dissolve the contract on a 
discretionary basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer (…)' may be unfair. 
1309 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 75. 
1310 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 6.1.1 at 43. 
1311 Naudé 2007 SALJ 150 and 153. 
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The clients will most probably have problems to find a similarly specialised catering service 
offering the same quality in a short period of time. A clause which allows the cancelling of 
such an agreement at will is thus unfair, despite the fact that the consumer is granted the same 
right. 
Regulation 44(3)(k) does not apply to clauses which allow a termination of the contract for 
stated reasons, like breach. A cancellation clause – or lex commissoria1312 – allowing 
termination for even minor breach, or a provision allowing a termination based on imprecisely 
worded general grounds, have to be assessed under section 48. Then the consumer will carry 
the risk of non-persuasion however as such clauses are not contained in the greylist. Some 
pieces of legislation set out criteria which have to be met before a contract may be cancelled, 
such as the Hire-Purchase Act,1313 the Alienation of Land Act1314 and the National Credit 
Act.1315 Then a cancellation by the supplier merely reflects the ordinary law and should be 
qualified as a cancellation ex lege and not as one ex contractu.1316 
In the view of the OFT, a clause which does not merely allow the supplier to cancel at will (i.e., 
a non-discretionary clause) may be fair if it would be impractical or impossible to complete the 
contract. Such a clause must clearly and specifically describe the circumstances in which the 
supplier may cancel, and require that the supplier find out and inform the consumer as soon as 
possible if such circumstances do apply. It must also explain the reasons for the cancellation if 
they are not obvious. The circumstances must be beyond the supplier’s control. In these cases, 
it may also be fair only to return prepayments without any further liability.1317 
It is suggested however that the termination of a contract based on a term containing the 
aforementioned circumstances can never be ‘at will’ in terms of regulation 44(3)(k). The phrase 
‘at will’ implies that no reasons whatsoever need to be given and that the supplier is completely 
free in terms of its decision to cancel.1318 On the other hand, where the conditions mentioned 
                                                             
1312 A forfeiture clause entitles the creditor to cancel the contract if the debtor fails to perform by the time fixed 
for performance. Such a clause is enforceable. See Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 534, Vessio LLD thesis 
425. Vessio points out that the meaning of the term lex commissaria has been widened through trade usage and 
nowadays encompasses all kinds of cancellation clauses, whereby the use of ‘forfeiture clause’ is reserved for 
certain kinds of clauses in relation to specific forfeiture of payments for breach. See Vessio LLD thesis 425 and 
426 note 2537. 
1313 36 of 1942, s 12(b). 
1314 68 of 1981, s 19. 
1315 34 of 2005, s 123. 
1316 Vessio LLD thesis 429. 
1317 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 6.1.5 at 44. 
1318 ‘At will‘ is defined in dictionaries as follows: 'at one's own desire, inclination, or choice'. See 'at will' at 
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/at-will. 
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above must be fulfilled in order to cancel, the contract is not terminated 'at will' but under 
certain conditions. This is admittedly more of a linguistic point without any practical impact.  
Clauses permitting the supplier to cancel for vaguely defined reasons or following a breach of 
contract committed by the consumer often aim to protect the supplier from problems beyond 
its control or serious misconduct by the consumer.1319 Suppliers should however avoid a 
drafting that is too vague and indicate the circumstances in which the agreement may be 
terminated. 
According to regulation 44(4)(a), paragraph (k) of subregulation 44(3) does not apply to a term 
by which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to terminate an open-ended 
agreement without notice unilaterally, but the supplier is required to inform the consumer 
thereof immediately. 
Van Eeden uncritically mentions that regulation 44(4)(a) applies to item (k),1320 whereas Naudé 
correctly points out that this qualification was actually meant to qualify item (l) in regulation 
44(3).1321 Item (l) which applies to open-ended agreements is, it is suggested, lex specialis to 
item (k) which applies to other agreements. For this reason, and because of the wording of 
regulation 44(4)(a) (‘unilaterally terminate an open-ended agreement’), this exception can only 
apply to item (l), and the reference in paragraph (a) of subregulation 44(4) to regulation 
44(3)(k) is an editorial error which should be corrected.  
Note should be taken that regulation 44(3)(k) applies to agreements other than open-ended 
agreements (cf. regulation 44(3)(l)) and fixed-term agreements. For the latter, section 14(2)(b) 
applies in terms of cancellation. In other words, item (k) is only applicable to ‘once-off’ 
transactions, such as the purchase of a product or service which is not continual. As section 14 
does not apply to juristic persons, regardless of their annual turnover or asset value, juristic 
persons do not seem to have the protection of section 14.1322 
                                                             
1319 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 273. 
1320 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 273. 
1321 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 79. 
1322 Section 14(1). 
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e)  Cancellation of open-ended agreements without notice by the supplier 
Regulation 44(3)(l) refers to terms enabling the supplier to terminate an open-ended agreement 
without reasonable notice except where the consumer has committed a material breach of 
contract. 
An open-ended agreement is a contract of indefinite duration, i.e., without stipulating the 
expected duration.1323 The reasons for the conclusion of such contracts are various: the parties 
intend, for instance, that the contract will be in force until it is terminated by notice, or that it 
will be in force for a reasonable period of time, and then terminate, or that it will last forever.1324 
The wording of item (l) indicates that terms which allow the supplier to terminate an open-
ended agreement without reasonable notice other than for a material breach will be presumed 
to be unfair.1325 The OFT took the view that if the term refers to certain ‘serious grounds’ it 
may be fair if the nature of such serious grounds is clearly indicated in the provision.1326 This 
is the case for ‘circumstances in which there is a real risk of loss or harm to the supplier or 
others if the contract continues even for a short period. This is, for instance, the case if there is 
a reasonable suspicion of fraud or other abuse.’1327 The formulations of Schedule 2 paragraph 1 
of the UK Unfair Contract Regulation and regulation 44(3)(l) are not identical, which begs the 
question of whether a ‘serious ground’ can be equated with ‘breach’. Breach of contract is a 
civil wrong that may give rise to a duty to pay damages as compensation.1328 Breach of contract 
arises if the terms of the contract are not performed at all, or performed late or performed in a 
wrong manner by the debtor.1329 It is suggested that breach is therefore, in any event, a ‘serious 
ground’ to cancel an agreement under regulation 44(3)(l). The term ‘serious grounds’ is 
however somewhat more extensive than the concept of breach because the OFT also considered 
circumstances in which there is a real risk of loss or harm to the supplier or others if the contract 
continues for even a short period, e.g., where there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud or other 
abuse.1330 This means that in these situations, the consumer has not yet committed a breach, 
                                                             
1323 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 213, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 81. 
1324 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 213. Certain contracts are legally incapable of enduring forever, e.g., the 
contract of lease which has the essential feature that the lessor only temporarily parts with the use and enjoyment 
of the thing. See Davids v Van Straaten 2005 (4) SA 468 (C) at 481. 
1325 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 80, Van Eeden and Barnard 
Consumer Protection Law 290. 
1326 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 7.4 at 47. 
1327 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 7.3 at 47. 
1328 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 39. 
1329 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 515. 
1330 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 7.3 at 47. 
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but there is some serious indication that he or she will do so. If the supplier waited until the 
breach has been committed, it would risk being the victim of a fraud or another harm. It is 
therefore my submission that the term ‘breach’ in paragraph (l) should be extended to ‘risk of 
breach’. This must however be clearly indicated in the supplier’s standard terms, and the risk 
must be sufficiently serious and probable.  
The common law also permits the supplier to cancel without giving notice if the consumer 
commits a material breach. To be material, a breach must be sufficiently serious. To establish 
if a breach is material, several tests have been developed. For example, the breach must go 'to 
the root of the contract',1331 or be so serious that the creditor would probably not have entered 
into the contract had he foreseen the breach, or the debtor failed to perform a 'vital part'1332 of 
his obligations or an 'essential'1333 or 'material' term of the contract.1334 In these cases too, the 
breach must already have been committed. 
The exception regulated in regulation 44(4)(a) has already been discussed earlier. Despite this 
exception, the consumer can still bring forward that such term is unfair under section 48 as 
pursuant to regulation 44(2)(c), a term which falls within the ambit of subregulation (4) remains 
subject to section s 48 to 52 of the Act. 
The EC Unfair Terms Directive1335 and the UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations1336 require ‘a valid reason’ for cancelling before the term falls within the 
exception. It is therefore suggested that the exception of regulation 44(4)(a) is less strict for the 
supplier than the EC Unfair Terms Directive and the UK Regulations because it does not 
require a ‘valid reason’ to cancel the banking or credit contract without notice. On the other 
hand, according to the UK regulation, there might be no need for a notice to the consumer, 
especially in circumstances in which a risk of significant detriment to the consumer is 
unlikely.1337  
In the OFT’s view, such a term should not be drafted in a manner that could in practice be used 
arbitrarily to suit the supplier’s interests.1338 There is no valid reason if the consumer is 
                                                             
1331 Oatorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v Maroun 1973 (3) SA 779 (A) 784. 
1332 Aucamp v Morton 1949 (3) SA 611 (A). 
1333 As to a material breach of an essential term see Christie Law of Contract 535-538, with further references. 
1334 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 295. 
1335 EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, Annex under no. 2 item 
(a) read with no. 1 item (g). 
1336 SI 1999/2083. 
1337 Schedule 2 para 2. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 7.5 at 48. 
1338 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 7.5 at 48. 
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confronted with 'an unexpected and unacceptable change in his or her position.1339 Regulation 
44(4)(a) does not require a valid reason and is hence less consumer-friendly. It is suggested 
that the fact that the supplier must inform the consumer of its cancellation immediately cannot 
balance the fact that the cancellation can be done without a valid reason.  
Moreover, it would have been less harsh if at least regulation 44(4)(a) required a ‘reasonable’ 
notice, or a notice expressed in days as it is the case in section 14(2)(b)(ii).1340 It is difficult to 
comprehend why the supplier has to give notice in the case of section 14, where the consumer 
commits a ‘material failure’ to comply with the agreement, whereas the supplier may 
unilaterally terminate the agreement under regulation 44(4)(a) at will, without a valid reason. 
This is clearly a systemic imbalance which should be corrected. At least, the supplier should 
only be able to cancel the agreement without notice where there are serious grounds for doing 
so, for instance, reasonable suspicion of fraud or other abuse. 
As discussed further above, transactions or acts subject to Financial Services Board Legislation 
are excluded from the scope of the Act since 28 February 2014.1341 The exception of regulation 
44(4)(a) is thus of limited practical application. 
f)  Obliging the consumer to perform although the supplier is in default 
In terms of regulation 44(3)(m) a term is presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect 
of obliging the consumer to fulfil all his or her obligations where the supplier has failed to fulfil 
all his or her obligations. 
Item (m) belongs to the category of terms which exclude or limit the consumer's legal rights 
against the supplier in the event of breach.1342 Such terms are greylisted because otherwise, the 
essence of the contract would be destroyed if one party were allowed to fail to perform while 
the other is held to its bargain.1343 Such an imbalance exists, for instance, where the supplier 
does not deliver the sold goods or services, and the consumer has to pay nonetheless. 
Item (m) reflects several items of the EC Unfair Terms Directive, such as items (b), (n) and 
(o). Regulation 44(3)(b) already covers provisions which apply to breach of contract. If the 
                                                             
1339 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.5 at 55. 
1340 The supplier may cancel the agreement 20 business days after giving written notice to the consumer. Note that 
in terms of s 14(1), s 14 does not apply to transactions between juristic persons regardless of their annual turnover 
or asset value. 
1341 Section 28 of the Financial Services Law Board Act 97 of 1990, as amended by s 66 of the Financial Services 
General Amendment Act 45 of 2013. 
1342 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 86.  
1343 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 273 and 274. 
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supplier fails to perform its obligations and therefore is in breach – and the breach is not due 
to supervening impossibility of performance, i.e., impossibility that arises after the conclusion 
of the contract1344 – the consumer is normally entitled to suspend his or her own reciprocal 
performance by raising the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.1345 Terms excluding this right 
thus limit the consumer’s legal rights in the event of breach of contract. This would be the case, 
for instance, if a term requiring a consumer to pay a monthly sum for the rent of a phone 
although there have been long periods during which the service was unavailable.1346 
Item (m) covers types of clauses which affect the residual common-law principle of reciprocity 
which applies to contracts for the sale of goods or the supply of services. This concerns clauses 
by virtue of which a consumer has to continue paying even though the goods or services he or 
she had contracted for are not provided as agreed due to an unavoidable, unforeseen event 
which is not due to the supplier’s fault. For the application of paragraph (m), the supplier’s 
breach is therefore not necessary. 
On the basis of the common-law rule of reciprocity of obligations that were promised in return 
for each other, the following scenarios are possible: If the total supervening impossibility is 
permanent, both obligations (e.g., delivery and payment) extinguish.1347 In the case of partial 
impossibility to perform, the creditor generally has a choice either to accept partial performance 
in return for a proportionally reduced counter-performance or to terminate the contract. Then, 
the counter-obligation will also extinguish. Where there is a temporary impossibility, the 
obligation and the counter-obligation are suspended until the impossibility has disappeared. If 
the creditor cannot be reasonably expected to continue with the contract because the 
impossibility continues for a period too long, the creditor may nevertheless choose to terminate 
the contract, in which case the counter-obligation will be extinguished.1348 A lessor, for 
                                                             
1344 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 383. 
1345 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 86. The underlying principle of the 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus is that the parties have the expressed or unexpressed common intention of 
reciprocity (do ut des), i.e., an exchange of performances (e.g., goods in exchange of money). The exceptio serves 
as a defence for the defendant who is sued by a plaintiff who has not yet performed or tendered to perform. See 
Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 437. 
1346 Example from Law Commission of England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in 
Contracts – Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scon 
Law Com No 199) (2005) at 191. 
1347 Two requirements must be met so that in the case of supervening impossibility of performance the contract 
can be terminated: Firstly, the performance must be objectively impossible (i.e., nobody can tender the agreed 
performance, by applying a 'standard of society' where, e.g., it would be too expensive to retrieve the given object 
of the contract, or performance has become illegal), and secondly, the impossibility must be unavoidable by a 
reasonable person (i.e., the impossibility must be due to an event which was objectively beyond the debtor's 
control). See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 383 and 384. 
1348 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 385 and 386. 
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example, cannot be expected to continue paying the full amount of rent without deduction until 
the end of the lease period if the rented house becomes uninhabitable after being damaged or 
destroyed by an unavoidable, unforeseen event, or vis maior.1349 Such a term would fall under 
item (m), and not under item (b) since there is no need for a breach of contract. 
According to the OFT, a term which gives the supplier the right to suspend its services may be 
fair where the consumer is exempted from paying during periods of suspension1350 or is entitled 
to a refund after a certain number of days for the time in which services were suspended.1351 
This also applies to terms allowing the contract period to be extended without additional costs 
to ensure that the consumer receives all services for which it had concluded the contract.1352 
Furthermore, clauses which allow the supplier to suspend its service while obliging the client 
to continue paying may be fair if, for instance, they enable the supplier to deal with technical 
problems or other circumstances outside its control. They may also be fair if they protect the 
interests of innocent third parties, or aim to enhance the service. Such clauses are fair if they 
have a restricted effect, so that they cannot be used to destroy the contractual balance, and are 
sufficiently qualified. This is the case where consumers are informed of exactly when and how 
they are likely to be affected. The supplier must give notice of any proposal to rely on the term, 
and the consumer is entitled to cancel before being affected by it, without a penalty or otherwise 
being worse off for having entered into the contract.1353 
It is imaginable that a supplier uses such terms in the guise of a penalty in order to deny the 
consumer a benefit under the contract because it is non-compliant with its obligations. Then it 
is crucial that the supplier is not given undue discretion in making the decision, and that there 
is no scope to inflict a disproportionate sanction.1354 In any event, the potential effect and the 
intention behind such provisions have to be considered. If the supplier’s clause goes further 
than is strictly necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose, it probably unbalances the contract 
and is unfair.1355 
                                                             
1349 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 90.  
1350 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 15.4 at 65. 
1351 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance – Annexes (2008) 102-103. 
1352 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 15.4 at 65. 
1353 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 2.7.2-2.7.3 at 33-34. 
1354 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.7.4 at 34. 
1355 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.7.2 at 33. 
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The OFT’s view is to be also welcomed in South Africa because it ensures that the consumer 
does not have to pay for services he or she did not receive. Besides, it strengthens the 
consumers’ trust in suppliers. 
g)  Unilateral avoidance or limitation or performance 
Greylisted in terms of regulation 44(3)(n) are also provisions permitting the supplier, but not 
the consumer, to avoid or limit performance of the agreement. 
This subregulation refers to clauses which, for example, entitle the supplier to deliver only 
partially, whereas the consumer would have to pay in full. 
The practical relevance of this subregulation is however limited as item (b) already greylists 
clauses excluding or limiting the consumer’s right in the event of breach of contract by the 
supplier. Other terms will already be prohibited outright by mandatory provisions in the Act 
with regard to the quality of the goods or services, e.g., sections 54, 55 56 and 61, read with 
section 51.1356 In practice, terms permitting the supplier to limit or avoid its performance may 
often have the same effect as terms obliging the consumer (and not the supplier) to fulfil all its 
obligations.1357 
h) One-sided renewal terms 
Regulation 44(3)(o) greylists terms permitting the supplier, but not the consumer, to renew or 
not renew the agreement. 
This item is based on a nearly similar item in the Australian Consumer Law.1358 
For fixed-term agreements between natural persons,1359 the maximum duration is set out in 
section 14(4)(a), read with regulation 5(1). In terms of regulation 5(1), the maximum period of 
a fixed-term consumer agreement is 24 months from the date of signature by the consumer 
unless another agreement has been expressly reached, or a regulation or an industry code 
provides for a different period for a specific type of agreement. As regards the renewal of fixed-
term agreements, section 14(2)(bb) provides that the consumer may cancel the agreement at 
                                                             
1356 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 92. 
1357 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 276. 
1358 Section 25(1)(e) of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010). 
1359 Section 14(1). 
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any other time than the expiry of its fixed term, by giving the supplier 20 business days’ notice 
in writing or other recorded manner and form.1360 
Under section 14(2)(c) and 14(2)(d), the supplier must, not more than 80, nor less than 40 
business days before the expiry date of the fixed term of the consumer agreement notify the 
consumer in writing or any other recordable form, of the impending expiry date, including a 
notice of any material changes that would apply if the agreement is to be renewed or may 
otherwise continue beyond the expiry date, and the options available to the consumer, that is 
on the expiry of the fixed term, the agreement will be automatically continued on a month-to-
month basis, subject to any material changes of which the supplier has given notice, as 
contemplated above, unless the consumer expressly directs the supplier to terminate the 
agreement on the expiry date, or agrees to a renewal of the agreement for a further fixed term. 
For other consumer agreements than fixed-term agreements, one has to take into account 
regulation 44(3)(o). When the consumer and the supplier are entitled to renew or not to renew 
the agreement, the term will not be deemed unfair in terms of this regulation.1361 On the other 
hand, the supplier may not insert a clause into the agreement by which the contract will be 
automatically renewed for another fixed term if the consumer does not give notice before a 
certain time of his or her intention to allow the contract to expire.1362 Such a term would distort 
the contractual equilibrium between the parties because consumers and suppliers should be on 
an equal footing as regards their right to end or withdraw from the contract. The same rationale 
can be found in item (h) of the EC Unfair Terms Directive.1363 What is more, the supplier’s 
rights should not be excessive, or the consumer’s rights excessively restricted. It is not 
sufficient that there is a formal equivalence in rights to terminate an agreement. Instead, both 
parties should enjoy rights of equal extent and value.1364 
i) Unreasonable long time to perform  
Item (p) of regulation 44(3) greylists a term allowing the supplier an unreasonably long time 
to perform.1365 
                                                             
1360 See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 273. 
1361 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 273. 
1362 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 93. 
1363 According to item (h) of the EC Unfair Terms Directive, terms 'automatically extending a contract of fixed 
duration where the consumer does not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express 
this desire not to extend the contract is unreasonably early' may be regarded as unfair. 
1364 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 6.1.1 at 44. 
1365 A similar item can be found in § 308 no. 1 BGB, according to which in standard business terms is in particular 
ineffective 'a provision by which the user reserves to himself the right to unreasonably long or insufficiently 
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The BGB and the Dutch Civil Code contain similar items. 
In terms of section 19(2), the supplier, ‘unless otherwise expressly provided or anticipated in 
an agreement’,1366 is obliged to deliver the goods or perform the services on the agreed date 
and at the agreed time, if any, or otherwise within a reasonable time after concluding the 
transaction or agreement. Therefore, section 19(2) does not per se prohibit terms which allow 
the supplier an unreasonably long time to perform. The wording in item (p) indicates however 
that an evaluative ‘reasonableness’ standard has to be applied, and once this standard is 
determined, a term failing this standard will be deemed to be unfair.1367 
Regulation 44(3)(p) has a warning function for suppliers in that they should carefully evaluate 
the reasonableness of terms regulating the time allowed for performance. Terms excluding 
liability for delays caused by situations beyond the supplier’s control may thus be fair, as 
opposed to terms serving to protect the supplier against delays for which he or she is 
responsible. In order to be fair, such terms must include factors outside the supplier’s control, 
and not factors which might be attributable to the supplier’s fault, like shortage of stock, labour 
problems, strike or labour shortage.1368 Furthermore, in order to achieve fairness, terms should 
not make it possible for suppliers to refuse redress where they are at fault, e.g., where they did 
not take reasonable steps to prevent or minimise any delay. Where there is a risk of substantial 
delay, the supplier might grant the consumer a right to cancel without penalty, in order to help 
achieve fairness with regard to an exclusion of liability for delay caused by circumstances 
beyond the supplier’s control.1369 
Finally, terms such as ‘force majeure’ or ‘Act of God’, which refer to a subsequent 
impossibility of performance through forces of nature, the conduct of third parties for whom 
the parties to the contract are not responsible, or unforeseen circumstances1370 should be 
avoided as they are legal jargon. Otherwise, they always should be clearly explained.1371 
                                                             
specific periods of time for acceptance or rejection of an offer or for rendering performance (…)'. Also art 
6:237(e) BW contains a similar provision. 
1366 Emphasis added. 
1367 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 94. 
1368 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 2.6.1-2.6.7 at 31-32. 
1369 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 2.6.5-2.6.6 at 32. 
1370 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 412. 
1371 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.6.7 at 32. 
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3.4.3 Penalty clauses and similar clauses 
a)   One-sided forfeiture clauses 
In term of regulation 44(3)(q), a clause allowing the supplier to retain a payment by the 
consumer where the latter fails to conclude or perform the agreement, without giving the 
consumer the right to be compensated in the same amount if the supplier fails to conclude or 
perform the agreement (without depriving the consumer of the right to claim damages as an 
alternative) is presumed to be unfair.1372 
The EC Unfair Terms Directive1373 and the Australian Consumer Law1374 contain similar 
provisions. 
The rationale behind paragraph (q) is that a term by which a substantial prepayment or deposit 
is entirely non-refundable, whatever the circumstances, conflicts with the principle that a party 
has normally the right to cancel the contract and receive a refund of any prepayments.1375 
Section 51(1)(h) blacklists standard terms that require the consumer to forfeit any money to the 
supplier if the consumer exercises any right in terms of the Act, or to which the supplier is not 
entitled in terms of the Act or any other law. Naudé correctly brings forward that this provision 
means that a supplier is not entitled to require a consumer to forfeit any money in terms of an 
agreement where this is forbidden by the Act or any other law. It does not mean that the supplier 
needs to be specifically entitled to do so in terms of the Act or other law.1376 As discussed 
further above under section 51, otherwise, too many clauses would be invalidated. This would 
not be consistent with the presumption of statutory interpretation that legislation does not alter 
the existing law more than necessary.1377 What is more, the negative formulation of 
                                                             
1372 This item is similar to item (d) of the Annex to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 according to which terms 'permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the 
consumer where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to 
receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling 
the contract' may be regarded as unfair. 
1373 Terms 'permitting the (…) supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decides not to 
conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent 
amount from the (…) supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract' may be regarded as unfair in 
terms of item (d) of the Annex to the EC Unfair Terms Directive. 
1374 Section 25(1)(c) of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010) 
lists 'a term that penalises (…) one party (but not another party) for a breach or termination of the contract'. 
1375 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 4.2 at 38. 
1376 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 97. 
1377 Du Plessis Re-interpretation 252, Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6 
and Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 97. See also Naudé 2009 SALJ 524. 
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subparagraph (ii) ('is not entitled') speaks for this point of view, meaning that a prohibitive 
provision in the Act or any other law is required in order to invalid the term in question. 
As the supplier is allowed to impose a reasonable charge for cancellation of the order or 
reservation made by the consumer in terms of section 17(3), this kind of forfeiture clauses 
neither fall under the prohibition of section 51 nor in the scope of regulation 44(3)(q). This 
means that clauses which satisfy the requirements of section 17 are deemed to be fair, even if 
they are not reciprocal and do not grant the same right to the consumer in the case where the 
supplier fails to perform. The cancellation fee must however be ‘reasonable’ since otherwise it 
can be challenged in terms of item (q).1378  
Section 17 does not apply to franchise agreements or special-order goods.1379 The exclusion of 
franchise agreements only applies to the relationship between the franchisee and the franchisor 
though but not in terms of third parties. Thus, section 17 applies when the goods are not ordered 
in terms of the franchise agreement because all franchisees are considered consumers 
regardless of their annual turnover or asset value.1380  
Special-order goods are defined in section 1 as ‘goods that a supplier expressly or implicitly 
was required or expected to procure, create or alter specifically to satisfy the consumer’s 
requirements’.1381 Where a supplier must order specific goods which are usually not in stock, 
this can be qualified as the procurement of a product to satisfy the consumer’s requirements. 
A consumer requiring from the supplier that a specific product be delivered in a colour other 
than normally available, e.g., wooden furniture that has to be repainted in a colour that is not 
offered by the supplier, qualifies as alteration in terms of special-order goods. Finally, a 
supplier who is required to build a wooden and metal garden pavilion for which the consumer 
provides her plans and ideas can be considered to be a creation of a product in terms of the 
definition of ‘special-order goods’. Industries that will be affected the most by section 17 are 
the airline and travel industry.1382 
The consumer’s cancellation must be made before the supplier procures its goods or services. 
A ‘cancellation’ is an express notice by the consumer to withdraw from his or her agreement 
with the supplier before the latter takes steps in terms of the delivery of his products or services. 
                                                             
1378 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 96. 
1379 Section 17(1). 
1380 Section 5(7). De Stadler ‘Section 17’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
1381 Emphasis added. 
1382 De Stadler ‘Section 17’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
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Therefore, a consumer who does not show, or simply refuses the acceptance of goods or 
services does not cancel but is simply in breach, except where such a conduct is justified.1383 
The reasonableness of the cancellation charge under section 17(3)(b) is subject to regulation 
44(3)(q). Section 17(4) provides guidelines for the determination of a reasonable cancellation 
charge. When determining the amount of such a fee, the supplier has to take into consideration 
the nature of the goods or services that were reserved or booked.1384 It is therefore suggested 
that a supplier of exclusive safaris where a small number of guests stay in luxurious 
accommodations, the food is prepared by a renowned chef, and they are accompanied by well-
trained guides, will be able to retain a higher cancellation charge than one who supplies mass 
holiday packages in over-crowded resorts. Another factor is the length of notice of cancellation 
provided by the consumer.1385 It is further suggested that this factor is closely linked to section 
17(4)(c) concerning the reasonable potential for the service provider, acting diligently, to find 
an alternative consumer between the time of receiving the cancellation notice and the time of 
the cancelled reservation. The longer in advance the consumer cancels, the more likely the 
supplier will find another consumer for his or her goods or services. It is further my submission 
that a supplier can charge a cancellation fee up to 100% if a client cancels the agreement, for 
instance, a booking in a hotel during the low season, in the last minute. The fact that the 
consumer did not use the room and that it had not to be cleaned afterwards is not an argument 
in favour of the consumer as those costs are fixed costs for a hotel which pay their staff the 
same amount regardless of the number of rooms to be cleaned on a particular day. Moreover, 
it is irrelevant if the hotel manager finds another guest instead. Paragraph (c) of section 17 only 
requires a ‘reasonable potential’ to find an alternative consumer, and not if an alternative 
consumer has actually been found. The fourth factor to be taken into account for the 
reasonableness of the cancellation fee is the general practice of the relevant industry. This 
factor is astonishing however as it would cement the status quo of the relevant industry and 
perpetuate unfair practices.1386 This factor could assist the consumer in cases though where the 
supplier charges cancellation fees that are higher than the standard of the relevant industry.1387 
It should be regarded with suspicion for the reason mentioned above though. 
                                                             
1383 De Stadler ‘Section 17’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
1384 Section 17(4)(a). 
1385 Section 17(4)(b). 
1386 See the discussion on reg 44(3)(g) supra. 
1387 De Stadler ‘Section 17’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9 note 2. 
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The word ‘and’ at the end of section 17(4)(c) indicates that the four factors have to be 
cumulatively taken into consideration. The assessment of the reasonableness of the cancellation 
fee will therefore depend on many factors against the backdrop of the actual situation. A well-
located hotel in a big city with good standards will thus be able to charge higher amounts than 
a family-run B&B in a remote area. 
It has to be kept in mind though that in many contracts, suppliers do not have any interest in 
being able to cancel as this would mean that the respective deal is lost. If the supplier agrees to 
accept a hefty penalty for cancelling the agreement, this does therefore not necessarily 
‘balance’ a term imposing a severe penalty on the consumer for cancelling. The consumer does 
not enjoy a real benefit in this case, although the clause seems to be 'balanced' for both parties. 
A real equilibrium exists where both parties roughly bear the same risk of losing because of 
the other party's cancellation.1388  
Although the Act does not require that the method of calculation be included in the contract, it 
is recommended that the supplier include a specific clause in terms of which the consumer can 
calculate the fee him- or herself, instead of relying solely on the Act or including a general 
clause such as ‘a reasonable cancellation charge may apply’.1389 This could be done by 
providing a sliding scale in which factors such as the length of the notice in advance and the 
season (high or low season) are set out. 
Section 17(5) provides that no cancellation fee may be imposed if the consumer is unable to 
honour the booking because of the death or hospitalisation of the person for whom or for whose 
benefit the booking was made. The supplier is entitled to require proof of the dead or 
hospitalisation, in order to prevent abuse of this subsection.1390 The legislator clearly wants to 
protect consumers in cases which are beyond his or her control. It is however surprising that it 
did include ‘hospitalisation’ as a reason as cases are conceivable where a consumer falls sick 
and is not obliged to stay in hospital, but unable to honour his or her agreement. What is more, 
the length of hospitalisation does often depend on factors which are not always medical. Health 
insurances and hospitals aim to cut costs and tend to limit the length of hospitalisation. Besides, 
medical advancement allows patients to be treated at home. It is furthermore suggested that the 
term ‘hospitalisation’ must be interpreted widely and includes the stay in a psychiatric 
                                                             
1388 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 4.4 at 39. 
1389 De Stadler ‘Section 17’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 10. 
1390 De Stadler ‘Section 17’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11. 
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establishment as well as quarantines. Furthermore, cases of force majeure should be included 
in subsection (5) of section 17. 
Better consumer protection would thus be achieved if the legislator had chosen a more 
extensive and better-defined range of reasons, such as: 
'… because of the death of the person for whom, or for whose benefit the booking, 
reservation or order was made, or for any other medical, psychological or psychiatric 
reason or treatment which was not known by the consumer at the time of his or her 
booking, reservation or order as well as any case of force majeure which makes it 
objectively impossible for the consumer to honour his or her agreement'.1391 
The phrase ‘objectively impossible’ in the aforementioned suggestion means that not the 
consumer’s personal view is to be taken into account, but the opinion of a medical professional. 
In a situation where the supplier breaches the contract, and the consumer cancels it, the 
consumer is normally entitled to get a refund under the common law. Conversely, if the 
consumer is in breach, and the supplier cancels the contract for this reason, the consumer will 
also be entitled to restitution under the rules of the common law.1392 The consumer will be 
liable to compensate the supplier for his or her actual loss in the form of damages, however. 
Therefore, a clause under which a supplier is entitled to retain a deposit or prepayment by the 
consumer, without granting the latter the right to be compensated in an equivalent amount in 
cases where the supplier is in breach, would be presumed to be unfair.1393 
Another solution would consist of a financial penalty1394 in case of breach. However, if the 
amount is out of proportion of the actual harm suffered by the supplier, the court may reduce 
it under section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act.1395 
                                                             
1391 Suggested modification of s 17(5) emphasised. 
1392 According to Walkers Fruit Farms v Sumner 1930 TPD 30, this does not apply if the payment was made in 
respect of an obligation which accrued as a separate cause of action independent from the executory part of the 
agreement, i.e., divisible from the remainder of the contract. This is the case, for instance, for the payment of rent 
regarding a period for which the consumer had already been given beneficial occupation by the lessor. 
1393 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 98. 
1394 A penalty, is defined, by virtue of s 1(2) of the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962 as '[a]ny sum of 
money for the payment of which or anything for the delivery or performance of which a person may so become 
liable (…).'  
1395 15 of 1962. Section 1(1) of the Conventional Penalties Act: ‘A stipulation, hereafter referred to as a penalty 
stipulation, whereby it is provided that any person shall, in respect of an act or omission in conflict with a 
contractual obligation, be liable to pay a sum of money or to deliver or perform anything for the benefit of any 
other person, hereafter referred to as a creditor, either by way of a penalty or as liquidated damages, shall, subject 
to the provisions of this Act, be capable of being enforced in any competent court.’ Section 3 of the Conventional 
Penalties Act: ‘If upon the hearing of a claim for a penalty, it appears to the court that such penalty is out of 
proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor by reason of the act or omission in respect of which the penalty 
was stipulated, the court may reduce the penalty to such extent as it may consider equitable in the circumstances: 
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According to section 1 of the Conventional Penalties Act, terms incorporated in a contract shall 
be deemed penalty stipulations, when the clause provides that any person shall, in respect of 
an act or omission in conflict with a contractual obligation, be liable to pay a sum of money or 
deliver or perform anything for the benefit of any other person, either by way of penalty or as 
liquidated damages.1396 In terms of this provision, all penalty stipulations are prima facie 
enforceable once the existence of a valid and enforceable contract is established, a penalty 
stipulation is contained therein and there is a breach of the given contract.1397 
In practice, item (q) of regulation 44(3) should be of minor relevance. First, as Naudé correctly 
points out, item (q) only operates in circumstances which are not covered by section 17 and 
only apply in situations where the forfeiture clause was intended to operate when the contract 
is cancelled after breach of one of the parties.1398 Second, suppliers will tend to insert penalty 
clauses rather than a clause which is presumed to be unfair in terms of this item. By doing so, 
the consumer is not necessarily more vulnerable because in situations where the penalty is out 
of proportion to the damage suffered by the supplier, the court must take into consideration 
equity, by not only the creditor’s (supplier’s) proprietary interest but every other rightful 
interest which may be affected by the act or omission in question.1399 It is my submission that 
‘every other rightful interest’ also includes the debtor’s (consumer’s) interests. Otherwise the 
phrase ‘may reduce the penalty to such extent as it may consider equitable in the circumstances’ 
would make no sense because in order to determine equity, all aspects concerning the parties 
involved have to be taken into account. A drawback of penalty clauses as opposed to forfeiture 
clauses is however that the proactive and extra-judicial effect of the items of the greylist is 
somehow circumvented as suppliers probably will tend to put an unreasonably high penalty 
into their contracts hoping that the consumer will not go to court. Consumers do most likely 
not know about the Conventional Penalties Act, contrary to the Consumer Protection Act. 
                                                             
Provided that in determining the extent of such prejudice the court shall take into consideration not only the 
creditor's proprietary interest, but every other rightful interest which may be affected by the act or omission in 
question.’ 
1396 See Vessio LLD thesis 463. 
1397 Belcher 1964 SALJ 84. 
1398 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 98. 
1399 Section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962. 
 251   
 
b)  Penalty clauses 
A clause is presumed to be unfair in terms of regulation 44(3)(r) if it requires any consumer 
who fails to fulfil his or her obligation to pay damages which significantly exceed the harm 
suffered by the supplier. 
The EC Unfair Terms Directive1400 contains a similar item, although it speaks of a 
'disproportionally high sum in compensation' instead of 'significantly exceed the harm'. 
The rationale behind this provision is that it is unfair if the consumer has to pay higher 
compensation for a breach than a reasonable pre-estimate of the actual loss caused to the 
supplier.1401 Conversely, if a clause merely stipulates that the amount payable just has to cover 
the ordinary expenses or other loss incurred by the supplier it may be fair.1402 
Like item (q), item (r) also operates in cases where the contract is cancelled after breach, with 
the exception that item (r) only applies in case of breach by the consumer. In contrast, item (q) 
operates in case of breach by either party.1403 
For the aggrieved party (the supplier), a penalty clause has the advantage that he or she may 
claim the penalty without the need to prove any loss and their extent.1404 Examples for item (r) 
are clauses stipulating that the consumer has to pay excessive storage fees where he or she 
failed to take delivery as agreed, or saying that the supplier is entitled to claim all its costs and 
expenses and not just its net costs, or – more excessively – to claim both the supplier’s costs as 
well as its loss of profit where this would lead to a double compensation of the same loss.1405 
Penalty clauses which give the supplier excessive discretion to decide the level of a penalty, or 
a clause which is formulated in a vague, misunderstanding way are most likely to be unfair in 
the OFT’s view. Hence, legal terminology and terms such as ‘mitigation’ should be avoided.1406 
On the other hand, terms which require the consumer to pay a sum which represents a real and 
fair pre-estimate of the costs or loss of profit the supplier will probably suffer, or merely stating 
that the consumer can be liable to pay reasonable compensation, are most likely to be fair.1407 
                                                             
1400 Item (e) of the Annex to the EC Unfair Terms Directive. 
1401 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 5.1 at 40. 
1402 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 99. 
1403 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 98. 
1404 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 379. 
1405 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 5.2 and 5.3 at 40. 
1406 This is already set out in s 22. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 5.5 at 41. 
1407 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 5.7 at 41. 
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In terms of regulation 44(4)(d), item (r) of subregulation (3) does not apply to any penalty, fee 
or compensation which the supplier is entitled to charge under the provisions of the Act or any 
other law. Item (r) thus does not apply to cancellation fees in terms of section 17 and sums 
payable for fixed-term agreements in terms of section 14. 
Item (r) of the greylist seems superfluous because the Conventional Penalties Act already 
provides for a similar provision. It is however disputable if the phrase ‘(…) significantly exceed 
the harm suffered by the supplier’ in item (r) has the same meaning as ‘out of proportion to the 
prejudice suffered by the creditor’ in section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act.1408 Even 
though both expressions contain an evaluative element, it is suggested that an amount payable 
may significantly exceed the harm suffered without being out of proportion. In practice, these 
differences should not cause any problems, however, as in both cases the courts will consider 
the circumstances of the given case. 
It is noteworthy that the legislator chose a formulation according to which the payable damage 
must significantly exceed the actual damage. At first sight, this does not seem to be very 
consumer-friendly. The wording begs the question why the consumer should pay a higher 
damage than the supplier has actually suffered, especially in cases where the Act applies. One 
should keep in mind though that the consumer is in breach after all. As the word ‘penalty 
clause’ indicates, there is a penalising element contained in such a clause. 
Even though the Conventional Penalties Act already provides for a legal framework in these 
cases, paragraph (r) could have an extra-judicial and proactive effect because the Consumer 
Protection Act is more likely to be known by laypersons than the Conventional Penalties Act. 
Besides, the fact that the provision is contained in the ‘checklist’ of regulation 44(3) helps non-
lawyers and suppliers when assessing whether a term is suspicious.1409 
c)  Unreasonable high remuneration upon termination by either party 
Greylisted in terms of regulation 44(3)(s) are also clauses permitting the supplier, upon 
termination of the agreement by either party, to demand unreasonably high remuneration for 
the use of a thing or right, or for performance made, or to demand unreasonably high 
reimbursement of expenditure.1410 
                                                             
1408 Also item (e) of the EC Unfair Terms Directive contains the word 'disproportionally'. 
1409 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 99. 
1410 This item is based on § 308 no. 7 BGB which declares clauses ineffective by which 'the user, to provide for 
the event that a party to the contract revokes the contract or gives notice of termination of the contract, may 
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Under regulation 44(4)(d), item (s) of subregulation (3) does not apply to any penalty, fee or 
compensation which the supplier is entitled to charge under the provisions of the Act or any 
other law. This item is therefore not applicable to compensation for use according to section 
20(6)(c). Section 20(6) determines in which cases the supplier may impose a charge upon the 
consumer if the latter returns any goods.1411  
This item applies to provisions which operate where the contract is terminated for reasons other 
than breach. It therefore has a wider scope of application than item (r).1412 Such clauses are 
often used to deter consumers from terminating an agreement.1413  
The legislator chose the word ‘unreasonable’/’unreasonably’ in item (l) (‘without reasonable 
notice’) and item (p) (‘unreasonably long time to perform’) to describe a period of time, 
whereas it uses ‘unreasonably’ in item (s) in connection with an amount of money 
(‘unreasonably high remuneration’/’unreasonably high reimbursement’). In item (r) it chose 
the word ‘significantly’ instead. It is doubtful that the legislature chose this expression merely 
for stylistic reasons. It is submitted that it aimed to stress the evaluative element because it also 
uses the term ‘unreasonable’ in section 48(1)(a)(i) in connection with the price to be paid by 
the consumer. In practice, this distinction should have no impact, however, since for the 
enquiry of whether the amount is reasonable, the courts might have to rely on a standard that 
includes whether the amount significantly exceeds the objective value of the received 
performance or use, like in Germany.1414 
                                                             
demand a) unreasonably high remuneration for enjoyment or use of a thing or a right or for performance rendered, 
or b) unreasonably high reimbursement of expenses'. 
1411 The supplier may not charge the consumer if the goods are returned in the original unopened packaging 
(s 20(6)(a)). If the goods are in their original condition and repackaged in their original packaging, the supplier 
may charge the consumer a reasonable amount for use of the goods during the time they were in its possession, 
or any consumption or depletion of the goods, unless that consumption or depletion is limited to a reasonable 
amount necessary to determine whether the goods were acceptable to the consumer (s 20(6)(b)). In any other case, 
the consumer may charge a reasonable amount for the use of the goods or any consumption or depletion, and for 
necessary restoration costs to render the goods fit for re-stocking, unless the consumer had to destroy the 
packaging in order to determine whether the goods conformed to the description or sample provided, or were fit 
for the intended purpose (s 20(6)(c)). 
1412 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 100. 
1413 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 125. 
1414 Locher Recht der AGB 137. See discussion on § 308 no. 7 in Part II ch 5 para 2.3.7. 
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3.4.4 Transfer of obligations and rights 
a)   Transfer of obligations without the consumer’s agreement 
Regulation 44(3)(t) refers to terms giving the supplier the possibility of transferring his or her 
obligations under the agreement to the detriment of the consumer, without the consumer’s 
agreement. 
This item in the greylist only refers to the transfer of obligations, and not to the transfer of 
rights, unlike EU1415 or German1416 law. The issue of free assignability of claims, i.e., rights, 
which is an essential factor in the credit economy, is therefore not concerned by item (t).1417 
On the other hand, the Directive does not contain the phrase ‘to the detriment of the consumer’. 
Naudé asserts that the South African formulation ‘to the detriment of the consumer’ could be 
misleading as it could be argued to place the burden of proof on the consumer to show first that 
the transfer of obligations would be detrimental for him or her, before the term in question will 
be presumed to be unfair.1418 As all items in the greylist are presumed to be unfair, it is the 
supplier though who has to prove that the term in question is fair. On the other hand, the 
consumer does not have to prove that it is unfair. This presumption concerns, it is submitted, 
all elements contained in the items of the greylist, and therefore includes the phrase 'to the 
detriment of the consumer'.  
Furthermore, when determining whether a transfer of obligations has been detrimental to the 
consumer, one has to bear in mind that a consumer who had purchased a good or a service often 
did so because he or she relied on the supplier’s market reputation which the latter had built up 
by advertising, and its position in the market (goodwill etc.). When such obligations are 
transferred without the consumer’s consent, the consumer is faced with another supplier who 
might not have the same reputation. This is the case, for instance, if a term in a transportation 
contract stipulates that the supplier has the right to engage other companies to transport the 
                                                             
1415 Under item (p) of the Annex to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 
5 April 1993 clauses 'giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under 
the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter's agreement' may 
be regarded as unfair. See also art II-9:410(o) of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. 
1416 In terms of § 309 no. 10 BGB, 'a provision according to which in the case of purchase, loan or service 
agreements or agreements to produce a result a third party enters into, or may enter into, the rights and duties 
under the contract in place of the user, unless, in that provision, a) the third party is identified by name, or b) the 
other party to the contract is granted the right to free himself from the contract' is ineffective. 
1417 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 104. 
1418 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 101. 
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goods and will not be liable if such third-party companies damaged the goods.1419 Then, such 
a transfer of obligations is likely to be to the detriment of the consumer. There is also a 
significant possibility of consumer abuse as the consumer had trusted the first supplier, and 
that trust is put at stake.1420 This is even true in cases where the consumer still has the same 
rights under the agreement against the third party.1421 Naudé thus concludes that any terms 
allowing the supplier to transfer its obligations should be presumed to be to the detriment of 
the consumer and unfair.1422 It is suggested though that this point of view is too stringent 
because one should distinguish between different scenarios. 
It is, therefore, my suggestion that terms allowing a supplier, without the agreement of the 
consumer, to transfer the supplier’s obligations to a third party are always to the detriment of 
the consumer where the latter not only relied on the market reputation and goodwill of the 
supplier, but also where the supplier offers products or services that imply a more or less 
personal relationship between the parties, where trust is an important element, or where the 
parties have had an ongoing and increasingly important relationship. This is the case, for 
instance, for architects' contracts, or contracts between a lawyer and his or her client. In these 
cases, the consumer might chose the supplier also for personal reasons, such as a good 
relationship with the supplier, a personalised service, or a long-term business relationship with 
the consumer. If the supplier can easily transfer its obligations to a third party, the consumer's 
trust is simply abused. A personal choice when concluding the transaction becomes a more or 
less risky transaction for the consumer. There may even exist an element of bad faith on the 
supplier's side as he or she knew or should have known that the consumer especially chose the 
supplier for personal reasons, especially in the contract types mentioned above. 
There may be exceptions where such a transfer of obligations can be considered fair, namely 
where the consumer is entitled to cancel the agreement, the supplier remains liable for 
performance of the third party, or the transfer occurs in connection of the transfer of the 
supplier's business by which all obligations and rights are transferred.1423 It is recommended, 
however, that in the fairness review under consideration of these exceptions, the fact that the 
consumer may cancel the agreement but has to find another supplier whom he or she trusts, or 
                                                             
1419 Law Commission of England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report 
on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005) 191. 
1420 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 292. 
1421 Naudé 2007 SALJ 162-163, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 101. 
1422 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 101. 
1423 These ‘exceptions’ are listed, for instance, in article 6:236(e) BW. 
 256   
 
that the former supplier is still liable for the performance of the third party but therefore might 
suffer delays, is taken into consideration. Those exceptions eventually might be detrimental to 
the consumer. As regards the transfer of a business with all its obligations and rights the case 
may be different where the transfer occurs to a subsidiary controlled by the original supplier, 
or as a result of a merger or a similar lawful company transaction if such transaction is not 
likely to negatively affect any right of the consumer.1424 It is suggested though that this is also 
a question that has to be answered on a case-to-case basis, by considering the nature of the 
agreement between the parties, the value of the transaction and other factors such as the 
consumer’s right to cancel the agreement. 
b)   Limitation of the transferability of commercial guarantees 
Paragraph (u) of regulation 44(3) greylists terms restricting the consumer’s right to re-sell the 
goods by limiting the transferability of any commercial guarantee provided by the consumer. 
The discussion of this item is closely linked to the previous paragraph. 
The OFT pointed out that '[g]uarantees, while they remain current, can add substantial value to 
the main subject matter of the contract. If consumers cannot sell something still under guarantee 
with the benefit of that guarantee, they are effectively deprived of part of what they have paid 
for.'1425  
If the transferability of a guarantee is not allowed, the saleability of the product in question will 
necessarily be affected. This applies especially to long-term service obligations under a 
consumer agreement. It would not be fair if the subsequent purchaser should be deprived of the 
balance of the unexpired rights against the original supplier. What is more, there is no 
legitimate reason why a purchaser should deprive a subsequent purchaser of a still valid 
guarantee since the price paid to the supplier incorporated the guarantee until its stipulated 
expiration date.1426 
The OFT allowed a supplier to request proof that the guarantee was properly assigned, provided 
that the procedural requirements involved are reasonable.1427 It is suggested that where the 
subsequent purchaser (assignee) cannot present a formal contract between him or her and the 
                                                             
1424 See article 85(m) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common 
European Sales Law COM(2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011. 
1425 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.4.2 at 76. 
1426 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 292. 
1427 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.4.3 at 76. 
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former purchaser (assignor) because no such contract had been set up, a simple statement by 
which the former purchaser certifies that he or she sold the item in question to the subsequent 
purchaser suffices. 
It should be noted that paragraph (u) of regulation 44(3) only applies to the resale of goods. 
Hence, a term under which the transferability of a commercial guarantee is limited in cases 
where the consumer gives the goods to the subsequent purchaser gratuitously, i.e., as a gift, 
would therefore not be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(u) when considering this 
provision in an isolated manner.1428 This limitation is of a somewhat limited practical 
importance though as ‘consumer’ is defined in section 1 as 'a user of those particular goods 
(…), irrespective of whether that user (…) was a party to a transaction concerning the supply 
of those particular goods (…).'1429 In other words, the person who received the goods as a gift 
is considered the (original) consumer in terms of regulation 44(3)(u). This applies only though 
'if the context so requires or permits'.1430 This could be the case where the original purchaser 
buys the goods in view of giving them to another person as a gift, this is done within a 
reasonable period of time, and the original purchaser has not used the goods meanwhile. 
Consequently, a person who subsequently receives the goods free of charge by the original 
purchaser after the latter had used them, or where he or she had initially bought them without 
the intention of giving them away gratuitously, could not be considered a consumer in terms 
of section 1. For this reason, a term limiting the transferability of a guarantee for transactions 
by which the original purchaser gives the goods to another person at a later stage, or after 
having used them, would not be presumed to be unfair in terms of regulation 44(3)(u). This 
case could be regarded as one in which 'goods' become 'used goods' in terms of the definition 
in section 1. Note should be taken that 'used goods', although defined in section 1, does not 
appear anywhere else in the Act.1431  
With regard to the arguments mentioned above, this limitation has in my opinion no legitimate 
ground, however. The original purchaser bought the goods in question including a guarantee, 
and for the supplier, and it should not matter who makes a claim under this guarantee as long 
it is justified. From a supplier's perspective, it is thus irrelevant if the initial purchaser re-sold 
the goods or gave them to a third party gratuitously. The objection that a person who receives 
                                                             
1428 They could be unfair in terms of s 48 though. See reg 44(2)(b). 
1429 Section 1 s.v. 'consumer' (c). 
1430 Section 1 s.v. ‘consumer‘ (c). 
1431 De Stadler assumes that the definition of 'used goods' in s 1 is a remnant of an earlier Bill where the term was 
actually used. See De Stadler 'Section 1’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
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something gratuitously should not be able to benefit from a guarantee as he or she did not pay 
for it, is not valid and is rather based on moral considerations. As mentioned earlier, the supplier 
had sold the item including a (still valid) guarantee, i.e., the selling price reflected the inclusion 
of a guarantee, and there is no reason why a donee should not benefit from it. Otherwise, the 
supplier would have an economic benefit in the form of the paid price for the guarantee without 
entirely granting the equivalent benefit, that is the remaining time of the guarantee. 
Paragraph (u) should hence be amended either by replacing the verb 're-sell' by 'alienate', or, 
as the latter term is legal jargon, by reformulating the phrase in question as follows: 'by 
restricting the consumer's right to re-sell the goods or dispose of them in any other way.'1432  
3.4.5 Terms relating to statements 
a)   Deemed statements and acknowledgements 
Under regulation 44(3)(v), a term is presumed to be unfair if it provides that the consumer must 
be deemed to have made or not made a statement or acknowledgement to his or her detriment, 
unless (i) a suitable period of time is granted to him or her for the making of an express 
declaration in respect thereof, and (ii) at the commencement of the period the supplier draws 
the attention of the consumer to the meaning that will be attached to his or her conduct. 
The rationale of this item is that according to certain terms, the consumer has to make a certain 
statement as otherwise he or she will be deemed to have consented to a particular state of 
affairs. The consumer bears the burden to interpret and react to such a statement required by 
the supplier, which may have onerous consequences for the consumer.1433 
For this item, §§ 308 no. 5 BGB1434 and 6(1) no. 2 KSchG1435 served as a model. According to 
regulation 44(3)(v)(ii), the supplier has to draw the consumer’s attention to the meaning that 
will be attached to his or her conduct. Naudé argues that this wording is not explicit enough 
and should be revised according to the German legislation because the latter would be clearer 
                                                             
1432 Suggested amendment emphasised. 
1433 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 294. 
1434 § 308 no. 5 BGB: '[A] provision by which a declaration by the other party to the contract with the user, made 
when undertaking or omitting a specific act, is deemed to have been made or not made by the user unless a) the 
other party to the contract is granted a reasonable period of time to make an express declaration, and b) the user 
agrees to especially draw the attention of the other party to the contract to the intended significance of his 
behaviour at the beginning of the period of time' is without effect. 
1435 In terms of § 6(1) no. 2 KSchG, the consumer should not be bound by a provision whereby 'a specific conduct 
by the consumer is deemed to constitute a declaration or failure to make a declaration, except when the consumer 
is expressly informed of the significance of his conduct at the beginning of the time limit provided and is allowed 
a reasonable period in which to make an express declaration'. 
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in that the supplier itself must draw the consumer's attention to the meaning that will be 
attached to his or her conduct.1436 However, § 308 no. 5 lit. b) BGB merely reads: '(unless) the 
user agrees to especially draw the attention of the other party to the contract to the intended 
significance of his behaviour at the beginning of the period of time.' Apart from the use of 
synonyms in the official translation (‘commencement of the period’/’beginning of the period 
of time’, ‘draws the intention of the consumer’/’agrees to especially draw the attention of the 
other party to the contract’, ‘to the meaning that will be attached to his or her 
conduct’/significance of his behaviour”), the German phrase ‘to especially draw the attention’ 
seems to be a bit stronger than the South African ‘draws the attention’. The German phrase 'der 
Verwender sich verpflichtet' (literally 'the user obligates himself') has been translated in the 
official translation1437 by 'the user agrees'; the German text is thus a bit stronger here again. 
Since the South African text is written in the active voice ('the supplier draws the attention'), it 
is however clear enough in my view that it is the supplier who is addressed by this obligation 
and not someone else. 
Regulation 44(3)(v) only applies to terms relating to acknowledgements which are not already 
prohibited elsewhere in the Act.1438 The Consumer Protection Act contains several of such 
prohibitions. Section 51(1)(g) blacklists a term if 'it falsely expresses an acknowledgement by 
the consumer that (i) before1439 the agreement was made, no representations or warranties were 
made in connection with the agreement by the supplier or a person on behalf of the supplier, 
or (ii) the consumer has received goods or services, or a document that is required by th[e] Act 
to be delivered to the consumer.' More implicitly, section 31(1)(b) provides that a supplier must 
not 'offer to enter into or modify an agreement for the supply of any goods or services  (…) on 
the basis that the goods or services are to be supplied, or the agreement or modification will 
automatically come into existence, unless the consumer declines such offer (…).' Any 
agreement or modification made in conflict with this provision is void.1440 Furthermore, section 
49(1)(d) provides that any notice to consumers or provision of a consumer agreement that 
purports to be an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer must be drawn to the attention 
of the consumer in plain language and in a conspicuous manner and form likely to attract the 
consumer’s attention and that the consumer must be given an adequate opportunity to receive 
                                                             
1436 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 105. 
1437 Available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. 
1438 See reg 44(2)(d). 
1439 Emphasis added. 
1440 Section 31(2) and (3). 
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and comprehend such provision. Lastly, section 49(2) in fine states that if a provision or notice 
concerns any activity or facility that is subject to any risk the consumer must have assented to 
the provision or notice by signing or initialling the provision or otherwise acting in a manner 
consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the 
provision. 
When excluding the above-mentioned provisions, the scope of application of item (v) is limited 
to terms that apply to acknowledgements which are deemed to have been made after the 
conclusion of the agreement and which do not relate to amendments of the agreement itself.1441 
This item has therefore a rather narrow ambit. 
b)  Deemed receipt of statements made by the supplier 
According to paragraph (w) of regulation 44(3), a term providing that a statement made by the 
supplier which is of particular interest to the consumer is deemed to have reached the consumer 
is presumed to be unfair, unless such statement has been sent by prepaid registered post to the 
chosen address of the consumer. 
The South African Law Commission's Bill1442 contained a similar item. §§ 308 no. 6 BGB1443 
and 6(1) no. 3 KSchG1444 contain similar items. The Austrian provision comes closer to the 
South African item than the German provision though. 
Such a term deprives the consumer of its defence that it has actually not received the 
communication unless the statement has been sent by prepaid registered post which reduces 
the risk of the dispute of whether it has been received. In addition, the item ensures that the 
burden of proof is born by the supplier.1445 
Naudé takes the view that with regard to the prevalence of more modern forms of 
communication, such as e-mail, the following words should be added at the end of paragraph 
(w): '(…) or by another means of communication chosen by the consumer for such statements'. 
                                                             
1441 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 106. 
1442 Section 2(r) of the Law Commission's Bill published in their Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in 
Contracts and the Rectifications of Contracts (Project 47) (1998). 
1443 § 308 no. 6 BGB: '[A] provision providing that a declaration by the user that is of special importance is 
deemed to have been received by the other party to the contract' is ineffective. 
1444 § 6(1) no. 3 KSchG: The consumer shall not by bound by a provision whereby 'a declaration of legal 
significance for the consumer sent by the entrepreneur, which is not received by the former, is deemed to have 
been received by him, unless it is a matter of the validity of a declaration sent to the consumer’s last known address 
in the event of the consumer not having notified the entrepreneur of a change of address.' 
1445 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 295. 
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She points out that this would narrow down the scope of application of this item to terms 
providing that a statement will be deemed to have reached the consumer where it was not sent 
by such a means of communication.1446 
Naudé’s opinion is reasonable also from a practical point of view since the South African Post 
Office is rather unreliable due to various factors.1447 Thus, the inclusion of other means of 
communication would be an advantage in order to avoid unnecessary frustration and disputes. 
In this regard, it is suggested that the reference to 'registered prepaid post' cannot be 
extrapolated to include other forms of communication, which is the case for article 13 of the 
CISG, for instance, where it is generally recognised that 'telex' and 'telegram' also include more 
modern means of communication.1448 
Unlike registered mail, the recipient of an e-mail does not have to confirm reception by his or 
her signature, and the supplier does not have to worry that its message went into his or her 
spam folder, or is simply not delivered or delivered without attachments, although the supplier 
has done everything it could. Pursuant to section 23 ECTA,1449 '[a] data message (a) used in 
the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be regarded as having been sent by the 
originator when it enters an information system outside the control of the originator or, if the 
originator and addressee are in the same information system when it is capable of being 
retrieved by the addressee, (b) must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when 
the complete data message enters an information system designated or used for that purpose by 
the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the addressee; and (c) must 
be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual place of business or residence and 
as having been received at the addressee's usual place of business or residence.' As the ECTA 
is applicable in terms of section 4(1) because it applies in respect of any electronic transaction 
or data message, its application is not excluded by Schedule 1 ECTA. Furthermore, in terms of 
                                                             
1446 Naudé points out that the current wording of item (w) has been inserted per incuriam, since the DTI had 
promised to amend it in the final version of the regulation by taking into consideration more modern forms of 
communication, such as e-mail. Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 107. 
1447 These are, amongst others, many strikes in recent years, poor service delivery and poor communication and 
unsatisfactory handling of complaints by consumers. See e.g., Mail & Guardian of 5 October 2016: 'Post Office 
closes 221 outlets amid R1.1bn loss' at https://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-05-post-office-closes-221-outlets-amid-
r11bn-loss, Mail & Guardian of 28 October 2015: 'Post office wins court order against strike' at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-28-post-office-wins-court-order-against-worker-strike. 
1448 This is assured by the principle of technological neutrality, according to which the rules of the CISG are 
'neutral', i.e., they do not depend on or presuppose the use of particular types of technology and could be applied 
to communication and storage of all types of information. See Eiselen FS Kritzer 124 and 125, with further 
references. 
1449 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
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section 26(1) ECTA, an acknowledgement of receipt of a data message is not necessary to give 
legal effect to that message. It is not required that the consumer confirms reception of the 
supplier's e-mail. This does not mean however that the supplier should not invite the recipient 
to confirm reception to prevent misunderstandings, although this is legally not necessary.  
Van Eeden points out that item (w) does not provide for situations where a supplier knows or 
has reason to know that the consumer’s given address is no longer his address of choice.1450 It 
is my submission that one has to distinguish here between different scenarios: First, the 
scenario is imaginable where the consumer informs the supplier of its new address. Then this 
address becomes the ‘chosen address of the consumer’ in terms of item (w) in fine as this item 
does not provide that the chosen address is necessarily the address chosen at the time when the 
contract has been concluded. In order to avoid unnecessary complications, consumer 
agreements, especially those which provide for further statements or communications between 
the parties, should always include a provision according to which the consumer has to update 
the supplier of any change of address. Second, there may be cases where the consumer does 
not explicitly but implicitly inform the supplier of its new address, for instance, in a letter to 
the supplier containing the consumer’s new address in the letterhead. Although there is no 
explicit information concerning an address change, the supplier has in my opinion always an 
obligation in terms of its commercial diligence to check not only information such as the order 
number, the customer’s name and the ordered goods or services but also the address. This 
applies especially where the supplier sends communications to the consumer. In those cases, 
the supplier should reasonably have known the consumer’s new address. If the supplier sends 
its communication to the former address, it should therefore be deemed not to have reached the 
consumer. This is also the case in the third scenario, where the supplier sends its 
communication knowingly to the consumer’s former address. Naudé correctly argues that this 
would amount to unconscionable behaviour or unfair tactics in the enforcement of the 
agreement, and therefore unconscionable conduct under section 40.1451  
It is suggested that in (the admittedly rare) fourth scenario where the supplier has knowledge 
of the fact that the consumer changed his or her address but does not know the address, the 
supplier should take reasonable steps in order to find out this new address. An e-mail to the 
consumer or a phone call should be sufficient in this regard. Although item (w) does not provide 
                                                             
1450 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 295. 
1451 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 107. 
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for any other obligations for the supplier than sending the statement to the address chosen by 
the consumer, the fact that the supplier sends any communication knowingly to the consumer's 
former address (although he or she does not know the new address), without taking reasonable 
steps to find out the new address should also be treated as unconscionable behaviour in terms 
of section 40. If the supplier could not find out the new address, it should not be penalised, 
however. The same applies if the consumer did not collect his or her mail or provided a wrong 
address.1452 It is suggested that this not only applies to cases where the supplier has inserted a 
clause by which the consumer must inform the supplier of any change of address since the 
supplier should not bear the consequences of the consumer's neglect. 
There are also cases imaginable where the consumer did not communicate its new address to 
the supplier. In these cases, the supplier has no obligation to find out the new address, and the 
statement should be deemed to have reached the consumer. Interestingly, this scenario is 
explicitly spelt out in § 6(1) no. 3 KSchG. 
3.4.6 Enforcement on the agreement by consumers 
a)  Terms excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise 
any other legal remedy 
Pursuant to regulation 44(3)(x), a term is presumed to be unfair if it excludes or hinders the 
consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, including by requiring 
the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by the Act or other 
legislation. 
This item is based on item (q) in the EC Unfair Contract Term Directive.1453 
From the wording of this item, it is clear that arbitration covered by the Act, for instance, the 
involvement of an applicable industry ombud accredited for the particular sector,1454 is not 
                                                             
1452 Otto takes this stance as regards the (now abolished) Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. See Otto Credit Law 
Service 29. 
1453 Under item (q) of the Annex to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 
5 April 1993 clauses 'excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other legal 
remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according 
to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract' may be regarded as unfair. Article 84(d) of the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales 
Law COM(2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011 blacklists such terms outright: A contract term is always unfair 
for the purposes of this Section if its object or effect is to 'exclude or hinder the consumer's right to take legal 
action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to 
an arbitration system not foreseen generally in legal provisions that apply to contracts between a trader and a 
consumer'. 
1454 See s 69. 
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regarded as unfair. What is more, there is nothing to say against clauses by which a consumer 
actually agrees to have settled a dispute that has already arisen to arbitration instead of 
submitting it to a court, if he or she has been informed in advance of the potential costs 
involved.1455 
In this context, it is interesting to note that certain unfair enforcement clauses are prohibited, 
i.e., blacklisted outright. Section 51((1)(ii) provides that 'an undertaking to sign in advance any 
documentation relating to enforcement of the agreement, irrespective of whether such 
documentation is complete or incomplete at the time it is signed' is not allowed, and 
subparagraph (iii) of the same provision prohibits 'a consent to a predetermined value of costs 
relating to enforcement of the agreement, except to the extent that is consistent with th[e] Act'. 
Under the common law, clauses superseding the courts' jurisdiction by prohibiting the 
consumer from seeking redress, or preventing him or her from defending him- or herself, are 
also prohibited.1456 Finally, terms by which the consumer agrees in advance that a certain 
magistrates' court which would normally have no jurisdiction under section 28 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act,1457 which provides the jurisdiction in respect of persons, are also void. 
Section 45 of the Magistrates' Courts Act provides that such consent may only be validly given 
if it 'is given specifically with reference to particular proceedings already instituted or about to 
be instituted in such court'.1458 
The problem with compulsory arbitration clauses under which the consumer agrees in advance 
to submit any future disputes not to the courts but to ‘private arbitration’ is that the consumer 
is unlikely to have read them, especially when they are non-negotiated or standard terms, which 
means that there is no informed consent. Moreover, the consumer is unlikely to understand the 
cost-implications in terms of arbitration which is generally much higher than court 
proceedings.1459 What is more, with regard to the costs involved, a consumer is unlikely to 
proceed to arbitration, especially when the goods or services subject to the dispute are of 
comparatively low value. This will dissuade consumers, who are more than often in a worse 
financial position than their suppliers, from taking any legal action against the supplier.1460 A 
cooling-off period, as suggested by the South African Law Commission in 2001 and 
                                                             
1455 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 109. 
1456 Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1925 AD 417 at 424, Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Essop 1997 (4) SA 
569 (D) 575-577. 
1457 32 of 1944. 
1458 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 114. 
1459 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 109. 
1460 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 111. 
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implemented in the Dutch Civil Code,1461 would not protect consumers, particularly if they are 
unaware of the high costs involved, and because of the fact that the cooling-off period will 
most probably have lapsed before the dispute arises.1462 
Suppliers sometimes have standard clauses by which the consumer agrees that the High Court 
will have jurisdiction over disputes arising from the contract, even if the Magistrates' Court 
would normally have jurisdiction over the matter. Even if successful suppliers would be limited 
in terms of the costs to the scale applicable to the Magistrates' Court, they might use this kind 
of clauses to dissuade consumers from initiating or defending legal proceedings because of the 
higher costs involved. Such clauses are likely to be unfair in terms of item (x), unless the 
supplier can convince the court that it has a legitimate interest in upholding such a clause, and 
on its fairness.1463 It is suggested that this is hardly imaginable though in a consumer context 
because of the higher costs involved and the often relatively small sums for the purchased 
goods or services. Involvement of the High Court would thus be out of proportion. 
On the other hand, terms providing for compulsory arbitration covered by the Act or other 
legislation are not greylisted. The same applies to provisions requiring the consumer to first 
take a dispute to the applicable industry ombud under section 69. 
As the Arbitration Act1464 applies to all arbitration agreements,1465 it could be argued that all 
arbitration is ‘covered by legislation’.1466 Such a broad interpretation would however make 
item (x) superfluous. In the UK, where arbitration is also governed by legislation,1467 the courts 
have interpreted this ‘exception’ to refer only to arbitration required by legislation. Compulsory 
arbitration clauses governed by the general arbitration legislation alone are still presumed to be 
unfair. Naudé correctly asserts that item (x) should be reworded in order to make it clear that 
                                                             
1461 Article 6:236(n) BW blacklists 'a stipulation which provides for the settlement of a dispute other than by a 
court with jurisdiction pursuant to law or by one or more arbitrators, unless it still allows the counterparty to 
choose for a settlement of the dispute by the court with jurisdiction pursuant to law and this choice can be made 
within a period of at least one month after the user has invoked the stipulation in writing.' 
1462 Section 58 of the Bill published in SALRC Report on Domestic Arbitration (Project 94) (2001) at 161-162. 
See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 112. 
1463 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 115. 
1464 42 of 1965. 
1465 Section 2 of the Arbitration Act only excludes '[a] reference to arbitration (…) in respect of (a) any 
matrimonial cause or any matter incidental to any such cause; or (b) any matter relating to status.' 
1466 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 110. 
1467 Arbitration Act, 1996. 
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any arbitration clause which does not refer a dispute to arbitration in terms of a dispute 
resolution system set up by the Act or other legislation will be regarded as unfair.1468 
In any event, if the legislator does not want to outlaw compulsory arbitration clauses outright, 
they should be free from the element of compulsion, and both parties should have a free choice 
as to whether to go to arbitration or not.1469 They also should be blacklisted for relatively small 
amounts. The current threshold in the UK is GBP 5,000. This amount seems to be very high at 
first sight but ensures that no expensive arbitration is possible under this threshold.1470 
In general, one has to ask when ascertaining the fairness of such a clause whether it serves the 
supplier or the consumer. In most cases, it will most probably serve the supplier who has an 
interest to dissuade consumers from legal action. The suppliers’ argument that those arbitration 
clauses serve cost-effectiveness and expedience is not convincing. Suppliers who are 
concerned about delays can be expected to make use of the statutory system of alternative 
dispute resolution for their sector. If such a system does not yet exist, they can take steps to 
have one implemented under the industry codes of conduct in terms of section 82(6).1471 Van 
Eeden puts it this way: 'The Act appears to be striving to strike a balance between judicial 
remedies and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and appears to place undue emphasis 
on the latter.'1472 
Hence, it is suggested that arbitration clauses should only be considered fair in consumer 
agreements if they are not compulsory, concern amounts above a considerable threshold which 
takes into account the relatively high arbitration costs, the consumer has been informed in 
advance about the cost implications, and the terms are fully, clearly and prominently set out in 
the consumer agreement.1473 
                                                             
1468 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 110. 
1469 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 17.3 at 67. 
1470 Section 1991 of the UK Arbitration Act, 1996. 
1471 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 111. Section 82(6): 'If (a) a 
proposed industry code provides for a scheme of alternative dispute resolution; and (b) the Commission considers 
that the scheme is adequately situated and equipped to provide alternative dispute resolution services comparable 
to those generally provided in terms of any public regulation, the Commission, when recommending that code to 
the Minister, may also recommend that the scheme be accredited as an "accredited industry ombud"'. 
1472 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 293 and 294. 
1473 See Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Buck [2008] EWHC 2172 (TCC) at 56. 
 267   
 
b)  Restricting evidence or reversing burden of proof  
Also greylisted in terms of regulation 44(3)(y) are clauses restricting the evidence available to 
the consumer or imposing on him or her a burden of proof which, according to the applicable 
law, should lie with the supplier. 
Item (q) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts served as a model for this 
item, although according to the Directive, the clause must be 'unduly' restrict the evidence.1474 
Such terms are also listed in other countries, such as Germany.1475 
This item in the greylist deals with two different scenarios: First, where a party to the contract 
unilaterally restricts evidence available to the other party, and second, where a party creates a 
burden of proof for the other.1476 In both cases, they are a hindrance to the consumer’s right to 
take legal action and typically cause the contract to be ‘excessively one-sided in favour of the 
supplier’ by disturbing a fair balance between the parties.1477 They have an effect similar to 
that of exclusion and limitation clauses.1478 
A typical clause restricting the evidence available to the consumer provides that the consumer 
has to provide the original invoice in order to have corrected a defect on the good he or she had 
purchased.1479 
The Act itself already contains a prohibition of certain false acknowledgements in section 
51(1)(g), i.e., terms purporting to limit the evidence on which a consumer may rely are invalid. 
A similar provision can be found in section 90(2)(g)(i) of the National Credit Act. Pursuant to 
regulation 44(3)(v), certain acknowledgements are presumed to be unfair. 
So-called ‘conclusive proof certificates’ under the common law which are nothing more than 
certificates established by the creditor and purporting to be conclusive proof of a certain 
                                                             
1474 Under item (q) of the Annex to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 
5 April 1993 clauses '(…) unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof 
which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract' may be regarded as unfair. 
1475 Pursuant to § 309 no. 12 BGB, 'a provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof to the disadvantage 
of the other party to the contract, in particular by a) imposing on the latter the burden of proof for circumstances 
lying in the sphere of responsibility of the user, or b) having the other party to the contract confirm certain facts 
[is ineffective]; letter (b) does not apply to acknowledgements of receipt that are signed separately or provided 
with a separate qualified electronic signature'. 
1476 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 295. 
1477 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 116, OFT Unfair Contract Terms 
Guidance (2008) para 17.1 at 67. 
1478 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 17.1 at 67. 
1479 See Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ 
Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005)191. 
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balance due by the debtor are also invalid as they are against public policy, contra bonos mores 
and unenforceable.1480 According to Van Zyl, the legality of such certificates should be 
reconsidered because 'account should be taken of business and commercial efficacy in 
considering a "conclusive proof" provision'.1481 With regard to the fact that in terms of such 
certificates the consumer is precluded from proving the contrary, and the creditor (and not an 
independent person) is the author of such certificate of balance, it is suggested, that in respect 
of the upsetting of the balance between the creditor and the debtor in favour of the creditor, 
conclusive proof certificates can never be fair.  
Under section 2(10), no provision of the Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer 
from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law. Hence, the courts should 
examine the residual rules on the normal incidence of the burden of proof which vary from 
contract to contract.1482 Section 65 provides that when a supplier has possession of any property 
belonging to or ordinarily under the control of a consumer, the supplier is liable to the owner 
of the property for any loss resulting from a failure to comply with the supplier’s obligation to 
treat that property as being its own and to handle, safeguard and utilise that property with the 
degree of care, diligence and skill that can reasonably be expected of a person responsible for 
managing any property belonging to another person. This provision seems to place the burden 
of proof on the consumer of whether the loss or damage of the goods in the supplier’s 
possession was caused by the supplier’s failure to take reasonable care. Section 65 thus deviates 
from the common-law rule according to which the supplier who takes the goods of the 
consumer into its safekeeping in the context of a depositum or bailment for reward1483 will be 
presumed to be at fault if the goods are damaged. Under section 2(10), a consumer can however 
rely on the residual rules, and a term which excludes such common-law rules and places the 
onus on the consumer will be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(y). 
Naudé argues that terms changing the onus of proof in contracts for safekeeping may 
sometimes be fair because the Act itself seems to allow such a shift.1484 On the one hand, the 
party giving the good under the control of another will have difficulties to prove how the good 
                                                             
1480 Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 15A; Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd & Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1995 (3) SA 1 (A). 
1481 Van Zyl J in Society of Lloyd’s v Romahn 2006 (4) SA 23 (C) at para [125]. 
1482 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 119. 
1483 Bailment describes the transfer of the possession of goods from one person (the 'bailor') to another person (the 
'bailee') who subsequently has possession of the property. It arises when a person gives property to someone else 
for safekeeping, hiring of goods, the loan of goods, the pledge of goods, and the delivery of goods for carriage or 
repair. It is a cause of action independent of contract or tort. See Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Bailment'. 
1484 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 119. 
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was dealt with. For the party who has the control of the good it will be easy to prove the 
measures it took for keeping the good safe, and the circumstances which lead to the damage or 
destruction of the given good. The praetor’s edict on seamen, innkeepers and stablekeepers 
provides that when goods are lost or damaged by such suppliers, the latter will be liable, except 
if they can prove one of a limited number of defences, such as vis maior.1485 There is no reason 
why innkeepers, for instance, should bear the onus of proof for goods 'occasionally' placed in 
their sphere of influence, whereas a party who agreed in safekeeping a good in terms of a 
depositum or bailment, which expressly has the object of keeping goods safe, should have the 
possibility to shift the onus onto the consumer. A term placing the burden of proof on the 
consumer will thus be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(y) in any event.  
c)  Limitation periods / Time-bar clauses 
Regulation 44(3)(z) greylists clauses imposing a limitation period that is shorter than otherwise 
applicable under the common law or legislation for legal steps to be taken by the consumer 
(including for the making of a written demand and the institution of legal proceedings). 
The EC Directive's list does not contain a similar item, although the wider formulated items 
(q) and (b) cover this issue ('excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action', 
'inappropriately excluding or restricting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or 
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate 
performance'). 
Section 11(d) of the Prescription Act1486 provides that the general prescription period, save 
where an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, is three years 'in respect of any other debt' than 
debts mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of this provision. Section 11(d) of the Prescription Act 
includes consumer contracts. 
The Consumer Protection Act is such an Act of Parliament and lays down specific prescription 
periods. The parties cannot deviate from these by agreement.1487 One of those provisions is 
section 56(2) according to which a consumer may return the goods to the supplier within six 
months after their delivery if they fail to satisfy the quality requirements and standards 
contemplated in section 55. Section 61(4)(d) also contains provisions concerning the exclusion 
of liability if the claim for damages is brought more than three years after certain events, such 
                                                             
1485 See Davis v Lockstone 1921 AD 153, Essa v Divaris 1947 (1) SA 753 (A). 
1486 68 of 1969.  
1487 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 122. 
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as death or injury, the earliest time at which a person had knowledge of the material facts about 
illness and so forth. Since section 61 does not apply to services, time-limitation clauses with 
regard to the provision of services fall under item (z) of regulation 44(3).1488 In terms of section 
116(1), a complaint in terms of the Act may not be referred or made to the Tribunal or to a 
consumer court more than three years after the act or omission that is the cause of the complaint, 
or in the case of a course of conduct or continuing practice, the date that the conduct or practice 
ceased. 
The OFT maintained that it is particularly misleading if contract terms seek to exclude or limit 
the consumer's right to redress for faulty goods during the limitation period set out by law and 
considered this as an unfair commercial practice.1489 This also applies to statements according 
to which statutory rights are unaffected, without any further explanation,1490 because the 
consumer is unlikely to know its statutory rights and therefore cannot claim them. 
When assessing whether a time-bar clause1491 is fair, the arguments put forward in Barkhuizen 
v Napier1492 can still be applied, although this case was decided before the Act came into force. 
The first question to be asked regarding the fairness of a time-bar clause is whether the clause 
affords the person bound by it 'an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress'.1493 
This is the case if the applicant knows the identity of the defendant and the amount of its claim, 
for instance.1494 This is of course not the case, it is submitted, where the facts are so 
complicated, or information which is not easily at hand has to be gathered, or where the 
defendant holds back such information. This view is supported by the minority judgment of 
Barkhuizen v Napier which held that a period of 90 days of repudiation of the claim was 
unreasonable and unconscionable because the claimant was required to find litigation funds, 
appoint an attorney, cause counsel to be briefed and issue and serve a summons.1495 
Furthermore, one has to ask if the contract was freely concluded, if there was unequal 
                                                             
1488 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 122. 
1489 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.4.4 at 26. 
1490 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.4.5 at 26. 
1491 A time-bar clause is a provision in a contract which sets a strict deadline within which either party may bring 
a dispute to either a court or to arbitration. See Duhaime's Law Dictionary s.v. 'Time-bar clause' at 
http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/T/TimeBarClause.aspx. On the other hand, limitation refers to statutory 
rules limiting the time within which civil actions can be brought. See Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 
'limitation'. 
1492 Barkhuizen v Napier (2007) (5) SA 323 (CC).  
1493 Barkhuizen v Napier para [67]. 
1494 Barkhuizen v Napier para [63]. 
1495 Barkhuizen v Napier para [112]. 
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bargaining power1496 and whether the relevant clause was drawn to the claimant’s attention.1497 
Even if the clause itself were not unfair, it would nonetheless be contrary to public policy to 
enforce it if this would be unfair and unreasonable.1498 One argument of the minority in the 
ruling mentioned above seems to be important when assessing the fairness of time-bar clauses, 
i.e., the legitimate interest of a certain time period. As a matter of course, a time-limitation has 
the objective to create certainty of a given legal status. However, there seems to be no reason 
to limit this period too much once the claimant has given timeous notice of his or her intention 
to claim because the defendant is now able to investigate and to preserve evidence for trial. As 
Moseneke DCJ and Sachs J put it in the aforementioned case, '[t]he likely harm to the insured 
that the provisions wreaks seems disproportionate to the interest the insurance company seeks 
to protect'.1499 Thus, the supplier must be able to explain why it and suppliers in a similar 
position or industry have a legitimate interest to differ from the normal prescription period.1500 
Other arguments put forward in Barkhuizen v Napier were that the clause lied buried obscurely 
in the insurer’s exceptional long standard terms that were entirely to the benefit of the insurer 
without any apparent reciprocal benefit for the insured. In addition, the time period was less 
than 10 % of the normal prescription period of three years and significantly limited the 
constitutional right to have a dispute settled by a court. Furthermore, it was not subject to 
express qualifications in the case of impossibility of compliance etc., impacted the relationship 
between insured and insurer in an unbalanced fashion in respect of an activity of considerable 
public interest (insurance), and erased the claim altogether, instead of simply limit or qualify 
it.1501 
For the OFT, a term which makes a claim dependent on the consumer having to notify the 
supplier of its complaint within an unreasonably short time is unfair. This applies particularly 
where '(a) a time limit is so short that ordinary persons could easily miss it through mere 
inadvertence, or because of circumstances outside their control, and (b) faults for which the 
supplier is responsible (…) could only become apparent after a time limit has expired.'1502 
                                                             
1496 As noted above, in standard contracts the parties almost never have equal bargaining power as those contacts 
are concluded on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.  
1497 Barkhuizen v Napier para [66]. 
1498 Barkhuizen v Napier para [69].  
1499 Barkhuizen v Napier para [113]. 
1500 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 126.  
1501 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 125. 
1502 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.4.2 at 26. 
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The OFT did not object to terms that warn consumers ‘of the need to check to the best of their 
ability for any defects of discrepancies at the earliest opportunity, and take prompt action as 
soon as they become aware of any problem’.1503 Although it considered that the supplier should 
have required prompt notification as this was helpful for the resolution of the dispute, the OFT 
maintained that it would be too severe to completely take away the consumer’s right to claim 
on the basis of this rationale.1504 As long as the supplier does not suggest that he or she 
disclaims liability for problems that consumer fail to notice, there is no reason for concern.1505 
Under § 309 no. 8 BGB, a supplier must not set a limitation period of less than one year after 
the start of the statutory limitation period.1506 This limitation for suppliers creates more 
balanced clauses in the context of standard terms in which the consumer only has limited 
bargaining power. Curiously, the South African legislature did not opt for such a minimum 
period.  
Time-bar clauses are common in insurance contracts.1507 However, the Act does generally not 
apply to insurance policies.1508 Nonetheless, the Policyholder Protection Rules issued by the 
Minister of Finance under the Long-term and Short-term Insurance Acts1509 provide for 
minimum prescription periods in insurance contracts. Besides notification periods and a period 
of not less than six months after the expiry of the period for representations to institute legal 
action, the insured may request the court to condone non-compliance with the clause if the 
court is satisfied that good cause exists for the failure to institute legal proceedings and that the 
clause is unfair to the policy-holder.1510 
                                                             
1503 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.4.6 at 27. 
1504 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.4.3 at 26. 
1505 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.4.6 at 27. 
1506 § 309 no. 8 BGB: '(…) (b) [A] provision by which in contracts relating to the supply of newly produced things 
and relating to the performance of work (…) (ff) the limitation of claims against the user due to defects in the 
cases cited in [§] 438 (1) no. 2 and [§] 634a (1) no. 2 is made easier, or in other cases a limitation period of less 
than one year reckoned from the beginning of the statutory limitation period is attained' is ineffective. 
1507 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 126. 
1508 Item 10 of Schedule 2 read with the definition of ‘services’ in s 1. 
1509 52 of 1998 and 53 of 1998, respectively. 
1510 Rule 16.2(c) of the Policyholder Protection Rules (Long-term Insurance), 2004, and rule 4(i) of the 
Policyholder Protection Rules (Short-term Insurance), 2004 (as amended). 
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d)  Legal costs clauses 
Regulation 44(3)(aa) provides that a term is presumed to be unfair if it entitles the supplier to 
claim legal or other costs on a higher scale than usual, where there is not also a term entitling 
the consumer to claim such costs on the same scale.1511 
Such clauses, which were very common in South African standard terms,1512 are excessively 
one-sided and therefore greylisted. Interestingly, legislation in other countries, such as 
Germany,1513 Austria or the Netherlands does not provide for similar legal provisions in the 
respective black- or greylists. This is probably because they are limited by other legal 
provisions providing for a tariff. The losing party normally has to pay its own and the other 
party’s costs (party-and-party costs) on the basis of a tariff prescribed by legislation. Terms 
providing that the consumer is liable for the costs on the basis of the so-called 'attorney-and-
client scale' entail that the consumer will be liable for the actual legal costs, which are much 
higher as they are not based on a tariff prescribed by legislation. A term under which the 
supplier is entitled to claim legal costs on an attorney-and-own-client scale would be presumed 
to be unfair if the contract does not provide the same rights for the consumer.1514 
Section 51(1)((i)(iii) provides that an agreement that expresses, on behalf of the consumer a 
consent to a predetermined value of costs relating to enforcement of the agreement, is void, 
except to the extent that is consistent with the Act. 
                                                             
1511 As to the different formulations for these clauses and further explanations see 'The difference between party-
and-party costs and attorney-and-client costs are becoming a problem.' at 
http://billsofcosts.co.za/component/content/article.html?catid=1:latest&id=19:problem-p-a-p--a-a-c&Itemid=2. 
1512 Naudé 2007 SALJ 154. 
1513 In Germany, the 'principle of the unity of costs' (Einheit der Kostenentscheidung) prevails, i.e., the court costs 
and fees (Gerichtskosten/Gebühren) as well as the so-called extra-judicial fees, such as lawyers' fees 
(außergerichtliche Kosten) are determined by the court ex officio in a so-called 'basic decision on the costs' (order 
on the costs) (Kostengrundentscheidung) in terms of §§ 308(2), 91 et seq ZPO. This decision only concerns the 
question who has to bear the costs and in which proportion, but not the actual amount, however. In terms of § 11(1) 
and (2) Gerichtskostengesetz ─ GKG), read with Annex 1 and 2 to the GKG, the court costs (Gerichtskosten) and 
fees (Gebühren), as well as the lawyer's costs (Anwaltskosten) are calculated on the basis of the amount in dispute 
(Streitwert or Gegenstandswert). The calculation itself is done by applying the so-called Baumbach formula 
(Baumbach'sche Formel). The actual amount of the court's costs and fees as well of the lawyers' fees is decided 
by a registrar/officer of justice (Rechtspfleger) in a taxation of costs procedure (Kostenfestsetzungsverfahren) 
pursuant to §§ 103 and 104 ZPO, read with §§ 19 GKG, 21 no. 1 and 3 Rechtspflegergesetz ─ RPflG. The amount 
a lawyer can require is set out in the Lawyers' Compensation Act (Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz ─ RVG, 
formerly the Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebührenordnung ─ BRAGO). Since 1 July 2006, lawyers can negotiate their 
fees for extra-judicial services. For all other services, i.e., before the courts, their fees are set out in the GKG. See 
Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Kostenentscheidung', 'Kostenfestsetzung' and 'Rechtsanwaltsgebühr'. See also 
'Kostenquotelung' at www.juratexte.de. 
1514 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 130. 
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According to the OFT, terms by which the supplier claims its legal costs on an 'indemnity' 
basis, i.e., all costs, and not just costs reasonably incurred, raise concern in terms of fairness 
because they might operate as penalty clauses.1515 
3.4.7 Choice of law clauses 
According to regulation 44(3)(bb), a term providing that a law other than that of South Africa 
applies to a consumer agreement concluded and implemented in South Africa, where the 
consumer was residing in South Africa at the time when the agreement was concluded, is 
presumed to be unfair.  
The reason for the greylisting of such provisions is that consumers should not be prevented 
from taking legal action in their local courts. It would not be fair if they were forced to travel 
long distances and use procedures that are unfamiliar to them.1516 
Hence, it is prohibited to choose another applicable law and to contract out of the Act. In any 
case, the application of the Act to transactions occurring within the Republic is mandatory 
under section 5(1)(a), unless it is exempted in terms of sections (5)(2), (3) or (4).1517 What is 
more, under section 5(2) the Act applies to every transaction occurring within the Republic. In 
addition, if a contract or provision is illegal under the lex fori it will be so, even if it is legal 
under the proper law of the contract as determined by the choice of law clause.1518 According 
to section 51(1)(a), a person must not make a transaction or agreement subject to any term or 
condition if its general purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes and policy of the Act. 
Therefore, a clause which circumvents the application of the Act by providing that another law 
is applicable will be presumed to be unfair in terms of item (bb). 
Suppliers are entitled to exclude residual rules of the common law which are not mandatory in 
terms of the Act, however. Otherwise, the consumer is entitled to rely on its common-law-
rights. This is because the Act is not supposed to be an overall consumer protection statute. 
Nonetheless, these clauses must be fair under section 48.1519 The residual common-law rules 
on the supplier's liability for consequential loss caused by defective goods, for example, offer 
greater protection to consumers than section 61 which governs damages for loss caused by 
goods. The supplier may exclude this residual common-law rule, but the terms governing this 
                                                             
1515 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 5.3 at 40. 
1516 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 17.4 at 68. 
1517 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 293. 
1518 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 131. 
1519 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 131. 
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exclusion must be fair in terms of section 48. Since section 48 declares excessively one-sided 
terms as unfair,1520 choice of law clauses at the consumer's disadvantage will be unfair. 
 
3.5    Conclusion 
The insertion of a greylist by means of regulations has the advantage that no act of Parliament 
is necessary in order to add or delete individual items in the future, if necessary. A more or less 
regular update of the list contained in regulation 44(3) would give guidance and certainty, even 
though it is made clear in regulation 44(2)(b) that the list is not exhaustive. Since South Africa 
has hardly any experience in an overarching consumer protection legislation, this approach is 
more appropriate and allows for more flexibility. Although the greylist has not been inserted 
directly into the Act, the threefold interplay of the blacklist in section 51, the greylist in 
regulation 44(3) as well as the general fairness enquiry in terms of section 48 offers a 
contractual regime able to strike a balance between the consumer's and the supplier's interests. 
Like blacklists, greylists have undoubted advantages because they enable consumer protection 
bodies and businesses to take preventive action ex ante, i.e., already during the negotiations 
with businesses, and therefore promote self-imposed fairness control. One of the greatest 
advantages is the shift of the onus of proof from the consumer to the supplier since only 
businesses are in the position to furnish proof as to why the inserted certain clauses into their 
standard terms. A regime in which contractual fairness is assessed only by a blacklist and a 
general clause does not offer sufficient guidance to judges and economic actors so that greylists 
also simplify the courts' task to reach a decision. 
The greylist's ambit is narrower than the one of section 51 because it only applies to consumer 
agreements (i.e., not to franchise agreements) between 'real' suppliers and 'real' consumers. 
B2B agreements which fall under section 51 are thus excluded. The artificial distinction 
between consumers purchasing goods or services which are intended for future business, and 
those who purchase goods or services for private purposes, which are later used for business 
purposes, should be abolished. In both cases, the consumer affords the protection of regulation 
44. The same applies to franchisees that are often as vulnerable vis-à-vis big firms as individual 
consumers. 
                                                             
1520 Section 48((2)(a). 
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The list contained in regulation 44 is only indicative and non-exhaustive. Thus, the listed terms 
may be fair in the particular circumstances of the case, and also terms not listed could be unfair 
under section 48. 
The items listed in regulation 44(3) are mostly inspired by foreign legislation, such as the EU 
Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, §§ 308 and 309 of the German BGB, § 6 of 
the Austrian KSchG, articles 6:236 and 6:237 of the Dutch BW, the UK Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 
2010. The reasoning for greylisting specific clauses is to ensure that the parties' rights and 
obligations are evenly balanced in terms of the contract law and the provisions implied by law 
and that the risks between the parties are fairly distributed. 
Terms excluding or restricting the supplier's liability for death or personal injury (item (a) of 
regulation 44(3)) should rather be blacklisted than greylisted. This would also be in keeping 
with the high value that the Constitution and the common law attribute to the sanctity of human 
life. Those who argue that the outright prohibition of such clauses could have adverse effects 
on South African businesses should not overlook that commercial reasons should not be put on 
the scales with questions of death or personal injury. This also applies to non-profit 
organisations, such as schools, where not the supervising parents but the schools, or better their 
subordinate governmental departments, should be held liable for death or personal injuries of 
students, which occur on school trips, for instance. Besides, the South African insurance 
industry could offer better and more cost-efficient policies in this regard, like in other countries. 
Non-derogable rights, such as provided in sections 19(6)(c), 54(2) or 56(2) are not covered by 
item (b), which deals with the exemption of breach. In addition, the common-law principle of 
material positive malperformance permits a party to immediately cancel the contract (mostly 
after a certain time has elapsed). Since the Act does not provide for a comprehensive law of 
contract, certain exemption clauses do not fall under item (b). Hence, certain 'saving provisions' 
make sure that common-law rights and warranties are still applicable. There might be 
legitimate reasons for the supplier to exclude the consumer's legal rights or remedies. In any 
event, the price should reflect the existence or non-existence of certain legal rights stipulated 
in a clause. If the consumer can find the same product elsewhere at a lower price but without 
the restrictive clause, the clause is likely to be unfair. 
In their fairness review, the courts have to take also into consideration whether the consumer 
knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any particular provision 
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that is alleged to be unfair, having regard to any custom of trade. This can lead to unfair results 
though since knowledge of an unfair term cannot make it fair. When a supplier has problems 
with its own subcontractors, it should not be allowed to exclude its liability for breach because 
the consumer did not influence the supplier's choice of its own suppliers and has no recourse 
against them. A term under which the consumer has to bring a defective good to the supplier's 
place of business at its own costs falls under item (b). Small businesses should be allowed to 
require the consumer to bring and fetch the given goods if this does not pose any problems to 
the consumer. This should be dealt with on a case-to-case basis though. In terms of item (b), 
the exclusion or restriction of the consumer's right to set off a debt is also greylisted. This 
provision should be interpreted widely so that also clauses by which a supplier may require full 
payment before the service delivery are presumed to be unfair. Otherwise, the supplier would 
have no incentive to do its work properly, and the consumer would bear the risk of the supplier's 
insolvency. 
Item (c) deals with entire agreement clauses and prevents that suppliers disclaim their 
responsibility by the use of such clauses, which have the effect that oral commitments by the 
supplier or its agents would not be valid. This item also prevents unfair outcomes which were 
often achieved by the strict application of the Shifren principle and the parol evidence rule, 
which is particularly important because consumers often do not read terms and conditions. 
Compared to section 51(1)(g), regulation 44(3)(c) has a broader scope of application because 
it aims to prevent consumers from relying on representations that were not expressly included 
in the contract. This item should be interpreted widely so that also compliance with formality 
requirements for variations are included. The EC Directive's formulation is clearer in the sense 
that it undoubtedly comprises cases where both parties sign a variation. The wording of the 
South African item should therefore be amended. 
Item (d) deals with vicarious liability. Even though this item does not mention the supplier's 
employees, it derives from section 113(1) that those are also included. In contrast to section 
113(1), which is only applicable to the joint and several liability in terms of the Act, item (d) 
applies to terms limiting the supplier's vicarious liability under the residual common-law rules. 
Indemnity clauses are dealt with in item (e) which aims to prevent the inappropriate transfer 
of risks onto the consumer. This provision also applies, contrary to item (a), to provisions in 
respect of liability for illness, loss of, or physical damage to property as well as economic loss 
resulting from the death, or injury to a natural person. 
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The restriction of the statutory defence of prescription is greylisted in item (f). The general 
framework for prescription is laid down in the Prescription Act, according to which contracts 
prescribe after three years. The institution of prescription not only provides for certainty for 
the benefit of the parties involved but also for the general public. Clauses which restrict or 
exclude the consumer's statutory defence of prescription should therefore always be void and 
rather be blacklisted. 
The term 'normal rules' regarding the distribution of risk in item (g) does not mean the rules of 
a particular industry or market. Otherwise, the status quo would be entrenched. It does neither 
mean the application of the reasonableness test of section 48(2) as the legislator had a more 
specific conception in mind. It rather means the consideration of the naturalia of a contract. 
Section 54(1)(d) must not be understood in the sense that the supplier also is responsible for 
losses caused by unforeseen events, such as vis maior or casus fortuitus. Because of its 
underogable character, section 18(1) escapes the assessment of item (g). 
Clauses by which the supplier may increase the agreed price because of costs which are beyond 
its control are most likely to be unfair in terms of item (h). This especially applies if the 
consumer cannot cancel the agreement. Price increase clauses may be fair though if the supplier 
specifies the level and timing of the price increases, e.g., by using an index. Without the 
possibility for the consumer to cancel the agreement due to a price increase, such clauses may 
be fair though if he or she was informed of the factors for the price increase and there was 
actual and informed consent. Other countries prohibit price increases before a certain period 
after the conclusion of the contract has elapsed. 
Item (i), which greylists unilateral variation clauses, does ─ contrary to item (h) ─ not contain 
the qualification 'without giving the consumer the right to terminate the agreement'. This means 
that the legislator set the fairness bar higher for the supplier. Only for open-ended agreements 
this qualification exists in terms of regulation 44(4)(a)(iv)(bb). The exceptions contained in 
subregulation (4)(c) are justified because the circumstances contained therein are beyond the 
supplier's control. So-called 'reasonableness qualifications' are generally too extensive since 
the consumer is unable to know in which circumstances variations are allowed. Variation 
clauses must hence be clearly set out and not merely protect the supplier's margin. Item (i) 
should be amended according to the wording of § 6(2) no. 3 of the Austrian KSchG, so that 
variation clauses are fair unless the consumer can reasonably expect them, mainly because they 
are negligible and factually justified. Also for improvements, the wording of the Austrian 
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provision (which is almost identical with § 308 no. 4 BGB) would be helpful. In any event, the 
balancing test between the supplier's and the consumer's interests should be applied in case of 
improvements, which are not always wanted by the consumer.  
The determination of conformity and right of interpretation is contained in item (j). The use of 
the word 'conformity' in this item is misleading since 'breach' would be more appropriate. The 
rationale for greylisting this term is that suppliers should not be the judges of their own affairs, 
but that rather independent testing is necessary for which the consumer does not have to bear 
the costs if its complaint is well-founded. The wording of the item should also be amended 
insofar as also terms should be presumed to be unfair where the supplier has the exclusive and 
final right to determine if it has breached the contract and the exclusive and final right of 
interpretation of the agreement. The referral to experts or arbitrators of matters which involve 
only small sums should be unfair, which is why the legislator should determine a threshold like 
in the United Kingdom. 
Unequal termination rights: Not only the absence of reciprocity makes terms falling under 
item (k) unfair as the consumer might suffer disproportionate consequences if the supplier 
terminates the contract, even if the consumer has the same right. This item does not apply to 
terms which allow a termination of the contract for breach. In those cases, section 48 is 
applicable, and the consumer bears the risk of non-persuasion. Item (k) only applies to once-
off transactions, and not to open-ended agreements. Because of an editorial error, regulation 
44(4)(a) does not apply to item (k). 
In terms of the termination of open-ended agreements without reasonable notice, item (l) 
requires a breach by the consumer. The UK regulations, on the other hand, require a broader 
concept of 'serious grounds' which include a reasonable suspicion of fraud or abuse. Item (l) 
should ideally be redrafted and include a 'risk of breach'. A supplier's terms must however be 
clearly drafted in this regard, and the risk must be sufficiently serious and probable. The EC 
Unfair Terms Directive requires a 'valid reason' for suppliers of financial services and is 
therefore somewhat stricter than item (l). With regard to section 14, regulation 44(4)(a) should 
be amended in that the supplier has to give reasonable notice. 
Item (m) concerns terms by which the consumer, unlike the supplier, is obliged to fulfil all its 
obligations. For the application of this item, and contrary to item (b), for instance, a breach of 
contract is not necessary. This item covers a wide range of scenarios, such as clauses by which 
the supplier may suspend its services and the consumer has to pay nonetheless. Such clauses 
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may be fair though if the suspension of its services enables the supplier to deal with technical 
problems or to enhance its services. They have to be narrow in effect and sufficiently qualified 
though, the supplier has to inform the consumer well in advance, and the consumer must be 
able to cancel the contract before being affected. As this type of clauses might be disguised as 
penalty clauses, their potential effect as well as the intention behind them have to be considered. 
The practical relevance of item (n), which concerns the unilateral avoidance or limitation of 
performance by the supplier, is limited because breach is already covered by item (b), and the 
Act already prohibits other terms with respect to the quality of goods and services. Clauses by 
which only the supplier may avoid or limit its performance often have the same effect as terms 
obliging the consumer, but not the supplier, to fulfil all its obligations. 
Item (o) dealing with one-sided renewal clauses does not apply to fixed-term agreements 
because section 14, read with section 5(1), already provides for an applicable legal framework. 
In this context, a formal equivalence in the parties' rights to cancel their agreement is not 
sufficient because both should enjoy rights of equal extent and value. 
Section 19(2) does not per se prohibit provisions allowing the supplier an unreasonable long 
time to perform, but according to item (p), an evaluative reasonableness standard must be 
applied. This item has a warning function for suppliers. In order to be fair, such terms must 
include factors which are beyond the supplier's control and include cases where he or she is not 
at fault. 
Item (q) concerns one-sided forfeiture clauses and is of rather limited application because it 
only operates in circumstances which are not covered by section 17 (cancellation fees) and in 
situations where the forfeiture clause was intended to operate when the contract is cancelled 
after a party has breached it. Another factor for the limited application of this item is that 
suppliers will tend to rather insert penalty clauses. Although consumers are not less vulnerable 
in terms of penalty clauses since the courts have to consider equity, suppliers could circumvent 
the rationale of item (q) by inserting unreasonably high penalty fees hoping that consumers, 
who often do not know about the Conventional Penalties Act, will not sue them. The 
reasonableness of cancellation charges under section 17 is subject to item (q) though. Section 
17 provides for guidelines for the determination of the amount of cancellation charges, which 
have to be taken into account cumulatively. Suppliers should provide for a method of 
calculation of cancellation fees (e.g., a sliding scale) in order to make their calculation 
comprehensible. Section 17(5) should be amended as not only death or hospitalisation should 
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be taken into consideration, but also other medical or psychological reasons as well as force 
majeure. The medical and psychological reasons should be assessed objectively by a medical 
professional. 
Like item (q), item (r), which concerns penalty clauses, operates in cases where the contract is 
cancelled after breach, except that the breach in item (r) comes from the consumer. This item 
does not apply to cancellation fees for fixed-term agreements under section 14 or to those in 
terms of advance bookings, orders or reservations according to section 17. Although item (r) 
seems superfluous with respect to the Conventional Penalties Act, this item has an extra-
judicial and proactive effect. 
Item (s) applies to terms which stipulate an unreasonable high remuneration upon the 
termination of the contract. This item has a wider application than item (r) because it applies 
to cases other than breach of contract. The use of the adverb 'unreasonably' in this context 
indicates an evaluative element which allows the consideration extrinsic factors, which gives 
the courts more leeway, as opposed to 'significantly' or 'disproportionally'. 
Unlike EU law, item (t) does not apply to a transfer of rights, but only to a transfer of the 
supplier's obligations without the consumer's consent. The presumption of the greylist covers 
the phrase 'to the detriment of the consumer', which means that the supplier has the onus of 
proof. In cases where the consumer relied on the supplier's reputation and goodwill, there is a 
possibility of abuse and bad faith on the supplier's side, even if the consumer has the same 
rights after the transfer of the supplier's obligations. This is also the case for contracts which 
rely on a trustful relationship, e.g., between lawyers or architects and their clients. A transfer 
of obligations should always be regarded as detrimental to the consumer in these cases. A 
transfer of obligations might be fair if the consumer may cancel the agreement, or the supplier 
remains liable for the third party's performance. The consumer has to find another supplier in 
these cases whom he or she trusts though, and there might be delays. Hence, detrimental effects 
cannot be excluded in these situations either. If the supplier's business is transferred to a 
subsidiary controlled by it, or within a similar lawful company transaction, the transfer of the 
supplier's obligations may be fair.  
The limitation of the transferability of commercial guarantees is greylisted in item (u). Those 
guarantees add substantial value to the purchased good. If the consumer cannot sell the item 
with the guarantee, he or she is deprived of part of what was paid for, and the supplier has an 
economic benefit. Item (u) should not only apply to the re-sale, but also to other types of 
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transactions, irrespective of whether the initial purchaser had used the good in question. There 
is no reason why a re-sale should be greylisted, and a donation not. The wording of this item 
should therefore be amended accordingly. 
Item (v) of the greylist deals with deemed statements and acknowledgements of the consumer 
and only applies to those which are not already prohibited by the Act. Hence, this paragraph is 
limited to terms purporting to apply to acknowledgements deemed to have been made after the 
conclusion of the agreement, and which do not relate to amendments of the agreement itself.  
Consumers should not be deprived of their legal defence that they have actually not received 
the supplier's communications. Therefore, item (w) presumes such deeming clauses as being 
unfair. Other means of communication, such as e-mail, should also be included. In cases where 
the consumer only implicitly informed the supplier of its new address, e.g., on its letterhead, 
the supplier's communications should not be deemed to have reached the consumer if it was 
negligently sent to the former address. Sending a communication knowingly to the consumer's 
former address amounts to unconscionable conduct in terms of section 40. If the consumer did 
not communicate its new address and the supplier does not know about it, the communication 
should neither be deemed to have reached the consumer. 
Clauses which exclude or hinder the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other 
legal remedy are greylisted in item (x). Such clauses often aim to dissuade consumers from 
taking legal action. Arbitration covered by the Act is not greylisted, however. Certain 
enforcement clauses are already blacklisted (section 51(1)(i) and (iii)). In common law, clauses 
prohibiting the consumer from seeking redress are forbidden too. Clauses giving jurisdiction 
to the High Court instead of the Magistrates' Court are likely to be unfair because of the higher 
costs and the relatively small sums involved. The phrase 'covered by legislation' should not 
include the Arbitration Act as otherwise, item (x) would be superfluous. Arbitration clauses 
should only be considered fair if they are not compulsory, concern only amounts above a 
considerable threshold taking into account the relatively high arbitration costs, the consumer 
has been informed in advance about the cost implications, and are fully, clearly and 
prominently set out in the consumer agreement. 
Item (y) covers cases where the supplier restricts available evidence to the consumer or creates 
a burden of proof so that the consumer is hindered from taking legal action. The courts should 
assess the residual rules on the normal incidence of the burden of proof which vary from 
contract to contract. Clauses which exclude residual rules have to be considered with regard to 
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section 2(10). A change of the onus of proof in contracts for safekeeping to the detriment of 
the consumer should be considered unfair because there is no reason why for innkeepers, for 
instance, in whose sphere a good is placed occasionally, should another standard be applied as 
opposed to a contract for safekeeping which expressly has the object of keeping goods safe. 
Commercial efficiency is not sufficient to make conclusive proof certificates fair because 
consumers would otherwise be precluded from proving the contrary. 
Item (z) greylists time-bar clauses and limitation periods that are shorter than the common-law 
rules or legislation for legal steps. The prescription periods set out in the Act take precedence 
over those provided for in the Prescription Act so that the parties cannot deviate from them. 
The fairness of time-bar clauses can be assessed by putting forward the arguments of 
Barkhuizen v Napier, although this case was decided before the Act came into force. Clauses 
by which the consumer has to check for any defects at the earliest opportunity are not unfair 
per se as they may ascertain a smooth resolution of the dispute. However, they cannot wholly 
take away the consumer's right to dispose of a prescription period long enough to seek judicial 
redress. It is regrettable though that item (z) does not contain a minimum period like § 309 
no. 8 BGB. 
Item (aa) especially concerns attorney-and-client fees which are much higher than party-and-
party costs based on a tariff prescribed by legislation. Consumers should not be prevented from 
taking legal action in their local courts. This is why item (bb) greylists choice of law clauses. 
Suppliers can exclude residual common-law rules which are not mandatory in terms of the Act 
though. The applicable rules must be fair in terms of section 48. 
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4.  The general clause of section 48 
Terms that are not listed in the blacklist contained in section 51 or in regulation 44 may still be 
unfair under section 48. 
Section 48 contains a general clause of unfair contract terms. General clauses are generally 
open-ended, and the courts’ task is to decide on their concrete contents.1521 This open-
endedness does not mean however that a general clause does not improve legal certainty,1522 
especially in combination with black- and greylists. The existence of a general clause alongside 
black- and greylists and the interplay between them is essential and certainly a factor why 
unfair terms control in Germany has been more effective than in the United States, for instance, 
where judges merely has to deal with a single general clause. In contrast, German law 
‘provide[s] additional authoritative points for application of unfair terms control [such as lists 
of prohibited terms with or without the possibility of evaluation],1523 while maintaining a 
general clause to respond to the need for flexibility’.1524 A general clause is therefore a catch-
all clause that concretises the standards contained in black- and greylists. Insofar any discretion 
remains when applying the clauses contained in black- or greylists, the standards of the general 
clause emanate upon these lists.1525 For this reason, the general clause can be referred to as the 
core of content control.1526  
Because a general clause is aimed to be a catch-all clause, the provisions contained in the 
applicable black- and greylists have to be examined first. The latter are not complete and merely 
exemplary.1527 
In most jurisdictions, the wording of a general clause is rather straightforward. Already Kötz 
in his report for the 50th German Jurists' Conference in 1974 wrote that 'the precise formulation 
of the general clause does not cause any excessive difficulties. One should at least choose 
formulations that, despite their inevitable vagueness, are as accurate and precise as possible. 
Hence, it is not recommendable to consider standard terms invalid without further ado if they 
are 'inequitable' or 'inadequate', or 'unilaterally favour' a party. The validity of standard terms 
                                                             
1521 Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 361. 
1522 Kötz Gutachten 50. DJT 62. 
1523 See §§ 308 and 309. 
1524 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 172. 
1525 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 10 and 83. 
1526 Locher Recht der AGB 123. 
1527 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 23. In the South African greylist contained in reg 44, this is expressly 
mentioned in subreg 2(b): 'The list in subregulation (3) is non-exhaustive, so that other terms may be unfair for 
purposes of section 48 of the Act.' 
 285   
 
should rather depend on the question of whether they cause an imbalance between the rights 
and obligations of the parties.'1528 Most general clauses in other jurisdiction therefore make 
clear that a clause is 'unfair' if there is some imbalance between the parties' rights and 
obligations, that is if the clause 'unreasonably disadvantage[s] the other party',1529 'constitute[s] 
a severe disadvantage for one of the parties',1530 'is unreasonably burdensome for the 
counterparty',1531 or 'causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising 
under the contract'.1532 Unfortunately, South Africa chose another path.  
Both the headings of section 48 (‘Unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms’) and Part G 
(‘Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions’) make clear that section 48 is aimed 
at content control. The Consumer Protection Act does not contain any definition of what is 
'unfair, unreasonable or unjust'. Therefore, one has to apply the ordinary meaning of these 
terms, and in the case of ambiguity, the courts must apply the principles of construction as 
amplified by the Act.1533 According to section 2(1), the Act must be interpreted in a manner 
that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 3. The use of the words 'unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust' in section 3 makes it difficult to interpret those words though. It will therefore be 
examined in the following if the provisions contained in section 48 contribute to a 
concretisation of the phrase 'unfair, unreasonable or unjust'. In terms of section 2(2), the courts 
may consider appropriate foreign and international law and international conventions. These 
can be very helpful too in order to define the concept of 'unfairness'. The German general clause 
of § 307 BGB, for instance, not only consists of a general standard in its paragraph (1) 1st sent. 
but also of three concretisations. Under § 307(1) 2nd sent., '[a]n unreasonable disadvantage may 
also arise from the provision not being clear and comprehensible'. Paragraph (2) of the same 
provision clarifies that an unreasonable disadvantage is 'to be assumed to exist if a provision is 
not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates, or 
limits essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that 
attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised'.1534 If and how German legislation can 
be used for the understanding of the South African provisions is a topic of this thesis. For the 
                                                             
1528 Kötz Gutachten 50. DJT 63. My own translation. 
1529 § 307(1) 1st sent. BGB (Germany). 
1530 § 879(3) ABGB (Austria). 
1531 Article 6:233 BW (Netherlands). 
1532 Article 3(1) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 and Art 
3(1) of the Australian Consumer Law. 
1533 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 182, Kellaway Legal Interpretation 229. 
1534 WLP/Wolf § 307 para 74. 
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moment, it should be sufficient to state that section 48 also contains 'concretisations' in its 
paragraph (2) which will be discussed further below. 
Van Eeden argues that the legislator has introduced three different standards by choosing the 
wording ‘unfair, unreasonable or unjust’.1535 In contrast to this view, Sharrock maintains that 
these three terms overlap considerably in meaning and that the legislator should have chosen 
only one of them which would have served the same purpose.1536 Sharrock's point of view is 
correct as these three adjectives are largely synonymous because an unreasonable clause (e.g., 
a clause that is excessively one-sided in favour of the supplier) is also unfair or unjust. What is 
more, one generally speaks of the 'fairness assessment' in this context, which includes 
unreasonable and unjust terms. Superfluously, the legislator chose even other synonyms for 
‘unfair’ in other instances in section 48, such as ‘inequitable’1537 or ‘unconscionable’,1538 which 
contributes even more to the general confusion. Instead, it should have opted for only one term. 
If the legislator was of the opinion that these different terms bear different meanings, they 
should have been defined in sections 1 or 48. In comparison with other legislation, only the EC 
Unfair Terms Directive1539 and the Australian Consumer Law1540 use the word 'unfair'. Other 
legislation, like Germany, Austria or the Netherlands, chose another structure according to 
which a clause is void if it causes an imbalance between the parties' rights and obligations.1541 
Terms such as 'unfair' or similar terms are not applied at all there.1542 Alternatively, the 
                                                             
1535 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 258. Van Eeden merely refers to section 48(1)(a)(i) which 
concerns only ‘unfair, unreasonable or unjust’ prices. There is however no strong argument why his view should 
not also apply to the other instances of section 48. 
1536 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 307, Sharrock Judicial control 128. 
1537 Section 48(2)(b). 
1538 Section 48(2)(d)(i). 
1539 Article 3(1) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993: 'A 
contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the 
requirements of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer'.  
1540 Section 3(1) Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010): A term 
is unfair 'if (a) it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract; 
and (b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be 
advantaged by it'.  
1541 § 307(1) BGB: 'Provisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the requirement of good 
faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the contract with the user. An unreasonable disadvantage 
may also arise from the provision not being clear and comprehensible.' § 879(3) ABGB (Austrian General Civil 
Code): 'Contractual provisions in standard business terms or contractual forms that do not determine a mutual 
principal obligation are void in any event if they constitute a severe disadvantage for one of the parties, having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case.' (My own translation). Article 6:233 BW: 'A stipulation from the 
applicable standard terms and conditions is voidable: (a) if it is unreasonably burdensome for the counterparty, 
having regard to the nature and content of the contract, the way in which these standard terms and conditions have 
been formed, the interests of each party, as evident to the other, and the other circumstances of the case; (b) if the 
user has not given his counterparty a reasonable opportunity to take knowledge of the content of the applicable 
standard terms and conditions.'  
1542 See § 307(1) BGB, § 879(3) ABGB (Austrian General Civil Code), and Article 6:233 BW (Dutch Civil Code).  
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legislator could have defined ‘unfair’ by including the other synonyms in order to maintain any 
additional differences in meaning not covered by ‘unfair’.1543 
4.1  Structure and ambit of section 48 
Section 48 contains several unfairness standards which will be dealt with below. The first 
unfairness standard is the ‘general unfairness standard’ of section 48(1) which deals with 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust terms or prices. This standard is complemented by section 
48(2)(a) and (b), the so-called ‘basic unfairness standards’. Furthermore, section 48(2)(c) deals 
with the consumer’s reliance on representations or statements of opinion, unlike section 
48(2)(d) which deals with non-compliance with section 49.1544 The last two provisions are 
systematically not part of the first two unfair standards and can thus be called ‘deceptive 
standard’ and ‘procedural standard’1545 in order to achieve a more precise classification.1546 
In conclusion, compared to other legislation, the South African general clause is very 
burdensome. 
4.1.1 The general unfairness standard of section 48(1) 
Section 48(1) sets out what a supplier must not do in general: offer to supply, supply or enter 
into an agreement to supply, any goods or services at an unfair, unreasonable or unjust price1547 
or such terms, market goods or services in an unfair, unreasonable or unjust manner, or require 
a consumer or another person to waive any rights, assume any obligation or waive the supplier’s 
liability on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or impose such terms as a condition 
of entering into a transaction.  
The general unfairness standard of section 48(1) even applies to provisions specifically agreed 
after negotiations, and not only to those in standard-form contracts or non-negotiated terms.1548 
                                                             
1543 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 307, Sharrock Judicial control 128. 
1544 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 248 and 249. 
1545 See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 250. 
1546 This is the terminology applied by Van Eeden. Other denominations are possible, of course. However, for the 
sake of simplification, the same terms will be applied in this thesis. 
1547 The question is if the abolished laesio enormis doctrine is applicable in respect of price. See Van der Merwe 
et al Contract General Principles 112. In terms of the laesio enormis doctrine (Latin: abnormal harm), a party 
could rescind an agreement if the price of exchange was less than a certain proportion of its actual value. The 
principle was developed so that people received a just price in exchange. This is in opposition to the Imperial 
Roman view, found in the Corpus Juris Civilis, according to which the parties to a contract were entitled to try to 
overreach each other. See 'Laesio enormis' at https://www.proverbia-iuris.de/laesio-enormis. 
1548 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 307, Sharrock Judicial control 128. 
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This is not the case in most other regimes, where individually negotiated clauses are not subject 
to content control.1549 
It is however puzzling that also the supply of goods or services on unfair terms is prohibited 
by section 48(1)(a) since any supply requires an agreement to supply (which is also regulated 
in paragraph (a)). What is more, it is difficult to imagine how a supply can take place without 
an underlying agreement.1550 Naudé suggests that the legislature might have wished to make 
clear that section 48 is also applicable in cases where suppliers who grant access to their 
premises or facilities set up notices, e.g., at the entrance at their premises, which contain unfair 
terms purporting to bind consumers who gain access to those facilities. Under the common-
law maxim volenti non fit iniuria,1551 such a notice would bind a consumer only if it entered 
into an agreement on those (unfair) terms, if the consumer relied reasonably that it had done 
so, or if it voluntary assumed a risk.1552 In these cases, the so-called 'ticket-cases'1553 could 
apply though by which an agreement is concluded without the customer's signature. These 
cases are relevant in situations where a great number of customers conclude the same kind of 
transactions with the same supplier, and where it is practically impossible to obtain a signature 
from every single customer. Hence, the term 'ticket cases' is not wide enough because it 
involves all cases where a supplier submits a document containing or referring to its terms and 
conditions, and which is not intended to be signed, before the consumer .1554 The consumer 
will be bound to the supplier's standard terms if the latter has done what was reasonably 
sufficient, necessary, or possible to draw the consumer's attention to the provisions in 
question.1555  
If the supplier can assume from the consumer's conduct that he or she has either read and agreed 
to the standard provisions or is prepared to be bound by them without reading them, the supplier 
                                                             
1549 This is the case for § 305b BGB: 'Individually agreed terms take priority over standard business terms', and 
also Art 2.1.21 of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) set up by UNIDROIT: 'In 
case of conflict between a standard term and a term which is not a standard term the latter prevails.' 
1550 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 308, Sharrock Judicial control 129. 
1551 Volenti non fit iniuria (Latin: 'no wrong is done to one who consents') is the defence that the claimant consented 
to the injury or to the risk of being injured. Knowledge of the risk is not sufficient, since there must be full and 
free consent to bear the risk. Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Volenti non fit iniuria'. 
1552 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
1553 For the ticket cases see ch 2 para 4.1 d) above. 
1554 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 186 and 187. 
1555 Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (A) 991I-992A, Jacobs v Imperial Group 
(Pty) Ltd 2010 (2) All SA 540 (SCA) at [9]. 
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can perform the contract. This is regularly the case where the supplier's document itself was 
sufficient to draw a reasonable consumer's attention to its content.1556 
The question of when a supplier's steps were sufficient to draw the consumer's attention to the 
provisions contained in a document (ticket) was dealt with in early cases, such as Central SAR 
v McLaren 1903 (TS) 727 (a case based on English law) and has since evolved as follows: If 
the consumer knows that the document in question contains terms without reading them, he or 
she is bound to them. If the client does not know that terms are printed on the ticket, he or she 
is only bound if the supplier took reasonable steps to draw the attention of a reasonable 
consumer to those terms, irrespective of whether they are printed on the ticket, or the ticket 
simply refers to them.1557  
In terms of section 11(3) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act,1558 
contractual provisions which are incorporated into an agreement and that are not in the public 
domain are regarded as having been incorporated into a data message if such information is 
referred to in a way in which a reasonable person would have noticed the given reference and 
incorporation, provided that the information is accessible in a form in which it may be read, 
stored and retrieved by the other party.1559 Thus, a consumer is justified to ignore a document 
which does not appear to him, as a reasonable person, to be an agreement.1560 The same applies 
if the consumer receives the document only after the contract has been made,1561 or where both 
factors are combined.1562  
If the consumer was meant to be bound by such a notice, it is submitted, that the word ‘supply’ 
in section 48(1)(a) would tacitly contain the requirement of entering into an agreement to 
supply. The fact that the word ‘supply’ is not put in a chronologically logical order with the 
other two verbs describing the ‘contractual steps’, namely ‘offer to supply’ and ‘enter into an 
agreement to supply’ speaks more for an inconsiderate mentioning of this superfluous verb. 
                                                             
1556 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 187. 
1557 King's Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Wakeling 1970 (4) SA 640 (N) at 643E, Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of the United Kingdom 2003 (5) SA 180 (SCA) at 188. 
1558 25 of 2002. 
1559 Section 11(3) ECTA. 
1560 See Central SAR v McLaren 1903 TS 727 (cloakroom ticket taken as a voucher to identify property); Dyer v 
Melrose Steam Laundry 1912 TPD 164 at 167-168 (laundry list taken for checking items and prices); Frocks Ltd 
v Dent and Goodwin (Pty) Ltd 1950 (2) SA 717 (C) (warehouse invoice containing conditions limiting the liability 
of the bailee); Micor Shipping (Pty) Ltd v Treger Golf and Sports (Pty) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 709 (W) (invoice with 
reference to 'standard trading conditions'); Sun Couriers (Pty) Ltd v Kimberley Diamond Wholesalers 2001 (3) 
SA 110 (NC) at 133 (dispatch note which required the consumer to enter the addresses of the sender and receiver).  
1561 Reynolds v Donald Curry & Co 1875 NLR (1) 14; WJ Lineveldt (Edms) Bpd v Immelman 1980 (2) SA 964 (O). 
1562 Roseveare v Auckland Park Sporting Club 1907 TH 230; R v Thompson 1926 OPD 141 at 143 (programme 
bought inside racecourse after the conclusion of the contract for admission at the gate). 
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What is more, even laypersons know that an agreement is the basis for any contractual 
obligation, even if concluded tacitly (by an implied acceptance). This especially applies after 
having paid a consideration, and because customers usually know that without any form of 
agreement between the parties, the consumer cannot expect any 'supply'.1563 It is therefore 
unlikely that the example mentioned above could be subsumed under the term 'supply'. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the word ‘supply’ could make sense in cases where the initial 
contract was concluded before the Act came into effect, and the supply occurred after this date. 
Under section 52(2)(c), in its fairness enquiry, a court must consider those circumstances of 
the transaction or agreement that existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the time that the 
transaction occurred or agreement was made, irrespective of whether the Act was in force at 
that time.1564 Naudé correctly argues that this implies that the fairness review of the terms in 
question will not only focus on the fairness at the time that the transaction was concluded but 
that also a change in circumstances making the provision unfair at the time of supply may be 
taken into account.1565 In other words, the fairness enquiry is extended temporally. Since the 
Act has come into force over a decade ago, this differentiation should be merely of academic 
interest by now. It could still matter though for contracts that govern the continuous supply of 
goods or services.1566 
That the legislator also included the offer to supply in section 48(1)(a) originates from the fact, 
according to Sharrock1567 and Naudé,1568 that it envisaged that consumer organisations and 
other interested parties might wish to take action against suppliers who try to contract on unfair 
terms. The fairness control would therefore be temporally moved forward. Section 48(1)(a), 
read with section 4(1), seems to provide for a locus standi of consumer organisations, allowing 
them to seek relief against a mere offer on unfair provisions not to individual consumers, but 
to consumers in general since such an offer would be prohibited conduct under section 40. 
However, section 52 is written with having individual consumers in mind, not general use 
                                                             
1563 In terms of unsolicited goods pursuant to s 21(1)(a), there is no agreement between the parties since there was 
no agreement on the price. The supplier regularly expects a payment at a later stage though. Therefore, the mere 
supply of unsolicited goods cannot take place on 'unfair terms' under s 48. See De Stadler ‘Section 21’ in Naudé 
and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. In the case of negative option marketing (s 31) there is no agreement 
between the parties as the agreement does not automatically come into existence by the mere fact that the supplier 
provided goods or services on the basis that the consumer did not opt out. See Van Heerden ‘Section 31’ in Naudé 
and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary paras 1 et seq. 
1564 Emphasis added. 
1565 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
1566 Naudé puts forward this argument in another context, but it should be valid here too. See Naudé ‘Section 52’ 
in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 22. 
1567 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 308, Sharrock Judicial control 129. 
1568 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
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challenges.1569 Naudé suggests that this should not prevent consumer organisations from 
challenging such prohibited conduct of suppliers who offer unfair terms and conditions.1570 
This view is correct, but courts will have difficulties in applying the badly worded general 
clause – which itself is not very helpful for the concretisation of the applicable fairness standard 
– without the assistance of section 52. It is suggested that section 52 contains elements which 
emanate from the principle of good faith, which in other legislation is expressly anchored in 
their general clause.1571 Without the 'good faith' guidance of section 52 (paragraph (b): nature 
of the parties, their relationship, relative capacity, experience etc., paragraph (c): circumstances 
of the transaction, paragraph (d): the supplier's conduct…), the courts do not have sufficient 
guidance at hand to apply reasonable standards. This should not prevent consumer 
organisations though to challenge unfair terms under the general clause so that courts may 
develop these standards accordingly. 
Pursuant to section 78, only accredited consumer protection groups are entitled to protect the 
interests of a consumer individually, or of consumers collectively before a forum contemplated 
in the Act. This is contradictory to section 4 which provides that any 'association acting in the 
interests of its members' or 'any person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or 
class of affected persons' is entitled to approach the enumerated fora. However, section 78 
could be lex specialis to section 4 so that only accredited consumer protection organisations 
can bring abstract challenges before the courts. This also would protect suppliers against 
expensive and baseless litigation by non-representative bodies.1572 In addition, accreditation 
provides for a minimum standard and protects consumers against fraudulent organisations.1573 
Such a minimum standard could also be assured if only those organisations were entitled to act 
on behalf of consumers who have some connection with the subject matter. § 3 UKlaG1574 
provides that in Germany, the following organisations have such a right: 1) qualified entities 
which demonstrate that they are inscribed in the current version of a list of qualified entities1575 
                                                             
1569 Also referred to as 'abstract', 'general use' or 'ex ante' challenges. In the German part of this thesis, these 
challenges will be referred to as 'institutional actions' (Verbandsklagen). 
1570 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
1571 See, for instance, § 307(1) 1st sent or art 3(1) of the EU Unfair Terms Directive. 
1572 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. 
1573 See s 78(3) et seq. 
1574 UKlaG = Unterlassungsklagengesetz (Injuctions Act). 
1575 The conditions for the inscription in this list are laid out in § 4 UKlaG: ' Qualified entities - (1) The Federal 
Office of Administration shall keep a list of qualified entities. This list shall be published in the Federal Gazette 
as at 1 January of each year and sent to the Commission of the European Communities with a reference to Article 
4(2) of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests (OJ L 166, 11.6.1998 at 51). (2) Associations with legal personality whose 
functions as laid down in their statutes include promoting consumers’ interests by education and advice on a non-
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or in the list of the Commission of the European Communities, 2) associations with legal 
personality for the promotion of commercial interests, insofar as their membership includes a 
considerable number of businesses marketing goods or commercial services of the same or a 
similar type on the same market, insofar as their staffing, material and financial resources 
enable them actually to perform the interest promotion functions laid down in their statutes, 
and 3) the Chambers of Trade and Industry or the Chambers of Crafts and Labour. This shows 
that accreditation is not necessary as far as numbers 2 and 3 are concerned, but that minimum 
standards (legal personality, membership requirements, and financial resources) must be met. 
As long as such standards are met, the non-accreditation should not prevent an organisation 
from defending consumer rights. On the other hand, those standards have to be well defined in 
order to prevent unserious or hopeless court actions.  
 
a) Unfair price, section 48(1)(a)(i) 
The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection do not recommend price control. Instead, they 
provide that ‘governments should encourage fair and effective competition in order to provide 
consumers with the greatest range of choice among products and services at the lowest cost’.1576 
The underlying assumption is that with effective competition, there is a fair market price. 
Therefore, courts should not be involved in price control. In order to function well and ensure 
that goods and services are available at affordable prices, a pricing system with the least 
possible interference by the State is necessary. All governmental measures to solve the problem 
of scarcity and affordability by raising salaries or prescribing prices have no positive effects in 
the long term, but a negative impact on the general economic picture.1577 Van Eeden even 
argues that any interference by the State in terms of price control is an obstacle for a well-
functioning economy with respect to the availability of goods and services at affordable 
prices.1578 Furthermore, most courts do not have the expertise and the resources for an effective 
market research. Market research requires sophisticated and empirical studies which can only 
be applied by highly trained and specialised individuals and bodies, such as competition 
                                                             
commercial and non-temporary basis shall be inscribed on request in the list if their membership includes 
associations active in this field or at least 75 natural persons, if they have been in existence for at least one year 
and if their previous activity affords assurance that they perform their functions correctly. There shall be an 
irrefragable presumption that consumer centres and other consumer associations supported by public funding 
satisfy these requirements. (…)' 
1576 Paragraph 24 of the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection (revision of 2015) at 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/UN-Guidelines-on-Consumer-Protection.aspx. 
1577 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 257 and 258. 
1578 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 185. 
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authorities.1579 For these reasons, article 4, read in conjunction with recital 19 of the EU Unfair 
Terms Directive, as well as § 307(3) BGB also excludes price control.1580 The fact that the 
South African legislator introduces an 'unfair price concept' raises complex practical and 
theoretical questions: Can a supplier be accountable ex post facto for prices it had charged in 
the past? Will these prices still be fair in the future when assessed by a court?1581  Moreover, 
prices have a rationing and allocative function in the economy. By removing this function, the 
positive effects of real competition, such as the efficiency of production and the allocation of 
resources are abandoned.1582 It is submitted that price control ultimately will lead to the result 
that low prices cannot be sustained because of a dysfunctional economy and lack of 
competition. The outcome will be market failure.1583  
In addition, competition law and the rules on improper conduct in the negotiation phase provide 
sufficient – and probably a more effective – price control.1584 Section 8(a) of the Competition 
Act,1585 for instance, prohibits a dominant firm to charge excessive prices to the detriment of 
consumers. An excessive price is a price for goods or services which (a) bears no reasonable 
relation to the economic value of that good or service, and (b) is higher than the value referred 
to in paragraph (a).1586 In Harmony Gold v Mittal Steel1587 the Competition Tribunal indicated 
that a ‘non-excessive price is a price that is determined by competitive conditions in the 
relevant market’. In Mittal Steel v Harmony Gold,1588 the Competition Appeal Court held that 
the definition of ‘excessive price appears to mandate an examination as to whether there is a 
reasonable relationship between the prices charged and the economic value of the good or 
service’. Section 9(1)(a) of the same Act prohibits any price discrimination which is likely to 
                                                             
1579 Factors and steps to be taken into account for the determination of a ‘fair’ price are, inter alia, the costing 
data, necessary adjustments for comparative purposes, the determination of the appropriate methodology, the 
opportunity costs of capital, the depreciation and replenishment of the plant. The limitations of accounting 
procedures have to be taken into account too. See also UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 144, Stoffels AGB-Recht 202. The 
German courts provide for some very restrictive exceptions for the argument that disadvantageous terms can be 
compensated by an advantageous price (so-called 'price argument'). These exceptions concern above all electricity 
suppliers and will be discussed in the German part of this thesis. See, for instance, BGH NJW 1998, 1640 (1644). 
1580 WLP/Wolf § 307 para 303. 
1581 See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 252 and 253. 
1582 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 252 and 253. 
1583 Factors of market failure are, for instance, monopoly, imperfect competition, public goods, externalities, 
asymmetric information and common property resources. See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 
254. 
1584 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
1585 89 of 1998. 
1586 Definition of ‘excessive price’ in s 1 of the Competition Act. 
1587 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and Another 2007 (1) CPLR 
37 (CT). 
1588 Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd, Macsteel International BV, and Macsteel Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Harmony Gold 
Mining Company Ltd and Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd (70/CAC/Apr07) [2009] ZACAC 1 (29 May 2009). 
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have the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition.1589 Price control under 
section 48 could force out suppliers by artificially set low prices. As a result, the choice of 
products in the market is reduced.1590 According to Naudé, courts should thus only interfere 
where the price is manifestly unjust or there is an excessive advantage for the supplier.1591 On 
the other hand, the price is part of the core terms, and consumers can be expected to shop 
around in order to find a better price, on the condition that they are transparent. This market 
behaviour normally ensures that suppliers offer competitive prices. What is more, it seems 
difficult to conceive how a court can assess an unjust price and an excessive advantage for the 
supplier without analysing the whole agreement in its economic context.1592 Nonetheless, cases 
are imaginable where an agreement is so one-sided and imbalanced that the price/quality ratio 
is obviously affected. In practice, this should be limited to cases though where a simple 
comparison with other suppliers reveals that the price is excessive, e.g., for 'simple' all-day 
products. In any case, courts should apply their discretion in this context very carefully. 
Although section 48(1)(a)(i) or any other provision of the Act do not contain any direct price 
control mechanism, it is not clear whether section 48(1)(a)(i) was intended to be a price control 
mechanism and a tool to control general price levels. If not, one has to ask whether it has a 
narrower scope, and if so, how far it reaches. Van Eeden is of the opinion that if it had been 
the legislator’s intention to introduce such a price control mechanism, it would have inserted it 
preferably in other pieces of legislation which fall in the ambit of fiscal and monetary 
authorities because the Act is not the appropriate statute for this kind of control mechanism.1593 
As already mentioned earlier, a court would have to deal with different empirical and analytical 
questions in its fairness enquiry. Then, it would have to determine if this price is ‘fair’, and 
calculate a margin. As a price alone is meaningless in a market economy without taking into 
consideration other provisions (on risk, ownership, warranties, quality etc.), these must also be 
considered together with the relationship between the parties to the contract (relative 
bargaining power, for instance). The degree of competitiveness in the relevant market is also 
crucial for the determination of the ‘fair’ price. 
                                                             
1589 Section 8(1)(e) CPA also contains a general prohibition of price discrimination with some exceptions when 
price differentiation is permitted. Sections 9 of the Competition Act and 8(1)(e) CPA have different conditions 
and objectives, however. In s 8, no domination is required, but the discrimination must be on the basis of grounds 
for unfair discrimination, whereas the objective of s 9 of the Competition Act is to protect competition. 
1590 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 256. 
1591 Naudé ‘Introduction to Sections 48-52 and regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
1592 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 144. 
1593 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 258 and 259. 
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Under consideration of all these factors, it is rather unlikely that the legislator intended to 
introduce a price control mechanism into section 48(1)(a)(i). Van Eeden contends that this 
section appropriately operates where an unfair price is applied and other factors are present, 
such as unconscionable conduct or deception. In his opinion, the application of this section is 
not ‘explicitly limited by reference to prices at which similar goods or services are readily 
available to consumers’ because this provision authorises an extensive exercise and 
discretionary power.1594   
Naudé alleges that courts should only interfere with excessive prices where the agreement was 
concluded on the basis of misrepresentation or other unconscionable conduct under sections 40 
and 41 as well as by applying the common-law rules on voidable contracts induced by improper 
means.1595 
Van Eeden's and Naudé's views can be interpreted to the effect that price control is not 
necessary because other mechanisms provided for in the Act are sufficient to prevent unfair 
pricing. In Germany, for instance, (mostly elderly) consumers tend to purchase excessively 
overpriced goods when undertaking so-called 'coffee trips' (Kaffeefahrten).1596 These are coach 
trips to towns or other more or less interesting places where 'occasionally'1597 products are 
promoted, usually at the end of the sightseeing tour, when having a break in a coffee-shop 
(hence the name 'coffee trips') or another venue. The salespersons first present their products, 
promote their incredible qualities and features, and then put pressure on their audience (which 
are trapped in the venue) by using sophisticated marketing strategies. The excursionists usually 
end up with low-standard products manufactured in the Far East for which they had paid 
multiple times more than the actual market price. Even in cases like this (if they existed in 
                                                             
1594 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 259 and 260. 
1595 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
1596 'Kaffeefahrt' is the non-legal term. The legal term is 'excursion' ('Ausflugsfahrt'). In terms of § 48 PBefG, the 
organiser determines the final destination. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Ausflugsfahrten'. § 48(1) PBefG 
provides that '[e]xcursions are tours that a supplier offers and performs with busses or passenger vehicles, 
according to a plan that is executed by him or her, for a purpose that is the same for and pursued by all participants.' 
(My own translation). In practice, the sightseeing part of the tour (if any) is accessory. See Creifelds 
Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Ausflugsfahrt' and the very instructive documentary film 'Abzocke Kaffeefahrt – 
Eingeladen und ausgenommen' at https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/zdfinfo-doku/abzocke-kaffeefahrt-104.html 
(last retrieved on 2 November 2017, accessible on the ZDF Mediathek until 4 October 2018, and still available on 
YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUL-Mu3hxBQ). See also 'Wer in den Bus steigt, sitzt in der 
Falle' Süddeutsche Zeitung of 6 April 2018 at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/leben/kriminalitaet-wer-in-den-bus-
steigt-sitzt-in-der-falle-1.3928107. 
1597 In fact, the promoting and selling of the offered products is the sole objective of the organisers, since they 
have enormous margins due to their excessive price and low quality. The offered goods can be anything, from 
pillows with 'incredible anti-allergic qualities', to vitamins promising a better quality of life, and paramedical 
equipment.  
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South Africa), price-control would not be necessary since sections 40, 41 and 29 offer sufficient 
protection against unconscionable conduct and false, misleading or deceptive representations 
as well as reprehensible marketing methods. 
At most, section 48(1)(a)(i) could have a warning function for suppliers. However, having the 
coffee-trips example above in mind, even this is arguable. 
It would have been beneficial for the application of the Act if the legislator had not introduced 
section 48(1)(a)(i). The problems for the courts with regard to the determination of the fair 
price outweigh the argument put forward by Sharrock in terms of which price control is covered 
by the general unfairness standard because this standard also applies to negotiated terms after 
‘hard bargaining’. Other provisions, such as sections 30 and 41, offer sufficient protection. This 
provision should be deleted. 
b) Unfair marketing, section 48(1)(b) 
Unfortunately, section 48(1)(b) refers more to the process of marketing, negotiation and 
administration than to the control of the content of an agreement. Other parts of the Act already 
provide for unfair marketing, negotiation and administration, such as Part F. Section 40, for 
instance, regulates unconscionable conduct and is a catch-all clause which covers any form of 
unfair conduct, such as the use of physical force, coercion, undue influence, pressure, duress 
or harassment, unfair tactics or any similar conduct in connection with the marketing of goods 
or services, their supply, or the negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement of an 
agreement.1598  
Part E provides for rulings in terms of marketing, too. According to section 29(a), certain 
parties must not market any goods or services in a manner that is reasonably likely to imply a 
false or misleading representation concerning those goods or services, as set out in section 41. 
Section 29(b) prohibits the marketing of goods and services in a manner that is misleading, 
fraudulent or deceptive in any way. 
For the reasons above, the location of section 48(1)(b) is unfortunate. By creating unnecessary 
confusion with other provisions of the Act, it does not contribute to any clarifications, rather 
the contrary. Section 48(1)(b) should thus be deleted. 
                                                             
1598 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 10. 
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c) Requiring or imposing to waive rights, the supplier's liability or assume obligations, 
section 48(1)(c) 
What is more, section 48(1)(c) is superfluous. It provides that a supplier must not require a 
consumer, or other person to whom goods or services are supplied at the direction of the 
consumer, to waive any rights, assume any obligation, or waive any liability of the supplier.  
Section 48(1)(c) can be divided into several elements, namely the imposition of terms that are 
unfair, as a condition of entering into a transaction, requiring a specific action on the part of 
the consumer, i.e., the waiver of rights, the assumption of obligations or the waiver of any 
liability of the supplier, and the waiver of rights or the assumption of obligations being on 
unfair terms.1599 
Although ‘to require’ assumes a request to contract on specific terms,1600 the mere use of a 
supplier’s terms can be interpreted in that the consumer is ‘required’ to contract on the basis of 
these terms so that the conditions of section 48((1)(c) are fulfilled.1601 Van Eeden correctly 
argues that the mere incorporation of particular unfair provisions in a standard form contract 
and their presentation to the consumer may be regarded as an imposition of unfair terms ‘as a 
condition’ to contract. This applies above all when the supplier does not present alternative 
terms which are not unfair.1602 This view is supported by the formulation of § 305 BGB, where 
the 'pre-formulation' of standard business terms is expressed by words such as 'present 
(standard business terms to the other party' ('Stellen'),1603 and the non-existing possibility of 
the consumer to contribute to the formulation of standard business terms.1604 
The wide formulation of section 48(1)(a) already includes the prohibition of section 48(1)(c). 
Therefore, it creates confusion by adding similar general provisions on conduct to already 
existing norms elsewhere.  
The value of this subsection is thus disputable since its regulatory content does not reach 
beyond section 48(1)(a). Naudé therefore correctly maintains that it is superfluous.1605 Thus, 
this paragraph should be deleted, too. 
                                                             
1599 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 251. 
1600 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 308, Sharrock Judicial control 129. 
1601 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 251. 
1602 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 251. 
1603 § 305(1) 1st sent. 
1604 § 305(1) 3rd sent. See UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 26. 
1605 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11. 
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4.1.2 The basic unfairness standard of section 48(2) 
Since the legislator chose the formulation ‘[w]ithout limiting the generality of subsection 1’ at 
the beginning of section 48(2), it can be said that the ambit of section 48(1) is supposed to 
reach beyond the instances of unfairness set out in section 48(2)(a) and (b). What is more, 
further instances are imaginable where a term is unfair, though their characteristics might be 
different from those described in section 48(2)(a) and (b).1606 Although the legislator did not 
choose the word ‘deem’, section 48(2) seems to be a deeming clause. Instead of using the words 
‘includes’ or 'including',1607 which would have the same effect of not ‘limiting the defined or 
generic expression to the examples or items so enumerated’,1608 the legislator chose the phrase 
‘[w]ithout limiting the generality of subsection (1)’.  
The phrase ‘without limiting the generality’ could mean that subsection (2) is lex specialis to 
subsection (1) (consequently, subsection (1) would be lex generalis). This would mean that 
when a clause is found to be unfair under subsection (2), subsection (1) must not be assessed 
anymore.  
Van Eeden is of the view that the objective of section 48(2) is to make sure that section 48(1) 
is not interpreted restrictively, i.e., in a manner where only the instances of unfairness of section 
48(2) are taken into account, but that also the deception standard of section 48(2)(c), read with 
section 41, as well as the procedural standard contained in section 48(2)(d)(ii) are included.1609 
This view is correct. Subsection (2) is not lex specialis to subsection (1), but the two provisions 
complete each other. It is suggested that subsection (2) has a radiating effect on subsection (1). 
Hence, when assessing if a clause is excessively one-sided in terms of subsection (2)(a), one 
has to take into consideration whether the consumer had to waive any rights in favour of the 
supplier, or if any terms have been imposed onto the consumer, for instance.1610 The same 
approach can be found in the German general clause where § 307(1) has a guiding function 
vis-à-vis subsection (2). Only where cardinal obligations are restricted, the legislator expressly 
stated that subsection (2) takes precedence over subsection (1).1611 Only insofar, § 307(2) BGB 
is lex specialis to subsection (1).1612 
                                                             
1606 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 249. 
1607 As defined in section 2(7). 
1608 See s 2(7). 
1609 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 250. 
1610 Section 48(1)(c)(i) and (iii). 
1611 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
1612 Stoffels AGB-Recht 204. 
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This 'radiating effect' is limited though, and subsection (2) is not helpful in concretising 
unfairness in terms of subsection (1). Section 48(2) gives examples for when a transaction is 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust. These ‘guidelines’ do not apply to the price charged by the 
supplier.1613 Unfortunately, only the first paragraph, relating to one-sidedness, helps define the 
concept of ‘unfair, unreasonable or unjust’, whereas paragraph (b) only uses the synonym 
‘inequitable’ and therefore creates a certain circularity.1614 Therefore, my suggestion is that the 
interlacing of these two subsections is limited, which is deplorable. In the view that the 
lawmaker chose a very complicated structure for a general clause, one could have expected a 
more significant impact and scope of its individual elements. 
Although section 48(2) provides when terms and conditions are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, 
the terms 'excessively one-sided'1615 and 'inequitable'1616 give room for a subjective 
interpretation.1617 The fact that certain terms are customary in the trade, or that certain suppliers 
put forward that in practice they never rely on the unfair term in an unfair manner and intend 
only to make use of it in a fair manner, is not a defence and does not lead to the result that such 
terms are permitted. This is because the potential unfairness or ‘tendency’ has to be judged, 
and not the actual use of a term.1618 On the other hand, the interpretation of these terms has to 
be done on a case-to-case basis.1619 Although the Act focuses on the individual consumer, 
contrary to §§ 305 et seq. BGB which cater to an abstract-universal approach, it is suggested 
that the Act 'borrows' elements of an abstract-universal approach in that the tendency of a term 
and not its actual application is to be assessed.  
a) One-sidedness, section 48(2)(a) 
Some items of the greylist of regulation 44(3) contain terms that are presumed to be unfair 
because of their excessive one-sidedness.1620 According to the South African Law 
Commission, a relevant factor for one-sidedness is ‘whether there is a lack of reciprocity in an 
otherwise reciprocal contract’.1621 
                                                             
1613 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 184. 
1614 In the same sense: Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1615 Section 48(2)(a). 
1616 Section 48(2)(b). 
1617 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 182. 
1618 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer 
Protection Law 249. 
1619 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 182, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 249. 
1620 See reg 44(3)(k), (m), (n) and (aa). 
1621 Section 2(o) of the Bill of the SALRC published in SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts 
and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) (1998). 
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On the other hand, a term that prima facie seems to be detrimental to consumers may be fair if 
it is counter-balanced by another term or terms that are to the consumer’s benefit.1622 A term 
may be so excessively one-sided though that even an overall balance of fairness may not ‘save’ 
it.1623 In addition, the clause which is supposed to counterbalance the consumer's disadvantage 
has actually to be advantageous for the consumer in order to be equivalent to the benefit that is 
granted to the supplier by the other clause.1624 For Naudé it is imaginable that a term which 
appears to be excessively one-sided may be justified if the consumer consciously decided to 
conclude the agreement on that basis after having considered alternatives. Therefore, also 
procedural factors should be relevant when assessing whether a ‘one-sided’ term is fair.1625 
Naudé took this view before the final wording of the Act was established. Her submission is 
supported by the wording of section 48(2) in pr. because the fairness enquiry not only covers 
individual clauses but also transactions or agreements as a whole. A purportedly unfair clause 
to which the consumer has agreed willingly should therefore be assessed against the backdrop 
of section 52. This does not mean that a term becomes automatically fair in cases where the 
consumer willingly concluded the agreement in the knowledge of the term in question. All the 
relevant factors in section 52 have to be assessed in these cases in order to examine under which 
circumstances the consumer concluded the agreement. If there is any indication of 
unconscionable conduct of the supplier, or where the consumer was taken advantage of because 
of his or her inexperience, such clauses/agreements will most likely to be unfair, despite the 
consumer's acceptance.  
Naudé's view is therefore correct. In German law, §§ 305 et seq. generally take an abstract-
universal approach when assessing a term's fairness, without having a concrete consumer in 
mind. German standard business terms legislation is a general law which governs a particular 
contract practice, i.e., standard terms.1626 Nonetheless, with the insertion of § 310(3) no. 3 and 
                                                             
1622 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. In German law, this phenomenon 
is referred to as 'compensation effect' (Kompensationswirkung). See Stoffels AGB-Recht 190. 
1623 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 251. 
1624 See Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 309, Sharrock Judicial control 130. Sharrock refers in note 81 to Deutch 
Controlling Standard Contracts – The Israeli Version’ (1985) 30 McGill LJ 458-472: ‘Other terms of a standard 
contract can certainly be taken into account when judging the validity of standard terms. Such other terms should 
be considered when they provide consumers with benefits not available under existing law and those benefits 
constitute a fair equivalent for the displaced protection. For instance, when a supplier displaces a customer’s right 
to repudiate the contract by giving him the right to free repairs for a year and such a right does not exist under the 
residual rules, it is possible that the limitation will be upheld. But a right to free repairs scarcely justifies exclusion 
of consequential damages if there is not proportional value between the right conferred and that taken away.’ 
1625 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 371. This article was published before the CPA came into force and before its final 
wording was established. 
1626 Schmidt-Salzer BB 1995, 734-736. 
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the consideration of 'other circumstances attending the entering into of the contract', a concrete 
and individualistic approach of the circumstances is taken for consumer contracts.1627 The Act 
does not assess fairness by taking a generalised-typified approach but a concrete-individual 
approach. 
As noted above, a supplier cannot defend an unfair term by saying that it never relies on it in 
an unfair manner. A term should always be judged in the light of its potential unfairness or 
'tendency', and not by the supplier's intention.1628 With the discussion above in mind, the 
fairness scrutiny must hence be 'enriched' by procedural factors. 
b) Adverseness, section 48(2)(b) 
According to section 48(2)(b), a term is unfair if it is so adverse to the consumer as to be 
inequitable. Unfortunately, the legislator chose to define ‘unfair’ by using the synonym 
‘inequitable’, which creates a certain circularity. This criterion is even more difficult to 
apprehend because there is no 'balancing' context like in section 48(2)(a) (one-sidedness 
presumes the consideration of two sides), and yet it must be seen within its commercial 
setting.1629 In other words, the type of contract, the relationship between the parties, the 
particular trade practices and so forth must be considered. 
It is recommended that for subsection (b), a two-tear enquiry is applied in which (1) the 
adverseness to the consumer, and (2) the inequitableness are examined. This is the same 
procedure as for the German general clause in which first a disadvantage, and second the 
unreasonableness of the disadvantage are assessed.1630 It is submitted that the adverseness in 
section 48(2)(b) is comparable to the 'disadvantage' in § 307(1) 1st sent. For this purpose, a 
comparison between the legal situation with and without the clause in question has to take 
place. If the consumer's legal situation with the clause is worse than without it, the clause is 
adverse to the consumer. At this stage, the mere determination of whether there is adverseness 
suffices, and no evaluative assessment is necessary. The second stage consists in the enquiry 
of whether the clause is equitable. Evaluative elements, such as good faith or the balance of the 
parties' interests have to be considered at this stage. Elements in other provisions of the Act, 
such as one-sidedness (section 48(2)(a)), the evaluative judgement made in the black- or 
greylists, or procedural elements contained in section 52 should be taken into consideration 
                                                             
1627 Hommelhoff/Wiedenmann ZIP 1993, 565 et seq. 
1628 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13. See also OFT Unfair Contract 
Terms Guidance (2008) at 9 and 10. 
1629 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 252. 
1630 Stoffels AGB-Recht 192 and 193. 
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here. This demonstrates that these provisions are intertwined with each other and that the 
fairness evaluation is a complex undertaking, for which various and multiple factors have to be 
considered. 
It is my submission that section 48(2)(b) would have served as a better starting point for a 
general clause than the actual verbose provision, in which subsection (b) is only one 'factor' to 
be considered.  
4.1.3 The deceptive and procedural standards of section 48(2)(c) and (d) 
a) False representations or statements of opinion, section 48(2)(c) 
Only section 48(2)(a) and (b) is referred to as the ‘basic unfairness standard’, but not 
subsections (c) and (d), because terms which fall under these two standards will be regarded as 
unfair, irrespective of the meaning that may be ascribed to the words unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust’ in section 48(1).1631 
Section 48(2)(c), which is supposed to give guidance on the determination of unfairness, does 
not relate to content control, but unnecessarily confuses other forms of control with content 
control.1632 Van Eeden calls this standard ‘deceptive standard’, as opposed to the ‘basic 
unfairness standards’ of section 48(2)(a) and (b).1633  
Section 41 concerns false, misleading or deceptive representations. It provides that a supplier 
is not allowed to use false, misleading or deceptive representation concerning a material fact, 
use innuendo, exaggeration or ambiguity as to a material fact or fail to disclose a material fact, 
or must not knowingly allow consumers to believe false, misleading or deceptive facts by 
failing to correct an apparent misapprehension on the part of the consumer. A supplier has to 
disclose material facts properly, and failure to do so may be regarded as a false, misleading or 
deceptive representation. A person acting on behalf of a supplier may also not falsely represent 
that such person has any sponsorship, approval or affiliation or engage in conduct that the 
supplier is prohibited from engaging in.1634  
Praise of goods or service by a supplier, or sales talk or so-called ‘puffing’ with respect to 
material facts can be regarded as the use of ‘exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a 
material fact’ in terms of section 41(1)(b). The common law qualifies ‘puffing’ as mere sales 
                                                             
1631 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 249. 
1632 Naudé 2009 SALJ 518. 
1633 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 250. 
1634 Section 41(2). 
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talk without any binding effect.1635 However, under section 41(1)(b), exaggeration, innuendo 
or ambiguity concerning a material fact are prohibited. If a consumer relied upon exaggeration, 
innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, it renders a contract or term unfair under section 
48(2)(c).1636 
The term ‘statement of opinion’ is not qualified in the Act. Therefore, it includes any opinions 
and not only false, misleading or deceptive opinions. This should be considered by suppliers 
of legal and medical services, such as advocates or medical practitioners, as a term or 
agreement can be declared unfair if a consumer had relied on an opinion.1637 
Van Eeden cites the case of Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd and 
Others1638 as an example where a consumer relied on a deceptive or misleading representation 
or statement of opinion of the supplier. He argues that section 48(2)(c) would apply in this 
case.1639 This case involved standard form contracts for gym memberships ranging from 12 to 
24 and 36 months. The UK court held that average consumers tended to over-estimate how 
often they would use the gym once they had become a member, and also unforeseen 
circumstances might prevent them from using it. The court was of the view that the supplier’s 
business model was designed and calculated to take advantage of the inexperience and naiveté 
of average consumers at the lower end of the market and that the contract contained a trap for 
them. It is suggested though that this case does not fall under section 48(2)(c) because for a 
false, misleading or deceptive representation or a statement of opinion, an active action of the 
supplier is necessary. Examples are the use of illustrations that are different from the product 
being sold, materially misleading product warranties, or promises to replace, maintain or repair 
an article, the distortion of test results, the use the words 'sale' or 'special' in relation to the price 
of a product unless a significant price reduction has occurred.1640 The fact that the supplier had 
                                                             
1635 Christie Law of Contract 155, 158 and 273-274 where it is indicated that puffing has no legal effect, but that 
it is difficult to draw a line between mere puffing and misrepresentation. See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 
General Principles (2007) 112. 
1636 The Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) is the regulatory authority which is voluntarily regulating the 
advertising industry in South Africa. In terms of s 97(1)(a), the Consumer Commission may liaise with any other 
regulatory authority on matters of common interest and may exchange information pertaining to matters of 
common interest or a specific complaint or investigation. The Consumer Commission may thus ask the ASA to 
regulate 'puffing' in the advertising industry. 
1637 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 356. 
1638 Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd and Others [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch). This 
judgment is accessible at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2011/1237.html& 
query=ashbourne&method=Boolean. 
1639 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 261. 
1640 Examples from 'False or Misleading Representations and Deceptive Marketing Practices Under the 
Competition Act' at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03133.html. These examples 
should also apply to South Africa. 
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designed and calculated its contracts in a way to take advantage of inexperienced clients cannot 
be seen as an active deception of the consumer. Had the supplier affirmed vis-à-vis the 
consumer, despite the contrary, that the bulk of its clients regularly attend the gym until the 
end of their contract, one could certainly assume an active misleading deception. The mere 
statement of an obligation of the consumer in a contract clause is not sufficient, however. 
Furthermore, the UK court maintained that such membership contracts were unfair because 
they create a significant imbalance between the members' obligations and the gym's rights. 
Minimum terms of 12 months were not considered unfair where the contract allowed the 
members to suspend or cancel their membership (without incurring charges) in certain 
circumstances, such as financial or health reasons, or if the member moved out of the area or 
lost their job.1641 Hence, the court took a more nuanced view than Van Eeden suggests. 
The legislature did not indicate any specific relationship between the representation or 
statement of opinion and the transaction or agreement, or standard provision like in the other 
instances of section 48(2). Du Plessis argues that the rationale behind the overlap of sections 
41 and 48(2)(c) is not clear.1642 When taking subsection (c) literally, a term or agreement which 
generally would be fair (e.g., because it balances the parties' interests) becomes unfair because 
of the supplier's representation or statement of opinion. If a consumer purchases a vacuum 
cleaner of good quality which does its job perfectly, i.e., vacuuming, and the supplier untruly 
assured the consumer that this product could also be used as a pump in order to empty a 
fishpond, the underlying agreement would become unfair.1643 
This means that after the fairness review of the clause, one must determine whether the supplier 
has issued a deceptive representation or statement of opinion and if the latter is 'material'. How 
this can be realised in practice remains unclear though. If, for example, a clause in an agreement 
grants the consumer the right to return the goods within six months after delivery (which is 
merely a restatement of section 56(2) and fair per se), and the supplier orally assures the 
consumer that this right is indefinite, it is arguable if the clause become unfair, although the 
consumer is afforded the minimum legal rights under the Act. 
                                                             
1641 Office of Fair Trading v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd and Others [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch) 
para [165]. 
1642 Du Plessis ‘Section 41’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
1643 My own example. 
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Du Plessis indicates that 'representation' should be interpreted broadly to ensure consumer 
protection.1644 Material facts are those that are significant, of consequence or relevance.1645 
Section 41(1) does not require that such a material fact be related to the goods or services in 
question. It is my suggestion that section 48(2)(c) could play a role, for instance, where a 
supplier explains a particular term of the agreement to the consumer, and by doing so 
‘embellishes’ it so that the consumer is of the view that he has certain rights (e.g., concerning 
the content and the conditions of a warranty). Therefore, in not all instances, there is a lack of 
reference to a contractual provision, as Van Eeden suggests.1646 This broad interpretation would 
indeed improve consumer protection. 
Naudé correctly suggests that it would have been much more elegant and efficient if, in terms 
of false, misleading or deceptive representations, the provision of section 48(2)(c) had been 
inserted into section 41 instead. Section 41 should have provided that a term is voidable if it is 
severable from the rest of the contract, and consensus on it was obtained on the basis of 
misrepresentation. Currently, a court must first declare a term unfair on the basis of 
misrepresentation under sections 48(2)(c) and 52. This is a convoluted way to achieve 
protection against false representations.  
b) Unfairness, section 48(2)(d)  
Similarly to paragraph (c), the inclusion of paragraph (d) of section 48(2) is also unsystematic 
because it is unrelated to content control. According to this provision, a term is unfair if the 
agreement was subject to a term contemplated in section 49(1) and the fact, nature and effect 
of that term were not drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner that satisfied the 
requirements of section 49. Van Eeden calls this standard hence ‘procedural standard’.1647 Here 
again, the contents of section 48(2)(d) should have been included rather in section 49 with the 
effect that a term is voidable if the requirements are not fulfilled.1648 
Because section 52(1) regulates the powers of the court in case of a contravention of section 
40, 41 or 48, section 48(2)(d) seems to have no extra-judicial effect, and to be not binding, a 
court must first declare a term unfair. In order to strengthen the consumer's position, courts 
should interpret any prohibition contained in this part of the Act, including those in section 48, 
as not binding on the consumer per se, and section 52 should be interpreted in that it just 
                                                             
1644 Du Plessis ‘Section 41’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7. 
1645 Du Plessis ‘Section 41’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7. 
1646 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 261. 
1647 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 250. 
1648 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 15. 
 306   
 
enumerates the orders which a court may make in case of a legal dispute.1649 Article 6 of the 
EU Unfair Terms Directive provides that unfair terms shall 'not be binding on the consumer 
and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of 
continuing in existence without the unfair terms.' The Act, which does not contain such a 
provision, should apply the same standard. 
In summary, it can be said that the South African general clause is very burdensome, lacks 
clarity, is quite unsystematic and does not correspond to international standard and good legal 
practice. Unfortunately, the legislature took the concept of a 'catch-all clause' too literally 
because it also regulated 'concretisations' that do not have their place in a general clause, such 
as the procedural and deceptive standards. The comprehensive formulation of this clause can 
only be explained by the supposition that the legislator aimed at a regulation that comprised all 
sorts of actions or gives guidance to the courts. Unfortunately, this objective has not been 
reached. A clearer and shorter clause with precise guidelines, such as the general clause in the 
EU Unfair Terms Directive or § 307 BGB, would have been more effective. 
4.1.4 Other guidelines for the determination of unfairness 
a) List of considerations set out in section 52(2) 
Section 52(2) contains a list of 'factors' that the court must consider in any proceedings 
concerning a transaction or agreement between a supplier and consumer if a person alleges that 
the supplier contravened section 40, 41 or 48, and the Act does not otherwise provide a remedy 
sufficient to correct the relevant prohibited conduct, unfairness, injustice or unconscionability. 
According to this provision, the court must consider the matters contained in this list only after 
considering the principles, purposes and provisions of the Act. 
§§ 305 et seq. BGB do not contain a similar list of factors. § 310(3) no.3, which deals 
specifically with consumer contracts, merely provides that 'in judging an unreasonable 
disadvantage under section 307(1) and (2) [general clause], the other circumstances attending 
the entering into of the contract must also be taken into account.' Article 4 of the EU Unfair 
Terms Directive (which was the reason for the insertion of § 310 into the BGB) contains a 
similar, but wider, clause.1650 §§ 305 et seq. do not define the 'other circumstances attending 
the entering into of the contract'. Recital 16 of the EU Directive gives some guidance and makes 
                                                             
1649 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 15. 
1650 Article 4: '(…) the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the 
goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, 
to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of 
another contract on which it is dependent.' 
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clear what has to be taken into consideration: the bargaining positions of the parties, whether 
the consumer had an inducement to agree to the term, or whether the goods or services were 
sold or supplied to the special order of the consumer. Fuchs is of the view that one can 
distinguish between three categories of circumstances attending the entering into the contract, 
namely 1) the personal qualities of the contractual party (level of his or her personal business 
experience), 2) the particularities of the concrete situation when concluding the contract (e.g., 
pressure, taking the other party by surprise, explanations), and 3) particular atypical interests 
of the consumer (the aimed use of the good known by the supplier).1651 
It is my submission that the factors contained in section 52(2) also have to be taken into account 
within the fairness enquiry of regulation 44(3). When the Act came into effect, the Minister 
had not yet made this regulation in terms of section 120(1)(d). There is no reason why a court 
should only consider the factors as mentioned earlier in terms of the general and basic fairness 
standards of section 48, and not in terms of presumably unfair provisions contained in 
regulation 44(3). 
Given the legislator's efforts to 'provid[e] for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective 
and efficient system for redress for consumers',1652 it is surprising that section 52 only applies 
to courts and not to the other entities, such as consumer courts or the Tribunal. This creates a 
different standard of content control between the entities involved in consumer protection, 
including the courts, which is clearly against the legislator's intention. This becomes clear, for 
instance, when considering that the Tribunal the procedure of which is set out in sections 142 
to 148 of the National Credit Act, will have to consider the same rulings of consumer courts, 
ombuds or arbitrators, as well as appropriate foreign and international law, international 
conventions, declarations and protocols relating to consumer protection as a court when 
interpreting or applying the Act. Since the Tribunal has been instituted by the National Credit 
Act and is also applying and interpreting this piece of legislation while aiming at the same time 
at a coherent jurisprudence in terms of both Acts, it must otherwise be feared that the Tribunal 
will not necessarily follow the same considerations as a court, notably when being excluded 
from applying the factors mentioned in section 52(2). 
Naudé points out that there are compelling grounds for granting ordinary courts sole 
jurisdiction over disputes about alleged unfair terms. Not only the list of section 52(2) is 
                                                             
1651 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 406 et seq. See also BAG NZA 2006, 324 (328). 
1652 Section 3(1)(h). 
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exclusively geared towards courts, but also the powers to make specific orders under section 
52 (3) and (4).1653 The fact that provincial consumer courts, ombuds or the NCC are not 
mentioned in section 52 speaks, according to Naudé, for this interpretation. Furthermore, the 
DTI was concerned that the ordinary courts' jurisdiction would be eroded by creating various 
tribunals.1654 
She argues that common-law courts follow a system of precedent, and their decisions are 
reported which 'bodes better for legal certainty'. In addition, they are composed of legally 
trained magistrates and judges who would understand contract law better than laypersons 
serving in consumer courts.1655 Lastly, she suggests that the use of a contract term becomes 
prohibited conduct only after a court has declared its unfairness and that therefore the other 
redress entities of the Act have jurisdiction to act against a supplier only after the provision in 
question has been declared unfair by an ordinary court.1656  
Naudé's arguments are however clearly against the wording of section 48 which implies that 
the use of unfair terms is prohibited in terms of the Act.1657 It is submitted that her position 
contradicts the legislator's intention to provide for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, 
effective and efficient system for redress for consumers.1658 If ordinary courts were in a better 
position to decide whether terms are unfair, the efforts undertaken by implementing a parallel 
redress system, consisting of consumer courts, the Tribunal, the National Consumer 
Commission and alternative dispute resolution agents, would be neutered. Moreover, most 
disputes are decided in the lower courts, the rulings of which will not be reported. What is 
more, consumers will often not be in a position to afford High Court proceedings, especially in 
a consumer context where rather small amounts are involved. Furthermore, section 691659 lists 
several other institutions tasked with deciding a dispute on unfair terms, such as the Tribunal, 
                                                             
1653 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
1654 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7. See the minutes of this briefing at 
'Consumer Protection Bill: Workshop Day 2' at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9055/. According to the 
briefing, the DTI's intention was that consumers may either directly approach the court for a declaration that a 
term is unfair, or approach the relevant ombud. The latter could then enter a consent order to be taken to court or 
the Tribunal in order to make an order of court. As a result, the ordinary court would not have to decide over the 
dispute. However, the intention also may have been not to bestow jurisdiction upon the Tribunal and consumer 
courts, as otherwise, s 52 would have given powers to these institutions as well. 
1655 Naudé 2010 SALJ 527. 
1656 Naudé 2010 SALJ 525. 
1657 Naudé 2010 SALJ 525. 
1658 Section 3(1)(h). 
1659 The problems involved with this provision have already been discussed elsewhere. In its current form, s 69 is 
unconstitutional as it restricts the consumer's fundamental right of access to court under s 34 of the Constitution. 
See Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 303. 
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ombuds, alternative dispute resolution agents as well as the National Consumer Commission. 
Therefore, it is surprising that section 52(2) only refers to the courts.1660 It can thus be said that 
if section 52 were only applicable to courts, there would be no real impact on the eradication 
of unfair contract terms.1661 The legislator might have omitted to insert the other entities, which 
is why this provision should be applied by analogy to the other entities so that they are given 
the same powers as the courts in order to ensure effective redress. 
A direct application of section 52(2) by the Tribunal and the other entities, save the courts, 
would be contra legem with a view to the current wording of this provision. Since the factors 
contained therein are an emanation of the legislator's value judgment, and the cases dealt with 
by the courts or the other entities of the Act are similar, it is submitted that section 52(2) has to 
be applied by analogy by the Tribunal, the consumer courts as well as all ADR agents in terms 
of the Act in order to achieve coherence.1662 The best solution would be however if the 
legislator changed the wording of this provision and included all consumer protection entities, 
especially the Tribunal. This would lead to a consistent and harmonised consumer redress 
system in terms of section 3(1)(h) and resolve the anomaly instituted by section 52.  
Other possible options of the legislator in terms of consumer redress and the courts' role in the 
light of the German regime will be discussed in Part III. 
Section 52(2) focuses mainly on procedural unfairness, as opposed to substantive unfairness 
dealing with the content of a term.1663 Unfortunately, some substantive fairness factors that the 
South African Law Commission had suggested1664 were not included in the Act.1665 In some 
instances however, control on substantive unfairness alone would also be justified as the use 
of standard contract terms creates procedural unfairness because of the lack of incentives for 
the consumer to read and bargain about terms.1666 This applies irrespective of whether the 
consumer ‘could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a different 
supplier’1667 because it is highly unlikely that a consumer will shop around and compare not 
only the goods in question but also the terms involved. In many cases though, procedural and 
                                                             
1660 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
1661 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
1662 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Analogie'. For a more detailed presentation of analogy in law, see 
'Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning' at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec. 
1663 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11. 
1664 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 374. 
1665 Some of those factors will be discussed below in the context of factors that a court should consider, under the 
premise that the list in s 52(2) is not exhaustive.  
1666 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
1667 See s 52(2)(i). 
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substantive unfairness cannot be separated due to the structural inequality caused by the use of 
standard form contracts.1668 The ‘visibility’ or prominence of a term must be considered in 
conjunction with its content when its fairness is enquired, for instance. What is more, in ex-
ante challenges, where no consumers are directly involved, substantive fairness is likely to play 
a more significant role, as opposed to procedural fairness, although ‘generalised’ procedural 
fairness factors, such as the bargaining position of the supplier (even without its counterpart) 
and the prominence of a term will still have to be considered.1669 
Even though section 52 does not expressly state it, it is submitted that the list contained in 
subsection (2) is not exhaustive.1670 There are many instances, which will be discussed below, 
which are not mentioned in the list but considered in foreign legislation. They can thus be taken 
into account by South African courts in terms of section 2(2). The list does not exclude this 
possibility. Hence, factors that serve as the best international model of relevant factors, and 
which can be found in the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law Commission of 
England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission in 20051671 should also be considered 
by the courts. The Bill contains, among others, the following substantive fairness factors: (c) 
the balance of the parties' interests, (d) the risks to the party adversely affected by the term, (e) 
the possibility and probability of insurance, (g) the extent to which the term (whether alone or 
with others) differs from what would have been the case in its absence, and (j) the nature of the 
goods or services to which the contract relates.1672 
Moreover, Sharrock and Naudé suggest that the word ‘must’ at the beginning of section 52(2) 
must be changed into ‘may’ in order to give courts the discretion to discuss only factors they 
consider relevant in a given case. The authors are of the opinion that ‘must’ probably implies 
that the parties should bring evidence on all the listed factors.1673 It is my suggestion that the 
word ‘must’ can be also interpreted in that the courts ‘must’ not only consider the matters 
contemplated in subsection (1) of section 52, but also (the relevant) factors in subsection (2). 
Thus, the word 'must' merely ensures a link between subsections (1) and (2). A change of the 
                                                             
1668 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. See also Barkhuizen v Napier at 
para [149] where Sachs J already recognised this in his minority judgment. See also BVerfG NJW 1993, 36. 
1669 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1670 Some authorities, like Naudé or Sharrock, are of the same opinion. See Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and 
Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11, Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 135. 
1671 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 373 and 374. 
1672 Section 14(4) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill published in Law Commissions of England and Wales and 
the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)(2005). 
1673 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 309, Sharrock Judicial control 131. 
 311   
 
word ‘must’ into ‘may’ could thus lead to the perception that the courts are not obliged to 
consider other circumstances than the principles, purposes and provisions of the Act, besides 
the assessment of sections 40, 41 or 48 respectively, but that they have discretion in this regard. 
The purpose of section 52(2) is that the courts also assess the factors listed therein, however. 
For the sake of a better understanding and a direction to the courts, the legislator should make 
this clear and reformulate the first sentence in subsection (2) as follows: 
'(2) In any matter contemplated in subsection (1), the court must consider, 
inter alia, the following factors, if applicable –1674 
                               (a)…' 
This formulation is clear enough in that the courts must consider also other circumstances than 
those mentioned in section 52(1), and that the list in section 52(2) is not exhaustive. 
In any event, section 52 seems to be the mechanism for the implementation of sections 40 and 
41 as well as for the general clause.1675 
It is further submitted that the location of this list of factors in section 52(2) is an obstacle for 
predictability and certainty as these factors only apply in a dispute. It would have been 
advantageous also to allow the possibility to make a term void per se in an extra-judicial 
context. Naudé correctly argues that a court which is not sufficiently aware of the realities in 
terms of standard form contracts may lay too much importance to the factors listed in section 
52(2) and decide that a term is fair, instead of taking into consideration other circumstances.1676 
Furthermore, predictability and certainty would be enhanced if a court would be prepared to 
declare a term unfair per se in a particular industry, or based on the ‘tendency of the clause’. 
Such an objective finding (‘objective’ because it would declare a term void regardless of the 
parties of the particular case) would not only be in the interest of the consumers, but also in the 
interest of the suppliers of the trade sector in question, advance predictability, and eliminate 
unfair terms in the given sector and probably also in other related and unrelated sectors. This 
is because some unfair terms are so repugnant that they rarely can be fair.1677 The same 
                                                             
1674 My own suggestion emphasised. 
1675 The National Consumer Commission v Western Car Sales t/a Western Car Sales NCT/81554/2017/173(2)(b). 
The NCC held that a reading of s 48 in conjunction with s 52 indicates that s 48 remains exclusively reserved for 
(adjudication) by a court of law. 
1676 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 372, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1677 See also Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. In Johannesburg Country 
Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA), the SCA decided in an obiter dictum that a term excluding liability for death 
caused negligently would probably be contrary to public policy because it conflicts with s 11 of the Bill of Rights, 
namely the right to life. It should be noted that terms excluding or limiting the liability for death or personal injury 
are presumed to be unfair under reg 44(3)(a). 
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approach can be found in German law where the circumstances of the parties involved in a 
particular transaction are not taken into account but rather the transactions of the type and 
classes of the participants.1678 In the unfairness enquiry, one therefore must also consider the 
socio-economic context in which the term is used. This also applies to so-called ‘general use’ 
challenges brought by consumer organisations or regulators, where no individual consumer is 
involved in the given dispute. As mentioned before, not only the content of the term but also 
its application in the given surroundings have to be considered.1679 
A court that is confronted with a general use challenge cannot apply section 52(2) directly but 
has to rely on its inherent jurisdiction in order to consider factors it deems relevant for the given 
case. In other words, the court is not obliged to consider any factor listed in section 52(2).1680 
The legislator should have drafted section 52(2) also having general use challenges in mind in 
which consumer protection organisations institute proceedings not involving individual 
consumers.1681 The experience in other countries has shown that unfair contract provisions can 
more effectively be eradicated with general use challenges as opposed to individual 
complaints.1682 It would thus beneficial if this provision would be redrafted accordingly. 
The legislator chose to locate this list in section 52(2) so that it is also applicable to sections 40 
and 41 and is constructed for a more procedural approach. Alternatively, the legislator could 
have chosen to insert a reference in section 48 to section 52(2), stating that the factors in this 
list are to be considered for the determination of whether an agreement or a term is unfair. 
In the following, the factors listed in section 52(2) will be discussed in detail as well as some 
other, not listed, factors the courts should consider. 
aa) Fair value of the goods or services 
In terms of section 52(2)(a), the court must consider the fair value of the goods or services in 
question. The ‘fair’ value relates to the price of a good or a service and therefore is a substantive 
fairness consideration. The price may be challenged under section 48((1)(a)(i) which has been 
already discussed above.1683 As mentioned, courts should be careful to interfere with pricing 
                                                             
1678 BGHZ 22, 91 (98), BGHZ 17, 1 (3). 
1679 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
1680 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11. 
1681 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. 
1682 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 379 and 380, Naudé 2010 SALJ 519 and 520. In Germany, the  possibility of institutional 
actions (Verbandsklagen) by certain qualified bodies, such as professional associations, offer the advantage that 
legal actions have a general effect and give a great deal of bargaining power to associations by means of 
extrajudicial 'declarations of discontinuance'. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 477 et seq. 
1683 See para 4.1.1 a). 
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issues because they do often not have the technical skills to assess the ‘fair’ price. In addition, 
the fact that a price for a good or a service exceeds the market price of the relevant goods or 
services is in itself not sufficient to declare it unfair. It was not the legislator’s intention to 
introduce a price control mechanism.1684 Often, the price of a product reflects the fact that other 
terms have influenced this price in terms of exemption clauses (which is likely to lower the 
price compared to similar products) or extended warranties or guarantees (which will increase 
the price compared to the market price). Such a price/quality ratio1685 has to be considered if 
brought forward by a supplier, especially when the consumer had a choice between several 
options as regards the inclusion or exclusion of an exemption clause or extended 
warranty/guarantee and a different price.1686 Therefore, when assessing whether a price of a 
product is fair, one should also take into consideration other terms (e.g., exemption clauses), 
besides factors such as the market price of similar goods or services or the supplier's margin. 
The first proposal for an EU Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts of 1990 
contained a provision according to which the price-performance ratio was to be considered in 
terms of the fairness control.1687 Above all German authors argued that in a free market 
economy, the price-performance relationship should be determined by the market and that the 
directive should not apply to the 'principle obligations' of the contract.1688 After a debate, the 
price-performance ratio consideration was finally not introduced into the EU Directive on 
unfair contract terms.1689 Article 4(2) of the Directive expressly sets out that '[a]ssessement of 
the unfair nature of the terms shall relate [not] to the adequacy of the price and remuneration'.  
Courts should only interfere where the price is manifestly unjust or there is an excessive 
advantage for the supplier.1690  
bb)  Nature of the parties to the contract 
Another factor, listed in section 52(2)(b), is the nature of the parties to the transaction or 
agreement in question, their relationship to each other and their relative capacity, education, 
experience, sophistication and bargaining position. 
                                                             
1684 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 309, Sharrock Judicial control 131. 
1685 See Recital to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993. 
1686 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
1687 OJ EC 1990 No. C 243 at 2. 
1688 Brandner/Ulmer Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1991, 647, 651-654, Bunte FS Locher 329, 331, 333. 
1689 See art 4(2). 
1690 Naudé ‘Introduction to Sections 48-52 and regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
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This factor relates to procedural fairness since it concerns the circumstances surrounding the 
conclusion of the agreement.1691 Already before the promulgation of the Act, unequal 
bargaining power was considered 'a factor that together with other factors plays a role in 
consideration of public policy'.1692 
As even educated and experienced consumers need protection, one should not lay too much 
importance to their sophistication and bargaining positions when assessing the fairness of a 
term or agreement. First, no consumer can be expected to read long standard term agreements 
when concluding an agreement because of the high transaction costs.1693 Second, standard 
terms are often presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and consumers often understand them 
as invariable.1694 When presenting a standard term contract, there is an inherent structural 
inequality of bargaining power between the parties.1695 Thus, courts should interfere in 
instances where unfair terms are hidden in the small print. This applies also when the supplier 
has informed a consumer of those terms, but at an inappropriate time, for instance, in the last 
minute before signing the contract.1696 
‘Bargaining position’ does not only mean the power of a party to impose specific terms but 
also other factors. According to the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish 
Law Commission, the following questions have to be asked when assessing the parties’ 
respective bargaining power:1697 
(a) Was the transaction unusual for either or both of them? 
(b) Was the complaining party offered a choice over a particular term? 
(c) Did that party have a reasonable opportunity to seek for a more favourable term? 
(d) Did that party have a realistic opportunity to enter into a similar contract with other 
persons, but without that term? 
(e) Could that party’s requirements have met in other ways? 
In its Explanatory Note, the Law Commission puts forward other factors which could be 
important when evaluating the strength of the parties’ bargaining positions, such as ‘(f) whether 
                                                             
1691 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. 
1692 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para [12], Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
para [59]. 
1693 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 34, MüKo/Basedow BGB before § 305 para 5. 
1694 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 366 and 377. 
1695 See, for instance, BVerfG NJW 1993, 36, Raiser Recht der AGB 91 et seq. 
1696 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
1697 Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – 
Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005) at 43. 
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it was reasonable, given that party’s abilities, for him or her to have taken advantage of any 
choice offered under (b), or available under (e).1698 
In practice, the ‘complaining party’ mentioned under (b), and referred to as ‘that party’ in the 
other questions, will be in most cases the consumer, and the question of whether the transaction 
was unusual for either party or both of them (a) unlikely concerns the supplier. 
However, the supplier’s superior bargaining power based on the fact that it can dictate terms is 
not sufficient to declare a provision unfair. This is the case where a consumer is professionally 
advised, for example. In instances where the consumer suggests a specific term – e.g., a term 
promulgated by a trade association – which is of his or her disadvantage (without him or her 
knowing it), and the supplier accepts this term, the supplier may be acting in bad faith, however. 
The mere fact that the consumer proposed this term should therefore not rule out its 
unfairness.1699 Cases, where a consumer had no opportunity to take independent advice, or 
make an informed judgment about the contract, may be regarded as a weak bargaining position. 
On the other hand, the fact that the parties had equal bargaining power does not make a term 
fair per se.1700 Hence, factors of procedural factors must not be assessed in isolation because 
the substantive fairness of a term crucial. 
Another factor to be taken into account is the consumer's ability to understand the language of 
the contract. If the supplier knows that its counterpart is unable to understand the agreement, it 
must explain the terms until the consumer understands them. Otherwise, the provisions are 
likely to be unfair. This is in line with section 40(2) which provides that 'it is unconscionable 
for a supplier knowingly to take advantage of the fact that a consumer was substantially unable 
to protect the consumer's own interests because of (…) inability to understand the language of 
an agreement'.1701 A factor that certainly has to be taken into account in this regard is the fact 
that the supplier had the possibility to draft its terms without haste and by taking legal advice, 
whereas the consumer is confronted with pre-formulated and rather comprehensive standard 
provisions that he or she cannot apprehend easily in the given situation.1702 
                                                             
1698 Paragraph 45 of the Explanatory Notes to the Unfair Contract Terms Bill, set out in Unfair Terms in Contracts 
– Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005) at 161. 
1699 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
1700 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 311, Sharrock Judicial control 132. 
1701 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 21. 
1702 Lieb AcP 178 (1978) 202. 
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cc) Existing or foreseeable circumstances 
The third factor in section 52(2)1703 concerns the circumstances of the transaction or agreement 
that existed or were reasonably foreseeable at the time that the conduct or transaction occurred 
or agreement was made, irrespective of whether the Act was in force at that time. 
This factor even applies to circumstances arising after the conclusion of contracts that were 
concluded before the Act was in force. Naudé legitimately alleges that also the actual supply 
of goods or services on unfair terms may be challenged on the basis that the terms are unfair at 
the time of supply. This applies regardless of whether they could have been considered unfair 
at the time of conclusion of the contract in which the supply was agreed upon, provided that 
the supply occurred after the general effective date of the Act.1704 This follows when reading 
section 52(2) with section 48 and Schedule 2 item 3 as well as the definition of ‘transaction’ 
which includes the actual supply of goods and services. This is important for contracts on the 
continuous supply of goods or services.1705 
A court will first assess whether a term was fair at the time at which the agreement was 
concluded, and then consider subsequent circumstances that were foreseeable at that time. 
However, too much uncertainty in contractual relations would arise if courts easily declared 
terms unfair that would have been fair at the time of the conclusion of the contract.1706 Courts 
should thus have good reasons to declare a term unfair under these circumstances. 
According to Sharrock, only circumstances of which both parties knew about or should have 
reasonably foreseen are relevant in terms of paragraph (c).1707 It is submitted that also 
circumstances of which only the supplier knew about or that were reasonably foreseeable only 
by him or her, are to be considered. It would be illogical to exclude circumstances that are only 
known or foreseeable by the supplier, especially with regard to his or her ‘insider’ knowledge 
of the relevant industry. The supplier's trade association or chamber of commerce and industry 
will often ‘warn’ its members about changes in the law which is why the supplier often knows 
well in advance about changes in circumstances, unlike the consumer. This is, for example, the 
case where a supplier sells a used car to a consumer, knowing by its trade association that the 
manufacturer of this car plans to recall this particular model because of severe technical 
problems causing a number of accidents. The consumer had no opportunity to know about these 
                                                             
1703 Paragraph (c). 
1704 31 March 2011. 
1705 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 22. 
1706 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 311, Sharrock Judicial control 132. 
1707 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 311, Sharrock Judicial control 132. 
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circumstances because they had not been revealed for the general public yet, neither by the 
manufacturer nor by the press. This recall was therefore foreseeable only by the supplier but 
not for the consumer. The same applies to successful lobbying influencing Parliament in terms 
of which, e.g., car manufacturers push for new standards (having in mind that they can sell new 
cars). Car dealers might be well aware of such changes long before the general public. Such 
one-sided knowledge or foreseeability should thus be considered in the fairness scrutiny.1708 
Unlike German law1709 and other legal systems, South African law does not recognise a 
doctrine of ‘change of circumstances’ or ‘hardship’ allowing the cancellation or adaption of a 
contract when unforeseeable circumstances arise. This even applies if the conditions of a 
contract become too harsh, such as an explosion of the cost of performance due to a rise of the 
costs for raw materials, because those circumstances must be foreseeable in order to be taken 
into account in terms of section 52(2)(c). Since the South African legislature seems 'paralysed 
with indecision' on this topic, the common law should be developed in this respect as the Act 
does not provide for the consideration of such circumstances.1710 This could be done by 
introducing a definition of hardship in order to cover frustration of purpose and 
impracticability.1711 
In this context, Sharrock suggests that a possible solution in South African law would be the 
reliance on a tacit resolutive condition.1712 Then, ‘a contract terminates, even though it is not 
                                                             
1708 My own examples. 
1709 In German law, this is referred to as ‘interference with the basis of the transaction (Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage)’ (§ 313 BGB) which is based on the former doctrine of 'cessation of the basis of the 
transaction (Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage)' which was originally developed by the courts, and corresponds to 
the English doctrine of frustration. See Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 312 note 99, Sharrock Judicial control 133 
note 99. § 313 BGB: '(1)If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed since 
the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have entered into the contract or would have entered 
into it with different contents if they had foreseen this change, adaptation of the contract may be demanded to the 
extent that, taking account of all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory 
distribution of risk, one of the parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without alteration. (2) 
It is equivalent to a change of circumstances if material conceptions that have become the basis of the contract are 
found to be incorrect. (3) If adaptation of the contract is not possible or one party cannot reasonably be expected 
to accept it, the disadvantaged party may revoke the contract. In the case of continuing obligations, the right to 
terminate takes the place of the right to revoke.' The English doctrine of frustration, on the other hand, provides 
for the possibility that a contract may be discharged on the ground of frustration when something occurs after the 
formation of the contract which renders it physically or commercially impossible to fulfil the contract or 
transforms the obligation to perform into a radically different obligation from that undertaken at the moment of 
the entry into the contract. See Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Frustration of contract'. 
1710 Hutchison PhD thesis 245, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 24. Naudé 
correctly states that Sharrock is wrong when arguing that para (c) suggests that an unforeseeable change of 
circumstances is a factor to be considered in determining whether a contract or term is unfair. See Sharrock 2010 
SA Merc LJ 311, Sharrock Judicial control 132. See also Hutchison 2010 Stell LR 414, Hutchison 2010 SALJ 84. 
1711 Hutchison PhD thesis 232 et seq. 
1712 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 312 note 99, Sharrock Judicial control 133 note 99. 
 318   
 
physically or legally impossible to perform, if circumstances change so fundamentally as to 
remove the basis of the contract and negate the purpose or object that the parties had in mind 
when they contracted’. The definition as mentioned earlier applies to the English law doctrine 
of frustration but could also be applied in the context of a tacit resolutive condition. The 
admittance of such a tacit resolution by the South African courts in the case of a fundamental 
change of circumstances removing the basis of a contract would be a step towards better 
consumer protection and be in the economic interest. It is not in the interest of the parties, of 
public policy or the economy to uphold agreements that are so hard to fulfil that one – or even 
both – economic actors of a contract bear too harsh consequences. 
Meanwhile, nothing hinders the parties from negotiating a clause that expresses the parties’ 
will to cancel the contract in case of an unforeseeable change of circumstances. Admittedly, 
this solution is a more or less 'tailored' one that does most probably not apply to mass contracts. 
A more effective solution would therefore be an innovative change towards a tacit resolutive 
condition by the courts. 
dd) Conduct of the supplier and the consumer 
The conduct of the supplier and the consumer, respectively, is a factor listed in section 52(2)(d). 
Since ‘conduct’ is not defined, the court may consider any conduct relevant.1713 It is my 
suggestion that conduct may also take the form of an omission, e.g., where the supplier did not 
fully answer the customer's questions about liability so that the consumer did not obtain a full 
picture of his or her rights and obligations. Circumstances where the supplier puts pressure on 
the consumer to sign the contract without giving him or her the opportunity to read the 
agreement are another example. Pressure can take all kind of more or less subtle forms. Where 
a supplier tells a consumer that a certain price for a product only will be maintained until the 
end of the business day and that afterwards, it will go up, this can be seen as a form of pressure 
to sign the contract immediately.  
Naudé correctly argues that employees should be trained to advise consumers to read all 
provisions of the agreement in questions before signing it, at least the provisions that must 
comply with the requirements of section 49.1714 It is suggested that this requires that those 
provisions be written in plain language so that the consumer is able to understand the content 
of these provisions. Otherwise, even when having a chance to read all, or at least the most 
                                                             
1713 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 312, Sharrock Judicial control 134. 
1714 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 25. 
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critical clauses, a consumer has no better understanding – or protection – than as if he or she 
has not read them. Therefore, the best practice would be, it is submitted, to give the opportunity 
to read the (well-written and understandable) provisions and to summarise them afterwards for 
the consumer in a concise, understandable and honest way. This would also give the consumer 
the opportunity to ask pertinent questions. This procedure requires well-trained employees who 
have a deeper understanding of the provisions. In cases where the consumer refuses such a 
summary or the reading of the clauses while having the opportunity, this conduct will certainly 
also have to be considered by the court in favour of the supplier in terms of paragraph (d). 
ee) Existence of negotiations and their extent 
Contrary to other legislation,1715 the Act also allows a court to assess the fairness of negotiated 
terms.1716 Negotiated and non-negotiated terms should be treated differently though as also the 
parties treat them differently. In addition, the fairness of negotiated terms in the context of a 
B2B contract will have to be assessed differently from those within a B2C relationship. If terms 
are not negotiated, this does not mean that they are automatically unfair. On the other hand, 
when negotiations take place over a particular term, and no changes will be made to that term, 
this does not mean that the term has become fair if it was unfair at the beginning.1717 It should 
be noted that not only the contract as a whole must be assessed in terms of fairness, i.e., if it 
was freely and voluntarily concluded, but also whether a given provision can be regarded as 
the product of the consumer's self-determination. This is not the case for unfair standard terms 
of which the consumer had no knowledge.1718 
This factor leads to the a contrario conclusion that the use of standard terms in contracts may 
be an indication of unfairness due to a lack of negotiation because non-negotiated terms are 
rarely regarded as the proper expression of the self-determination of the parties. This is the 
reason why fairness intervention is justified in these cases.1719 Genuine negotiation may thus 
be an indication of fairness. This does not mean though that all non-negotiated terms are unfair 
or that all negotiated terms are fair.1720 The fact that the greylist in regulation 44 merely 
                                                             
1715 See, for instance, art 3(1) of the EU Unfair Terms Directive, §§ 305(1) and 305b BGB, § 6(2) Austrian KSchG, 
art 6:231a Dutch BW. 
1716 Naudé 2007 SALJ 138 to 140. In this regard, one should also consider Ngcobo J's statements in Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [57]: 'The extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily concluded 
is clearly a vital factor [in the determination of whether a term is contrary to public policy] as it will determine 
the weight that should be afforded to the values of freedom and dignity'. 
1717 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 26 and 27. 
1718 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 26 note 1.  
1719 See BVerfG NJW 1990, 1469. 
1720 Stoop LLD thesis 151. 
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presumes certain terms to be unfair is an implicit recognition of this statement. One should not 
forget that suppliers instruct their front desk employees to contract with consumers on a 
controlled basis. They are usually not allowed to deviate too much from the company's standard 
provisions. This has obvious advantages because in most cases, employees dealing directly 
with customers do not have the expertise to predict the legal repercussions when altering 
liability or other clauses. What is more, too much negotiation would be contrary to the 
rationalisation effect of standard terms. Rationalisation only takes place where a considerable 
number of contacts are dealt with in the same manner. Rationalisation means cost savings and 
organisational advantages for the supplier because the negotiations become less burdensome 
for the parties and the resulting transaction costs can be seen as an efficient resource 
allocation.1721 On the other hand, this non-negotiation obviously affects the term's fairness.1722 
The Act does not define the term ‘negotiation’. With regard to other factors, it is assumed that 
this factor requires the presence of choice. The question is therefore if the consumer had a real 
opportunity to influence the contents of the contractual terms. The mere fact that a supplier 
presents the consumer with more than one pre-formulated alternative to choose from therefore 
does not qualify as ‘negotiation’.1723 It is suggested that real negotiation only takes place where 
the parties have the liberty to alter terms without being limited to pre-formulated clauses. In 
practice, this is likely to happen very rarely, however, at least in B2C contracts. The reasons 
for that lie in the rationalisation effect of standard terms in mass contracts. 
In general, courts should not easily interfere where there is a genuine negotiation between the 
parties.1724 It is submitted that the conduct of the parties during the negotiations1725 has also to 
be taken into account when assessing the fairness under paragraph (e). Paragraphs (d) and (e) 
are therefore intertwined in some cases. Hence, where a consumer aims to negotiate specific 
terms, and this is obvious to the supplier (for example, by expressly or impliedly making this 
clear to the supplier), or where on the contrary one party clearly indicates by its conduct that it 
does not want to negotiate, this should be taken into consideration. 
                                                             
1721 Schäfer and Ott Ökonomische Analyse 394, Kötz JuS 2003, 211 et seq. 
1722 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 27. 
1723 Stoop LLD thesis 152. 
1724 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 312, Sharrock Judicial control 134. 
1725 Section 52(2)(d). 
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ff) No legitimate interest of the supplier 
Under section 52(2)(f), the court must consider whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by 
the supplier, the consumer was required to do anything that was not reasonably necessary for 
the legitimate interests of the supplier.1726 
The importance of the legitimate interest factor is highlighted in the Australian consumer 
protection legislation, where it is a central criterion of the general clause.1727 
It is suggested that the combination of the phrases ‘not reasonably necessary’ and ‘legitimate 
interest’ requires a two-step enquiry, namely first of the legitimacy of the supplier's interest, 
and second, of the reasonableness of the consumer's required action.  
In any event, the assessment of the legitimate interest of the supplier begs the question of 
whether a term represents a proportionate response to the supplier’s interest, such as a risk 
faced by it, and other possible ways by which it could have protected its interest as well as 
market practice.1728 Where the supplier limits its liability, one has to consider whether it was 
reasonable to expect it to insure itself against the liability and whether the consumer could be 
expected to insure him- or herself. The question of whether the supplier had advised the 
consumer timeously to take insurance, or whether the consumer should otherwise have realised 
that he or she needed insurance, are essential factors for this enquiry too.1729 The possibility 
and probability of insurance is explicitly listed in the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by 
the Law Commission in the UK.1730 
gg) Plain language requirements 
The next factor is the extent to which any documents relating to the transaction or agreement 
satisfied the plain language requirements of section 22.1731 
                                                             
1726 Two factors of the SA Law Commission's list implicitly refer to the legitimate interest criterion: '(m) whether 
a term is unduly difficult to fulfil, or imposes obligations or liabilities on a party which are not reasonably 
necessary to protect the other party' and '(n) whether the contract or term excludes or limits the obligations or 
liabilities of a party to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to protect his or her interests'. Emphasis added. 
1727 Section 3(1) Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010) provides 
that a term is unfair 'if (a) it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract; and (b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would 
be advantaged by it'. Emphasis added. 
1728 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 28. 
1729 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 30. 
1730 Section 14(4)(f). The fact that the supplier could insure itself was also an important factor in the UK case 
George Mitchel (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 where the court regarded an 
exemption clause in a B2B contract for the supply of seeds as unreasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 because the supplier could have insured itself against the risk of crop failure without increasing significantly 
the contract price. 
1731 Section 52(2)(g). 
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Section 22 has been discussed in detail further above.1732 In summary, agreements must be 
written in plain language under sections 50(2)(b)(i) and 22. A contract that is not written in 
plain language is not unfair in itself, but it may nevertheless be unfair to enforce it.1733 The fact 
that all consumer contracts must be written in plain language should make it easy for the courts 
to strike out terms as unfair that do not meet the requirements of section 22.1734 In this context, 
the OFT took the stance that an agreement (or term) which is not written in plain language is 
in itself sufficient to render a term unfair.1735 In addition, a lack of transparency, which is part 
of the plain language requirement, could be the primary or sole reason to consider a provision 
unfair.1736 
With regard to the importance that the Act lays on the plain language requirement and the 
objectives of the Act in terms of section 3, terms or agreements written in verbose language 
should be considered unfair per se, except where the supplier's representative clearly explained 
them to the consumer so that the consumer knows what his rights and obligations are. In 
practice, this should however only concern short standard terms. Long terms and conditions 
which are so unclear that a consumer cannot easily understand them after the conclusion of the 
contract should be considered unfair (despite the supplier's explanations) since the consumer 
ultimately will struggle to understand them after the contract has been executed. In these cases, 
only terms written in plain language assure that the consumer knows its rights and obligations 
and can easily refer to them. In addition, consumers confronted with such provisions cannot be 
sure if the supplier's representative is able to explain the terms accurately. This submission has 
the advantage that suppliers will be incited to improve the language of their terms and 
conditions and apply good commercial practice. 
hh) Consumer’s knowledge of unfair provisions 
In terms of section 52(2)(h), a court must consider whether the consumer knew or ought 
reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any particular provision of the 
agreement that is alleged to have been unfair, having regard to any custom of trade, and any 
previous dealings between the parties.  
                                                             
1732 See ch 2 para 3.2 a) above. 
1733 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 313, Sharrock Judicial control 134. See also Barkhuizen v Napier para [183]. 
1734 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 31. 
1735 Office of Fair Trading Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) 135-88. 
1736 Paragraph 41 at 159 Law Commission of England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in 
Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot 
Law Com No 199) (2005). 
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This provision is astonishing at first sight because knowledge of an unfair term does not make 
it fair. On the other hand, terms may be fair if the supplier specifically pointed them out, and 
the consumer agreed to them. Hence, an onerous term is more likely to be fair if the supplier 
had referred to its content and consequences because this might be an indication that the 
consumer consciously decided to conclude the agreement after having weighed alternatives.1737 
This is thus an issue of procedural fairness taking precedence over substantial fairness.  
The knowledge of a term requires that the consumer has read it or that the supplier has 
explained it to the consumer. Therefore, suppliers should at least give consumers an 
opportunity to read the provisions of the contract because adverse terms are more likely to be 
regarded as fair if the consumer knew or reasonably ought to have known of their existence.1738 
It is proposed that the term 'knowledge' does not necessarily mean that the consumer must have 
a deeper understanding of the given term, but at least some understanding of its legal 
implications. The more unfair the term is, the deeper the knowledge should be, however. The 
phrase 'of the existence and extent' in paragraph (h) speaks for this argument. It is furthermore 
suggested that this knowledge must be concrete and not abstract or general. This means that 
the consumer must know of the content of a given term. Therefore, it is not sufficient that the 
consumer merely knows that the presented document contains certain restrictions, but what 
kind of restrictions, e.g., a limitation of the supplier's liability. 
The phrase ‘or ought reasonably to have known’ means that that the consumer has had the 
opportunity to acquaint him- or herself with the term, but did not take it. It can be said though 
that the mere fact that standard terms are presented to the consumer does not qualify for this 
condition because consumers usually do not read contract terms for the reasons already 
discussed elsewhere. It is suggested that 'reasonably' means that the consumer had enough time 
to make herself acquainted with the term and that the surrounding circumstances were 
favourable to do so.  
A consumer is more likely to know a term if it attracted its attention. Hence, the prominence 
of a term is critical. Under section 49(4)(a), clauses limiting or excluding liability as well as 
acknowledgements of facts have to be presented in a conspicuous manner and form likely to 
attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer.1739 Such terms are very onerous as they 
                                                             
1737 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 34. 
1738 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 34. 
1739 Before the CPA came into effect, jurisprudence had decided that harsh terms written in small print and to 
which the consumer has not been informed could either be surprising so that there was no reasonable reliance of 
consensus (see Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA)), or would probably 
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may have negative consequences for the consumer. The problem with the prominence given to 
a provision within a document is that usually, standard terms contain a number of provisions 
which are disadvantageous for the consumer, and therefore might be unfair. The more unfair 
terms a document contains, the more difficult it is for a supplier to give particular prominence 
to them. It is therefore submitted that, where necessary, the supplier has to explain the onerous 
terms to the consumer in order to escape from a negative consequences in terms of section 
52(2)(h). This can be done summarily but requires that the supplier's staff be trained to do so. 
The fact that a consumer signed or initialled an onerous term according to section 49(2) is not 
necessarily a proof that he or she knew about the given term. Often, consumers are easy prey 
for suppliers assuring that their signature or initials are ‘a simple formality’, and consumers 
sign or initial without having knowledge of the terms in question. Therefore, it seems 
problematic to argue that signing or initialling is equal to the knowledge of the given terms.1740  
Naudé suggests that suppliers could grant a cooling-off period to consumers during which they 
have the opportunity to read and understand the terms and to shop around for alternatives.1741 
Griggs correctly argues though that the mere knowledge of a provision does not necessarily 
lead to a rational decision of the consumer.1742 Therefore, the understanding of the term and its 
implications is essential. A cooling-off period might nonetheless be a good solution because 
the factors that will ultimately lead to the consumer's decision are most probably beyond the 
supplier's sphere of influence and rather belong to the psychological sphere. Consumers often 
reach irrational decisions, even if they have all the necessary knowledge to do otherwise.1743 
                                                             
be contrary to public policy as the consumer was not informed of the term in small print (see Swinburne v Newbee 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD). 
1740 The problem of initialling has been discussed in detail above. See ch 2 para 3.2 b) cc) above. 
1741 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 37. 
1742 Griggs 2005 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 51. 
1743 Eiselen and Naudé ‘Introduction’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 22. In Germany, the 
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (VZBV), the umbrella organisation of the German consumer protection 
organisations, tends to establish a dubious guiding model for the 'typical' consumer. The VZBV argues that the 
model of the 'responsible' consumer has the disadvantage that such a 'responsible consumer' is often seen as 
identical with a well-informed and rationally acting homo oeconomicus who succeeds in making decisions that 
maximise its economic and other advantageous. Therefore, the VZBV suggests a more differentiated model which 
considers the different areas in which the consumer makes an economic decision. Hence, a consumer might be a 
'vulnerable consumer' in one area, or a 'confident' or 'responsible' in other areas. The VZBV puts forward that in 
any event, consumers need 'paternalistic assistance' to a certain degree, above all in situation where they are not 
able to reach rational decisions despite all necessary information at hand. As a consequence, the VZBV suggests 
direct interventions in individual consumer decisions, reaching from information that includes the entire 
housekeeping, or even administrative prohibitions or officially prescribed consumption. It is suggested that these 
measures confuse social policy and consumer protection and reflect a degree of paternalism that is not compatible 
with the German social market economy. They do not only put consumers under tutelage, but also do not consider 
the general-objective approach of §§ 305 et seq which does not take into account the individual consumer in the 
given situation. See 'Unmündige Verbraucher als neues Leitbild' in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 February 
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Commercials, others' influence, aspiration, status, materialism and other factors often play a 
crucial role in this respect. A cooling-off period would at least give a chance to the consumer 
to rethink his or her decision. Most suppliers are probably hesitant in offering a cooling-off 
period though, unless the consumer requires more reflection. Unfortunately, often the supplier's 
business model favours deals that are made on the spot because the employee in charge will be 
entitled to a commission.  
§ 305(2) BGB1744 chooses another way by which the supplier simply has to explicitly refer to 
the contract terms at the time when the parties enter into a contract in an acceptable manner, 
and the consumer has to have the opportunity to take notice of their contents.1745 If the reference 
to such terms is only possible with disproportionate difficulty, it is sufficient to post the terms 
in a clearly visible manner at the place where the contract is concluded. In special cases 
(transportation, telecommunications, information services etc.), § 305a allows incorporation 
without compliance with these requirements if the consumer agrees to their applying. If these 
conditions are not fulfilled, the terms do not become part of the contract. It is irrelevant if the 
consumer took the opportunity to take knowledge of the given terms.1746 In the German regime, 
it is therefore not necessary to expressly point out unfair terms as long as the entire legal 
instrument of standard terms has been duly incorporated into the contract. It is also not relevant 
if the consumer has read or understood the standard provisions. 
The courts also have to take into consideration any previous dealings between the parties when 
judging if the consumer had knowledge or ought reasonably to have known of the existence 
and extent of an unfair term. The wording of this provision is quite unfortunate as it could mean 
that a consumer who has already had some kind of business with the same supplier before is 
supposed to know the terms of a contract. Then it would be curious though that the legislator 
chose the word 'dealing', which is not defined in section 1, instead of the term 'transaction'.1747 
A reason could be that the definition of 'transaction' in section 1 is written from the supplier's 
                                                             
2018 at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/verbraucherschuetzer-propagieren-fragwuerdiges-leitbild-
15455696.html. 
1744 § 305(2) BGB: 'Standard business terms only become a part of a contract if the user, when entering into the 
contract, - 1.  refers the other party to the contract to them explicitly or, where explicit reference, due to the way 
in which the contract is entered into, is possible only with disproportionate difficulty, by posting a clearly visible 
notice at the place where the contract is entered into, and - 2.  gives the other party to the contract, in an acceptable 
manner, which also takes into reasonable account any physical handicap of the other party to the contract that is 
discernible to the user, the opportunity to take notice of their contents, and if the other party to the contract agrees 
to their applying.' 
1745 WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 62. 
1746 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 145, Stoffels AGB-Recht 99. 
1747 See s 1 s.v. 'transaction'. 
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perspective ('"transaction" means in respect of a person acting in the ordinary course of 
business…'), and that section 52(2)(h) exclusively refers to the consumer. Other provisions of 
the Act use the term 'transaction' indiscriminately though,1748 and the long title and section 
3(1)(g) even speak of 'consumer transactions'. The reason to choose the term 'dealing' rather 
indicates that the previous 'business' between the parties had not necessarily led to the 
conclusion of a contract. Otherwise, the legislator could have chosen at least the noun 'deal', 
indicating that the negotiations between the parties were finalised by a contract, or 'transaction'. 
Therefore, 'dealing' can only refer to negotiations of some kind before the conclusion of the 
current transaction.1749 
This presumes that the consumer has knowledge about particular terms, or at least that he or 
she reasonably should know them. As already explained, consumers typically do not read terms 
and conditions though. Furthermore, the previous dealings could have contained different 
terms. It is therefore submitted that the courts must look into the current transaction as well as 
the content of the previous dealings in order to establish whether they contained similar terms. 
In practice, this assessment factor will not be of too much importance in my opinion. 
The courts should also take into consideration any customs of trade. It is my submission that 
this factor should be taken with a pinch of salt as most individual consumers cannot be expected 
to know about the customs of trade of a particular sector. In B2B contracts, this might be 
different. 
In any case, courts should also consider if the party understood a term's meaning if a person in 
a similar position as the consumer would usually expect a similar transaction in the given 
situation, the information given to the consumer before he or she signed the contract as well as 
further explanations made by the supplier. Furthermore, the courts should assess whether the 
consumer had a reasonable opportunity to absorb provided information as well as the 
complexity of the transaction, whether it was transparent and if the consumer took professional 
advice or it was reasonable to expect to have done so. These considerations are relevant for the 
Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission1750 but should also 
                                                             
1748 See, for instance, ss 2(3), 5(1)(a) or 14(1). 
1749 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 35. 
1750 Paragraph 45 of the Explanatory Notes to the Unfair Contract Terms Bill, set out in Unfair Terms in Contracts 
– Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005) at 161. 
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apply in South Africa. Interestingly, the UK Law Commissions refer to the 'knowledge and 
understanding', and not only to 'knowledge'.1751 
It is important to note that terms remain unfair, even if they have been explained to the 
consumer, if the latter was informed of them in the very last minute, i.e., when the decision to 
conclude the contract and all sorts of arrangements have already been made.1752  
By and large, courts should not lay too much importance on this factor but rather construe it in 
the sense that knowledge of the provision in question could merely serve as a ‘warning’ or 
information to the consumer as regards the existence of the term. This ‘warning’ or information 
did however not necessarily exist in previous dealings with the supplier.  
ii) Possibility to acquire identical goods or services elsewhere 
In their fairness enquiry, courts also must consider the amount for which, and circumstances 
under which the consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from 
a different supplier.1753 Consequently, a supplier's terms are more likely to be regarded as unfair 
if the consumer had the possibility to purchase similar goods or services elsewhere on better 
terms. 
‘Amount’ certainly refers to the price – or value – of the goods or services and reminds of 
paragraph (a) of the same section. Paragraph (i) expressly relates to the price offered by other 
suppliers though, a factor which is only implied in the fairness enquiry of paragraph (a). The 
term ‘circumstances’ is not defined and could mean, it is suggested, the terms themselves under 
which a product is acquired, but also, similar to the discussion above on German law,1754 the 
surrounding circumstances of the contract, such as another supplier’s conduct (explanations, 
pressure etc.), or the existing stock/supply of a given article in the consumer's geographical 
area. The consideration of another supplier's conduct seems to be too hypothetical though since 
it requires an actual transaction between the consumer and another, alternative supplier. 
Consequently, this would mean that the circumstances are put into relation to other suppliers, 
which seems to be a difficult task. The consumer cannot be expected to bring forward this kind 
of information which, in addition, is difficult to prove. Therefore, 'circumstances' can only refer 
to the terms under which the consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or 
                                                             
1751 Emphasis added. 
1752 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 37. 
1753 Section 52(2)(i). 
1754 Concerning § 310(3) no. 3.  
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services from a different supplier. The legislator should make this clear by replacing 
'circumstances' by 'terms and conditions'.  
Furthermore, the question begs to be asked what implications the phrase ‘could have acquired’ 
means. On the one hand, this could mean that the mere theoretical – or abstract – possibility 
for the consumer must be considered so that a consumer does not need to know or ought to 
have known that similar goods were obtainable on better terms elsewhere. In this case, the mere 
fact that they were would be sufficient. Such an ex post facto appreciation would be difficult 
though. Furthermore, it would be challenging to define what 'from a different supplier' means: 
It could mean from a different supplier in the area/town/province of the consumer, or in South 
Africa as a whole, or internationally (with e-commerce the latter possibility cannot be 
disregarded). In this case, it is very probable that anywhere another supplier offers the same 
product or service at a better price and on better terms. On the other hand, this phrase could 
mean that the focus has to be put on the consumer’s concrete situation, i.e., whether the 
consumer could have acquired similar products on better terms because another supplier 
offered those with the consumer knowing this. 
In a competitive market, the consumer certainly cannot be expected to shop around and 
compare all kinds of prices and 'circumstances'. What is more, terms cannot be judged in 
isolation, but only within their context as, for instance, the price often reflects liability or 
warranty issues which are stipulated in other provisions. Consumers will not be able to assess 
this kind of questions. Therefore, the focus has to be on the concrete, and not an abstract, 
possibility for the consumer to obtain similar products on better terms. In any case, the mere 
theoretical possibility to obtain better terms elsewhere should not count against the 
consumer.1755 
Naudé correctly states that in instances where the consumer had a real possibility to understand 
the terms, it will be difficult to declare a term unfair because he or she could have obtained a 
similar product on better terms elsewhere.1756 In this case, the consumer reached an informed 
decision. 
In the view of the problems related to this factor, it should not be of much relevance in practice. 
                                                             
1755 See also Naudé 2006 Stell LR 368, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 38, 
Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 313 note 111, Sharrock Judicial Control 135 note 111. Naudé and Sharrock are of the 
same opinion. 
1756 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 38. 
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jj) Special order goods 
According to the last factor listed in section 52(2), the courts also must consider in the case of 
the supply of goods, whether goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special 
order of the consumer.1757 
This factor only applies to goods, but not to services.1758 The legislator had probably in mind 
that services, compared to goods, are more often adapted to a client's needs, whereas special 
order goods are the exception and have to be considered differently in the fairness enquiry. One 
can thus argue that goods are more often mass products than services insofar as they are 
repeatable without modification, whereas services can be individualised more easily. 
According to Naudé, paragraph (j) refers to goods with unusual characteristics that are usually 
not manufactured by a supplier in its ordinary course of business, or to the processing or 
adaptation of goods according to the client’s wishes, not generally undertaken by the 
supplier.1759 An example is a supplier who usually produces metal terrace roofs, and who 
manufactures a metal gate made of the steel frames that are usually used for the roofs.  
The rationale of this factor is certainly that fairness has to be assessed differently if the 
consumer required goods which are normally not manufactured by the supplier, and for which 
the latter has not the same expertise as for his or her usually produced goods. 
Naudé's point of view seems to be too narrow, and it is suggested that item (j) also covers cases 
in which a supplier delivers goods that he or she normally manufactures, but that were produced 
with different measurements, for instance. A carpenter, for example, who regularly 
manufactures bookcases with standard measurements will also manufacture bookcases that fit 
into a room with very high or very low ceilings. Also in these cases, paragraph (j) should be 
applied as this provision refers to bespoke products in general, irrespective of whether they 
were produced in the normal course of business. Otherwise, suppliers specialising in custom-
made products would be excluded. Furthermore, the wording of item (j) does not restrict its 
application to goods that are not manufactured in the ordinary course of the supplier's business. 
                                                             
1757 Section 52(2)(j). 
1758 The same applies to item (e) in Schedule 2 of the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, according to which 
particular regard must be had to ‘whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order 
of the customer’. On the other hand, the preamble of the EC Unfair Terms Directive of 1993 also includes 
services: Particular regard shall be held to ‘(…) whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special 
order of the consumer’. 
1759 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 39. 
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It is important to note that terms which exclude liability for manufactured and supplied goods 
are void if they conflict with sections 55, 56 and 61. Suppliers will nevertheless still be able to 
include exemption clauses because liability for damages caused by defective goods under the 
common law is broader than liability under section 61.1760 
b) Other factors not listed in section 52(2) 
As mentioned earlier, the list of section 52(2) should not be considered exhaustive. The South 
African Law Commission explicitly indicated in item (z) of its guidelines that a court might 
consider in its fairness enquiry any other factor.1761 The South African Law Commission 
Report contains twenty-six factors that a court may consider in this regard. In this context, also 
other factors, drawn on foreign jurisdictions, might be interesting.1762 The more factors are 
identified, the more the level of uncertainty resulting from the unfairness criterion is reduced. 
This approach ensures that any enquiry into substantive fairness is properly balanced.1763  
In the following, some of these factors will be discussed. 
aa) Nature of the goods or services 
In terms of section 52(2)(b), the court must consider, inter alia, the nature of the parties to the 
given transaction or agreement. Paragraph (j) of this section refers to the very nature of the 
‘special-order goods’. It thus seems only logical to include the nature of the goods or services 
in question too.1764 Recital 18 of the EU Unfair Terms Directive explicitly provides that 'the 
nature of goods or services should have an influence on assessing the unfairness of contractual 
terms'. After all, the nature of the goods or services is one of the main characteristics of the 
goods or services sold and has a direct impact on the formulation of the terms and conditions. 
Therefore, a particular term concerning the cancellation of a subscription, for instance, will 
have to be assessed differently, depending on the nature of the product sold, e.g., a newspaper 
subscription, as opposed to the provision of gas or electricity. Also other aspects should be 
taken into account here: If a product which was on display for a while is sold to a consumer, it 
might well be justified to exclude certain liabilities in terms of warranty, provided that the 
supplier has informed the consumer of the fact that it is selling a product which had previously 
                                                             
1760 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 39. 
1761 Bill of the SALRC published in SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) (1998) at 213. 
1762 See s 2(2). 
1763 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 135-136. 
1764 See s 14(4)(j) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law Commission of England and Wales and 
the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005). 
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been displayed, which means that it had already been touched and tried out by a certain number 
of customers. This could also apply to products of an experimental nature that have not been 
well tested yet1765 or a clause which stipulates that the consumer forfeits a deposit when 
withdrawing from a contract for the sale of land, given the high transaction costs involved and 
the supplier's likely loss of profit.1766 
In this regard, it is not sufficient that a supplier sells a product voestoots under section 55(6) 
by simply labelling the sale as ‘voetstoots’. On the contrary, the supplier has to describe the 
condition of the goods in order to warn the consumer that there may be defects so that he or 
she is able to examine the item closer.1767 
bb) Balance of the parties’ interests 
Contrary to section 52(2)(f), it is not sufficient to focus only on the legitimate interests of the 
supplier as section 48(2)(a) clearly implies that a term must not be excessively one-sided. On 
the contrary, in a synallagmatic contractual relationship, the parties’ rights and obligations 
should be balanced. An overall view of all contractual terms is therefore necessary.1768 Article 
3(1) of the EU Unfair Terms Directive says that '[a] contractual term (…) shall be regarded as 
unfair, if, contrary to the requirements of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer'. 
§ 307(1) 1st sent. BGB contains a similar provision, but instead of a 'significant imbalance', an 
'unreasonable disadvantage' is required.1769 § 879(3) of the Austrian ABGB1770 requires 'a 
severe disadvantage for one of the parties'.1771 In German literature, content control is justified 
by the concept of 'warranted rightness' (Richtigkeitsgewähr) which is based on the premise that 
contracts reflect an 'objectively righteous order' that is disturbed in the case of a structural 
imbalance. This imbalance has to be mended by legal control.1772 The balance of the parties' 
interests thus seems to be the foundation of every contract. 
                                                             
1765 In this case, a clause limiting liability for consequential loss might be justified, provided that it is not in conflict 
with s 61. 
1766 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 47. In this case, for such a forfeiture 
clause, probably s 17 is applicable. 
1767 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 48. 
1768 See s 14(4)(c) and (d) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law Commission of England and 
Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of 
the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005). 
1769 WLP/Wolf § 307 para 74. 
1770 AGBG = Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian General Civil Code) 
1771 My own translation of § 879(3) ABGB. 
1772 Schmidt-Rimpler AcP 147 (1941) at 149, Lieb AcP 178 (1978) 203. 
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A similar factor is whether there is a lack of reciprocity in an otherwise reciprocal contract.1773 
cc) Inter-dependent terms 
This factor means that the terms of an agreement must not be seen in isolation, but that also the 
circumstances and the context of the agreement must be considered.1774 In other words, the 
contract ‘as a whole’ must be taken into account since a provision of the agreement that confers 
a benefit on the consumer might be commensurate with the detriment caused by the provision 
alleged to be unfair.1775 
The greylist of regulation 44 contains a number of one-sided terms in favour of the supplier.1776 
The terms listed therein are therefore more likely to be fair if they are commensurate with a 
right granted to the consumer, either in the same term or in another term.1777 
dd) Extent to which a term differs from the ius dispositivum 
Another factor is the extent to which the term differs from what would have been in the case 
of its absence.1778 The South African Law Commission formulated this criterion in its list as 
follows: ‘(w) whether, to the prejudice of the party against whom the term is proffered, the 
party proffering the term is otherwise placed in a position substantially better than that in which 
the party proffering the term would have been under the regulatory law, had it not been for the 
term in question; (x) the degree to which the contract requires a party to waive rights to which 
he or she would otherwise be entitled’. The German BGB chose a much more comprehensive 
formulation by which unfairness is presumed if a term ‘is not compatible with essential 
principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates’.1779 This refers to the residual rule 
in the relevant part of the BGB.1780 
The Law Commission's formulations require that a given term has to be compared with the 
residual rules. In addition, the common law must be considered residual rules. Those have been 
                                                             
1773 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 136. 
1774 See s 52(2)(c) and (e). See also art 4 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC 
of 5 April 1993 and art 83(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Common European Sales Law COM (2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011 and art 32(2) of the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COM (2008) 614 final, submitted 
on 8 October 2008. 
1775 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 136. 
1776 For instance, reg. 44(3)(h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o) and (aa). 
1777 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 49. 
1778 This is the formulation of s 14(4)(g) of the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005). 
1779 § 307(2) no. 1. 
1780 For the discussion what the phrase 'essential principles of the statutory provision' means, see Stoffels AGB-
Recht 197 et seq, with further references. 
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developed during a long period of time and represent a fair balancing of interests of typical 
suppliers and consumers, having the given type of contract in the background. One has to keep 
in mind though that the residual rules do not always represent a fair balancing of the parties’ 
interests as they may differ from trade sector to trade sector. Therefore, a deviation from 
residual rules in itself is not automatically unfair but can fairly balance the parties' interests. 
One should also consider that the generalised naturalia of a contract, i.e., the terms included 
ex lege, do not necessarily ensure a fair balancing of the parties' interests and that it might be 
justified to deviate from them in order to reflect the realities of the given industry.1781 
ee) Greater costs for the supplier if the term was to be omitted 
Another comparison between the term and residual rules begs the question of whether the 
supplier would have to bear higher costs in the case of the absence of the term.1782 Hence, a 
term might be fair if it represents a fair balancing between the consumer’s and the supplier’s 
interests. A slight increase in costs due to the omission of the term would probably not make it 
fair. If the supplier can insure itself against the risk in question without materially increasing 
the price paid by the consumer, the term will probably be unfair. 
Higher costs for the supplier are inextricably linked to higher prices for the consumer. In 
German law, the so-called 'price argument'1783 by which an unfair clause might become fair if 
the supplier compensates this with a lower price, is generally not relevant. The reasons put 
forward are that each legal disadvantage can be justified somehow with economic reasons and 
that the client is unlikely to receive fair compensation for this disadvantage. Furthermore, the 
advantage in terms of the price is not measurable with regard to the price that would be fair in 
the absence of the term.1784 
These arguments have admittedly some weight. We have seen above that questions linked to 
prices are always difficult to assess. Thus, not too much importance should be laid on this 
factor. 
ff) Limitation of essential rights and duties 
Terms limiting essential rights and duties inherent in the nature or essence of the contract 
jeopardise the attainment of the contractual purpose and are likely to be unfair.1785 Under 
                                                             
1781 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 45. 
1782 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 136. 
1783 Preisargument. 
1784 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 144 and 145. 
1785 See § 307(2) BGB: 'An unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to exist if a provision - 
1. is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates (…)'. See also 
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§ 307(2) no. 2 BGB, a provision is presumably unfair if it 'is not compatible with essential 
principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates’.1786 The type of contract in question 
defines the essential rights and duties. In Mercurius Motors v Lopez,1787 the court decided that 
an exemption clause which ‘undermines the very essence’ of the type of contact should be 
clearly and pertinently brought to the consumer's attention. Naudé and Lubbe correctly argue 
that even if the consumer signs such a contract with knowledge of the exemption clause, the 
fact that it undermines the very essence of the type of contract is an indicator that it may be 
contrary to public policy. They argue that this is an indication for the fatally compromised 
bargaining power of the consumer and the fact that the supplier took improper, unconscionable 
advantage of the consumer’s position. In their view, a term might nonetheless be fair when 
considering other circumstances.1788 It is suggested that it is problematic to sanction terms that 
put at stake the nature or essence of the contract and the attainment of the contractual purpose 
because they distort the contract as a whole. Such terms should thus never be fair. 
c) South African case law 
Some South African judgments and principles derived therefrom also give some guidance for 
the revetment of the concepts of unfairness and unreasonableness, but also for the role that the 
principle of good faith plays. As mentioned above, the common law is still applicable under 
section 2(10) so that common-law jurisprudence is still a valuable source under the Act. The 
debates on good faith in South African law of contract can best be characterised by the words 
of Hawthorne: 'The core ethic of the law of contract may be identified as either the belief in 
individualism or an avowal to co-operativism. Adherence to either paradigm determines the 
acceptance or rejection of a doctrine of good faith.'1789  
The principle of freedom of contract was regarded as a cornerstone of South African law upon 
which the courts heavily relied. The doctrine encompasses several different notions: the parties 
must be able to freely negotiate the terms of their agreement, decide with whom they wish to 
contract, or that they must be free to decide not to contract. The principle of pacta sunt 
                                                             
Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2002] 1 All ER 97 para [54]: 'It may also be necessary 
to consider the effect of the inclusion of the term on the substance or core of the transaction'. 
1786 For the discussion what the phrase 'essential principles of the statutory provision' means, see Stoffels AGB-
Recht 197 et seq, with further references. 
1787 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
1788 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 441. 
1789 Hawthorne 2006 Fundamina 71. 
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servanda, i.e., that full effect should be given to agreements, is of upmost importance in this 
regard.1790 
This topic has already been discussed in detail above,1791 which is why a summary should 
suffice here. 
Even though the principle of good faith was not expressly rejected in Bank of Lisbon & South 
Africa Ltd v De Ornelas1792 where the court held that it was rather an informative norm that 
merely informed substantive rules and principles, this case is crucial regarding the decline of a 
general defence based on good faith because the majority of the court refused to acknowledge 
a substantive contractual defence based on good faith.1793 Indeed, the court expressly held that 
the exceptio doli generalis was not received into Roman-Dutch law and thus was not received 
in South African law.1794   
The majority ruling was heavily criticised by academia,1795 but created a binding precedent and 
had to be followed by lower courts. With the abandonment of the exceptio doli generalis, there 
was no general equitable remedy available to the courts to decide not to enforce an otherwise 
valid agreement.1796 
The question of good faith also came up in Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom.1797 One of the 
issues in Afrox was very similar to that raised in Brisley v Drotsky, namely whether good faith 
can be used by the court to refuse to enforce a certain term included in the contract.1798  
The court restated that good faith is an informative consideration underlying the existing 
substantive rules and doctrines and not a substantive ground or defence by which the court can 
declare invalid a contract or refuse to enforce a contractual provision.1799 Hawthorne refers to 
the Afrox case as the 'zenith of condonation of aggressive capitalistic entrepreneurship' as legal 
certainty and commercial and economic interests again were the critical considerations in 
favour of the traditionalist approach.1800 He also criticises that the court acknowledged the 
                                                             
1790 Hawthorne 1995 THRHR 163, Tladi 2002 De Jure 308. 
1791 See ch 1 para 1 above. 
1792 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
1793 Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 297. 
1794 At 608. See also Glover (2007) SALJ 450.  
1795 Lubbe and Murray Contract 391; Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 146, 148-149, 154.  
1796 Hawthorne/Thomas 1989 De Jure 146, 154, Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 297.  
1797 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA).  
1798 Brand 2009 SALJ 81.  
1799 Bhana/Pieterse 2005 SALJ 876.  
1800 Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 299.  
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widespread use of standard form agreements without considering the effect of such a contract 
on consensus. The use of standard form agreements actually undermines the notion of freedom 
to contract and party autonomy.1801  
According to common law, contracts or provisions that are contrary to public policy are 
unenforceable. As confirmed many times by the courts, public policy is anchored in 
constitutional values.1802 Therefore, a term that offends against a constitutional value will be 
unfair under the Act as well. It is important to consider that the mere offence of one’s individual 
sense of propriety and fairness does not suffice, and that a more principled approach is 
requested that uses objective criteria, as Sachs J states in his minority judgment in Barkhuizen 
v Napier.1803 According to Sachs J, such an approach must consist in the enquiry of the 
‘tendency’ of the provision in question and the extent to which it affects standards of reasonable 
and fair dealing that the community would consider intrinsic to appropriate supplier/consumer 
relationships. This must be done in the context of the contract as a whole.1804 Sachs J also 
relates to procedural fairness by stating that it would be unfair to hold a person to one-sided 
terms of a transaction to which it apparently did not actually agree, and where nothing indicates 
that its attention was drawn and the legal significance of which a reasonable person in its 
position could not be expected to be aware.1805 
Sachs J states in Barkhuizen v Napier1806 that one-sided clauses do not affect ‘only the indigent 
and the illiterate who in practice remain ignorant of everything the document contains; the fact 
that consumer protection is especially important for the poor does not imply that it is irrelevant 
for the rich.’1807 Therefore, a control over unfair contract terms protects the autonomy of 
consumers, by forcing suppliers to actually obtain informed consent to onerous provisions in a 
fair manner, instead of hiding them in small print.1808 In addition, as already discussed, the 
consumer’s transaction costs involved in reading complex standard terms in small print are too 
high. It is therefore unlikely that the consumer will focus on other things than the core terms. 
                                                             
1801 Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 299.  
1802 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) and Afrox Healthcare.Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
1803 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). 
1804 Barkhuizen v Napier para [146]. Hutchison is of the opinion that this case must be read in context and that 
only where constitutional values and principles – here the constitutional right of access to the courts – the question 
of fairness or reasonableness becomes relevant. See Hutchison et al. Law of Contract 32. 
1805 Barkhuizen v Napier para [147]. 
1806 Barkhuizen v Napier (2007) (5) SA 323 (CC). 
1807 Barkhuizen v Napier at para [149]. Sachs J’s equations indigent and/or illiterate = poor, and consequently 
educated = rich can only be explained from a stylistic point of view as he probably did not want to repeat the same 
nomenclature.  
1808 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 15. 
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What is more, it will be difficult to negotiate most terms and find someone who is authorised 
to negotiate about standard terms.1809 Strictly speaking, it is the very nature of standard terms 
to be ‘employed without variation in all transactions of a similar kind’.1810 The suppliers’ 
advertising which mostly suggest that the consumer’s experience with the supplier will only be 
positive, also contributes to consumers’ behaviour. This especially applies if they are 
unsophisticated and take for granted ‘information’ contained in advertising. Most 
unsophisticated consumers will thus assume that standard terms are invariable.1811 
The notion of public policy is important as it is inseparably linked to other concepts, such as 
fairness, justice, equity and reasonableness.1812 When determining fairness, the test, according 
to Ngcobo J is, first, whether the clause itself is reasonable, and second, if so, whether it should 
be enforced in the light of the circumstances which prevented compliance with the clause.1813 
The question of how Barkhuizen v Napier should be interpreted was debated since it had the 
potential to change the law of contract radically.1814 Some commentators even suggested that 
it led to the resurrection of the exceptio doli generalis.1815 Academia wondered after 
Barkhuizen v Napier whether the court's approach left sufficient room for the law of contract 
to be infused with constitutional values.1816 Many authors felt that the court's approach was too 
conservative and did not promote a more equitable society.1817 Brand, who usually takes a more 
traditional stance and thus is not a friend of open-ended concepts such as good faith, argued 
that more judicial activism might be appropriate to ensure development in a constitutional 
direction.1818 
The SCA tried to narrow the effect of the wide dicta of Barkhuizen v Napier in Bredenkamp 
and Others v Standard Bank Ltd.1819 The court stated that it did 'not believe that the judgment 
held or purported to hold that the enforcement of a valid contractual term must be fair and 
                                                             
1809 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1810 Harker 1981 SALJ 16. 
1811 Eiselen 1989 De Jure 44; Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 13. 
1812 Barkhuizen v Napier para [51]. 
1813 Barkhuizen v Napier para [56]. 
1814 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 31. 
1815 Glover 2007 SALJ 449, Kerr 2008 SALJ 241, Sutherland 2008 Stell LR 390 (Part 1) and 2009 Stell LR 50. For 
the discussion on the exceptio dolis generalis see ch 1 para 2 above. 
1816 Bhana 2007 SALJ 274. 
1817 Davis 2008 SAJHR 319, 324. 
1818 Brand 2009 SALJ 89. 
1819 2010 (4) SA 468 (SCA). 
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reasonable, even if no public policy consideration found in the Constitution or elsewhere is 
implicated'.1820 
In Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel,1821 however, Barkhuizen v Napier was also interpreted in that 
even if a clause is considered to be reasonable on that first enquiry, it may still not be 
enforceable in the particular circumstances of the case if it denies a party an adequate and fair 
opportunity to have the dispute resolved by a court of law.1822 
In Everfresh v Shoprite Checkers1823 it was said obiter that the law of contract should be infused 
with constitutional values, including values of Ubuntu,1824 which inspire many constitutional 
aspects.1825 In this case, both the majority and minority judgments expressly mention the 
importance of the principle of good faith in contractual relationships.1826 The court stated that 
if the case had been properly pleaded, the concept of Ubuntu and the principle of good faith 
might have been crucial in the applicant's favour.1827 According to Moseneke DCJ, Ubuntu 
‘emphasises the communal nature of society and carries in it ideas of humaneness, social justice 
and fairness’ and includes ‘the key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human 
dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity’. In addition, according to Moseneke, 
‘[c]ontracting parties certainly need to relate to each other in good faith’.1828 
Moseneke’s view about the infusion of constitutional values into the law of contract certainly 
has its merits. Mokgoro argues that Ubuntu can be an appropriate principle to use to inform the 
                                                             
1820 At para [50]. 
1821 2012 (6) SA 170 (GSJ).In this case, the court had to decide whether a clause exempting the hotel from claims 
for bodily injury suffered by a hotel guest by negligence on the part of a hotel employee was lawful. The court 
held that such a clause could not be enforced in the particular circumstances, even if it is not objectively 
unreasonable and contrary to public policy. According to the court, to deny a guest judicial redress for injuries he 
sustained while exiting through the hotel gates, which is not supposed to be an inherently dangerous activity, 
offends against notions of justice and fairness.  
1822 At paras [47]-[53]. The court held that a term in a contract that is inimical to the values enshrined in the 
Constitution is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable. To deny a hotel guest judicial redress for 
injuries he or she suffered in exiting the hotel gate because of the negligent conduct of the hotel (not properly 
maintaining the gate, not warning the guest) offends against the notions of justice and fairness. 
1823 Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC). Mupangavanhu is 
of the view that the Constitutional Court missed the opportunity in Everfresh v Shoprite to settle the question 
'whether the spirit, purport, and objects of our Constitution require courts to encourage good faith in contractual 
dealings or whether the Constitution insists that good faith requirements are enforceable'. See Mupangavanhu 'Yet 
another missed opportunity to develop the Common Law of Contract? An analysis of Everfresh Market Virginia 
(Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 30' at 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/1988?show=full. 
1824 Ubuntu is a philosophical concept found in Southern Africa focusing on people's allegiances and relations 
with each other. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 185 note 93, with further references. 
1825 Everfresh v Shoprite Checkers para [71]. 
1826 Everfresh v Shoprite Checkers paras [23], [26], [36], [37], [61], [68], [72], for example. 
1827 Everfresh v Shoprite Checkers para [71]. 
1828 Everfresh v Shoprite Checkers para [72]. 
 339   
 
new developments in the law of contract and that the flexibility of the concept is an advantage. 
As a basis it has a certain invariable focus on the greater good, the interest of the community 
and dignity.1829 It is nonetheless my submission that the concept of Ubuntu does not help 
determine fairness in a legal context. Ubuntu certainly contains valuable elements for a 
peaceful life in society but is more of a philosophical rather than legal nature. The difficulty of 
this concept is that it is explained differently by various people rather than defined concisely 
(which is probably an inherent problem with this concept).1830 It is possible of course, and often 
necessary, to revert to philosophical and other concepts in constitutional law, such as dignity, 
respect etc. Most of the concepts contained in Ubuntu are already present in the concepts of 
good faith, public policy though, or are just the fundamental basis of each society. Hence, it is 
not necessary or even helpful to add another, rather vague concept which does not introduce 
new elements for the determination of constitutional values. 
In Beadica,1831 the Constitutional Court recently confirmed that courts cannot refuse to enforce 
contract terms for equity considerations, such as good faith, fairness and reasonableness 
because these values have no self-standing status. Only where contractual terms or their 
enforcement would be so unfair that they are contrary to public policy, a court has the right to 
refuse to enforce them.1832 
The pacta sunt servanda principle still plays a crucial role in the context of the control of 
contracts by the courts through the principle of public policy. The protection of this maxim is 
indispensable for the achievement of the objectives set out in the Constitution.1833 This 
                                                             
1829 Mokgoro 1998 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 16, 18 et seq. 
1830 Eze explains the concept of Ubuntu as follows: '"A person is a person through other people" strikes an 
affirmation of one’s humanity through recognition of an "other" in his or her uniqueness and difference. It is a 
demand for a creative intersubjective formation in which the "other" becomes a mirror (but only a mirror) for my 
subjectivity. This idealism suggests to us that humanity is not embedded in my person solely as an individual; my 
humanity is co-substantively bestowed upon the other and me. Humanity is a quality we owe to each other. We 
create each other and need to sustain this otherness creation. And if we belong to each other, we participate in our 
creations: we are because you are, and since you are, definitely I am. The "I am" is not a rigid subject, but a 
dynamic self-constitution dependent on this otherness creation of relation and distance.' See Eze Intellectual 
History 190 and 191. It should be noted that in the second minority judgement of Beadica, Victor AJ stresses the 
importance of Ubuntu in the South African law of contract. According to Victor AJ, Ubuntu is a constitutional 
value that adds a value of substance, and together with other values, forms a transformative basis in the 
adjudicative process when deciding whether an unfair contract term has to be enforced or not. Ubuntu has a greater 
and context-sensitive reach, especially where there is inequality in the bargaining power between the parties. This 
concept is wider than fairness. Victor AJ is of the view that adjudicating fairness cannot be done within a set of 
neutral legal principles, but in a manner that ensures objective, reasonable practicality and certainty. Ubuntu thus 
does not exclude or undermine certainty in contract, but remains a central consideration in harmony with the other 
values. See Beadica at paras [206]-[216]. 
1831 [2020] ZACC 13 (17 June 2020). 
1832 Beadica at para [80]. 
1833 Beadica at paras [83]-[85]. 
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principle is not absolute, though, and where several constitutional rights and values must be 
considered, for the determination of whether enforcement of the terms would be contrary to 
public policy in the given case, these must be carefully balanced against each other.1834 
In Beadica, the Constitutional Court also specified that the principle of 'perceptive restraint' 
must not hinder the courts from shying away from their constitutional duty to infuse public 
policy with constitutional values. Hence, the degree of necessary restraint must be balanced 
against the backdrop of the constitutional rights and values.  
The ambivalence on the exact role of fairness in the case law decided before the Act was 
somewhat mitigated by the Beadica case. The ideas and arguments contained in this case give 
some certainty to the courts when deciding whether a term has to be struck down because of 
unfairness in terms of the Act. Undoubtedly, the principle of freedom of contract cannot be 
regarded as absolute.1835 
d) Foreign legal systems 
As section 2(2)(a) provides that the courts, the Tribunal or the Commission may consider 
appropriate foreign and international law when interpreting or applying the Act, it is interesting 
to see how other legal systems deal with unfairness and define this concept. Some of them have 
already have presented above. Obviously, section 48(2) or the non-exhaustive list of factors in 
section 52(2) are not sufficient to give a satisfactory guideline to the judiciary. 
The general clause of the EC Unfair Terms Directive provides that a term is unfair if, ‘contrary 
to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’.1836 The ‘significant 
imbalance’ mentioned in the Directive reminds of the excessive one-sidedness mentioned in 
section 48(2)(a) and therefore does not provide new aspects in the determination of unfairness. 
Unlike the Directive and section 48, the BGB refers to an ‘unreasonabl[e] disadvantage’ rather 
than a ‘significant imbalance’ or an ‘excessive one-sided[ness]’. § 307 BGB reads: 'Provisions 
in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they 
unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the contract'.1837 § 879(3) of the Austrian 
                                                             
1834 Beadica at para [87]. 
1835 Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 295. 
1836 Article 3 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993. 
1837 Emphasis added. 
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ABGB,1838 which contains the general clause to § 6 KSchG,1839 also refers to a disadvantage 
for the other party to the contract, but in contrast to § 307(1) BGB, the disadvantage has to be 
'severe'.1840 This should be similar in most cases to 'unreasonably' in terms of § 307(1) BGB 
because only 'objectively justified deviations from the dispositive law constitute a severe 
disadvantage'.1841 Besides the unreasonable disadvantage, another dimension, namely good 
faith, is added, which could give some more guidance. Pursuant to § 307(2) BGB, an 
unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed, if a provision ‘is not compatible 
with essential principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates’, or ‘limits essential 
rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the 
purpose of the contract is jeopardised’. The statutory provision from which the provision 
deviates is the residual rule in the relevant part of the BGB and other statutory provisions.1842 
The concepts of a ‘significant imbalance’1843 and an ‘unreasonable disadvantage’1844 suggest 
that such an imbalance or disadvantage has to be balanced in order to be fair. This is expressed 
in Barkhuizen v Napier as follows: ‘the idea of balance suggests that an advantage obtained in 
ancillary terms, such as an exclusion of liability or a fixed measure of damage for breach, 
should be matched by corresponding benefits to the other party.'1845 
Unlike the BGB which provides the two circumstances as mentioned earlier in which an 
unreasonable disadvantage exists, the Dutch Civil Code merely provides that a term is voidable 
if it is ‘unreasonably detrimental to the adhering party’.1846 
                                                             
1838 ABGB = Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian General Civil Code). § 879(3) ABGB: 'Contractual 
provisions in standard business terms or contractual forms that do not determine a mutual principal obligation is 
void in any event if it constitutes a severe disadvantage for one of the parties having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case.' My own translation. 
1839 Unlike in other legal systems, in Austria the general clause is contained in a different code than the back and 
greylists. The Konsumentenschutzgesetz (KSchG) came into effect on 1 October 1979 and did not contain a 
general clause from the beginning. On 1 July 1992, subparagraph (3) was inserted into § 879 ABGB. It is 
submitted that the legislator considered it more systematic to insert this provision rather in this piece of legislation 
than into the KSchG, as the other provisions of § 879 ABGB also concern the invalidity of contracts. See website 
of the Austrian Bundeskanzleramt at https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen& 
Dokumentnummer=NOR40045312. 
1840 '(…) gröblich benachteiligt'. 
1841 Kothbauer 2011 Immolex 160 ('Zur Inhaltskontrolle des § 879 Abs. 3 ABGB') at 
https://www.onlinehausverwaltung.at/Portals/1/publikationen/immolex 2011-05 § 879 Abs 3 ABGB.pdf (no 
longer available). 
1842 WLP/Wolf § 307 para 105 et seq. 
1843 Article 3 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993. 
1844 § 307 BGB. 
1845 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [165], where Sachs J cites Collins Law of Contract 253. 
1846 Article 6:233 BW. 
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According to article 2(b) of the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law, good faith and 
fair dealing can be defined as ‘a standard of conduct characterised by honesty, openness and 
consideration for the interests of the other party to the transaction or relationship in question’. 
In other words, the supplier has to bear in mind the consumer’s interests when drafting or 
submitting its standard terms and act honestly and openly. Accordingly, the House of Lords 
suggests that when interpreting the EC Unfair Terms Directive, good faith also ‘looks to good 
standards of commercial morality and practice’ and contains the notion of ‘fair and open 
dealing’ which also includes ‘community standards of fairness and reasonableness’.1847 This 
means, according to Lord Bingham of Cornwall that a ‘term should be expressed fully, clearly 
and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps.’ Furthermore, potentially 
disadvantageous terms should be given appropriate prominence. ‘[F]air dealing requires that a 
supplier should not, whether deliberately or unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer’s 
necessity, indigence, lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, 
weak bargaining position (…)’.1848 This is also expressed in section 40 of the Act. One must 
nevertheless not forget that good faith not only concerns issues of fair dealing, i.e., procedural 
fairness, but also substantial fairness which concerns the content of a transaction or a term. 
Lord Steyn makes this clear in the same case: ‘Any purely procedural or even predominantly 
procedural interpretation of the requirement of good faith must be rejected.’ Therefore, good 
faith requires a composite test that consists of both procedural and substantive fairness. A 
useful question one should ask is whether or not a consumer would have accepted a certain 
clause or term had it been drawn to their attention.1849 
Section 24(1) of the Australian Consumer Law1850 is based on article 3 the EC Unfair Terms 
Directive1851 but does not refer to good faith. Instead, a legitimate interest criterion has been 
added under which a term is unfair if it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the 
legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term. 
In summary, the concepts of good faith and fair and open dealing should be considered by the 
courts when assessing whether a term is unfair.  
                                                             
1847 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2002] 1 AC 491 para [490], Mylcrist Builders 
Limited v Buck [2001] UKHL 52 para [17]. 
1848 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2002] 1 AC para [490]. 
1849 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2002] 1 AC para [499]. 
1850 Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act, 2010. 
1851 See above. 
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In addition to that, the concept of a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations 
which is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the supplier as well as 
the above-mentioned presumptions of the BGB should be taken into account. Lubbe has 
expressed the consideration for the interests of the consumer,1852 by the formulation that the 
supplier’s interests ‘must be tempered by a reasonable measure of concern’ for the consumer’s 
interests.1853 Naudé adds that the consumer’s fundamental right to dignity may encompass this 
same standard.1854 
e) Extra-legislative guidelines 
Besides the provisions contained in the Act (including its regulations), the findings of the 
common law and foreign legislation, South Africa could also adopt an extra-legislative strategy 
in order to provide guidance to businesses and consumers. These could be helpful for the 
scrutiny of the fairness of contractual terms. The non-binding guidelines on terms which are 
considered unfair of the OFT1855 could thus be a good example for the National Consumer 
Commission. These guidelines were based on the OFT’s experience with negotiation and 
enforcement. As a matter of course, only the courts have the final saying of whether or not a 
term is unfair. Nevertheless, guidelines are an effective tool for preventive and reactive control 
and predictability. Especially for businesses, they are a valuable source for the drafting of their 
standard terms. What is more, these guidelines could have a proactive effect. 
4.1.5 Burden of proof in terms of section 48 
In terms of section 48, the consumer carries the risk of non-persuasion and therefore has to 
convince the court that a term is unfair, as opposed to regulation 44, where the burden of proof 
lies with the supplier. Some authors defend this solution by stating that the greylist is already 
very extensive and that it might be too drastic to lay the onus on the supplier in terms of section 
48.1856 The English and Scottish Law Commissions suggest that the burden of proof should 
never lay on the consumer because this would be too much a burden.1857 Others take the view 
                                                             
1852 Article 2(b) of the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law. 
1853 Lubbe 1990 Stell LR 20. 
1854 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 366. 
1855 The Office of Fair Trading was a non-ministerial department which existed from 1973 to 1 April 2014. OFT’s 
responsibilities passed to a number of different organisations when it closed. 'Office of Fair Trading' at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-fair-trading (no longer available). Some relevant 
information is still available in the UK National Archives at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20140525130048/http://www.oft.gov.uk. 
1856 See Naudé 2009 SALJ 535-536, with further references. 
1857 Law Commissions of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – 
Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005), ss 16(1), 16(2) and 17(2). 
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that no provision on the burden of proof is needed or desirable as also the EC Unfair Terms 
Directive does not contain such a provision.1858  
Naudé favours the model suggested by the UK Law Commissions1859 which distinguishes 
between litigation where individual consumers are involved, on the one hand, and general use 
challenges, on the other. In the first case, the burden of proof should lay on the business, 
whereas in the second case, the consumer organisation, regulator or National Consumer 
Commission should bear the onus. These institutions are in a stronger position than 'true' 
consumers to argue their case and more familiar with the legislation. In B2B transactions, the 
onus of proof should always remain on the complainant, however.1860 
A drawback of Naudé's differentiation is that it creates different standards depending on which 
kind of complainant (individual consumer or consumer organisation) is involved although the 
same terms and conditions are subject to the proceedings. Even though an individual 
consumer's position is weaker than the one of a consumer organisation in terms of bargaining 
power, financial strength and expertise, both are comparable in the sense that in standard form 
contracts, the supplier submits (imposes) its standard terms to its consumers. It is therefore 
suggested that the supplier should systematically bear the onus of persuasion that a term is fair.  
In most cases, standard terms deviate from residual rules and are drafted in the interest of the 
supplier.1861 Not only under regulation 44 but also with regard to unlisted terms, the supplier 
has more insight than the consumer as to why a particular term has been formulated in a certain 
fashion, and therefore in a position to put forward arguments that speak for its fairness. This 
does not mean that the consumer – or a consumer organisation – can afford to be utterly passive 
during litigation. In general use challenges, consumer organisations would at least have to 
present arguments as to why a particular term is unfair in a specific economic context. Where 
individual consumers are involved, they should describe the context in which the agreement 
was made. The list contained in section 52(2) is a guideline for the material the parties should 
present in litigation. The supplier then would have to present counter-arguments so that the 
                                                             
1858 See Naudé 2007 SALJ 141, with further references. 
1859 Section 16(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill published in Law Commissions of England and Wales and 
the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)(2005). 
1860 Naudé 2009 SALJ 535. 
1861 Naudé 2007 SALJ 142.  
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court can reach a decision based on factual and legal arguments. This view is in line with the 
fact that the unfairness of a term is a question of law rather than of fact.1862 
In practice, this solution would have the same results as the suggestion according to which the 
party who would have an advantage by the standard term in question (mostly the supplier) has 
to prove that the provision is reasonably necessary in order to protect its legitimate interests.1863  
Naudé asserts that a court should consider a provision's fairness on its own initiative, where the 
court or Tribunal has the legal and factual elements available for that undertaking.1864 This is 
clearly against the wording of section 52(1), according to which a person has to allege that the 
supplier contravened section 48. Nevertheless, it does not make any sense if a court can enquire 
a term's fairness according to section 51 and regulation 44, but cannot do so under the general 
clause. As discussed before, the threefold fairness enquiry of these three provisions cannot be 
split. Naudé is therefore correct when suggesting that the Act should be amended accordingly 
in order to make this clear.1865 This question is inextricably linked with the question of burden 
of proof. Although the fairness review is rather a question of law, and not a factual question, a 
provision for the allocation of the onus of proof is useful in order to allocate the risk of non-
persuasion if no clear conclusion can be reached.1866  
4.2 Legal consequences 
Pursuant to section 52(1), if in any proceedings before a court concerning a transaction or 
agreement between a supplier and consumer, a person alleges that the supplier contravened 
section 48, and the Act does not otherwise provide a remedy sufficient to correct the relevant 
unfairness, the court, after considering the principles, purposes and provisions of the Act, and 
the matters set out in subsection (2), may seek an order contemplated in subsection (3). 
From this provision derives that the court may not start a fairness enquiry on its own initiative 
but that 'a person' must allege that a transaction or agreement is unfair. As discussed earlier, 
the court should be able to assert a term's fairness on its own initiative though, as it can do in 
terms of section 51 and regulation 44. 
                                                             
1862 Vincenzo Roppo 'Workshop 3: The definition of "unfairness": the application of Article 3(1), 4(1) – and of 
the annexes of the Directive' in European Commission Brussels Conference 1-3/7/1999 (1999) at 128. 
1863 This solution has been adopted by s 24(4) of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition 
and Consumer Act, 2010). 
1864 See Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts: Advice to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) 100. 
1865 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
1866 Naudé 2007 SALJ 142.  
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If the court determines that a transaction or agreement was, in whole or in part, unjust, 
unreasonable or unfair, it may (a) make a declaration to that effect, (b) make any further order 
it considers just and reasonable in the circumstances, including, but not limited to, an order (i) 
to restore money or property to the consumer, (ii) to compensate the consumer for losses or 
expenses relating to the transaction or agreement, or the proceedings of the court, and (iii) 
requiring the supplier to cease any practice, or alter any practice, form or document, as required 
to avoid a repetition of the supplier's conduct.1867 
The court's possibility to make a declaration that an agreement was unfair implies that the 
underlying terms are void. Section 52 should however not be interpreted in that the prohibition 
against unfair terms in section 48 has no extra-judicial effect since the inclusion of unfair terms 
is clearly 'prohibited conduct' under section 40, read with section 48. The supplier may not rely 
on unfair terms, irrespective of whether the court has declared them void as this would be 
prohibited conduct in terms of section 1.1868 Unfortunately, section 52(3) does not clearly 
provide that not the agreement as a whole is void and that it continues, as far as practicable, to 
have effect in every other respect.1869 However, the doctrine of severability applies in terms of 
section 52(3) where the unreasonable part of the contract is to be severed from the rest in order 
to prevent the injustice that could have been caused by enforcing the agreement in its original 
state.1870 Where the unreasonable part cannot be severed from the rest, e.g., for impracticability 
or economic reasons, the whole agreement is invalid.1871 Moreover, the Act should also make 
clear that if the supplier cannot rely on a provision as a result of the Act, the content of the 
contract is determined by the rules that would have applied in the absence of the term in 
question. In addition, it should provide that the contract is invalid if one party would suffer 
unreasonable hardship if it were bound by the agreement even after its amendment and the 
rules being applied in the absence of the given term.1872 
                                                             
1867 Section 52(3). The German UKlaG provides in its § 1 a right to require refrainment from use and withdrawal 
of recommendation of standard contract terms: 'Those who use provisions which are invalid under §§ 307 to 309 
of the Civil Code in standard contract terms or who recommend such provisions for commercial use may be 
required to refrain from using such terms and to withdraw any recommendation made.' § 11 UKlaG sets out the 
effects of the judgment: 'If the user against whom judgment has been given fails to comply with an injunction 
based on § 1, the provision in the standard contract terms is to be regarded as void insofar as the party concerned 
invokes the effect of the injunction. However, this party cannot invoke the effect of the injunction if the user 
against whom judgment has been given could contest the judgment under § 10'. 
1868 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 52. 
1869 See § 306. 
1870 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 333.  
1871 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 381. 
1872 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 52. 
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The list of examples in subsection (3) is non-exhaustive and constitutes an incentive for 
suppliers to cease illegal practices. The restoration of money or property or the compensation 
of the consumer for losses or expenses are individual measures with a limited impact with 
respect to a deterrent effect vis-à-vis suppliers to cease their illegal practices. They are 
nevertheless valuable because the consumer’s position is being restored to its previous one.  
Under section 52(3)(b), only the loss actually suffered by the consumer will be compensated, 
which is why it is very unlikely that a court will grant compensation for expenses relating to 
the proceedings on an attorney and client scale. This would infringe the supplier's fundamental 
right to equality before the law1873 since in the absence of a term providing for costs on an 
attorney-and-won-client scale it would normally be entitled only to costs on the party-and-
party-scale if it is unsuccessful.1874  
The restriction that only the proven and actual damage must be compensated does only apply 
to individual consumers, but not to a collective injury to all or a class of consumers in terms of 
section 76(1)(c). Naudé suggests that this widely formulated provision could be interpreted in 
that the court may grant punitive damages for collective injury to the consumers involved.1875 
This mechanism could thus be useful to help finance actions taken by consumer protection 
organisations against suppliers. Systematically, there is no reason why the legislator should 
have granted the possibility for punitive damages to a class of consumers, whereas this 
possibility is not given to individual consumers. Punitive damages combine punishment and 
the setting of public example. This kind of damages is awarded to punish the defendant rather 
than to compensate the claimant for harm done. They are exceptional and may be awarded 
when the defendant acted in a malicious, oppressive, fraudulent or grossly reckless way in 
causing the special and general damages to the plaintiff.1876 What is more, this would lead to a 
different treatment of consumers, depending on whether an individual consumer, a class of 
consumers or a consumer organisation has brought an action before the court, with the same 
terms and conditions being the object to the proceedings. Such a punitive-damage mechanism 
might be useful for the financing of other proceedings. It is unlikely though that the legislator 
intended such a mechanism. It is suggested that the use of the wide term 'damages' only includes 
the actual loss but no punitive damages. What is more, consumer organisations should be 
                                                             
1873 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
1874 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 56. 
1875 Naudé 2010 SALJ 535. 
1876 See 'Damages' at http://dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=423, Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 
'exemplary (punitive, vindictive) damages'. 
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financed rather by their members and/or the State, and not by the proceedings of court actions. 
Financing by punitive damages could be an incentive for challenging only standard terms of 
suppliers that are 'worth it' financially. 
On the other hand, requiring the supplier to cease or alter any illegal practice under section 
52(3)(b)(iii) has a much more substantial impact on businesses and is a precious weapon 
against illegal practices. This type of order allows for preventive control as suppliers will have 
to alter their practice in future contracts. The court order should however be formulated in that 
not only the exact wording of a provision is prohibited but its effect and purpose. Ideally, the 
order should contain a suggestion for the rewording of the clause in order to make it fair. In 
that way, suppliers cannot circumvent the court order by merely reformulating the clause.1877 
As the list contained in section 53(3) is not limited, a court may also alter, amend or adjust a 
problematic term or the agreement as a whole. An argument for this approach is that a supplier 
might have honestly been of the opinion that a term was fair, whereas it was not.1878 Some 
countries exclude this possibility because of the danger that a supplier might cynically include 
unfair terms knowing that a court may assist him if necessary by reducing the ambit of the 
clause in question.1879 
Naudé suggests that a court may also make a 'preventive order' in order to introduce a new 
practice for the supplier.1880 As South Africa does not have an institution similar to the OFT in 
the United Kingdom giving guidance to suppliers and suggesting formulations, and court orders 
only have an effect on the parties of the process, such a 'preventive order' might create an 
imbalance within a particular industry, however. If one supplier is forced to comply with 
preventive measures, but not the other suppliers of the same sector because they are not 
involved in the particular court proceedings, this may cause a certain asymmetry. This approach 
could nevertheless have an extra-judicial effect and create a new practice within the industry 
as other suppliers might certainly aim to conform to judicial standards. 
It is deplorable that section 52(3)(b) has been written with only having individual consumers 
in mind, and not also abstract challenges by consumer organisations. Unfair terms can generally 
only be eradicated when general use challenges are possible. Section 4(1) allows the persons 
mentioned in this provision to approach a court, the Tribunal or the Commission. Persons 
                                                             
1877 Naudé 2010 SALJ 534, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 54. 
1878 This approach is possible in the Nordic countries. 
1879 Germany does therefore prohibit such an approach. See BGHZ 86, 297. 
1880 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 55. 
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acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of affected persons as well as 
associations acting in the interest of their members thus have standing under section 52.1881 It 
is therefore submitted that section 52(3) is not only applicable to individual consumers, but 
also to organisations having locus standi according to section 4(1). In order to make this clear, 
section 52 should be rewritten with having also abstract challenges in mind.1882 
The objective of section 52(3)(b)(iii), i.e., requiring the supplier to cease the use of specific 
terms, can also be achieved by general use challenges because under section 4(2)(b)(ii)(bb), 
the Tribunal or court may make any innovative order that better advances the realisation by 
consumers of their rights in terms of the Act. Naudé suggests that in any general use challenge 
a court will have jurisdiction to decide that the mere offer of the terms for general use to the 
public infringes section 48 and that the supplier may not continue offering such terms.1883 She 
also suggests that under certain circumstances, orders should be published at the expense of 
the supplier since this would have a preventive effect.1884 In any event, a court should direct 
the supplier to advice the NCC and provincial consumer protection agencies of its decision, 
especially if the court considered the term unfair in all the contracts concluded by that 
supplier.1885 It should be noted that a court only decides on a particular matter and cannot state 
that a term is unfair in all contracts the supplier has concluded with other consumers. 
Nevertheless, both suggestions are to be welcomed and should be adhered to by the courts. 
Another order could be a phased-in penalty1886 per clause and per violation that would comprise 
an initial phase-out period for the supplier in order to adapt his terms gradually.1887  
Finally, section 53(4) provides that a court may make certain orders if in any proceedings 
before a court concerning a transaction between a supplier and a consumer a person alleges 
that a term is void in terms of the Act. The court may severe any part of the relevant agreement 
or provision, or alter it to the extent required to render it lawful if it is reasonable to do so 
having regard to the transaction, agreement, provision or notice as a whole.1888 The court may 
also declare the entire agreement, provision or notice void as from the date that it purportedly 
                                                             
1881 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
1882 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 58. 
1883 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 59. 
1884 In Germany, the publication of the judgment is possible pursuant to § 7 UKlaG. 
1885 Naudé 2010 SALJ 515, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 61. 
1886 This kind of clauses is used in Germany and Sweden. 
1887 Naudé 2010 SALJ 515, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 62. 
1888 Section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa). 
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took effect.1889 Thirdly, the court may make any further order that is just and reasonable in the 
circumstances with respect to that agreement, provision or notice, as the case may be.1890 
The fact that the court may make 'any further order that is just and reasonable in the 
circumstances' in terms of paragraph (b) is wide enough to give the court the power to alter 
unfair terms. The courts will nonetheless probably rather strike out unfair terms in order to 
avoid that suppliers use unfair terms hoping that the courts might refine them.1891 
The enforcement mechanism of the Act will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The general clause of section 48 completes the threefold fairness enquiry alongside with the 
blacklist of section 51 and the greylist of regulation 44. 
The terms 'unfair', 'unjust' and 'unreasonable' are synonymous and should not be assessed 
differently. Unfortunately, the South African general clause is unnecessarily burdensome, lacks 
clarity and is unsystematically structured. This could have been avoided by taking various 
foreign general clauses as examples. 
Section 48(1) and (2)(a) and (b) contains various concretisations of the general clause. Section 
48(2)(c) and (d), although part of the general clause, is systematically not part of content 
control.  
In contrast to other regimes, the general unfairness standard of section 48(1) also applies to 
individually negotiated clauses. The formulation that also the supply of goods on unfair terms 
is prohibited is superfluous since at any rate, an agreement of some sort would be necessary in 
order to bind the consumer. The fairness enquiry could be extended time-wise though as the 
court must also consider circumstances that existed when the agreement was made, irrespective 
of whether the Act was in force at that time. In practice, this could still be relevant for 
agreements on the continuous supply of goods or services. On the other hand, the formulation 
'offer to supply' in this section seems to provide for a locus standi of consumer organisations.  
Under the premise that section 78 is lex specialis to section 4, consumer organisations must be 
accredited in order to be entitled to protect consumer interests. Other countries do not 
                                                             
1889 Section 52(4)(a)(i)(bb). 
1890 Section 52(4)(b). 
1891 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 64. 
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necessarily require accreditation as long as organisations fulfil some minimum standards. Non-
accredited organisations fulfilling minimal standards should thus also be able to bring actions 
to the court. 
Section 48(1)(a)(i) seems to introduce a price control mechanism. Such a mechanism raises 
complex practical and theoretical questions. Other pieces of legislation already offer sufficient 
measures to curtail prices and avoid price discrimination. In addition, since the price is part of 
the core terms, and only where a simple comparison with other suppliers reveals excessive 
pricing, courts should be able to apply their discretion in this regard. It is however unlikely that 
the legislator intended to introduce such a price control mechanism. The provision rather 
applies where an unfair price is applied and other factors are present, such as unconscionable 
conduct or deception. Sections 40, 41 and 29 offer sufficient protection against certain forms 
of consumer abuse so that section 48(1)(a)(i) is superfluous. The same applies to section 
48(1)(b) and (c) which creates an unnecessary duplication of other provisions. Hence, these 
provisions should be deleted. 
The formulation '[w]ithout limiting the generality of subsection (1)' in section 48(2) indicates 
that subsection (1) must not be interpreted restrictively. Since subsection (2) has a radiating 
effect on subsection (1), the former is not lex specialis to the latter. Although the Act focuses 
on individual consumers, the tendency of a term has to be judged, and not its actual use. 
Therefore, the Act seems to apply a mixed approach in this regard. 
One-sidedness can lead to unfairness under section 48(2)(a). In this respect, terms that are 
detrimental to consumers can be counter-balanced by other provisions that outweigh the 
detrimental effect. Section 48(2)(b) requires a two-tear enquiry consisting of the adverseness 
to the consumer and the inequitableness of the term. Inequitableness can thus be assessed with 
the help of evaluative elements, such as good faith, or other provisions expressing an evaluative 
judgement. In any event, section 48(2)(b) would have been a better starting point for a general 
clause, instead of the over-complicated and unclear current formulation of section 48(1). This 
would also be more coherent with international standards. 
The deceptive standard of section 48(2)(c) does not relate to content control and should have 
been inserted into section 41 instead. It seems clear though that for representations or 
statements of opinion, the supplier has to act actively, e.g., by using illustrations that are 
different from the product being sold. The overlap between sections 41 and 48(2)(c) is not clear 
though. The courts will have to establish whether a clause that is fair per se becomes unfair 
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because of the supplier's false representation. In any event, 'representation' should be 
interpreted widely.  
The 'procedural standard' in paragraph (d) does not provide for content control either. As this 
provision seems to have no extra-judicial effect, and the Act does not contain a provision 
similar to article 6 of the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive, courts should construe any 
prohibition contained in this part of the Act per se as not binding on the consumer, and section 
52 should be interpreted in that it merely contains an enumeration of the orders a court may 
make. 
The guidelines contained in section 48(2) are too broad and imprecise and therefore not really 
of assistance for the determination of unfairness. On the other hand, section 52(2) provides for 
guidelines as to when an agreement or a term is to be considered unfair. The wording of section 
52 only allows courts to apply this provision but not the other redress entities, which creates 
different standards. Instead, the other entities should apply the factors listed in section 52(2) 
by analogy. In order to allow for a direct application, the legislator should reformulate section 
52. Although section 52(2) is geared towards procedural unfairness, also other factors can be 
taken into consideration as the list is not exhaustive. International practice provides for good 
examples in this regard. Predictability and certainty could be enhanced if the court could make 
objective findings, regardless of the parties of a particular case. In this regard, the legislator 
should redraft section 52(2) having also general-use challenges in mind in order to allow for 
an abstract-universal approach. 
Unlike the Unfair Terms Directive or the BGB, a factor of substantial fairness to be considered 
in section 52(2) is the 'fair value' of a good or service. Courts should apply this factor with 
prudence since the price alone is not sufficient in order to determine a term's fairness. Instead, 
the agreement as a whole must be considered as it might contain counter-balancing terms. 
Another factor is the nature of the parties, their relationship to each other and their relative 
capacity, education, and so forth. Nonetheless, one should consider that even educated and 
experienced consumers need protection since a structural inequality is inherent in standard 
terms. Courts should thus only interfere where unfair terms are 'hidden' or where the supplier 
has informed the consumer of specific terms at an inappropriate time. For other fairness 
considerations, one should keep in mind that the supplier, unlike the consumer, had plenty of 
time and could take counsel for drafting its standard terms. 
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The circumstances of the transaction that existed or were reasonable foreseeable at the time 
that the transaction occurred also have to be considered, irrespective of whether the Act was in 
force at that time. In this regard, it is submitted that the supplier's knowledge is sufficient 
because of its insider-knowledge. The provision admits only the consideration of foreseeable 
circumstances, but courts should not hesitate to develop a doctrine of hardship in circumstances 
where unforeseeable circumstances make the fulfilment of a contract a burden for one party. 
This would also be in the economic interest. 
Unlike other legislation, the Act permits the fairness enquiry of negotiated terms. B2B and B2C 
contracts should be treated differently, however. What is more, the fact that there has been no 
negotiation does not make a term unfair per se since the objective of standard terms is 
rationalisation. In the case of genuine negotiation, courts should hesitate to interfere, though. 
The plain language requirement is also listed in section 52(2). Terms that are not written in 
plain language should be considered unfair, save where the supplier explains the terms to the 
consumer. This should however not apply to long standard terms because of their complexity. 
This approach will ultimately lead to better commercial practice. 
The factor according to which the court must consider whether the consumer knew or ought 
reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any unfair particular provision seems 
astonishing at first sight since knowledge of an unfair term does not make it fair. If the supplier 
specifically pointed out the given term and the consumer agreed to it, it might be fair though. 
The mere signing or initialling of a term is not equal to its understanding. A good solution 
would be to grant a cooling-off period. It is suggested that 'previous dealings' between the 
parties does merely necessitate some kind of previous negotiations, but not a finalised 
conclusion of an agreement. This element is problematic as consumers typically do not read 
terms and conditions, and those of previous dealings could have been different. The 
consideration of customs of trade seems to raise concerns too and should only matter in B2B 
agreements.  
Also part of the fairness enquiry of section 52(2) is the consideration of the price for which and 
the circumstances under which the consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods 
or services from a different supplier. 'Circumstances' can only refer to the terms and conditions 
since the assessment of hypothetical circumstances is impossible. The phrase 'could have 
acquired' is also problematic as the mere theoretical possibility of better terms or a better price 
is difficult to assess.  
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The last factor in the list of section 52(2) concerns special order goods (not services). If this 
factor referred only to goods that are manufactured outside the ordinary course of business, this 
would exclude suppliers who specialise in custom-made products. Hence, this paragraph 
should also apply to products manufactured in the ordinary course of the supplier's business. 
Besides, other factors that are not listed in section 52(2) should be included in the fairness 
enquiry, such as the nature of the goods or services. Products that were on display, for instance, 
must certainly be assessed differently. 
Furthermore, in a synallagmatic contractual relationship, the parties' interests should be evenly 
balanced, which is why the legitimate interests of both parties should be considered. The terms 
of an agreement must not be seen in isolation, but are inter-dependent, which is why the 
contract has to be assessed as a whole. What is more, the residual rules and the common law 
often represent a fair balancing of the parties' interests. Therefore, it is advisable to take into 
account the extent to which a term differs from what would have been in its absence.  
Another factor often mentioned concerns more significant costs for the supplier in the case of 
the absence of the term. However, each legal disadvantage can somehow be justified 
economically and price-advantages are difficult to measure. 
Terms limiting essential rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract should never be 
fair since they jeopardise the attainment of the contractual purpose. The fact that the consumer 
signed them is merely an indicator of its compromised bargaining power. 
Not only listed or non-listed factors should be considered in the fairness enquiry but also case 
law. The common law is applicable under section 2(10) and therefore infuses its principles. 
Terms that are contrary to public policy are unenforceable, and public policy itself is anchored 
in constitutional values. The concept of Ubuntu is not helpful however as it is rather a vague 
concept already included in the principle of good faith and the doctrine of public policy. 
Section 2(2)(a) enables the courts to also consider foreign law. The fact that the general clause 
of section 48 lacks clarity is therefore counter-balanced to a certain degree by the fact that the 
courts can consult foreign law in order to adopt international standards. Extra-legislative 
guidelines similar to the non-binding guidelines of the former OFT could also provide for 
guidance, especially for businesses, and be a valuable tool for preventive and reactive control. 
The distribution of the burden of proof between the consumer and the supplier, suggested by 
some authorities, and depending on the nature of the transaction (B2C/B2B), or on whether a 
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consumer organisation is involved, creates different standards. Suppliers have more insight into 
their respective businesses and can better defend themselves than consumers or organisations. 
Therefore, the onus should always lie with the supplier. The other party has to present its 
arguments though so that the court can reach a decision based on the arguments of both sides.  
Furthermore, the courts should be able to assess the fairness of a term on their own initiative. 
Even though this is clearly against the wording of section 52(2), there is no obvious reason 
why a court can assess the fairness on its own initiative under section 51 and regulation 44, but 
not in terms of section 48. Section 52 should be amended accordingly. 
The legal implications of unfair terms have also been discussed in this chapter. Since the 
inclusion of unfair terms constitutes prohibited conduct under section 40, section 52 has insofar 
also an extra-judicial effect. The legislator should clarify that the doctrine of severability is 
applicable, i.e., that not the agreement as a whole is void if it contains unfair terms. The Act 
should also provide that the contract is invalid if one party would suffer unreasonable hardship 
if it were bound by the agreement even after its amendment. Systematically, there is no room 
for punitive damages, as suggested by some authors, and the financing of court actions by such 
an instrument could be an incentive for consumer organisations to challenge only terms that 
are financially worth it. Requiring the supplier to cease or alter its illegal practice has a heavier 
impact on businesses than the restoration of money or property, for example, because it allows 
for preventive control and has a dissuasive effect. Preventive orders might create imbalances 
within a certain industry but could have an extra-judicial effect and create new practices within 
the relevant industries. Unfortunately, section 52(3)(b) has been written with individual 
consumers in mind, but not ex-ante challenges. Read with section 4(1), the locus standi of 
consumer organisations must be admitted, however. Section 52 should be amended in this 
regard. Other measures, such as the publication of a court order, or a phased-in penalty with an 
initial phase-out period are laudable measures, too. 
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CHAPTER 4 – INTERPRETATIONAL CONTROL 
 
1. Introduction 
Section 2 is the pivotal provision for the interpretation of the Act, as shown by its heading 
'Interpretation'. This provision must thus be read in conjunction with other sections which 
provide further guidance for interpretation1892 in order to assess the legislator's intention.1893 
Since section 2(1) provides that the Act must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the 
purposes set out in section 3, the latter provision is one of these provisions.1894 Furthermore, 
section 4(2)(b)(i) provides that the Tribunal or a court must promote the spirit and purposes of 
the Act. According to section 4(3), in case of any ambiguity, the Tribunal or court must prefer 
the meaning that best promotes the spirit and purposes of the Act, and will best improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of consumer rights generally, and in particular by persons 
contemplated in section 3(1)(b).1895  
In addition to interpretational rules, section 2 contains some miscellaneous provisions which 
do not directly refer to interpretation but rather provide for guidance for the calculation of a 
period in business days,1896 or for the validity and protection of signatures and electronic 
signatures.1897 Furthermore, section 2(7) contains a legal definition of 'includes' or 'including'. 
Section 2(5) refers to the determination of the monetary threshold in respect of section 5(2)(b) 
and is therefore out of place. It should have been inserted in section 6 instead.1898 
The interpretational rules of section 2 will be discussed below in detail. Despite the existence 
of these rules, the common law also plays its role as the consumer cannot be deprived of its 
common-law rights when interpreting the Act.1899 
Besides the interpretation of the provisions of the Act, the Act also contains provisions for the 
interpretation of terms and conditions of a supplier in section 4(4). This is the provision dealing 
with interpretational control in a narrower sense. Both, the interpretation of the Act and of 
standard terms will be presented below. 
                                                             
1892 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
1893 This is clearly set out in s 2(1). 
1894 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
1895 I.e., 'vulnerable' consumers. 
1896 Section 2(6). 
1897 Section 2(3) and (4). 
1898 It is submitted that the legislator thoughtlessly copied s 2(4) NCA. Already the NCA suffers from the same 
structural problem. See ss 2(4), 7(1) and 42(1) NCA. 
1899 See s 2(10). 
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2. Purposive interpretation of the Act 
Unlike many other pieces of legislation, section 2(1) provides that the Act must be interpreted 
in a manner that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 3. Hence, the Interpretation 
Act,1900 as amended by the Interpretation Amendment Act,1901 does not apply to the Consumer 
Protection Act.  
As section 2(1) provides that 'this Act' must be interpreted purposively, the Schedules to the 
Act, regulations made or notice issued by the Minister under the Act are also concerned by this 
approach.1902 
Usually, statutes are interpreted according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words 
contained therein. Contextual construction, i.e., the interpretation of the meaning that the words 
have in their broader legal context, is also current in South African law.1903 The Constitutional 
Court held in Kubayana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd1904 that it is a well-established 
principle that statutes must be interpreted with regard to their purpose and within their context, 
and that this general principle is supported by section 2(1) of the Act.1905 This principle 
expressly requires a purposive approach to the Act's construction.1906 Schreiner JA states in 
Jaga v Dönges1907 that '"the context" is not limited to the language of the rest of the statute 
regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted. Often of more 
importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its 
background.'1908  
The Act's self-proclaimed purposes in section 3(1) give a rather precise idea of its agenda in 
terms of consumer protection. The entire Act is infused with its purposes, including the 
                                                             
1900 33 of 1957. 
1901 45 of 1961. 
1902 Section 1 s.v. 'this Act'. 
1903 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 305. 
1904 2014 ZACC. See also Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 ZACC 12 para [61], 
Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 ZACC 10 paras [17]-[18]. 
1905 The decision concerned the National Credit Act, but the court's explanation in terms of statutory interpretation 
is also applicable to the CPA. 
1906 At para [18]. 
1907 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 662H. 
1908 See also Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 
(A) at 646C which refers to 'the nature of the transaction as it appears from the entire contract', Van der Post v 
Twijfelhoek Diamond Prospecting Syndicate (1903) 20 SC 231, where an agreement was read in conjunction with 
two earlier contracts dealing with the same subject-matter, Cash Converters Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Rosebud 
Western Province Franchise (Pty) Ltd 2002 (5) SA 494 (SCA) at 501-503, where two contracts signed on the 
same day were read together, or Eastern Free State Board of Executors v Theron 1922 OPD 174 at 178, where 
De Villers JP states: 'If the object could be determined, a long step would have been taken towards ascertaining 
the meaning of the ambiguous words'. 
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preamble and the long title, and when interpreting this statute, one has to give effect to the 
purposes set out in section 3 specifically.1909 The purposes mentioned in section 3 are not only 
crucial for the determination of the legislator's intention and the understanding of the spirit and 
scope of this piece of legislation, but with respect to the courts' obligation to interpret its 
provisions in a manner that gives effect to the Act's purposes.1910 What is more, these purposes 
can clearly be recognised by a paternalistic attitude towards the consumer as the weaker party 
to a contract. This is in keeping with international developments in terms of which public policy 
concerns can override freedom of contract in appropriated cases and by the increase in 
regulatory legislation.1911 On the other hand, and as we will see later in the discussion in Part 
II, the German standard business terms legislation set out in §§ 305 et seq. primarily do not 
have the purpose of protecting the weaker party and of balancing the supplier's bargaining 
power.1912 They rather aim to prevent abuse of freedom of contract-drafting and therefore 
protect all parties against the misuse of standard terms.1913 Hence, §§ 305 et seq. cannot be 
qualified as pure consumer protection provisions, with the exception of § 310(3) (consumer 
contracts).1914  
One can see from the reading of section 3(1) that all provisions therein lead directly or 
indirectly to the conclusion that any ambiguous provision in the Act must be interpreted in 
favour of the consumer.1915 This approach can be a double-edged sword though as the interests 
of the parties are not always competing. If a court favours the consumer's interests in a 
particular case, this may ultimately lead to higher prices – or worse – make the product or 
business unprofitable. In the long run, this would go against the consumers' interests. This is 
why courts should also consider the broader economic impact of their decisions by taking into 
                                                             
1909 The purposes of consumer protection legislation in general has been set out in the Crowther Report of 1971. 
Albeit the fact that this report was destined for UK credit legislation, it is still valuable as regards its findings in 
terms of consumer legislation. According to this report, consumer protection legislation has three main functions, 
namely 1) addressing the consumer's unequal bargaining position, 2) curbing malpractices in the commercial 
environment, and 3) managing the exercise of remedies. See Crowther Royal Commission on Consumer Credit 
Cmnd 4596/1971 at 234-235. See also the debate of the House of Lords of 28 June 1972 in this regard (HL Deb 
28 June 1972 vol. 332 cc 928-977). In s 3 CPA, the consumer's lack of bargaining power is addressed in paras a, 
b, e and f. The curbing of commercial malpractices is addressed in paras c and d, while remedies are set out in 
paras g and h. For further reading on the same issue concerning the National Credit Act, see Vessio LLD thesis 
149 et seq. 
1910 Du Preez 2009 TSAR 65. See s 4(2) and (3). 
1911 Stoop LLD thesis 83. 
1912 Stoffels AGB-Recht 29. 
1913 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. 
1914 Locher JuS 1997, 390. See discussion in the introduction and historical overview in Part I ch 1. 
1915 De Stadler is of the opinion that 'nearly all of these "means"' lead to this conclusion. However, ultimately, all 
of them lead to it, either directly or indirectly. See De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 11. 
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account the interests of both parties.1916 The National Credit Act1917 deals with this problem in 
a more nuanced way than the Consumer Protection Act by providing that the purpose of the 
NCA is to protect consumers by 'promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the 
respective rights and responsibilities of credit providers and consumers.' Thus, it would have 
been beneficial if the legislator had inserted into section 2(1) the following additional phrase:  
'(…) and by taking into consideration the broader economic impact that any 
interpretation of the Act might have.'  
Moreover, the legislator could substantiate this additional consideration by introducing 'factors' 
that the court may1918 consider in terms of the economic consequences, such as the costs of 
production, the supplier's economic situation or the competitive situation in terms of the given 
product. Courts should normally not interfere with price control as they lack the necessary 
micro- and macro-economic expertise. In situations where ultimately adverse consequences for 
the consumer are visible, they should be able to reach a decision promoting equity though. This 
is also Van Eeden's view according to which a more equitable construction should be favoured 
to lessen the burden. He also assumes that the legislature does not intend to impair the rights 
of persons or confiscate their property.1919 De Stadler's remark that Van Eeden is of this view 
'despite section 4(3)' could be read as if his view were contra legem.1920 His opinion is however 
supported by section 3(1)(a) which provides that one of the objectives of the Act is a fair, 
efficient and sustainable consumer market. Fairness, efficiency and sustainability can only be 
achieved if a balance is struck between the parties' interests in order to create a legal framework 
that is sustainable for both sectors.1921 Otherwise, there is a real danger of market failure, which 
ultimately leads to higher prices, discontinuation of business models or products, or worse, the 
insolvency of suppliers. Van Eeden's view is thus in line with the Act. 
Section 4(3) provides that if any provision of the Act, read in its context, can reasonably be 
construed to have more than one meaning, the Tribunal or court must prefer the meaning that 
best promotes the spirit of the Act, and will best improve the realisation of consumer rights, 
particularly in respect of vulnerable persons mentioned in section 3(1)(b). It would probably 
                                                             
1916 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
1917 34 of 2005. 
1918 The legislator should not make the consideration of these factors compulsory by using the verb 'must' instead 
of 'may' as judges are often not sufficiently trained to consider such economic factors, except where obvious. 
1919 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 38. 
1920 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 15. 
1921 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 40. It is suggested that the term 'sectors' is incorrect in this 
context. Van Eeden means the supplier and the consumer. 'Sector' refers to the supplier's side in the sense of an 
area of the economy in which businesses share the same or a related product or service. See 'What is a Sector' at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sector.asp. 
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go too far though to include into 'context' in section 4(3) also the larger economic context, and 
not only the context provided by the other provisions of the Act. Consumer rights are ultimately 
only realised if all factors, included macro- and micro-economic factors, are taken into 
consideration, though. 
Purposive construction seeks to look for the purpose of the legislation before interpreting the 
words. Other interpretative rules require the courts to apply the literal rule first and to analyse 
the wording of a statute, whereas the purposive approach starts with the mischief rule in seeking 
the purpose or intention of Parliament. Thus, it is a much more flexible approach that gives the 
courts more freedom to develop the law in line with what they perceive to be the legislator's 
intention. The purposive approach readily embraces the use of extrinsic aids to enquire 
Parliament's intention.1922 The mischief rule applies where the particular purpose of a provision 
is not immediately apparent from the provision itself. According to this rule, courts may 
consider (1) the law that was applicable before the measure was passed, (2) the mischief or 
defect for which the law had not provided, (3) the remedy the legislator had appointed, and (4) 
the reason for that remedy.1923 A purposive interpretation may lead to different results than a 
'classical' statutory interpretation because the provisions must be interpreted in a way that 
benefits consumers.1924  
Lord Simon illustrated purposive interpretation in Maunsell v Olins1925 by saying that the 
court's first task is to put itself in the legislator's position, to consider what knowledge, and 
statutory objective it had so that it is able to assess the meaning of the statutory language. 
According to Du Plessis, the purposive approach is one that gives meaning to a legislative 
provision against the backdrop of the purpose which it seeks to achieve in the context of the 
statute of which it is part.1926 In Standard Bank Investment Corporation Ltd v Competition 
Commission; Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Competition Commission,1927 the court 
                                                             
1922 'The Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation' at http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Purposive-approach.php. 
1923 Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949 (1) SA 842 (A) 852-853. A case that illustrates the mischief rule is 
Royal College of Nursing of the UK v DHSS (1981). The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging 
the legality of the involvement of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
makes it an offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would be an 
absolute defence for a medical practitioner to carry out abortions provided certain conditions were satisfied. 
Advances in medical science made possible that surgical abortions were largely replaced with hormonal ones, 
which were commonly administered by nurses. The courts were responsible for determining whether the nurses 
performing abortions were acting unlawfully as they were not medical practitioners. The courts found that the Act 
was intended to provide for safe abortions and that nurses could carry out such abortions.  
1924 Du Preez 2009 TSAR 66. 
1925 [1975] AC 373. 
1926 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation 96. 
1927 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) 
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held that it is not the function of a court to disregard the language of a statute and impose its 
view of what the policy or object of a measure should be. Purposive interpretation or any other 
method of statutory interpretation is not necessary though where the language of the statute is 
clear and unambiguous.1928 Then, a plain reading of its words suffices.1929 In Kubayana v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,1930 the Constitutional Court stated that legislation must be 
understood holistically and construed within the relevant framework of constitutional rights 
and norms. This does not mean that ordinary meaning and clear language may be 
disregarded.1931 
The content of section 4(3) seems to be similar to section 2(1), read with section 3(1), but goes 
beyond their legislative content. Section 4(3) fosters the purposive interpretation by providing 
that the court or Tribunal must give preference to interpretations that favour vulnerable 
consumers.1932 In other words, where a court is confronted with a situation where two 
interpretational outcomes are possible, it must adhere to the construction that favours the 
consumer. On the other hand, sections 2(1) and 3(1) must be read with section 4(2)(b)(i) in 
terms of which the Tribunal or court must promote 'the spirit and purposes' of the Act. This 
could simply be a repetition of section 2(1). Section 4(2)(b)(i) has a stronger formulation 
though as it not only concerns the purposive interpretation of the Act. It also requires that the 
judicial bodies do not only promote the purposes of the Act but also its spirit. 'Promote' has 
obviously a different meaning here than in the definition contained in section 1, and rather 
means 'to help something happen, develop or increase',1933 or 'to help or encourage to 
flourish'.1934 Such an interpretation also corresponds to Kellaway's observation according to 
which words without a precise (or various) meaning (such as 'promote') have to be construed 
by looking at the object of the statute in question in order to find the legislator's intention.1935 
In law, the word 'spirit' means 'the real meaning or the intention behind something as opposed 
to its strict verbal interpretation'.1936 Van Eeden is hence correct when stating that the word 
                                                             
1928 Standard Bank Investment Corporation Ltd v Competition Commission; Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 
v Competition Commission 2000 (2) SA 797 (SCA) at 810 D et seq; Grey v Pearson [1843-60] All ER Rep 21 
(HL) 36, Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910 at 914-915. 
1929 At 810D. 
1930 2014 ZACC 1.   
1931 At para [18]. 
1932 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13. 
1933 See 'promote' in Merriam Webster Dictionary at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/promote. 
1934 See 'promote' in Dictionary.com at http://www.dictionary.com/browse/promote. 
1935 Kellaway Legal Interpretation 72. 
1936 Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. 'spirit' (4). 
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'spirit' was employed to indicate a policy that the Act should not be interpreted too literally.1937 
It is thus suggested that the scope of section 4(2)(b)(i) is broader than the one of section 2(1) 
in that it commands the judges not to lose sight of the overall 'picture' of the Act. As stated 
above, ambiguous provisions must be interpreted in favour of the consumer, which might have 
economic implications that ultimately are not in the consumer's or the economy's interest. 
Although the Act's purpose is to protect vulnerable consumers, its spirit is certainly not to harm 
the economy. Therefore, the courts must detach from the wording of the Act and keep in mind 
the economic and other implications of their decisions. 
2.1  Definitions 
An aspect that is often overseen in terms of interpretation are the definitions contained in a 
piece of legislation. This legislative technique is customary South Africa and has its pros and 
cons. An advantage is that all definitions are located together and can easily be found. Other 
legal systems, like Germany, prefer defining terms within the section they relate to or which 
deals with a related question. A legal definition might nonetheless also apply to other sections 
in the given piece of legislation which makes it sometimes difficult to be aware of its 
existence.1938 The South African technique is only fully efficient though if the list of definitions 
is complete and definitions are not 'hidden' elsewhere in the given statute. Furthermore, the list 
must be well-drafted, unambiguous in respect of its applicability and not be too extensive. What 
is more, the list of definitions must not contain too many cross-references.  
Unfortunately, the Act does not maintain a high standard of unambiguity. For instance, the 
definition of 'used goods' cannot be found elsewhere in the Act and should preferably be 
deleted. What is more, other terms, such as 'promote' are not only used within their meaning 
set out in section 1, but also within other meanings.1939 This could have been avoided by making 
clear when a specific term is to be understood with a certain meaning, or even better by using 
synonymous words.1940 Especially the English language assiduously borrows its words from 
many different languages (Germanic languages, French, Latin and so forth)1941 and therefore 
                                                             
1937 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 40. 
1938 For instance, §§ 183 and 184(1) BGB define 'consent' and 'ratification' as prior or subsequent approval, 
respectively: § 183: 'Prior approval (consent) may be revoked until the legal transaction is undertaken, unless the 
legal relationship on which this consent is based leads to a different conclusion (…)'. § 184(1): 'Subsequent 
approval (ratification) operates retroactively from the point of time when the legal transaction was undertaken, 
unless otherwise provided.' These terms operate throughout the BGB and other civil law statutes, however. 
1939 See ss 3(1) or 4(2)(b)(i), for instance. 
1940 In ss 3(1) or 4(2)(b)(i), the word 'promote' could have been replaced by words such as 'foster', 'nourish', 
'nurture', 'serve' or 'endorse', for example. 
1941 See 'English language' at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_language#Word_origins. 
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has many synonyms. To a certain extent, this possibility should also exist in the other official 
languages of South Africa. 
Section 1 contains intensional and extensional definitions.1942 Intensional (or connotative) 
definitions specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the object or concept being 
defined as a member of a specific set. This is done mainly by underscoring the essence of the 
defined word by genus and differentia. For this purpose, a vast category (the genus) is taken 
and narrowed down to a smaller category by a distinguishing characteristic, the differentia.1943 
The Act also uses extensional definitions in the form of enumerations. Such enumerative 
definitions are generally used for an explicit and exhaustive listing of all the objects that fall 
under the concept or term in question. Enumerative definitions are therefore only possible for 
finite sets and only practical for relatively small sets. An example of an enumerative definition 
is 'loyalty credit or award' in section 1. Unfortunately, the Act uses enumerations in its 
definitions also for cases that concern vaster categories, such as 'goods' or 'service'. The purpose 
of enumerative definitions is to enumerate the objects included in the definition conclusively. 
This objective cannot be achieved though where the words 'includes' or 'including' are used, 
like in the Act. Greater certainty would have been achieved by defining these terms 
intensionally first, and then by adding, where necessary, examples.  
Moreover, the definition of 'auction' in section 45 contains neither an intensional nor an 
extensional definition. This term is merely described by including 'a sale in execution of or 
according to a court order, to the extent that the order contemplates that the sale is to be 
conducted by an auction'. The same applies to 'person' in section 1. 
Strictly speaking, many terms contained in section 1 are no definitions, but rather precisions. 
For interpretational purposes and legal certainty, it would have been beneficial to define the 
terms in section 1 neatly and to insert definitions scattered elsewhere in section 1 by honouring 
the applicable techniques in this field.  
Despite these imperfections and the fact that the Act is very far from these prerequisites, the 
definitions contained in section 1 are a valuable tool for the interpretation of the Act.1944 
                                                             
1942 For an overview on this topic, see Cook Dictionary of Philosophical Logic s.v. 'Intensional definition'. 
1943 'Agreement' for instance, is defined in s 1 as 'an arrangement or understanding between or among two or more 
parties [= genus] that purports to establish a relationship in law between or among them [= differentia].' 
1944 In the same sense: De Stadler ‘Section 1’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1, Du Preez 2009 
TSAR 66. 
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2.2  Foreign law and other precedents 
Section 2(2) provides that when interpreting or applying the Act, a person, court or Tribunal or 
the Commission may consider (a) appropriate foreign and international law, (b) appropriate 
international conventions, declarations or protocols relating to consumer protection, and (c) 
any precedents of a consumer court, ombud or arbitrator in terms of the Act, to the extent that 
such decision has not been set aside, reversed or overruled by a higher court.1945 This provision 
is not mandatory ('may').1946 
The legislator does not define what 'appropriate foreign and international law' means. In order 
to qualify as 'appropriate' foreign law for the interpretation of the Act, it is submitted that the 
given foreign or international pieces of legislation must be of the same nature and the same 
subject matter. On the other hand, foreign legislation need not necessarily aim at consumer 
protection in a narrow sense. Otherwise, §§ 305 et seq. BGB would not apply since their 
primary purpose is not consumer protection but the prevention of the abuse of freedom of 
contract-drafting and the protection of all parties against the misuse of standard terms.1947 It is 
further submitted that it is not necessary that these foreign or international regimes must be 
structured in the same manner as South African law. If a country has enacted questions 
pertaining to standard terms in a piece of legislation pertaining to other areas than consumer 
protection, the South African court may pick the relevant provisions in the piece(s) of 
legislation in question. Examples are the Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz, §§ 305 to 310 
BGB or the UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations. It also derives from section 
2(2)(a) that the court may take several different pieces of legislation of various countries into 
account, so it does not have to stick to the regime of a particular country. This is a very flexible 
and original approach which allows adapting foreign or international law to the domestic 
situation.  
A reason for such a flexible approach could be that South Africa does not have an extensive 
body of appropriate decisions in respect of consumer protection. The fact that the legislator 
created such an original 'toolbox' begs the question though whether this approach was 
indispensable, especially when considering that foreign and international law may influence 
                                                             
1945 Interestingly, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 restricts the considerations of the court to appropriate foreign 
and international law and does not contain provisions similar to paras (b) and (c) of s 2 CPA. 
1946 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. 
1947 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. This will be discussed in detail in Part II. 
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not only the interpretation of the Act but also its application.1948 The provision of section 2(2) 
is even more astonishing when considering that the Act fosters a purposive interpretation, 
which already provides for a lot of guidance. Although it is true that South African courts do 
not have much experience in consumer protection matters, and especially the Consumer 
Protection Act, one might ask the – admittedly provocative – question of whether the legislator 
who had the ambitious goal to conform with high international standards for consumer 
protection1949 might not have been better off if it had rather eliminated the shortcomings of the 
Act in order to provide a proper legislative basis on which the courts, the Tribunal and the 
Commission can build their decisions over time.  
Moreover, the consideration of foreign law should be done carefully because each piece of 
legislation has to be seen in the light of the legal and socio-economic situation of the given 
country. Therefore, foreign legislation cannot be 'transposed' directly into the legislation of 
another country. This especially applies to South Africa with its unique socio-economic 
pattern. Courts should always consider this.1950 On the other hand, the consideration of foreign 
and international law can be a precious 'tool' in order to align South African law to international 
standards where necessary. After all, the experience gained internationally cannot be 
overestimated. What is more, also suppliers benefit from foreign and international law, 
conventions, declarations or protocols.1951 In any event, the courts should consider foreign and 
international law appropriately and cum grano salis rather than applying it injudiciously to the 
Act. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine, even if applied with precaution, how considerations 
developed in the context of an abstract-generalised approach – which is an international 
standard – can be applied within a framework whose system applies a particular-individualised 
approach. 
 
                                                             
1948 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. In this regard, the interpretation 
of a foreign piece of legislation must be distinguished from the effort of international harmonisation of law. Many 
critics assert that the application of such international laws is often not uniform or harmonised since they are 
interpreted differently in the given jurisdictions. However, the CISG is an example of one of the most successful 
instruments of legal harmonisation. The proper collection and dissemination of information plays a crucial role in 
the consistent interpretation and application of an international convention. See Eiselen FS Kritzer 107 and 108.  
1949 See SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 
(1998) at (xiv) et seq. 
1950 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. 
1951 Coertse 2014 De Rebus 27. 
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It is unclear if the law of the European Union is to be considered international law in terms of 
section 2(2)(a). Other sections of the Act using the term 'international law' are not of help as 
they do not provide any guidance on how to answer this question.1952  
The legal nature of the EU is widely debated. Some authorities argue that because of the mixed 
nature of the EU combining intergovernmental and supranational elements, it shares 
characteristics with both confederal and federal entities, and that consequently, its legislation 
is sui generis,1953 i.e., a law of its own kind.1954  It is generally considered more than a 
confederation but less than a federation,1955 thus being appropriately classified as an entity of 
neither political form. Besides, the EU is often considered sui generis because its legal system 
comprehensively rejects any use of retaliatory sanctions by one Member State against another, 
which is a characteristic of international organisations.1956 
Others reject this theory as historically unfounded and put forward the lack of explanatory 
value of the sui generis theory that would not provide any external standard and would thus 
not be able to detect or measure the EU's evolution. This theory is based on the idea of 
undivided sovereignty, which poses unsolvable problems for an analysis of the political and 
constitutional dualism. Instead, one could see the normative ambivalence surrounding the 
sovereignty principle as part of Europe's federal nature. According to this view, EU law is 
supranational law,1957 a special form of international law.1958  
                                                             
1952 Preamble of the CPA, before the first bullet point, and s 5(3)(b). 
1953 Hlavac Less Than a State, More Than an International Organization:  The Sui Generis Nature of the European 
Union Paper Georgetown Public Policy Institute December 2010 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719308. 
1954 Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'sui generis'. 
1955 Marquand 2006 Political Quarterly 175. 
1956 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Internationale Organisationen' and 'Supranationale Organisationen', 
Neulen Recht A-Z s.v. 'Supranationalität'. 
1957 Supranational law is a form of international law, based on the limitation of the rights of sovereign nations 
between one another. In the EC, sovereign nations have pooled their authority through a system of courts and 
political institutions. They have the ability to enforce legal norms against and for Member States and citizens, in 
a way that public international law does not. According to the European Court of Justice in the early case, 26/62, 
of NW Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Admniistratie der 
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, (also known as Van Gend en Loos) it constitutes 'a new legal order of international 
law': 'The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only member 
states but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of member states, community law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their 
legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the treaty, but also by reason of 
obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the member states 
and upon the institutions of the community.' See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Internationale Organisationen' 
and 'Supranationale Organisationen', Neulen Recht A-Z s.v. 'Supranationalität'. 
1958 Schütze European Constitutional Law 67-68. 
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The debate mentioned above has no impact on the question of whether EU law is international 
law in the sense of section 2 though. Although it is an important debate in terms of the definition 
of the EU itself, it has no consequences on the South African legislator's intention. It is 
submitted that the legislator wanted to include the law of the European Union into the notion 
of 'international law' since it intended to give the courts the possibility to fish in a big pool of 
already existing legislation and conform to international standards. A distinction between the 
law of the EU and (other) international law would therefore be artificial. What is more, there 
is no reason why a court should be able to consider law of another country but not EU law. The 
law of the EU, especially in the form of directives, has an umbrella effect on the legislation of 
the EU Member States.1959 These have to transpose EU directives into their respective national 
regimes.1960 In that way, national law is 'transformed' EU law. Through this process, 
harmonisation is achieved from which not only the economies of the EU Member States benefit 
by uniform application, but also the national courts, and ultimately the European Court of 
Justice which oversees the uniform application and interpretation of EU law. An exclusion of 
EU law as opposed to national ('foreign') law would thus be an unnecessary measure cutting 
off a valuable source, and artificial. Hence, under section 2(2)(a), a South African court may 
consider, e.g., the EC Consumer Sales Directive,1961 the EU Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive,1962 or the Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,1963 to mention 
but a few. 
If EU law is international law in terms of the Act, this begs the questions if also decisions of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have to be regarded as 'international law' in the sense of 
section 2(2)(a). The rulings of the ECJ are surely no 'legislation'. Section 2(2)(a) uses the term 
'law' though. The ECJ's task consists in interpreting EU law and ensuring its equal application 
across all EU Member States.1964 Its decisions are only binding to the parties involved, 
however, which does not prevent another Member State from conforming its legislation 
accordingly if the ECJ decision concerns a similar subject matter. As mentioned above, the 
                                                             
1959 Vessio LLD thesis 154. 
1960 Articles 10 (ex 5) and 249 (ex 189) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. If a Member State 
fails to implement a Directive, this violation may lead to proceedings brought by the Commission under art 169 
of the EC Treaty against the EU Member State in question before the ECJ. See also 'Better Regulation Guidelines' 
at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines.pdf and 'Quellen und Geltungsbereich des 
Rechts der Europäischen Union' at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/de/FTU_1.2.1.pdf. 
1961 1999/44/EC of 25 May 1999. 
1962 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005.  
1963 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993. 
1964 Article 220 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome 1957). See also Law Oxford 
Dictionary of Law s.v. 'European Court of Justice (ECJ), Court of Justice of the European Communities'. 
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South African legislator aimed to ensure that courts can consider foreign sources. It is thus 
suggested that the term 'law' in section 2(2)(a) affords a broad interpretation in order to 
ascertain that all kind of foreign and international sources can be drawn upon as long as this 
seems 'appropriate' in terms of section 2(2). What is more, the ECJ interprets European law, 
and there is no reason why the South African entities should have access to the primary sources 
of law but not to decisions interpreting them. It is thus submitted that the courts, the Tribunal 
and the Commission can also consider the rulings of the European Court of Justice.  
Another question is whether the appropriate foreign and international law has to be in force, or 
if also former law may be considered. On the one hand, one could argue that also former law 
could be considered as long it is 'appropriate' for the given situation. It is submitted though that 
only the existing foreign or international law should be taken into account. Provisions or 
decisions that have been set aside are no longer 'the law', and only the existing law reflects the 
actual international standard of consumer protection. Section 2(2)(c) expresses this idea with 
regard to domestic decisions. There is no reason why this standard should not also apply to 
foreign or international law and ECJ rulings. 
Under the 'appropriate international conventions, declarations or protocols relating to consumer 
protection' falls the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 1999, for instance.1965 
Section 2(2)(c) refers to domestic decisions and allows the court to consider them as long as 
they have not been declared invalid. It is astonishing that the courts may even consider 
decisions of ombuds and arbitrators. This might be of advantage where there is a lack of 
appropriate domestic court rulings. In the long run, this approach might however lead to 
confusion and be an obstacle in terms of a uniform interpretation and application of the Act. 
This is because a decision of a decision-making body may influence another decision-making 
body, even an ombud or arbitrator. According to Coertse, this cross-implementation will 
certainly create uncertainty, unpredictability and unreliability, these being the very essence of 
the stare decisis principle.1966 Coertse argues that it is uncertain how every individual court, 
ombud or arbitrator will interpret and apply the Act in a manner that is consistent and 
sustainable.1967 It is suggested though that the parallel consideration of decisions from various 
                                                             
1965 Recently revised by the General Assembly in resolution 70/186 of 22 December 2015. 
1966 Stare decisis is a doctrine according to which a trial court is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents) 
on a legal question which is raised in the lower court. Reliance on such precedents is required of trial courts until 
an appellate court changes the rule, even when the trial judge believes it is 'bad law'. See Law Oxford Dictionary 
of Law s.v. 'stare decisis', 'Stare decisis' at http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2005. 
1967 Coertse 2014 De Rebus 28. 
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sources does not impact the stare decisis doctrine. After all, the lower courts are bound to 
precedents set by the higher jurisdictions, and it is unlikely that a body such as the Commission 
would go against such precedents and prefer an arbitrator's or ombud's decision. On the other 
hand, where a higher court has not decided on a specific question, i.e., where there is no 
precedent, there is no reason why a lower court should not adopt the view of an ombud or an 
arbitrator, provided it is reasonable. Coertse has a point however by stating that it will be 
difficult to obtain consistent decisions because of the different decision-making bodies between 
which no hierarchy exists. In practice, this problem should be gradually resolved though since 
even bodies that are not part of the judicial hierarchy should adhere to rulings of the higher 
courts. 
In theory, once the courts have reached a certain number of decisions and gained more 
experience, the inclusion of foreign and international law as well as decisions of ombuds and 
arbitrators will not be necessary anymore. 
2.3  The use of the words 'includes' and 'including' 
Section 2(7) provides that the word 'includes' and 'including' must not be used to limit the 
generic term or the enumerated example or item to which it relates.1968 The two words are 
qualified by the phrase 'but is not limited to'.1969 The provision excludes the common-law rules 
of statutory interpretation known as eiusdem generis and noscitur a sociis. Both rules take into 
account the context of a word when interpreting it. According to the eiusdem generis rule, a 
word of a more general meaning, when used with words describing species of the same genus, 
has to be restricted in its signification as not to include anything outside that genus, or class.1970 
According to Christie, this abstract description should be reserved for cases where the 
conclusion is drawn from the more comprehensive, more abstract context such as the nature 
and background of the given contract.1971  
The noscitur a sociis rule states that 'the meaning of the general words being known from the 
company they keep'.1972 This means that it usually applies to restrict the wide meaning of a 
particular word by associating it with another word of narrower meaning. Therefore, the 
                                                             
1968 'Includes' can be found in s 1 s.v. 'goods', 'juristic person', 'person', 'premises', 'price', 'services' etc., but also 
in s 45 or 61(5), for instance. 'Including' is used, e.g., in ss 2(3), 2(6), 4(2)(b)(ii) or 15(3). 
1969 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
1970 S v Wood 1976 (1) SA 703 (A) 707, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 267. 
1971 See Boss v Whyte 1906 EDC 317-318. Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 230. 
1972 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 230. 
 370   
 
reading of the context is important in order to understand the word, and the word must not be 
seen in isolation.1973 
As these common-law rules have a more extensive application than section 2(7), they are not 
excluded from the ambit of the Act. Only where the words 'includes' or 'including' are applied, 
the eiusdem generis and the noscitur a sociis rules are not applicable. 
De Stadler correctly argues that the phrase 'unless the context indicates otherwise' in section 
2(7) is an ineffective limitation as rules such as the aforementioned ones only apply in the 
context of a particular provision. Their exclusion by the use of the words 'includes' or 'including' 
does not restrict their common application within their scope of application.1974 
In practice, this means that a signature in terms of section 2(3) also includes other means than 
a handwritten or (advanced) electronic signature, provided they are (or will be) recognised by 
law. In the future, biometric signatures (iris, fingerprints) or signatures with an implanted 
chip1975 will likely be recognised. Furthermore, 'electronic communication'1976 is not only 
limited to 'communication by means of electronic transmission, including by telephone, fax, 
SMS, wireless computer access, email or any similar technology or device' but also includes 
other existing and future means of communication (this is highlighted by the phrase 'or any 
similar technology or device'). 
Note should be taken that 'includes' is written in the third person singular, which means that 
the plural form ('include') or the past tense or passive voice ('(to be) included') are not 
concerned. Hence, these verbal forms merely serve as synonyms for verbs such as 'comprise' 
or 'enclose'1977 or in the negative form ('does not include').1978  
2.4  Conflict with other legislation 
Section 2(8) provides that in case of an inconsistency between the Public Finance Management 
Act1979 or the Public Service Act1980 and Chapter 5 of the Consumer Protection Act, dealing 
                                                             
1973 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 230. 
1974 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 24. 
1975 In Sweden, an implanted chip already serves as a 'key' for certain facilities or usages. It is thus likely that this 
technology will be expanded later to other usages. See 'Chip, der unter die Haut geht' at 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/mikrochip-ersetzt-schluessel-und-kreditkarte-in-schweden-15604931.html 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 May 2018). 
1976 Section 1. 
1977 E.g., in s 24(4): 'The Minister may prescribe (…) (c) the information that is required to be included in any 
trade description (…)', or ss 7(1)(b), 26(3), 70(4), 74(3), 79(2). Emphasis added. 
1978 E.g., in ss 1 ('court'), ('intermediary'), ('mark'), 43(1)(a), 81(2)(c). 
1979 1 of 1999. 
1980 Proclamation 103 published in GG 15791 of 3 June 1994. 
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with national consumer protection institutions, the former statutes prevail. 'Inconsistency' 
means that two provisions are merely different but not in conflict. The latter is the case if the 
application of two provisions is not possible without leading to non-compliance with one of 
them.1981 The object of the Public Finance Management Act is to secure transparency, 
accountability, and sound management of the revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the 
institutions to which the Public Finance Management Act applies.1982 The Public Service Act 
applies to or in respect of employees and in respect of persons who were employed in the public 
service or who are to be employed in the public service. With restrictions, it also applies to 
members of the services, educators or members of the Intelligence Services.1983  
As the objects of the Consumer Protection Act, the Public Finance Management Act and the 
Public Service Act differ and do not interfere with each other, with the exception of Chapter 5 
of the Act, they can never apply concurrently.1984 
Under section 2(9), in case of any inconsistency between a provision of the Act and a provision 
of any other statute other than the Public Finance Management Act or the Public Service Act, 
the provisions of both statutes apply concurrently, to the extent that it is possible to apply and 
comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without contravening the second.1985 Then, a 
supplier has to comply with both statutes. 
Where such a concurrent application is not possible, then whichever provision extends the 
greater protection to the consumer prevails over the alternative provision.1986 This provision 
conveys the idea of a purposive interpretation in terms of section 2(1) for the benefit of the 
consumer. As discussed above, it would be too much a simplification to say that what is in the 
supplier's interest is not in the consumer's interest as the interests of both parties do not always 
compete. The concept of 'greater protection to a consumer' is a subjective and unpredictable 
standard which creates uncertainty and confusion. It is therefore difficult to predict in advance 
which provision extends greater protection to the consumer under section 2(9) and to give 
sound legal advice.1987 Before the Act was enacted, it was suggested that 'the provisions of the 
bill should (…) be made subservient to the specific provisions of other national legislation, 
                                                             
1981 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 26 note 6. 
1982 Section 2 of the Public Finance Management Act. 
1983 Section 2 of the Public Service Act. 
1984 In the same sense: De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 26. 
1985 Section 2(9)(a). 
1986 Section 2(9)(b). 
1987 Du Preez 2009 TSAR 66. 
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treaty, convention or protocol'.1988 It is submitted that any subservience to other, especially 
national legislation would have been in conflict with the purposive interpretation standard of 
the Act and would have introduced other interpretational problems. 
Under section 2(9)(b) in fine, hazardous chemical products are treated differently because only 
the provisions of the Act relating to consumer redress will apply.1989 It is noteworthy that the 
term 'hazardous chemical products' cannot be found elsewhere in South African legislation. 
The term usually used is 'hazardous chemical substances' or shortly 'HCS'. A hazardous 
chemical substance is defined as 'any toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant or asphyxiant substance, 
or a mixture of such substances (…) which creates a hazard to health.'1990 These are, for 
instance, household chemicals used for the cleaning of surfaces. The Act merely contains a 
definition of 'hazard' in section 53(1)(c), according to which this word means 'a characteristic 
that (i) has been identified as, or declared to be, a hazard in terms of any other law; or (ii) 
presents a significant risk of personal injury to any person, or damage to property when the 
goods are utilised. The Act uses the term 'hazardous or unsafe goods', except in section 2(9).1991 
The divergent terminology begs the question of why the legislator chose the term 'hazardous 
chemical product' instead of 'hazardous chemical substance'. The term 'product' is not defined 
in the Act, unlike the term 'producer' which, 'with respect to any particular goods, means a 
person who (…) generates, refines, creates, manufactures or otherwise produces the goods 
(…) '.1992 From this definition, one can conclude that the outcome of the actions as mentioned 
earlier by a producer is a 'product'. The term 'substance' consequently does not necessitate such 
an action, which is why a substance can also exist by nature (e.g., naturally existing acids). 
Thus, the term 'substance' is more extensive than 'product' since the latter requires at least some 
further processing of an existing substance, or is the outcome of a combination of several 
substances. It is suggested though that the legislator did not intend to restrict the application of 
section 2(9) in fine to hazardous chemical products, and that all such substances are included. 
                                                             
1988 Parliament of South Africa research unit 'Synopsis of submissions made on the Consumer Protection Bill'. 
The electronic resource mentioned by Du Preez is unfortunately no longer available. See Du Preez 2009 TSAR 66 
note 77. 
1989 The CPA does not specifically deal with hazardous products, but Part H, and specifically s 59 governs the 
recovery and safe disposal of designated products or components which could include hazardous chemical 
products. 
1990 Section 1 (definitions) of the Hazardous Chemical Substances Regulations, 1995. 
1991 See s 58(2)-(4). 
1992 Section 1. 
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According to De Stadler, this provision causes interpretational problems. On the one hand, it 
could be interpreted in that it applies to inconsistencies between the Act and other pieces of 
legislation concerning hazardous chemical products, except in the case of consumer redress. 
Then, the provisions of the Act would apply irrespective of which statute affords the greater 
protection to consumers. On the other hand, section 2(9) could be read in that the analysis set 
out in this section should be performed only in the case of consumer redress provisions of 
competing legislation.1993  
It is submitted that in case of hazardous chemical products, the analysis of section 2(9) has to 
be performed, except in matters related to consumer redress. In this case, the provisions of the 
Act apply regardless of the question of whether the other piece of legislation offers better 
consumer protection. This becomes clear when considering the last phrase of section 2(9) 
('…provided that in the case of hazardous chemical products…') as a sentence of its own, and 
is read as: 'In the case of hazardous chemical products…'). Then, it is evident that this phrase 
is meant to prevail in consumer redress matters. The legislator should thus amend this provision 
accordingly. 
De Stadler also criticises that the Act does not explain which provisions are meant by 'relating 
to consumer redress'. She argues that 'consumer redress' could be understood in that all 
provisions of the Act concern the redress of consumers.1994 The legislator would probably have 
chosen a phrase such as 'the provisions of the Act' in this case, however. In addition, a reading 
of all provisions using the term 'redress' does not permit this interpretation.1995 Therefore, 
'consumer redress' should be interpreted narrowly and merely concerns the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of Chapter 3 (sections 68 to 78). 
It is somehow astonishing that the legislator did only treat hazards related to chemical 
substances differently, and not also other hazards, such as environmental (photocopy 
machines), psychological (bright lights or loud sounds in shops), or radiation hazards 
(radioactivity).1996 A reason might be the prevalence of hazards related to chemical products in 
households and their traceability. Harms from other sources are often difficult to relate with 
                                                             
1993 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 29. Van Heerden mentions this 
provision without elaborating further. See Van Heerden ‘Section 69’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 24 note 5. 
1994 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 29.  
1995 Preamble (b): 'accessible, transparent and efficient redress', preamble, 4th bullet point: 'develop effective means 
of redress', s 3(1)(h): 'system of redress', s 4(2)(b)(ii): 'access to redress'. 
1996 For more hazards see, e.g., 'Types of hazards' at http://fortresslearning.com.au/cert-iv-content/design/types-
of-hazards/. 
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certainty to a given hazard, or they are detectable with difficulty or only after a long time 
because of their long-term effects. What is more, most South Africans regularly deal with 
household products or similar substances, as opposed to radioactivity, for instance. 
Two additional remarks seem to be important in this context: First, if the common law provides 
greater protection than the Act in terms of losses related to hazardous chemical substances, 
consumers can exercise their rights afforded in terms of the common law.1997 Section 2(9) only 
concerns inconsistencies between statutes but not those between the Act and the common law. 
Second, section 2(9) only applies to consumers1998 but not to employees suffering exposure to 
hazardous chemical substances at their working place. Employees must therefore seek 
protection under the common-law rules as far as there is no protection afforded by other 
legislation. 
2.5  Common-law remedies 
Section 2(10) provides that no provision of the Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a 
consumer from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law. Like section 
56(4)(a), this section serves as a 'savings clause' with regard to the common law.1999 This must 
be viewed with the presumption in mind ─ which can only be revoked where the language of 
the given statute is unclear ─ that the legislator did not intent to alter the common law unless 
this is unambiguously indicated in the given statute.2000 According to Du Plessis, '[l]egislation 
must (…) be interpreted in the light of the common law, must as far as possible be reconciled 
with related precepts of the common law and must be read to be capable of co-existing with 
the common law'.2001 Put differently, legislation and the common law co-exist, and statutes 
such as the Act have to be construed with regard to the common law. Obviously, this extension 
of the consumer's rights by including the common law serves consumer protection. 
Section 2(10) must be read with section 69(d) in terms of which a person can only approach 
the courts2002 if all other remedies available to that person in terms of national legislation have 
been exhausted. This provision could be understood to the effect that the consumer can still 
rely on the common law and approach the ordinary courts directly to exercise any remedy for 
which the Act – which is national legislation – does not provide, and seek the enforcement of 
                                                             
1997 Section 2(10). 
1998 See definition of 'consumer' in s 1. 
1999 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 29. 
2000 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 31 read with note 2. 
2001 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation 178. 
2002 In terms of the definition of 'courts' in s 1, this excludes consumer courts. 
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such remedy. Such cases do not raise concerns, and they are in keeping with sections 69(d) and 
2(10). In cases where both the Act and the common law provide a remedy, the question is 
whether the consumer can approach the ordinary courts directly. The reading of section 69(a) 
to (d) leads to the conclusion that first, the remedies of paragraphs (a) to (c) have to be 
exhausted before the consumer is entitled to approach the courts in terms of paragraph (d). 
Then, the Tribunal, the ombud with jurisdiction, the industry ombud, the consumer court of the 
province or the alternative dispute resolution agent under paragraphs (a) to (c) would have 
primary jurisdiction over such a matter.2003 To restrict the consumer's right to access to the civil 
courts could infringe section 2(10). On the other hand, section 69 refers to the enforcement of 
any right in terms of the Act or in terms of a transaction or agreement as well as to the resolution 
of any dispute with a supplier.2004 Hence, claims based not on the rights created by the Act 
itself, but also under the common law could be included.  
De Stadler suggests that the Act should be interpreted narrowly so as not to unduly take away 
the consumer's right to approach the ordinary courts directly.2005 This view is convincing with 
regard to its outcome. As regards the narrow interpretation requisite, one could also argue 
though that not only section 2(10) but also section 69(d) has to be interpreted narrowly. This 
ultimately leads to contradictory results. It is suggested that section 2(10) prevails over section 
69(d) because it applies to all provisions of the Act. The wording of subsection (10) is 
unambiguously clear in this regard ('[n]o provision…'). What is more, the Act does reserve the 
application of a certain number of provisions exclusively to the courts.2006 Others are directed 
to the courts and the Tribunal.2007 It is submitted that the legislator aimed to give the ordinary 
courts an important position within the Act, and that they hence play a crucial role within the 
redress system provided for in the Act. Moreover, denying consumers direct access to ordinary 
courts would also mean that they would not be able to claim for damages2008 under section 
76(1)(c), read in conjunction with subsection (2)(a), since the other enforcement bodies 
mentioned in the Act are not allowed to award damages. The argument that only rulings of the 
courts are reported is only of limited value because this only applies to the higher courts. It is 
unlikely that a supplier who lost a case in a lower court starts a prohibitively expensive appeal 
                                                             
2003 The entities mentioned in s 69(a) to (c) do not have a specific hierarchy. See Van Heerden ‘Section 69’ in 
Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7. 
2004 See s 69 in pr. 
2005 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
2006 For instance, ss 4(2)(a), 8(3), 10(2)(b), 45(5)(c), 52, 76. 
2007 For instance, ss 2(2), 4(1), 4(1)(d), 4(2), 4(2)(b), 4(3), 4(4), 70(3)(b), 74(1). 
2008 Naudé 2010 SALJ 526. 
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to the High Court, or goes even further up to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Besides, also the 
decisions of the Tribunal are reported on its website.2009  
Another argument often put forward is that ordinary courts are composed of magistrates and 
judges with legal training and that they are therefore best able to understand questions of 
contractual fairness. It is certainly true that non-lawyers are not best-suited to decide on these 
issues. However, at least the chairpersons of the provincial consumer courts must usually be 
experienced lawyers.2010 In other countries, such as the United Kingdom, only the ordinary 
courts are empowered to adjudicate the fairness of contract terms. This is balanced by the active 
role of the (former) Office of Fair Trading (and partly its successors). The OFT could negotiate 
with suppliers against the backdrop of possible injunction applications, for instance. Its 
proactive role made it most of the time unnecessary for consumers to pursue challenges against 
unfair terms themselves.2011 This is not the case in South Africa though.  
Considering all pros and cons, the view that a consumer may always approach a civil court 
directly is more convincing. Especially low-income consumers, whose claims usually involve 
relatively small amounts, might prefer approaching a small-claims court, which may be more 
accessible for them. It is not always in the consumers' best interest to insist that they first 
exhaust the other redress options offered by section 69. What is more, the constitutional right 
of access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution might be violated if direct access to a 
small claims court is barred.2012 Hence, a purposive interpretation of section 69(d), read with 
section 3(1)(h), according to which one purpose of the Act is to provide 'for an accessible (…) 
system of redress for consumers'2013 must be adopted, according to Mupangavanhu.2014 The 
fact that the wording of section 69(d) appears to deny consumers to access civil courts directly 
might be an unintended consequence of the legislator's aim to ensure quick, effective and 
efficient redress system.2015 
Section 2(10) must be read with section 4(2)(a) in terms of which the Tribunal or the courts (in 
the sense of the Act, i.e., ordinary courts) must develop the common law as necessary to 
                                                             
2009 Naudé 2010 SALJ 527. The Tribunal's decisions are available at http://www.thenct.org.za. 
2010 Naudé 2010 SALJ 527. See, e.g., s 14(2) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 
of 1996. 
2011 Naudé 2010 SALJ 528. 
2012 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32, Van Heerden ‘Section 69’ in 
Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 27. 
2013 Emphasis added. 
2014 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 338. 
2015 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 336. 
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improve the realisation and enjoyment of consumer right generally, and in particular by 
vulnerable persons. This provision is mandatory ('must'). It is dubious though how the courts 
should be able to develop the common law when applying the provisions of the Act. De Stadler 
maintains that this might only apply in respect of common law methods of statutory 
interpretation2016 and that this provision should rather apply to any matter involving the 
common law rights of a consumer under section 2(10).2017 Since there seems to be an inter-
relation between sections 2(1) and 4(2)(a), this appears to be the only explanation as to how 
the courts can develop the common law when applying the Act.  
The wording of this provision only applies to the courts as the Tribunal has no power to develop 
the common law.2018 The Tribunal is only mentioned at the beginning of section 4(2) because 
subsection (b) is also applicable to the Tribunal. 
3.  Miscellaneous provisions contained in section 2 
3.1   Signatures 
Section 2(3) provides that if a provision of the Act requires a document to be signed or initialled 
by a party, that signing or initialling may be effected in any manner recognised by law, 
including the use of an advanced electronic signature, or an electronic signature. Electronic and 
advanced electronic signatures are both defined in the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act (ECTA).2019 According to section 1 ECTA, an electronic signature is 'data 
attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data which is intended by the 
user to serve as a signature.2020 Under section 1, read with section 37 ECTA, an advanced 
electronic signature is one that is produced as a result of a process that has been accredited by 
                                                             
2016 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 33. 
2017 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
2018 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 10. 
2019 25 of 2002. 
2020 This definition was largely inspired by art 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 2001, 
read with art 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law of Electronic Commerce, 1996. Both the UNCITRAL Model Laws 
of 1996 and 2001 and the ECTA embody the principle of functional equivalence, i.e., electronic communications 
(and signatures) have the same legal effect and protection as physical communications and signatures. The South 
African definition contains a subjective element though since the data must be intended by the user to serve as a 
signature. This requirement corresponds to traditional physical signatures which also need the parties' intention 
and complies thus with the principle of media neutrality. What is more, s 13(3)(a) ECTA provides another 
requirement contained in the aforementioned two Model Laws: 'Where an electronic signature is required by the 
parties to an electronic transaction and the parties have not agreed on the type of electronic signature to be used, 
that requirement is met in relation to a data message if (a) a method is used to identify the person and to indicate 
the person's approval of the information communicated; (…)'. See Eiselen 2014 PELJ 2811 and 2813-2814. See 
also Eiselen 2002 VJ 306 and Eiselen FS Kritzer 107, 124. 
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the Accreditation Authority.2021 In South Africa, an advanced electronic signature requires a 
digital certificate2022 and has a higher level of security than a 'simple' electronic signature.2023 
The legislator's intention to accept (advanced) electronic signatures is, inter alia, to provide for 
the facilitation and regulation of electronic communications and transactions, to provide for the 
development of a national e-strategy for the Republic and to promote universal access to 
electronic communications and transactions and the use of electronic transactions.2024  
This is in line with the principle of functional equivalence according to which formal 
requirements are also met by electronic means.2025 According to the definition contained in 
section 1 ECTA, "'electronic signature' means data attached to, incorporated in, or logically 
associated with other data and which is intended by the user to serve as a signature'.  
Section 13 ECTA distinguishes signatures required by law and those merely required by the 
parties to the transaction. In cases where a signature is required by law, that signature must 
meet the requirements of an advanced electronic signature.2026 Where the parties require an 
electronic signature, and they have not agreed on the type of electronic signature to be used, 
that requirement is met in relation to a data message, if the data message sufficiently identifies 
the person and indicates his or her approval.2027 This topic has already been discussed more in 
detail.2028 
In terms of section 2(4), suppliers have to take reasonable measures to prevent the electronic 
signatures of their consumers from being used for any purpose other than the signing or 
initialling of the particular document that the consumer intended to sign or initial. It is 
submitted that 'reasonable measures' are those which prevent the supplier's server from being 
                                                             
2021 So far, the LAW Trusted Third Party Services (Pty) Ltd ('LAWtrust') and the South African Post Office have 
been accredited in 2011 and 2013, respectively. See Eiselen 2014 PELJ 2816. 
2022 'Advanced electronic signatures' at https://www.lawtrust.co.za/e-signatures/advance-electronic-signatures/ 
(no longer available). 
2023 Other countries, such as Germany or Switzerland, have introduced a higher standard than an advanced 
electronic signature, referred to as 'qualified electronic signature'. Technically, a qualified electronic signature is 
implemented through an advanced electronic signature that utilises a digital certificate, which has been encrypted 
through a security signature-creating device. The following features are common for advanced electronic 
signatures in most countries: 1. The signatory can be uniquely identified and linked to the signature, 2. the 
signatory must have sole control of the private key that was used to create the electronic signature, 3. the signature 
must be capable of identifying if its accompanying data has been tampered with after the message was signed, 
and 4. in the event that the accompanying data has been changed, the signature must be invalidated. See Law 
Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Electronic signature'. 
2024 See long title of the ECTA. 
2025 Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 23. 
2026 Section 13(1) ECTA. 
2027 Section 13(3) ECTA. See Van der Merwe et al ICT Law 25. 
2028 See ch 2 para 4.2 a). 
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hacked by third parties, or that the electronic signature is 'copied' for other purposes. This 
provision does not require a supplier to prevent any loss, damage or defective processing of the 
consumer's signature, though. Sections 50 and 51 ECTA provide for the protection of personal 
information. A person's signature cannot be qualified as 'personal information' under section 1 
ECTA though.2029 Sections 52 to 58 ECTA provide for the protection of databases to the extent 
that the Minister has declared them 'critical'. This includes data that is essential to the daily 
functioning of an information society. Furthermore, critical databases include data the 
interruption or destruction of which could have widespread effects and consequently result in 
or generate grave consequences to an information society. At a governmental level, an 
interruption or destruction of critical databases could hamper and/or delay the delivery of 
services.2030 Even though a signature can be qualified as 'data' in the sense of section 1 
ECTA,2031 and all signatures collected by the supplier in electronic form could be qualified as 
a 'database",2032 such a database is not 'critical' in the sense of the ECTA because critical 
databases are collections of critical data in an electronic form kept in a site from where the data 
may be accessed, reproduced or extracted.2033 It is thus improbable that a supplier's server and 
the data which it contains is 'critical' in terms of the ECTA.2034 
It should be noted that the use of a rubber stamp with the supplier's name is regarded as a 
sufficient signature to bind the company,2035 provided the stamp was used with authority. 
Composite signatures, i.e., an impression of a stamp with the company's name and a dotted line 
                                                             
2029 'Personal information' is defined in s 1 ECTA as follows: 'information about an identifiable individual 
including, but not limited to (a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of the individual; (b) information relating to the education or the 
medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in 
which the individual has been involved; (c) any identifying number, symbol, or other particular assigned to the 
individual; (d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual; (e) the personal opinions, views or 
preferences of the individual, except where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an 
award or a prize to be made to another individual; (f) correspondence sent by the individual that is implicitly or 
explicitly of a private or confidential nature or further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original 
correspondence; (g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual; (h) the views or opinions of 
another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the individual, but excluding the 
name of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual; and (i) the name 
of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure 
of the name itself would reveal information about the individual, but excludes information about an individual 
who has been dead for more than 20 years.' 
2030 Chapter 5 Part II Principle A of Procl R1 in GG 21951 of 1 January 2001. 
2031 Section 1 ECTA (definitions): 'data' means electronic representations of information in any form. 
2032 The ECTA does not define 'database' but only 'critical database'. See s 1 ECTA. 
2033 Definition of 'critical database' in s 1 ECTA. 
2034 See Njotini 2013 PELJ 456. 
2035 Associated Engineers Co Ltd v Goldblatt 1938 WLD 139, Jones v John Barr & Co /Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA 
292 (W). 
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under it, with the word 'director' or a similar function at the right-hand end of the dotted line, 
are only complete when the person in question has signed on the dotted line.2036 If the dotted 
line and the word 'director' is above the company's name, this will most probably be interpreted 
as merely descriptive. In this case, the signatory, and not the company, is bound to the 
contract.2037 If the rubber stamp does not contain a word such as 'director', and it bear the 
signature of an individual without qualification (i.e., simpliciter), the signature does not 
indicate that he or she is the mere scribe.2038 Consequently, in cases where the dotted line bears 
no signature, the use of the 'signature stamp' binds the company.2039 The unqualified signature 
of an individual, no matter where it has been put with regard to the company's stamp, indicates 
that the company and the signatory are parties to the contract.2040 The same applies to machine-
printed company names.2041 The signatory can avoid personal liability if he or she puts the 
word 'for' before the company's name (meaning 'acting for'), or adds the letters 'pp' (per 
procurationem) or 'qq' (qualitate qua).2042 If the company's name does however not appear on 
the document at all, these additions will not relieve the signatory of personal responsibility 
because there is no indication of the party on whose behalf the individual signed the 
document.2043 The company's liability is engaged though when its name is printed at the top of 
the document.2044 Where a descriptive word, such as 'seller', appears after an unqualified 
signature, the given individual might have signed for and on behalf of a company if the latter 
is identified as the seller in the body of the document.2045 
3.2   Business days 
Section 2(6) sets out how time periods measured in business days between two events have to 
be calculated.2046 According to this provision, when a particular number of business days is 
                                                             
2036 Nicolaides v Henwood, Son, Soutter & Co 1938 TPD 390. However, the company may put forward that this 
kind of stamp without signature is its signature. See Meyer v Roberts 1971 (1) SA 328 (O) 331. 
2037 Nicolaides v Henwood, Son, Soutter & Co 1938 TPD at 395-396.  
2038 Moon & Co Ltd v Eureka Stores (Pty) Ltd 1949 (4) SA 40 (T) at 43-44. 
2039 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 211. 
2040 Associated Engineers Co Ltd v Goldblatt 1938 WLD 139; Hein v Hofmeyr 1958 (1) SA 29 (W); Puzey and 
Diss Motors Ltd v Litherland 1959 (4) SA 177 (SR) and 1961 (2) SA 177 (SR); De Beer v Diesel and Electrical 
Engineering Co 1960 (3) SA 89 (T) at 92-93; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Dugmore 1972 (3) SA 926 (D); Burger 
v I Lopis & Sons (Pvt) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 37 (RA). 
2041 Akasia Finance v Da Souza 1993 (2) SA 337 (W) at 340J-341A. 
2042 Hersch v Nel 1948 (3) SA 686 (A) 703; Natridge Finance (Pty) Ltd v Pillay 1971 (4) SA 412 (D); Hutchinson 
v Hylton Holdings 1993 (2) SA 391 (O). For a cheque, it is sufficient if the individual who signed on the reverse 
side 'for and on behalf of…' also signed on the face for and on behalf of the drawer company. See Sappi 
Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1997 (1) SA 457 (A) at 462C-H. 
2043 Kruger v Rheeder 1972 (2) SA 391 (O). 
2044 De Beer v Diesel and Electrical Engineering Co 1960 (3) SA 89 (T). 
2045 Major v Business Corners (Pty) Ltd 1940 WLD 84. 
2046 This provision correlates with s 2(5) NCA. 
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provided for between the happening of one event and another, the number of days must be 
calculated by (a) excluding the day on which the first such event occurs, (b) including the day 
on or by which the second event is to occur, and (c) excluding any public holiday, Saturday or 
Sunday that falls on or between the days contemplated in paragraphs (a) and (b), respectively. 
Example: Under section 14(2)(b)(i)(bb), despite any provision of the consumer agreement 
to the contrary, a consumer may cancel a fixed-term agreement at any other time 
than upon the expiry of its fixed term, by giving the supplier 20 business days' 
notice. 
Provided that a consumer gave notice on 7 March 2016, and that a normal week 
comprises 5 business days (except Saturdays and Sundays), the beginning of the 
notice started on 8 March as the first day on which the first event occurs is 
excluded. Adding 20 business days, the last event took place on 4 April. 
However, in South Africa, the 21, 25 and 28 March 2016 were public holidays 
which all fell on weekdays.2047 Therefore, one has to add 3 business days after 
the 4 April, which leads to 7 April. Thus, the last event took place on 7 April 
2016. 
On the other hand, section 4 of the Interpretation Act2048 applies to the calculation of a number 
of days in general, and not only of business days. The calculation itself is also different in that 
the Consumer Protection Act excludes any public holiday and Sunday during the entire period 
of time but also any Saturday. The Interpretation Act, on the other hand, only refers to public 
holidays and Sundays and excludes only public holidays and Sundays that happen to fall at the 
end of the given period, and not in-between.  
4. Interpretation of agreements 
After having discussed the rules for the interpretation of the Act, the interpretation of 
agreements remains to be discussed. 
Under section 4(4), the Tribunal or court must construe any standard form, contract or other 
document prepared or published by or on behalf of a supplier, or required by the Act to be 
produced by a supplier, to the benefit of the consumer. The classical approach of interpretation 
of contracts is not abandoned by this approach2049 but rather a first step. In order to understand 
                                                             
2047 Human Rights Day (Monday 21st), Good Friday (Friday 25th) and Family Day (Monday 28th), respectively. 
2048 33 of 1957. Section 4 of the Interpretation Act: 'When any particular number of days is prescribed for the 
doing of any act, or for any other purpose, the same shall be reckoned exclusively of the first and inclusively of 
the last day, unless the last day happens to fall on a Sunday or on any public holiday, in which case the time shall 
be reckoned exclusively of the first day and exclusively also of every such Sunday or public holiday.' 
2049 Naudé 'Introduction to sections 48-52' in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
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the policy pursued by the Act, a short presentation of the classical interpretational rules seems 
compelling before discussing the approach of the Act. 
4.1   The classical approach 
a)  Primary rules of interpretation 
The primary purpose of the classical approach in the field of interpretation of contracts is to 
determine the parties' common intention and give effect to it, and not what only one or the other 
had in mind.2050 The parties' intention is relevant because of the principle of freedom of 
contract.2051 In practice, many disputes arise because the parties disagree on what the terms of 
their agreements mean.2052 Then, the courts have to ascertain the common intention of the 
parties by applying the so-called 'primary rules of interpretation' in order to interpret the 
meaning of the words used in the given agreement.2053 The classical approach generally 
consists of four steps.2054 The objective of the first step is to find out the grammatical and 
ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement.2055 This rationale is based on the assumption 
that the use of certain words or phrases of a language is based on a convention and that the 
parties to a contract, who know the conventional meaning of the words contained therein, will 
use them accordingly in order to be understood.2056 The language of an agreement offers a 
'firmer footing' for the assertion of the parties' common intention at the time when they 
contracted than the assertion of their actual intention locked up in their minds, or what they 
maintain being their intention when a dispute arises.2057 Hence, 'the intention so gathered is 
presumed in law to be the common intention of the parties'.2058 Difficulties arise where the 
                                                             
2050 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 255, Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 at 37. 
2051 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. 
2052 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 255. 
2053 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 199. 
2054 South African courts prefer this approach rather than following Pothier's and Van der Linden's first rule of 
interpretation, according to which '[i]n agreements we should consider what the general intention of the 
contracting parties rather than follow the literal meaning of the words (is)'. See Pothier Treatise s 91, Van der 
Linden Institutes 14 4. 
2055 This is known as Lord Wensleydale's golden rule from Grey v Pearson (1857) 10 ER 1216 at 1236, according 
to which '(…) the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some 
absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and 
ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.' In 
this regard, see Crispette and Candy Co Ltd v Oscar Michaelis NO and Leopold Alexander Michaelis NO 1947 
(4) SA 521 (A) at 543; N&B Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v British Trading Insurance Co Ltd 1966 (2) SA 
522 (W) at 525C; Kalil v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1967 (4) SA 550 (A) at 556D; Western Credit Bank 
Ltd v Van der Merwe 1970 (3) SA 461 (C) at 463H. 
2056 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 256. See also Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bekker 1992 (1) SA 617 (A) at 
624G-625B; Hirt & Carter (Pty) Ltd v Mansfield 2008 (3) SA 512 (D) at para [63]-[70]; African Products (Pty) 
Ltd v AIG South Africa Ltd 2009 (3) SA 473 (SCA) at para [13]. 
2057 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 215. See Hansen, Schrader & Co v De Gasperi 1903 TH 100 at 103. 
2058 Centlivres JA in Lanfear v Du Toit 1943 AD 59 at 72. 
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parties attribute different meanings to the same word or phrase.2059 In addition, the meaning of 
words changes over time or in different circumstances. The 'ordinary meaning' thus describes 
the meaning of a word or phrase in the given contractual context. When reading the contract as 
a whole, this might be the everyday meaning, or a more technical one.2060 Hence, a word or 
phrase should never be interpreted in isolation (in vacuo),2061 and its meaning must be 
ascertained in the light of the context in which the word or phrase in question has been used.2062 
If the construction of the words of an agreement leads to an absurd, repugnant or inconsistent 
result with the rest of the contract, the judge may modify the sense of the words only to an 
extent as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency. Otherwise, the court must not amend the 
agreement.2063 Inconsistencies are frequent in agreements where various documents, such as 
contracts and plans, form a single contract. In these cases, the parties are well-advised to agree 
on the priority of the documents. In the absence of such a provision, the principle by which the 
words which probably had the parties' closer attention should prevail, applies.2064 This principle 
can also find application in conjunction against superfluity.2065 
In a second step, the textual context in which the word or phrase is placed is examined.2066 This 
is the context in which a word or phrase is used, considering also the contract as a whole, 
including the nature and purpose of the agreement.2067 In any event, as the parties rather aim at 
their agreement's validity, the words contained therein should be interpreted to give effect to 
                                                             
2059 This is the case, for instance, where the parties usually use the same word in different circumstances or 
domains. One party might use a term in its all-day meaning, whereas the other uses it in its meaning that it has 
acquired by trade usage or law. For instance, in every-day language 'owner' and 'possessor' have the same meaning, 
whereas their meaning is different in legal terminology. 
2060 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 216. Jansen JA's statement in Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 (A) at 646B, in words adopted in List v Jungers 1979 
(3) 106 (A) 119A-B are very instructive in this regard. 
2061 Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
2062 Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 (A) at 646. 
In Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) SA 710 (A) at 726H-727A, Hefer JA remarked: 
'Recourse to authoritative dictionaries is, of course, a permissible and often helpful method available to the Courts 
to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words. (…) But judicial interpretation cannot be undertaken (…) by 
excessive peering at the language to be interpreted without sufficient attention to the contextual scene.' In De 
Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka 1980 (2) SA 191 (T) at 196E-F, Nicholas stated in 
connection to the interpretation of a patent specification: 'A dictionary meaning of a word cannot govern the 
interpretation. It can only afford a guide. And, where a word has more than one meaning, the dictionary does not, 
indeed it cannot, prescribe priorities of meaning.' 
2063 Scottish Union & National Insurance Co Ltd v Native Recruiting Corpn Ltd 1934 AD 458 at 465-466. See 
also Plumbago Financial Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a Project Finance 2008 (3) SA 
47 (C) [7]-[12].  
2064 Badenhorst & Van Rensburg 1985 (2) SA 321 (T) 3361-T; Trever Investments (Pty) Ltd v Friedhelm 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 7 (A) at 15B-C. 
2065 B&E International (Pty) Ltd v Enviroserv Waste Management (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 152 (SE) at 158J-159F. 
2066 Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
2067 Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. Schreiner JA referred to this as 'linguistic treatment' 
in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 454-455. 
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the contract.2068 Naturally, the first and second steps cannot be separated because the 
grammatical or literal meaning of words can only be assessed in their context. The meaning of 
the abbreviation 'CFA', for instance, can only be assessed by considering the textual context. 
In one contract, these letters can mean 'Chief Financial Advisor', or in another 'Chartered 
Financial Accountant'. Moreover, in an insurance contract, it could mean 'Conditional Fee 
Arrangements'.2069 The parties could also give another meaning to this abbreviation (e.g., for a 
product) which is only apparent in its context. 
If the first and second steps, which concern intra-textual elements, do not provide a satisfactory 
interpretational result, in a third step, extra-textual elements, i.e., the extended context of a 
contract, or the background circumstances, are taken into account in order to draw useful 
conclusions as regards the intended meaning from the nature of the contract, its purpose and 
background.2070 According to Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant,2071 background 
circumstances are 'matters probably present to the minds of the parties when they contracted'. 
Malan AJA mentions in Engelbrecht v Senwes Ltd2072 that those 'are part of the context and 
explain the "genesis of the transaction" or its "factual matrix"'.  
In order to limit the extrinsic evidence so that the purposes of reducing the agreement in writing 
are not undermined, the parol evidence rule plays an important role because it constitutes a 
middle way between the textual and the extra-textual context. The parol evidence rule states 
that where the parties intended to lay down their agreement entirely and finally in writing, 
evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of the writing is inadmissible.2073 
The purpose of this rule is to ensure that a party cannot contradict, add or modify the written 
contract by reference to extrinsic evidence and in that way redefine the contractual terms.2074 
The rule applies only in cases where the parties intended the written contract to be the exclusive 
                                                             
2068 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257. African Products (Pty) Ltd v AIG South Africa Ltd 2009 (3) SA 473 
(SCA) at 479. 
2069 For more meanings of 'CFA', see 'CFA' at https://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/CFA. 
2070 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257. 
2071 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
2072 2007 (3) SA 29 (SCA) at para [7]. 
2073 Union Government v Vianini Ferr Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 47; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 
(A) 938; Dreyer v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 548 (SCA); Auckland Park Theological Seminary v 
University of Johannesburg (1160/2018) [2020] ZASCA 24 (25 March 2020); Kooij and Others v Middleground 
Trading 251 CC and Another (1249/18) [2020] ZASCA 45 (23 April 2020). The parol evidence rule was first 
stated in Lowrey v Steedman 1914 AD 532 at 543: 'The rule is that when a contract has once been reduced to 
writing no evidence may be given of its terms except the document itself, nor may the contents of such document 
be contradicted, altered, added to or varied by oral evidence.' 
2074 Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 943B. 
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memorial of their agreement.2075 It does nevertheless not automatically apply by the mere fact 
that a contract has been established in writing. First, it has to be ascertained whether the 
document is truly a reduction to writing of the parties' intention. Therefore, extrinsic evidence 
may be necessary because the true nature of the given document may not appear from the 
document itself.2076 The parol evidence rule has two aspects of which the distinction is often 
somehow artificial,2077 but helpful in order to understand its role in the context of 
interpretational matters. The integrational aspect2078 determines what evidence is admissible to 
prove the contents of the contract (integration rule). In contrast, the interpretation rule 
determines what evidence is admissible in proving the meaning of the words the parties used 
to express those terms. If the parties declared that they wanted to lay down their final agreement 
in writing entirely, they are not allowed to alter the terms of their contract by reference to 
evidence that contradicts these terms. Hence, such extrinsic evidence is regarded as legally 
irrelevant.2079 The parol evidence rule does not apply though where the court has to determine 
whether the parties intended to draw up an exclusive memorial of their agreement, or where 
their agreement is partly oral.2080 Furthermore, it is not applicable in cases of fraud,2081 
misrepresentation,2082 mistake,2083 undue influence, duress2084 or illegality because the 
contract's validity itself has to be determined in these cases.2085 The same applies to cases where 
one party claims that the contract is a sham agreement or not an agreement at all.2086 Subsequent 
                                                             
2075 Affirmative Portfolios CC v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2009 (1) SA 196 (SCA) at para [14]. 
2076 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 202. In Schneider v Raikin 1955 (1) SA 19 (W) at 21E, Rammsbottom J 
puts it at follows: 'The question of the admissibility of the evidence as to the agreement cannot be decided until 
evidence of the circumstances has been given.' Innes CJ stated in Beaton v Baldachin Bros 1920 AD 312 at 315: 
'(…) a party to such a writing, which it is sought to use against him, may lead evidence to show that the document 
in question is not a contract at all, that it was not intended by the signatories to operate as such, but was given for 
another purpose.' 
2077 A judge cannot determine whether a term is part of an agreement without considering the meaning of the given 
term, for instance. 
2078 See Venter v Birchholtz 1972 (1) SA 276 (A) at 282; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 983. In National 
Board (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd v Estate Swanepoel 1975 (3) SA 16 (A) 26, Botha JA refers to Wigmore Evidence 3rd 
ed vol 9 s 2425 as follows: '(…) When a jural act is embodied in a single memorial, all other utterances of the 
parties on that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act.' 
2079 As an evidentiary rule, the parol evidence rule follows the fundamental principle according to which irrelevant 
evidence is inadmissible. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 258, Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 201. 
2080 Stiglingh v Theron 1907 TS 150 at 151. The parties can exclude extrinsic evidence in the case of a partly oral 
agreement by a non-variation clause. 
2081 Dawson v Cape Times Ltd 1926 CPD 144; Rosettenville Moter Exchange v Grootenboer 1956 (2) SA 624 (T); 
Von Ziegler v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 399 (T) at 408-409; Slabbert, Verster & 
Malherbe (Bloemfontein) Bpk v De Wet 1963 (1) SA 835 (O) at 839-840; Sentrale Kunsmis Korp (Edms) Bpk v 
Van Heerden 1972 (2) SA 729 (W) at 733-734. 
2082 Sentrale Kunsmis Korp (Edms) Bpk v Van Heerden 1972 (2) SA 729 (W). 
2083 Neuhoff v York Timbers Ltd 1981 (4) SA 666 (T). 
2084 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 201. 
2085 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 258 and 259. 
2086 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 203, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 259. See, for example, Joubert 
v Van Hees 1908 TS 935 at 941-942. 
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oral agreements can be excluded by a non-variation clause which is binding in the absence of 
fraud.2087 
The interpretational aspect of the parol evidence rule determines the evidence for the 
establishment of the meaning of the provisions of an agreement. In terms of the interpretation 
rule, evidence of matters outside the contract is irrelevant if the meaning of an agreement can 
be ascertained with sufficient certainty from the written words.2088 The interpretation of a 
contract normally requires a reference to extraneous facts. In order to draw a line, the courts 
traditionally distinguished between background and surrounding circumstances.2089 
Background circumstances were admissible, and surrounding circumstances were admissible 
only in cases of ambiguity. This distinction between these two categories was blurred and 
seemed to hamper more than help though. It appeared that the definitions between background 
and surrounding circumstances varied.2090 Already, the approach in different stages was quite 
theoretical, which is why the courts did not apply it with 'military precision'.2091 This is why 
the Supreme Court of Appeal suggested that the court would abandon this distinction as soon 
as it had an opportunity to do so.2092  
Actually, in the last decade, there has been a development, and the courts no longer apply this 
distinction.2093 Instead, they allow all evidence in order to determine the meaning of a word or 
                                                             
2087 See discussion on non-variation clauses, ch 2 para 4.2 a). 
2088 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 259. 
2089 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 260. 
2090 Smalberger JA, for instance, remarked in Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bekker 1992 (1) SA 617 (A) at 624H: 
'Apparently, "background" circumstances are something different from "surrounding" circumstances.' Also Harms 
DP noted in KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) at para [39] that the 
terms 'background circumstances' and 'surrounding circumstances' are 'vague and confusing'. In Delmas Milling 
Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 454, Schreiner JA defined 'surrounding circumstances' as those that 
were 'probably present to the minds of the parties when they contracted'. In Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 
(3) SA 761 (A) at 767-768, these were considered 'background circumstances', though. In Van der Westhuizen v 
Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) at para [13], the aforementioned 'matters probably present to the minds of the 
parties when they contracted' were considered those matters of which the parties were actually aware (sic), rather 
than those of which they were only probably aware. In Seven Eleven Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Cancun Trading No 150 CC 2005 (5) SA 186 (SCA), background circumstances were regarded as 'facts known 
to all parties and that are not in contention'. 'Background circumstances' were defined in Engelbrecht v Senwes 
Ltd 2007 (3) SA 29 (SCA) as those that explain the 'factual matrix' of the contract. 
2091 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 213. Christie puts it very figuratively by saying: 'The four steps of this 
technique (…) must not be paced out in succession with military precision, but must be danced with some 
pirouetting and an entrechat or two.' 
2092 KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA). Wallis 2010 SALJ 674-675. 
2093 Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 2008 (5) SA 1 (SCA); 
KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA); Natal Joint Municipality 
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA); Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA); Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport 
(Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA); Airports Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd  2019 (2) 
BCLR 165. See also Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A); Boerne v Harris 1949 (1) SA 
793 (A), Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A). 
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phrase because the relevance of evidence cannot be determined before the end of a case, which 
defies the purpose of the parol evidence rule.2094 The distinction between background and 
surrounding circumstances could probably only survive so long, according to Harms DP in 
KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd,2095 because trial courts widely ignored it. 
The imprecise definition of background and surrounding circumstances made it difficult for a 
judge not to consider also extrinsic evidence, such as previous negotiations and correspondence 
between the parties, their subsequent conduct, or direct evidence of their own intentions.2096 
The statement of Schreiner JA in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis2097 that surrounding 
circumstances specifically excluded 'actual negotiations and similar statements' is out of touch 
with reality. It is impossible for a party to give evidence of his or her negotiations with another 
party without indicating what he or she intended the negotiations to achieve.2098 The 
consideration of extrinsic evidence remains inadmissible to the extent that it would have been 
inadmissible under the regime that distinguished between background and surrounding 
circumstances though. This is mainly because of policy reasons. The parol evidence rule 'seeks 
to protect judges against intractable disputes of fact regarding subjective states of minds and 
the concomitant risks of fraud and perjury' that will be present if the parties were allowed to 
present extrinsic evidence freely. What is more, the unfettered permission of extrinsic evidence 
would lead to longer trials and higher costs.2099 However, often extrinsic documents, such as 
correspondence, are clear enough to read the parties' intentions, without digging in their 
respective state of mind at the time when the contract was concluded.2100 What is more, the 
enquiry into the parties' subjective intentions is in keeping with one of the most fundamental 
                                                             
In Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk, Wallis JA summarises the 
development as follows at para [12]: 'Whilst the starting point remains the words of the document, which are the 
only relevant medium through which the parties have expressed their contractual intentions, the process of 
interpretation does not stop at a perceived literal meaning of those words, but considers them in the light of all 
relevant and admissible context, including the circumstances in which the document came into being. The former 
distinction between permissible background and surrounding circumstances, never very clear, has fallen away. 
Interpretation is no longer a process that occurs in stages but is ‘essentially one unitary exercise’. Accordingly 
it is no longer helpful to refer to the earlier approach'. In the summary, one can concisely read: '[I]nterpretation a 
unitary process commencing with the words and construing them in the light of all relevant circumstances – no 
distinction to be drawn between background and surrounding circumstances.' Emphasis added. 
2094 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 260. In Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) at para [2] and 
Hangar and Others v Robertson [2017] JOL 37735 SCA (6) it was decided that in interpreting a contract, a court 
must determine the intention of the parties as reflected by the terms of the contract. 
2095 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA). 
2096 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 261, Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767-768. 
2097 1955 (3) SA 447 (A). 
2098 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 262. 
2099 Lubbe and Murray Contract 463. 
2100 For the contrary view, see Hutchison et al Law of Contract 265. 
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rules of South African law of contract, namely that a contract is only concluded if there is 
consensus between the parties.2101 
A party is able to circumvent the parol evidence rule by alleging a tacit term. These are terms 
which the parties neglected to include in their agreement even though they intended to do so, 
or terms that are so essential to the commercial viability of the agreement that they would have 
inserted the terms in question had they thought about them.2102 Terms that contradict the written 
content of a contract may not be proved. Whenever a party can allege a tacit term modifying a 
written term, all types of evidence that are excluded by the parol evidence rule are allowed 
though.2103 Another possibility to circumvent the parol evidence rule is an application for 
rectification. Rectification is given where a party alleges that it had mistakenly inserted a term 
or failed to include one in a written contract.2104 The litigant then must persuade the court that 
the agreement fails to reflect the parties' common intention because of error or mistake and 
must provide the court with a formulation that reflects this common intention. In these cases 
too, all evidence becomes admissible.2105 
b)  Secondary rules of interpretation 
Usually, rules of interpretation are classified in various canons of construction, i.e., guidelines 
or 'classical rules of interpretation'. These are not limited, and there is no special order in which 
a court has to apply them. An exception are the rules as mentioned earlier (ordinary 
grammatical meaning, textual and extra-textual context) which should be applied first when 
interpreting an agreement.2106 If the primary rules of interpretation do not lead to a satisfactory 
result, the secondary rules of interpretation come into play. The eiusdem generis rule and the 
noscitur ad sociis rule belong to this category. They overlap though with the primary rule of 
interpretation that words must be interpreted in the context of the agreement in question as a 
whole. Other rules belonging to the secondary rules state, e.g., that where a contract consists 
partly of print and partly of inserted typed or handwritten words which are not consistent with 
the printed text, the written or typed insertions prevail as the written insertions are more likely 
to reflect the parties' intentions. The operative part of an agreement, provided it is sufficiently 
clear, prevails over the preamble, which also can be used to clarify the terms of a contract. The 
                                                             
2101 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 273. 
2102 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 265. 
2103 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 265. 
2104 See, for example, PCL Consulting (Pty) Ltd t/a Phillips Consulting SA v Tresso Trading 119 (Pty) Ltd 2009 
(4) SA 68 (SCA) at 70F-G. 
2105 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 266. 
2106 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 267. 
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ut res magis valeat quam pereat rule provides that where a term is ambiguous, it should be 
given a meaning which would make it effective rather than one that makes it legally 
ineffective.2107 The rule that it can be assumed that the parties to a contract intended their 
agreement to be legal rather than illegal is similar to the last-mentioned rule.2108 When a term 
is so ambiguous that it may be interpreted as being either constitutional or unconstitutional, 
one should favour an interpretation that considers the term as constitutional.2109 Where a fair 
result must be achieved when interpreting a contract, the principle that contracts are governed 
by bona fides is applied, and the parties' intention is determined on the basis that they negotiated 
in good faith.2110 
c)  Tertiary rules of interpretation 
Finally, tertiary rules of interpretation apply as a last resort. These maxims do not attempt to 
find the actual or presumed intention of the parties but aim to provide a fair outcome.2111 The 
contra proferentem and the quod minimum rules belong to this category. The contra 
proferentem rule states that ambiguous terms of an agreement must be interpreted against the 
party who proposed them.2112 In contrast, the quod minimum rule provides that words which 
are capable of more than one meaning must be narrowly interpreted in order to encumber the 
debtor or promisor as little as possible.2113  
A term may however not be construed contra proferentem if it is clear and unambiguous. In 
the event where a term, e.g., an exemption clause, is ambiguous, the courts will seek to 
minimise its effect. This is done by reducing its scope or the exempted legal grounds for 
responsibility for the damaged caused.2114 In any event, the court must not adopt a strained or 
forced meaning in order to import some kind of ambiguity into a provision.2115 Where a clause 
is unambiguous, the court must give effect to it, even if the consequences are harsh,2116 save 
                                                             
2107 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 267. 
2108 See, for instance, Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) at 429-430. 
2109 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
2110 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) at 340I. 
2111 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 304. 
2112 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. This will be often an insurance company or a public utility. See Fedgen 
Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33 (A) at 38E. In Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 
(SCA), for example, the court interpreted the term 'driving' narrowly, stating that although the terms and 
conditions of the adventure tour company expressly excluded Drifter's liability from time of departure to time of 
return, due to the nature of tours offered by the company (adventure tours), this exclusion could hardly cover 
driving on a public road, but rather in 'exciting terrain' (at 88J-89A). 
2113 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
2114 ER24 Holdings v Smith 2007 (6) SA 147 (SCA).  
2115 Walker v Redhouse 2007 (3) SA 514 (SCA). 
2116 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 271. In Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 
(SCA), the court ruled that the exemption clause by which the appellant was 'absolutely unable to accept liability 
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where the 'provision is so gratuitously harsh and oppressive that public policy could not tolerate 
it.'2117 
What is more, if the court cannot find the true meaning of the contract, it will declare it void 
for vagueness.2118 
By and large, the South African approach to contractual construction seems to move from a 
more objective stance (parol evidence rule) to a more subjective perspective (the parties' 
intention). Evidence that formerly was considered surrounding circumstances first moved to 
the category of background circumstances, which means that they became always admissible, 
and not only in exceptional cases.2119 What is more, the category of surrounding circumstances 
now also includes evidence of negotiations. The somewhat artificial distinction between 
surrounding and background circumstances became more and more blurred. As a result, the 
courts now admit extra-textual context in order to assess the parties' intention. Thus, it can be 
said that the rules of interpretation of contracts are slowly being aligned with one of the most 
fundamental rules of the law of contract which is that the basis of an agreement is the meeting 
of the parties' minds.2120 
4.2   The approach of the Act 
Naudé is of the view that interpretational control takes place after content control.2121 She 
suggests that '[o]nce contract terms pass this additional hurdle [of content control], rules on 
interpretation would cause terms to be interpreted against the party on whose behalf they were 
drafted'. It is arguable though if the reverse approach in which interpretational control takes 
place before content control would not be more efficient. 
Before assessing whether a clause in a standard contract bears up against the catalogue of 
forbidden or 'sensitive' clauses in terms of section 51, regulation 44, or the general clause of 
                                                             
or responsibility for injury or damage of any nature whatsoever (…) suffered by any person who enters the 
premises and/or uses the amenities provided', was not unambiguous, and that an interpretation of the phrase 'to 
accept liability' in the sense of 'not to admit' liability' was 'far-fetched'. Therefore, according to the court, the 
exemption clause in question was valid. This stance was confirmed in more recent cases: First National Bank of 
South Africa Ltd v Rosenblum 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA); Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 
(SCA); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 
(SCA), Walker v Redhouse 2007 (3) SA 514 (SCA), Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 
(SCA); Viv's Tippers (Edms) Bpk v Pha Pharma Staff Services (Edms) Bpk h/a Pha Pharma Security 2010 (4) SA 
455 (SCA) at 462-463; Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA). 
2117 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) at 286F-G; Swinsburne v 
Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD) at 312 (obiter). 
2118 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 227, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 269. 
2119 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 272. 
2120 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 273. 
2121 Naudé 2009 SALJ 506 
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section 48, it is reasonable to ascertain its actual meaning first. If this order is reversed, one 
risks either to undertake a lengthy discussion on whether or not a clause is unfair, before even 
knowing exactly its meaning. In most cases, the interpretation will cause no particular problems 
because many clauses are unambiguously formulated. Although standard terms are generally 
sophisticated provisions that have been drafted by experts, formulations contained therein 
might be unclear or ambiguous, or the contract concluded on the basis of standard business 
terms is incomplete.2122 However, apparently unambiguous declarations must be interpreted 
too by considering all surrounding circumstances (i.e., the context). If A sells '100 pianos' to 
B, and from the negotiations one can conclude that A and B deal with weapons which they 
name after music instruments for confidentiality reasons (whereby 'pianos' stand for 'machine 
guns'), the seemingly 'unambiguous' declaration of '100 pianos' must be interpreted as '100 
machine guns'.2123 In these cases, the performance of content control before the enquiry of the 
meaning of the clause would make no sense and would even be absurd in the earlier mentioned 
machine-guns example.  
Furthermore, it is recommended that the interpretation of a term and the control of its contents 
have to be strictly separated so that one is not undertaken within the other. This approach is 
'economic' because it saves unnecessary and unstructured arguments. In other words, the 
interpretation control 'prepares' the content control.2124 This is also the approach of the German 
legislator who was in favour of an 'open content control'. 'Open content control' means that the 
reasons of the inadequacy of standard terms must be unfolded within the content control, and 
not 'concealed' within the interpretational control, which then would serve as a 'correction' of 
standard terms.2125 For the reasons mentioned above, Naudé's view with regard to the respective 
order of the content and interpretational controls has to be rejected. 
As consumer agreements are mostly drafted by or on behalf of the supplier, it is not very likely 
that the provisions contained therein will be in favour of the consumer in terms of fairness.2126 
Section 4(4) provides that '[t]o the extent consistent with advancing the purposes and policies 
of t[he] Act, the Tribunal or court must interpret any standard form, contract or other document 
prepared or published by or on behalf of a supplier, or required by t[he] Act to be produced by 
a supplier, to the benefit of the consumer (a) so that any ambiguity that allows for more than 
                                                             
2122 Stoffels AGB-Recht 131. 
2123 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 61. 
2124 See Stoffels AGB-Recht 131. See also BGH NJW 1999, 1108; 1633 (1634). 
2125 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634). 
2126 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 40 and 41. 
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one reasonable interpretation of a part of such a document is resolved to the benefit of the 
consumer, and (b) so that any restriction, limitation, exclusion or deprivation of a consumer's 
legal rights set out in such a document or notice is limited to the extent that a reasonable person 
would ordinarily contemplate or expect, having regard to (i) the content of the document, (ii) 
the manner and form in which the document was prepared and presented, and (iii) the 
circumstances of the transaction or agreement.'2127 
Although section 4 provides that 'any standard form, contract or other document' must be 
interpreted in the manner set out in this section, it is submitted that the Tribunal or court has to 
construe the individual clauses of the given agreement rather than the contract as a whole. This 
must be done against the backdrop of the entire contract, its object and the interaction between 
individual clauses. Section 4 expresses this indirectly by the formulations 'interpretation of a 
part of such a document' (subsection (a)) and 'any restriction, limitation, exclusion or 
deprivation of a consumer's legal rights set out in such a document' (subsection (b)). The latter 
can only be set out in individual clauses, and not in an agreement as a whole.2128 
Section 4(4)(a) must be read in the light of the contra proferentem rule. According to this rule, 
contractual provisions, if capable of more than one meaning, must be interpreted against the 
party who proposed them.2129 The rationale of this rule is that the party who formulated or 
imposed the rule should suffer from an adverse construction as it had the opportunity to 
articulate the terms clearly.2130 The same rationale can be found in the quod minimum rule in 
terms of which ambiguous words must be interpreted narrowly, to encumber the debtor or 
promisor (i.e., the consumer) as little as possible.2131 These rules normally serve as a last 
resort,2132 since they do not take into consideration the parties' actual intentions. In standard 
                                                             
2127 Emphasis added. 
2128 In the BGB, this is expressed in the heading of § 305c 'Surprising and ambiguous clauses'. 
2129 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
2130 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268, De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 17. This is often the case, e.g., with insurance companies or public utilities. As to insurance companies, see 
Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33 (A) at 38E. A good example where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
applied the contra proferentem rule is Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 (SCA). In this case, 
the court held that the term 'driving' in the terms and conditions of a tour operator where any liability in connection 
with a loss experienced was excluded 'due to the nature of hiking (…), driving and the general third-world 
conditions on our tour/ventures', must be interpreted narrowly. The court held (at 88J-89A) that the condition 
quoted above was not intended to cover liability for negligent driving on a public road, but was rather aimed at 
indemnifying the company for the kind of risks encountered in off-road driving in 'exciting terrain'. 
2131 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
2132 According to the ordinary classification of interpretational rules, these rules are tertiary rules of interpretation 
'which are applied as a last resort, without any pretence at attempting to find the real intention of the parties'. See 
Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) 304. 
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form contracts, this consideration is irrelevant because the clauses included in such agreements 
are rarely negotiated or even read by the consumer.2133 
The same approach is applied in the so-called 'rule of ambiguity' of § 305c(2) BGB, according 
to which any doubts in the interpretation of standard business terms are resolved against the 
user (supplier).2134 If the content of a clause cannot be clearly determined, the supplier bears 
the risk. This means that the supplier has the responsibility for the content of its standard 
terms.2135 § 305c(2) sets out an interpretational rule which prepares the content control, but 
which cannot serve as a standard for the content control.2136 
German courts tend to restrict the application of the ambiguity rule of § 305c(2) as otherwise 
too many problematic clauses would already be mitigated at this stage in favour of the 
consumer, without the possibility to assess their adverse effect within the content control.2137 
Therefore, a cautious application of this rule is advised.2138 Hence, the courts apply § 305c(2) 
only where despite the application of all other interpretational methods an irremovable doubt 
still remains, and where at least two legally justifiable interpretational possibilities persist.2139 
The South African legislator rightly expressed this idea in section 4(4)(a) in that 'any ambiguity 
that allows for more than one reasonable interpretation (…) is resolved to the benefit of the 
consumer.'2140 
Section 4(4)(b) goes even beyond the usual scope of the contra proferentem maxim in that a 
standard form, contract or document must be interpreted to the benefit of the consumer and that 
this interpretation must be effected so that any restriction of the consumer's rights contained in 
such document 'is limited to the extent that a reasonable person would ordinarily contemplate 
or expect'. This obviously applies to unexpected or surprising terms. According to this 
provision, such unexpected terms could thus be construed as pro non scripto. De Stadler argues 
that there is no need for the application of such an interpretative rule because sections 48 and 
51 as well as regulation 44(3) already provide for a sufficient fairness standard.2141 The 
                                                             
2133 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. 
2134 This provision corresponds to art 5 2nd sent. of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
2135 Stoffels AGB-Recht 136. 
2136 Report of the Law Commission BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 5, Roth WM 1991, 2086. Therefore, the BGH wrongly 
states in BGH NJW 1985, 53 that a certain clause 'infringes' § 305c(2). 
2137 This problem had already be seen by Raiser (Recht der allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen at 264 et seq) and 
later by the government in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 15 and 60. 
2138 Stein AGBG § 5 para 14. 
2139 BGH NJW-RR 1995, 1303 (1304), BGH NJW 1997, 3434 (3435); 2002, 3232 (3233); 2007, 504 (506), BAG 
NZA 2006, 923 (926). See also Palandt/Heinrichs § 305c para 18. 
2140 Emphasis added. 
2141 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
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introduction of paragraph (b) would therefore unnecessarily complicate the fairness enquiry 
and make it difficult for suppliers, but also for consumers and lawyers, to predict whether a 
term complies with the Act. Instead, unexpected limitations of rights should be treated as 
unfair.2142 With regard to the aforementioned suggestion that interpretational and content 
control must strictly be separated, and that interpretational control must be undertaken before 
content control, De Stadler's argument demonstrates that only where both 'controls' are 
intermingled, unnecessary complications arise. 
Section 4(4)(b)(i) to (iii) contains three factors which have to be considered when determining 
whether a reasonable person would ordinarily expect to find the limitation of rights contained 
in a particular document. These are (i) the content of the document, (ii) the manner and form 
in which the document was prepared and presented, and (iii) the circumstances of the 
transaction or agreement. De Stadler maintains that not only this provision creates problems 
with regard to its construction, but also that it is disputable whether a document which fulfils 
the fairness standard under sections 48 et seq. can still restrict the consumer's rights in a fashion 
that a reasonable person would ordinarily not expect.2143 For De Stadler it is hence conceivable 
that section 4(4)(b) serves as a last resort and operates to the consumer's benefit. For suppliers, 
however, it would be challenging to know exactly how to comply with the Act.2144 De Stadler's 
arguments are based on the assumption that standard agreements or their clauses must be 
interpreted after having assessed whether their content is fair. It is my submission though that 
section 4(4)(b) is a reference to the classical approach and the primary rules of interpretation. 
The fact that the court must take into account the content of the given document, the manner 
and form in which it was prepared and the circumstances of the agreement merely refers to the 
textual context of the agreement and extra-textual elements, such as the background 
circumstances. In this sense, section 4(4)(b) is a reminder that the interpretation of standard 
terms is no free-floating and unstructured enterprise but a principled approach. 
It is furthermore submitted that section 4(4)(b) introduces a different standard of consumer 
protection. At first sight, it is not clear what a 'reasonable person' means and what this person 
'would ordinarily contemplate or expect'. It is suggested that a reasonable person in terms of 
this provision cannot be a vulnerable consumer under section 3(1)(b) as those persons are often 
inexperienced and do not know what to expect or not to expect in a standard form contract 
                                                             
2142 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 453. 
2143 De Stadler asserts that such situations are imaginable, without further substantiating. See De Stadler 
‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
2144 See De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
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(which is precisely the reason why the Act aims to protect them). For the determination of a 
person's reasonableness, a more objective standard should thus be applied, such as a bystander 
or an average consumer. 
Also in German law, such an approach is applied. When interpreting standard terms, not the 
recipient's (individual consumer's) standpoint is relevant, i.e., how he or she had to interpret a 
clause. Instead, the standpoint of an average customer without legal knowledge, having due 
regard to the relevant public that is usually concerned with these provisions, is considered.2145 
This means that the interpretation does not take into account the circumstances of an individual 
case or the individual understanding of a party.2146 Therefore, the BGH decided that the 
standard terms of an investment company must be interpreted in the same way for both 
inexperienced and shrewd investors.2147  
Unlike sections 48 and 49 which only consider the parties involved, section 4(4)(b) therefore 
widens the perspective in terms of what a reasonable person can or cannot expect. In spite of 
this fact, it would go too far to qualify this approach as abstract-universal where the 
circumstances of the parties involved in a particular transaction are not taken into account, but 
rather the transactions of the type and classes of the participants.2148 After all, the circumstances 
of the agreement or transaction as well as the manner and form in which the document was 
presented have to be considered under section 4(4)(b). For example, if it is not clear if the price 
in a contract of sale expressed in 'Dollars' means U.S.-American, Australian or Canadian 
Dollars, and the seller acquired the items in Canada, one can conclude that the stipulated price 
is expressed in Canadian Dollars.2149 
There are good reasons for the modification of the interpretational standard for standard 
contracts. The use of pre-formulated clauses is characterised by the lack of individual 
particularities as they serve for a significant number of customers.2150 In addition, the 
rationalising effect of standard terms would be jeopardised if suppliers had to fear that their 
                                                             
2145 BGH NJW 2002, 285 (286); 2007, 504 (505); 2008, 2172 (2173). 
2146 BGHZ 33, 216 (218); 84, 268 (272), BGH NJW 1992, 2629; 2001, 2165 (2166), BAG NZA 2006, 324 (327), 
UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 73 et seq, Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
2147 BGH NJW 1980, 1947. 
2148 BGHZ 22, 91 (98); 17, 1 (3). 
2149 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. 
2150 Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
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terms and conditions would not be applied in a unified manner because of differing 
interpretations.2151 
 
5. Conclusion  
Section 2 constitutes the pivotal provision for the interpretation of the Act and promotes a 
purposive approach which aims to give effect to the purposes of the Act. Contrary to the 
classical approach of construction (of statutes and contracts), purposive interpretation is more 
flexible and starts with the search of the legislator's intention by taking into consideration 
extrinsic factors. Only where a statute's language is sufficiently explicit, there is no need for 
this approach, although it should not be lost out of sight. The Act's ultimate purpose is the 
consumer's protection. Even though the consumer is the weaker party, the supplier's and its 
counterpart's interests are not always competing. If the interpretational result would lead to 
higher prices and ultimately market failure, this would go against the spirit of the Act. This is 
why section 4(2)(b)(i) provides that the courts must promote not only the purposes of the Act 
but also its spirit. 
Despite some inconsistencies, the definitions contained in section 1 and elsewhere in the Act 
offer a valuable tool for the interpretation of the Act. 
Section 2(2) provides for an original approach by which foreign and international law may be 
considered with regard to interpretation. Such an undertaking has to be carried out very 
carefully as foreign law has been enacted in a specific context which cannot always be 
transposed into South Africa's socio-economic pattern. It can be beneficial to 'tap' into foreign 
sources though, especially when considering that South Africa does not have much experience 
with consumer protection matters. EU law and the rulings of the ECJ are also to be considered 
international law in terms of the Act. On the other hand, former foreign law does not reflect 
the current standard of consumer protection legislation and should thus not be considered 
'appropriate' under section 2(2). The same rationale is expressed in section 2(2)(c) for domestic 
decisions. 
The cross-implementation of the decisions of ombuds and arbitrators under section 2(2)(c) 
raises concern because of the lacking hierarchy between these bodies and possible 
contradictory results. The stare decisis principle is not directly compromised though since the 
                                                             
2151 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 306c para 75. 
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lower courts will not apply decisions of arbitrators and ombuds that contradict precedence. 
Where a specific matter has not been decided yet by a court of justice, there is however no 
reason for a court not to adopt decisions of other decision-making bodies.  
Section 2(8) deals with conflicts between Chapter 5 of the Act and other statutes. In this 
context, the Act introduces the term 'hazardous chemical products'. However, the legislator did 
not intend to distinguish these products from 'hazardous chemical substances' (HCS), the 
commonly used legislative term. With regard to section 2(9)(b), it seems that in the case of 
hazardous chemical products, only the provisions of the Act relating to consumer redress apply, 
and not the alternative provisions, even if they offer better protection. 
Section 2(10) is a 'saving clause' providing that consumers are not precluded from exercising 
any common law rights. This provision must be read with section 69(d). It is submitted that a 
consumer can directly access an ordinary court, and need not exhaust all other remedies first. 
Besides, only ordinary courts can award damages, and small-claims courts are less expensive. 
The wording of section 69(d) seems to be an unintended consequence of the legislator's 
objective to ensure a quick, effective and efficient access to redress.  
Section 2 also contains some miscellaneous provisions for (electronic) signatures. The 
provisions of the ECTA have to be considered to this effect. The courts have developed a long 
line of jurisprudence as to when a signature is valid, e.g., in combination with a rubber stamp. 
Subsection (6) deals with the calculation of time periods measured in business days. 
The classical approach of interpretation of contracts aims to seek the parties' common intention. 
In this context, the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words, the given textual context 
and eventually extra-textual elements, such as the background circumstances, had to be taken 
into account (primary rules of interpretation). The latter are curtailed by the parol evidence 
rule, which does not apply in specific instances though (e.g., fraud). Nonetheless, the courts do 
not apply the former distinction between permissible background and surrounding 
circumstances anymore, and interpretation is no longer a process that occurs in stages but is 
‘essentially one unitary exercise’. If the primary rules of interpretation lead to no satisfactory 
result, the secondary rules apply, such as the eiusdem generis or the noscitur ad sociis rules. 
The tertiary rules of interpretation serve as a last resort since their objective is not to seek the 
parties' actual or presumed intention but a fair outcome. The contra proferentem and the quod 
minimum rules belong to this category. Finally, if a court cannot find the true meaning of an 
agreement, it will declare the contract void for vagueness. 
 398   
 
When interpreting standard clauses, the interpretational control should take place before the 
content control. This is a more economic approach and has the advantage that the actual fairness 
enquiry takes place within the content control and that the interpretational control serves as a 
'correction' of standard terms. Both controls thus have to be strictly separated and executed in 
the previously mentioned order. This is also the approach of the German legislator. 
Consumers are often faced with situations where they have no real choice because the suppliers' 
standard terms widely replace any negotiation. As these documents are likely to be drafted by 
the supplier, they must be interpreted to the benefit of the consumer (section 4(4)). What is 
more, any limitation, restriction, exclusion or deprivation of a consumer's legal rights contained 
therein is only valid if a reasonable person would ordinarily expect such a term, considering 
the content of the document, the manner and form in which it was presented and the 
circumstances of the transaction. The ambiguity rule of section 4(4)(a) corresponds to 
§ 305c(2) BGB. German courts restrict its application though in order to ensure that not too 
many problematic clauses are mitigated in the interpretational control.  
According to De Stadler, sections 48 and 51 as well as regulation 44(3) already provide for a 
sufficient fairness standard, so that section 4(4)(b) unnecessarily diffuses this standard. Hence, 
unexpected limitations of rights should be treated as unfair. This view cannot be supported 
though if the interpretational control takes place before the content control and both are strictly 
separated. In addition, the standard of section 4(4)(b) begs the question, according to De 
Stadler, if a document which is fair under sections 48 et seq. can still represent a restriction of 
consumer rights that a reasonable person would ordinarily not expect. She argues that in such 
as case, section 4(4)(b) could be to the benefit of the consumer, which makes it unpredictable 
for suppliers to know exactly how to comply with the Act. Here again, this problem does not 
arise if the interpretational control and the content control are carried out in the above-
mentioned order. 
Section 4(4)(b) introduces a different standard of consumer protection. A 'reasonable person' 
in terms of this provision means that an objective standard should be applied, such as a 
bystander or an average consumer. In contrast, sections 48 and 49 consider the parties involved. 
The objectivation has the advantage that the rationalisation effect of standard terms is not 
jeopardised because they are interpreted in a unified manner. 
  
 399   
 
CHAPTER 5 - ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER RIGHTS 
1. Introduction 
Consumer protection is only efficient if an efficient system of redress exists as otherwise the 
objectives of the legislation are defeated.2152 Ideally, and especially in the South African socio-
economic context, such a system should be cost-efficient and speedy because litigation is 
generally costly, complex and time-consuming.2153 Thus, it is not sufficient to provide for the 
protection of vulnerable consumers, but consumers should also be empowered.2154 The 
empowerment of consumers is essential to society because informed and empowered 
consumers are a powerful social and economic force in that they can improve their overall 
standard of living and drive innovation in industries.2155 Before the Act came into being, 
consumer protection was provided for by the common law as well as some industry-specific 
legislation. The Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act2156 was such an industry-
specific piece of legislation. It had some major disadvantages, however. It did, for instance, not 
contain a list of practices that could be considered unfair.2157 What is more, the Consumer 
Affairs Committee2158 had no power to order redress2159 so that the resolution of consumer 
transactions under that statute was more or less left to the common law, the courts and various 
self-regulatory regimes.2160 Once a business practice was declared prohibited, it was primarily 
left to the South African Police Services and the Public Prosecutor to finalise the case.2161 This 
                                                             
2152 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 321, Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 37, published 
in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004. 
2153 Paleker 2003 ADR Bulletin 48, Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 55. 
2154 Du Preez 2009 TSAR 63. 
2155 Law Reform Commission of Ireland 2008 at https://www.lawreform.ie. 
2156 The former title of the Act was Harmful Business Practices Act 71 of 1988. This Act was renamed and certain 
of its provisions were amended by the Harmful Business Practices Amendment Act 23 of 1999. 
2157 Woker 2001 SA Merc LJ 316. 
2158 The Committee had the function to investigate business practices. It reported to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry and made recommendation to the Minister if it found certain business practices to be unfair. If the 
Minister accepted the Committees recommendations, a notice was published in the Government Gazette by which 
the business practice was declared unfair and the business directed to refrain from applying the unfair practices in 
question. Non-compliance was an offence. The problem of this Act was that it aimed to protect consumers not 
only from unlawful business practices but also from lawful yet unfair or harmful practices that lead to complaints 
by the suppliers who asserted that this piece of legislation violated their constitutional rights of freedom of trade, 
occupation and profession granted by s 22 of the Constitution. See Woker 2001 SA Merc LJ 316. 
2159 Woker 2010 Obiter 220. 
2160 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 402. 
2161 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 38, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
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piece of legislation mainly dealt with market practices but not with unfairness in contracts, the 
sale of goods and services or product liability.2162 
Provincial legislation partly regulated consumer affairs by pieces of legislation that were based 
on the previously mentioned statute. Currently, all provinces have Provincial Consumer Affairs 
Offices.2163 Not all provinces have provincial consumer courts though, which is why also 
various industry regulators attempted to provide measures of consumer protection. This 
disjointed and uncoordinated approach not only hampered access to justice for many 
consumers, but the statutes regulating consumer protection also were often unknown to 
consumers and suppliers alike.2164 
The Consumer Protection Act has repealed many of these fragmented pieces of legislation2165 
and aims to provide for consumer protection by one comprehensive piece of legislation. Its 
purpose is, inter alia, to achieve an accessible, transparent and efficient redress for 
consumers.2166 As the Act does not abolish the provincial consumer protection, it operates in 
tandem with it as overarching national consumer protection legislation. Besides, the legislator 
encourages alternative dispute resolution procedures and self-regulatory activities.2167 These 
mechanisms are expressly regulated in the Act, inter alia by industry codes of conduct2168 and 
the accreditation of industry ombuds.2169  
Providing for various fora has indisputable advantages since the most appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism depends on the circumstances of the particular complaint, such as the 
value of the claim, its level of complexity, the time, money and effort the consumer or supplier 
is willing to spend.2170 It is important though that these different fora do not work in isolation 
and in an uncoordinated manner as it was the case before the Act became effective. Their roles 
must thus be clearly spelt out, and the already existing and new fora have to be streamlined2171 
in order to avoid unnecessary confusions, duplications and ineffective mechanisms. Especially 
                                                             
2162 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 402. 
2163 These were set up pursuant to Schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
2164 Woker 2010 Obiter 219. 
2165 See s 121 for the list of the repealed and amended laws. 
2166 See Preamble of the CPA. 
2167 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 403. 
2168 Sections 82 and 93. 
2169 Section 82(6). 
2170 Centre for European Economic Law 2007 Final report: 'An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of 
consumer redress other than redress through judicial proceedings' (Study for the European Commission) at 
ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress/reports.../comparative_report_en.pdf (last retrieved on 28 October 2019). 
2171 See Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 39, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 
of 9 September 2004. 
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consumers who live in remote areas are disadvantaged where redress fora are far away. This is 
why accessibility, not only in terms of costs but also in terms of geography, is crucial. 
One of the Act's aims is to reform the fragmented institutional framework with numerous 
regulators and responsible government departments.2172 In addition, the former framework was 
under-resourced, by and large ineffective and had limited capacity as regards expertise and 
staff.2173  
The present chapter will therefore not only present the now existing framework but also 
evaluate its efficiency and accessibility. A comprehensive presentation and discussion of all 
entities involved in consumer redress would be beyond the scope of this thesis. It is nonetheless 
unavoidable to discuss some issues in detail in order to understand the complex interactions 
within the redress mechanism. 
After discussing the locus standi provisions of the Act, the various entities and the redress 
mechanisms will be analysed critically in order to evaluate whether they are apt to achieve the 
legislator's purposes set out in the Act.  
2. Persons with locus standi 
Section 4(1) enumerates the persons who are entitled to approach a court, the Tribunal or the 
Commission alleging that a consumer's rights under the Act have been infringed, impaired or 
threatened, or that prohibited conduct2174 has occurred or is occurring. The Act sets out 
extensive locus standi provisions and therefore enhances access to redress, especially for low-
income persons since class actions facilitate their access to redress in terms of affordability.2175 
The extensive locus standi provisions in section 4(1) are in line with the purpose of the Act in 
that section 3(1)(h) provides 'for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective and efficient 
system of redress for consumers'.2176 Furthermore, '[c]lass actions are to the benefit of the 
individual consumers who do not have the ability or financial means to institute action against 
a supplier.'2177 Jacobs, Stoop and Van Niekerk argue that class actions may have significant 
and adverse implications for suppliers in terms of their finances and public image. Hence, 
                                                             
2172 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 37, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
2173 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 38, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004 
2174 See definition of 'prohibited conduct' in s 1. 
2175 Van Heerden ‘Section 69’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. 
2176 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
2177 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 306. 
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suppliers should have sufficient insurance.2178 Van Eeden correctly maintains, by referring to 
Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak,2179 that the persons on whose behalf a person 
mentioned in section 4(1) as being entitled to approach the given entities must be a 
consumer.2180 
Obviously, a person acting on his or her own behalf, or a person who is authorised to act on 
behalf of a consumer who is not able to act for him- or herself (a minor, a trust or a juristic 
person), have locus standi.2181  
In addition, section 4(1)(c) provides for the standing of a member or representative of a class 
of affected persons. Class actions are typically used in order to recover claims vis-à-vis few 
defendants but numerous plaintiffs having similar claims against the defendants.2182 Although 
the members of the given class are not parties in the formal sense, the judgment is binding on 
all class members, even those who are not parties to the litigation. Members who are not a party 
to the action can institute a plea of res judicata in order to assert their rights.2183 Class actions 
serve procedural economy as they protect the courts from having to rule on numerous claims 
referring to the same cause of action,2184 and facilitate access to the courts, especially by people 
living in remote areas.2185 
Unlike section 38(c) of the Constitution, which provides standing regarding infringements of 
rights set out in the Bill of Rights,2186 section 4(1) focuses on the infringement of consumer 
rights. Regardless of the different views of various authorities of whether section 38 of the 
Constitution introduces a general class action or only a class action that is restricted to 
constitutional issues,2187 Wallis JA held that it would be irrational for the court to sanction a 
class action in cases where a constitutional right is invoked, but to deny it in equally appropriate 
                                                             
2178 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 306. See also De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 7. 
2179 Eskom Holdings Limited v Halstead-Cleak [2017] JOL 37573 (SCA). 
2180 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 416. 
2181 Section 4(1)(a) and (b). 
2182 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 532, with further references. 
2183 Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (2) SA 592 (C) at 
paras [16] and [17]. 
2184 Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign NPC and 
Another as Amici Curiae) [2016] 3 All SA 233 (GJ) at para [98]. 
2185 Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign NPC and 
Another as Amici Curiae) [2016] 3 All SA 233 (GJ). 
2186 Prior to the Constitution, class actions were unknown in South Africa. Class actions are now also possible in 
terms of s 4(1)(c) CPA, 157(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and s 32 of the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998. 
2187 See Kok 2003 THRHR 158, Hurter 2008 De Jure 293, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 
535. 
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circumstances, merely because of the claimant's inability to identify the infringement of a right 
protected under the Bill of Rights.2188 In any event, it raises some concern that there are no 
procedural provisions for class actions, neither in the Constitution nor in the Act, despite the 
introduction of class actions in both pieces of legislation. Even though the legislator, which 
recognised the need for legislation in this field, produced a report in 1998 and included a draft 
bill,2189 the latter has not yet been promulgated.2190 Therefore, one has to rely on the courts for 
now to fill this void.2191 In various cases, the courts have somehow addressed this issue and 
tried to resolve it by underscoring that courts have an inherent power to protect and regulate 
their own process.2192 In Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v 
Ngxuza,2193 the court formulated a procedure for class actions in terms of infringements of a 
right in the Bill of Rights2194 by referring to Firstrand Bank Limited v Chaucer Publications 
(Pty) Limited.2195 It stated that the following procedural aspects must be considered in order to 
institute a class action:2196 
(a) Leave must be sought from the High Court to embark on a representative basis prior 
to actually institute a class action; 
(b) The determination of a common interest sufficient to justify a class action takes 
place before the institution of the proceedings; 
(c) The representing party must give sufficient notice to all the affected parties so that 
they may associate or dissociate themselves from the proposed litigation. 
In Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others,2197 a 
case that dealt with damages suffered by consumers as a result of price-fixing by bread 
producers, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that class actions should not be limited to 
                                                             
2188 Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (2) SA 592 (C) at 
para [21]. 
2189 Public Interest and Class Actions Bill. 
2190 SALRC Report on the Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law (Project 
88) (1998). 
2191 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. According to de Vos, for the sake 
of uniformity and legal certainty, the procedure of class actions should be established through legislation and not 
by the courts. He is of the view that judge-made procedural law in terms of class actions is not the appropriate 
way forward, and that South Africa is lagging dismally behind other jurisdictions in this field. See De Vos 2012 
TSAR 755 and 756. 
2192 See s 173 of the Constitution. 
2193 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA). 
2194 In doing so, the SCA drew, inter alia, from Federal Rule 23(a) of the American Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure which provides for the following prerequisites for a class action: '(1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims 
or defences or the representative parties are typical of the claims or defences of the class, and (4) the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' 
2195 2008 (2) SA 592 (C). 
2196 At para [26]. 
2197 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) - hereafter Children's Resource Centre Trust. 
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constitutional claims and laid down the following requirements for an application for prior 
certification, which is necessary for the institution for such a class action: 
(a) The class must be defined;2198 
(b) A cause of action raising a triable issue must be identified (e.g., by way of a draft 
particulars of claim and in the affidavits filed in support of the application);2199 
(c) The claims must give rise to a common issue of fact or law, but need to be 
identical;2200 and 
(d) The court must be satisfied that the representative is suitable.2201 
In Mukkaddam and Others v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd,2202 the Constitutional Court overturned 
a previous decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal to refuse the certification of a class action. 
It held that the requirements for certification that the SCA had laid down in Children's Resource 
Centre Trust are merely 'factors to be taken into account in determining where the interests of 
justice lie in a particular case.2203 If one or another factor is absent, the certification may still 
succeed because the interests of justice require so. Besides, a court may also consider other 
relevant factors when applying the interests of justice standard.2204 
In view of these requirements, it becomes clear that legislation is necessary with regard to 
harmonisation, substantiation and legal certainty. The requirements established by the courts 
are too vague in order to ensure a harmonised approach to class actions. Questions pertaining 
to the conditions for a leave of the High Court, or the question of when the common interest is 
sufficient to justify a class action must be answered by legislation in order to ensure legal 
certainty and uniformity. De Vos argues that particularly in mass class actions with thousands 
of plaintiffs, the judges 'would need Solomon's wisdom to guide [themselves] through the 
possible minefields ahead'.2205 As suggested by the Law Commission, class actions should thus 
be regulated by means of the introduction of a Public Interest and Class Actions Act.2206 
                                                             
2198 At para [29]. 
2199 At para [35]. This means that there must be a prima facie case. 
2200 At para [44]. 
2201 At para [46]. There must be no conflict of interest and he or she has the capacity to conduct the litigation 
properly. 
2202 2013 (5) SA 89 (CC). 
2203 At para [35]. 
2204 At para [47]. 
2205 De Vos 2012 TSAR 755. 
2206 SALRC Report on the Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law (Project 
88) (1998) at 111 et seq. 
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Under section 4(1)(c), a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
affected persons also has locus standi. From sections 78, 71(2)(b)(iii) and 10(1), which all 
speak of 'accredited consumer groups', one can conclude that such a consumer group must be 
accredited in order to have standing, despite the wording of section 4(1)(c). Naudé suggests 
that section 78 could be construed by the courts as lex specialis to section 4(1), considering the 
previously mentioned provisions that require accreditation for consumer groups.2207  
Section 4(1)(d) provides that a person acting in the public interest, with leave of the Tribunal 
or court, has standing. This mirrors section 39(d) of the Constitution. 
In terms of section 4(1)(e), an association acting in the interest of its members also has locus 
standi. This extensive formulation begs the question which kind of association could be meant 
by this provision because under section 78(1)(a), only accredited consumer protection groups 
have standing. One could argue that also consumer protection groups that are not accredited 
can institute class actions.2208 On the other hand, section 78 might be lex specialis so that all 
consumer protection groups will have to be accredited before they are allowed to bring an 
action.2209 Furthermore, section 71(2)(b)(iii) provides that the Commission may directly initiate 
a complaint at the request of an accredited consumer protection group. Section 10(1) sets out 
that accredited consumer protection groups may institute proceedings in the equality court or 
file a complaint with the Commission regarding discriminatory marketing. Naudé argues that 
if accreditation were processed speedily, it would not make much difference because non-
accredited organisations could easily obtain accreditation in order to bring a general use 
challenge.2210 The accreditation of consumer protection groups is analogous to the registration 
of trade unions in terms of the Labour Relations Act.2211 It is submitted that, irrespective of the 
time required for accreditation, the functioning or malfunctioning of an administration and the 
time needed for processing accreditation cannot determine the interpretation of legal 
provisions. What is more, although regulation 38(8) of the Act provides that the Commission 
must consider the application and objection to it timeously, it is unlikely that the procedure of 
accreditation can be done speedily as the Commission has to consider the aspects set out in 
regulation 38(2). Some of them require some time, such as the applicant's ability to sustainably 
provide a service to historically disadvantaged consumers in remote areas (item (c)), the 
                                                             
2207 Naudé 2010 SALJ 515. 
2208 Naudé 2010 SALJ 522. 
2209 Naudé 2010 SALJ 523. 
2210 Naudé 2010 SALJ 523. 
2211 66 of 1995. See ss 52 and 127 et seq. Labour Relations Act. Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 418. 
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efficiency and effectiveness of the applicant (item (d)), its infrastructure and support 
mechanisms (item (e), its policy on conflicts of interest (item (g). Moreover, the Commission 
must publish a notice in the Gazette and any newspaper as well as on its own website 
(subregulation (5)). More importantly, it must give the opportunity to object the application 
and invite the applicant and other interested persons to make oral submissions in support of or 
opposition to the application (subregulations (5)(d) and (7)).   
In terms of consumer access to redress, it is unfortunate that the Commission's website2212 is 
still not fully operational to date and that a search for consumer protection groups does not 
yield any result, which infringes regulation 38(12)(b). 
It is suggested that Naudé's view to require accreditation is only correct in terms of consumer 
protection groups. In terms of section 1, these are entities promoting the interests or protection 
of consumers as contemplated in section 77.2213 Other associations, not primarily concerned 
with consumer protection matters, are not contemplated in section 1. Hence, section 4(1)(e) 
could cover associations that do not focus on consumer protection, such as automobile or sports 
clubs. This would also be in line with the objective of section 4(1) to provide for a wide locus 
standi provision. Therefore, an automobile club, for example, could bring an action on behalf 
of its members against an automotive manufacturer whose vehicles are defective due to a 
manufacturing or design error. This view is supported by the fact that consumer protection 
groups might not always represent the interests of all or a specific category of consumers.2214 
It is thus suggested that section 4(1)(e) opens class actions also to consumers who are not 
represented by (accredited) consumer protection groups. Furthermore, there is no reason why 
consumers, and particularly low-income persons who are not represented by accredited 
consumer protection groups, should not be represented by a non-accredited association of 
which they are members. The broad wording of section 4(1)(e) speaks for this solution which 
also improves the realisation of the purposes of the Act set out in section 3. This being said, in 
order to ensure that consumers have their interests represented one should not put the threshold 
too high for such associations by requiring an interest of the intervening party in the subject 
matter of the litigation. Usually, an intervention in court proceedings requires such an 
                                                             
2212 http://www.thencc.gov.za. 
2213 Section 77 enumerates activities such as (a) consumer advice and education activities and consumer-related 
publications, (b) research, marketing monitoring, surveillance and reporting, (c) promotion of consumer rights 
and advocacy of consumer interests, (d) representation of consumers in court, (e) alternative dispute resolution 
through mediation or conciliation, and (f) participation in national and international associations, conferences or 
fora concerned with consumer protection matters. 
2214 See s 78(3)(a). 
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interest.2215 However, if there is no adequate representation of consumers, one should allow 
non-accredited associations to represent the concerned consumers.2216 The legislator should 
nonetheless amend section 4(1) in order to bring clarification of whether also non-accredited 
consumer protection groups have locus standi.2217 
The German Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG) provides in its § 3 which bodies are eligible 
in terms of filing institutional actions (abstract challenges). Qualified entities must be inscribed 
in the list of the European Commission or the German list in order to be 'certified'. For this, 
they must have legal personality, and their functions must at least include the promotion of 
consumers' interests by education and advice on a non-commercial and non-temporary basis, 
without this being necessarily their central role. Furthermore, there are minimum requirements 
as regards the number of members. Examples are automobile clubs, tenant associations or the 
chambers of trade and industry and chambers of crafts and labour.2218 Unlike consumer 
protection groups as defined by the Act in section 1, read in conjunction with section 77, the 
Act seems not to include associations that are not primarily concerned with consumer 
protection. Hence, 'accreditation' in terms of the Act and 'certification' under the UKlaG are 
not congruent with respect to the associations concerned. 
The wording of section 4(1) suggests that a consumer's rights must have been infringed. This 
means that the legislator only provides for an ex post facto redress and not for a preventative 
or proactive control mechanism. A proactive approach would however be essential in a country 
like South Africa with a large number of vulnerable consumers who cannot afford litigation, 
or who simply do not know that their rights are being or have been infringed. Preventive control 
is independent from an individual contract or consumer and is exercised by consumer 
organisations with preventative powers.2219 Such proactive control by consumer organisations 
and administrative watchdog entities would hence be very effective, as shown by international 
experience.2220 In German law, institutional actions aim to prevent the use of invalid clauses. 
                                                             
2215 See, e.g., Minister of Local Government and Land Tenure v Sizwe Development 1991 (1) SA 677 (Tk), Ex 
parte Sudurhavid (Pty) Ltd: In re Namibia Marine Resources (Pty) Ltd v Ferina (Pty) Ltd 1993 (2) SA 737 (Nm). 
2216 Van Heerden ‘Section 78’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
2217 Van Heerden ‘Section 78’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
2218 See discussion in Part II ch 6 para 2.3.5 a). 
2219 Naudé 2010 SALJ 517. 
2220 Article 7 of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts requires 
adequate and effective means to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers 
by 'provisions whereby persons or organisations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protection 
consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before competent 
administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that 
they can apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms.' 
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It is therefore not necessary that a given clause has been incorporated into the agreement, and 
it is sufficient that the intention of incorporating the standard provisions into contracts in the 
future is apparent.2221 This broad interpretation corresponds to article 7(2) of the Unfair Terms 
Directive according to which the abstract control must be designed for 'contractual terms drawn 
up for general use'.2222 Therefore, a commercial offer or the invitation to make an offer 
including standard business terms,2223 or an invoice on which standard terms are printed, 
without the latter being incorporated,2224 can be challenged by the eligible entities. 
The effect of such a proactive approach would be enhanced if the competent organisation or 
body not only assesses a particular term but also extends its scrutiny to other terms of the 
contract that it considers potentially unfair.2225 Since the involvement of an individual contract 
is not necessary, Naudé refers to 'abstract', 'ex ante' or 'general use' challenges in this 
context.2226 The fact that those entities have the power to negotiate with suppliers is often 
sufficient to change their unfair terms, and litigation is mostly not necessary. The threat of legal 
action can be an effective tool.2227 Hence, the legislator should amend the Act accordingly.  
German consumer protection associations usually send a 'warning' to standard terms users. 
Such a warning contains, inter alia, a deadline to comply with the association's complaint and 
a threat to take legal action. This is often sufficient to avoid litigation as most suppliers comply 
with the warning they received. 
The combination of obtaining undertakings to cease unfair practices or to apply for an 
injunction, as practised in the United Kingdom2228 and in Germany,2229 seems to be the most 
effective tool.2230 
It is important to note that the work of consumer protection groups will largely depend on their 
funding. Their work is very resource-intensive because it requires well-trained caseworkers 
                                                             
2221 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 7, UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 24. 
2222 WLP/Pfeiffer Art 7 RiLi para 7. Emphasis added. 
2223 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 1 UKlaG para 20. 
2224 LG Munich BB 1979, 1789. 
2225 UK DTI Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate Commission Review of Council Directive 93/13(EEC 
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Consultation Paper) (2000) paras 8.5-8.8. 
2226 Naudé 2010 SALJ 518. The Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG) refers to 'Verbandsklage' which will be 
referred to as 'institutional action' in the German part of this thesis. 
2227 Naudé 2010 SALJ 518. See UK DTI Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate Commission Review of 
Council Directive 93/13(EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Consultation Paper) (2000). 
2228 Unfair Terms Regulations of 1999, Regulations 10-16 read with Schedule 1 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999 No 2083. 
2229 See discussion of this topic in Part II ch 6 para 2.3, passim. 
2230 Unfair Terms Regulations of 1999, Regulations 10-16 read with Schedule 1 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999 No 2083. 
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and administrative staff and entails other costs of operation. In addition, there are much fewer 
consumer organisations in South Africa than in most European countries. A reason for this is 
undoubtedly that the idea of consumer protection as well as the Consumer Protection Act, 
which brought a new approach to this issue, are relatively new in South Africa. Another reason 
might be that the vast majority of South Africans are no big consumers due to their small 
income. It is thus imaginable that consumer protection groups will gradually gain more interest 
and influence in the changing South African consumer landscape. The Act should provide for 
provisions regulating the procedure to be followed by accredited consumer protection 
organisations when instituting abstract challenges in order to prepare them better.2231 
Moreover, the Act should make clear how consumer protection groups are financed. Regulation 
38(15) of the Act provides that an accredited consumer protection group may not charge a 
consumer any fee other than out of pocket expenses. It is hardly imaginable though how these 
groups can work efficiently and independently by relying on state funding or funding by 
interest groups such as the industry.  
Unfortunately, German consumer protection organisations are chronically under-funded 
too.2232 
3. The consumer protection entities, their functions and the redress mechanism 
3.1   General remarks 
The order set out in section 69 is quite random and contains an implied hierarchy. Nonetheless, 
the following discussion will start with the National Consumer Commission, the primary body 
tasked with the enforcement of the Act. The very complicated interactions between the various 
entities will be discussed after their presentation. 
3.2  The National Consumer Commission 
The National Consumer Commission (NCC) is the body primarily tasked with the enforcement 
of the Act. Its role however extends far beyond this function as it also has an administrative 
function, monitors market conduct and practices and fosters the education of consumers and 
suppliers alike. What is more, it must promote the coordination of activities of other 
regulators.2233 The NCC is a regulatory body that has been established under section 85, i.e., it 
is an organ of state within the public administration. The designation 'National Consumer 
                                                             
2231 Naudé 2010 SALJ 531. 
2232 Stoffels AGB-Recht 481. Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 20 is of the view that the biggest obstacle 
for an effective work of consumer associations is their weak financial resources. 
2233Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 40, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
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Commission' is somehow misleading since it does not have the same features and tasks like a 
commission under the Commissions Act.2234 Its enforcement function is set out in section 99, 
whereas its other functions are regulated in sections 92 to 98. The Commission is a juristic 
person with jurisdiction throughout the Republic.2235 It must exercise its functions in the most 
cost-efficient and effective manner, and in accordance with the values and principles mentioned 
in section 195 of the Constitution.2236 It carries out its functions in terms of the provisions of 
the Act2237 but also in terms of the National Consumer Commission Rules2238 and the Final 
Enforcement Guidelines.2239 It has also published a Service Charter2240 that provides 
information on its functions and service standards.  
a) General functions of the Commission 
Besides the enforcement function of the Commission, its other, more general functions are 
manifold. Therefore, only a short overview shall be given here. 
In terms of section 92(1), the Commission is responsible to carry out the functions and exercise 
the powers assigned to it by or in terms of the Act or any other national legislation. It may 
develop and promote the voluntary use of codes of practice in respect of the use of plain 
language in documents, a standardised or uniform means of presenting and communicating the 
information contemplated in sections 23 to 28,2241 alternative dispute resolution under section 
70, or any other matter to achieve the purposes of the Act.2242 It also has the task to promote 
legislative reform by identifying national or provincial legislation, or other public regulation, 
that affects the welfare of consumers and is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. It also 
consults with relevant provincial consumer protection authorities and organs of state within the 
national sphere of government, as well as with consumer protection groups, alternative dispute 
                                                             
2234 8 of 1947. A commission under this Act is an ad hoc body of temporary nature the findings of which usually 
culminate in a report that will be in the public domain. 
2235 Section 85(1). 
2236 Section 85(2)(c). Section 196 of the Constitution governs the basic values and principles governing public 
administration. These are, inter alia, a high standard of professional ethic, efficient, economic and effective use 
of resources, development-orientation, impartial, and fair provision of service, accountability, transparency. 
2237 Sections 85-106. 
2238 Published under GN 489 in GG 34348 of 3 June 2011. 
2239 Published under GenN 492 in GG 34484 of 25 July 2011. 
2240 National Consumer Commission Service Charter published in GenN 492 in GG 35435 of 15 June 2012. 
2241 These concern the disclosure of price of goods or services (s 23), product labelling and trade descriptions (s 
24), the disclosure of reconditioned or grey market goods (s 25), sales records (s 26), the disclosure by 
intermediaries (s 27) and the identification of deliverers, installers and others (s 28). 
2242 Section 93(1)(a)-(d). 
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resolution agents and suppliers. Moreover, it reports from time to time to the Minister with 
recommendations for achieving the transformation and reform of law set out in section 94.2243  
The Commission also monitors the effectiveness of entities, such as the relevant provincial 
consumer protection authorities, organs of state, regulatory authorities, consumer protection 
groups, and ombuds, relative to the purposes and policies of the Act.2244 It also has a research 
function concerning the nature and dynamics of the consumer market, and promotes public 
awareness of consumer protection.2245 Furthermore, it can apply to a court for a declaratory 
order on the interpretation or application of any provision of the Act, or publish any orders or 
findings of the Tribunal or a court in respect of an infringement of the Act.2246  
While the publication of findings in respect of a violation of the provisions of the Act has a 
deterrent effect, it is submitted that also decisions with regard to agreements that do not infringe 
the provisions of the Act might be useful as they can serve as a guidance for other suppliers. 
The decisions can only be published in the form of non-binding opinions on the interpretation 
of any provision of the Act in terms of section 96(b)(i). This possibility is somehow restrictive 
as a finding of the Tribunal or a court might also concern other issues than interpretational 
ones. Section 96(b)(iii) should thus be amended in that the Commission can publish any 
findings of the Tribunal or a court that are useful in terms of the application of the Act. 
In addition to any other advice or reporting requirements, the Commission is also responsible 
to advise the Minister on consumer protection matters and on the determination of national 
norms and standards regarding this field. It also reports annually on market practices and the 
implications for consumer choice and competition in the consumer market, for instance.2247 It 
has to be underlined that the Minister has no direct power to bring legislative changes on the 
provincial level because consumer protection is subject to concurrent jurisdiction.2248 The 
concurrent jurisdiction in this field might be an obstacle to effective consumer protection 
because many transactions are made across provincial borders. 
                                                             
2243 Section 94(a)-(c). 
2244 Section 95(2)(a). 
2245 Section 96. This function is similar to the function of the UK Office of Fair Trading. 
2246 Section 96(b)(ii) and (iii). 
2247 Section 98(a)-(e). 
2248 See Schedule 4 Part A of the Constitution. 
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In terms of section 83, the Minister must consult with the responsible Member of any relevant 
provincial Executive Council to co-ordinate and harmonise the functions to be performed by 
the Commission and one or more provincial consumer protection authorities. 
To date, the Commission published2249 the rules regulating its functions or operations as well 
as its draft guidelines which set out its core values.2250  
b) Enforcement function of the Commission 
The Commission's primary function is the enforcement of the Act. These functions are set out 
in section 99. Due to its failure to employ the correct procedure before issuing compliance 
notices, the Commission's enforcement functions have unfortunately been hampered.2251 The 
central role of the Commission follows international practice. It is closely linked to the Tribunal 
as under section 74, the Tribunal or a court may confirm an agreement between the Commission 
and a respondent as a consent order, for instance. Its enforcement functions can be divided into 
a prosecutorial and an investigative part.2252 
aa)   Promotion of informal resolution of disputes 
Under section 99(a), the Commission is responsible for enforcing the Act by promoting 
informal resolution of any dispute arising in terms of the Act between a consumer and a 
supplier. It is however not responsible for intervening in or directly adjudicating any such 
dispute. That the legislator did not oblige the Commission to intervene in disputes and to play 
a more direct role in the eradication of unfair contract terms on the basis of individual 
complaints is unfortunate.2253 The Commission as a national entity could have the ultimate 
responsibility to exercise preventative powers over unfair contract terms. This could have 
                                                             
2249 The NCC website (www.thencc.gov.za) contains many useful information. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
file a complaint online. However, a complaint form can be downloaded. Some links are not operational yet. 
2250 Those include respect, confidentiality, consistency, responsiveness and timeliness. See Lake 2011 De 
Rebus 46. 
2251 Van Heerden ‘Section 69’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8 note 9. See for instance City 
of Johannesburg v National Consumer Commission NCT/2667/2011/101(1)P; Vodacom Service Provider (Pty) 
Ltd, Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/2793/2011/101(P); Multichoice Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v National Consumer Commission NCT/3220/2011/101(1)(a)(P).  In Murray, Cloete et al v The National 
Consumer Commission et al NCT/4454/2012/101(1)(P) CPA and Auction Alliance v The National Consumer 
Commission and Others Case No 7798/2012 (WCC), the NCT quoted the SCA after the Commission had issued 
media statements prior to the issuing of a compliance notice and the completion of an investigation, stating that a 
certain party had engaged in a 'mock auction' although an allegation to this effect did not form part of the 
compliance notice. The NCA, quoting the SCA, stated that it would not allow persons or businesses to be subjected 
to an abuse of power and that the Commission is also subject to the Constitution and the law and must accordingly 
mend its ways in certain respects. The acts of the Commission involve a gross violation to the appellants' rights 
to privacy under the Constitution and his rights of resort to a court. 
2252 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 403. 
2253 Naudé 2010 SALJ 523. 
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several advantages, such as a consistent and predictable enforcement policy for suppliers 
operating in more than one province, as well as more consistency and legal certainty.2254 It is 
suggested that, with a view to the fact that consumer protection is subject to concurrent 
legislation, such preventive powers would achieve more harmonised outcomes. 
As already discussed, section 69 contains an implied hierarchy. Thus, a consumer should first 
approach an alternative dispute resolution agent before approaching the Commission. The 
Commission may promote informal dispute resolution by first referring the matter to an ADR 
agent according to section 72(1)(b). When the Commission acts on its own initiative in terms 
of section 71(2) though, the courts will likely construe the Act in that the Commission is not 
obliged to first seize an ADR agent before it is allowed to act on the matter.2255 
Another possibility is that the Commission attends to mediation and conciliation of disputes in 
cases where a complaint has been filed with it. This can be done by telephonic or written 
mediation or face-to-face conciliation.2256 In certain instances, extraordinary conciliation 
measures may be employed.2257 The Commission's current practice is to refer mediation of 
industry-specific matters to industry regulators.2258 
bb)   Reception of complaints 
Section 99(b) provides that the Commission receives complaints concerning alleged prohibited 
conduct or offences, and deals with those complaints according to Part B of Chapter 3.2259 
Van Eeden correctly contends that the Commission must make sure that complaints received 
from consumers are sufficiently precise and contain the relevant legal and factual information 
in order to be able to ascertain the complaint. This applies even though consumers are 
laypersons and are often illiterate. The Commission must assist them on how to formulate their 
complaints, if necessary.2260 This prevents not only abusive complaints, but the Commission 
can also advise consumers to drop their complaint if there is no basis for a successful outcome. 
                                                             
2254 Naudé 2010 SALJ 524. 
2255 Naudé 2010 SALJ 524. 
2256 Guideline 3 Part B of the Final Enforcement Guidelines published under GenN 492 in GG 34484 of 25 July 
2011. 
2257 Guideline 3.1.4 of the Final Enforcement Guidelines published under GenN 492 in GG 34484 of 25 July 2011. 
This can be done in cases where questions about impartiality of the Commission may impede the success of a 
mediation process, or because of the complexity of the case, or when face-to-face conciliations are not appropriate, 
e.g., in a mass complaint, or as an ultima ratio, where the respondent fails to co-operate. 
2258 E.g., the Consumer Goods and Services Ombud. See Van Heerden ‘Section 99’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) 
CPA Commentary para 2. 
2259 Part B of Chapter 3 deals with Commission investigations. 
2260 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 397. 
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It is submitted that given the shortage of the Commissions resources, this might also be 
beneficial in terms of eliminating obviously unsuccessful claims. This only works if the 
Commission's assessments of the outlook as regards the success of a complaint are well-
founded though, which conditions that its staff is legally trained.   
The Commission's assistance in the formulation of complaints corresponds to § 139(3) 
ZPO,2261 by which the court may indicate to a party any inconsistencies. German courts do not 
'replace' the parties' lawyers though in that they help to reformulate statements. If an application 
is, and remains, incomplete after the court's indication, the action is inadmissible.2262  
It would have been strategic to establish a national consumer helpline as mentioned in the Draft 
Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004.2263 It could be located at the NCC that 
co-ordinates and monitors a host of services so that consumer complaints could be channelled 
to the relevant redress agency. The hotline could give advisory support in order to filter out 
obviously unsuccessful complaints, which would relieve the other redress fora. 
cc)   Monitoring of the consumer market and consumer groups 
The Commission is responsible for enforcing the Act in terms of section 99(c) by monitoring 
the consumer market to ensure that prohibited conduct and offences are prevented, or detected 
or prosecuted.2264 It must also monitor the effectiveness of accredited consumer groups, 
industry codes and alternative dispute resolution schemes, service delivery to consumers by 
organs of state, and any regulatory authority exercising jurisdiction over consumer matters 
within a particular industry or sector.2265 
dd)   Investigation and evaluation of prohibited conduct 
In terms of section 99(d), the Commission must investigate and evaluate alleged prohibited 
conduct and offences. Prohibited conduct is defined in section 1 as an act or omission in 
contravention of the Act. It is submitted that only offences under the Act are covered by section 
99(d). These are breach of confidence,2266 hindering the administration of the Act,2267 offences 
relating to Commission and Tribunal, such as improperly influence the Tribunal or a regulator, 
                                                             
2261 ZPO = Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure). § 139(3) ZPO: 'The court is to draw the parties’ 
attention to its concerns regarding any items it is to take into account ex officio.' 
2262 Erman/Roloff § 8 UKlaG para 1, Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 1. 
2263 At 37, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004. 
2264 Section 99(c)(i). 
2265 Section 99(c)(ii). 
2266 Section 107. 
2267 Section 108. 
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providing false information, interruption of the proceedings or misbehaviour,2268 and offences 
relating to prohibited conduct.2269 In order to give effect to the provisions with regard to 
offences, it is submitted that both the supplier and the consumer can commit an offence. This 
view corresponds to the wording of the provisions in question that use the words 'any person' 
or 'a person' instead of 'consumer' and/or 'supplier',  
The Commission has wide investigative powers. It is empowered to issue summonses for 
purposes of interrogation or delivery of certain documents, books and objects.2270 Van Eeden 
is correct when stating that 'the power to issue a summons constitutes an authority of the holder 
of that power to exercise substantial state power', and that by conferring such an authority on 
an individual, Parliament entrusts to that person a commensurate responsibility to exercise its 
power with respect for the rule of law and the rights of the respondents.2271 This is also true for 
inspectors' extensive power to search as they have the powers of a peace officer as defined in 
section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act (section 88(2)(c)).2272 Inspectors are appointed in terms 
of section 88(1). What is more, the NCC has powers to enter and search persons or premises.2273 
The Commission's investigative powers are similar to those of the National Credit Regulator 
in terms of the National Credit Act2274 and the Competition Commission under the Competition 
Act.2275 Hence, one can expect that the Commission will be guided by the manner in which 
these bodies deal with their respective investigative powers.2276 
Obviously, accredited consumer protection organisations do not have the same powers as those 
are responsibilities under public administration. Naudé correctly contends that not only the 
Commission but also accredited consumer organisations should be empowered to obtain a 
                                                             
2268 Section 109. 
2269 Section 110. 
2270 Section 102 read with s 72(1)(d). 
2271 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 426. 
2272 Act 51 of 1977. Section 88(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedures Act. See also ss 88(2)(c), 103 and 104 CPA. 
2273 Section 104 read with s 103. A warrant to enter and search may be executed only during the day, unless the 
judge, regional magistrate or magistrate who issued it authorises that it may be executed at night at a time that is 
reasonable in the circumstances (s 103(4)). It is therefore submitted that a warrant to enter and search may be 
executed on weekends. This view is supported by s 103(6)(b) in terms of which a person executing the warrant 
must, if neither the owner, or person in control, of the premises to be searched is present, affix a copy of that 
warrant to the premises in a prominent and visible place. Furthermore, under s 105(9), the Commission may 
compensate anyone who suffers damage because of a forced entry during a search when on one responsible for 
the premises was present. It is further submitted a person executing a warrant on weekends may only do so if there 
is an imminent danger that otherwise evidence will be destroyed. Section 105(8), which is normally applicable 
for the use of force when someone inside the premises is believed to destroy or dispose of an article or document 
that is object of the search, could be applied by analogy in these cases. 
2274 34 of 2005. 
2275 89 of 1998. 
2276 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8.  
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supplier's terms of conditions.2277 As those are no 'internal' documents, such as accounting 
documents, strategic papers, or confidential documents2278 or those containing privileged 
information,2279 this would doubtlessly enhance and facilitate the work of consumer 
organisations. In practice, this issue seems not to be very relevant though because at least big 
companies offer access to their terms and conditions on their websites. 
ee)   Issuing and enforcement of compliance notices 
Section 99(e) provides that the Commission may issue and enforce compliance notices in order 
to enforce the Act. If the compliance notice has been complied with, the Commission is 
required to issue a compliance certificate.2280 
When issuing a compliance notice, the Commission may, in appropriate circumstances, 
disregard the corporate identity of the parties so that a supplier cannot circumvent the 
application of the Act by arranging its entities providing services accordingly.2281 Once a 
compliance notice has been issued, the Commission cannot investigate the matter further as it 
is functus officio.2282 A compliance notice has the purpose 'to ensure that a party who is not 
complying with the Act is informed of its non-compliance and is given an opportunity to mend 
its ways and ensure that in the future (…) it does comply with the Act.'2283 Before issuing a 
compliance notice, the Commission must consult with the regulatory authority that issued a 
licence to the regulated entity in question.2284 As the Commission must have 'reasonable belief' 
that the supplier has engaged in prohibited conduct, Van Eeden correctly asserts that the 
Commission exchanges its investigative role for a determinative action.2285 
The German UKlaG provides for a 'warning' that can be issued by an eligible body (consumer 
association) in order to warn the standard terms user prior to initiating court proceedings and 
give him the opportunity to resolve the dispute by incurring the obligation to cease and desist 
subject to a reasonable contractual penalty. The warning set out in § 5 UKlaG, read with § 12(1) 
                                                             
2277 Naudé 2010 SALJ 529. 
2278 Section 106. 
2279 Section 105(5). 
2280 Section 100(5). 
2281 Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v The National Consumer Commission NCT/2738/2011(1)(P) at 
para [28]. 
2282 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 434. 
2283 Murray, Cloete et al v The National Consumer Commission et al NCT/4454/2012/101(1)(P) CPA;  Auction 
Alliance v The National Consumer Commission and Others Case No 7798/2012 (WCC); CJ Digital SMS 
Marketing CC v The National Consumer Commission (NCT/3584/2011/101) [2012] ZANCT 22 (1 October 2012). 
2284 Section 100(2). 
2285 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 437. 
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UWG2286 corresponds to the 'prior consultation' in Directive 98/22/EC. Such a warning is 
dispensable though if it is in vain or unreasonable, e.g., where the infringement is so significant 
that the claimant cannot be expected to issue a warning before going to court.2287 
If a person does not agree with the compliance notice the Commission has issued, it may apply 
to the Tribunal to review that notice within 15 business days after receiving that notice, or such 
longer period as may be allowed by the Tribunal on good cause shown.2288 The Tribunal may, 
after considering any representations by the applicant and any other relevant information, 
confirm, modify or cancel all or part of the notice.2289 If the Tribunal confirms or modifies all 
or part of the notice, the applicant must comply with that notice as confirmed or modified, 
within the timeframe specified in it.2290  
When reading section 100(3), and particularly paragraphs (a) to (c), it becomes clear how 
essential the manner is in which the Commission conducts its investigations. In doing so, the 
investigators have to ascertain legal questions such as how and why a specific provision of the 
Act has been infringed as well as the details of the nature and extent of the non-compliance. 
Only after having conducted an investigation, the Commission can have reasonable grounds 
for believing2291 that the supplier has committed prohibited conduct. The subjective view of 
the Commission is not to be qualified as 'reasonable belief''.2292 There must be a reasonable 
belief, based on reason, and 'on objective facts, reasons or principles that the [a]pplicant was 
engaged in prohibited conduct'.2293 Otherwise, the compliance notice will be based on 
unsubstantiated allegations and assumptions, and the Commission will not be able to supply 
details in terms of the nature and extent of the non-compliance.2294 
Various compliance notices have been challenged because of non-compliance with legal 
provisions. In some cases, the Commission had failed to complete an investigation into 
prohibited conduct before issuing the compliance notice.2295 In a case, the compliance was 
issued for a purpose which does not constitute prohibited conduct under the Act, namely in 
                                                             
2286 UWG = Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act against Unfair Competition). 
2287 Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 7, WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 12. 
2288 Section 101(1). 
2289 Section 101(2). 
2290 Section 101(3). 
2291 Section 100(1). 
2292 Vodacom Service Provider (Pty) Ltd, Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission 
NCT/2793/2011/101(P) at para [58]. 
2293 Vodacom Service Provider (Pty) Ltd, Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission at para [62]. 
2294 City of Johannesburg v National Consumer Commission NCT/2667/2011/101(1)P.  
2295 City of Johannesburg v National Consumer Commission NCT/2667/2011/101(1)P. See also Accordian 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/4061/2012/60(3)101(P). 
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order to force the applicant to sign a consent order.2296 Also, failure by the Commission to 
consult with the relevant regulatory authority before issuing the compliance notice led to a 
decision that set aside the compliance notice.2297 In other matters, the compliance notices were 
set aside because they had been issued in order to force the supplier to refund monies to the 
consumer, which is not a permitted request in terms of a compliance notice.2298  
The fact that the Tribunal insisted on following the correct procedure in terms of the Act and 
gave detailed explanations in the cases described above will assist the Commission in the future 
and ensure that the correct procedure will be followed.2299  
The question begs to be asked what role compliance notices have alongside the Commission's 
other tools, namely consent orders, or the referral to the Tribunal. All those instruments require 
the investigator's belief that the supplier had engaged in prohibited conduct. Contrary to the 
latter, the former exposes the recipient to criminal prosecution should he or she not comply 
with the notice though. Van Eeden suggests that compliance notices serve as a quick and simple 
enforcement instrument with regard to a clear and specific transgression. They should be used 
in exceptional circumstances or in very clear cases, and if there are no compelling reasons for 
the issuance of a consent order or a referral to the Tribunal or a consumer court.2300 This view 
is correct as otherwise, one has to ask what the purpose of a referral to the Tribunal under 
section 73(1)(c)(iii) and (2) is. Contrary to the Commission's practice in the cases mentioned 
above, it cannot simply issue compliance notices without carrying out a proper investigation 
beforehand, and simply transfer the burden of proof to the respondents.  
In German law, a warning is not mandatory.2301 Although the issuing of a warning has no 
impact on the admissibility and merits of the court action,2302 it can avoid negative costs 
                                                             
2296 Vodacom Service Provider (Pty) Ltd, Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission 
NCT/2793/2011/101(P). 
2297 Multichoice Africa (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/3220/2011/101(1)(a)(P). 
2298 Audi SA (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/4058/2012/101(1)(P) CPA; Toyota Financial 
Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/4053/2012/101(1)(P) CPA; Accordian 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/4061/2012/60(3)101(1)(P) CPA; ADT Security 
(Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission NCT/4114/2012/101(1)(P) CPA, CMH Fiat Alfa Westrand v National 
Consumer Commission NCT/3710/2012/101(1)(P) CPA; Cell C (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission 
NCT/2737/2011/101(1)(P) CPA; KIA Motors SA (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission 
NCT/3914/2012/101(1)(P) CPA; Volkswagen South Africa v National Consumer Commission NCT/ 
3913/2012/101(1)(P) CPA; Smartsurf Wireless (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission 
NCT/4833/2012/101(1)(P) CPA; Wingfield Motors (Pty) Ltd v National Consumer Commission 
NCT/3882/2012/101(1)(P) CPA. 
2299 Van Heerden ‘Section 99 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6.  
2300 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 438. 
2301 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 1. 
2302 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 5 UKlaG para 9, Maxeiner 2003 J. Yale Int. Law 158. 
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implications.2303 Most incriminated standard clauses where consumer associations are involved 
are modified by compliance by the user after an issued warning, and not by court action.2304 
Besides, in most cases, the statutes of the eligible bodies (consumer associations) provide for 
such prior warnings.2305 Hence, a warning is issued – contrary to a compliance notice – not 
only in cases of apparent transgressions but almost systematically as a previous step before 
taking legal action, if necessary. 
Similar to the Competition Commission and its staff, the National Consumer Commission 
might abuse its powers. Van Eeden suggests that the existing compliance notice mechanism, 
coupled with a substantial criminal sanction or the threat of an administrative fine, is not an 
appropriate instrument for fighting alleged prohibited conduct in all cases.2306 It is suggested 
that the fact that the person receiving a compliance notice can apply to the Tribunal for a 
review,2307 and that the Tribunal2308 or the National Prosecuting Authority2309 will reconsider 
the facts before taking action against a supplier, provide for a sufficient safeguard mechanism 
in order to curb abuse committed by the Commission.2310 
A useful, less circuitous and less expensive procedure that could apply alongside compliance 
notices would consist in the establishment of a register of undertakings by the Commission.2311 
The latter would have to keep a record of all undertakings in respect of unfair terms and publish 
them, e.g., on its website. Furthermore, it would be convenient if the Commission had the duty 
to inform any person on request about the contents of a particular undertaking and amendments 
made to them.2312 
The former AGBG provided for a register of court decisions. For data protection reasons and 
because of the loss of significance, its procedural successor, the UKlaG, does not contain a 
similar provision.2313 The former AGBG register never entirely fulfilled its function because it 
was designed only for court decisions and could thus only be useful ex post facto. What is 
                                                             
2303 Stoffels AGB-Recht 492. 
2304 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
2305 Stoffels AGB-Recht 492. 
2306 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 439. 
2307 Section 101. 
2308 In the case of an administrative fine. See s 100(6)(a). 
2309 In the case of an offence in terms of section 110(2). See s 100(6)(b). 
2310 The Tribunal must consider the factors set out in s 112(3). 
2311 In the UK, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 do not provide for undertakings to be 
made court orders, but the OFT had simply to keep a record of all undertakings in respect of unfair terms which 
were published on its website. See para 10(3) read with para 15 UTCCR. 
2312 Naudé 2010 SALJ 529.  
2313 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 276. 
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more, the concerned actors did not – or simply could not – keep track of the register, and 
infringements were only discovered by chance.2314 An 'information pool', as suggested by 
Stoffels,2315 would thus be a much more efficient solution. Such a pool could apply a 'matrix 
approach',2316 similar to the structure of many specialised commentaries on standard terms, and 
consist of a catalogue of specific terms across all type of controls and categorisation by their 
legal nature and business sector. This would help to identify specific terms in their context.  
Much would be achieved if the Minister held the Commissioner accountable for wrongdoings 
within the Commission and discharge the Commissioner if those are not ceased. The annual 
report the Commission has to issue2317 is only of limited value in this regard because the 
Commission does not have to specify the cases that have been 'corrected' by the Tribunal. On 
the other hand, the Tribunal's statistics and published cases are a valuable source for the 
evaluation of the Commission's work. In addition, the audit review that the Minister must 
conduct at least once every five years can be helpful, but only if it is done more regularly. The 
only way to prevent abuse seems to be to establish a system of accountability. Furthermore, 
appropriate training of the staff is a second pillar to prevent (unintended) abuse. Especially 
investigators have to be chosen carefully and trained so that they are able – and willing – to 
abide by the law. 
Naudé suggests that the Commission should also be able to issue compliance notices in respect 
of provisions that have already been declared substantively unfair by a court relating to the 
supplier's interests and the terms' effect on consumers dealing typically with that supplier. This 
would imply that courts are prepared to declare terms unfair in an entire trade sector or 
industry.2318 It is suggested that because of the inter partes effect of court rulings, courts do not 
have the power to declare terms of a supplier unfair who is not a party to a litigation.  
In terms of section 96, the Commission is responsible for increasing knowledge of the nature 
and dynamics of the consumer market and to promote public awareness of consumer 
protection. This is done, inter alia, by implementing education and information measures to 
develop public awareness of the provisions of the Act, providing guidance to the public by 
issuing explanatory notices on its non-binding opinion on the interpretation of any provision 
                                                             
2314 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz before § 1 UKlaG para 36. 
2315 Stoffels AGB-Recht 481. 
2316 See Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 156. 
2317 Section 91(2) 
2318 Naudé 2010 SALJ 530. 
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of the Act,2319 or publishing any orders and findings of the Tribunal or a court in respect of an 
infringement of the Act.2320  
The former OFT, which had published its Unfair contract terms guidance with its Annexes 
containing unfair terms could serve as an example to the Commission in this respect. The OFT's 
approach did not only deter suppliers but also served as a model for drafting fairer terms. The 
supplier would then have to apply to the Tribunal to have the compliance notice set aside, or, 
if its application is unsuccessful, to take legal action before an ordinary court for review.2321  
Another approach, suggested by Naudé, could consist of court orders by which suppliers have 
to inform the Commission, the provincial consumer protection authority and all its existing 
consumers of the decision. Besides, the supplier could also be obliged to publish the decision, 
e.g., on its website or other media, with an obligation to furnish proof of implementation.2322  
Under § 7 UKlaG, the applicant may be authorised by the court to publish the operative part of 
the judgment (i.e., not the entire judgment) in the Federal Gazette and otherwise. The benefit 
of this provision is somewhat limited because of the very limited number of readers of the 
Federal Gazette or other relevant publications.2323 A publication in newspapers is not very 
efficient either because the operative part of the judgement is not always very conclusive read 
in isolation. Furthermore, the costs for the publication must be borne by the claimant. 
Consumer protection groups with limited resources might thus tend to renounce publication. 
A compliance notice remains in force until it is set aside by the Tribunal, or a court upon a 
review of a Tribunal decision concerning the notice. If the requirements of the compliance 
notice have been satisfied, the Commission issues a compliance certificate.2324 
Since warnings under the UKlaG are no administrative acts but rather a pre-trial step issued by 
eligible bodies, they can be set aside only by the issuing entity itself. Although the chambers 
of trade and industry and the chambers of crafts and labour are eligible bodies in terms of § 3 
                                                             
2319 Section 96(b)(i). 
2320 Section 96(b)(iii). 
2321 Section 100(4)(a). 
2322 Naudé 2010 SALJ 545. 
2323 Staudinger/Schlosser § 7 UKlaG para 2, WLP/Lindacher § 7 UKlaG para 4, Stoffels AGB-Recht 503. 
2324 Section 100(4) and (5). 
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UKlaG and corporations under public law,2325 the warnings they issue are not administrative 
but civil-law acts.2326 
ff)   Negotiation and conclusion of undertakings and consent orders 
Section 99(f) provides that the Commission enforces the Act by negotiating and concluding 
undertakings and consent orders contemplated in section 74. In terms of section 74(1), if the 
Commission has investigated a matter, and the Commission and the respondent agree to the 
proposed terms of the appropriate order, the Tribunal or a court, without hearing any evidence, 
may confirm that agreement as a consent order.2327 
Consent orders are an essential dispute resolution tool and have the advantage that they avoid 
civil actions in cases where a complainant agrees to a damages award.2328 
In German law, the eligible entities' warnings systematically contain an invitation to the 
standard terms user or recommender to issue a declaration to cease the use or recommendation 
of the given standard provision. Warnings require that the person refrain from using or 
recommending the standard terms in question. This also includes the referral to standard 
business terms by the user that are contained in contracts that have already been concluded.2329 
In order to avoid the costs in terms of § 93 ZPO, it is customary and reasonable2330 to include 
in the warning the invitation of the promise to make by the user or the recommender of the 
standard terms to pay a contractual penalty in case of further infringements. In addition, by 
requiring such a promise, the claimant has a leverage against the user or recommender. Usually, 
the eligible body – and not the court – determines the given amount.2331 
                                                             
2325 § 3(1) Gesetz zur vorläufigen Regelung des Rechts der Industrie- und Handelskammern of 18 December 1956 
(BGBl. 1956 I 920), as amended and § 90(1) HwO. 
2326 See https://www.hannover.ihk.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Merkblatt_Abmahnung-was_nun_ 
2012_01.pdf. 
2327 The consent order is issued on Form T1.138(1) in the Regulations pertaining to the Rules of the Tribunal 
(Regulations for matters relating to the functions of the Tribunal and Rules for the Conduct of matters before the 
National Consumer Tribunal, 2007, published under GN 789 in GG 30225 of 28 August 2007, as amended by 
GenN 428 in GG 34405 of 29 June 2011). 
2328 Van Heerden ‘Section 99 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7.  
2329 WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 18. 
2330 The indication is not necessary however in order to avoid the negative consequences of § 93 ZPO, since they 
occur automatically. 
2331 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 5. Lindacher is of the view that the determination of the amount to be paid should 
be made by the court, as the latter is neutral. He does not exclude though that the eligible bodies in terms of § 3 
UKlaG or even third parties may determine this amount (WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 18). 
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gg)   Referral to the Competition Commission, the Tribunal and the National 
Prosecuting Authority 
Under section 99(g), the Commission is empowered to refer to the Competition Commission 
any concerns regarding market share, anti-competitive behaviour or conduct that may be 
prohibited in terms of the Competition Act.2332 
These matters fall within the jurisdiction of the Competition Commission.2333 For tying 
arrangements,2334 the NCC has concurrent jurisdiction with the Competition Commission as 
these may constitute both anti-competitive2335 and prohibited conduct.2336 
Section 99(h) provides that the Commission may refer matters to the Tribunal, and appear 
before the Tribunal, as permitted or required by the Act. When referring matters to the Tribunal, 
the Commission appears as the applicant.2337 
The Commission may also refer alleged offences in terms of the Act to the National Prosecuting 
Authority according to section 99(i).2338 This is because the Commission does not have 
prosecuting authority for criminal offences.2339 In Levitt v National Consumer Commission,2340 
it was decided that the Commission has no power to conduct any investigation into the 
common-law crime of fraud. Besides its extensive investigative powers that include the issuing 
of summonses, it can lead searches by an inspector or police officers (sections 103 and 104). 
c) Legal representation 
The right to be represented in court by a legal practitioner is an inalienable right in criminal 
proceedings. In terms of section 35(2)(b) of the Constitution, everyone who is detained, 
including every sentenced prisoner, has the right to choose and to consult with a legal 
practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly. This is not the case in administrative 
and tribunal proceedings, however.2341 The Commissions is vested with vast investigative and 
                                                             
2332 89 of 1998. 
2333 See ss 19 and 21 of the Competition Act. 
2334 Tying arrangements are those whereby a seller conditions the sale of one product (the tying product) on the 
purchase of another product (the tied product) or on the purchaser's agreement not to purchase the tied product 
from any other seller. Tying arrangements are suspicious because sellers may be exploiting their control over 
tying products to force consumers into purchasing products that they may not want, or that they may have preferred 
to obtain elsewhere on different terms. See Van Heerden ‘Section 99 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 8 note 5.  
2335 Section 8(d)(iii) of the Competition Act. 
2336 Section 13 read with s 1 (definition of 'prohibited conduct'). 
2337 Van Heerden ‘Section 99 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9.  
2338 This provision has to be read in conjunction with the provisions relating to offences. See ss 107-110, 112. 
2339 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 323. 
2340 (7088/12) [2012] ZAWCHC 93 (18 June 2012). 
2341 See Cuppan v Cape Display Supply Chain Services 1995 (4) SA 175 (D) at 180G-H. 
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prosecutorial powers in terms of interrogation and search, which can be qualified as quasi 
police powers.2342 In addition, failure to comply with a compliance notice is an offence.2343 In 
terms of section 105(3) however, a person who enters and searches premises before questioning 
anyone must advise that person of the right to be assisted at the time by an advocate, and allow 
that person to exercise that right. This provision, coupled with the standard practice for a person 
appearing in response to a summons for interrogation before the Competition Commission to 
be accompanied by a legal representative,2344 can be construed in that such a practice should 
also apply before the Commission.2345 This view is convincing, particularly with regard to 
possible infringements of section 14 of the Constitution that might apply when the company of 
a supplier is privately owned. 
d)  Finances 
Under section 90(1), the Commission is financed from money appropriated by Parliament, any 
fees payable to the Commission in terms of the Act, income derived from its investment and 
deposit of surplus money, and money accruing from any other source. While subsection (2) 
clearly defines and narrows the Commission's investments and deposits,2346 the phrase 'money 
accruing from any other source' is not further defined. It is submitted that such a provision 
might lead to undue influence exerted by professional associations representing suppliers or 
other interested persons or groups (lobbying). This might compromise the Commission's 
neutrality. The legislator should therefore restrict these other sources in order to warrant the 
Commission's neutrality. 
e) Role of the Commission 
Complaints resolution is not an authorised function of the Commission, but it is vested with 
investigative functions that lead eventually to complaint resolution.2347 Complaint resolution is 
the function of the alternative dispute resolution agents, consumer courts, the Tribunal and the 
civil courts. Hence, the Commission does not play an active role in terms of dispute resolution. 
Providing for a consistent, accessible and efficient system of consensual resolution of disputes 
                                                             
2342 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 448. 
2343 Section 110(2). 
2344 Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law para 11.3.5.6. 
2345 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 448. 
2346 The Commission my invest or deposit its money that is not immediately required for contingencies or to meet 
current expenditures on a call or short-term fixed deposit with any registered bank or financial institution in the 
Republic, or in an investment account with the Corporation for Public Deposits established in terms of s 2 of the 
Corporation for Public Deposits Act 46 of 1984. 
2347 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 424. 
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arising from consumer transactions,2348 and for an accessible, consistent, harmonised, effective 
and efficient system of redress for consumers2349 are objectives of the Act. Nonetheless, the 
Act clearly indicates that the Commission does not have the function of active dispute 
resolution. In terms of section 99(a), the Commission is responsible for enforcing the Act, by 
promoting informal resolution of any dispute arising in terms of the Act between a consumer 
and a supplier, but is not responsible to intervene in or directly adjudicate any such dispute. 
The wording of this provision clearly shows that dispute and complaints resolution activities 
are not part of the Commission's functions.2350 What is more, section 72(1)(b), read with section 
70, set out the Commission's powers after having received a complaint. These do not contain 
any active role in terms of dispute resolution. Thus, the Commission's role is restricted to the 
promotion of informal dispute resolution by supporting the parties. In addition, the 
Commission is not specified as an institution in terms of section 70(1)(a) to (d) where a 
consumer may seek to resolve any dispute in respect of a transaction or agreement with a 
supplier. Van Eeden correctly maintains that the distinction drawn by the Act with respect to 
enforcement and conciliation/dispute resolution wise and should be adhered to.2351 The 
Commission's functions are already extensive, and its prosecutive functions should not be 
mixed with any adjudicative functions. 
In terms of section 71(1), any person may file a complaint concerning a matter set out in section 
69(1) [sic] (c)(ii) or (2)(b) [sic]2352 in the prescribed manner and form, alleging that a person 
has acted in a manner inconsistent with the Act. The extensive formulation 'any person' means 
that not only a consumer as a victim of alleged prohibited conduct may file a complaint, or a 
consumer protection group. Included are also persons with knowledge about such conduct, 
without being directly involved in any marketing or supply of goods or services with the given 
supplier, and even competitors.2353 Section 71(1) thus widens the locus standi provision of 
section 4(1) with regard to the Commission. This is surprising because in civil law, normally 
only persons that have a legal or other interest can institute an action. Such an interest exists if 
the party is directly subject to an adverse effect by the statute or action in question, or the party 
is not directly harmed by the conditions by which it is petitioning the court for relief but asks 
for it because the harm involved has some reasonable relation to its situation. In some cases, 
                                                             
2348 Section 3(1)(g). 
2349 Section 3(1)(h). 
2350 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 446. 
2351 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 425. 
2352 This is an editorial error. See further below. 
2353 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 416. 
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the party is granted automatic standing by act of law, which is the case here.2354 It is submitted 
that with the broadening of the standing the legislator aims to enable anyone to denounce 
prohibited conduct by suppliers in order to facilitate its eradication. This could also have a 
deterring effect on suppliers, knowing that not only consumers can approach the court when 
involved with prohibited conduct, but also persons knowing 'accidentally' of such conduct. 
The reference in section 71(1) to section 69(1)(c)(ii) or (2)(b) is wrong because these provisions 
– which existed in the Draft Bill – do not exist in the Act. It appears that they have been 
absorbed into the current section 70. The legislator probably intended that any provision in an 
industry code providing that in the event of the inability to resolve a dispute the ombud must 
make a ruling in favour of one of the parties is superseded by the requirement of section 70. 
This means that the agent must then terminate the process by notice to the parties, and the party 
who referred the matter to the agent has then the right to refer the matter to the Commission.2355 
The legislator should correct the wording of section 71(1) accordingly. 
The Commission may also directly initiate a complaint on its own motion under section 71(2). 
A third possibility is that the Commission 'may' initiate a complaint when directed to do so by 
the Minister in terms of section 86(b), or on the request of a provincial consumer protection 
authority, another regulatory authority, or an accredited consumer protection group. It is 
submitted that the Commission has no discretion when being directed by the Minister to initiate 
a complaint, as indicated by the word 'direct'. The word 'may' in section 71(2) in pr. must thus 
be read as 'must'. 
After the matter has been referred to the NCC, it will then either issue a notice of non-
referral,2356 refer the complaint to another regulatory authority, or investigate the matter.2357  
The Commission can issue a notice of non-referral if the complaint appears to be frivolous or 
vexatious, does not allege any facts which, if true, would constitute grounds for a remedy under 
the Act, or is prevented in terms of section 116,2358 from being referred to the Tribunal.2359  
                                                             
2354 See, e.g., Law Dictionary of Law s.v. 'locus standi'. Under some environmental laws in the United States, a 
party may sue someone causing pollution to certain waterways without a federal permit, even if the party suing is 
not harmed by the pollution being generated.  
2355 Van Heerden ‘Section 71 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. 
2356 Section 72(1)(a). 
2357 Section 72(1)(d). In terms of section 1, a regulatory authority is an organ of state or entity established in terms 
of the national or provincial legislation responsible for regulating an industry, or sector of an industry. 
2358 Limitation of bringing action. 
2359 Section 72(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii). 
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It may also refer the complaint to an alternative dispute resolution agent, a provincial consumer 
protection authority or a consumer court to assist the parties to attempt to resolve the dispute 
under section 70 unless the parties have previously and unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the 
dispute in that manner.2360 The referral to another regulatory authority for investigation under 
section 72(1)(c) makes only sense where no ADR agent has previously dealt with the matter, 
or where the dispute resolution process has been terminated prematurely.2361  
The Commission may also direct an inspector to investigate the complaint as quickly as 
practicable, in any other case.2362 After the conclusion of its investigation under section 
72(1)(d), it may issue a notice of non-referral to the complainant under section 73(1)(a), in 
response to a complaint, other than on the grounds contemplated in section 116. In such case, 
the complainant may refer the matter directly to the consumer court, if any, in the province 
within which the complainant resides, or in which the respondent has its principal place of 
business in the Republic, or the Tribunal, with leave of the Tribunal.2363 The respondent may 
apply to the Tribunal for an order that the matter be referred to the Tribunal. The provisions of 
section 73(4) apply to such an application.2364 Under section 73(4), if an application has been 
made to the Tribunal, the Tribunal may order that the matter be referred to it instead of the 
consumer court if the balance of convenience or interests of justice so require. 
If the Commission alleges that a person has committed an offence in terms of the Act, it may 
refer the matter to the National Prosecuting Authority.2365 
If the Commission is of the view that a person has engaged in prohibited conduct, it may refer 
the matter, according to section 73(1)(c)(i), to the equality court,2366 if the complaint involves 
a matter concerning discriminatory conduct.2367 Van Heerden and Barnard correctly argue that 
in equality-related cases, it is unnecessary and too time-consuming to approach the 
Commission first as it has no jurisdiction over these matters.2368 It is recommended that in 
matters that also comprise other consumer-related issues besides discrimination, the 
Commission should be contacted first. It can then 'split' the matter into a discriminatory part 
                                                             
2360 Section 72(1)(b). 
2361 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 33 note 5 at 69-17 (the 
numeration of the footnotes in this chapter is not logical). 
2362 Section 72((1)(d). 
2363 Section 75(1)(a) and (b). 
2364 Section 75(2). 
2365 Section 73(1)(b). 
2366 See s 10. 
2367 Part A of Chapter 2. 
2368 Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 JICLT 135. 
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(which it will refer to the equality court) and another part concerning prohibited conduct that 
it will handle itself. This has the advantage that consumers do not have to decide which entity 
they have to address. 
Where the Commission is of the view that prohibited conduct has occurred, it may propose a 
draft consent order if an agreement is reached with the respondent.2369 If the Commission and 
the respondent agree to the proposed terms of the draft consent order, the Tribunal or a court, 
without hearing any evidence, may then confirm that agreement as a consent order.2370 The 
Tribunal or the court is not obliged though to make such a consent order.2371 It may also indicate 
any changes that must be made in the draft order before it will make the order,2372 or refuse to 
make the order.2373 With the consent of a complainant, a consent order confirmed by the 
Tribunal or the court may include an award of damages to the complainant.2374 
Under section 73(1)(c)(iii), read with subsection (2), the Commission may also refer the matter 
to the consumer court of the province in which the supplier has its principal place of business, 
if there is a consumer court in that province, and the Commission believes that the issue raised 
by the complaint can be dealt with expeditiously and fully by such a referral.2375 The consumer 
court hearing the matter must conduct its proceedings in a manner consistent with the 
requirements applicable to hearings of the Tribunal and may make any order that the Tribunal 
could have made after hearing that matter.2376 An order of a consumer court made after hearing 
a matter referred to under section 73 has the same force and effect as if the Tribunal had made 
it.2377 It is submitted that this means that there is no hierarchy between the provincial consumer 
courts and the Tribunal. The legislator probably intended to put in charge the provincial entities 
and discharge the Tribunal, while providing at the same time for the possibility to apply for a 
referral to the Tribunal. A referral to the consumer court only computes if the consumer court 
had not dealt with the matter before.2378  
                                                             
2369 Section 73((1)(c)(ii). 
2370 Section 74(1). 
2371 Section 74(2)(a). 
2372 Section 74(2)(b). 
2373 Section 74(2)(c). 
2374 Section 74(3). 
2375 Section 72(2)(a). 
2376 Section 73((5)(a) and (b). 
2377 Section 73(6). 
2378 Of the same opinion: Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 33 note 3 
at 69-18 (the numeration of the footnotes in this chapter is not logical). 
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The Commission may also refer to the Tribunal in such case.2379 If the Commission refers the 
matter to a consumer court, any party to that referral may apply to the Tribunal for an order 
that the matter is referred to the Tribunal.2380 The Tribunal may order then that the matter be 
referred to it instead of the consumer court if the balance of convenience2381 or interests of 
justice so require.2382 
Finally, the Commission may issue a compliance notice under section 100.2383 If the person to 
whom the compliance notice has been issued fails to comply with the notice, the Commission 
may either apply to the Tribunal for the imposition of an administrative fine or refer the matter 
to the National Prosecuting Authority for prosecution as an offence under section 110(2).2384 
Although it is not a requirement of section 73(1)(c)(o) to (iii) that the Commission's believe in 
respect of prohibited conduct be reasonable, reasonableness is a fundamental requirement in 
administrative law.2385 It would therefore be reasonable to expect that the facts established and 
conclusions drawn during and after the investigation be documented in a report.2386 
Van Eeden correctly maintains that if the Commission has not chosen to investigate the 
complaint by an inspector under section 72(1)(d), but has instead decided to take any of the 
actions in terms of section 72(1)(a) to (c), it is precluded from investigating the complaint, 
unless a further complaint is filed. In this regard, the importance of a thorough investigation of 
each complaint by the Commission is underlined. Where the NCC chose not to investigate after 
the first consumer complaint and referred the matter to another entity, and then decides, after 
having received another complaint from another consumer concerning the same supplier and 
the same matter, to investigate, the other entities and the Commission's findings might be very 
different. This is increasingly so where the Commission did not investigate properly. Especially 
vulnerable consumers tend to lay down arms after having received an 'official' decision. They 
are more likely to accept a decision, even if it might be wrong. The problem of different 
                                                             
2379 Section 73(2)(b). 
2380 Section 73(3). 
2381 In terms of the balance of convenience, the relief given to the plaintiff is balanced against the injury that will 
be done to the defendant. See 'What is Balance of Convenience?' at http://thelawdictionary.org/balance-of-
convenience. 
2382 Section 73(4). 
2383 Section 73((1)(c)(iv). 
2384 If the Commission has applied to the Tribunal for the imposition of an administrative fine, such a prosecution 
in terms of section 110(2) is not possible. 
2385 Section 6(2)(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000: 'A court or tribunal has the power 
to judicially review an administrative action if (…) the exercise of the power or the performance of the function 
authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action was purportedly taken, 
is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or performed the function.' 
2386 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 430. 
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outcomes also exists when the Commission refers the matter to other entities, such as an ADR 
agent,2387 or when proposing a draft consent order.2388 Hence, a clear policy of the Commission 
and its smooth, professional and law-abiding functioning is not only crucial for its credibility, 
but also for a harmonised redress system in terms of section 3(1)(h). This applies even though 
the Commission does not have a direct role in dispute resolution.  
3.3  The National Consumer Tribunal 
a) General remarks 
The National Consumer Tribunal (NCT) is an ad hoc body that was established in terms of 
section 26 of the National Credit Act.2389 It has, as opposed to the Commission, adjudicative 
functions.2390 Like the Commission, it is a juristic person with jurisdiction throughout the 
Republic. While the Commission can be regarded as a 'watchdog', the Tribunal is a regulatory 
body.2391 It is a tribunal of record,2392 which means that the Registrar has to compile a record 
of the proceedings.2393 Since the Tribunal has jurisdiction over matters concerning the National 
Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act, it can be expected that it will deal with the 
different cases in a similar fashion, e.g., in respect of compliance notices, consent agreements 
and administrative fines.2394 Its procedure is governed by the Regulations for Matters relating 
to the Functions of the Tribunal and Rules for the Conduct of Matters before the National 
Consumer Tribunal, 2007.2395 The Tribunal also has a Service Charter2396 in which its 
commitment to serve the public is set out. 
Neither the Consumer Protection Act nor the National Credit Act describe the legal nature of 
the Tribunal. A comparison with the Commission is therefore helpful. The members of the 
Commission, i.e., the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, are appointed by the 
                                                             
2387 Section 72(1)(b). 
2388 Section 73(1)(c) read with s 74. 
2389 34 of 2005. 
2390 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 403. 
2391 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 325. 
2392 Section 26(1)(a)-(c) NCA. A court of record or a tribunal of record is a legal term referring to a court or 
tribunal in which a clerk takes down a record of proceedings. See Law Dictionary of Law s.v. 'court of record'. 
Tribunal records may be inspected by arrangement with the Registrar. See rule 36, GN 789 in GG 30225 of 28 
August 2007. 
2393 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 467. 
2394 Having cost-efficiency concerns in mind, the legislator expanded the Tribunal's function to other areas of 
consumer protection. Hence, the Tribunal can also hear matters of general consumer protection. See Vessio LLD 
thesis 125 note 779, GenN 1957 in GG  26774 of 9 September 2004 at 44. 
2395 Hereafter the 'Rules of the Tribunal'. These were published in GN 789 of 28 August 2007. 
2396 See www.thenct.org.za. 
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Minister,2397 whereas the members of the Tribunal are appointed by the President.2398 The 
Commission must thus be located within the administrative branch of government. This begs 
the question of whether the Tribunal is an organ of state according to the definition contained 
in section 239 of the Constitution, which expressly does not include courts or judicial officers. 
However, an organ of state is, in addition to any department of state or administration in the 
national, provincial or local sphere of government, and any other functionary or institution 
exercising a power of performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution, any other functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a 
public function in terms of any legislation. Hence, the Tribunal is an organ of state. According 
to Van Eeden, it is a 'specialist administrative tribunal', and its functions and activities 
constitute 'administrative action' in terms of section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act.2399 This view is supported by the fact that administrative action is subject to a right 
of review, which is expressly provided for by section 148(2)(a) of the National Credit Act. 
The members of the Tribunal, viewed collectively, must represent a broad cross-section of the 
population of the Republic and must comprise sufficient persons with legal training and 
experience to satisfy the requirements of section 31(2)(a) of the National Credit Act.2400 
Pursuant to section 31(2)(a) of the same Act, the Chairperson must ensure that at least one 
member of the panel is a person who has suitable legal qualifications and experience.  
The wording of section 28(1)(a) is vague because it is not clear what 'sufficient persons with 
legal training' means. Neither the meaning of 'sufficient' nor the meaning of 'legal training' is 
clear. The latter could include legal studies at a university or a more practical legal background, 
such as it is the case for clerks. With a view to the fact that the Chairperson must assign each 
matter referred to the Tribunal to a member of the Tribunal, to the extent that the National 
Credit Act provides for a matter to be considered by a single member of the Tribunal,2401 it is 
possible that a matter is decided by a person without any legal training.2402 This risk is curtailed 
                                                             
2397 Section 87(1) and (6) CPA. 
2398 Section 26(2) NCA. 
2399 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 444. 
2400 Section 28(1) NCA. 
2401 Section 31(1)(a) NCA. 
2402 The assignment of a single member of the Tribunal takes place, in accordance with section 31(1)(a) NCA, in 
terms of an application in terms of sections 73(3) (CPA) (order that the matter be referred to the Tribunal instead 
of the consumer court), an application for leave as contemplated in section 75(1)(b), an application In terms of 
section 75(2) (direct referral to a consumer court and application for an order that the matter be referred to the 
Tribunal), an application in terms of section 106 (claim that information is confidential), or an application for an 
extension of time, to the extent that the Tribunal has authority to grant such an extension in terms of the CPA. See 
s 75(5) CPA. 
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though by section 31(2)(a). According to this provision, the Chairperson, when assigning a 
matter to a panel under section 31(1)(b), must ensure that at least one member of the panel is a 
person with suitable qualifications and experience. 
Moreover, a member of the Tribunal may only serve a maximum of two consecutive terms of 
five years each.2403 This limitation seems to have more disadvantages than advantages. The 
members of the Tribunal are mostly laypersons who usually need some time to develop 
specialised legal skills, especially with regard to the variety of matters the Tribunal deals with 
and the steadily changing area of consumer protection. The valuable knowledge and skills 
developed during the one or two terms are lost for the Tribunal after expiration of the term(s). 
It is further my submission that the limitation of terms should be rather applied to governmental 
functions, in order to avoid or limit abuse, but not to a specialised administrative body. 
With a view to the fact that the Tribunal both hears matters concerning the National Credit Act 
and the Consumer Protection Act, it is also suggested that the establishment of two specialised 
chambers would be a step towards more professionalism. The subjects of these two statutes, 
although quite similar in their structure, are too different to be treated by the same members. 
This applies even more with regard to the limitation to two consecutive terms of the members. 
The procedure applicable to and the powers of the Tribunal are set out in the Consumer 
Protection Act as well as in the National Credit Act. After an investigation by the Commission 
and agreement between the Commission and the respondent on the proposed terms of an 
appropriate order, the Tribunal may confirm that agreement as a consent order, without hearing 
any evidence, in terms of section 74(1). After hearing a motion for a consent order, the Tribunal 
must make an order as agreed to and proposed by the Commission and the respondent, indicate 
any changes to be made in the draft order before it will make the order, or refuse to make the 
order.2404 A consent order can only be confirmed in respect of a person or association of persons 
who were submitted to an investigation2405and always requires that an agreement has been 
reached. Without an agreement, the matter should be referred to the Tribunal for a hearing into 
                                                             
2403 Section 29(1) and (2) NCA. 
2404 Section 74(2)(a)-(c). 
2405 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 407. See Murray, Cloete et al v The National Consumer 
Commission et al NCT/4454/2012/101(1)(P) CPA. 
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prohibited conduct in order to enable the complainant to institute an action in the civil courts 
for damages.2406 
An extensive presentation and discussion of the proceedings applicable to the Tribunal would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be noted that the word 'appeal' in section 148(1) 
of the National Credit Act must be interpreted broadly to include a review of a decision. It 
would make no sense to give a full panel of the Tribunal appeal jurisdiction in respect of a 
decision reached by a single member of the Tribunal, but no review jurisdiction, and to reserve 
the possibility of a review to the High Court.2407 
An order made by the Tribunal has the status of an order of the High Court.2408 At first sight, 
one might think that this creates problems as regards the separation of powers because the 
Tribunal is strictly speaking not part of the judiciary but an administrative body. Usually, 
decisions reached by an administration do not have the status of court decisions. It is submitted 
that the rationale of section 152 of the National Credit Act is to clarify that orders of the NCT 
are binding vis-à-vis the bodies mentioned in this provision. Section 148 of the same Act 
provides that orders made by the Tribunal are subject to an appeal before the High Court. 
Hence, the separation of powers between the executive branch and the judiciary is not affected. 
The Tribunal may vary or rescind its decision or order (a) erroneously sought or granted in the 
absence of a party affected by it, (b) in which there is ambiguity, or a manifest error or 
omission, (c) or made or granted as a result or a mistake common to all the parties to the 
proceedings.2409 
On the other hand, with a view to the doctrine of separation of powers, administrative bodies, 
such as the Tribunal, are usually not endowed with interdictory powers, but rather with powers 
to grant or withhold specific permissions. In terms of section 114(1), not only the court but also 
the Tribunal may grant interim relief. By bestowing this power, the Tribunal may also issue 
interdicts. An 'interdict' is an order made by a court prohibiting or compelling the doing of a 
                                                             
2406 CJ Digital SMS Marketing CC v The National Consumer Commission (NCT/3584/2011/101) [2012] ZANCT 
22 (1 October 2012). 
2407 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. Section 148 NCA: '(1) A 
participant in a hearing before a single member of the Tribunal may appeal a decision by that member to a full 
panel of the Tribunal. (2) Subject to the rules of the High Court, a participant in a hearing before a full panel of 
the Tribunal may (a) apply to the High Court to review the decision of the Tribunal in that matter; or (b) appeal 
to the High Court against the decision of the Tribunal in that matter, other than a decision in terms of section 138.' 
(Section 138 NCA deals with consent orders). 
2408 Section 152 NCA. 
2409 Section 165 NCA. 
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particular act in order to protect a legally enforceable right that is threatened by continuing or 
anticipated harm.2410 In cases where the Commission refers or does not refer the matter to the 
Tribunal and opts for a compliance notice instead, the Commission has effectively barred the 
applicant from accessing interim relief, a potential claim for damages and other legal 
remedies.2411 With a view to the prerequisites set out in section 114(1)(a) to (d), it is suggested 
that the legislator's decision to endow the Tribunal with the power to grant interim relief was 
done with good reasons. This is because a complainant seeking low-cost redress who avoids 
approaching the ordinary courts can be granted this measure inexpensively.  
b) Redress by the Tribunal 
A complainant cannot directly approach the Tribunal as it is no 'point of first entry' for redress. 
A matter can only be referred to it by the Commission under section 73(2)(b) or by application 
of the respondent under section 75(2).2412 Even in the context of an application for interim relief 
according to section 114, the Tribunal can only be approached for relief once the complaint has 
been referred to it by the Commission or by a consumer after the Commission has issued a 
notice of non-referral in respect of the complaint.2413 Van Eeden seems to suggest that the 
Tribunal may be directly approached by the persons indicated in section 4(1)(a) to (e).2414 
Despite the wording of section 69(a) according to which '[a] person contemplated in section 
4(1) may seek to enforce any right (…) by referring the matter directly to the Tribunal if such 
a direct referral is permitted by this Act in the case of the particular dispute',2415 it is submitted 
that such a direct referral is contrary to the redress mechanism of the Act. The Act clearly 
favours ADR or dispute settlements by provincial consumer courts (where they exist) before a 
matter is referred to the Tribunal by the Commission after it has investigated the complaint. 
This 'filtering' function of the Commission ensures that the Tribunal is not flooded with 
potentially unsubstantiated demands and safeguards the Tribunal, which is an ad hoc body with 
limited capacities, from congestion. It is submitted that such a direct referral to the Tribunal 
under 69(a) must be understood in the context of section 75(1)(b) according to which the 
                                                             
2410 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 460. 
2411 Nayyara Distribution Enterprise CC v Ealryworks 266 (Pty) Ltd t/a/ Gloria Jeans Coffees SA 
NCT/4450/2012/114 (1) (P) CPA at para [19]. 
2412 Mupangavanhu is of the opinion that a consumer may directly refer a matter to the Tribunal in terms of section 
69(a). Such a 'direct referral' is only possible though with leave of the Tribunal to refer a matter to it directly in 
response to a notice of non-referral by the Commission in terms of s 75(1)(b). See Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 
325. 
2413 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 33. 
2414 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 449, Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 426 
and 427. At 437 (2013 ed), he states that such a direct referral is only possible where the Commission has issued 
a notice of non-referral and the consumer then applies for leave to refer the matter directly to the Tribunal. 
2415 Emphasis added. 
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complainant may, after the Commission has issued a notice of non-referral, refer the matter 
directly to the Tribunal, with leave of the Tribunal. The word 'directly' must therefore not be 
understood literally, but as 'after having received a notice of non-referral in terms of section 
75(1)'. A person not acting on his or her own behalf who intends to approach the Tribunal in 
terms of the locus standi provisions of section 4(1)(b), (c), (d) or (e) must first apply to the 
Tribunal for leave to approach the Tribunal on this basis.2416 
The Tribunal may hear matters that have been referred by the Commission under section 
73(2)(b), or where a complainant has obtained leave from the Tribunal under section 75(1)(b) 
to refer the matter to it directly in response to a notice of non-referral by the Commission other 
than a notice of non-referral in terms of section 116,2417 or where a matter has been transferred 
by a consumer court to the Tribunal according to section 73(3) or 75((2). 
The Tribunal may make a consent order in terms of section 74, as discussed above. It may also 
make any applicable order contemplated in the Act or section 150 or 151 of the National Credit 
Act, read with the changes required by the context.2418 This includes orders declaring conduct 
to be prohibited under the Act,2419 interdicting any prohibited conduct,2420 imposing an 
administrative fine under section 151, with or without the addition of any other order under 
section 150,2421 or confirming a consent agreement in terms of the Act as an order of the 
Tribunal.2422 In addition, the Tribunal may issue an order confirming, modifying or cancelling 
all or part of a compliance notice after considering any representations by the applicant and 
any other relevant information,2423 condoning any non-compliance with its rules and 
procedures on good cause shown,2424 granting interim relief in terms of section 114 of the 
Consumer Protection Act, and granting relief under section 60(3) of the Act in respect of a 
notice according to section 60(2) by the Commission regarding an investigation or recall 
programme with respect to unsafe goods, or reviewing a compliance notice.  
                                                             
2416 Rule 4A(1) of the Tribunal Rules for Conduct which refers to s 4(b), (c) (d) or (e) CPA. 
2417 Section 116 sets out the limitations of bringing action. 
2418 Section 75(4). 
2419 Section 150(a) NCA. 
2420 Section 150(b) NCA. 
2421 Section 150(c) NCA. 
2422 Section 150(d) NCA. 
2423 See Murray, Cloete et al v The National Consumer Commission et al NCT/4454/2012/101(1)(P) CPA and 
Auction Alliance v The National Consumer Commission and Others Case No 7798/2012 (WCC). 
2424 Section 150(e) NCA. 
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What is more, the Tribunal may impose an administrative fine in respect of prohibited 
conduct.2425 Contrary to criminal prosecution, administrative fines have the advantage that they 
can be imposed relatively quickly and depend on less strict demands. They are nonetheless 
efficient because they carry significant reputational and financial consequences for the accused 
person's business.2426 
In the case of a notice of non-referral by the Commission, in response to a complaint, other 
than the grounds contemplated in section 116, the complainant may refer the matter directly to 
the Tribunal, with leave of the Tribunal.2427 Then, the Tribunal must conduct a hearing in 
accordance with the requirements of the Act, and the applicable provisions of the National 
Credit Act pertaining to the proceedings of the Tribunal and may make any applicable order 
contemplated in the Consumer Protection Act or in section 150 or 151 of the National Credit 
Act, read with the changes required by the context.2428  
This means that, when applying the Act, the Tribunal may consider appropriate foreign and 
international law, international conventions or declarations in terms of section 2(2).2429 It also 
must develop the common law as necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of 
consumer rights generally, and in particular by vulnerable persons,2430 and promote the spirit 
and purposes of the Act.2431 What is more, the Tribunal must2432 make appropriate orders to 
give practical effect to the consumer's right of access to redress, included, but not limited to 
any order provided for in the Act, and any innovative order that better advances, protects, 
promotes and assures the realisation by consumers of their rights in terms of the Act.2433 As the 
Act does not define words like 'appropriate' and 'practical effect', the interpretation of them is 
left to the discretion of the presiding officer in the given dispute.2434  
                                                             
2425 Section 112(2)(a) and (b). 
2426 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 415. 
2427 Section 75(1)(b). 
2428 Section 75(4)(a) and (b). 
2429 Section 2(2) NCA is more restrictive than s 2(2) CPA in that the Tribunal may only consider foreign and 
international law, but not international conventions, declarations etc. 
2430 Section 4(2)(a). 
2431 Section 4(2)(b)(i). 
2432 The word 'must' indicates that the Tribunal has no discretion. See Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and 
Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 25. 
2433 Section 4(2)(b)(ii). 
2434 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 326. 
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A complaint in terms of the Act may not be referred or made to the Tribunal more than three 
years after the act or omission that is the cause of the complaint, or in the case of a course of 
conduct or continuing practice, the date that the conduct or practice ceased.2435  
In German law, the limitation period for individual and institutional actions is also three years 
(§ 195 BGB).2436 If a user reuses its standard terms or the latter are recommended again, the 
limitation period starts from the beginning.2437  
In addition, a complaint may not be referred to the Tribunal against any person that is, or has 
been, a respondent in proceedings under another section of the Act relating substantially to the 
same conduct.2438 
The standard of proof in any proceedings before the Tribunal in terms of the Act is on a balance 
of probabilities.2439 
3.4  Consumer courts 
a) General remarks 
A 'consumer court' is defined in section 1 as a body of that name, or a consumer tribunal, that 
has been established under applicable provincial consumer legislation. This means that there 
are no national consumer courts, and that ordinary courts are not included in this definition. 
'Courts' in terms of the Act thus means common-law courts. Consumer courts are rather 
administrative bodies.2440 
It seems that the jurisdiction of consumer courts to hear direct referrals by a consumer extends 
beyond the traditional rules of geographic jurisdiction, which require a matter to be instituted 
in the court where the respondent resides. According to the principle actor sequitor forum 
rei,2441 the plaintiff (or applicant) has to follow the defendant (or respondent) to his or her 
forum and institute legal proceedings there. However, when reading section 69(c)(ii) in terms 
of which a person with locus standi under section 4(1) may seek to enforce any right under the 
Act by applying to the consumer court of the province with jurisdiction over the matter, in 
                                                             
2435 Section 116(1). 
2436 § 195 BGB: 'The standard limitation period is three years.'  
2437 Erman/Roloff § 1 UKlaG para 12, Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 15. 
2438 Section 116(2). 
2439 Section 117. In terms of this section, this standard of proof also applies to consumer courts. 
2440 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 518. 
2441 This principle is laid down, inter alia, in s 28(1)(a) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 and s 21 of the 
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. It states that the plaintiff must follow the forum of the thing in dispute. In view 
of this maxim, the remedies upon contracts and their incidents are regulated and pursued according to the law of 
the place where the action is instituted. See 'Actor Sequitur Forum Rei Law & Legal Definition' at 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/actor-sequitur-forum-rei. 
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conjunction with section 75(1)(a), pursuant to which the consumer may refer a matter directly 
to a consumer court where the Commission issues a notice of non-referral after an investigation, 
it becomes clear that the consumer court in the province within which the complainant resides 
or in which the respondent has its principal place of business has jurisdiction.2442 Interestingly, 
the complainant has a jurisdictional choice, which may also cross provincial boundaries. The 
provinces govern provincial jurisdiction though. The provinces should therefore draft their 
legislation accordingly.2443 
According to Schedule 4 Part A of the Constitution, consumer protection matters are matters 
of concurrent jurisdiction. Certain provinces have adopted provincial consumer protection 
legislation based on the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act.2444 The Gauteng 
Consumer Affairs Court, for instance, has been established in 1999 on the basis of the Gauteng 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996.2445 Pursuant to item 7 of 
Schedule 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, the Minister, by notice in the Gazette, may 
delegate the relevant Member of the Executive Council (MEC) any or all of the functions of 
the Commission to be exercised within that province and in accordance with the Act, until 
provincial legislation has been enacted in a province establishing a provincial consumer 
protection authority. In all nine provinces, Consumer Affairs Offices have been established to 
provide consumers with advice and information though. A provincial consumer protection 
authority is defined in section 1 as a body established within the provincial sphere of 
government, and designated by the responsible MEC of a province to have general authority to 
deal with consumer protection matters within that province.  
Under section 84, a provincial consumer protection authority has jurisdiction within its 
province to (a) issue compliance notices in terms of the Act on behalf of the Commission to 
any person carrying on business exclusively within that province, (b) facilitate the mediation 
or conciliation of a dispute arising in terms of the Act between or among persons resident, or 
                                                             
2442 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 86. 
2443 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 87. 
2444 71 of 1988. 
2445 In other provinces, consumer affairs and the establishment of consumer courts are regulated by the following 
statutes: Western Cape Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices Act 10 of 2002, Mpumalanga 
Consumer Affairs Act 6 of 1998, North-West Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 4 of 
1996 (suspension of certain provisions of the North West Consumer Affairs Act 13 of 1995), Northern Cape 
Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996, Eastern Cape Province Consumer Affairs 
(Unfair Business Practices) Act 5 of 1998, Free State Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 14 of 
1998 and Northern Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 8 of 1996, as amended by the 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 2 of 2003, Limpopo Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business 
Practices) Act 8 of 1996. Kwa-Zulu Natal Consumer Protection Act 4 of 2013. 
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carrying on business exclusively within that province, (c) refer a dispute contemplated in 
paragraph (b) to the provincial consumer court within that province, if there is one, and (d) 
request the Commission to initiate a complaint in respect of any apparent prohibited conduct 
or offence in terms of the Act arising within that province. Some provinces have concurrently 
established consumer courts.2446 The fact that not all provinces have established consumer 
courts means that many South Africans have no access to them.2447 Therefore, this form of 
redress will be unavailable for many consumers in other parts of South Africa, and even in the 
more remote parts of the provinces where consumer courts have actually been established.2448 
Only when all provinces will provide for consumer courts, an important step towards better 
service delivery for consumer redress will be done.2449 
Each consumer court has its own procedural rules so that consumers have to consult those first 
in order to comply with them before approaching the competent court. This is not very 
consumer-friendly and hampers even more the access to consumer courts. Unfortunately, the 
provinces did not create a common legislative framework to be used as an overarching model. 
This approach has been successfully adopted in Germany, where 15 out of 16 federal states 
took the Administrative Procedure Act2450 of the Federal Republic as a sample. Some of the 
federal states have even copied the federal rules word for word. This approach ensures a 
harmonised procedure throughout the country.2451 It would also facilitate the transfer of matters 
from one province to another, as illustrated in the case of Coen Scheepers v N12 Diesel Engines 
CC.2452 In this case, the matter was transferred from the Consumer Affairs Court for the Free 
State Province2453 to the Office of the Consumer Protector in Gauteng. The Consumer Affairs 
Court held that an investigation had to be conducted by the Gauteng office and not the Free 
State office because both provinces were governed by different provincial laws and have 
separate jurisdictions. The Minister should take the opportunity provided for in section 98(d) 
should the Commission recommend any changes as regards uniformity in the provincial 
legislation concerning consumer protection so that they can develop a common framework. 
                                                             
2446 Currently in Gauteng, the Free State, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Western Cape. 
2447 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
2448 Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 JICLT 135. 
2449 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 87. 
2450 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG). 
2451 See Neulen Recht A-Z s.v. 'Verwaltungsverfahren' and Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 
'Verwaltungsverfahren'.  
2452 GCC 131/10/08/04. 
2453 Case No. FSCAC 2003/8-7. 
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In Gauteng, for example, the Consumer Affairs Court consists of five persons. The chairperson 
shall be a retired judge of the Supreme Court, or pursue another legal profession, e.g., as an 
advocate, with not less than one years' cumulative experience in one or more such capacities. 
The four additional members must have special knowledge or experience of consumer 
advocacy, economics, industry or commerce.2454 Although the members of the court have legal 
experience, the fact that they do not necessarily need a law diploma, except for the chairperson, 
raises some concerns. The legal complexity of consumer protection legislation requires 
adjudicative bodies consisting solely or mainly of lawyers. Some subjects that need sound legal 
knowledge, experience and analysis should be given here as examples: The determination of 
unfairness or the wrongfulness in product liability involves a value judgment, which requires 
an open and structured process of reasoning, including the proven facts, the relationship 
between the parties and the relevant legislation.2455 These matters are often fought in an unequal 
struggle between suppliers, who have access to the necessary information and superior 
resources, and consumers that are often vulnerable.2456 What is more, the wide definition of 
goods2457 may involve copyright or intellectual property issues that only lawyers may assess. 
Furthermore, the unsatisfactory and often poor definitions as well as the innumerable problems 
and contradictions contained in consumer protection legislation contribute to its complexity 
and legal problems that require sound legal expertise. It is submitted that the possibility offered 
by section 18(4) of the Gauteng Consumers Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act in terms 
of which the office may be represented or assisted by an advocate, attorney, or any other person 
approved by the responsible Member, does not balance these shortcomings. In legal systems 
where a court is composed by one professional lawyer and several laypersons, experience has 
shown that as soon as complex legal questions arise, the lay judges rely on the professional 
magistrate's opinion rather than forming an independent judgement.2458   
As consumer protection is a field of concurrent jurisdiction, the Act contains provisions aimed 
at the co-operation between the Commission and the Provinces. The Minister's power to 
delegate the relevant MEC functions of the Commission to be exercised within the province 
                                                             
2454 Section 14(2) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2455 In terms of s 61(6), '[n]othing in this section limits the authority of a court to (a) assess whether any harm has 
been proven and adequately mitigated, (b) determine the extent and monetary value of any damages, including 
economic loss, or (c) apportion liability among persons who are found to be jointly and severally liable.' 
2456 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 78 and 79. 
2457 Section 1. This definition includes any literature, music, photograph, motion picture, game, information, data, 
software, code or other intangible product written or encoded on any medium or a licence to use any such 
intangible product. 
2458 In Germany: §§ 20-22 ArbGG for labour law matters, or 109 GVG for commercial matters. 
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until a provincial consumer protection authority has been established has already been 
discussed.  
What is more, under section 83(5), at the direction of the Minister, the Commission must 
engage with any relevant provincial consumer protection authority in co-operative activities to 
detect and suppress prohibited conduct or offences in terms of the Act, occurring within the 
province or across its provincial boundaries. In terms of section 41(2) of the Constitution, the 
Minister must consult with the responsible Member of any relevant provincial Executive 
Council to co-ordinate and harmonise the functions to be performed by the Commission and 
one or more provincial consumer protection authorities. When necessary, he or she must 
facilitate the settlement of any dispute between the Commission and one or more provincial 
consumer protection authorities, concerning the functions to be performed by them relating to 
consumer protection.2459 Moreover, the Minister must consult with the responsible MEC of the 
given province to determine the steps to be taken to ensure the fulfilment of a statutory 
obligation contemplated by the Act.2460 The Commission may request a provincial consumer 
protection authority to submit any report or information related to the activities of that 
provincial consumer protection authority to the Commission.2461 
b) Redress by consumer courts 
Instead of approaching an alternative dispute resolution agent, the consumer or another person 
contemplated in section 4(1) may approach a provincial consumer court with jurisdiction over 
the matter directly, if one exists in the given province.2462 
The rules governing consumer courts vary from province to province. Complaints are generally 
received by a consumer protector2463 who is a 'provincial consumer protection authority' in 
terms of section 84. A consumer may lodge a complaint with the protector's office. The office 
may also institute an investigation where no complaint has been lodged.2464 The office has wide 
powers, such as summoning and questioning persons and requiring the production of books 
and other documents,2465 or entering premises and executing searches and seizures.2466 The 
                                                             
2459 Section 83(1)(a) and (b). 
2460 Section 83(2). 
2461 Section 83(6). It is suggested that the formulation 'may request' leaves no discretion to the provincial consumer 
protection authority and that the latter must provide the Commission with such report or information. 
2462 Section 69 read with s 70. Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
2463 See, e.g., s 6 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2464 See, e.g., s 7 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2465 See, e.g., s 8 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2466 See, e.g., s 10 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
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office may also negotiate arrangements to discontinue unfair business practices.2467 Upon 
completion of an investigation, the Consumer Protector may institute proceedings in the court 
of the area concerned against the person alleged to be responsible for the unfair business 
practice in question.2468 If the office decides not to institute proceedings, the Consumer 
Protector shall inform the complainant.2469 A person who does not comply with the Consumer 
Protector's requests is guilty of an offence and will be liable, if convicted, to a fine not 
exceeding R 200,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years.2470 
In general, consumer courts may make orders prohibiting unfair business practices,2471 
awarding costs against persons that have committed unfair business practices,2472 confirming 
or setting aside arrangements negotiated by the Office of the Public Prosecutor2473 or declaring 
certain business practices to be unlawful.2474 In addition, they are entitled to appoint a curator 
to perform duties necessary to give effect to any of these orders.2475 The curator is empowered, 
inter alia, to take control over a business and realise its assets to reimburse consumers.2476  
Consumer court orders must be published in the Provincial Gazette.2477 The publication serves 
as a record because the hearings and arrangements are recorded entirely, but also for future 
reference.2478 These publication requirements are more far-reaching than in § 7 of the German 
UKlaG that requires that only the operative part of judgement may be published. 
The proceedings of the court are generally open to the public.2479 They shall be prosecuted by 
the office, which may be represented or assisted by an advocate, attorney, or any other person 
approved by the responsible Member.2480 
                                                             
2467 See, e.g., s 11 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2468 See, e.g., s 12(1)(a) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2469 See, e.g., s 12(2) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2470 See, e.g., ss 8(4), 30 and 31 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2471 See, e.g., s 22 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2472 See, e.g., s 17(1)(b) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2473 See, e.g., s 20(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2474 See, e.g., s 24 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2475 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 77. See, e.g., s 23 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) 
Act 7 of 1996. 
2476 See, e.g., s 23 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2477 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 77. See, e.g., s 21(3) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) 
Act 7 of 1996. 
2478 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 77. 
2479 See, e.g., s 18(2) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2480 See, e.g., s 18(4) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
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The sanctions pronounced against persons who disregard the court's orders correspond to those 
for infringements of the Consumer Protector's orders.2481 
Even though consumer courts may make extensive orders, their enforcement and execution 
remain unaddressed in the relevant consumer court legislation,2482 which makes them toothless 
tigers. A drawback of this phenomenon is that matters which could normally be handled by 
provincial consumer courts end up at national level in order to achieve adequate 
prosecution.2483 The only sanction in provincial legislation in a case where a respondent 
(supplier) fails to comply with a consumer court order, is that the latter can be found guilty of 
an offence. Then, he or she can be convicted to pay the penalties set out in the legislation.2484 
The Consumer Protector may then lay a charge of contempt of court against the respondent 
with the South African Police Service (SAPS) which, after investigation, will hand over the 
matter to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). The case will then become a criminal 
matter. In the criminal matter S v PL Mholongo2485 which stemmed from the consumer court 
affair Rakgadi Nyusawa v Patwell Funerals CC (represented by PL Mhlongo),2486 the accused 
was found guilty of fraud, and a sentence of 12 months imprisonment, suspended for 12 
months, was passed.2487 However, the complainant (consumer) was not granted any financial 
compensation because the compensation award imposed by the consumer court, based on the 
breach of contract, could not be enforced by the criminal court.2488 
Therefore, there is an urgent need for a proper enforcement and execution procedure in this 
field.2489 Du Plessis suggests that the provincial legislation should be amended as follows: 'Any 
decision, judgment or order of the consumer court is final and binding and may be served, 
executed and enforced as if it were an order of the National Consumer Tribunal.'2490 The 
                                                             
2481 See, e.g., s 31 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2482 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 517. 
2483 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 39, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
2484 See, for instance ss 30 and 31 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
2485 Benoni CAS 154/01/08. 
2486 GCC 240/13/06/06. 
2487 In this case it is astonishing that the attorney proceeded to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of fraud in terms 
of s 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, instead of a charge of contempt to court, although no 
alteration of a charge from contempt of court to fraud was found in the court filed and the complainant did not lay 
a charge of fraud. Since the accused had ignored the order of the consumer court, there was clearly a contempt of 
court though. 
2488 The public prosecutor could have ensured financial satisfaction though by requesting the magistrate to make 
a civil order for compensation in terms of s 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Such an order would have had the 
effect of a civil judgment of that court. See Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 523. 
2489 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 327. 
2490 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 527. 
 444   
 
reasoning for this formulation can be found in section 73(2)(a). According to this provision, 
the Commission may refer a matter to a consumer court of the province, if there is one. In 
addition, under section 73(6), an order of a consumer court made after hearing a matter referred 
to has the same force and effect as if the Tribunal had made it. According to section 75(1)(a), 
when the Commission issues a notice of non-referral, the complainant may refer the matter 
directly to a consumer court. The consumer court must conduct its proceedings in a matter 
consistent with the requirements applicable to hearings of the Tribunal and may make any order 
that the Tribunal could have made after hearing the matter.2491 Du Plessis admits though that 
the problem with such a formulation is that under section 152(1) of the National Credit Act, 
the Tribunal's decisions, judgments or orders (and effectively those of the consumer courts too) 
will be binding on the National Credit Regulator, provincial credit regulators, other consumer 
courts, alternative dispute resolution agents or the ombuds with jurisdiction, debt counsellors 
and magistrates' courts. The legislator's intention was not to grant such powers to provincial 
consumer courts though. In addition, it is improbable that the legislator wants consumer courts 
to be on the same level as the High Court with regard to the different appointment procedures 
and qualifications of the members of these two bodies.2492  
Du Plessis therefore suggests an alternative to her amendment mentioned above in that 'any 
decision, judgment or order of the consumer court is final and binding and is deemed to be an 
order of a magistrates' court in terms of the Magistrates' Court Act2493 and is enforced in terms 
of that Act.'2494 The order of the magistrates' court might exceed the monetary jurisdiction limit 
of R 300,000, however.2495 To solve this problem, one could limit the monetary jurisdiction of 
the consumer courts to that of magistrates' courts, which would be a restriction of consumer 
protection though, especially in class actions where this limit might easily be reached. Another 
solution could be that a consumer court has to refer a matter to the Commission in cases where 
the magistrates' court monetary limit is reached. The Commission then would have to 
investigate the matter in order to determine whether the matter should be referred back to the 
consumer court for a hearing.2496 The order of the consumer court, after the hearing, has the 
same force and effect as if the Tribunal had made it.2497 According to section 152(1) of the 
                                                             
2491 Section 73(5)(a) and (b). 
2492 See s 14 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) 'Act 7 of 1996. 
2493 32 of 1944. 
2494 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 528. 
2495 Section 29 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 and GN 670 in GG 33418 of 29 July 2010. 
2496 Section 73(2)(b). 
2497 Section 73(6). 
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National Credit Act, such an order may then be served, executed and enforced as if it were an 
order of the High Court.2498 Although this solution is preferable and has the merit of being 
elegant, it reveals the over-complicated redress mechanism of the Act. 
As mentioned above, besides the consumer courts, there are also consumer protection 
authorities on the provincial level. According to section 84, a provincial consumer protection 
authority has jurisdiction within its province to (a) issue compliance notices in terms of the Act 
on behalf of the Commission, (b) facilitate the mediation or conciliation of a dispute arising in 
terms of the Act, (c) refer a dispute to the provincial consumer court within that province, if 
there is one, and (d) request the Commission to initiate a complaint in respect of any apparent 
prohibited conduct or offence in terms of the Act.   
There seems to be a tacit agreement in terms of which provincial consumer courts focus on 
individual complaints against regional or local businesses. In contrast, the national 
government's role (Commission) is to investigate and prosecute suppliers having national reach 
or presence.2499 It is suggested that, if such a tacit agreement exists, it should be set out 
expressly in a piece of legislation in order to achieve more legal certainty and coherency. Tacit 
agreements in the administrative sphere are no sufficient legal basis in a democracy. If no 
clarification is provided, there is a risk of duplication and misallocation of resources.2500 
The standard of proof in any proceedings before a consumer court in terms of the Act is on a 
balance of probabilities.2501 
3.5  Alternative dispute resolution  
a) Ombuds with jurisdiction and industry ombuds as ADR agents 
The Consumer Protection Act and the National Credit Act both provide for alternative 
complaint procedures, including ombuds.2502 The Department of Trade and Industry was of the 
view that there is a need for ADR mechanisms in the form of industry-funded procedures. Only 
where voluntary mechanisms have 'not been effective or where the industry is of such a nature 
that greater regulation is required should statutory mechanisms be considered.'2503 Contrary to 
                                                             
2498 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 528 and 529. 
2499 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 44, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
2500 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 44, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
2501 Section 117. In terms of this section, this standard of proof also applies to the Tribunal. 
2502 The word 'ombud' has been coined in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. 
2503 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 37 and 47, published in: GenN 1957 in GG 
26774 of 9 September 2004. 
 446   
 
litigation, alternative dispute resolution is relatively affordable and time-efficient. Hence, it 
increases access to justice.2504 Essential characteristics of ombuds are their credibility to their 
users, their accessibility and efficiency. They must be able to operate independently and free 
of opposition.2505 Ombuds provide faster, more affordable and less formal2506 dispute 
resolution than ordinary courts, which is crucial for consumer redress.2507 Despite these 
advantages, an ombud might not be the appropriate forum in cases that involve complicated 
facts, legal uncertainty or expert witnesses. In such matters, other fora, like the courts, are 
probably more suited.2508 
Ombuds play an invaluable role in achieving speedy redress.2509 The informal dispute 
resolution promoted by ombuds has a filtering function as ADR relieves the courts from simple 
matters so that they only deal with more complicated matters.2510 Besides, people who 
otherwise would not have access to the court system have a real prospect of a remedy, which 
ultimately leads to consumer empowerment. 
The concept of 'ombudsmen',2511 of which the name derives from the Old Norse word 
'umbodhsmadhr',2512 is not new on the African continent. In Ethiopian culture, for instance, the 
ombudsman is known as the 'Keeper of the People's Tears'. Thabo Mbeki, the former South 
African President, noted in an address: 
'Because [the office of the ombud's] role is not merely to apportion blame, but rather to 
protect and promote the rights of citizens, it has the possibility to draw on the wealth of 
wisdom found in African traditional ways of conflict resolution (…). In this regard, it 
is important that Ombudspersons should display, maintain and enhance African values 
                                                             
2504 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 329. 
2505 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 54. 
2506 Although some offices in South Africa are akin to the role of an ombud, they are closer to a tribunal than that 
of an ombud since there procedures are quite formalised and their determinations are legally binding and subject 
to appeal in the court system. This is the case for the statutory Pension Fund Adjudicator and the Ombud for 
Financial Service Providers. See 'The Pension Funds Adjudicator' at https://www.pfa.org.za/Pages/default.aspx 
and the Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers Annual Report 2004/2005 at 5 at 
http://www.itinews.co.za/pdf/FAIS_A_R_2005_32859.pdf (no longer available). 
2507 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 330. 
2508 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 57. 
2509 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 47, published in: GenN 1957 in GG 26774 
of 9 September 2004. 
2510 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 63. In 2006, the insurance and banking ombuds alone finalised 16,681 cases. See 
FinMark Trust Landscape for Consumer Recourse in South Africa's Financial Services Sector (2007) at 6, at 
http://www.finmark.org.za/landscape-for-consumer-recourse-in-south-africas-financial-services-sector. There 
seems to be no updated figures available at the moment. It is not unlikely however that the numbers have increased 
meanwhile. 
2511 In many countries, Germany included, ombuds are rather referred to as 'ombudsmen' or 'ombudswomen', or 
simply 'ombudsmen and –women'. Even in South Africa, the term 'ombudsmen' can still be found, e.g., in the 
Ombudsmen Association of South Africa. 
2512 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 50. Among the early Germanic tribes, the ombudsman had originally the role of 
recovering compensation from the family of a wrongdoer on behalf of the family affected by a wrongdoing. 
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(…). As we work for our renaissance, this institution should see itself as one of the 
important agents of change on our continent.'2513 
With a view to traditional dispute resolution in African cultures, it is suggested that ombuds 
can play an essential role in this regard, as opposed to more adversarial redress mechanisms 
such as courts or tribunals. 
Ombuds can be divided into several categories, namely legislative ombuds (classical or 
parliamentary ombuds), executive ombuds, organisational ombuds and advocate ombuds.2514 
This list can be extended to include international ombuds and private sector ombuds as well as 
ombudsmen consultants.2515 
Classical (or legislative) ombuds can be defined as independent high-level public officials 
responsible to Parliament or legislature and appointed by constitutional or legislative 
provisions to monitor the administrative activities of the government'.2516 They receive 
complaints from aggrieved persons against government agencies, officials and employees or 
acts on their own motion. They are empowered to investigate, recommend corrective action 
and issue reports.2517 This concept has been established for the first time in 1809 in Sweden2518 
and is accepted as being the genesis of the modern ombud concept.2519 In South Africa, for 
instance, the Public Protector is a classical ombud.2520  
Executive ombuds are appointed by the executive authority, e.g., a municipality, or report 
directly to the head of the executive branch. They receive complaints concerning actions and 
                                                             
2513 Address of the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the General Assembly of the African 
Ombudsman Association (AOA): Misty Hills Conference Centre, Muldersdrift, Johannesburg (11 April 2005) at 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/address-president-south-africa-thabo-mbeki-general-assembly-african-
ombudsman-association. 
2514 This is the classification of the American Bar Association. See 'Standards for the Establishment and Operation 
of Ombuds Offices' at https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/file/551/standards-establishment-and-operations-
ombuds-offices. 
2515 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 52. 
2516 Owen The Ombudsman 1, Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 52. In the UK, the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration) fulfils this role. See Law Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Parliamentary 
Ombudsman'. 
2517 International Bar Association, quoted in SALRC Report on Constitutional Models (Project 77) Vol. 3 at 1222. 
2518 Then, the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Justice (Riksdagens Justitieombudsman) was 
established. 
2519 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 50. 
2520 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 57. The Public Protector's functions are set out in the Public Protector Act 23 of 
1994, according to which he or she is empowered to investigate any form or allegation of maladministration, 
abuse of power, unfair and improper conduct. It may also investigate corruption with respect to public money and 
improper or unlawful enrichment, Should the Public Protector find evidence of the above-mentioned allegations, 
prosecution in a court of lay may follow and may include a fine. See Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 JICLT 134. 
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failures to act of the executive entity, its officials, employees and contractors.2521 For example, 
the Interim Complaints Directorate, created by the Interim Constitution of South Africa, is a 
specialised ombud for complaints against the police and regarded as an executive ombud.2522  
Organisational ombuds are usually located in the public or private sector and created by the 
executive head, such as the CEO. They address problems of members, employees or 
contractors of the given organisation concerning its actions or policies. They generally work 
informally within an organisation.2523 Advocate ombuds evaluate claims objectively. They can 
advocate on behalf of individuals of aggrieved groups, however.2524 Industry ombuds are 
located in the financial sector and may be voluntary, statutory, or voluntary and subject to some 
degree of regulation by statute.2525  
In Germany, there is no mandatory mechanism for alternative dispute resolution in consumer 
protection or standard business terms legislation matters.2526 Some industries, such as banks2527 
and insurance companies,2528 offer free-of-charge dispute resolution by ombuds though. If their 
client is not satisfied with the ombud's decision, a legal action is still possible.2529 
Under section 1 of the Act, '"ombud with jurisdiction", in respect of any particular dispute 
arising out of an agreement or transaction between a consumer and a supplier who is (a) subject 
to the jurisdiction of an 'ombud', or a 'statutory ombud', in terms of any national legislation, 
means that ombud, or statutory ombud, or (b) a 'financial institution' as defined in the Financial 
Services Ombud Schemes Act (…),2530 means 'the ombud', as determined in accordance with 
section 13 or 14 of that Act'. Hence, the ombud has to be referred to as an ombud in the given 
                                                             
2521 'Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices' at 
https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/file/551/standards-establishment-and-operations-ombuds-offices. 
2522 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 57. Under s 51(1) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, the 
Independent Complaints Directorate is appointed by the Minister for Safety and Security in consultation with the 
Parliamentary Committees. 
2523 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 53. Examples in South Africa are ombuds dealing with complaints of ratepayers 
(City of Cape Town), the non-statutory ombud of the State Information Technology Agency dealing with 
complaints of tenderers, and the ombud of the University of Stellenbosch dealing with complaints of students. 
Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd (Edcon) has appointed an ombud dealing with staff matters. See Melville 2010 
SA Merc LJ 58. 
2524 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 53. 
2525 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 53. 
2526 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Ombudsmann'. 
2527 https://bankenombudsmann.de. 
2528 https://www.versicherungsombudsmann.de. 
2529 See discussion in Part II ch 6 para 1.2. 
2530 Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004. Section 13 of this statute, for instance, provides for 
instances where the Pension funds Adjudicator, the Ombud and deputy ombud for Financial Service Providers or 
statutory ombud, acting in the capacity set out in s 14 will have jurisdiction with regard to a complaint. Section 
14 provides for the authority of the statutory ombud to entertain certain complaints. 
 449   
 
piece of legislation. Ombuds such as defined in the Act are, according to the classical definition 
of the American Bar Association, close to classical (legislative) ombuds, subject to national 
statutory provisions as they have been created and regulated by statute. They do not monitor 
legislative or parliamentary activities but activities of the private sector. It is suggested that 
they are a hybrid between a classical ombud and an industry-specific ombud. In any event, they 
are statutory ombuds.2531 An example is the ombud for Financial Service Providers who is 
appointed by the Financial Services Board.2532 If a consumer logs a complaint against a bank 
that belongs to an ombud scheme recognised under the Financial Services Ombud Schemes 
Act,2533 the matter can be referred under section 70(1)(a) to the ombud scheme for resolution. 
If the supplier does not belong to such a scheme, the complaint may be dealt with by an industry 
ombud, accredited under section 82(6), if the supplier falls under such ombud. Industry ombuds 
may be provided for in industry codes and have to be approved by the Commission.2534 
The term 'industry ombud' is not defined in the Act. Section 69(c)(i) refers to an industry 
ombud, accredited under section 82(6). From section 82(6) one can conclude that an industry 
ombud in terms of the Act is an industry-specific ombud which either is subject to a scheme of 
alternative dispute resolution provided for in the relevant industry code, or subject to some 
degree of regulation if the scheme has been accredited under the Act.2535 
South African examples are the ombuds of insurance companies and banks dealing with client 
complaints,2536 or the Wireless Application Service Providers' Association (WASPA) 
Ombudsman.2537 This kind of ADR usually involves codes of conduct. 
Surprisingly, a scheme is referred to as an ombud. Van Heerden suggests that the legislator 
most likely intended to incorporate a definition of an 'accredited industry ombud' into section 
1 but neglected to do so.2538 This explanation seems plausible with a view to the fact that the 
definitions contained in section 1 have not been thought through from a logical perspective.2539 
Van Heerden construes section 82(6) in that 'scheme' must be read as the ombud appointed for 
                                                             
2531 Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 JICLT 134. 
2532 According to the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990. 
2533 37 of 2004. 
2534 Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 JICLT 134. 
2535 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
2536 In order to avoid confusion, South African financial institution may however not employ the word 'ombud', 
unless they are authorised by the Council to do so. See s 18(5)(a) of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 
37 of 2004. 
2537 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 58. 
2538 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
2539 As discussed before, s 1 contains too many cross-references and is unnecessarily complicated. Also, the term 
'used goods' cannot be found elsewhere in the Act. 
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that particular industry in the accredited code of that industry.2540 This view is correct as it 
would be nonsensical to refer to a scheme as an ombud. This view is supported by section 
82(6)(a) which speaks of a 'scheme of alternative dispute resolution'. It is suggested that 
'scheme' in this context must be interpreted narrower than in section 82(1)(b) where it also 
includes industry codes. 
In order to achieve credibility as a real alternative to other forms of redress, an ombud must be 
able to work independently, free from opposition by the industry or entity in respect of which 
it operates, and be adequately budgeted. Furthermore, it must be accessible, and potential users 
must know of its existence.2541 Neutrality is another critical factor, even though some might 
have expectations that ombuds have a consumer advocacy role.2542 
It is important to note that the ombud's recommendations usually are not legally binding. 
Because of the political pressure and the status of the office, they are usually adhered to, which 
makes them factually binding. The fact that the ombud's decisions usually are not binding has 
several advantages. An ombud should not imitate formal adjudicative bodies, such as courts. 
Otherwise, the ombud's decisions could be attacked on review or appeal. According to 
Melville, this would be contrary to the premise that an ombud is a recourse of last resort, which 
is typically stipulated in privative clauses.2543 This 'last resort' argument is however not 
reflected in the Act. Section 70 provides that any person with locus standi may file a complaint 
with the Commission (as discussed earlier, the reference to section 69 in section 71 has to be 
read as 'section 70'). What is more, section 70(2) provides that if a complaint has no reasonable 
probability of the parties resolving their dispute through the process provided for, the ombud 
may terminate the process by notice to the parties. Then, the party who referred the matter to 
the agent may file a complaint with the Commission under section 71. Hence, in South Africa, 
the ombud does not necessarily have the last word. On the other hand, the South African 
financial industry ombuds make legally binding decisions.2544 
The procedure followed by ombuds is quite informal. Commonly, there is a phase of informal 
fact-finding, but mediation is increasingly common. This allows the parties to continue in a 
working relationship.2545 Legal assistance is neither mandatory nor encouraged. Therefore, 
                                                             
2540 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
2541 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 54. 
2542 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 56. 
2543 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 64. 
2544 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 54. 
2545 Hill The Ombudsman as Mediator 149. 
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legal fees cannot be claimed by a party. The informality of the procedure and the fact that the 
development of legal precedence is inhibited are negative consequences.2546 Ombuds can 
however provide feedback to the regulators on weaknesses in the legislation, rules and 
guidelines so that the regulators can seek improvements.2547 
In the South African context, the variety of different ombuds and the fact that the Act only 
recognises 'ombuds with jurisdiction' and 'industry ombuds' is a concern. Consumers cannot 
easily distinguish between the different types of ombuds and often do not know why some of 
them are accredited and others are not. The establishment of a common legal framework in 
which the role, the procedure and the legal consequences of this form of alternative dispute 
resolution is thus recommendable. Already existing statutes, such as the Financial Services 
Ombud Schemes Act2548 can serve as a model for such a legal intervention. This approach has 
been adopted in New Zealand, for instance, where the Ombudsman Act2549 provides that '[n]o 
person, other than an Ombudsman appointed under this Act, may use the name "Ombudsman" 
in connection with any business, trade, or occupation or the provision of any service, whether 
for payment or otherwise, or hold himself, herself, or itself out to be an Ombudsman except 
pursuant to an Act or with the prior written consent of the Chief Ombudsman.' This approach 
would ensure that the procedure set out in such a statute would conform to the standards of the 
Act and provide a harmonised procedural standard. The alternative in the form of self-
regulation could also be an option if all ombuds meet the standards of the Ombudsman 
Association of South Africa, and the term 'ombud' can only be used when the entity in question 
meets the requirements of this association. Considering that South Africa has little experience 
with consumer protection, legislative intervention seems to be the better option, though. 
What is more, it could be beneficial in the South African context to merge several ombuds of 
a particular sector, such as the financial industry, telecommunications or the insurance industry. 
Overlapping jurisdictions would then be eliminated and economies of scale could be achieved. 
Moreover, the given ombud's profile would be raised, and consumers would exactly know 
whom they have to approach.2550 It is furthermore submitted that this would lead to more 
                                                             
2546 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 55. 
2547 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 56. 
2548 37 of 2004. 
2549 1975 No. 9. 
2550 See 'A public service ombudsman: Government response to consultation' at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/public-service-ombudsman at 'A public service ombudsman: 
Government response to consultation' at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/public-service-
ombudsman (no longer available). 
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professionalism and more consumer-friendly laws, primarily because of the ombud's feedback 
to the regulator of the given sector. After all, codes of conduct are only useful if they mind all 
or at least the majority of businesses in a sector.2551 A single ombud for each sector who bases 
its decisions on the code of conduct for the specific sector would enhance the efficiency and 
credibility of this form of ADR. The argument against such a merger, according to which the 
accountability process is more effective with several separate entities attempting to tackle the 
problem at the same time2552 is not convincing.  
The ombuds' decisions are not published, and many matters are solved rather by mediation 
instead of adjudicative decisions. Unlike a more adversarial mechanism, settlements reached 
by the parties, by the intermediary of an ombud, are not necessarily appropriate for a 'mutual 
control'. The 'organic growth' of ombuds offices that Melville considers desirable2553 might 
hamper effective redress, duplications and uncoordinated approaches to consumer affairs. Time 
will tell whether a statutory intervention will be necessary for South Africa, or whether an 
entity such as the Ombudsman Association of South Africa will be able to 'harmonise' the 
existing and forthcoming structures. Where the various sectors have succeeded in establishing 
effective alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, a statutory intervention will not be 
necessary. This seems to be the case in some sectors in South Africa.2554 In other cases, it might 
be the only solution to achieve the purposes of the Act.  
b) Other alternative dispute resolution agents 
An 'alternative dispute resolution agent' is defined as '(a) an ombud with jurisdiction; (b) an 
industry ombud accredited in terms of section 82(6); or (c) a person or entity providing 
conciliation, mediation or arbitration services to assist in the resolution of consumer disputes, 
other than an ombud with jurisdiction, or an accredited industry ombud.'2555 This definition has 
been reproduced in section 70(1)(a) to (c). By 'excluding' the ADR agents mentioned in section 
69, one comes to the conclusion that 'another alternative dispute resolution agent contemplated 
in section 70' (section 69(c)(iii)) only refers to a person mentioned in section 70(1)(c). 
Therefore, only persons or entities providing conciliation, mediation or arbitration services to 
                                                             
2551 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 47, published in: GenN 1957 in GG 26774 
of 9 September 2004. 
2552 Ayeni National Ombudsman Institutions 102. 
2553 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 65. 
2554 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 48, published in: GenN 1957 in GG 26774 
of 9 September 2004. 
2555 Section 1. This definition has been reproduced in section 70(1)(a)-(c). 
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assist in the resolution of consumer disputes, other than ombuds with jurisdiction, or accredited 
industry ombuds are concerned.2556 
When reading section 70(1)(d) one could conclude that consumer courts are also alternative 
dispute resolution agents. In addition, section 69(c)(iii) refers to 'another alternative dispute 
resolution agent', after indicating 'the consumer court of the province' in subparagraph (ii). Du 
Plessis and Van Heerden correctly assert that these formulations are unfortunate and do not 
include consumer courts as ADR agents. They refer to the different beginning of section 
70(1)(d) ('applying') as opposed to paragraphs (a) to (c) of the same section.2557 What is more, 
when reading section 70(1) entirely and by simplifying this provision, it becomes clear that this 
provision is divided into two different alternatives: A consumer may seek to resolve any dispute 
(…) by referring the matter to an alternative dispute resolution agent (…) or applying to the 
consumer court of the province (…). Moreover, consumer courts are not mentioned in the 
definition of 'alternative dispute resolution agents'.2558 The fact that consumer courts are 
mentioned at the end of section 70(1) also speaks for this view.  
c) Redress by alternative dispute resolution agents 
A consumer should first approach an ADR agent mentioned in section 69 and 70, i.e., an ombud 
with jurisdiction, an industry ombud accredited under section 82(6), or a person or entity 
providing conciliation, mediation or arbitration services. 
It should be noted that it derives from the wording of section 70(1) that only consumers may 
approach ADR agents and not the other persons contemplated in section 4(1). A person acting 
as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of affected persons, or acting in the public 
interest2559 is thus excluded in seeking relief with such an agent. This is contrary to the wording 
of section 69, which expressly provides redress for '[a] person contemplated in section 4(1)', 
which includes consumer protection groups. What is more, the legislator expressly encourages 
this form of dispute resolution.2560 The legislator's intention by excluding the other persons 
from standing in terms of ADR could be that ADR agents should resolve only smaller affairs. 
Where consumer protection groups are involved or class actions filed, the other entities' 
involvement is probably more efficient because of the complexity of the affairs. What is more, 
                                                             
2556 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
2557 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 524 and 525, Van Heerden ‘Section 70 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 2. 
2558 See s 1. 
2559 See S 4(1)(c) and (d). 
2560 See S 72(1)(b), for example. 
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in this way, precedents can be established. One cannot exclude though that the formulation of 
section 70(1) is an editorial error. In this case, the legislator should amend the wording of 
section 70(1) and replace '[a] consumer' by '[a] person contemplated in section 4(1)'.  
The formulation of section 72(1)(b) and 72(1)(d) suggests that the Commission will not 
investigate a complaint until the parties have unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the dispute 
through an ADR agent, a provincial consumer protection authority, or a consumer court.2561 
Consequently, the Commission is required to encourage consumers to first approach the other 
entities before approaching the Commission.2562 
If the ADR agent has resolved or assisted the parties in resolving their dispute, the agent may 
(a) record the resolution of that dispute in the form of an order, and (b) if the parties to the 
dispute consent to that order, submit it to the Tribunal or the High Court to be made a consent 
order, in terms of its rules.2563 With the consent of a complainant, a consent order that has been 
confirmed by these judicial bodies may include an award of damages to that complainant.2564 
If the alternative dispute resolution agent concludes that there is no reasonable probability of 
the parties to resolve their dispute through the process provided for, the agent may terminate 
the process by notice to the parties. Then, the parties who referred the matter to the agent may 
file a complaint with the Commission under section 71.2565  
The ADR agent has to adhere to the Conciliation Guidelines in terms of which the conciliation 
proceedings are private and confidential.2566 Besides, no person may refer to anything said at 
conciliation proceedings during any subsequent proceedings, except where such an issue is not 
likely to cause prejudice to the parties.2567 Before the holding of the conciliations, the parties 
generally exchange documents, in the form of the referral form and other relevant documents 
determined by the Conciliator.2568 The parties must not be represented by a legal 
representative.2569  
                                                             
2561 Naudé 2010 SALJ 523. 
2562 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 325. 
2563 Section 70(3). 
2564 Section 70(4). 
2565 Section 70(2). 
2566 Paragraph 5.3 of the Conciliation Guidelines. 
2567 Paragraph 5.3 of the Conciliation Guidelines. The Guidelines do not provide for any safeguards that the 
Commission's investigator will not have access to information disclosed at conciliation. They do also not set out 
how and by whom the existence of prejudice is to be determined. 
2568 Paragraph 5.4 of the Conciliation Guidelines. 
2569 Paragraph 5.7 of the Conciliation Guidelines. 
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The wording of the Conciliation Guidelines suggests that they are mandatory.2570 Moreover, 
they contain indications that they are not consensual, even though they stress the consensual 
nature of the proceedings. This is because the parties must comply with the directions of the 
Conciliator,2571 the exchange of documents and the attendance of the parties at hearings is 
mandatory,2572 and there is no provision for legal representation.2573 
The provisions contained in the Conciliation Guidelines do not provide any assurance for 
suppliers that anything that has been said during the proceedings will remain undisclosed, and 
neither party can be sure that the Conciliator is independent and unbiased. Furthermore, with a 
view to the substantial sanctions provided for by the Act, the restriction of legal representation 
is inexcusable.2574 Van Eeden correctly states that without appropriate safeguards for protecting 
the confidentiality of the information and securing the impartiality of conciliators and the 
consensual nature of the proceedings, and without permitted legal representation, suppliers 
participate in conciliation at their own risk.2575  
3.6  Ordinary courts 
a) General remarks 
As mentioned earlier, the term 'courts' is not defined in the Act, unlike 'consumer courts'. Thus, 
this term refers to the civil courts, i.e., the High Court, the Magistrates' Court and the Small 
Claims Court.2576 Because of their accessibility, most consumers might prefer a Small Claims 
Court to settle their dispute.2577 
The problems inherent to sections 69(d) and 52(2) have already been discussed in length2578 
and shall only briefly be summarised here. Section 52 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the 
ordinary courts. This provision contradicts other provisions of the Act, such as sections 72 and 
69(d). Section 69(d) unduly restricts the consumer's right to approach the ordinary courts 
directly, even though this might be more convenient for him or her. Van Eeden suggests that 
                                                             
2570 See Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 422 note 348. 
2571 Paragraph 16.1 of the Conciliation Guidelines in terms of which 'the parties will co-operate with the 
Conciliator and, in particular, will endeavour to comply with requests by the Conciliator to submit documents, 
provide evidence and attend Conciliation hearings'. 
2572 Paragraphs 5.4 and 16.1 of the Conciliation Guidelines. 
2573 Paragraph 5.7 of the Conciliation Guidelines. 
2574 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 424. 
2575 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 424. 
2576 Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 JICLT 135. 
2577 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 331. The Small Claims Courts have a jurisdictional limit. They have an 
inquisitorial and consumer-friendly procedure that does not allow for cost orders. See Van Heerden/Barnard 2011 
JICLT 136. The jurisdictional limit was raised to R 20,000 on 1 April 2019. See 'How to resolve your legal 
problem in a small claims-court' at https://www.lawforall.co.za/2017/07/small-claims-court-guide/. 
2578 See Part I ch 2 para 1, ch 5 paras 3.2 b) aa) and 3.3 b). 
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section 69(d) has the effect of exhaustion of remedies referred to in this provision, and also 
includes exhaustion of the possibilities of appeal and review under section 148(2)(a) to (d) of 
the National Credit Act. Since the outcome of an application for appeal or review will constitute 
the legal force of the matter, he is of the view that where section 69 applies, the courts cannot 
be approached in the given matter.2579 
The provision infringes the consumer's constitutional right of access to court though, which is 
an unintended consequence of the legislator's desire to ensure quick, effective and efficient 
redress of disputes for consumers.2580 Hence, there is a contradiction between sections 69(d) 
and 52. The latter provision favours ordinary courts, whereas the former promotes dispute 
resolution by other fora. That only the ordinary courts may declare a contract term to be unfair 
implies that consumers are sent to and fro because they must approach the provincial consumer 
courts first. What is more, relatively small claims can speedily be handled by small claims 
courts. Referring consumers to other bodies before they can institute action with a small claims 
court is inefficient in terms of procedural economy.2581 This anomaly should be corrected by 
extending the same powers to the Tribunal.2582 
Van Heerden suggests an interesting and conclusive solution for this conundrum. He reminds 
that in the Constitutional Court's decision Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others,2583 it was held 
that where the law provides for a specialised framework for the resolution of a dispute, the 
parties must primarily use the given mechanism. Although section 3(1)(g), read in conjunction 
with section 69(d), seems to favour the approach that first all other avenues of redress must 
have been exhausted before approaching a civil court, section 4(3) provides that if any 
provision of the Act can reasonably be construed to have more than one meaning, the meaning 
which best promotes the spirit and purposes of the Act and will best improve the realisation 
and enjoyment of consumer rights must be preferred. Van Heerden correctly maintains that 
section 69(d) is ambiguous, which is why the alternative aid of section 4(3) comes into play. 
Hence, if for a consumer it is more expedient to approach a small claims court first, the latter 
would have jurisdiction in terms of section 4(3), and the consumer would not be forced to 
exhaust first the other remedies.2584 This solution offers the advantage that the more efficient 
                                                             
2579 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 518. 
2580 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 336. 
2581 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 27. 
2582 Mupangavanhu 2012 PELJ 337.  
2583 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC). 
2584 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
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and cheapest solution always prevails. It also enhances procedural economy and saves most of 
the entities mentioned in section 69 from unnecessary engagement. 
In this regard, note should be taken that under section 2(10), consumers are not precluded from 
exercising their rights afforded in terms of the common law. If consumers prefer to pursue their 
remedies under the common law instead of under the Act, section 69 and the redress mechanism 
contemplated therein find no application, and they may directly approach a civil court.2585 By 
referring to section 2(10), the Act does not apply though as both routes exclude each other.2586 
Van Heerden's aforementioned solution (section 4(3)) has the benefit that despite approaching 
a civil court directly, the Act applies. 
The equality court has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to unfair discrimination.2587 When a 
person files a complaint because of an alleged contravention of Part A of Chapter 2 
(discriminatory marketing), the Commission must refer the matter to the equality court if the 
complaint appears to be valid.2588 Alternatively, an accredited consumer protection group or 
any other person contemplated in section 20(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act may directly institute proceedings before an equality court.2589 
The legislator clearly did not draft section 52 with general use challenges in mind, but only 
proceedings with respect to transactions or agreements between suppliers and consumers.2590 
This also becomes clear when going through the factors contained in section 52(2) as these are 
                                                             
2585 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 2. 
2586 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 404. The consumer's choice as to whether opting for the 
application of the common-law or the Consumer Protection Act depends on various factors. Generally, consumers 
have broader rights under the Act than under the common law, and the costs before the Tribunal or a consumer 
court are likely to be lower than before a civil court, if the consumer does not seek legal assistance. However, it 
is less likely that the Tribunal will grant a cost order, which means that a consumer with legal representation 
before the Tribunal is less likely to be able to recover its legal costs from the other party. On the other hand, the 
Commission's power of investigation might be advantageous for consumers in order to obtain information from 
suppliers. The fact that before the civil courts a higher standard of accuracy and precision is applied as compared 
to the Tribunal should not be disregarded though. See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 404 and 
405. 
2587 Section 10. 
2588 Pursuant to section 8, a supplier 'must not unfairly (a) exclude any person or category of persons from 
accessing any goods or services offered by the supplier; (b) grant any person or category of persons exclusive 
access to any goods or services offered by the supplier, (c) assign priority of supply of any goods or services 
offered by the supplier, (d) supply a different quality of goods or services, (e) charge different prices for any goods 
or services, (f) target particular communities, districts populations or market segments for exclusive, priority or 
preferential supply of any goods or services, or (g) exclude a particular community, district, population or market 
segment from the supply of any goods or services offered by the supplier, on the basis of one or more grounds of 
unfair discrimination contemplated in s 9 of the Constitution or Chapter 2 of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.' The constitutional grounds for discrimination are, inter alia, 
age, sex, religion, colour, disability and culture. Section 9 of the Act enumerates reasonable grounds for 
differential treatment in specific circumstances. See Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 419. 
2589 Section 10(1)(a). 
2590 Section 52(1). 
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geared to a particular transaction between a supplier and an individual consumer.2591 Section 
52(3)(b)(iii) provides though that the court may also 'make any further order [it] considers just 
and reasonable in the circumstances, including, but not limited to, an order (…) requiring the 
supplier to cease any practice, or alter any practice, form or document, as required to avoid a 
repetition of the supplier's conduct.' Naudé correctly points out that this allows for preventative 
control in the view of future contracts between a supplier and other consumers (who were not 
a party to the procedure). She correctly suggests that section 52 should be redrafted in order to 
include abstract challenges.2592 
The legislator should also insert a provision in section 52 which gives explicitly a court the 
discretion to declare that its order is to be published at the supplier's cost.2593 This would have 
a deterrent and educative effect in Naudé's view. As discussed before, the publication of the 
operative part of German judgments is not that effective, though.2594 
Under section 52(3)(b), a court could also order payment of a penalty per prohibited clause and 
per violation after an initial phase-out period for implementation of the order. This is not 
explicitly stipulated in section 52(3)(b) but included in the courts' power to make any further 
order the court considers just and reasonable in the circumstances.2595 Ideally, the legislator 
should insert this possibility in section 52(3) in order to give guidance to the courts. 
As discussed above, 'warnings' issued by eligible bodies in terms of § 3 UKlaG contain the 
promise to be made by the other party to pay a penalty in case of further infringements. The 
amount of the penalty is determined by the eligible body, and not by the court.2596  
According to Naudé, it is not desirable that a court order be binding on other suppliers of a 
trade sector. Such possibility is provided, e.g., in the UK Unfair Terms Regulations. These 
provide that '[a]n injunction may relate not only to use of a particular contract term drawn up 
                                                             
2591 E.g., 'the nature of the parties' (para (b)), the 'circumstances of the transaction or agreement' (para (c)), 'the 
conduct of the supplier' (para (d)). 
2592 Naudé 2010 SALJ 531. 
2593 Naudé 2010 SALJ 532. This possibility is provided for in Germany in § 7 Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG). 
§ 7 UKlaG: 'If the application is upheld, the applicant may, on request, be authorised to publish the operative part 
of the judgment, identifying the defendant against whom judgment was given, at the defendant’s expense in the 
Federal Gazette and otherwise at his own expense. The court may set a time limit on this authorisation.' There is 
currently no official translation of the UKlaG by the Federal Ministry of Justice. In the following, the English 
translation of the EU Consumer Law Acquis Compendium No. 8 (IPR Verlag GmbH Munich 2005) will be cited. 
Where necessary, the author of this thesis has updated this translation to the current version of the UKlaG. This 
translation seems not to be available online anymore (17 September 2019).  
2594 See above and in Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6 f). 
2595 Naudé 2010 SALJ 532. 
2596 See discussion above and in Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6 a) cc). 
 459   
 
for general use but to any similar term or a term having like effect, used or recommended for 
use by any person'.2597 This view is convincing because businesses who were not a party to any 
proceedings before the court did not have the possibility to make submissions and may not be 
aware of the interdict.2598 In this context, it is submitted that the unfairness of a term cannot be 
evaluated without considering other factors, such as warranties, guarantees, or the price. This 
is also the case with § 11 UKlaG, although the court applies a general-abstract approach. The 
German courts' judgments only apply inter partes and only refer to the supplier who was a 
party to the lawsuit but not to other suppliers of the same sector. 
Instead of making a court order binding on other suppliers, the Commission has the possibility 
to co-operate with trade associations, negotiate models for fair terms and conditions and 
eradicate unfair terms by establishing voluntary codes of practice.2599 What is more, the 
Minister may prescribe by means of regulation an industry code on the recommendation of the 
Commission.2600 The Commission, acting on its own initiative, or in response to a proposal 
from persons conducting business within a particular industry, may recommend a proposed 
industry code to the Minister.2601 Such codes will be binding on all suppliers of the relevant 
industry as a supplier is not allowed to contravene an applicable industry code in the ordinary 
course of business.2602 The fact that such an industry code comes into effect after a public 
consultation speaks for its coercive nature.2603 
It is suggested that industry codes, regardless of whether they are voluntary or mandatory, 
providing for industry-wide standards and contract forms also have the advantage that they do 
not contain any surprising terms. What is more, it will be easier for consumers to shop around 
for a better bargain because they only have to focus on the core terms. Customers could identify 
such standard terms by an Approved Code logo which assists them in their choice.2604 
                                                             
2597 Regulation 12(4) of the UTCCR 1999. 
2598 Naudé 2010 SALJ 533. 
2599 Section 93. 
2600 Section 82(2)(a). 
2601 Section 82(3). 
2602 Section 82(8). 
2603 Naudé 2010 SALJ 543. 
2604 OFT press release of 7 December 2004: 'OFT launches code approval scheme to consumers' at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426 (no longer available). Interestingly, the DTI had 
suggested a similar idea in terms of alternative dispute resolution in its Draft Green Paper of 2004. Consumers 
should be able to seek out those suppliers that successfully meet the terms of a good code of conduct or has its 
own reputation for equal or higher standards. See Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 
at 37 and 48, published in: GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 9 September 2004. 
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A good example is the standard terms of car rental companies. Even though they all have the 
same object (the rental of a particular car to an individual consumer), they often contain varying 
clauses, which makes it difficult to compare the contracts proposed by different suppliers. This 
concerns, inter alia, matters such as insurance, excess,2605 the number of kilometres included 
in the price or the amount payable per kilometre exceeding this number. The argument that 
suppliers within an industry often have different business models, and that a standardised 
contract would not consider these differences, is not valid. Different business models that entail 
slightly different standard terms can be taken into consideration by highlighting these terms 
and pointing them out to the customer. These terms too can be negotiated between the 
Commission and the suppliers of the trade sector in question.  
b) Redress by ordinary courts 
Unlike the Tribunal, a person contemplated in section 4(1) may seek to enforce any rights in 
terms of the Act or a transaction or agreement, or otherwise resolve any dispute with a supplier, 
by approaching a (civil) court with jurisdiction over the matter.2606  
The powers of the courts to enforce consumer rights are set out in section 76. In addition to any 
other order that it may make under the Act or any other law, a court, considering a matter in 
terms of the Act, may order a supplier to alter or discontinue any conduct that is inconsistent 
with the Act.2607 It also may make any order contemplated explicitly in the Act.2608 In addition, 
it may award damages against a supplier for collective injury to all or a class of consumers 
generally, to be paid on any terms or conditions that the court considers just and equitable and 
suitable to achieve the purposes of the Act.2609 A person who suffered loss or damage because 
of prohibited conduct may only institute a civil claim in a court if he or she simultaneously 
files with the registrar or clerk of the court a notice issued by the chairperson of the Tribunal. 
This notice must indicate whether the Tribunal decided that the given conduct was prohibited 
or required by the Act. It must also contain the date and details of the Tribunal's findings.2610  
Van Heerden correctly remarks that due to the ad hoc character of the Tribunal and its limited 
capacity, only in cases where someone wants to approach a civil court for purposes of assessing 
the amount of damages or the awarding of damages, the said person should provide the court 
                                                             
2605 This is the amount the customer has to pay out-of-pocket when a damage to a car exceeds a certain amount. 
2606 Section 69(d). 
2607 Section 76(1)(a). 
2608 Section 76(1)(b). 
2609 Section 76(1)(c). 
2610 Section 115(2)(b). See Van Heerden and Barnard JICLT 136. 
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with a certificate in terms of section 115. In no case, the application of section 115 should be 
extended to any type of infringements of consumer rights or prohibited conduct.2611  
Section 115(2)(b) is in keeping with section 69(d) according to which the consumer may 
approach a civil court only if all other remedies in terms of national legislation have been 
exhausted. In other words, the consumer must first approach an ADR agent (which is 
encouraged by the Act, e.g., in sections 71(1) and 72(1)(b)) or the Commission. The 
Commission then may refer the matter to either to a consumer court or the Tribunal. Only then, 
the consumer may approach the civil court by presenting the said notice in terms of section 
115(2)(b). In this regard, it is referred to the discussion further above concerning the arguments 
in favour of a direct access to the civil courts.2612 
In terms of section 111(2), the Magistrates' court has jurisdiction, despite anything to the 
contrary contained in any other law, to impose any penalty provided for in subsection (1) of 
section 111. Under section 111(1), any person convicted of an offence in terms of the Act is 
liable in the case of a contravention of disclosure of any personal or confidential information 
concerning affairs in terms of the Act. The severity of the penalties set out in this provision 
shows that the legislator considers the disclosure of personal information as a serious 
offence.2613 
It is a well-established principle that courts may decide issues overlooked by the parties where 
this is required in the interest of justice.2614 Naudé correctly argues that it would be advisable 
to include an explicit provision in the Act according to which the courts are empowered to raise 
the issue of unfairness on their own initiative.2615 This is the case in Germany, where the courts 
assess the fairness of standard terms 'incidentally' within a so-called 'incidental control'.2616 
 
4. Conclusion 
In order to ensure a cost-saving, efficient and speedy redress system for consumers, the Act 
has repealed many former fragmented pieces of legislation. It acts in tandem with provincial 
consumer protection legislation. The objective is to achieve an accessible, transparent and 
                                                             
2611 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
2612 See Part I ch 4 para 2.5. 
2613 Jacobs/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 308. 
2614 See Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund Inc v Industrial Credit Corporation Africa Ltd 2008 (6) 
SA 468 (W). 
2615 Naudé 2009 SALJ 536. 
2616 See discussion in Part II ch 6 para 1.1. 
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efficient redress system for consumers, also by ADR. The existence of different fora is 
advantageous because the dispute can be resolved by taking the particular circumstances, the 
complexity and value of the claim into account. In order to achieve this, the various institutions 
have to work in a coordinated manner. 
Section 4 provides for a comprehensive locus standi provision and enhances consumer 
protection. Class actions are possible too. Nonetheless, the Act does not contain procedural 
provisions for class actions. Legislation in this field is necessary in order to harmonise the 
procedural aspects of class actions, and for legal certainty. The Act should also provide for a 
procedure for general use challenges so that consumer associations are better prepared and have 
more legal certainty.  
Unlike consumer protection groups as defined by the Act, this statute seems not to include 
associations that are not primarily concerned with consumer protection. Associations whose 
purpose is not mainly consumer protection should have standing too so that also consumers 
who are not members of an accredited consumer protection group are included. 
South African consumer protection legislation only provides for an ex post facto redress, unlike 
German legislation which provides for a proactive approach in the form of institutional actions. 
This approach also has the advantage that consumer organisations can negotiate with suppliers, 
which often leads to the eradication of unfair terms without litigation. The wording of section 
52 indicates that the legislator did not have abstract challenges in mind, but only individual 
proceedings between a consumer and a supplier. This provision should be redrafted to include 
general use challenges too. With regard to abstract challenges, German consumer associations 
tend to send a 'warning' to standard terms users that contains, inter alia, a deadline and a threat 
to take legal action if the user does not comply. This is a very effective and proactive instrument 
as most suppliers comply with such a warning and cease their unfair practices. 
Although there are more consumer protection organisations in Germany than in South Africa, 
both countries have in common that these organisations are chronically under-funded for their 
resource-intensive work. The Act should include provisions for the funding of these 
organisations because their efficient work depends on independent resources. 
The various entities that are competent for the enforcement of the Act are set out in section 69. 
This provision contains an implied hierarchy. 
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The Commission's roles are manifold. Besides enforcement, it has an administrative and other 
functions. The NCC is an organ of state and has jurisdiction throughout the Republic. It 
functions as an interface between various enforcement bodies but is not actively involved in 
active dispute resolution. It is thus a 'watchdog' in terms of the enforcement of the Act. If it had 
preventive powers over unfair contract terms, a more consistent and predictable redress policy 
and more harmonised outcomes could be achieved, despite the fact that consumer protection is 
subject to concurrent jurisdiction. 
The Commission's extensive investigative powers are similar to those of other entities, such as 
the National Credit Regulator. It can therefore be expected that the NCC will use their approach 
as a guideline. 
The issuing of compliance notices requires that the NCC has reasonable belief that a supplier 
has engaged in prohibited conduct. It must therefore base its arguments on objective facts. This 
requires sound legal reasoning. Compliance notices serve as a quick and straightforward 
enforcement tool in cases of apparent transgressions. In complex cases, the NCC refers the case 
to the Tribunal or a consumer court. In German law, eligible bodies systematically issue so-
called 'warnings' in order to avoid negative cost implications. In most cases, standard terms 
users comply with such warnings in order to avoid legal actions. 
Naudé suggests that suppliers should be obliged to publish the NCC decisions on their website 
or in other media. The experience in Germany has shown though that the publication of 
judgments in the Federal Gazette or other media has a very limited effect. 
The Commission may also negotiate and conclude undertakings and consent orders with 
suppliers that the Tribunal or a court may confirm. This avoids legal actions in cases where a 
complainant agrees to a damages award. In German law, warnings issued by eligible bodies 
contain an invitation to cease the use or the recommendation of unfair standard terms as well 
as the invitation to the user to promise to pay a contractual penalty in case of infringement. 
Because of the Commission's quasi police powers, persons who are concerned with an 
investigation led by the NCC should have the right to be assisted by a lawyer, which usually is 
not the case for administrative and tribunal proceedings. In order to avoid any influence and 
lobbying by professional associations representing suppliers, the legislator should curtail the 
'other sources' of financing mentioned in section 90(1) in order to ensure the NCC's neutrality. 
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Section 71(1) broadens the locus standi to any person who is not directly concerned with a 
supplier's standard clauses. This provision has a deterring effect on suppliers and facilitates the 
eradication of unfair terms. 
In order to avoid the problem of different outcomes, e.g., where the Commission decides not 
to investigate a matter but then chooses to investigate after having received a complaint by 
another consumer of the same supplier, a clear policy would be beneficial so that a harmonised 
system of redress can be established.  
It is recommended to establish a national consumer helpline. It could co-ordinate and monitor 
complaints, filter obviously unsuccessful complaints and channel complaints to the relevant 
enforcement body. 
The National Consumer Tribunal is an ad hoc body that was established in terms of the National 
Credit Act. It has adjudicative functions and is a tribunal of record. The requirement that the 
NCT must be staffed with sufficient persons with legal training is too vague, and the restriction 
to two consecutive terms of five years each entails that valuable specialised skills are 
irretrievably lost. 
Since the Tribunal deals both with matters concerning the Consumer Protection Act and the 
National Credit Act, the establishment of two separate and specialised chambers is advisable. 
Although the Tribunal is an administrative body, it may grant interim relief. This ensures an 
affordable consumer redress because consumers are not obliged to approach ordinary courts. 
The Tribunal is no 'point of first entry' as the legislator favours ADR and settlements by 
provincial consumer courts. What is more, the 'filtering function' of the Commission ensures 
that the Tribunal with its limited capacity is not flooded with too many matters. 
As consumer protection is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction, the provinces can establish 
consumer courts. These are administrative bodies whose jurisdiction extends beyond the 
traditional rules of geographic jurisdiction, which may cause problems. 
The provinces' consumer protection legislation differs from province to province, which is very 
unfavourable to consumers and hampers the transfer of matters between provinces. To tackle 
this problem, the provinces should create a common legislative framework. This approach has 
been very successful in Germany. Consumer courts have wide powers, but the enforcement 
and execution of their orders remain unaddressed. The legislator should address the urgent need 
for proper enforcement and execution procedure in this field.  
 465   
 
Alternative dispute resolution plays an essential role in the Act. The legislator encourages 
conducting ADR as the first possibility of consumer redress. Ombuds with jurisdiction, 
industry ombuds and other ADR agents ensure quick, cost-efficient and accessible redress. 
They have a filtering function as they relieve courts from simple matters. With a view of 
traditional dispute resolution in African cultures, they could be a better choice than more 
adversarial redress mechanisms.  
A drawback is that it is not easy for consumers to distinguish between ombuds with jurisdiction 
and industry ombuds, and to know whether an ombud is accredited or not. A common legal 
framework as in New Zealand would be helpful in this regard. In order to avoid overlapping 
jurisdiction and to achieve economies of scale, the merger of several industry ombuds could 
also be beneficial, also in terms of efficiency and credibility.  
Section 70(1) grants locus standi only to consumers but not to the other entities mentioned in 
section 4(1). This might be an editorial error of the legislator. However, it could also be its 
intention to submit only smaller affairs to ADR agents and to reserve more complex class 
actions or actions, where consumer protection groups are involved, to the other entities. 
The term 'courts' in the Act refers to civil courts. Small Claims Courts offer cost-efficient 
redress. Despite the contradiction between sections 69(d) and 52 in terms of the accessibility 
of civil courts, section 4(3) offers a solution by which consumers may approach a Small Claims 
Court as a first port-of-call if this is the more efficient solution in terms of consumer protection. 
This solution has the benefit that the Act applies and that the consumer is not obliged to use 
the path of the common law. It is also beneficial in terms of procedural economy. 
The implementation of industry codes providing for industry-wide standards and contract 
forms would have the advantage that consumers are not confronted with surprising terms and 
could better shop around because of the comparability of the terms of various suppliers. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The consumer redress mechanism of the Consumer Protection Act 
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After the presentation of the South African legislation on the right to fair, just and reasonable 
terms and conditions in terms of the Consumer Protection Act, in this part of this thesis, the 
German standard business terms legislation under §§ 305 to 310 of the German Civil Code 
(BGB)2617 and under the Injunctions Act (UKlaG)2618 will be discussed. In order to facilitate a 
comparison between both regimes, this chapter will generally adopt the same structure as the 
South African part, except where a different presentation is necessary.2619 
A comparison with the German legislation on standard business terms is interesting because 
Germany was the first country in Europe to identify the issue of standard terms, and the first to 
address this field systematically. What is more, the German Standard Business Terms Act 
(AGB-Gesetz)2620 had an enormous impact on the drafting of the European Unfair Terms 
Directive.2621 
After a brief historical overview, from the first use of standard business terms during Germany's 
industrial revolution in the 19th century to date, the scope of application of §§ 305 et seq. will 
be discussed, followed by a presentation of legal problems inherent to the incorporation 
requirement of § 305(2).2622 Then, the exclusion of surprising contract clauses (§ 305c) and the 
priority of individually agreed terms (§ 305b) shall be examined, before the field of 
interpretation of standard business terms will be presented. The heart of this part of this thesis 
will be the content control, consisting of the list of prohibited terms with or without an 
                                                             
2617 BGB = Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. Except where otherwise indicated, the provisions mentioned in this part 
are those of the BGB. 
2618 UKlaG = Unterlassungsklagengesetz. 
2619 In order to be in line with the wording of §§ 305 et seq, the terminology of the official English translation of 
the BGB, provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, will be used in this part 
(https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/). This especially refers to 'standard business terms', the 'user' 
(mostly the 'supplier' according to the terminology of the CPA) and the 'other party', which typically is the 
consumer (see § 305(1)). 
2620 AGB-Gesetz or AGBG = Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen. 
2621 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 109 (141). 
2622 Except where otherwise indicated, legal provisions preceded by '§' are those of the BGB.  
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evaluative element (§§ 308 and 309) as well as the general clause of § 307. In the present part, 
also the legal implications of clauses that have not been incorporated into the agreement as well 
as the invalidity of contract terms will be examined. Finally, the Unterlassungsklagengesetz 
dealing with procedural questions and the defence against 'unfair' standard terms, especially 
through institutional actions,2623 will be examined. 
As it will be presented further in detail in the historical overview, the appearance of standard 
business terms in the 19th century, due to the industrialisation of the country and mass 
production, was characterised by the unfettered shift of risks onto consumers.2624 After some 
hesitation, due to the fact that the Reichsgericht (RG) did not want to interfere with freedom of 
contract, the view gained ground that exploitative contractual terms must be restricted.2625 The 
Reichsgericht adopted different approaches in this regard, which all were unsatisfactory from 
a dogmatic point of view.2626 After World War II, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) then based its 
legislation on its landmark decision of 19562627 where the principle of good faith (§ 242) 
became the fulcrum. From this moment on, an evolution in this field took its starting point what 
was in retrospective referred to as a 'highly commendable performance of German 
jurisprudence'.2628 In 1976, a time when the notion of consumer protection gained ground, the 
AGBG came into force. This statute was by far more than a 'codified case law', although the 
previous work of the courts had prepared the ground. It contained many innovations and 
corrections, and distinguished B2C and B2B contracts, for instance.2629 After the Unfair Terms 
Directive of 1993 was transposed into the AGBG,2630 its provisions were inserted, with some 
modifications, as §§ 305 to 310 into the BGB. For procedural questions, the 
Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG)2631 was created. Today, the German standard business 
terms legislation is a modern legal instrument bearing the signature of a long evolution. The 
                                                             
2623 Verbandsklagen. Since this kind of action is inexistent in South Africa, its designation is inconsistent. Naudé 
summarises the different terms in use: 'actions in the collective interest' (Naudé 2010 SALJ 517), 'general use 
challenge' (Naudé 2010 SALJ 528), 'abstract challenge' (Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 58), 'ex ante challenge' (Naudé 2010 SALJ 517), for instance.  
2624 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 1. 
2625 Stoffels AGB-Recht 6. 
2626 These were: 1. a restrictive interpretation of the clause in favour of the consumer (see e.g., RGZ 142, 353; RG 
JW 1934, 2395), 2. the presumption that the consumer's 'declaration of submission' under the standard terms was 
invalid if they were unusual or inequitable (see e.g., RGZ 103, 84; 112, 253), and 3. the invalidity of clauses that 
are contrary to accepted principles of morality, that is public policy in terms of § 138 BGB (see e.g., RGZ 20, 115 
(117); 62, 264 (266); 99, 107 (109); 115, 218 (219 et seq). 
2627 BGHZ 22, 90 et seq. 
2628 Zweigert and Kötz Rechtsvergleichung 329. 
2629 Stoffels AGB-Recht 11. 
2630 Gesetz zur Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes und der Insolvenzordnung of 09/07/1996. 
2631 BGBl. 2001 I at 3138 et seq. 
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significance of this field of law both in the law and in the economy cannot sufficiently be 
accentuated because it is the 'control instrument' in an (online) economy geared towards mass 
consumption, rationalisation, anonymisation and profit maximisation.2632 
  
                                                             
2632 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 9. 
 470   
 
CHAPTER 1 – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS OF STANDARD 
BUSINESS TERMS LEGISLATION 
 
1. Historical Overview 
1.1 Legislation before the Standard Business Terms Act  
The existence of standard business terms in Germany can be seen as a consequence of the 
technical and economic development in the 19th century and the transition from a mostly 
agrarian to an industrial society. In the simultaneously developing service sector, the insurance 
industry, with its standardised mass contracts, was the first sector using standardised business 
terms, followed by the major banks in 1880. The lawmaker was not idle either as in 1871, the 
year of the foundation of the German Reich, the Liability Act of the German Reich came into 
force. It imposed liability on railroads and prohibited contracts excluding liability.2633 This 
tendency was intensified by the creation of some cartels during this time so that quite early 
standard terms were used in the manufacturing business as well as in trade and services.2634 
The introduction of standard business terms allowed a rationalisation of time and effort. Other 
industries and businesses, such as architects, landlords and real estate agents, soon followed.2635 
The appearance of widely used standard provisions was also a result of new contractual forms 
for which the then existing statutes did not cater for. Leasing and factoring, franchising, or 
special forms of service contracts,2636 e.g., travel contracts or developer contracts,2637 belong 
to this category. The new contractual forms were partly a further development of already 
existing contract types or new ones. Hence, the economic actors had to find solutions in order 
to cater to these new forms on the basis of freedom of contract. Standard terms were ideal 
because they allowed the creation of standardised contracts.2638 Gradually, the wide use of 
standard clauses let businesses systematically impose the contractual risks on their clients and 
modify the legal situation substantially to their favour.  
This phenomenon has been widely discussed in the literature between the World Wars, and 
some authors argued that the legal characteristics of contracts did not reflect the statutory 
provisions anymore, but was rather a 'self-made law of the economy' ─ Naudé refers to 'private 
                                                             
2633 Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (RHPflG). See Kötz Gutachten 50. DJT at A38. 
2634 Stoffels AGB-Recht 4, WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 1. 
2635 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 1. 
2636 Werkvertrag. 
2637 Bauträgervertrag.  
2638 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 2. 
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legislation'2639 ─ in the form of standard business terms.2640 Above all Ludwig Raiser 
contributed to the academic discussion on standard business terms. According to him, the use 
of standard terms makes economic sense, but their formulation and use must be considered in 
the light of the public interest and the legal consciousness of the community.2641 Thus, 
businesses must be prevented from burdening customers unduly, harming the overall economy, 
or infringing the laws by applying deceit and pressure in order to obtain advantages for 
themselves. This is to be done by effective control through administrative bodies and the 
courts.2642 The most important 'discovery' in Raiser's seminal work is the ius dispositivum as 
the applicable standard for the legitimacy of standard business terms.2643 Indeed, residual rules 
are merely subsidiary law in the field of the law of contract. Nonetheless, they contribute to an 
appropriate balance between the conflicting interests of the parties and therefore are the 'normal 
order' of the circumstances of a given case.2644 A legal system based on balance by control by 
a third party (such as the courts) cannot accept structural imbalances of this order.2645 
On the other hand, the courts were very hesitant at that time with respect to the need for control 
of standard terms. The belief that the market would balance any shortcomings and the view 
that freedom of contract should be free from any public intervention still prevailed. Notably in 
a decision of 1883, the then German Supreme Court, the Reichsgericht, held that although the 
transfer of risk in the given case was inequitable and unfair and would shift the 'natural 
circumstances' due to a lack of legal limitations of freedom of contract in this respect, it would 
not be possible to invalidate the given agreement, irrespective of how offensive the terms might 
be.2646 Indeed, the BGB of 1896 took individually agreed contracts as the norm, and the historic 
legislator drafted the BGB against the backdrop of the idea that the parties to a contract will 
find a balance between their converging interests.2647 Nonetheless, gradually jurisprudence 
developed three different approaches for the content control of standard business terms because 
                                                             
2639 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 369. 
2640 Großmann-Doerth Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft, passim. 
2641 According to Stoffels, the accentuation of the aspect of the 'legal consciousness of the community' must be 
seen in the context of the time when Raiser wrote his book and is not significant anymore. See Stoffels AGB-
Recht 5. 
2642 Raiser Recht der AGB 98 et seq. 
2643 Stoffels AGB-Recht 5. 
2644 Raiser Recht der AGB 293 et seq. See also Eiselen Control of Unfair Standard Terms and CISG 172. 
2645 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 4. 
2646 RGZ 11, 100 (110). 
2647 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 1. 
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it became soon clear that the maxim of contractual fairness 'volenti non fit iniuria' only could 
be put into practice where the parties were fitted with equal bargaining power.2648 
The first approach consisted of a restrictive interpretation of the given clause. In the event of 
uncertainties, the clause in question was thus interpreted in favour of the consumer.2649 This 
jurisprudence was particularly applied to disclaimers of liability or warranty and other forms 
of transfer of risks. The boundaries of interpretation were often transgressed though since the 
Reichsgericht modified contracts and applied a content control in the guise of interpretation of 
clauses.2650 A second approach was based on the consumer's 'declaration of submission'2651 
under the business's standard terms and stated that an express and voluntary submission under 
standard terms was invalid if the given clauses were unusual or inequitable.2652 In these cases, 
the courts did not clearly distinguish between the inclusion2653 of contract terms and content 
control, however.2654 Finally, the third approach, similar to § 307(1) BGB, was based on 
clauses being 'contrary to accepted principles of morality', i.e., public policy2655 pursuant to 
§ 138 BGB,2656 in cases where a business imposed its standard terms upon a client by taking 
advantage of its monopoly.2657 Other cases were based on unconscionability in terms of § 242 
BGB.2658 This approach became possible because in 1900, the BGB came into force and gave 
courts a statutory basis for intervention.2659 This approach had inconveniences too because 
cases in which companies took advantage of their freedom of contract could not be limited to 
monopolies. Furthermore, the application of public policy alone did not allow for the 
determination of a fair balance between the parties' rights and obligations.2660  
                                                             
2648 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 1a. 
2649 RGZ 142, 353; RG JW 1934, 2395. See current version of § 305 c (2). 
2650 Stoffels AGB-Recht 6. The interpretation of clauses is nonetheless still a corrective measure of the courts in 
terms of content control, see § 5 AGBG (now § 305c (2) BGB). See WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 5. 
2651 Unterwerfungserklärung. 
2652 RGZ 103, 84; 112, 253. 
2653 The official English translation of the BGB refers to 'incorporation'. See https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/ (translation of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection). 
2654 These two aspects are strictly separated today in §§ 305(2) and 307. 
2655 In German 'Verstoß gegen die guten Sitten'. 
2656 § 138: '(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void. (2) In particular, a legal transaction 
is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable 
weakness of will of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to be promised 
or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to the performance.'  
2657 The first decision in this regard was RGZ 20, 115 (117). See also RGZ 62, 264 (266); 99, 107 (109); 102, 396 
(397); 103, 82 (83); 115, 218 (219 et seq). 
2658 RGZ 168, 329. 
2659 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 109 (142). 
2660 WLP/Wolf Introduction para 6. 
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Hence, after the Nazi dictatorship, the newly established German Supreme Court, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), abandoned very soon the Reichsgericht's jurisprudence based on 
monopolies and preferred a content control based on § 242,2661 regardless of whether the 
business held a monopoly. The BGH was inspired by Ludwig Raiser's work who contended 
that the misuse of freedom of contract did not only exist in cases where the user of standard 
terms was in a monopolistic position but also where it depends on the indifference or legal 
inexperience of the other party.2662 Its decision of 29 October 1956 was a milestone in this 
respect.2663 In this case, which concerned the purchase of newly fabricated furniture, the BGH 
decided that the company had the right to exclude its warranty in its standard terms if it granted 
a right of rectification of defects instead. If this right could not be exercised, the client's 
warranty was reinstated though. According to the BGH, any other formulation of standard 
terms violates the principle of good faith because it would be an inequitable and unacceptable 
burden for the customer. In this regard, § 242 limits, pursuant to the BGH, the content of 
standard delivery terms.2664 The BGH justified the application of § 242 by stating that a 
company could abuse its freedom of contract by imposing its standard terms upon the 
customers because merely by the use of standard terms it claimed freedom of contract only for 
itself.2665 Therefore, according to the principle of good faith, businesses would be obliged to 
consider the interests of potential clients as well. Otherwise, the company in question abuses 
its freedom of contract.2666  
In the beginning, the BGH faltered in its decisions as regards the criterion of good faith between 
the 'crass inadequacy' of the contractual terms and their 'contrariety to the principles of the 
community' or contractual justice.2667 Finally, in 1964, the BGH specified the standard of good 
faith (Treu und Glauben) using Raiser's idea of the guiding function of the ius dispositivum.2668 
According to the court, as far as the provisions of the statutory law are not only based on 
considerations of expediency but rather on requirements of justice, any deviation from these 
requirements by standard terms must be based on reasons allowing a deviation that is 
compatible with the law and equity. The ius dispositivum can contain different degrees of 
                                                             
2661 § 242: 'An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice 
into consideration.'  
2662 Raiser Recht der AGB 284.  
2663 BGHZ 22, 90 et seq. 
2664 BGHZ 22, 90 (100). 
2665 The application of the principle of good faith found later application in § 9 AGBG (= § 307 BGB). 
2666 BGH NJW 1965, 246; 1969, 230. 
2667 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 6, Wolf Rechtsgeschäftliche Eintscheidungsfreiheit 253 et seq. 
2668 BGHZ 41, 151 et seq.  
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'fairness', and the higher this degree, the stricter is the applicable standard for the compatibility 
of the deviation by standard terms with the principle of good faith.2669 Therefore, the BGH 
rejected terms that waived essential contractual obligations in most cases.2670 
Overall, jurisprudence concerning standard terms was extremely complex and varied. Its 
objective was nonetheless uniform in the sense that inappropriate, inequitable or abusive 
clauses were invalidated. There is consensus that this was a 'highly commendable performance 
of German jurisprudence'.2671 Today, it is unanimously recognised that freedom of contract as 
a means of a fair balancing of the parties' mutual interests is only appropriate where an 
approximate balance of bargaining power exists.2672 It is the general understanding that mere 
formal freedom of contract is not sufficient, but that material freedom of contract must be 
achieved where not the formal position of a party but its actual power to shape the content of 
the agreement is significant.2673 
1.2 The Standard Business Terms Act of 1976 
The fact that the scrutiny of standard business terms was not codified was criticised from the 
beginning. According to Otto von Gierke, the principle of contract of freedom 'does not mean 
an arbitrary, but rather reasonable freedom of contract' because unrestricted freedom of contract 
will destroy itself and 'becomes a means for the suppression of the other party'.2674 After the 
spreading of standard terms in the period between the World Wars, the National Socialist 
government discussed the creation of a People's Code2675 but contented itself with to some 
dirigiste interventions with regard to some contract types (German uniform rental agreement, 
General German Carrier Conditions).2676 
After World War II, the discussions on the protection of parties that are subject to standard 
business terms was revived, especially at the beginning of the '70s, when the notion of 
consumer protection became more weight. The need for a codified standard terms assessment 
seemed to become urgent, mainly because de facto content control was limited to B2B 
contracts. This was because consumers did assert their rights far less often, either because they 
ignored them, or because they did not want to take the procedural risk for the relatively small 
                                                             
2669 BGHZ 41, 151 (154). 
2670 For instance, BGHZ 50, 200 (206 et seq); 72, 206 (208); BGH NJW 1973, 1878. 
2671 Zweigert and Kötz Rechtsvergleichung 329. 
2672 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 1a. 
2673 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 1b. 
2674 Von Gierke Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts 23. My own translation. 
2675 Volksgesetzbuch. 
2676 Deutscher Einheitsmietvertrag, Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteursbedingungen. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 8-9. 
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sums at stake.2677 There was a need for legislation because judge-made law is limited in its 
scope because the courts can only deal with cases that are brought to them. Besides, court 
rulings have a limited effect because they are only valid inter partes. As in Germany, the losing 
party bears the costs, only few consumers wanted to take the risks involved with litigation. 
Only the most flagrant abuses were thus controlled by the courts. What is more, the absence of 
concrete provisions and the uneven application by lower courts was criticised.2678 On the other 
hand, legislative intervention is proactive, more systematic and has a universal effect.2679 It 
also increases legal certainty,2680 and the political process taking place before a law is passed 
gives the affected social groups the opportunity to participate.2681 
The report of the Federal Government on consumer protection policy of 18 October 1971 gave 
the decisive impulse for the preparatory work in this field. This report underlined the need for 
efficient protection of consumers against inappropriate contractual conditions.2682 The Federal 
Minister of Justice then appointed a workgroup which presented its First Interim Report in 
March 1974, which did not deal with procedural questions though.  
Significant too was the work of the 50th German Jurists' Conference.2683 The majority of this 
conference welcomed legislative measures for the regulation of standard terms. The conference 
recommended above all content control consisting of a combination of prohibited clauses and 
a general clause.2684 In this regard, the work of Hein Kötz must be emphasised. Kötz, a 
comparative-law scholar, presented a 100-page report on standard terms which called for 
legislative measures.2685 Hence, the question was no longer whether legislative measures were 
necessary, but which ones.2686 
The propositions of the First Interim Report were the basis of a first Ministerial Draft of 1974 
which was also limited to questions of the substantive law. An important question during the 
                                                             
2677 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 7. 
2678 Bunte NJW 1987, 921 (922), Dietlein NJW 1974, 1065 (1065). 
2679 Dietlein NJW 1974, 1065 (1065). 
2680 Bunte NJW 1987, 921 (922). 
2681 Stürner JZ 1974, 720. 
2682 Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Verbraucherpolitik of 18/10/1971, BT-Drs. 6/2724 at 8. 
2683 Deutscher Juristentag (DJT). The German Jurists' Conference is an association that holds a bi-annual 
conference since 1860. The Conference brings together lawyers in private practice, in-house lawyers, civil 
servants, judges and academics to discuss legal reform projects and legal policy. It has repeatedly proved 
rather influential. Its deliberations receive wide coverage in the legal and non-legal press alike. See Creifelds 
Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Deutscher Juristentag' and the homepage of this institution at 'https://www.djt.de'. 
2684 See the thorough report of Kötz in Verhandlungen des 50. DJT, Vol. I, A at f) et seq. 
2685 Kötz Gutachten 50. DJT at A1. 
2686 Wolf JZ 1974, 465. Bunte notes that the conviction that legislative measures had to be taken was 'firmly 
anchored' in the public, the political parties and scholars. Bunte NJW 1987, 921 (921 and 922). 
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debate was if the statute merely should contain a general clause, or whether a catalogue of 
prohibited terms should complete a general clause. Another debate concerned the adequacy of 
standard clauses, i.e., whether the fairness enquiry should be geared to positive adequacy, or if 
inadequacy should lead to the invalidity of a clause. Furthermore, it was discussed if the statute 
should be applied only to clauses contained in forms, or to all kinds of contractual 
provisions.2687 A further question was whether the application of the provisions should be 
limited to consumers or be extended to businesses as well, 2688 and if the same control standard 
should apply both to consumers and to merchants.2689 
The statements and hearings on this Ministerial Draft finally led to a second Ministerial Draft 
in March 1975. In June 1975, this Draft was presented with minor modifications by the Federal 
Government to the German Bundestag as 'Draft for a Statute for the Regulation of the Law of 
Standard Business Terms'.2690 The result of this process should be a statute that had the 
objective 'to obtain validity of the principle of an appropriate balance between the interests of 
both parties which legitimates freedom of contract in accordance with the fundamental ideas 
of the BGB', and to 'obtain contractual justice'. The bill hence tended 'to restore the function of 
the private contract law which has been violated by the unfettered development in the field of 
standard business terms'. Thus, the statute should counter the advantage of standard business 
terms users and their possibility to formulate the contractual terms by doing so in an appropriate 
and reasonable manner, without restricting freedom of contract more than necessary.2691 
The Government's Draft was then submitted to the German Bundesrat which argued against 
the inclusion of procedural questions into the statute.2692 Finally, the bill was passed by the 
Bundestag on 10 November 1976, and the Bundesrat assented to it two days later, so that the 
Standard Business Terms Act (AGBG)2693 could be promulgated on 9 December 1976 in the 
Federal Law Gazette.2694 Most of its provisions came into force on 1 April 1977.2695 In 1990, 
it was extended to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.2696  
                                                             
2687 Grunsky BB 1971, 1113, WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 8. 
2688 Brandner JZ 1973, 614. 
2689 Wolf JZ 1974, 465 and 469. 
2690 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz), BT-
Drs. 7/3919. 
2691 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 13.  
2692 See Report of the Law Commission, BT-Drs. 7/5422. 
2693 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz). 
2694 BGBl. I at 3317. 
2695 § 30 AGBG. 
2696 Gesetz über die Inkraftsetzung von Rechtsvorschriften der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik of 21/06/1990, GBl.-DDR I at 357. 
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The AGBG contained it its § 1 a definition of standard business terms and provided in § 2 for 
the requirements for their incorporation into the contract.2697 The core of the content control2698 
was the general clause (§ 9) invalidating standard terms that, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, unreasonably disadvantage the other party (consumer). § 9(2) contained guidelines 
providing that in case of doubt an unreasonable disadvantage is to be assumed if a clause is not 
compatible with essential principles of the default legal position, or endangers the attainment 
of the purpose of the contract. Besides the general clause, a 'blacklist' in § 11 enumerated terms 
that were invalid without any discretion. Furthermore, § 10 contained a 'greylist' with terms 
that were prohibited prima facie but could be considered as valid after evaluation.2699 The 
content control provisions of §§ 9, 10 and 11 AGBG were applicable to all contracts.2700 
Excluded from the ambit of the AGBG were, for example, contracts in the field of labour 
law,2701 the law of succession, family law and company law (§ 23(1)). §§ 13 to 21 AGBG 
contained provisions dealing with institutional actions.2702 
Although the AGBG was in many respects in keeping with the jurisprudence on the limits of 
standard business terms, it would be wrong to describe this statute as 'codified case law' since 
it contained many innovations which the former jurisprudence did not provide for as well as 
some corrections.2703 For instance, the new law differentiated between B2C and B2B 
transactions, and contrary to prior jurisprudence, the definitions of 'standard business terms' 
was more precise and included so-called form-contracts.2704 The material scope of application 
was therefore not only defined negatively, as in § 23 AGBG, but also positively.2705 The civil 
courts' role as controlling bodies was confirmed and legitimated, the standards specified and 
the methodology accentuated. The courts decided ultimately on the validity of standard terms, 
which meant that other alternatives, such as the creation of consumer protection authorities 
endowed with the task to validate standard terms beforehand, or the introduction of a procedure 
                                                             
2697 Brox BGB-AT (1991) 107-110. 
2698 Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 1. 
2699 Brox BGB-AT (1991) 112-115. The text of the AGBG is printed in UBH at 26-40, for instance. 
2700 §§ 307, 308 and 309 BGB which largely correspond to §§ 9, 10 and 11 ABGB only apply to consumer 
contracts. For other (B2B) contracts, only the general clause of § 307 applies. See §§ 24 AGBG and 310(1) BGB. 
The BGH has decided however that the list contained in §§ 308 and 309 provide for an indication of an 
unreasonable disadvantage and that violations of the black- or greylists also might infringe § 307 in commercial 
agreements (BGH XII ZR 54/05, 27/05/2007). 
2701 Labour law is no longer excluded from the ambit of §§ 305-310 BGB. See § 310(4). Wendland in: 
Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 8. 
2702 Verbandsklage. Stoffels AGB-Recht 11. 
2703 Stoffels AGB-Recht 10. 
2704 § 1 AGBG. 
2705 Stoffels AGB-Recht 11. 
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for the formulation of model conditions, were not provided for in this statute.2706 Such solutions 
would have meant more bureaucracy and would not have been compatible with a free economic 
order. De facto it would also have led to less judicial control because official 'authorisations' 
by an official body would have legitimised the given standard terms.2707 Although model terms 
would have been more compatible with the free economic order, there was a lack of 
associations being able to defend consumer interests during the negotiations of such model 
terms. This solution was therefore dismissed as well.2708  
The scope of the AGBG was formulated very widely and B2B transactions were included too, 
although some flexibility was introduced by excluding some provisions for this kind of 
transactions.2709 The first step of the validity assessment of standard terms was the question of 
whether the terms became lawfully part of the agreement (incorporation or inclusion),2710 
followed by the content control, which was widely based on the jurisprudence of the BGH.2711 
In cases in which the 'other party', i.e., the consumer, wished to oppose standard terms, it could 
enforce the provisions of the AGBG in individual proceedings at court. The validity of the 
given standard terms was then assessed in a so-called 'incidental control', i.e., within the 
proceedings at court. In order to strengthen the protection of this statute, the legislator 
introduced an 'abstract control' in the form of an 'institutional action'.2712 This kind of action 
was granted to certain qualified bodies, professional associations and chambers of industry and 
commerce as well as to chambers of crafts.2713 The standing of consumer protection 
organisations ensures that consumers have knowledgeable partners on their side and that legal 
actions have a general effect. What is more, associations with locus standi have a certain 
bargaining power because in many cases, they can require an extrajudicial declaration of 
discontinuance.2714 Hence institutional actions and the bargaining power that ultimately derives 
from it indirectly have the same effect as the drafting of model standard business terms.2715 
                                                             
2706 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 9. 
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2708 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 9. 
2709 § 24 AGBG. 
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2713 See § 13(2) AGBG. 
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The AGBG quickly played a central role in German contract law. According to Remien, 
contract law became above all the law of the control of standard business terms.2716 
The so-called 'contract model' solved the question of how freedom of contract would not unduly 
be restricted by giving courts control over contractual terms. From a legal standpoint, the 
existence of standard terms is based on the fact that the parties can differ from the legal set of 
rules serving as default provisions (ius dispositivum). In the case of standard terms however, 
the user restricts the other party's freedom of contract by imposing its terms and conditions. 
The other party (consumer) takes these terms as mandatory and usually merely accepts the core 
terms, the essentialia negotii. Therefore, users (suppliers) take upon themselves the obligation 
to draft suitable terms in good faith.2717 Good faith requires that the terms be fair and that the 
user does not subject its counterpart to an unreasonable disadvantage.2718 The AGBG limits the 
users' freedom to exploit their position as drafters to their sole benefit and prohibits them from 
taking inappropriate advantage of their counterparts. Therefore, not the parties' freedom of 
contract2719 is controlled, but rather the user's freedom of contract-drafting.2720 This so-called 
'contract model'2721 does not assess a term's fairness but rather whether the user's standard terms 
serve as a good faith basis for the parties' contractual relationship.2722 Hence, the contract model 
compares standard terms to two principal validity standards: first, the essential basic principles 
of the statute from which the given term deviates, and second, the essential rights and duties 
necessary to achieve the purpose of the contract.2723 Thus, the scope of the contract model 
focuses on the challenged terms, the relevant ius dispositivum and the contract concerned. On 
the other hand, the circumstances of the parties involved in a particular transaction are not taken 
into account.2724 This approach is therefore 'supra-individual and generalising' (or 'abstract-
universal', 'abstract-general' or generalised-typified),'2725 and not 'particular-personalised'.2726 
The relevant statute serves a 'classifying and guiding function'.2727 Even though to foreign 
jurists not familiar with the 'dogmatic-conceptual' phase of German standard business terms 
law, the approach of the contract model must be a 'simply incomprehensible approach to the 
                                                             
2716 Remien ZEuP 1994, 34. 
2717 BGHZ 54, 106 (109). 




2722 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 109 (148). 
2723 See § 307(2). Schmidt E DRiZ 1991, 81, 83. 
2724 BGHZ 22, 91 (98); 17,1 (3). 
2725 Abstrakt-generell. 
2726 Konkret-individuell. Heinrichs NJW 1993, 1817, 1820. 
2727 Ordnungs- und Leitbildfunktion. Schmidt-Salzer Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen 186-189. 
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problem', as Schmidt-Salzer comments,2728 it made the development of a judicature of specific 
prohibited terms in their various manifestations possible by a combination of legal provisions 
and judicial decisions.2729 
1.3 The Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts and its transposition into German law 
The harmonisation of the European national laws has been discussed since the 1970s, but only 
in the '90s of the last century, those endeavours took a more concrete shape. In July 1990, the 
European Commission submitted its first proposal for a Council Directive on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts.2730 This proposal had many deficiencies though because of a content 
control including the control of the price-performance ratio, and the lack of a distinction 
between pre-formulated and individually negotiated terms. Above all German scholars harshly 
criticised this proposal.2731 It was contended that the equal treatment of individually agreed 
terms and standard-form clauses would cause a 'considerable dilution of the principle of a free 
market economy, which is safeguarded by the EEC Treaty'2732 and would therefore drastically 
restrict private autonomy and upset freedom of contract.2733 German authors argued that 
German standard terms legislation honoured freedom of contract, and that this principle 
counsels not the free application of standard terms, but their scrutiny. Where, on the other hand, 
the parties negotiate terms individually, their choice had to be accepted with regard to private 
autonomy.2734 The control of individually negotiated terms had to take into consideration the 
entire contract as well as the circumstances of its conclusion.2735 Furthermore, they argued that 
in a free-market economy, the price-performance relationship should be determined by the 
market and that the directive should not apply to the 'principle obligations' of the contract.2736  
The following proposal for a directive followed in March 1992 under the impression of the 
criticism of the first proposal and the statements of the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee.2737 This proposal for a Council Directive contained many improvements 
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2729 Kötz notes that the courts did not have to rely on indefinite general clauses, but could develop case groups, 
clause varieties and contract types. See Kötz Gutachten 50. DJT at A51. 
2730 OJ EC 1990 No. C 243 at 2. 
2731 Brandner/Ulmer BB 1991, 701 et seq, Hommelhoff AcP 192 (1992) at 90 et seq. 
2732 Brandner/Ulmer Common Mkt- L. Rev. 1991, 647, 652 et seq (translation of Brandner/Ulmer). Their original 
contribution in German: Brandner/Ulmer BB 1991, 701, 703-704. 
2733 Brandner/Ulmer Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1991, 647, 652-654. 
2734 Zoller JZ 1991, 850, 853, 855. 
2735 Brandner/Ulmer Common Mkt- L. Rev. 1991, 647, 654.  
2736 Brandner/Ulmer Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1991, 647, 651-654, Bunte FS Locher 329, 331, 333. 
2737 OJ EC 1992 No. C 73 at 7. 
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and had numerous similarities with the German AGBG but still included individually 
negotiated terms.2738 The antagonism between the proposal of the Directive and German 
standard business terms law originated in their different approaches. Whereas the German 
contract model applies to contracts in general, without taking into consideration the personal 
characteristics of the parties (abstract-universal approach), the draft of the Directive focused 
on consumer protection (particular-personalised approach).  
After some resistance, the Commission finally agreed that the Unfair Terms Directive should 
not apply to individually agreed terms.2739 Furthermore, pre-formulated standard contracts 
were not considered individually negotiated,2740 and the control of the adequacy of the price-
performance ratio and the Directive's application to the principal obligations of a contract were 
abandoned.2741 
Finally, the common position of the Council with a view to the adoption of the Council 
Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts became the Council Directive 93/13/EC of 
5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.2742 In conclusion, the German standard 
business terms legislation had a major influence on the Unfair Terms Directive.2743 
In terms of article 1(1) of the Directive, '[t]he purpose of the[e] Directive is to approximate the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms 
in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.' The material scope of the 
Directive covers 'contractual term[s] which ha[ve] not been individually negotiated'.2744 This 
is a broader definition for standard business terms than in article 1 AGBG.2745 What is more, 
the Directive does not include B2B agreements but only 'consumers', unlike the AGBG.2746 
More importantly, the Directive considers a term 'unfair'2747 if it causes a significant imbalance 
                                                             
2738 Stoffels AGB-Recht 13. 
2739 Article 3(1) of the Directive. 
2740 Article 3(2) of the Directive. 
2741 Article 4(2) of the Directive. 
2742 OJ L 95 of 21 April 1993 at 29 et seq. 
2743 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 109, 160. 
2744 Article 3(1) of the Directive. 
2745 Article 1(1) AGBG: '(1) Standard business terms are all contract terms pre-formulated for more than two 
contracts which one party to the contract (the user) presents to the other party upon the entering into of the contract. 
It is irrelevant whether the provisions take the form of a physically separate part of a contract or are made part of 
the contractual document itself, what their volume is, what typeface or font is used for them and what form the 
contract takes.' The AGBG did not yet contain the sentence 'Contract terms do not become standard business terms 
to the extent that they have been negotiated in detail between the parties', which later was inserted into § 305(1). 
2746 Pursuant to art 2(b) of the Directive, '"consumer' means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this 
Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession'. For the personal scope of 
application of the AGBG see § 24 AGBG. 
2747 In the German official translation of art 3(1) of the Directive, 'unfair' is translated by 'missbräuchlich'. 
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in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract, whereas the centrepiece of the German 
general clause is an 'unreasonable disadvantage'. Since EU law has to be interpreted 
independently from national law, i.e., autonomously, it cannot be excluded that the content of 
EU and national laws might differ in certain instances. Because of the primacy of European 
law over national law and the radiating effect of the former, these differences should be 
minimal though.2748 
On the other hand, many provisions of the Directive are similar to the AGBG: Article 4(2), 
read with recital 19, expressly excludes the price-performance ratio.2749 Besides, the general 
clause in article 3 of the Directive is geared to the principle of good faith.2750 The 'significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of 
the consumer' in the Directive's general clause is, as Stoffels correctly contends, nothing else 
than the 'unreasonable disadvantage' referred to in § 9 AGBG because the Directive's general 
clause is not aimed to grant greater protection than the general clause in the AGBG.2751 The 
Directive's list of prohibited terms in the Annex is merely a not binding 'reminder' directed to 
the Member States of possibly unfair terms though.2752 
The Directive aims at a harmonised minimal standard of protection, and 'Member States may 
adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by 
this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer'.2753 Stricter 
provisions of the AGBG are therefore not in conflict with the Directive.2754 
The Directive was transposed into German law by a law which became effective on 25 July 
1996.2755 The objective of this statute was not a complete overhaul but to amend the AGBG as 
little as possible to conform to the Directive 2756 as the legislator was of the view that the 
protection required by the Directive could be achieved by the AGBG. On the other hand, the 
German lawmaker considered that the personal and material scope of application of the AGBG 
                                                             
2748 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 10. 
2749 Stoffels AGB-Recht 13. 
2750 See § 9(1) AGBG. 
2751 Stoffels AGB-Recht 14 and 15. 
2752 Article 3(3) of the Directive: 'The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms which 
may be regarded as unfair'. 
2753 Article 8 of the Directive. 
2754 BGH NJW 2001, 1132 (1133). 
2755 Gesetz zur Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes und der Insolvenzordnung of 09/07/1996. 
2756 UBH/Ulmer Introduction para 92 refers to a 'minimal solution'. 
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had to be amended. This led to the introduction of § 24a AGBG, applicable to consumer 
contracts.2757 
1.4 The Law of Obligations Modernisation Act and the integration of the law of 
standard business terms into the BGB 
After the Directive's transposition into German law, some specific intervention took place with 
respect to the AGBG. These were notably due to the Commercial Law Reform Act of 1998,2758 
the Cashless Payment Transactions Act of 1999,2759 the Acceleration of Due Payments Act of 
20002760 and the Distance Selling Contracts Act of 2000.2761 The by far most significant 
intervention was due to the Law of Obligations Modernisation Act of 26 November 2001, 
which took effect on 1 January 2002.2762 
By the aforementioned statute, the AGBG was repealed, and the substantive provisions of the 
AGBG2763 were integrated into the BGB in a newly created Division 2 'Drafting contractual 
obligations by means of standard business terms'2764 containing the official note that '[t]his 
provision also serves to implement Directive 93/13/EEC of the Council of 5 April 1993 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts.'2765 
Despite the integration of the AGBG provisions into the BGB, the lawmaker did not choose to 
redraft these provisions but limited its intervention to some focal points, such as necessary 
modifications due to the modified law of defective performances, or the adaption of some 
provisions in the light of the Directive.2766 A rather significant modification was the abolition 
                                                             
2757 Now § 310(3 BGB. Stoffels AGB-Recht 18. 
2758 Handelsrechtsreformgesetz (HRefG), BGBl. 1998 I at 1484 et seq. 
2759 Überweisungsgesetz (ÜG), BGBl. 1999 I at 1642. See §§ 675, 675a and 676 a to c BGB. 
2760 Gesetz zur Beschleunigung fälliger Zahlungen, BGBl. 2000 I at 330 et seq. 
2761 Fernabsatzgesetz (FernAbsG), BGBl. 2000 I at 897 et seq. See § 312 c BGB. 
2762 Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, BGBl. 2001 I at 3138 et seq. 
2763 §§ 1 to 11 and 23 to 24a AGBG. 
2764 §§ 305 to 310 BGB. 
2765 The AGBG provisions have been integrated into the BGB as follows:  
AGBG BGB 
§§ 1 and 2 
§ 23 (part) 
§ 4 
§§ 3 and 5 
§ 6 
§ 7 
§§ 8 and 9 
§ 10 
§ 11 












2766 Stoffels AGB-Recht 19. 
 484   
 
of the applicability of content control to employment contracts.2767 With the integration into 
the BGB, the legislator hoped to achieve more transparency and understandability, a strong 
interlacing between the law of standard business terms and the law of obligations. Other 
objectives were the prevention of the development of different principles of interpretation, 
definitions and scrutiny standards as well as a strengthening of the concept of codification. The 
ultimate aim was that the BGB should regain the 'rank of a general codification of the civil 
law'.2768 
The procedural provisions which were formerly contained in §§ 13 et seq. AGBG were not 
included in the BGB. Instead, the legislator created the Unterlassungsklagengesetz 
(UKlaG).2769 The reason for this was that the BGB, which only contains substantive law 
provisions, should not be 'tainted' with procedural provisions, and the Civil Procedures Act 
(ZPO)2770 should not contain provisions dealing with institutional actions.2771 
The creation of §§ 305 to 310 BGB was received with some criticism, and some authors 
favoured the maintenance of the AGBG.2772 Some authors suggested that there had been no 
compulsory need for action, contrary to the legislator's given reasons,2773 as intransparency and 
contradictions had not characterised the parallel existence of the AGBG and the BGB. Ulmer 
even asserted that the signalling effect of the AGBG provisions were stronger if they had not 
been integrated into the BGB.2774 Indeed, one can criticise the fact that many AGBG provisions 
had been 'contracted' into fewer BGB provisions in a sometimes illogical manner.2775 For 
instance, the inclusion of standard business terms was regulated in a provision of its own 
(§ 2 AGBG), whereas now, it is contained in § 305(2) BGB. § 9 AGBG only contained the 
general clause, whereas § 307 BGB also contains a provision dealing with content control in 
its 3rd subsection.  
Nonetheless, the insertion of the standard business terms legislation into the BGB must be seen 
more positively than negatively. Even though the organisation of some provisions could be 
                                                             
2767 Formerly § 23(1) AGBG. § 310(4) provides that when the provisions of § 305 et seq are applied to employment 
contracts, reasonable account must be taken of the special features that apply in labour law. See UBH/Fuchs 
before § 307 para 18. 
2768 Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 92 and 97. 
2769 BGBl. 2001 I at 3138 et seq. 
2770 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO). 
2771 Verbandsklage. Stoffels AGB-Recht 19. 
2772 Ulmer JZ 2001, 491 et seq, Schulze and Schulze-Nölke Schuldrechtsreform 215 et seq. 
2773 AnwKomm Schuldrecht-Hennrichs before §§ 305 et seq para 6. 
2774 Ulmer JZ 2001, 497. 
2775 Palandt/Heinrichs (2008) before § 305 para 1, Ernst and Zimmermann Zivilrechtswissenschaft 503. 
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different, the codification in a single code is more transparent and logical. The BGB which 
deals with the most important civil law matters of individuals from birth to death is by far the 
best-known code in Germany (after the Grundgesetz), and probably only few laypersons knew 
of the existence of the AGBG. The signalling effect of the AGBG was therefore probably not 
as strong as Ulmer asserts. More importantly, courts assess standard terms within a so-called 
'incidental control', i.e., within the assessment of other legal questions, such as the validity of 
a contract. The insertion of the given provisions into this code containing other relevant 
substantive provisions was thus logical. 
From a systematic point of view, the provisions on standard business terms belong to the 
general part of the BGB, however,2776 and not to the general part of the law of obligations2777 
because content control is also applicable for clauses concerning representation, prescription 
or property law. The legislator was of the view though that the standard business terms 
provisions should be inserted into Book II of the BGB because they mostly concerned the 
contract types contained in the special law of obligations.2778 The provisions of §§ 305 to 310 
must be applied by analogy to clauses that do not contain any provisions of the law of 
obligations, save where provided otherwise, like in § 310.2779 
2. Theoretical and practical implications of standard business terms legislation 
The relatively long history of the German standard business terms legislation allowed an in-
depth debate on various questions. These will be briefly discussed here. 
2.1 Positive functions and negative implications of standard business terms 
2.1.1   Positive functions of standard business terms 
As already mentioned, standard clauses can rationalise transactions. In today's e-commerce 
mass contracts, this characteristic is essential.2780 Since the same conditions apply to a 
significant number of customers, the supplier's organisation and calculation is simplified, and 
it is not necessary to negotiate the terms individually.2781 Furthermore, standard provisions 
avoid disputes as regards the content of the contract and allow a quick adjustment to changing 
economic and technical circumstances.2782 The rationalisation effect is judged positively by 
German courts. It is thus permissible to consider aspects of rationalisation when formulating 
                                                             
2776 Book I, §§ 1 to 240 BGB. 
2777 Book II, §§ 241 to 432 BGB. 
2778 Book II, §§ 433 to 853 BGB. WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 13, UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 17. 
2779 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 13. 
2780 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 2. 
2781 Stoffels AGB-Recht 21. 
2782 Raiser Recht der AGB 20, Stoffels AGB-Recht 22. 
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standard business terms, even if their wording deviates from legal provisions.2783 These effects 
can also be beneficial for clients since they do not need to negotiate the conditions of the 
agreement in question, and suppliers are able to lower their prices, especially when they act in 
a very competitive area.2784 
Finally, standard terms often adjust the content of legal provisions which are not suitable for 
specific situations, or which simply do not exist. This function is also called 'gap-filling 
function'.2785 Furthermore, another function of standard terms is the 'typification function', i.e., 
contractual forms that are not contained in the BGB are 'created' and defined, such as leasing, 
factoring, franchise and automate installation contracts2786 which have their basis solely in 
complex and standardised instruments.2787 This phenomenon explains the term 'self-made law 
of the economy'.2788 
2.1.2 Negative implications of standard business terms 
Unfortunately, standard business terms also have negative effects, such as the fact that suppliers 
tend to act only in their own interest and pass on risks onto their clients.2789 These negative 
implications were also mentioned in the AGBG Bill, where a 'fundamental disregard of the 
principles of freedom of contract and contractual justice to the disadvantage of the other party 
to the contract' was observed 'which are subject to such pre-formulated contractual 
instruments'.2790 
Often, the rationalisation effect and the tendency to shift risks overlap, however. Pre-
formulated terms granting damages at a predetermined sum prevent the supplier from 
calculating damages for every single case, but also shift the risk onto the customer where the 
compensation would be higher than the predetermined sum.2791 
The borders between rationalisation, transfer of risk and abuse of the supplier's position are 
often blurred. Hence, not all deviations from the ius dispositivum which are disadvantageous 
                                                             
2783 BGH NJW 1996, 988 (989). 
2784 Stoffels AGB-Recht 22. 
2785 Lückenausfüllungsfunktion. Locher Recht der AGB 6. 
2786 Automatenaufstellungsverträge. The object of these contracts consists of the installation of vending or 
gambling machines, for instance. Their dogmatic classification depends on the parties' agreement and the 
circumstances (lease, mixed contract, private company or profit-sharing agreement). See Creifelds 
Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Automatenaufstellungsvertrag'. 
2787 Joost ZIP 1996, 1685, Stoffels AGB-Recht 22. 
2788 Stoffels AGB-Recht 23. Großmann-Doerth coined this term in 1933 in his inaugural lecture with the title 
'Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft und staatliches Recht', Freiburger Universitätsreden 10. 
2789 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 3. 
2790 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 9. My own translation. 
2791 Stoffels AGB-Recht 23. 
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for the consumer are necessarily inadequate in the sense of § 307(1) or (2) no. 1. This applies 
above all to clauses that improve the calculation of business risks by a uniform contract 
implementation.2792 Therefore, the question of whether a clause for which §§ 308 and 309 are 
not applicable is inadequate can only be answered by balancing the interests of the parties.2793 
2.2 Legitimation of content control 
As discussed above, the use of standard business terms has various functions which are 
appraised by jurisprudence. This does not explain though how to legitimise content control in 
the face of the principles of the law and other aspects. 
2.2.1 Constitutional aspects 
The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) has held in three 
landmark decisions that freedom of contract needs to be limited by the courts' content control 
due to constitutional reasons. 
In its decision of 7 February 1990 ('commercial representative decision'),2794 the BVerfG put 
forward that freedom of contract is based on the principle of self-determination, which assumes 
that the conditions of free self-determination must exist de facto. Where in fact one party 
determines unilaterally the contractual provisions, the other part experiences heteronomy, 
which is the contrary of autonomy or self-determination. In cases where a balance of the parties' 
rights and obligations does not exist, a balance can often not be established by the provisions 
of contract law alone. Hence, in circumstances where constitutional rights, such as freedom of 
contract, are violated, a balance must be found by other legal provisions in order to ensure the 
protection of constitutional rights. The courts have thus to ascertain this protection by applying 
the provisions of the civil law, namely the general clauses.2795 
In its 'security decision' of 19 October 1993,2796 the BVerfG specified that the constitutional 
threshold of intervention depends on the question of whether the given case is characterised by  
'typified circumstances' that reveal a structural inferiority of the other party, and whether the 
consequences of the contract are unusually incriminatory for this party. In the court's view, the 
existing rules of contract law are sufficient to counter structural imbalances. Therefore, the 
civil courts have an obligation to ensure, when interpreting and applying general clauses, that 
                                                             
2792 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 9. 
2793 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack Introduction para 5. 
2794 BVerfG NJW 1990, 1469 (Handelsvertreterentscheidung). 
2795 By 'general clauses' the BVerfG does not only refer to the general clause of § 307, but also to §§ 138 (public 
policy) or 242 BGB (good faith). 
2796 BVerfG NJW 1993, 36 ('Bürgschaftsbeschluss'). 
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contracts do not foster heteronomy. Where the contractual provisions are abnormally 
burdensome for one party and not appropriate for balancing the parties' interests, the courts 
cannot simply put forward the principle of pacta sunt servanda but must rather clarify whether 
the provision is a result of structurally imbalanced bargaining power. If necessary, they must 
correct this imbalance by employing the general clauses of the civil law. The procedure to be 
applied and the result to be achieved is, according to the BVerfG, a question of the civil law, 
for which the constitution grants a broad leeway.2797 
In its decision of 6 February 20012798 concerning judicial control of nuptial agreements on 
maintenance, the BVerfG described situations where the contractual balance is disturbed 
because of typical inferiority of one party. According to the court, the civil courts must 
intervene in these cases.2799 Although the problem of standard terms and its legal regulation 
are not explicitly dealt with in this decision, the following correlations can be observed: The 
unilateral claiming of freedom of contract by a party which imposes pre-formulated contract 
terms on the other party gives the user typically a preponderance to such a degree that in fact, 
it alone can determine the contractual content. Pre-formulated contracts create thus structural 
inferiority of the other party, which is why the risk of exploitation necessitates legal 
protection.2800  
In summary, the law of standard business terms contained in §§ 305 et seq. can be understood 
as the realisation of the mandate of protection of constitutional rights defined by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. What is more, the BVerfG considers content control of pre-
formulated contracts not only as 'constitutionally unproblematic', but also as 'necessary'.2801 
2.2.2 The approach of the contract theory 
In the face of freedom of contract, the submission of contractual provisions to content control 
requires a justification. The reconcilability of freedom of contract and content control has 
produced some legal literature. Since this discussion is more of a theoretical nature without any 
practical relevance, only the main arguments shall be discussed. 
                                                             
2797 Stoffels AGB-Recht 24 and 25. 
2798 BVerfG NJW 2001, 957 and its subsequent decision BVerfG NJW 2001, 2248. 
2799 In this case, the BVerfG stated that provisions contained in a matrimonial agreement, by which the wife alone 
has to bear burdensome consequences in the case of a divorce, are not acceptable de iure if at the time when the 
agreement is concluded she is pregnant by her future husband. 
2800 Stoffels AGB-Recht 25. See also the discussion on unilateral bargaining power in Part I ch 1 para 1. 
2801 BVerfG NJW 2005, 1036 (1037). 
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According to Schmidt-Rimpler, a 'warranted rightness' (Richtigkeitsgewähr), a term he has 
coined, is inherent to the conclusion of a contract.2802 This means that the contract reflects not 
only the wills of the parties but also an 'objectively righteous order'. There are cases though in 
which this order does not exist due to a structural imbalance, for instance. Then, contractual 
justice must be re-established by external measures, i.e., legal control. Otherwise, the contract 
as a legal institution would suffer harm. In order to ensure legal certainty, these measures have 
to be restricted to 'typified' circumstances though in which the 'warranted rightness' generally 
and effectively fails.2803 This is undoubtedly the case where a supplier uses standard business 
terms because here, the user's superiority is 'conditioned by the situation'.2804 The user's 
(supplier's) advance is based on the fact that it can draft its terms without haste and by taking 
legal advice, whereas the other party (customer) is confronted with pre-formulated and rather 
comprehensive standard terms which he or she cannot easily apprehend in the given 
situation.2805 The legislator has considered this by its formulations in §§ 305 et seq. The 'pre-
formulation' of standard business terms is expressed by words such as 'present' (standard 
business terms to the other party' ('Stellen')2806 and the non-existing possibility for the consumer 
to contribute to the formulation of standard business terms.2807 
Raiser suggests another approach, which is rather complementary to the idea of the 'warranted 
rightness'. He refers to the 'institutionalised abuse of rights' (institutioneller 
Rechtsmissbrauch).2808 This approach gained importance before the AGBG came into force. 
The BGH formulates the 'institutionalised abuse of rights' in the sense that the user of standard 
business terms, who claims for himself freedom of contract by presenting them to the other 
party, is obliged, according to the principle of good faith, to take into consideration the interests 
of its future contractual partner when drafting its standard business terms. If the user only 
considers its own interests though, it abuses the principle of freedom of contract.2809 This 
approach aims to maintain the principle of freedom of contract and market-oriented 
competition2810 and has its merits. Lieb correctly contends though that it is rather 
                                                             
2802 Schmidt-Rimpler AcP 147 (1941) at 149, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 1. 
2803 Lieb AcP 178 (1978) 203. 
2804 Lieb AcP 178 (1978) 202. 
2805 See also the discussion on the supplier's 'information asymmetry' and bargaining power in Part I ch 3 para 1.1. 
2806 § 305(1) 1st sent. BGB. 
2807 § 305(1) 3rd sent. BGB. 
2808 Raiser Recht der AGB 282. 
2809 For instance, BGHZ 70, 304 (310). 
2810 Market failure has already been discussed in in Part I ch 3 para 1.1.1 a). 
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complementary to the approach mentioned above because it is not sufficiently precise in order 
to explain the legitimation of content control.2811 
2.2.3 The approach of the economic analysis of law 
Another approach consists of the use of economic tools in order to solve legal problems. 
According to this approach, legal forms are examined with respect to the question of whether 
they contribute to an efficient allocation of resources. The aforementioned rationalisation effect 
with its cost savings and organisational advantages for the user, the fact that negotiations 
become less burdensome for the parties as well as the lower transaction costs can be seen as an 
efficient resource allocation.2812 
Posner, an important protagonist of the Chicago School, is of the view that the take-it-or-leave-
it situation that customers face does not justify any intervention through content control. In his 
opinion, in situations where a customer finds unattractive contractual conditions, he or she will 
contract with another supplier offering more attractive conditions.2813 
Posner's view is based on a misjudgement of the real market,2814 and he misconceives that 
consumers merely compare the core terms of an agreement because of the high transaction 
costs.2815 The only choice the consumer has is to refuse to conclude the given agreement 
('negative freedom of contract').2816 In addition, the supplier does not have any competitive 
advantages by offering better terms. In any event, it has lower costs by leaving its terms 
unchanged than taking over the risks it passed onto the consumer. Better terms do not 
necessarily offer a competitive advantage because consumers usually do not compare standard 
terms of different suppliers, due to the high transaction costs involved. Therefore, instead of a 
'perfect market,' there is market failure. In this context, §§ 305 et seq. can be seen as an 
'economic law with the objective to compensate for market failure'. 
2.3 Protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. 
The provisions formerly contained in the AGBG and now in §§ 305 et seq. BGB primarily do 
not aim to protect the weaker party and to balance the bargaining power gap and inferiority of 
the 'other party' in the sense of § 305(1) 1st sent.2817 If this were the case, the legislator would 
                                                             
2811 Lieb AcP 178 (1978) 201. 
2812 Schäfer and Ott Ökonomische Analyse 394, Kötz JuS 2003, 211 et seq. 
2813 Posner Economic Analysis 102. 
2814 Köhler ZHR 144 (1980) 602 et seq, Horn AcP 176 (1976) 320 et seq. 
2815 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 34, MüKo-Basedow BGB before § 305 para 5. Concerning the transaction costs, 
see also Part I ch 3 para 1.1. 
2816 Negative Vertragsabschlussfreiheit. Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 3. 
2817 Stoffels AGB-Recht 29. 
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have limited the application of §§ 305 et seq. to consumers. Furthermore, it could have 
submitted individually negotiated terms to content control because of the typical imbalance of 
the parties' bargaining power. The contract model is oriented towards general contract law and 
hence not limited to consumer protection. It aims to prevent abuse of freedom of contract-
drafting and therefore protects all parties against the misuse of standard terms.2818 Thus, §§ 305 
et seq. cannot be qualified as pure consumer protection provisions, except for § 310(3) 
(consumer contracts).2819 What is more, for the definition of 'standard business terms' in 
§ 305(1), the relative strength of the parties to the contract is not relevant because also the 
consumer can be a 'user' of standard business terms and subjected to §§ 305 et seq.2820 
According to the prevailing view in literature and jurisprudence, the provisions contained in 
§§ 305 et seq. have a more comprehensive protective purpose, namely to prevent the use of 
pre-formulated standard terms by compromising the 'warranted rightness'.2821 German standard 
business terms legislation is thus a general law governing a particular contract practice, i.e., 
standard terms.2822 
The aforementioned protective purpose was valid without restrictions until the amendment of 
the AGBG in 1996. With the transposition of the Directive on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, § 24a AGBG was inserted and subsequently became § 310(3) BGB. In other words, 
consumer protection became part of German standard business terms legislation. The 
'attainment of a high level of consumer protection' is one of the objectives of the European 
Union2823 and radiates on the German civil law because of the requirement to implement 
European directives in the national laws.2824 Accordingly, consumer protection is now part of 
the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. Another modification is the consideration of 'other 
circumstances attending the entering into of the contract' under § 310(3) no. 3, which reflects 
a particular-personalised approach, in contrast to the generally applied abstract-universal 
approach.2825 
                                                             
2818 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. 
2819 Locher JuS 1997, 390. 
2820 Stoffels AGB-Recht 30. 
2821 BGH NJW 1994, 2825 (2826); 1999, 3558 (3559); 2004, 1454 (1455), Palandt/Heinrichs Overview before 
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2822 Schmidt-Salzer BB 1995, 734-736. 
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Stoffels legitimately asserts that this development is rather a modification than an amendment 
of the protective purpose of the standard business terms legislation. The fundamental 
conception of this legislation has not been given up so that one can argue that these provisions 
have been enriched by another protective purpose. Hence, § 310(3) is rather a special case of 
the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq., namely the prevention of abusive contract terms.2826 
The argument that content control leads to the 'farewell of freedom of contract' can be countered 
by the fact that the user itself took its leave from freedom of contract by exercising this maxim 
unilaterally, to the extent that the consumer's rights become mere fiction.2827 Content control is 
thus a reaction to functional disorders of the contractual mechanism.2828 
2.4 Contract theory versus norm theory 
Very soon, the view prevailed that standard terms are 'products of a legal transaction since they 
emanate from the will of individuals and merely regulate concrete relations between the parties, 
who reach an agreement on a specific content, or submit themselves to this agreement'.2829 
According to Raiser, from a dogmatic point of view, standard clauses are the content of a legal 
transaction, and the parties can freely choose their formulation with respect to the principle of 
freedom of contract. If the conditions for the conclusion of the contract are met and the 
agreement does not infringe public policy, they are legally valid and afford legal protection.2830 
Despite these arguments of the contract theory,2831 some authors, and especially Meyer-
Cording, 2832 suggested before the coming into force of the AGBG a 'norm theory'2833 which 
was then based on a different and much more comprehensive definition of 'legal norms'. 
Without sharing Meyer-Cording's view on the definition of 'legal norms', Pflug2834 and Eike 
Schmidt2835 recently revived the norm theory with different arguments. They suggest that pre-
formulated standard clauses cannot be seen as contractual declarations which are based on 
freedom of contract, even though they must be incorporated in terms of § 305(2). According to 
                                                             
2826 Stoffels AGB-Recht 31. See also Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 7, Locher in Ingenstau/Korbion VOB-
Kommentar at 506 para 3, Damm VersR 1999, 129 note 91. 
2827 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 4. 
2828 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 5. 
2829 Von Thur Bürgerliches Recht AT Vol. II/1 146. My own translation. 
2830 Raiser Recht der AGB 81. 
2831 Vertragstheorie. 
2832 See Meyer-Cording Rechtsnormen 101 et seq. 
2833 Normentheorie. 
2834 Pflug Kontrakt und Status, passim. 
2835 Schmidt E JuS 1987, 929 et seq. 
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Schmidt, they have a normative quality due to their intention to regulate economic relations 
supra-individually, and therefore have a general-abstract normative character.2836  
The classification of standard business terms as contractual provisions or norms is not purely 
academic but has also practical repercussions, such as on interpretation. Contractual provisions 
are interpreted according to the general principles of the BGB and those of the interpretation 
of declarations of intent and agreements.2837 On the other hand, legal norms are interpreted by 
applying different principles, such as the grammatical construction (legislator's style which 
should reflect its intention), teological interpretation (search of the law's objective) and 
historical interpretation (historical development of the given norm).2838 
The courts have not yet committed themselves to one or another theory. The Reichsgericht2839 
coined a formula which later was also used by the BGH,2840 the 'submission to a ready and laid 
out legal order', when referring to carrier conditions.2841 This formula was widely criticised and 
its dogmatic content never clarified. Besides, the highest courts tend – more or less indirectly 
– to adhere to the contract theory, which is reflected by their use of contractual vocabulary.2842 
The norm theory refers to the issuance of standard terms by only one party, the user, and the 
lacking influence of the other party, who is usually the customer. These are factual observations 
though which do not allow any conclusions as regards the legal consequences.2843 Furthermore, 
the law itself clearly aims to preserve the contractual order and strengthen contractual justice, 
and thus freedom of contract.2844 In order to achieve these objectives, the law merely restricts 
freedom of contract. On the other hand, the argument that §§ 305 et seq. do not only contain 
'contractual terminology', but also one that refers to a rather normative quality, has some 
merits.2845 In addition, it was upheld that for the interpretation of standard terms, an objective 
                                                             
2836 Schmidt E JuS 1987, 931. 
2837 Palandt/Heinrichs (2008) § 305c para 15.  
2838 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Auslegung (Interpretation)' para 1. These principles will be presented in ch 4. 
2839 RGZ 81, 117 (119); 171, 43 (48); RG DR 1941, 1211. 
2840 BGHZ 1, 83 (86), BGH NJW 1995, 2224 (2225 et seq); 1995, 3117 (3118). 
2841 General German Carrier Conditions (Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteursbedingungen (ADSp)) and General 
Carrier Conditions for the Commercial Short-Distance Transportation of Goods with Motor Vehicles (Allgemeine 
Beförderungsbedingungen für den gewerblichen Güternahverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen (AGNB)). 
2842 In BGH NJW 1982, 1388 (1389), for instance, the BGH states as regards the conditions of the incorporation 
of standard business terms under § 2 AGBG (§ 305(2) BGB) that the legislator, by requiring the agreement of the 
other party, aimed to clarify that 'in terms of the contractual nature of the standard terms the other party must 
consent'. My own translation and emphasis. 
2843 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 33. 
2844 Stoffels AGB-Recht 36. 
2845 § 305(1): 'contract terms pre-formulated for more than two contracts' (the German text refers to a 'multitude 
of contracts', i.e., 'Vielzahl von Verträgen'). The translation of this provision by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard 
Dannemann (German Law Archive (2002) at http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=632#b2s2) is more precise 
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standard has to be applied. Therefore, only a 'neutral control' that would prohibit a stricter 
control of the standard terms user could be applied.2846 With the insertion of § 310(3) no. 3, 
this argument is not valid anymore, however. In terms of this provision, 'in judging an 
unreasonable disadvantage under section 307 (1) and (2), the other circumstances attending the 
entering into of the contract must also be taken into account.' This is a concrete standard which 
takes into consideration the individual circumstances, and which is hardly compatible with the 
norm theory.2847 What is more, the legal provisions qualify standard business terms as 
'contractual provisions'.2848 Finally, the legislator chose to insert §§ 305 et seq. in Book II of 
the BGB ('Law of Obligations'), which is a clear indication that the contract theory reflects its 
contractual conception of these provisions.2849 
Hence, the arguments of the norm theory are not convincing. 
2.5 Impact of the introduction of the standard business terms provisions into the BGB 
on B2B transactions 
Under § 307(2) no. 1, '[a]n unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to 
exist if a provision  (…) is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision 
from which it deviates'. Consequently, the courts also draw on other substantive provisions 
when assessing the fairness of a clause, such as the provisions concerning the prescription, the 
general provisions on defective performance, and particularly the provisions on the law of 
contract specifying the different contract types.2850 This begs the question of whether the 
leeway for businesses for the formulation of their agreements is limited due to the reform of 
the law of obligations, An example is § 4752851 which declares that the provisions of the law 
of sales, which are normally ius dispositivum provisions, are mandatory for consumer sales 
                                                             
in this regard than the official translation by the German Ministry of Justice to which is generally referred to in 
this thesis. § 305(2): 'only become a part of a contract'; § 305 c (1): 'do not form part of the contract' etc. Emphasis 
added. 
2846 WLP/Wolf Introduction para 13. 
2847 Stoffels AGB-Recht 36. 
2848 Stoffels AGB-Recht 36. 
2849 Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 92 and 97. See also justification of the government 
draft to § 2 AGBG (now § 305(2) BGB) in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 13, according to which the objective of § 2 AGBG 
is to ensure that the introduction of standard terms into an individual contract is 'once again firmly anchored into 
the ground of the contractual will which is relevant in terms of the BGB.' My own translation. 
2850 Stoffels AGB-Recht 20. 
2851 § 475 ('Deviating agreements'): '(1) If an agreement is entered into before a defect is notified to the 
entrepreneur and deviates, to the disadvantage of the consumer, from [§§] 433 to 435, 437, 439 to 443 and from 
the provisions of this subtitle, the entrepreneur may not invoke it. The provisions referred to in sentence 1 apply 
even if circumvented by other constructions. (2) The limitation of the claims cited in [§] 437 may not be alleviated 
by an agreement reached before a defect is notified to an entrepreneur if the agreement means that there is a 
limitation period of less than two years from the statutory beginning of limitation or, in the case of second-hand 
things, of less than one year. (3) Notwithstanding [§§] 307 to 309, subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply to 
the exclusion or restriction of the claim to damages.' 
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contracts, i.e., ius cogens. The fear is that the scrutiny of standard terms by the court will lead 
to a shift of standards for B2B contracts so that content control would become substantially 
obsolete in these cases.2852 This apprehension is fuelled by the fact that the new law of sales is 
geared towards consumer sales law as the typical form of sales contracts.2853 
Westermann correctly states that the result of the reform of the consumer sales law must not 
unnecessarily restrict the leeway of businesses in the formulation of their clauses.2854 Content 
control must consider the differences between 'normal' B2C sales and B2B sales because the 
provisions on consumer sales are based on the European directives on consumer protection vis-
à-vis businesses and their superiority in respect of commercial knowledge and bargaining 
power. In B2B contracts, the interests are fundamentally different though since both parties are 
usually equally experienced, and therefore do not deserve the same protection as individual 
consumers. Hence, they should be able to negotiate provisions according to their situation.2855 
What is more, § 310(1) 1st sent. provides that in the review of standard terms, 'reasonable 
account must be taken of the practices and customs that apply in business dealings'.2856 An 
extension of provisions that are aimed at consumer protection to B2B contracts can therefore 




Simultaneously with Germany's industrialisation in the 19th century, the use of standard 
business terms became widespread because of their rationalisation effect for mass transactions. 
They also catered to new contractual forms on the basis of freedom of contract, such as leasing 
or factoring, for which no legal provisions existed. The drawback was that businesses 
systematically burdened their clients with contractual risks, which led to the designation of a 
'self-made law of the economy'.  
After the Reichsgericht's hesitation to interfere with freedom of contract, it developed different 
approaches to encounter these problems as it became clear that the 'volenti non fit iniuria' 
                                                             
2852 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 13a. 
2853 Westermann JZ 2001, 535 et seq; agreeing: AnwKomm Schuldrecht/Hennrichs § 307 para 13, Dauner-Lieb 
JZ 2001, 13; against a guiding function of the law of sales for B2B contracts: Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 
para 251. 
2854 Westermann JZ 2001, 535 et seq. 
2855 Stoffels AGB-Recht 21. 
2856 AnwKomm Schuldrecht/Hennrichs § 307 para 251. 
2857 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 251. See, for instance, BGH NJW 2006, 47 (49). See also UBH/Fuchs 
before § 307 para 16. 
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maxim was only a reality where the parties had equal bargaining power. Because of their 
shortcomings, the BGH adopted a new jurisprudence in 1956 with a content control based on 
the principle of good faith (§ 242 BGB). According to the BGH, § 242 restricts the content of 
standard terms because businesses abuse their freedom of contract if they do not also consider 
their customers' needs under the principle of good faith. The BGH adopted a concept introduced 
by Raiser, where the ius dispositivum has a guiding function, and any deviation from this order 
has to be justified. Content control based on § 242 was the tool for this approach. Although the 
standard business terms jurisprudence was very complex and varied, in retrospective, it is 
considered a 'highly commendable performance' of the German courts. 
Due to the development of the notion of consumer protection at the beginning of the 1970's 
and the fact that content control was de facto limited to B2B contracts, the impulse was given 
for the preparation of a legal framework for standard business terms. After several drafts and a 
final bill, the Standard Business Terms Act (AGBG) of 9 December 1976 came into force. This 
statute was not merely a 'codified case law' but contained many innovations and corrections, 
such as the differentiation between B2C and B2B transactions. The statute contained a general 
clause as well as a black- and a greylist. It also contained provisions for institutional actions. 
The civil courts kept their role as controlling bodies. The civil courts had to assess the validity 
of standard terms within a so-called 'incidental control', i.e., within the given civil proceedings. 
The possibility of institutional actions by specific qualified bodies, such as professional 
associations, was also created. These offered the advantage that legal actions had a general 
effect, and gave a great deal of bargaining power to associations through extrajudicial 
'declarations of discontinuance'. 
The Council Directive 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
brought further amendments to German law, although the legislator believed that the AGBG 
should be amended as little as possible. Nevertheless, the Directive, transposed into German 
law in 1996, offered some interesting changes to the AGBG, such as the concept of consumer 
contracts. Other provisions and concepts of the Directive were quite similar to the AGBG, such 
as the exclusion of the adequacy of the price-performance ratio, or a general clause based on 
the principle of good faith. The legislator was free to adopt stricter or different provisions than 
those contained in the Directive as long as they were not in conflict with European law. Despite 
some terminological differences between the Directive and the AGBG / BGB provisions, the 
practical relevance should be minimal due to the primacy of the EU law over national law and 
the radiating effect of the former. 
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Finally, the AGBG was repealed by the Law of Obligations Modernisation Act of 2001, and 
its provisions were inserted, with minor amendments, into §§ 305 to 310 BGB. For systematic 
reasons, the procedural provisions formerly set out in the AGBG were inserted in a newly 
created Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG). Despite some criticism in favour of a 
maintenance of the AGBG, the insertion of the standard business terms legislation into the 
BGB must be judged positively. The codification of these provisions into a single code is more 
logical and transparent, and since the courts have to assess the validity of standard terms within 
an 'incidental control', which preconditions the scrutiny of other legal institutions contained in 
the BGB, it is only logical to merge these provisions into a single instrument. A drawback is 
however that some former AGBG provisions have been artificially contracted, and that 
systematically, §§ 305 to 310 rather belong to the general part of the BGB. 
German courts judge the rationalisation effect of standard terms positively. These clauses have 
a gap-filling function which ensures that legal provisions can be adjusted to a given situation, 
as well as a typification function for contractual forms that are not codified. Suppliers tend to 
pass on risks to their clients and disregard the principles of freedom of contract though. Often, 
the rationalisation effect and the tendency to pass on risks to the other party overlap. 
Jurisprudence and legal literature explain from different angles why content control is justified. 
The BVerfG justifies content control by the fact that freedom of contract is based on the 
principle of self-determination, and that the latter does not exist where one party determines 
the content of the contract unilaterally. It refers to 'typified circumstances' or a 'structural 
inferiority' of the other party. Courts must thus rebalance this heteronomy by applying the 
general clauses of the civil law (§§ 307, 138, 242 etc.). Hence, the civil courts have a mandate 
to counter these unconstitutional imbalances. Content control can be characterised as a reaction 
to functional disorders of the contractual mechanism. 
In literature, content control is justified, e.g., by the concept of 'warranted rightness' which is 
based on the premise that contracts reflect an 'objectively righteous order' that is disturbed in 
the case of a structural imbalance. This imbalance has to be mended by legal control. Another, 
complementary approach refers to the 'institutionalised abuse of rights' whereby the drafter of 
standard terms must consider the other party's interests as otherwise, it abuses its freedom of 
contract. 
Content control can also be justified economically. The use of standard terms offers an efficient 
allocation of resources because of their rationalisation effect. Because of the user's abuse of 
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freedom of contract and the existing imbalance in bargaining power, content control can also 
be seen as an economic law that aims to compensate market failure. The viewpoint of the 
Chicago School (Posner) misjudges the conditions of the real market, however. 
Traditionally, German standard business terms legislation did not aim at consumer protection 
because it had a vaster protective purpose, i.e., to ascertain the 'warranted rightness' that is 
jeopardised by the use of pre-formulated standard terms. Due to the Unfair Terms Directive 
and the subsequent insertion of § 24a AGBG (§ 310(3) BGB), the legislation became however 
enriched by another protective purpose: consumer protection. Nonetheless, this is rather a 
modification than an amendment of the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. 
The arguments of the supporters of the norm theory according to which standard terms are legal 
norms, are not convincing. The insertion of § 310(3) no. 3 which takes into consideration 
individual circumstances, the qualification of standard terms in legal provisions as 'contractual 
provisions' and the fact that the legislator inserted §§ 305 et seq. into the law of obligations of 
the BGB clearly speak for the contract theory. 
The courts have to draw on other substantive law when assessing the 'fairness' of standard 
terms. § 475 provides that the law of sales provisions are mandatory in consumer contracts. 
This raises the question of whether this has an impact on B2B agreements because content 
control becomes substantially obsolete due to § 475, especially because the law of sales is 
geared towards consumer sales. Since B2B contracts do not deserve the same protection as 
consumer contracts, they must be judged differently though. In addition, businesses need 
sufficient leeway in their dealings with other businesses and should be able to negotiate their 
agreements according to their situation. Thus, the extension of provisions geared towards 
consumer protection to B2B contracts should be considered an 'unreasonable disadvantage' in 
the sense of § 307. 
Today, there is consensus that freedom of contract as a means of a fair balancing of the parties' 
mutual interests is only appropriate where an approximate balance of power exists. Material 
freedom of contract must be achieved where not the formal position of a party, but its actual 
power to shape the content of the agreement is relevant. 
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CHAPTER 2 – SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF §§ 305 ET SEQ. 
 
1. Material scope of application 
1.1   Definition of 'standard business terms' 
Pursuant to the official English translation of § 305(1) provided by the German Ministry of 
Justice,2858 standard business terms are all contract terms pre-formulated for more than two 
contracts which one party to the contract (the user) presents to the other party upon the entering 
into of the contract. In Geoffrey Thomas' and Gerhard Dannemann's translation,2859 the German 
phrase 'für eine Vielzahl von Verträgen' is translated literally by 'for a multitude of contracts', 
instead of 'for more than two contracts'. Since Thomas' and Dannemann's translation is closer 
to the German original text, it will be referred to in the following. 
Since the amendment of the AGBG in 1996 due to the Unfair Terms Directive, §§ 305 et seq. 
also apply to contractual terms that do not necessarily fulfil the requisites for the notion of 
standard terms.2860 Despite this extension of the material scope of application to pre-formulated 
clauses in consumer contracts under § 310(3), the title of Division 2 of Book II of the BGB 
(Law of Obligations) is 'Drafting contractual obligations by means of standard business terms'.  
1.1.1 Conditions for 'standard business terms' 
§ 305(1) 1st sent. enumerates the conditions for standard terms. The 2nd sentence of this 
provision contains characteristics that are irrelevant for the classification of standard 
provisions, whereas the 3rd sentence contains a negative demarcation to individually negotiated 
clauses.2861 This definition is extensive in order to include all pre-formulated clauses that 
necessitate legal protection for the benefit of the other party.2862 Hence, all kinds of form 
contracts, notarised mass contracts and officially authorised standard terms are included. 
Where a court or lawyer has to interpret whether contractual terms are standard business terms, 
the protective purpose and rationale of §§ 305 et seq. must be kept in mind, i.e., the unilateral 
                                                             
2858 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. 
2859 Reprinted in Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 177 et seq. 
2860 § 310(3) no. 1: 'even if the [pre-formulated contracts] are intended only for non-recurrent use on one occasion'. 
2861 § 305(1): 'Standard business terms are all contract terms pre-formulated for a multitude of contracts which 
one party to the contract (the user) presents to the other party upon the entering into of the contract. It is irrelevant 
whether the provisions take the form of a physically separate part of a contract or are made part of the contractual 
document itself, what their volume is, what typeface or font is used for them and what form the contract takes. 
Contract terms do not become standard business terms to the extent that they have been negotiated in detail 
between the parties.' (The phrase in italic corresponds to Thomas' and Dannemann's translation). 
2862 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 15, MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 1. 
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usage of freedom of contract by the user.2863 § 305(1) 1st sent. also defines the 'user' as the party 
to the contract that presents to the other party the standard terms upon the entering into of the 
contract.2864 
The conditions of § 305(1) must be fulfilled cumulatively.2865 It is important to note that not 
the contract as a whole is to be assessed but only its individual clauses because only specific 
clauses might be qualified as standard terms, whereas others might not.2866 
a) Contract terms 
In order to be qualified as standard business terms, the clauses in question must be contract 
terms. These are declarations of the user that are intended to govern the contract.2867 Hence, 
also terms that do not become part of the agreement, or those which are not incorporated in 
terms of § 305(2) are contract terms. What is more, the content of the contract is irrelevant.2868 
Clauses that govern the conditions for the conclusion of a contract2869 must also be qualified as 
standard terms. It is nevertheless necessary to enquire by means of interpretation (§§ 133, 157) 
whether their content actually deviates from the conditions for the conclusion of a contract set 
out in §§ 145, 147, 148, 151 and 156.2870  
Strictly speaking, clauses that aim to govern the conclusion of a contract are not standard 
business terms because they concern a pre-contractual relationship. However, §§ 305 et seq. 
also govern pre-contractual relations, for instance in §§ 308 no. 1 and 309 no. 7 lit. b), which 
is why also pre-contractual relations should be included in the standard terms assessment.2871 
Therefore, a clause by which an insurance contract is only valid if declarations vis-à-vis the 
insurance agent are made in writing defines the legal framework under which the contract is 
concluded, and thus falls under § 305 et seq.2872 
§§ 305 et seq. do not apply to contracts of which the content has been established by law, 
directive or by-laws.2873 In practice, this is relevant for contracts for the supply of utilities, such 
                                                             
2863 BGH NJW 2010, 1277, UBH/Habersack § 305 para 5 et seq. 
2864 Stoffels AGB-Recht 38. On the other hand, s 1 CPA defines both the 'supplier' and the 'consumer'. 
2865 Stoffels AGB-Recht 38. 
2866 BGH NJW 1998, 2600 et seq. 
2867 BGH NJW 1987, 1634; 1996, 2575; 2005, 1645 (1646); 2009, 1337 (1338); 2014, 2269 (2270). 
2868 Stoffels AGB-Recht 38. 
2869 Vertragsabschlussklauseln. 
2870 Stoffels AGB-Recht 38. 
2871 BGH NJW 2011, 139 (141). 
2872 BVerwG NJW 1998, 3216 (3218). 
2873 Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 4. 
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as electricity, gas, district heating or water. On the other hand, where standard business terms 
have to be authorised by the competent authorities, this does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the provisions in question are not to be qualified as standard terms. Contracts 
governed by public law must conform to §§ 305 et seq. too2874 
Contract terms presume a bi- or multilateral transaction. Nonetheless, the other party might 
need protection also in cases where the user imposes pre-formulated clauses within a unilateral 
legal act2875 by which the user unilaterally uses its freedom of contract and hereby influences 
the contractual relation.2876 In these cases, the BGH applies §§ 305 et seq. by analogy.2877 Thus, 
a clause on a bank transfer form by which the bank reserves the right to credit the amount also 
to another account of the customer directly concerns the bank's obligations, and §§ 305 et seq. 
apply by analogy.2878 The same applies to a standard form by which the client grants power of 
attorney to the bank.2879 The reason why §§ 305 et seq. are applicable (by analogy) is that their 
applicability should not depend on random factors, such as the qualification as a unilateral or 
multilateral legal act.2880 
In this context, it is important to distinguish between unilateral declarations of the user and 
those of the other party (consumer). Only for the latter, §§ 305 et seq. apply. This is because 
where the user makes a unilateral declaration, it merely uses its power of decision,2881 e.g., 
when drafting the conditions of participation for a sports event.2882 On the other hand, where 
the other party's rights are restricted by pre-formulated conditions and its legal position is 
concerned, §§ 305 et seq. apply.2883 This is notably the case where standard terms deviate from 
legal provisions which, in addition to other purposes, serve the other party's interests. Hence, 
if the user's (insurer's) standard terms deviate from the legal requirements of § 69(1) no. 2 
                                                             
2874 Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 5. 
2875 Einseitiges Rechtsgeschäft. For such a legal act, the declaration of intent of only one party is needed. Examples 
are the establishment of a last will, the declaration of termination of a contract, the declaration of avoidance in 
terms of § 143, or a binding promise in terms of § 657. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Rechtsgeschäft (2a)' 
'Willenserklärung (2c)', Brox BGB-AT 50. 
2876 UBH/Habersack § 305 para 16, WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 11. 
2877 Stoffels AGB-Recht 40. 
2878 BGH NJW 1986, 2428. 
2879 BGH NJW 1987, 2011. 
2880 Stoffels AGB-Recht 40. 
2881 BGH NJW 2011, 139 (141), Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 6, UBH/Habersack § 305 para 18. 
2882 In these cases, the application of the principle of good faith (§ 242) has to be considered so that the evaluative 
standard of §§ 305 et seq is indirectly applied. See BGH NJW 2011, 139 (141). 
2883 BGH NJW 2011, 139 (141). 
 502   
 
VVG2884 for the insurance agent's power of attorney that also serve the client's interest, they 
are subject to content control.2885 
Furthermore, one has to distinguish between contract terms, on the one hand, and mere 
recommendations, factual notices or requests, on the other. The point of departure is the 
standpoint of the recipient, i.e., how he or she has to understand the user's 'declaration'. A 
declaration is a contract term if the recipient (other party), by considering the objective wording 
of the declaration, must have the impression that the user tends to establish a (pre-)contractual 
relationship.2886 A notice at the entrance of a supermarket with the heading 'Information', 
according to which clients are requested to leave their (hand)bags at the entrance since 
otherwise they 'are kindly informed that they might be asked at the till to open them for control' 
gives the customer (recipient of the declaration) unmistakably the impression that this is not a 
mere nonbinding request. The notice rather suggests that the control of the bags is the necessary 
consequence of the fact that he or she entered the market with a bag. The fact that the notice is 
formulated politely ('kindly informed') does not matter in this regard because only the objective 
wording (purpose) of the notice is considered. The title of the notice 'Information' does not 
change this qualification either.2887 On the other hand, the information in a catalogue according 
to which 'the products are subject to modifications, and their descriptions are subject to 
corrections', or that pictures are only 'similar' are mere notices without any legal content as long 
as the consumer's rights (warranty, supplier's liability) are not restricted and he or she is 
informed thereof before the conclusion of the agreement. False or misleading catalogue 
information is subject to competition law though.2888 
Internal notices or directives of companies are not aimed to be used vis-à-vis consumers and 
therefore are no standard terms. Despite this fact, if §§ 305 et seq. are circumvented 
(§ 306a),2889 §§ 305 et seq. are applicable. 
                                                             
2884 VVG = Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Insurance Contract Act). § 69(1) no. 2 VVG: 'The insurance agent shall 
be deemed to have power of attorney in respect of (…) taking receipt of applications for the renewal of or 
amendment to a contract of insurance and its revocation, termination, rescission and other declarations relating to 
the insurance agreement, as well as any information to be provided by the policyholder throughout the policy 
period (…).' 
2885 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1635); 2279 (2283). 
2886 BGH NJW 1996, 2574; 2009, 1337; 2014, 2269 (2270 et seq). 
2887 BGH NJW 1996, 2575. 
2888 BGH NJW 2009, 1337. 
2889 § 306a: 'The rules in this division [§§ 305-310] apply even if they are circumvented by other constructions.'  
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It is controversially discussed if bond terms for securities are to be qualified as standard 
business terms. In the Klöckner decision,2890 the BGH was of the view that such bond terms 
are standard terms. 
Ekkenga argues that the unrestricted application of §§ 305 et seq. for bond terms is not 
plausible. He argues that standard business terms legislation falls short of the factual 
circumstances in which bonds are issued, and bond terms cannot be assessed for the lack of a 
normative control standard. In addition, the assessment of standard terms does not consider the 
collective relations of the market.2891 Masuch, on the other hand, puts forward the relationship 
between the issuer and the investors. Investors are not involved in the issuance contract 
between the issuer (company) and the bank. The investor (final client) is however in the same 
position as if the bonds were issued directly, which is why the evaluative standard of §§ 305 et 
seq. should apply. Private investors are regularly not in the position to understand entirely 
complex bond terms. What is more, it should make no difference whether bonds are issued 
directly or indirectly. The indirect issuance of bonds is merely another technique and should 
have no impact on whether §§ 305 et seq. apply.2892 
More recently, the BGH made clear that only a restricted and modified application of §§ 305 
et seq. can be considered in order to ensure functional trading of securities. This presumes a 
standardised content of securities. The court puts forward that if the content of securitised rights 
would depend on the circumstances of their acquisition, their transferability would not be 
possible. For the incorporation of bond terms, an implied agreement for their incorporation is 
therefore sufficient.2893 Because of the idiosyncrasies of bond terms, the BGH's view is correct. 
b) Pre-formulation for a multitude of contracts 
In order to be qualified as standard business terms, the contract clause must furthermore be 
pre-formulated for a multitude of contracts. 
aa) 'Pre-formulated' 
A contract term is pre-formulated if its wording has been readily formulated before the 
conclusion of future agreements.2894 It is irrelevant whether the pre-formulation is in writing, 
on another support (CD), or if the user makes its agent learn a specific formulation by heart in 
                                                             
2890 BGH NJW 1993, 57. 
2891 Ekkenga ZHR 160 (1996) 59 et seq. 
2892 Masuch Anleihebedingungen und AGB-Gesetz 149 et seq. 
2893 BGH NJW 2005, 2917. 
2894 BGH NJW 1998, 2600, WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 14. 
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order to insert it into its standard terms.2895 If, for instance, the user instructs its agents to insert 
'residual payment at delivery' in the blank space next to the field 'payment at', the contract term 
is considered pre-formulated.2896 Furthermore, it is not necessary that the wording of the given 
formulation is identical each time. Not the repeated use of the same grammatical or 
orthographical structure is essential but the repeated use of the actual content of a 
formulation.2897 The supplier does not need to use its own formulations; the wording can also 
be drafted by a third party. This is the case, e.g., if a landlord uses a sample of a rental agreement 
drafted by a home and property owners association.2898 
If the user's form provides for the possibility to complete certain information or choose between 
several possibilities, it must be assessed whether the completions merely concretise the object 
of the contract, without modifying its actual content, or whether they are completely 
independent and give a real option to the other party.2899 The completion of a form by inserting 
the other party's name and the designation of the object of the contract or a simple computation 
(e.g., the amount of an insurance premium) as a consequence of the duration of the contract are 
therefore considered pre-formulations.2900 On the other hand, where the customer has a real 
choice that is not limited to several options given by the user, one can assume that the wording 
is not pre-formulated. A client who can choose between several options provided for by the 
supplier does not have a real choice, though.2901 Besides, the user could circumvent §§ 305 et 
seq. by giving several inadmissible options. Therefore, a customer who can choose between a 
three- or a four-year-duration for the subscription of a newspaper is confronted with two 
prohibited options in terms of § 309 no. 9 lit. a) because they impose a contract duration over 
two years. The fact that the other party may choose between two options does thus not exclude 
their qualification as pre-formulated contract terms.2902 
Where the standard form provides for the possibility to insert another duration that the other 
party can freely choose, and next to the blank space for the insertion a specific duration is 
already indicated, the printed clause is considered to be a pre-formulation as it superimposes 
the possibility to choose another duration.2903 On the other hand, if the standard form merely 
                                                             
2895 BGH NJW 2001, 2635 (2636); 2002, 2388 (2389); NJW-RR 2014, 1133 (1134), BAG NZA 2012, 908 (909). 
2896 OLG Dresden BB 1999, 228. 
2897 OLG Düsseldorf NZG 1998, 353, OLG Dresden BB 1999, 228. 
2898 Stoffels AGB-Recht 44. 
2899 BGH NJW 1998, 2815 (2816); 1999, 1105 (1106); 3260. 
2900 BGH NJW 2000, 1110 (1111). 
2901 MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 16. 
2902 Stoffels AGB-Recht 45. 
2903 Stoffels AGB-Recht 45. 
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provides for a blank space without suggesting any pre-formulated options, the client's insertion 
can be regarded as independent because in this case, the user does not unilaterally impose its 
will.2904 If the user or its agents always insert the same information (e.g., the duration) without 
any negotiation, the given clause can be qualified as pre-formulated, however.2905 
bb)  'For a multitude of contracts' 
The given clause must be pre-formulated for a multitude of contracts. This condition expresses 
that standard terms are intended for mass contracts.2906 It is not necessary though that a clause 
has actually been incorporated into several agreements because the mere intention to do so 
suffices.2907 Hence, one can already assume that the supplier uses standard business terms if it 
does so for the first time, provided that it has the intention to use them also in the future.2908 
On the other hand, if a clause has been drafted for a single contract and is later inserted in other 
agreements, the qualification as a standard clause only extends to the subsequent use, and not 
to the first contract.2909 When a supplier uses standard business terms that have been drafted by 
a third party (e.g., a contract of sale form provided by an automobile club), it is not necessary 
that the user itself has the intention to use the form for a multitude of contracts.2910 
The prevailing opinion asserts that a 'multitude' is given where the supplier uses the given 
clause in at least three cases.2911 It is sufficient that it is used for the same client. However, it 
is irrelevant if the use was intended for a limited number of contracts.2912 
cc)  Non-recurrent use on one occasion in consumer contracts 
§ 310(3) no. 2 provides for consumer contracts that § 305c (2) and 306 and 307 to 309 BGB as 
well as Article 46b EGBGB2913 apply to pre-formulated contract terms even if they are intended 
only for non-recurrent use on one occasion, and to the extent that the consumer, by reason of 
the pre-formulation, had no influence on their contents. 
                                                             
2904 BGH NJW 1998, 1066 (1067), OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 1997, 1485. 
2905 BGH NJW 1992, 746; 1998, 1066 (1068). 
2906 Stoffels AGB-Recht 45. 
2907 BGH NJW 2004, 1454, WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 15. 
2908 Stoffels AGB-Recht 45. 
2909 BGH NJW 1997, 135. 
2910 BGH NJW 2010, 1131, BAG NJW 2010, 550 (552), Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 9. 
2911 BGH NJW 2002, 138 (139); 2002, 2470 (2471), WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 16, UBH/Habersack § 305 para 25a, 
Faust BGB-AT 106. The official English translation of § 305 refers to pre-formulated contract terms 'for more than 
two contracts' and anticipates the prevailing view in literature and jurisprudence. The German text however refers 
to 'a multitude of contracts', which has been correctly translated by Thomas and Dannemann (Maxeiner Yale J. 
Int. Law 177 et seq). 
2912 BGH NJW 1981, 2344 (2345). 
2913 EGBGB = Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Introductory Act to the Civil Code). 
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The fact that the law renounces the condition of a use 'for a multitude of contracts' in consumer 
agreements is due to article 3 of the Unfair Terms Directive. The Directive merely refers to 
terms 'which ha[ve] not been individually negotiated' and 'drafted in advance'.2914 The condition 
set out in article 3(2) of the Directive that the consumer has not been able to influence the 
substance of the term due to the fact that it had been pre-formulated is similar to § 305(1) 3rd 
sent. The BGB norm provides that contract terms do not become standard terms to the extent 
that they have been negotiated in detail between the parties.2915 Hence, individual agreements 
are not included in the scope of application of § 310(3) no. 2. Since the BGB condition of the 
presentation of the contract terms in § 305(1) is not mentioned in § 310(3) no. 2, it is irrelevant 
whether the user or a third party suggested a certain clause.2916 On the other hand, if the client 
itself suggested a clause which is subsequently inserted into the contract, it deserves no 
protection.2917 
§ 310(3) no. 2 does not ascertain the application of the entire BGB division (§§ 305 et seq.). It 
is problematic that the application of §§ 305(2) (incorporation) and 305c(1) (surprising 
clauses), which ascertain transparency, is excluded in consumer contracts. When interpreting 
§ 310(3) no. 2 in the light of articles 4(2) and 5 of the Unfair Terms Directive, one must  
conclude though that the clauses must be drafted in plain, intelligible language.2918 
Since § 1 UKlaG2919 refers to the definition of standard business terms in § 305(1), and not to 
the extended definition in § 310(3) no. 2, clauses that are intended for non-recurrent use on one 
occasion are excluded in institutional actions.2920 This is understandable because institutional 
actions aim at standard clauses that are used in mass contracts. This interpretation is also 
coherent with article 7(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive that requires a control mechanism only 
for contractual terms that have been 'drawn up for general use'.2921 
                                                             
2914 Stoffels AGB-Recht 46. 
2915 BAG NZA-RR 2009, 519 (521), Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 17, Erman/Roloff § 310 para 20. 
2916 MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 71, Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 16. 
2917 Locher Recht der AGB 29, Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 16. 
2918 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 91, Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 18. 
2919 § 1 UKlaG: 'Those who use provisions which are invalid under §§ 307 to 309 of the Civil Code in standard 
contract terms or who recommend such provisions for commercial use may be required to refrain from using such 
terms and to withdraw any recommendation made.' 
2920 Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 2. Medicus rightly asserts that in order to fall under the definition of 
standard business terms they do not necessarily have to be cumbersome or lengthy. For example, the sentence on 
the back of a cloakroom ticket 'Any liability excluded' is sufficient. See Medicus BGB-AT 164. 
2921 Stoffels AGB-Recht 47. 
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1.1.2 Presentation of the terms ('Stellen') 
In addition to the conditions mentioned above, the user must present the contract terms to the 
other party upon entering into of the contract and require their application, i.e., unilaterally use 
its freedom of contract.2922 By this condition of § 305(1) 1st sent., also the term 'user' is 
defined.2923 The definition of the user is relevant because clauses become only ineffective under 
§§ 305 et seq. if the other party suffers an unreasonable disadvantage. On the other hand, 
content control for the benefit of the user does not take place.2924 Disadvantages suffered by 
the user are not subject to these provisions. Vice versa, one cannot conclude that the party who 
has an advantage because of specific clauses is necessarily the user.2925 
a) Concrete unilateral suggestion to incorporate the terms 
By the fact that the contract terms have to be 'presented', the legislator underscores their 
unilateral imposition by the user. This unilateral presentation is the rationale and point of 
departure for the special treatment of standard business terms vis-à-vis individually agreed 
clauses.2926 Terms are presented if a party to the contract requires the incorporation of its 
standard terms into the contract and unilaterally suggests their incorporation.2927 The attempt 
of such a unilateral imposition is sufficient though.2928 This means that it is not necessary that 
a contract has been concluded, or that the contract terms have been effectively incorporated.2929 
In case of doubt, the courts refer to the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq.2930 Hence, where a 
party with significant market power (e.g., an automobile manufacturer vis-à-vis its 
subcontractors) requires the application of its standard terms in order to contract, as otherwise 
no deal will be reached, and the subcontractor inserts the manufacturers standard clauses in its 
offers from the outset, without being formally asked to do so, this insertion is not the result of 
a free choice. It is rather the effect of the manufacturer's practice to conclude only agreements 
for which its standard terms apply. By its market power, it indirectly imposed its terms. 
Therefore, the manufacturer is considered the standard terms user, even though it did not 
expressly require their application.2931 
                                                             
2922 Faust BGB-AT 106, Brox and Walker SchuldR-AT 38. 
2923 Schwab AGB-Recht para 87, Stoffels AGB-Recht 47. 
2924 BGH NJW 1998, 2280 (2281), BAG NZA 2006, 257 (258); 2007, 687 (690). 
2925 BGH NJW 1995, 2034 (2035). 
2926 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 15. 
2927 Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 10. 
2928 Locher Recht der AGB 27. 
2929 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 13. 
2930 Stoffels AGB-Recht 47. 
2931 BGH NJW 1997, 2043; NJW-RR 2006, 740. 
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b) Terms drafted by third parties 
§ 305(1) merely requires that the user present its standard terms to the other party, but not that 
it also has drafted them. If a third party has drafted the standard terms, one must assess which 
party is to be considered the one which presented them to the other party.2932 Therefore, a 
supplier who uses standard terms drafted by a retail association must be regarded as the user. 
The same applies to an employer who uses a sample of an employment contract that has been 
drafted by its employer organisation.2933 
In the past, it was problematic how to deal with contract terms that have been drafted by 
notaries public or lawyers (advocates) on the basis of their internal contract samples. The courts 
correctly argue that such contract terms have not been presented by a party if the notary public 
or lawyer is impartial and neutral2934 vis-à-vis both parties.2935 On the other hand, where a party 
uses a contract sample that had been drafted by a third party for a recurrent use, this party is 
considered the one who presents the given terms to the other party.2936 This is the case, e.g., 
where a building society plans to sell a certain number of houses and commissions a notary 
public with the drafting of the contracts of sale. If the building society inserts the notary public's 
clauses into its contracts, the company, and not the notary public, is considered the party who 
presents the standard terms to the other party.2937  
For the considerations mentioned above, an imbalance between the parties in respect of their 
respective bargaining power is not necessary.2938 One can also not conclude that the party who 
benefits from certain clauses is necessarily the user,2939 even if this is regularly the case. 
§ 310(3) no. 1 extends the scope of application to consumer contracts in that standard terms 
are deemed to have been presented by the entrepreneur, unless they were introduced into the 
contract by the consumer. As a consequence, content control is also conducted for clauses that 
were inserted by a third party. In consumer contracts, clauses which are based on an internal 
contract sample of a notary public are thus also subject to content control.2940 
                                                             
2932 BGH NJW 1994, 2825 (2826); 2010, 1131. 
2933 Examples from Stoffels AGB-Recht 48. 
2934 For notaries public, the impartial and neutral exercise of the office is set out in § 14 BNotO. 
2935 BGH NJW 1991, 843; 1992, 2817, UBH/Habersack § 305 para 31. 
2936 BGH NJW 1992, 2160 (2162), WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 27. 
2937 BGH NJW 2002, 138 (139). 
2938 BGH NJW 2010, 1131 (1132). 
2939 BGH NJW 2010, 1131 (1132), UBH/Habersack § 305 para 29. 
2940 Stoffels AGB-Recht 49. 
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The reason for this extension of the scope of application is that the Unfair Terms Directive does 
not contain the criterion of the 'presentation' of contract terms and that the Directive can be 
interpreted in that also clauses that had been pre-formulated by a third party should be subject 
to content control.2941 The German legislature took account of this by modifying the criterion 
of 'presentation' in § 310(3) no. 1.2942 Since the insertion of § 310(3), the above-mentioned 
discussion on clauses that have been formulated by a third party (e.g., a notary public) is hence 
only relevant for cases outside the scope of application of § 310, i.e., contracts that are not 
consumer contracts. Then, the entrepreneur is always considered the user.2943 
The deeming-provision of § 310(3) no. 1 provides for an exception ('unless') for terms 
introduced by the consumer. In this case, the user bears the burden of proof.2944 The exception 
applies where, e.g., the consumer requires that a certain form be used for the contract of sale.2945 
c) Bilateral suggestion to insert the terms 
Cases where both parties require independently from each other the application of the same 
standard terms are controversially discussed.  
This debate concerns cases, where, for instance, both the contractor and the builder wish to 
contract on the basis of the German Construction Tendering and Contract Regulations (Part B) 
(VOB/B).2946 
According to the correct view, the protective provisions of §§ 305 et seq. are not applicable in 
these cases because it is impossible to determine who is the user and who is the other party.2947 
A determination on the basis of the chronology of the negotiations, for example, would be 
arbitrary. Furthermore, the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. does not apply as none of the 
parties interferes with the freedom of contract-drafting of the other party, which is a 
prerequisite for the application of the content control provisions. Where single clauses require 
the application of §§ 305 et seq., these provisions should apply by analogy.2948 
                                                             
2941 Stoffels AGB-Recht 49. 
2942 BT-Drs. 13/2713 at 5, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 10. 
2943 WLP/Pfeiffer Art 3 RiLi paras 9 and 21. 
2944 Heinrichs NJW 1996, 2192. 
2945 BT-Drs. 13/2713 at 7. 
2946 VOB/B = Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen – Teil B. 
2947 UBH/Habersack § 305 para 29, WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 32, Erman/Roloff § 305 para 12. A different view 
have Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 31 and Sonnenschein NJW 1980, 1491 et seq. 
2948 Stoffels AGB-Recht 50. 
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The BGH decided that the condition of the presentation of contract terms is not met where the 
incorporation of pre-formulated contract terms into the contract is based on a free decision of 
the party who was confronted with the suggestion to incorporate them. Hence, the court gives 
more room for the definition of a bilateral suggestion of insertion.2949 The confronted party 
must nonetheless have a free choice between the contract terms to be considered, and the 
opportunity not only to suggest its own wording but also to effectively enforce them vis-à-vis 
its counterpart. This kind of situations is met where it is fortuitous which party gets the standard 
form to be used, e.g., a contract of sale form for a vehicle provided by an automobile club.2950 
1.1.3 Irrelevant circumstances 
Pursuant to § 305(1) 2nd sent., it is irrelevant whether the provisions take the form of a 
physically separate part of an agreement or are made part of the contractual document itself. 
Their volume, the used typeface or font and the form the contract are irrelevant too. This 
provision merely has a clarifying function because the same result is achieved by the definition 
of standard business terms contained in the 1st sent. of § 305(1).2951 However, the 2nd sentence 
highlights that the scope of application of §§ 305 et seq. should not be determined by applying 
formal criteria, but material characteristics that have to be geared towards the protective 
purpose of this provision.2952 Therefore, the submission of the general conditions of sale via 
the internet does not prevent their qualification as standard business terms.2953 
1.1.4 Contract terms that have been negotiated in detail between the parties 
Under § 305(1) 3rd sent., contract terms do not become standard terms to the extent that they 
have been negotiated in detail. If such individually agreed clauses exist, the parties are on an 
equal footing regarding their negotiations and defence of their respective interests. This is why 
it is logical to exclude such terms from the protection of §§ 305 et seq.2954 § 305b highlights 
this fact by stating that individually agreed terms take priority over standard business terms. 
                                                             
2949 BGH NJW 2010, 1131 (1133). 
2950 See Stoffels WuM 2011, 268. 
2951 MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 29. 
2952 UBH/Habersack § 305 paras 6 and 33. 
2953 Löhnig NJW 1997, 1688. Stoffels AGB-Recht 51. 
2954 BGH NJW 2014, 1725 (1728). 
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a) Function of § 305(1) 3rd sent. 
The fact that terms which have not been pre-formulated for a multitude of contracts and not 
been presented to the other party are excluded per se from the scope of application of §§ 305 
et seq. begs the question of the function of this provision.  
Jurisprudence is of the view that the provision is a restriction of the definition of standard terms. 
According to the courts, it is sufficient for individually agreed clauses that the user is willing 
to modify its terms and that the other party is conscious of this readiness.2955 The threshold for 
assuming that 'negotiations' (Aushandeln) have taken place is very low.2956 Insofar, the 3rd 
sentence of this provision is a negatively formulated part of the legal definition of 'standard 
business terms'.2957 The prevailing view in literature also accepts that the terms have been 
individually negotiated if the user was willing to do so, and the terms have eventually not been 
modified.2958  
Some authors require that the terms must have been modified so that they can be seen as 
individually negotiated. According to this view, the provision is thus no restriction of § 305 but 
merely has a clarifying function.2959 
Despite the difficulties of proof, the prevailing view in jurisprudence and literature is more 
convincing. As long as the parties are both able and willing to modify certain terms and decide 
to leave them unchanged, the user does not abuse its bargaining power because both parties are 
on an equal footing.  
b) Conditions for the 'negotiation' 
The courts take the stance that in order to be considered to be negotiated in detail, a very high 
standard must be applied. The fact that the parties 'negotiate' is not sufficient. The BGH requires 
that the parties meet the conditions of an 'Aushandeln' and not only of a 'Verhandeln'.2960 
Unfortunately, in English, both terms are translated by 'negotiating'. 'Aushandeln' requires that 
the user places the clauses differing from the statutory provisions seriously at the other party's 
disposal and allows the client to shape their content.2961 Hence, the user must be ready to 
                                                             
2955 BGH NJW 1977, 624 (625). See also Medicus BGB-AT 166. 
2956 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 41. 
2957 Stoffels AGB-Recht 52. 
2958 MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 37, Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 21, Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 44. 
2959 Braun BB 1979, 689 (692), Graf von Westphalen DB 1977, 946, Stübing NJW 1978, 1611. 
2960 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1040; NJW 2013, 856; 2014, 1725 (1727). 
2961 BGH NJW 2013, 856; 2014, 1725 (1727), BAG NZA 2006, 40 (44); 2008, 229, Brox and Walker SchuldR-AT 
40. See also Graf von Westphalen ZIP 2010, 1110 et seq. 
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modify its standard terms accordingly. It is not sufficient though that the user expresses its 
general and diffuse willingness to modify specific clauses if the other party wishes so,2962 or 
that the client is 'free' to sign the contract or to step away.2963 
In order to be able to influence the content of a clause, the other party must understand its 
import. Therefore, the user must explain complicated or lengthy terms and ascertain that its 
client has actually grasped the implications so that the requirements of an Aushandeln are 
met.2964 
These requirements are also be fulfilled where the supplier suggests several pre-formulated 
clauses to the other party between which the latter can choose. The customer must have the 
possibility to negotiate their contents though. The consumer's choice must not be influenced 
by the user, even not by the design of the standard form, or in another manner.2965 
A standard business term does not lose its qualification as such by a subsequent modification. 
Only where the content of the clause is subsequently negotiated as described above, it might 
become an individually agreed clause. If the clause merely 'weakens' its adverse consequences 
for the other party, it is still a (not individually agreed) standard clause. This is because the user 
still prevails in its power to formulate the clause to the disadvantage of the other party.2966 For 
instance, a standard provision by which the other party has to pay an unreasonable amount in 
advance is still unlawful if the user – after being asked by the client to cancel this clause – only 
slightly reduces the amount to be paid in advance. Then, the user reworded its clause once more 
to its client disadvantage, and there was no real negotiation between the parties.2967 
§ 305(1) 3rd sent. is also applicable in B2B contracts. The BGH applies this provision to B2B 
contracts without restrictions.2968 Because of the principle of freedom of contract and the 'self-
responsibility' of businesspersons, many authors argue that the requirements for individually 
agreed terms should be lowered de lege ferenda for B2B agreements. The high requirements 
of the BGH in terms of 'negotiating' (Aushandeln) are unrealistic, according to this opposing 
opinion. Some authors thus suggest that the threshold for the requirements should be lowered 
for very far-reaching contracts that the other party agrees upon on the basis of its commercial 
                                                             
2962 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1040 (1041). 
2963 BGH NJW 2005, 2543. 
2964 BGH NJW 2005, 2543 (2544). 
2965 BGH NJW 2003, 1313 (1314); 2008, 987 (989). 
2966 BGH NJW 2013, 1431 (1432). 
2967 BGH NJW 2013, 1431 (1432). 
2968 BGH NJW 1992, 2283 (2285); 2000, 1110. 
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experience and decision-making.2969 Klaus Peter Berger suggests that contract terms that are 
used vis-à-vis a businessperson should be deemed negotiated if the other party has negotiated 
them or other provisions of the same contract in a manner that is reasonable in the light of the 
object of the contract.2970 Others suggest a catalogue of criteria for the differentiation between 
standard business terms and individually agreed terms.2971 
Stoffel correctly contends that, although B2B contracts should be treated differently than B2C 
contracts in certain circumstances, a modification of the legal standards should only be 
considered if the current law does not allow for appropriate solutions.2972 An interpretation of 
§ 305(1) 3rd sent. which is guided by the purpose of this norm is likely to find appropriate 
solutions without any modifications of this provision.2973 It is particularly the 'specific situation 
during the conclusion of the contract that leads to the conclusion that the other party freely and 
self-responsibly agreed to a certain standard form, and that therefore there is no need for 
protection by standard business terms legislation'.2974 Such a situation could be given, 
according to some authors, in M&A contracts2975 or bidding procedures for business 
acquisitions,2976 i.e., complex transactions with a significant transaction volume. Even if some 
contracts are presented as 'packages', one must not forget though that the single clauses of an 
agreement have to be assessed individually and that it is rare that every single contract clause 
has been negotiated individually.2977 A sweeping non-application of § 305(1) 3rd sent. for such 
'contract packages' should thus be seen with some scepticism.2978 
1.1.5 Burden of proof 
In general, the party that claims the protection of the standard business terms legislation must 
prove that the given clause must be qualified as a standard clause. This will be the client in 
most cases, or an association in the context of an institutional action.2979 If the content and 
appearance of a contract give the impression that the agreement has been drafted for a multitude 
of contractual relationships, and it was presented by a professional, e.g., a property developer, 
                                                             
2969 Suggestion of the Frankfurter Initiative zur Fortentwicklung des AGB-Rechts at 
www.zvei.org/Downloads/Recht/AGB-Recht-Positionspapier-Endfassung-20110210.pdf (no longer available). 
2970 K. P. Berger NJW 2010, 467. 
2971 Müller, Griebler and Pfeil BB 2009, 2660 et seq. 
2972 Stoffels AGB-Recht 53. 
2973 Fuchs FS Blaurock 91 et seq. 
2974 Fuchs FS Blaurock 103. My own translation. 
2975 Kästle NZG 2014, 288. 
2976 Fuchs FS Blaurock 95. 
2977 Stoffels AGB-Recht 54. 
2978 Kieninger AnwBl 2012, 1261 (1262), MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 16. 
2979 UBH/Habersack § 305 para 60, MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 45. 
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the used contract is prima facie a form contract with standard clauses.2980 This is regularly the 
case if it contains many typical clauses that have not been adjusted to a given situation.2981 
Once it has been established that the contract contains standard terms, the user has to prove the 
individually agreed terms in order to avoid a control of their content.2982 A clause by which the 
parties agree that the terms have been individually agreed upon2983 is not sufficient in order to 
assume that the given clause has been negotiated in detail. This results from § 309 no. 12 lit. 
b).2984 Even individual agreements in which the parties declare that the entire contract has been 
negotiated in all details are ineffective because such a clause runs contrary to the protective 
purpose of § 305(1) 3rd sent.2985 A clause by which the parties subsequently recognise the 
validity of standard terms or renounce to assert their invalidity is nonetheless valid.2986 
In consumer contracts, the consumer is protected under § 310(3) no. 1 and 2. Hence, in the case 
of § 310(3) no. 1, according to which in consumer contracts, standard terms are deemed to have 
been presented by the entrepreneur unless they were introduced into the contract by the 
consumer, the consumer bears the onus of proof that the clause in question had been pre-
formulated for a multitude of contracts. On the other hand, the entrepreneur has to prove that 
the pre-formulated clauses were negotiated in detail.2987 
On the other hand, § 310(3) no. 2 highlights the fact that the consumer did not influence the 
content of the term because of its pre-formulation. Consequently, the consumer must prove that 
the clause was pre-formulated and that he or she therefore had no influence on its contents.2988 
1.2   Exceptions from the material scope of application 
It should be noted that it is useful to begin the enquiry of the scope of application with § 310 
since this provision contains modifications or exclusions of the scope of application.2989 
                                                             
2980 BGH NJW 2004, 502 (503); 2014, 1725 (1727); BAG NZA 2008, 170 (171). No prima facie proof if the 
property developer does not act within a commercial activity: BGH NJW 1999, 1261 (1262). 
2981 BAG NZA 2008, 1004 (1006).  
2982 BGH NJW 1998, 2600 (2601). 
2983 Aushandlungsklausel. 
2984 WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 58. § 309 no. 12 lit. b): '(Burden of proof) [A] provision by which the user modifies 
the burden of proof to the disadvantage of the other party to the contract, in particular by a) (…) b) having the 
other party to the contract confirm certain facts' is ineffective in standard business terms. 
2985 BGH NJW 2014, 1725 (1728), UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 65. 
2986 BGH NJW 2014, 2269 (2275). 
2987 BGH NJW 2008, 2250 (2251). 
2988 BGH NJW 2008, 2250 (2252 et seq), UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 89. 
2989 Faust BGB-AT 105. 
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In terms of § 310(4), §§ 305 et seq. do not apply to contracts in the field of the law of 
succession, family law and company law or collective agreements2990 and private-sector works 
agreements2991 or public-sector establishment agreements.2992 The legislator was of the view 
that the protection of §§ 305 et seq. unnecessary, inappropriate or not system-compatible in 
these cases.2993 
1.2.1   Law of succession 
The application of the standard business terms legislation in the field of the law of succession 
was rejected because standard terms are not very current in the law of succession.2994 Besides, 
§§ 305 et seq. are aimed at contractual relationships based on a mutual exchange of 
performances.2995 Although many contracts in the field of the law of successions are drafted by 
a notary public using standard forms for this task, contracts such as contracts of inheritance,2996 
contracts of renunciation of inheritance2997 and inheritance distribution contracts2998 are 
excluded from the content control of §§ 305 et seq. Content control can be based on § 242 
(good faith), however. On the other hand, contracts by which an heir sells the inheritance2999 
or the execution of a promise of donation mortis causa while the testator is still alive3000 are 
contracts under the law of obligations. In this case, §§ 305 et seq. are applicable.3001 
1.2.2 Family law 
An application of §§ 305 et seq. in family law with its prescribed contract types and restricted 
freedom of varying from legal provisions would not be appropriate. Like in the law of 
succession, contracts in this field are quite individualised, so there is no need for strict content 
control.3002 The exception concerns marriage contracts,3003 contracts on the equalisation of 
accrued gains,3004 agreements of maintenance3005 and agreements on the equalisation of 




2993 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 41.  
2994 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 13. 
2995 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 41. 
2996 Erbverträge. See § 2274. 
2997 Erbverzichtsverträge. See § 2346. 
2998 Erbauseinandersetzungsvereinbarungen. See §§ 2042 et seq. 
2999 Erbschaftskauf. See § 2371. 
3000 Zu Lebzeiten vollzogene Schenkung auf den Todesfall. See § 2301(2). 
3001 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 113 et seq, Staudinger/Schlosser § 310 para 74, Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 48. 
3002 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 41. 
3003 Eheverträge. See §§ 1408 et seq. See also BVerfG NJW 2001, 957, BGH NJW 2004, 930, Rakete-Dombek 
NJW 2004, 1273 et seq, Dauner-Lieb JZ 2004, 1027. 
3004 Verträge über den Zugewinnausgleich. See §§ 1372 et seq. 
3005 Unterhaltsverträge. See § 1585c. 
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pension rights.3006 §§ 134 (statutory prohibition), 138 (legal transactions contrary to public 
policy) and 242 (good faith) are applicable though. What is more, contracts under the law of 
obligations between family members, such as contracts of sale, do not fall under the exception 
of § 310(4).3007 
1.2.3   Company law 
a)  Rationale of the exception 
Contrary to §§ 305 et seq. which target contractual relationships in which performances are 
exchanged, company law regulates, inter alia, the organisation of companies by company 
agreements.3008 Hence, §§ 305 et seq. are not appropriate for these relationships with their 
various particular characteristics.3009 In private companies3010 and limited companies,3011 there 
is no imbalance between the partners because the agreements are mostly negotiated in person 
and with the assistance of specialised lawyers and tax counsellors.3012 There is also no need for 
protection where the relevant legal provisions are mandatory.3013 Atypical situations are 
thinkable though, especially in semi-public companies3014 and associations that call for 
protection in the form of content control.3015 
b)   Scope of the exception 
The wording of § 310(4) ('in the field of … company law') is quite vague.3016 Nonetheless, it 
is generally accepted that the term 'company law' includes here the law of partnerships3017 and 
                                                             
3006 Versorgungsausgleichsvereinbarungen. See § 1587o. 
3007 Stoffels AGB-Recht 56. 
3008 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 310 para 28, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 13. 
3009 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 41. 
3010 Personengesellschaften. 
3011 Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH). 
3012 MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 86. 
3013 Stoffels AGB-Recht 57. See §§ 23(5) and 38 AktG, §§ 18 2nd sent. and 11a GenG.  
3014 Publikumspersonengesellschaften. These companies are characterised by the fact that the company is created 
by a small number of founders, and the company agreement provides that others can invest in the company without 
having any further rights (votes etc.). There is neither any personal or other relation between the founders and the 
subsequent investors nor among the subsequent investors. The most popular semi-public company is the GmbH 
& Co. KG. The GmbH & Co. KG is a limited partnership with typically the sole general partner being a limited 
liability company (GmbH). It can thus combine the advantages of a partnership with those of the limited liability 
of a corporation. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 58 and Schade Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht 142-151 
(Kommanditgesellschaft), 174-201 (GmbH). 
3015 Grunewald FS Semler 179 et seq, Stoffels AGB-Recht 57. 
3016 Stoffels AGB-Recht 57.  
3017 Personengesellschaften. Examples: BGB-Gesellschaft or GbR (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts - civil law 
partnership), oHG (offene Handelsgesellschaft – general partnership), KG (Kommanditgesellschaft – limited 
partnership) or GmbH & Co. KG. 
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corporations,3018 as well as the law of cooperatives3019 and associations.3020 Only if specific 
instruments or provisions concerning the organisation of these structures, such as company 
agreements or articles of association, or constructions pertaining to the membership of the legal 
structure, §§ 305 to 310 are not applicable.3021 Therefore, a provision in a partnership 
agreement of a limited company (GmbH) by which the partners, a group of partners or the 
majority of the partners have the right to exclude a partner from the company without an 
objective reason, is not subject to content control.3022 On the other hand, clauses pertaining to 
the exchange of performances or the use of a thing in an association are subject to such a 
control. Hence, for employment contracts of board members3023 or the sale of company 
shares3024 §§ 305 et seq. apply. As far as company acquisition contracts are negotiated 
individually, they are not subject to content control.3025 On the other hand, if such a contract 
consists of standardised clauses, such as in the company sales contracts of the former Trust 
Agency,3026 the exception of company law under § 310(4) does not apply.3027 
In this context, it is important to note that the company in question does not tend to circumvent 
the application of §§ 305 et seq. (§ 306a)3028 by using another construction, for instance, by 
choosing the form of a book club (association), although, in respect of the contractual 
relationships, another company structure would be required.3029  
c) Content control of pre-formulated company agreements and articles of association 
with the standard of good faith (§ 242) 
The fact that § 310(4) excludes company law from content control leads to the result that also 
agreements where a need for protection obviously exists are excluded from the scope of 
                                                             
3018 Kaptitalgesellschaften. Examples: AG (Aktiengesellschaft – stock corporation/public limited company), 
GmbH (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung – limited liability company), KG a.A. (Kommanditgesellschaft auf 
Aktien - partnership limited by shares), BGH NJW 1995, 192. 
3019 Genossenschaften. 
3020 Vereine. BGH NJW 1998, 454 (concerning associations), BGH NJW 1988, 1729 (concerning cooperatives). 
3021 Stoffels AGB-Recht 57. 
3022 BGH NJW 2005, 3641, Verse DStR 2007, 1822. 
3023 BGH NJW 1989, 2683 (2684 et seq), Bauer/Arnold ZIP 2006, 2338. 
3024 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 123, Erman/Roloff § 310 para 29, MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 89 
3025 MüKo/Wurmnest § 307 para 99. 
3026 The Treuhandanstalt ('Trust agency') was an agency established by the government of the German Democratic 
Republic to (re)privatise East German government-owned enterprises (Volkseigene Betriebe or 'VEB' for short), 
prior to the German reunification. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Treuhandanstalt'. 
3027 Stoffels AGB-Recht 58. 
3028 § 306a: 'The rules in this division [§§ 305-310] apply even if they are circumvented by other constructions.' 
3029 Stoffels AGB-Recht 58. 
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application of §§ 305 et seq. Therefore, the courts perform a content control based on the 
principle of good faith (§ 242).3030 
aa) Semi-public companies 
Semi-public companies (Personenpublikumsgesellschaften) are created by a small number of 
founders. The company agreement provides that others can invest in the company without 
having any further rights (votes, etc.). There is no personal or other relationship between the 
founders and the subsequent investors or among the subsequent investors.3031 Despite the 
exclusion of company law in terms of § 310(4), the BGH performs content control based on 
§ 242.3032 The reason is that the subsequent investors have to accept a company agreement that 
has been pre-formulated by the initial investors, without having the possibility to amend this 
agreement. Such a company agreement is thus similar to standard business terms, and content 
control is necessary in order to avoid abuses.3033 The BGH applies this jurisprudence by 
analogy also to dormant partnerships.3034 There, the dormant partner also has no influence on 
the company agreement and is merely capitalistically involved.3035 
In a landmark decision of 1975,3036 the BGH decided that a clause in a company agreement of 
a semi-public company (GmbH & Co. KG) by which claims against the GmbH (limited liability 
company) or the members of the supervisory board, based on an infringement of their 
obligations, become time-barred after three months, and by which the liability of the GmbH 
and the members of the supervisory board vis-à-vis partners and former partners was limited 
to the assets that the persons against whom the claims were raised had invested in the company 
was ineffective under § 242. Indeed, such a construction would give advantage to the partners 
sitting on the supervisory board so that the protection of the investors was insufficient. 
Also ineffective is a clause in a company agreement of a semi-public company providing that 
the managing director, who is also a partner, can only be dismissed with the unanimous 
approval of the other partners. According to the BGH, a simple majority is sufficient.3037 
                                                             
3030 § 242: 'An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice 
into consideration.' A description of similarities of and differences between company agreements and standard 
business clauses can be found in Bieder ZHR 174 (2010), 708 et seq. 
3031 BGHZ 64, 238 (241); 102, 172 (177 et seq); 104, 50 (53). 
3032 BGHZ 104, 50, 53. 
3033 BGHZ 64, 238 (241); 102, 172 (177); 104, 50 (53), UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 134 et seq. 
3034 Stille Gesellschaften. BGH NJW 2001, 1270. 
3035 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Stille Gesellschaft'. See also §§ 230-237 HGB. 
3036 BGHZ 64, 238. 
3037 BGH NJW 1988, 969. 
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The BGH assesses the clauses of company agreements of semi-public companies by referring 
to the principle of good faith. The court emphasises though that a comparative legal yardstick 
is not necessary.3038 Because of the particularities of semi-public companies, a reference to 
HGB3039 or BGB provisions would be unsuitable since semi-public companies differ to a large 
extent from other legal structures.3040 Hence, the courts tend to be geared to the general 
principles of company law, and partially to the guiding principles of semi-public companies.3041 
bb) Associations 
Associations have some parallels with semi-public companies, which is why the courts here 
also apply a content control based on § 242. Associations are vested with statutory power3042 
and the power of self-administration3043 which are both based on the principle of organisational 
autonomy.3044 The principle of organisational autonomy is grounded on the principle of private 
autonomy (freedom of contract) though, which itself is restricted, e.g., through content 
control.3045 It is important to distinguish in this context between control of articles of 
association (statutes) and other internal regulatory instruments on the one side, and the 
decisions of the association, on the other.3046 
Clauses of articles of association and other regulatory instruments are subject to content control 
under § 242 if the association has significant economic or social power, and a member is 
dependent on its membership because there is no alternative to it on the basis of a monopolistic 
position of the association.3047 Hence, the BGH decided that the regulatory framework of the 
umbrella organisation of credit cooperatives are subject to content control under § 242 because 
the cooperatives do not become members on a voluntary basis.3048 Content control (§ 242) of 
a regulatory instrument of a sports association can also have an impact on non-members if they 
must recognise the rules in order to be able to participate in a competition. This is the case of 
the rules of the umbrella organisation of tournament riding, an influential association. Non-
                                                             
3038 BGHZ 64, 238 (244). 
3039 HGB = Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code). 
3040 Stimpel FS Fischer 773, Stoffels AGB-Recht 60. 




3045 WHL/Horn § 23 AGBG para 88. 
3046 Stoffels AGB-Recht 60. 
3047 BGH NJW 1989, 1724 (1726); 2000, 1028, UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 136. 
3048 BGH NJW 1989, 1724 (1726). 
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members of this association who do not accept its rules are not allowed to participate in 
competitions.3049 
Decisions of associations having an impact on members are also subject to content control 
based on good faith.3050 The most common decisions in this field concern exclusions of 
members and penalties. The threshold for intervention is very high though and only met if the 
decision is obviously inequitable.3051 
d) Modifications due to the Unfair Terms Directive? 
Some authors are of the view that due to the principle of interpretation in accordance with the 
European directives, §§ 305 et seq. should be applicable to company agreements where 
consumer contracts are involved (e.g., for the acquisition of shares).3052 Recital 10 of the Unfair 
Terms Directive3053 clarifies however that the existing exceptions should further exist. Hence, 
the exclusion of company law is not modified by the Unfair Terms Directive.3054 
1.2.4   Limited control in labour law 
Under § 310(4), §§ 305 et seq. do not apply to collective agreements and private-sector works 
agreements or public-sector establishment agreements. Thus, employment contracts are not 
excluded from the scope of application. When assessing employment contracts, reasonable 
account must be taken of the special features that apply in labour law, however,3055 and § 305(2) 
(incorporation) and (3) (framework agreements) must not be applied.3056 
Pre-formulated employment contracts are ubiquitous, and these agreements are rarely agreed 
individually.3057 Before the modernisation of the law of obligations, the entire labour law was 
excluded from the application of the AGBG (§ 23). The inclusion of labour law in § 310(4) 
was probably the most significant modification in individual labour law in the last decades.3058 
The legislator justified this inclusion by the fact that in spite of a certain protection of 
employees by collective agreements and legal provisions, they need protection because of their 
existential dependence on their employment. Furthermore, there must be a counter-weight of 
                                                             
3049 BGH NJW 1995, 583. 
3050 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 137. 
3051 Stoffels AGB-Recht 61. 
3052 Heinrichs NJW 1997, 1407, MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 92, Armbrüster ZIP 2006, 413. 
3053 Recital 10: '(…) whereas as a result inter alia contracts relating to (…) the incorporation and organisation of 
companies or partnership agreements must be excluded from this Directive.' 
3054 Stoffels AGB-Recht 62. 
3055 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 15. 
3056 § 310(4) 2nd sent. 
3057 Staudinger/Krause Annex to § 310 para 1. 
3058 Preis/Roloff ZfA 2007, 44. 
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the employer's power to determine the employment conditions unilaterally.3059 The inclusion 
of labour law into content control also ensures that courts will no longer reach varying rulings 
leading to legal uncertainty. This also contributes to an equalisation of the level of protection 
of content control between labour and civil law.3060 
A consequence of the previously mentioned inclusion is that the courts now differentiate 
between pre-formulated and individually agreed employment contract clauses.3061 Where 
employees can negotiate their working conditions to a certain degree, one must assume that 
they are able to defend their interests. Despite this fact, this 'more' of freedom of contract must 
not be nullified by considerations of equity (§ 315(3))3062 or public policy (gute Sitten) 
(§ 138(1)).3063 In a ruling of 2005, the BAG held that equity control in the sense of general 
control of reasonableness in terms of § 242, which is independent of the particularities of the 
contract, does not take place anymore. The BAG stated that §§ 305 et seq. concretise the 
principle of good faith (§ 242) in terms of the content of employment clauses.3064  
a) No control for collective, company and service agreements  
Collective agreements are concluded between employers' associations or individual employers, 
on the one hand, and labour unions, on the other. If the conditions of the Collective Bargaining 
Act (TVG)3065 are met, the collective agreement applies directly between the parties. Since the 
bargaining power of the parties is balanced, there is no need for protection in terms of content 
control as both parties' interests are sufficiently considered. What is more, neither party is the 
'user' in the sense of § 305.3066 More importantly, the autonomy of collective bargaining 
                                                             
3059 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
3060 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
3061 Hanau NJW 2002, 1242, Stoffels AGB-Recht 63. 
3062 § 315(3): 'Where the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of a party, the 
specification made is binding on the other party only if it is equitable. If it is not equitable, the specification is 
made by judicial decision; the same applies if the specification is delayed.' 
3063 § 138(1): 'A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void.' Thüsing/Leder BB 2005, 940, Stoffels 
AGB-Recht 63. 
3064 BAG NZA 2005, 1111 (1116). 
3065 TVG = Tarifvertragsgesetz. 
3066 BAG AP no. 22 concerning § 611 'Ausbildungsbeihilfe', Stoffels AGB-Recht 63. 
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(Tarifautonomie) is a constitutional right (article 9(3) GG),3067 and the parties' power to shape 
their agreements must not unnecessarily be restricted by content control.3068 
Private-sector works agreements3069 and public-sector establishment agreements are excluded 
too under § 310(4). Particularly the normative character of these agreements speaks for their 
equal treatment with collective agreements.3070 Like for collective agreements, only a legal 
control against the standard of superior norms is possible in these cases.3071 
b)  Collective agreements as legal norms in terms of § 307(3) 
In their employment contracts, employers often refer to the collective agreement(s) that apply 
in the given branch. The collective agreement then becomes applicable to the given contract of 
employment.3072 Consequently, also employees who are not bound to the given collective 
agreement benefit from it. The legislator did not wish to alter this practice and expressed this, 
in a quite complicated manner, in § 310(4) 3rd sent. According to this provision, collective 
agreements (as well as private-sector works agreements and public-sector establishment 
agreements) are equivalent to legal provisions within the meaning of section 307(3).3073 Hence, 
employment contract clauses which refer to collective agreements as a whole3074 or a 'self-
contained regulatory complex'3075 are merely declaratory in nature and not subject to content 
control in terms of §§ 307 to 309 ((§ 307(3). The objective of this provision is not to allow for 
                                                             
3067 Article 9(3) GG: 'The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions 
shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or profession. Agreements that restrict or seek to 
impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be unlawful. Measures taken pursuant 
to Article 12a [Compulsory military and alternative civilian service], to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35 [Legal 
and administrative assistance and assistance during disasters], to paragraph (4) of Article 87a [Armed Forces], or 
to Article 91 [Internal Emergency] may not be directed against industrial disputes engaged in by associations 
within the meaning of the first sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic 
conditions.' 
3068 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
3069 See § 77 BetrVG. 
3070 Stoffels AGB-Recht 64. 
3071 Stoffels AGB-Recht 64. The former jurisprudence of the BAG according to which private-sector works 
agreements and public-sector establishment agreements were subject to a general equity control was heavily 
criticised. See also Preis/Ulber RdA 2013, 211. 
3072 Stoffels AGB-Recht 65. 
3073 § 307(3): 'Subsection (1) and (2) above, and [§§] 308 and 309 apply only to provisions in standard business 
terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing those 
legal provisions, are agreed. Other provisions may be ineffective under subsection (1) sentence 2 above, in 
conjunction with subsection (1) sentence 1 above.' 
3074 Reference to single clauses of a collective agreement is not sufficient. See BAG NZA-RR 2009, 593. 
3075 The BAG requires at least a reference of entire and definable areas in the case of a partial reference to an 
agreement. See BAG NZA 2009, 1366 (1368). 
 523   
 
an indirect material content control of collective agreements that have been included in 
employment contracts by reference.3076 
c) Consideration of the special features that apply in labour law 
Pursuant to § 310(4) 2nd sent., reasonable account must be taken of the special features that 
apply in labour law when §§ 305 et seq. are applied to employment contracts.3077 This vague 
formulation begs the question what it actually means. The government merely states that the 
prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation (§ 309) should not apply in labour law 
without restriction.3078 This provision does not have the practical impact that was expected at 
the beginning, though. According to the prevailing view, the 'special features that apply in 
labour law' that must be considered are the legislature's evaluations in labour and social law, 
as well as deviating factual situations in this field of law, or the fact that certain prohibitions in 
§§ 308 and 309 do not aim at long-term contractual relationships such as employment 
contracts.3079 The discussion in legal literature on this topic is more of a theoretical nature.3080 
1.2.5 Exception in case of inclusion of the VOB/B as a whole 
In terms of § 310(1) 3rd sent., in cases that involve contracts with an entrepreneur, a legal person 
under public law or a special fund under public law, § 307 (1) and (2) as well as § 308 no. 1, 2 
to 8 do not apply to contracts in which the entire Construction Tendering and Contract 
Regulations, Part B (VOB/B)3081 in the version applicable at the time of conclusion of the 
contract are included without deviation as to their content, relating to an examination of the 
content of individual provisions. The VOB/B contains general conditions for the execution of 
building works. They are always applied in public works contracts, but also private 
construction agreements.3082 The VOB/B are no statutory provisions in the sense of § 307(2) 
no. 1, but general business terms, which is why they are subject to content control under §§ 305 
et seq.3083 Jurisprudence has always recognised their special role and treats them differently 
from other standard terms, however. The courts argue that they have been negotiated between 
various interest groups, such as developers, construction companies and public authorities, 
                                                             
3076 Stoffels AGB-Recht 66. 
3077 Also termination contracts and settlement agreements are subject to this provision because of their regulatory 
content in the field of labour law. See UBH/Fuchs § 310 para 148. 
3078 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
3079 Stoffels AGB-Recht 66 and 67, with further references. 
3080 Staudinger/Krause Annex to § 310 para 144, Junker FS Buchner 378 et seq. 
3081 Version 2012. Notice of 31 July 2009, BAnz no. 155 of 15 October 2009, last amended by notice of 26 June 
2012 (BAnz AT 13 July 2012 B3). 
3082 Stoffels AGB-Recht 68. 
3083 UBH/Christensen Spez. AGB-Werke Part 4 (9) para 1 et seq. 
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which is why the interests of these parties are fairly balanced. Hence, when the parties have 
agreed that the VOB/B should apply as a whole, the courts will hold that they withstand content 
control.3084 Where the parties agree though that only parts of the VOB/B should apply, §§ 305 
et seq. are applicable.3085 Furthermore, the BGH decided that in consumer contracts, the 
VOB/B are subject to content control.3086 
The legislator adopted this new jurisprudence in the new version of § 310(1) 3rd sent., pursuant 
to which the VOB/B are excluded from content control only if they are applied without 
deviation as to their content vis-à-vis entrepreneurs and a legal person under public law or a 
special fund under public law. The least deviation entails content control in terms of §§ 305 et 
seq. For reasons of legal certainty, it is irrelevant what weight the deviation has, or who benefits 
from it.3087 What is more, in consumer contracts, content control always takes place, even if 
the application of the VOB/B as a whole has been agreed.3088 
2.  Personal scope of application 
2.1   Restrictions concerning entrepreneurs and public entities as clients 
1.1.1   Classification of § 310(1) 
As mentioned earlier, the assessment of the scope of application should start with § 310 since 
this provision contains some modifications and exclusions of the scope of application.3089 
§ 310(1)3090 concerns standard terms which are used in contracts with3091 an entrepreneur, a 
legal person under public law or a special fund under public law. This means that generally, all 
persons vis-à-vis of whom a supplier uses standard terms benefit from the protection of §§ 305 
et seq. This applies regardless of their personal status, intellectual abilities or economic 
                                                             
3084 BGH NJW 1983, 816 (818). 
3085 BGH NJW 2004, 1597. 
3086 BGH NZBau 2008, 640 (642 et seq). 
3087 This was already the case before the new version of this provision came into force. See BGH NJW 2004, 1597. 
3088 Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 145, BT-Drs. 16/9787 at 17. 
3089 Faust BGB-AT 105. 
3090 § 310(1): '[§] 305 (2) and (3) and [§§] 308 and 309 do not apply to standard business terms which are used in 
contracts with an entrepreneur, a legal person under public law or a special fund under public law. [§] 307 (1) and 
(2) nevertheless apply to these cases in sentence 1 to the extent that this leads to the ineffectiveness of the contract 
provisions set out in [§§] 308 and 309; reasonable account must be taken of the practices and customs that apply 
in business dealings. In cases coming under sentence 1, [§] 307 (1) and (2) do not apply to contracts in which the 
entire Award Rules for Building Works, Part B [Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen Teil B - 
VOB/B] in the version applicable at the time of conclusion of the contract are included without deviation as to 
their content, relating to an examination of the content of individual provision.'  
3091 The German text expresses the idea of two 'opposing' parties more clearly by using the preposition 'gegenüber' 
(vis-à-vis), instead of 'with'. 
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situation3092 as this provision only excludes the application of certain provisions of this BGB 
division.3093 This is legitimate because the legislator aims to balance the client's need for 
protection with regard to the unilateral use of the supplier's (user's) freedom of contract. On the 
other hand, §§ 305 et seq. are an emanation of the bona fides principle so that the legislator 
considered the exclusion of certain persons per se from the scope of application of §§ 305 et 
seq. as inappropriate.3094 
The legislator considered though that especially in commerce, the need for protection of the 
other party is lesser than it is for consumers.3095 The same applies to public entities which 
usually have business experience in their field.3096 Hence, commercial and public clients are 
included in the protection of §§ 305 and seq.3097 They benefit only from a reduced protection, 
however. The incorporation requirements (§ 305(2) and (3)), the unconditioned prohibition of 
certain clauses (§§ 308 and 309) and the extension of the international scope of application 
(article 29a EGBGB) do thus not apply in commercial transactions.3098  
2.1.2   Clients to whom the exception applies 
a)  Entrepreneurs as 'the other party' 
According to the legal definition of § 14(1), an entrepreneur is a natural or legal person or a 
partnership with legal personality who or which, when entering into a legal transaction, acts in 
exercise of its trade, business or profession. Under § 14(2), a partnership with legal personality 
is a partnership that has the capacity to acquire rights and to incur liabilities. 'Trade, business 
or profession' is any independent participation in commerce that is intended to have a certain 
duration. According to a more recent understanding, the intention to realise profits is not 
necessary. It is sufficient that the transactions are done with consideration of commercial and 
economic principles.3099 The law applies the notion of 'entrepreneur' according to the 
                                                             
3092 The CPA, on the other hand, privileges 'vulnerable consumers'. See s 3 and Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a) bb). 
3093 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 9. 
3094 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 43. 
3095 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 43. 
3096 Schmidt BGB-AT 416. 
3097 This point was subject to discussion when the AGBG was drafted. In a first draft, merchants (Kaufleute) 
should not benefit at all from the protection of the AGBG legislation. See DB Beilage 18/74 at 23. 
3098 Stoffels AGB-Recht 70. With the reform of the commercial law of 1998 (BGBl. 1998 I at 1474), the 
qualification as a merchant (Kaufmann) is not the point of reference anymore, but the commercial or professional 
activity of the other party. Hence, also freelancers are included since their situation has to be considered equal in 
terms of the use of standard terms. See BT-Drs. 13/8444 at 46 et seq. 
3099 BGH NJW 2006, 2250 (2251), UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 18, MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 45. 
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situation3100 so that the same person can be an entrepreneur in one situation and a consumer in 
another. 
In case of doubt, by reference to the legal concept of § 344(1) HGB,3101 an entrepreneur that 
concludes a transaction most probably will do so in his or her capacity as an entrepreneur, and 
not as a private person.3102 
Entrepreneurs are thus capital companies (AG, KgaA, GmbH),3103 partnerships (oHG, KG),3104 
individual merchants, freelancers, artisans and farmers. Employees or civil servants are no 
entrepreneurs because they are not independent. Therefore, a professor who purchases a new 
computer for her own account in order to assess her students' assignments acts as a consumer, 
and not as an entrepreneur.3105 On the other hand, the activity as an entrepreneur does not need 
to be the person's main occupation. Therefore, the activity of lessors who own several flats 
which they administrate themselves can be seen as entrepreneurs if this activity requires a 
certain expenditure of time and organisation. Ebay power sellers are regularly considered 
entrepreneurs.3106 
b)  Public entities as 'the other party' 
The legislator considers that not only entrepreneurs but also public entities need less protection 
in terms of §§ 305 et seq. Legal persons under public law are the State (government), public 
corporations (e.g., municipalities), public agencies (e.g., universities, social security agencies), 
foundations of public law and the churches.3107 After the privatisation of the German Federal 
Post Office (Deutsche Bundespost), only a few special funds under public law remain, such as 
the Federal Railway Fund (Bundeseisenbahnvermögen – BEV) and the Fund of the European 
                                                             
3100 Faust BGB-AT 105. 
3101 § 344(1) HGB: 'A legal transaction that is concluded by a merchant is, in case of doubt, presumed to be 
concluded within the scope of his or her commercial enterprise.' My own translation, since there is no official 
translation of Book IV of the HGB. 
3102 Palandt/Ellenberger § 14 para 2, UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 22. 
3103 Aktiengesellschaft (AG), Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KgaA), Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
(GmbH). 
3104 Offene Handelsgesellschaft (oHG), Kommanditgesellschaft (KG). For these entities, in no case there is room 
for private transactions. Stoffels AGB-Recht 70. 
3105 Borges DZWiR 1997, 404. 
3106 OLG Frankfurt NJW 2005, 1438. 
3107 Stoffels AGB-Recht 71. 
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Recovery Program (ERP-Sondervermögen).3108 In most cases, however, public entities will act 
standard terms users, in which case they need no protection under §§ 305 et seq.3109 
2.1.3   Inapplicable provisions 
§ 310(1) provides that the incorporation requirements of § 305(2) and (3) do not apply to 
entrepreneurs and public entities so that also an implied concurrence of wills is sufficient.3110 
The prohibitions of §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309 find no application in terms of § 310(1). 
Nonetheless, the enquiry by means of the general clause (§ 307) remains possible. Furthermore, 
§ 310(1) 2nd sent. clarifies that § 307 nevertheless applies to these cases to the extent that this 
leads to the ineffectiveness of the contract provision set out in §§ 308 and 309. This means that 
the valuations contained in §§ 308 and 309 can be considered within the general clause. This 
approach allows for a flexible application of the law by taking reasonable account of the 
practices and customs that apply in business dealings (§ 310(1) 2nd sent. in fine).3111 
2.2   Personal scope of application of § 310(3) 
2.2.1   Background of the provision 
§ 310(3)3112 extends in its no. 1 and 2 the object of content control and modifies in its no. 3 the 
standard for the enquiry of an unreasonable disadvantage. The provision has been inserted due 
to the Unfair Terms Directive and therefore aims at consumer protection in line with the 
Directive.3113 
                                                             
3108 The ERP Fund is based on a convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of 
Germany for economic cooperation. It was concluded in 1949 (BGBl. 1950 at 9). See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch 
s.v. 'ERP-Sondervermögen'. 
3109 Stoffels AGB-Recht 71. 
3110 Stoffels AGB-Recht 71. 
3111 Stoffels AGB-Recht 71. 
3112 § 310(3): 'In the case of contracts between an entrepreneur and a consumer (consumer contracts) the rules in 
this division apply with the following provisos: 1. Standard business terms are deemed to have been presented by 
the entrepreneur, unless they were introduced into the contract by the consumer; 2. [§] 305c (2) and [§§] 306 and 
307 to 309 of this Code and Article 46b of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code [Einführungsgesetz zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche] apply to pre-formulated contract terms even if the latter are intended only for non-
recurrent use on one occasion, and to the extent that the consumer, by reason of the pre-formulation, had no 
influence on their contents; 3. in judging an unreasonable disadvantage under [§] 307 (1) and (2), the other 
circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must also be taken into account.'  
3113 Stoffels AGB-Recht 71. 
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2.2.2   Consumer contract 
§ 310(3) applies to contracts between an entrepreneur and a consumer (referred to as 'consumer 
contracts'). Contrary to the Unfair Terms Directive, § 310(3) is not limited to specific contract 
types,3114 namely contracts on goods and services.3115 
The definition of 'entrepreneur' in § 14 is the counterpart of the definition of 'consumer' in 
§ 13.3116 In terms of this provision, a consumer means every natural person who enters into a 
legal transaction for purposes that predominantly are outside his trade, business or profession. 
This corresponds to the definition of 'consumer' in article 2 lit. b) of the Directive.3117 A civil 
law company (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts) consisting of several natural persons can be 
qualified as a natural person as well.3118 This applies as long as the natural person concludes 
the contract for purposes that are mainly not related to its commercial or independent 
professional activity, i.e. the contract serves primarily private purposes. This is the case where 
a contract is concluded for private consumption or private investment or asset management.3119 
Unlike the Unfair Terms Directive, § 310(3) does not require the parties to conclude a certain 
type of transaction, such as a sales agreement. Hence, for the German provision, consumption 
of the given item is not necessary, even though consumption will in most cases be the final 
purpose of the contract. § 13 defines 'consumer' negatively since the legal transaction must be 
concluded neither for a commercial nor for an independent activity.3120 Insofar, the German 
legislature extends permissibly3121 the scope of the concerned legal transactions in comparison 
to the Directive in that the latter requires only a purpose that is 'outside [the consumer's] trade, 
business or profession'.3122 Therefore, an employed (i.e., dependent) commercial agent who 
buys a car for his or her business trips is a consumer in terms of §§ 13 and 310(3).3123 
                                                             
3114 Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 11. 
3115 Recital 2 of the Directive refers to 'contract[s] between the seller of goods or supplier of services, on the one 
hand, and the consumer of them, on the other hand', and art 4(1) of the Directive refers to 'goods or services for 
which the contract was concluded.' 
3116 Faust BGB-AT 106. 
3117 Stoffels AGB-Recht 72. Article 2 lit. b): '[C]onsumer means any natural person who, in contracts covered by 
this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession.' 
3118 BGH NJW 2002, 368, UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 57. 
3119 Stoffels AGB-Recht 72. 
3120 In the English translation, this is not sufficiently clear though, as the German negatively formulated phrase 
for 'der weder ihrer gewerblichen noch ihrer selbständigen beruflichen Tätigkeit zugerechnet werden kann' 
(neither for … nor for) is translated in English by a positive grammatical structure that is closer to art 2 lit. b) of 
the Directive: 'for purposes that predominantly are outside his trade, business or profession'. Emphasis added.  
3121 Article 8 of the Directive: 'Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with 
the Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer.' 
3122 Stoffels AGB-Recht 72. 
3123 Stoffels AGB-Recht 72. 
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The wider BGB definition of 'consumer' also means that employees are 'consumers' vis-à-vis 
their employers with respect to their contracts of employment.3124 § 13 is highly abstract, which 
is why it does not require any consumption or a non-professional use of the given item; only 
independent activities are excluded. German standard business terms legislation is not linked 
to specific contract types so that also in labour law, it is appropriate to apply § 310(3). After 
all, an employee is comparable to a consumer with regard to its inferior position because it is 
economically dependent on its workplace.3125 
On the other hand, someone who concludes a contract (e.g., a franchise agreement)3126 in order 
to start a commercial or independent business is an entrepreneur, and not a consumer in the 
sense of § 310(3).3127  
The enquiry of whether a contract is concluded for private or professional (independent) 
purposes must be undertaken objectively at the time of the conclusion of the agreement. This 
is done by taking its content and other surrounding circumstances that are visible for the other 
party into consideration. The customer's intention is therefore irrelevant.3128 
It can be difficult to assess whether a contract is concluded for private or a professionally 
independent use in the case of a so-called dual use,3129 i.e., a mixture of both. § 13 refers to a 
'predominant' use outside the consumer's trade, business or profession. Hence, the predominant 
use that is visible for the supplier is relevant, taking into consideration the client's conduct, its 
professional situation and needs, for instance.3130 This means that a client who intended to buy 
an item for private use is not considered a consumer if the supplier objectively had to interpret 
the other party's conduct otherwise.3131 
                                                             
3124 BAG NZA 2005, 1111 (1115), confirmed by BVerfG NZA 2007, 85, 86; BAG NZA 2011, 89 (90); 2013, 1265 
(1266), ErfK/Preis § 611 para 182, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 15. Hence, the specific provisions 
for consumer contracts in § 312(3) must also be taken into consideration. 
3125 Preis NZA 2003, special supplement to issue no. 16 at 24. 
3126 In terms of s 5(6)(d) CPA, franchise agreements are regarded as transactions between a consumer and a 
supplier. See discussion in Part I ch 2 para 2.2 a) aa). 
3127 BGH NJW 2005, 1273; 2008, 435 (436). 
3128 Palandt/Ellenberger § 13 para 4, OLG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 2012, 289. 
3129 This term is also used in German law ('Dual-use'). See Stoffels AGB-Recht 73. 
3130 KG NJW-RR 2011, 1418, NK/Ring § 14 para 31. 
3131 BGH NJW 2009, 3780 (3781). 
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3.  Standard business terms in international legal relations 
3.1   Protection granted by the private international law 
3.1.1   General remarks 
In our more and more international world, not only businesses conclude contracts with other 
businesses that are located in other countries. Consumers too buy goods and services from 
companies overseas, for instance, from mail order firms or service companies that offer their 
product in various countries. Just as German companies, foreign firms make their transactions 
subject to their standard business terms. This begs the question of whether clients in Germany 
can also benefit from the protection against unfair standard terms.3132 
The answer to this question depends on whether the contractual relationship is subject to 
German or foreign law, and whether also special connecting criteria3133 granting particular 
protection must be applied. These questions are answered by the application of the private 
international law of the country whose courts deal with the given case. German courts thus 
apply the German private international law,3134 which is why the following discussion focuses 
only on this aspect. Since courts might have to apply another foreign domestic law to decide a 
case, this might lead to imponderable outcomes. In order to unify the different regimes in terms 
of questions of conflict of law, Regulation (EC) no. 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I)3135 provides in its article 6 that the courts in the EU Member 
States have, in theory, to apply the same law. In order to minimise conflicts of law, German 
standard terms users should insert a forum clause stipulating the exclusive competence of 
German courts or courts of another EU Member State.3136 
3.1.2   Applicable law to contracts under the law of obligations 
a)  Free choice of law 
Article 3(1) of the Rome-I Regulation provides that the parties can freely select the law 
applicable to the contract. It is not necessary that the parties or the contract have any relation 
                                                             
3132 Stoffels AGB-Recht 75. 
3133 Sonderanknüpfung. 
3134 Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters regulates the 
international competence of jurisdiction. For actions brought before 10 January 2015, Regulation (EC) no. 
44/2001 of the Council of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters is still applicable though (art 66 of Reg 1215/2012). 
3135 Regulation (EC) no. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). 
3136 Stoffels AGB-Recht 75. 
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to the chosen law. Under certain circumstances, the law applicable to the user's standard 
business terms can be freely chosen.3137 
b)  Objective connecting criteria 
If the parties did not select a law, or their choice is invalid, the Rome-I Regulation sets out 
different criteria for the determination of the applicable law for contracts of carriage,3138 
consumer contracts,3139 insurance contracts covering large risks3140 and individual employment 
contracts.3141 
In cases where the previously mentioned contracts are not concerned (articles 5 to 8 of Rome 
I), the applicable law is determined in terms of article 4 of Rome I.3142 According to this 
                                                             
3137 This topic will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3138 Article 5(2) of Rome I: 'To the extent that the law applicable to a contract for the carriage of passengers has 
not been chosen by the parties in accordance with the second subparagraph, the law applicable shall be the law of 
the country where the passenger has his habitual residence, provided that either the place of departure or the place 
of destination is situated in that country. If these requirements are not met, the law of the country where the carrier 
has his habitual residence shall apply.' 
3139 Article 6(1) of Rome I: 'Without prejudice to Articles 5 and 7, a contract concluded by a natural person for a 
purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the consumer) with another person acting 
in the exercise of his trade or profession (the professional) shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
consumer has his habitual residence, provided that the professional: (a) pursues his commercial or professional 
activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, or (b) by any means, directs such activities 
to that country or to several countries including that country, and the contract falls within the scope of such 
activities.' 
3140 Article 7(2) of Rome I: 'An insurance contract covering a large risk as defined in Article 5(d) of the First 
Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance shall 
be governed by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3 of this Regulation. To the extent that 
the applicable law has not been chosen by the parties, the insurance contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the insurer has his habitual residence. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that 
the contract is manifestly more closely connected with another country, the law of that other country shall apply.' 
3141 Article 8(2) 1st sent. of Rome I: 'To the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment contract 
has not been chosen by the parties, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing 
that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract.' 
Article 8(3) of Rome I: 'Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract 
shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged 
is situated.' 
3142 Article 4(1) of Rome I: 'To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in accordance 
with Article 3 and without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law governing the contract shall be determined as 
follows: (a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his 
habitual residence; (b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country where 
the service provider has his habitual residence; (c) a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or 
to a tenancy of immovable property shall be governed by the law of the country where the property is situated; 
(d) notwithstanding point (c), a tenancy of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a period 
of no more than six consecutive months shall be governed by the law of the country where the landlord has his 
habitual residence, provided that the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual residence in the same country; 
(e) a franchise contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the franchisee has his habitual residence; 
(f) a distribution contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the distributor has his habitual 
residence; (g) a contract for the sale of goods by auction shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
auction takes place, if such a place can be determined; (h) a contract concluded within a multilateral system which 
brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial 
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provision, the contract is subject to the law of the country to which it has the closest 
connections. This will regularly be the country where the supplier has its habitual residence.3143 
For contracts not listed in article 4(1), the characteristic performance has to be determined in 
terms of article 4(2).3144 
Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more 
closely connected with a country other than the one indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2 of article 4, 
the law of that other country shall apply.3145 Where the law applicable cannot be determined 
under paragraphs 1 or 2 of article 4, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country 
with which it is most closely connected. 
 
c)   Scope of the applicable law and standard business terms legislation 
The law applicable to the contract according to a choice of law or the objective connectivity 
criterion means that only the provisions of the legal system in question apply to the contract 
'from the cradle to the grave'. The applicable legal provisions determine the coming into being 
and validity of the contract,3146 its formal validity,3147 as well its scope and performance of the 
contractual obligations, its interpretation and the consequences of breach (damages).3148  
This means that if German law applies, the customer benefits from §§ 305 et seq.3149 German 
employees who work for foreign employers will most probably be subject to foreign law. This 
is either because their employment contract provides so, or because article 4(1) and (2) of 
Rome I provides for equivalent objective connectivity criteria. As the Unfair Terms Regulation 
grants minimum protection for all EU and EEC Member States, the employee benefits from a 
                                                             
instruments, as defined by Article 4(1), point (17) of Directive 2004/39/EC, in accordance with non-discretionary 
rules and governed by a single law, shall be governed by that law.' 
3143 See art 4(1)(a)-(f) of Rome I. 
3144 Article 4(2) of Rome I: 'Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the 
contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by 
the law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his 
habitual residence.' 
3145 Article 4(3) of Rome I. 
3146 Article 10(1) of Rome I: 'The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be 
determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.' 
3147 Article 11(1) of Rome I: 'A contract concluded between persons who, or whose agents, are in the same country 
at the time of its conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it in 
substance under this Regulation or of the law of the country where it is concluded.' 
3148 Article 12(1) of Rome I: 'The law applicable to a contract by virtue of this Regulation shall govern in 
particular: (a) interpretation; (b) performance; (c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its 
procedural law, the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations, including the assessment of damages 
in so far as it is governed by rules of law; (d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and 
limitation of actions; (e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.' 
3149 Stoffels AGB-Recht 77. 
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high level of protection. Less protection is only offered where the national, e.g., German law 
grants a higher level of protection,3150 or where the law on a non-EU or EEC country applies. 
It is important to note that sometimes the parties agree that for contracts for the international 
sale of goods, the CISG3151 shall apply, provided that the country in question is a signatory of 
that convention.3152 If the parties did not exclude the application of CISG in terms of article 6 
CISG, the UN convention replaces the national provisions on commercial law.3153 
3.1.3   Special connecting criteria for the application of protective provisions in 
standard term contracts 
The Rome-I Regulation provides for special rules by which also protective provisions of §§ 305 
et seq. apply that might improve the other party's situation. This applies above all for consumer 
contracts, individual employment contracts and domestic contracts and transnational contracts 
without any connection to third countries. 
a) Consumer contracts: article 6(2) of the Rome-I Regulation 
Notwithstanding article 6(1) of Rome I (law of the habitual residence of the consumer), the 
parties may choose the law applicable to a contract which fulfils the requirements of 
paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3 (freedom of choice). Such a choice may thus not 
have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him or her by provisions 
that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of 
choice, would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1. 
Hence, in consumer contracts, one has to assess if the national law contains mandatory 
provisions from which the parties must not derogate. 
aa) Conditions of article 6(2) 
In order to be applicable, the parties must conclude a consumer contract. Certain contracts are 
excluded in terms of article 6(4). This applies for agreements on the supply of services to be 
supplied exclusively in a country other than that in which the consumer has its habitual 
residence, contracts of carriage other than a contract relating to package travel as well as certain 
                                                             
3150 See art 8 of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
3151 United Nations Convention on Contracts on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) of 11 April 1980. 
3152 Article 1(1) lit. b) CISG. Almost all EU Member States (Germany included), the U.S., numerous East-
European and African countries are signatories to CISG. South Africa is not a contracting State, however. For an 
overview of all participating countries see 'CISG – Table of Contracting States' at 
http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/page/cisg-table-contracting-states. 
3153 Stoffels AGB-Recht 77. The application of the CISG will be discussed later in detail in this chapter. 
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agreements relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable 
property. What is more, certain contracts concerning financial instruments,3154 as well as 
insurance contracts (article 7) and contracts of carriage do not apply under article 6(1). 
Furthermore, the supplier must act in the exercise of his or her trade or profession. Besides, 
there must be a connection between his or her professional activity and the habitual residence 
of the consumer in terms of article 6(1)(a) in order to justify the application of the domestic 
law.3155 It is sufficient though if the professional directs such activities to that country or to 
several countries, including that country (article 6(1)(b)). This is the case, e.g., where the 
supplier undertakes promotion or marketing measures in the given country, such as the 
distribution of prospects or catalogues, newspaper commercials, phone calls or commercial 
television spots.3156 
It is however arguable whether a professional (supplier) also 'directs' its activities to one or 
several countries in the sense of article 6(1)(b) if the contract has been concluded by means of 
e-commerce. The ECJ has developed several guidelines concerning article 15(1) lit. c) of the 
Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 (Brussels I),3157 which is similar 
to article 6(1) of the Rome-I Regulation, that could be helpful in this regard.3158 The link 
between both regulations is specifically pointed out in recital 24 of the Rome-I Regulation.3159 
                                                             
3154 Article 6(4)(a)-(e) of Rome I. 
3155 MüKo/Martiny Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 29. 
3156 MüKo/Martiny Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 32. 
3157 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I). Article 15(1): 'In matters relating to a 
contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Article 4 and point 5 of Article 
5, if: (a) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or (b) it is a contract for a loan repayable 
by instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or (c) in all other cases, the 
contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State 
of the consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States 
including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.' 
3158 Staudinger/Magnus Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 115. 
3159 Recital 24 of the Rome-I Regulation: 'With more specific reference to consumer contracts, the conflict-of-
law rule should make it possible to cut the cost of settling disputes concerning what are commonly relatively small 
claims and to take account of the development of distance-selling techniques.' Consistency with Regulation (EC) 
No. 44/2001 requires both that there be a reference to the concept of directed activity as a condition for applying 
the consumer protection rule and that the concept be interpreted harmoniously in Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 
and this Regulation, bearing in mind that a joint declaration by the Council and the Commission on Article 15 of 
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 states that ‘for Article 15(1)(c) to be applicable it is not sufficient for an undertaking 
to target its activities at the Member State of the consumer's residence, or at a number of Member States including 
that Member State; a  contract must also be concluded within the framework of its activities’. The declaration also 
states that ‘the mere fact that an internet site is accessible is not sufficient for Article 15 to be applicable, although 
a factor will be that this internet site solicits the conclusion of distance contracts and that a contract has actually 
been concluded at a distance, by whatever means. In this respect, the language or currency which a website uses 
does not constitute a relevant factor.' 
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According to the ECJ, a supplier 'directs' its activity to a country if its activity has an 
international character, if its website contains directions for clients from other Member States 
to the supplier, the use of another language or currency as the one which is current in the 
supplier's country, the possibility to book and to receive a booking confirmation in this other 
language, the indication of telephone numbers with an international dialling code ('00xx…' or 
'+xx…'), the use of another top-level domain (e.g., '.de' or '.fr') or the indication of an 
international clientele on the professional's website.3160 Mere accessibility to the professional's 
website from the country in which the consumer has its habitual residence is not sufficient 
though.3161 Furthermore, according to the ECJ, causality between the supplier's 'direction' of 
its activity to this country and the conclusion of the contract is not necessary.3162 The last point 
is however contrary to recital 25 of Rome I ('and the contract is concluded as a result of such 
activity'), and it is disputable whether this jurisprudence is also valid for the Rome-I 
Regulation.3163 In any event, it should not be necessary that the contract itself has been 
concluded by means of distance selling.3164 What is more, pursuant to recital 24 of Rome I, 'the 
language or currency which a website uses does not constitute a relevant factor.' Finally, the 
contract must fall within the scope of such activities.3165 
If the conditions of article 6(1) are not met, the law applicable to the contract is determined 
pursuant to articles 3 (freedom of choice) and 4 (applicable in the absence of choice) of Rome 
I. Consumers who chose to conclude a contract with a foreign supplier on their own initiative 
must thus be content with the legal standards of the given country.3166 
bb) Legal consequences 
Under article 6(2) 2nd sent. of Rome I, the selection of a certain law is valid. A complementary 
special rule is introduced though under which the consumer protection provisions of the 
country of the consumer's habitual residence apply.3167 The mandatory provisions of §§ 305 et 
seq. are such provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement.3168 Since the consumer 
cannot be deprived of 'the protection afforded to him', the so-called 'favourability principle'3169 
                                                             
3160 ECJ dec. of 07/12/2010 – C-585-08, Pammer, C-144/09, Hotel Alpenhof, para 83 (NJW 2011, 505). 
3161 ECJ dec. of 07/12/2010 – C-585-08, Pammer, C-144/09, Hotel Alpenhof, para 94. See also rec. 24 of Rome I. 
3162 ECJ dec. of 07/12/2010 – C-585-08, Pammer, C-144/09, Hotel Alpenhof, para 32. 
3163 Staudinger/Steinrötter NJW 2013, 3505 (3506). 
3164 ECJ dec. of 06/09/2012 – C-190/11, Mühlleitner, para 45 (NJW 2012, 3225). See also recital 24 of Rome I. 
3165 Article 6(1) in fine of Rome I. 
3166 MüKo/Martiny (2010) Art 6 para 29. 
3167 Palandt/Thorn Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 8. 
3168 Staudinger/Magnus Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 140, MüKo/Martiny Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 44. 
3169 Günstigkeitsprinzip. 
 536   
 
applies. According to this principle, the consumer protection provisions of the BGB apply only 
if they are more favourable to the consumer in the concrete case than the provisions of the 
selected law or the law applicable by virtue of connecting criteria.3170 
cc) Gap in the protection 
The scope of article 6 of Rome I is much wider than the scope of its predecessor provision of 
article 29 EGBGB3171 since all kinds of consumer contracts fall under its ambit as long as its 
application is not superseded by articles 5 or 7. A great deal of contracts is excluded by article 
6(4) though so that in these cases, the consumer does not benefit from increased protection 
under the BGB provisions.3172 
b) Article 46b EGBGB  
Article 46b EGBGB repeals article 29a EGBGB and applies to areas where the EU has set out 
special conflict-of-law rules.3173 
aa) Significance of article 46b EGBGB 
In order to facilitate the purchase of goods and services in other EU countries for consumers, 
besides the harmonisation of the national consumer protection legislation, it is necessary to 
protect consumers from the exclusion of these provisions. Therefore, a number of directives 
contain conflict-of-law rules which prevent that a supplier might choose to select a legislation 
that affords less protection.3174 Under article 23 of Rome I, these conflict-of-law rules take 
precedence over the provisions contained in Rome I.3175 The function of article 46b EGBGB is 
to transpose the said conflict-of-law rules into German law. Hence, the Directives mentioned 
                                                             
3170 Staudinger/Magnus Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 137, MüKo/Martiny Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 46. 
3171 Article 29 EGBGB included only certain consumer contracts, such as contracts on the delivery of movable 
things, the performance of services or the financing of these transactions. 
3172 Stoffels AGB-Recht 79. 
3173 Stoffels AGB-Recht 80. 
3174 Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive provides that '[M]embers shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law 
of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close connection with the territory 
of the Member States.' Similar provisions contain articles 7(2) of the Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees, 12(2) of the Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, 22(4) of the Directive 2008/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and 12(2) of the Directive 
2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers 
in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts. 
3175 Staudinger/Magnus Art 46b EGBGB para 1. 
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above are transposed into German law by article 46b(1) EGBGB,3176 with the exception of the 
Timeshare Directive for which article 46b(4)3177 applies.3178 
Article 46b EGBGB is wider than article 6(2) 2nd sent. of Rome I in that it covers all types of 
consumer contracts (as far as they fall under the ambit of the consumer protection directives). 
A close connection to the EU/EEC single market is sufficient.3179 Article 46b EGBGB is 
nonetheless more restrictive compared to article 6 of Rome I in that it only applies in choice-
of-law cases but not where an objective connecting criterion applies.3180 
bb) Conditions of the application of article 46b EGBGB 
Article 46b(1) applies to contracts which, due to a valid choice of law, are governed by the law 
of a country which is not a member of the EU or the EEC.3181 Furthermore, the agreement in 
question must be a consumer contract. This condition is not expressly mentioned in article 46b, 
the Directives mentioned in paragraph 3 require such a contract, however.3182 
In addition, the contract must show a close connection to the area of an EU or EEC3183 Member 
State. Article 46b(2)3184 concretises this condition. Since the German legislator oriented itself 
                                                             
3176 Article 46b(1) EGBGB: 'If a contract, due to choice of law, is governed by the law of a country which is 
neither a Member State of the European Union, nor another Contracting State of the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area, yet if the contract shows a close connection to the area of one of these states, then the provisions 
of this particular state that have [been] adopted in implementation of the consumer protection directives are 
nevertheless applicable.' 
3177 Article 46b(4) EGBGB: 'If a timeshare contract, a long-term holiday product contract, a resale contract or an 
exchange contract in the meaning of Art 2 para. 1 (a) to (d) of Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, 
long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts (OJ L 33 of 3.2.2009 at 10) is governed by the law of a 
country which is neither a Member State of the European Union, nor another Contracting State of the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area, then the consumers shall not be deprived of the protection granted in 
implementation of this directive, if 1. any of the immovable properties concerned is located in the sovereign 
territory of a Member State of the European Union or of another Contracting State of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area, or 2. in the case of a contract not directly related to an immovable property, the 
entrepreneur pursues commercial or professional activities in a Member State of the European Union or another 
Contracting State of the Agreement on the European Economic Area or where he, by any means, directs such 
activities to such a state, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.' 
3178 Stoffels AGB-Recht 80. 
3179 Stoffels AGB-Recht 80. 
3180 Palandt/Thorn Art 46b EGBGB para 4. 
3181 Stoffels AGB-Recht 80. 
3182 Palandt/Thorn Art 46b EGBGB para 3. 
3183 Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. See Palandt/Thorn Art 46b EGBGB para 2. 
3184 Article 46b(2) EGBGB: 'A close connection must be assumed particularly where the entrepreneur 1. carries 
on a professional or commercial activity in a Member State of the European Union or in a Contracting State of 
the Agreement on the European Economic Area in which the consumer has his or her habitual residence, or 
2. directs such activity in some way towards this Member State of the European Union or towards another 
Contracting State of the Agreement on the European Economic Area or towards several states including this state, 
and the contract falls within the scope of this activity.' 
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to article 6(1) of Rome I,3185 one can assume that the previously mentioned jurisprudence 
concerning article 15(1) lit. c) of the Brussels I Directive applies, especially concerning the 
concretisation of the condition of the direction of commercial or professional activities.3186 The 
enumeration in article 46b(2) is not exhaustive though ('particularly'), so that also other 
conditions may apply.3187  
The 'close connection' is assessed by considering the circumstances of the given case3188 and 
applying all connecting criteria of the private international law, such as the consumer's habitual 
residence, the entrepreneur's principal or branch office, the place of the conclusion of the 
contract, its language and the place of execution or the location of the purchased item.3189 The 
view that the 'close connection' has no autonomous meaning has to be dismissed as otherwise, 
paragraph 2 of article 46b would not contain concretisations of this condition.3190 
Even though article 46b(1) EGBGB merely requires a close connection to one of the EU or 
EEC countries, this provision also applies where there is a connection to several of them. The 
Directives that are transposed by article 46b require a close connection 'with the territory of the 
Member States' (article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directives) or 'with the territory of one or 
more Member States' (article 22(4) of the Consumer Credit Directive).3191 In this case, it must 
be assessed to which country the closest connection exists. Any connection to third countries 
must be disregarded.3192 
Even though article 46b(2) mentions the habitual residence of the consumer as a criterion for 
the existence of a close connection, article 46b(1) may nonetheless apply in cases where a 
consumer living outside the EU/EEC concludes a contract within the single market. The 
Directives mentioned in paragraph 3 do not require the consumer to have its habitual residence 
in the EU/EEC, neither does paragraph 4.3193 Its high consumer protection standards thus 
protect consumers living outside the single market who conclude a contract within the 
EU/EEC.3194 
                                                             
3185 MüKo/Martiny Art 46b EGBGB para 57. 
3186 See discussion above. 
3187 Stoffels AGB-Recht 81. 
3188 Palandt/Thorn Art 46b EGBGB para 3. 
3189 Palandt/Thorn Art 46b EGBGB para 3. 
3190 See MüKo/Martiny Art 46b EGBGB para 38 who shows some sympathy for this approach but finally does 
not adhere to it. 
3191 MüKo/Martiny Art 46b EGBGB para 51. 
3192 MüKo/Martiny Art 46b EGBGB para 55. 
3193 Staudinger/Magnus Art 46b EGBGB para 50. 
3194 Stoffels AGB-Recht 82. 
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cc) Legal consequences 
If the conditions of article 46b(1) EGBGB are fulfilled, the provisions for the implementation 
of the directives mentioned in article 46b(3) are applied to the contract in question. Article 
46b(1) therefore is a reference to domestic law.3195 This means that the provisions the given 
country has adopted by implementing the consumer protection directives apply directly. Hence, 
it is not necessary to assess further the conflict-of-law rules of this country.3196 
Article 46b(1) refers to 'the provisions of this particular state that have been adopted in 
implementation of the consumer protection directives'. If the contract shows a close connection 
to German law, §§ 305 et seq., 13 (consumer) and 14 (entrepreneur) are applicable. For all 
other areas not covered by these provisions, the chosen law of the other country is still 
applicable.3197 For instance, since the incorporation control of §§ 305(2), 305c(1) BGB offers 
a higher protection than the directives – which do not provide for incorporation control – the 
German provisions are considered  'provisions (…) that have been adopted in implementation 
of the consumer protection directives', and therefore apply under article 46b(1) EGBGB.3198 
Since the directives mentioned in article 46b(3) merely prescribe a minimum consumer 
protection standard, the question arises whether the reference to the law of the country showing 
a close connection also applies if it offers a higher standard than the directives. As long as the 
standard clause falls into the material scope of application of the directive, this should be the 
case.3199 On the other hand, if the directive offers higher protection, the standard of the directive 
should apply. Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive is no hindrance to this view.3200 
Contrary to article 6(2) 2nd sent. of Rome I, article 46b(1) EGBGB does not require a 
comparison as to which law is more favourable to the consumer. Such a 'favourability 
comparison' must be applied, however.3201 The said consumer protection directives merely 
require that the consumer must not lose its protection, but they do not allow for a deterioration 
of its situation. Hence, the law of the non-EU/EEC country must be compared with the law of 
the country with the closest connection to the contract. If the law of the EU/EEC country offers 
                                                             
3195 Sachnormverweisung. 
3196 Stoffels AGB-Recht 82. 
3197 Stoffels AGB-Recht 82. 
3198 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 83. 
3199 MüKo/Martiny Art 46b EGBGB para 75, Staudinger/Magnus Art 46b EGBGB para 53. 
3200 Stoffels AGB-Recht 83. 
3201 MüKo/Martiny Art 29a EGBGB para 81, Staudinger/Magnus Art 29a EGBGB para 54. 
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less protection than the law of the third country, the latter prevails.3202 Hence, if the law of a 
non-EU/EEC country prohibits an exclusion of liability also for minor negligence (meaning 
better consumer protection), § 309 no. 7 lit. b), which excludes only gross negligence, is not 
applicable.3203 
It is noteworthy that the law to which article 46b(1) refers does not apply if it widens the 
material scope of application of the given directive.3204 According to article 3(1) 5th indent of 
the Distance Sales Directive,3205 the Directive does not apply to contracts concluded at an 
auction. If such contracts are included in a law implementing the Directive, which is the case 
in §§ 312b to 312d BGB, the material scope of application of the Directive is widened. 
Therefore, these provisions cannot be applied by reference in terms of article 46b EGBGB, and 
the selected law is applicable.3206 
c)  Article 8 of the Rome-I Regulation – employment contracts 
According to § 310(4), German standard terms legislation is also applicable to employment 
contracts. Article 8(1) 2nd sent. of Rome I provides that for the selection of the applicable law, 
a comparison as to what law is more favourable for the consumer has to be undertaken. If the 
chosen law thus offers less protection than §§ 305 et seq., the German provisions apply, 
provided that they would have been applicable if no other law had been selected.3207 
Article 8(2) 1st sent. provides that to the extent that the parties have not chosen the law 
applicable to the individual employment contract, the contract shall be governed by the law of 
the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work 
in performance of the contract. It is irrelevant whether the employee temporarily works in 
another country (2nd sent.).3208 
Where the law applicable cannot be determined (which is the case, e.g., for flight attendants or 
lorry drivers), article 8(3) sets out that the contract shall be governed by the law of the country 
where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated.3209 
                                                             
3202 Stoffels AGB-Recht 83. 
3203 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 83. 
3204 Stoffels AGB-Recht 83. 
3205 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997. 
3206 Freitag/Leible EWS 2000, 344. 
3207 Stoffels AGB-Recht 84. 
3208 Stoffels AGB-Recht 84. 
3209 Stoffels AGB-Recht 84. 
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If a closer connection exists to another country than the country of employment, the law of that 
other country shall apply (article 8(4)).3210 
d)  Article 3(3) and (4) of the Rome-I Regulation 
If a contract has no connection to the chosen law, save the selection of this law itself, article 
3(3) of Rome I provides that the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of 
provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement. In 
other words, the ius cogens of the country with the closest connection applies. For such a close 
connection, it is sufficient that the contract has been concluded in this country, is executed 
there, or the head office or habitual residence of a party is located there.3211 
On the other hand, if there is a connection to one or several Member States, the choice of the 
law of a third country cannot override the mandatory provisions of the Member State under 
article 3(4) of Rome I. In this context, the phrase 'provisions which cannot be derogated from 
by agreement' also includes mandatory provisions contained in the directives themselves, 
although directives do not have a direct and mandatory effect between individuals.3212 
Since articles 6 of Rome I and 46b EGBGB already provide for protection with respect to 
consumer contracts and ensure better protection for consumers due to the favourability 
principle, article 3(3) has no practical significance for consumer contracts.3213 Article 3(3) of 
Rome I can nevertheless be relevant in B2B contracts and ensure the applicability of the 
mandatory provisions of §§ 305 et seq.3214 Pfeiffer opines though that the parties can choose to 
select a foreign law for contracts without any connection to this foreign law by an arbitration 
clause.3215 For consumer contracts, this possibility should have no relevance though. In any 
event, such clauses should be an unreasonable disadvantage for the consumer in terms of 
§ 307(1) because the costs involved for arbitration should be higher than the sum at stake. 
Example:  S, a producer of printing machines located in Heidelberg, sells a printing 
machine for B's business in Mainz. The contract is concluded in Heidelberg. 
Both companies are registered in Germany. The parties agree that the purchase 
price shall be transferred to S's account in a German bank. S's standard terms 
contain a clause by which the contract is subject to English law.  
                                                             
3210 Stoffels AGB-Recht 84. 
3211 Staudinger/Magnus Art 3 Rom-I-VO para 138, MüKo/Martiny Art 3 Rom-I-VO para 93. 
3212 Staudinger/Magnus Art 3 Rom-I-VO para 161. 
3213 Staudinger/Magnus Art 3 Rom-I-VO para 25, with further references. 
3214 Stoffels AGB-Recht 83. 
3215 Pfeiffer NJW 2012, 1169. 
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Since in this example the contract has no connection to English law (except for the choice-of-
law clause), §§ 305 et seq. are applicable in terms of article 3(3) of Rome I.3216 
3.2   Validity of choice-of-law clauses in standard business terms 
In international commercial relationships, it is common to insert a choice-of-law clause in 
standard terms according to which the law of a particular country shall govern the contract. 
Such clauses are often inserted unilaterally by one party, and not individually agreed. There is 
broad consensus today that such choice-of-law clauses are permissible.3217 
Hence, today, only the question under which conditions a choice-of-law clause in standard 
terms is valid under article 3(1) of Rome I is of interest.3218 
3.2.1   Choice-of-law clause as a separate agreement 
The choice-of-law clause is considered a separate agreement from the main agreement (e.g., 
the contract of sale).3219 Thus, both contracts have to be assessed separately in terms of their 
existence and validity. The choice-of-law agreement has understandably to be assessed first.3220 
The existence and validity of the choice-of-law agreement must be determined, according to 
articles 3(5)3221 and 10(1)3222 of the Rome-I Regulation, in terms of the legal order that the 
parties agreed upon in their contract.3223 If the parties agreed, for instance, that Spanish law 
should apply, the existence and validity of the choice-of-law clause must hence be determined 
according to Spanish law. 
It is unclear how the situation is to be dealt with where the standard terms of both parties contain 
different choice-of-law clauses. The prevailing view maintains that in these cases there is no 
consensus on the applicable law. Therefore, a scrutiny of the validity of a choice-of-law clause 
according to both legal systems is unnecessary.3224 According to another view, both choice-of-
                                                             
3216 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 85. 
3217 § 10 no. 8 AGBG provided that an agreement on the validity of foreign law is invalid, unless there is a 
reasonable interest for its validity. This prohibition was revoked in the course of the private international law 
reform of 1986, since it was not compatible with the principle of the free choice of law granted by art 3 of the 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (Rome Convention). 
3218 Stoffels AGB-Recht 86. 
3219 Kollisionsrechtlicher Verweisungsvertrag. 
3220 Stoffels AGB-Recht 86. 
3221 Article 3(5) of Rome I: 'The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to the choice of the 
applicable law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 13.' 
3222 Article 10(1) of Rome I: 'The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be 
determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.' 
3223 As to the similar provisions of art 27(4) and 31(1) EGBGB see BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1071 (1072). 
3224 MüKo/Spellenberg Art 10 Rom-I-VO para 69, Soergel/v. Hoffmann Art 31 EGBGB para 10. 
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law clauses have to be assessed in terms of their validity.3225 If the choice of law is invalid 
under both legal orders, no choice of law has been made. If only one choice-of-law clause is 
valid according to the law applicable in terms of that clause, the selected law applies. However, 
if both clauses are valid, there is no consensus in terms of article 3(1) of Rome I, and no choice 
of law has been validly made.3226 
Both views differ merely with respect to the situation where only one choice-of-law clause is 
valid. In the other situations, there is no valid choice-of-law clause according to both views. 
Since the invalidity of the underlying agreement itself (e.g., a contract of sale) is not affected 
in the case of an invalid choice-of-law clause, it is suggested that in situations where the parties' 
standard terms contain conflicting choice-of-law clauses, the provisions of article 4 of Rome I 
should apply. The parties should hence be treated as if no choice has been made. Article 4 of 
Rome I offers a well-balanced and reasonable solution in this regard. If the parties wish to 
avoid such a situation, they should put a clause in their agreement according to which in the 
case of conflicting choice-of-law clauses the underlying agreement is suspended until they have 
found an agreement as to which law shall apply. Whether such a 'protection clause',3227 that is 
common in order to find a solution in the case of differing standard terms in B2B contracts,3228 
is reasonable depends on the given case. In most cases, the parties might have no interest in 
suspending the main contract though and wish rather execute it. Hence, they should probably 
prefer the solution offered by article 4 of Rome I. 
3.2.2   Choice of German law 
If the choice-of-law clause determines the application of German law, §§ 305 et seq. apply. 
However, if the object of the contract is the international sale of goods for commercial use, the 
CISG3229 might apply. The CISG contains provisions that take precedence over national 
provisions on the incorporation of standard terms and therefore choice-of-law clauses.3230 
a) Incorporation 
Where German law applies pursuant to the choice-of-law clause, the standard terms have to be 
incorporated according to §§ 305(2), 305b and 305c(1).3231 A choice-of-law clause is not 
                                                             
3225 Meyer-Sparenberg RIW 1989, 347, 348, Schwenzer IPRax 1988, 86, 87, Sieg RIW 1997, 811, 817. 
3226 Stoffels AGB-Recht 87. 
3227 Abwehrklausel. 
3228 See discussion on conflicting standard business terms ('battle of forms') in ch 3 para 1.5. 
3229 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) (CISG). 
3230 Staudinger/Magnus Art 14 CISG para 40. The CISG will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3231 For the incorporation of standard business terms see ch 3. 
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surprising in terms of § 305c(1) if one of the parties is domiciled in Germany. If the supplier's 
standard terms stipulate that German law shall be applicable, this clause is not surprising vis-
à-vis a customer who resides abroad.3232 
It is debatable whether a choice-of-law clause has been validly incorporated if the foreign 
commercial customer does not react to a commercial letter of confirmation (kaufmännisches 
Bestätigungsschreiben) containing such a clause.3233 Under article 10(2) of Rome I,3234 the law 
of the country in which the other party has its habitual residence is also applicable if it appears 
from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of its conduct in 
accordance with the law specified in article 10(1). In other words, the silence of the customer 
does not imply acceptance of the choice-of-law clause if the law of its habitual residence does 
not apply similar principles with respect to a commercial letter of confirmation (e.g., in 
Austria),3235 and the customer has a legitimate interest to be protected because it could count 
on the applicability of the law of its habitual residence. This is regularly not the case if the 
negotiations took place in another country, or if in previous commercial relations with the 
supplier, German law was applicable.3236 Has the choice-of-law clause therefore not validly 
been incorporated, the applicable law is determined in terms of article 4 of Rome I (applicable 
law in the absence of choice).3237 
b) Validity 
If the pre-formulated choice-of-law clause has been validly incorporated into the contract, a 
content control under § 307 (general clause) will not take place.3238 Its validity has already been 
definitely confirmed by article 3(1) of Rome I, and an additional content control would 
undermine the Rome-I Regulation.3239 
                                                             
3232 WLP/Hau IntGV para 23, Staudinger/Magnus Art 3 Rom-I-VO para 176. 
3233 Such a commercial letter of confirmation is a custom of trade in Germany (i.e., not regulated by law). Offers 
made over the phone are confirmed by letter by one of the parties in order to have a proof of the agreement. If the 
recipient does not oppose itself against the content ('silence') of this letter, the agreement is concluded. See 
Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Bestätigungsschreiben'.  
3234 Article 10(2) of Rome I: 'Nevertheless, a party, in order to establish that he did not consent, may rely upon 
the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it appears from the circumstances that it would not 
be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1.' 
3235 See OLG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1993, 567 (568), OLG Munich IPRax 1991, 46 (49). 
3236 Staudinger/Hausmann Art 10 Rom-I-VO para 107 et seq. 
3237 Stoffels AGB-Recht 87. 
3238 WLP/Hau IntGV para 22, MüKo/Martiny (2007) Art 31 EGBGB para 23. 
3239 Stoffels AGB-Recht 88. 
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3.2.3   Reference to foreign law 
If the choice-of-law clause refers to foreign (i.e., not German) law, this law is applicable. In 
B2B contracts for the international sale of goods, the CISG has to be considered since this 
convention contains overriding rules as regards the incorporation of standard terms, which also 
concerns pre-formulated choice-of-law clauses.3240 
a) Incorporation 
Pursuant to articles 3(5) and 10(1) of Rome I, the incorporation of a choice-of-law clause is 
assessed by applying the foreign legal system to which the clause refers.3241 
As discussed above, under article 10(2) of Rome I, also the law of the consumer's habitual 
residence might apply in certain cases. In this regard, only those foreign provisions are 
applicable that concern the consent to the choice of law. For consumers in Germany, the 
provisions on incorporation set out in §§ 305(2) and 305c(1) are therefore applicable (if the 
conditions of article 10(2) of Rome I are met). Article 10(2) of Rome I requires that it must 
appear from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of the 
consumer's conduct in accordance with the determined law according to paragraph 1 of the 
same provision. This condition is regularly only met in international distance selling 
agreements where a law has been selected that the other party does and needs not to know.3242 
b) Validity 
Content control of the choice-of-law clause does not take place under the foreign law since the 
same principles as for a clause stipulating the application of German law apply.3243 
3.3   German standard business terms legislation and the CISG 
Contrary to Germany, South Africa is not a contracting State of United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). Despite this fact, a short overview of the 
implications of the CISG on B2B contracts should complete the discussion of this chapter. 
3.3.1   Scope of application of the CISG 
In B2B contracts for the international sale of goods, the CISG is to be considered. According 
to article 1(1) CISG, the Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are located in different countries. It is sufficient that the country whose law 
                                                             
3240 Staudinger/Magnus Art 14 CISG para 42. 
3241 BGH NJW 1994, 262. 
3242 Staudinger/Hausmann Art 10 Rom-I-VO para 107 et seq. 
3243 Stoffels AGB-Recht 89. See discussion above. 
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applies in terms of the choice-of-law clause is a contracting State of the CISG (article 1(1) 
lit. b) CISG), or that the places of business of both parties are located in countries that are both 
signatory of the CISG (article 1(1) lit. a) CISG).3244 
The CISG provisions take precedence over national law, but only to the extent that the CISG 
contains exhaustive provisions in the given area.3245 Questions concerning matters governed 
by this Convention which are not expressly regulated in it must be settled in conformity with 
the general principles on which the CISG is based or, in the absence of such principles, in 
conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law (article 
7(2) CISG). The law applicable under the rules of private international law is set out in articles 
3 and 4 of Rome I. 
The CISG governs only the formation of the contract and the extent of the parties' rights and 
obligations (article 4(1) CISG). This includes questions of liability and of proof.3246 
The national law thus provides for rules concerning the validity of the contract (including 
standard terms control),3247 capacity, representation, prescription and questions of 
ownership.3248 
3.3.2   Incorporation of standard terms according to the CISG 
Since articles 14 to 24 CISG contain exhaustive provisions for the formation of the contract, 
the application of the German incorporation provisions, such as § 305(2) is excluded.3249 
Hence, the conditions for the incorporation of standard terms are exclusively governed by the 
CISG.3250 The rules for the non-incorporation of surprising clauses must be determined by 
national law though since they concern the question of the validity of specific contract 
clauses.3251 
Since the CISG does not provide for any rules concerning the incorporation of pre-formulated 
contract clauses, article 14 et seq. CISG (formation of the contract) apply. Hence, the standard 
                                                             
3244 Stoffels AGB-Recht 89. 
3245 Staudinger/Magnus Before Art 1 et seq CISG para 1. 
3246 Staudinger/Magnus Art 4 CISG paras 41 and 63. 
3247 Articles 4 lit. a) and 5 CISG. 
3248 Article 4 lit. b) CISG. Stoffels AGB-Recht 90. 
3249 WLP/Hau IntGV para 72. 
3250 Staudinger/Magnus Art 14 CISG para 40, with further references. See also CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 (1) 
Inclusion of Standard Terms under the CISG, available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no13. 
3251 Staudinger/Magnus Art 14 CISG para 42. In this regard, see Eiselen Control of Unfair Standard Terms and 
CISG 166 and 169 et seq and Eiselen 2011 PELJ 3. See also CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 (1) Inclusion of Standard 
Terms under the CISG and Comment A3, available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no13. 
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terms must be part of an offer in the sense of article 14 CISG, which has to be assessed by 
applying the interpretation provision of article 8 CISG.3252 The other party (buyer) must have 
the occasion to take reasonable notice of the standard terms.3253 This is regularly the case where 
the supplier refers explicitly to its standard terms, and the latter are drawn up in a language the 
other party can understand.3254 Furthermore, the recipient must agree to the standard terms 
(article 18 CISG). Silence, e.g., concerning a commercial letter of confirmation, is not 
sufficient,3255 unless the parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed or by any 
practices which they have established between themselves.3256 
Article 19 CISG3257 contains rules for the incorporation of colliding standard terms. If the 
standard terms of one party do not materially alter the terms of the other party, the contract is 
concluded, whereby the standard terms of the offeree prevail. 
                                                             
3252 For the criteria of interpretation see BGH NJW 2002, 370 (371). Article 8 CISG: '(1) For the purposes of this 
Convention statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where 
the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was. (2) If the preceding paragraph is not 
applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding 
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances. (3) In 
determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is 
to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties 
have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.' 
3253 BGH NJW 2002, 370 (371). See also CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 (3) Inclusion of Standard Terms under the 
CISG, available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no13. 
3254 BGH NJW 2002, 370 (371), Staudinger/Magnus Art 14 CISG para 41, with further references. See also CISG-
AC Opinion No. 13 (6) Inclusion of Standard Terms under the CISG, available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-
opinion-no13. See also Eiselen 2011 PELJ 4 et seq (with further references) for the presentation of the three 
distinct approaches the courts have developed concerning the availability of standard terms: 1. Strict approach 
which requires that the standard terms must be made available to the other party at the time of contracting, Eiselen 
correctly argues (at 12) that this approach - that is stricter that the German domestic law - does neither correspond 
to domestic German nor to international commercial practice which generally accepts that the text of the standard 
terms will or should be available at the time of contracting. Besides, in the modern world with its various means 
of communication, the buyer can make enquiry about the standard terms or protest their inclusion at the time of 
contracting; it is not more difficult to do so in international trade than it is in a domestic contract (at 13). 2. 
Moderate approach according to which a clear reference to the inclusion of the terms is sufficient. 3. Lenient 
approach that allows the inclusion of the standard terms even after the conclusion of the agreement. Eiselen 
correctly argues that this approach is inacceptable since a party cannot add unilaterally additional terms to the 
contract after it has been concluded. If one party insisted on additional terms, this would amount to breach of 
contract (at 234). 
As to the language in which the standard terms are written, Eiselen legitimately asserts that it makes no practical 
difference if they are written in a language that the other party does not understand if the latter does not read them 
or require a copy of the standard terms; the language in which they are formulated becomes entirely immaterial 
then. The other party then obviously has no interest in obtaining the wording of the terms and has also not objected 
to their inclusion. Hence, it has made the impression that it has assented to the standard terms (at 16 and 17). What 
is more, it is submitted that in international sales, business people can be expected to be aware of the existence of 
standard terms and to require a translation in a language they understand. 
3255 Article 18(1) CISG: 'A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an 
acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.' 
3256 Article 9(1) CISG. Staudinger/Magnus Art 19 CISG para 26. 
3257 Article 19 CISG: '(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations 
or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer. (2) However, a reply to an offer 
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If the terms of both parties differ materially, which is a recurrent situation, two theories apply. 
According to one view, the alleged acceptance is considered a new offer which is accepted 
when the contract is executed (so-called 'last shot rule').3258 The other opinion argues that the 
contradicting standard terms neutralise each other and are replaced by the legal provisions 
('remaining validity solution').3259 
Although the second view corresponds to the solution presented above as regards colliding 
choice-of-law clauses, it is submitted that in the context of the CISG, article 19(1) contains a 
provision that excludes the application of the last shot rule (which is referred to as 'theory of 
the last word' applied by German courts). Article 19(1) CISG unmistakably provides that '[a] 
reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other 
modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter offer.' The fact that paragraph 
(2) contains the phrase 'which do not materially alter the terms to the offer' points out that 
paragraph (1) applies to situations where the terms materially differ from the terms of the other 
party. It is therefore suggested that the 'remaining validity solution' is contra legem.  
3.3.3   Content control 
Content control of standard business terms is a question of the 'validity of the contract or of 
any of its provisions' in terms of article 4 2nd sent. lit. a) CISG, for which the Convention does 
not provide any rules. Therefore, the national provisions that apply in terms of the private 
international law rules are applicable. Under articles 3 and 4 of Rome I, the content control set 
out in § 307 (general clause) applies if German law is applicable.3260 
3.3.4   Exclusion of the application of the CISG in standard terms 
Pursuant to article 6 CISG, the parties may exclude the application of the CISG or derogate 
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.3261 This provision expresses the principle of 
party autonomy which permits the parties to exclude the application of the CISG in whole or 
                                                             
which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the 
terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the 
discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of 
the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance. (3) Additional or different terms relating, among 
other things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one 
party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.' 
3258 The English term is also used in German law. MüKo HGB/Ferrari Art 19 CISG para 15, Karollus UN-
Kaufrecht 70 et seq. 
3259 Restgültigkeitslösung. Staudinger/Magnus Art 19 CISG para 20 et seq, with further references. 
3260 Stoffels AGB-Recht 91. 
3261 Staudinger/Magnus Art 6 CISG para 1. 
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in part at the time or after the conclusion of the agreement.3262 The parties can exclude the 
application of the CISG expressly or impliedly. If a contract contains a choice-of-law clause in 
favour of the law of a CISG country, the application of the CISG is not impliedly excluded.3263 
Hence, for the exclusion of the CISG, the insertion of an express clause is recommended.3264 
 
4.  Conclusion 
Since the definition of standard business terms of § 305(1) is very wide and includes all kinds 
of pre-formulated clauses, it is useful to keep the rationale of the provision in mind in order to 
restrict the application of § 305 et seq. to cases where the protective purpose of this provision 
is affected. The enquiry concerns the individual clauses of the given agreement, but not the 
contract as a whole. 
Standard terms are contract clauses which are intended to govern the contract. Hence, also non-
incorporated clauses or those who eventually do not become part of the contract are qualified 
as standard clauses. On the other hand, contracts of which the content has been established by 
law do not form part of the standard terms enquiry.  
As the protection of §§ 305 et seq. should not depend on random factors, the BGH applies these 
provisions by analogy to unilateral legal acts. Where the user makes a unilateral declaration to 
the consumer's detriment, e.g., by deviating from legal requirements, §§ 305 et seq. also apply. 
With regard to the qualification of bond terms for securities, the BGH correctly argues that 
§§ 305 et seq. are applied in a restricted and modified manner. The factual circumstances of 
the issuance and the idiosyncrasies of such terms speak for this view. 
For the qualification as pre-formulated standard terms, the actual content of the formulation is 
significant. Where the consumer has a real choice between several options, the clause cannot 
be qualified as pre-formulated. 
                                                             
3262 CISG-AC Opinion No. 16 (1) Exclusion of the CISG under Article 6, available at https://www.cisgac.com. 
3263 BGH NJW 1997, 3309 (3310); 1999, 1259 (1260); Staudinger/Magnus Art 6 CISG para 24, with further 
references. 
3264 Stoffels AGB-Recht 91. Pursuant to art 6 CISG, generally, a clear intent to exclude: (a) should be inferred, 
for example, from: (i) express exclusion of the CISG; (ii) choice of the law of a non-Contracting State; (iii) choice 
of an expressly specified domestic statute or code where that would otherwise be displaced by the CISG’s 
application. (b) should not be inferred merely from, for example: (i) the choice of the law of a Contracting State;  
(ii) choice of the law of a territorial unit of a Contracting State.  
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A clause is pre-formulated for a multitude of contracts (i.e., in at least three cases) if the user 
has such intention. In consumer contracts, the standard terms enquiry applies to pre-formulated 
contracts even if they are intended only for non-recurrent use on one occasion.  
By the condition of 'presentation' of contract terms, the legislator highlights their unilateral 
imposition by the user. Already an indirect imposition suffices. 
The use of a model contract drafted by the user's professional association or clauses stemming 
from a lawyer's contract sample are open to scrutiny in terms of §§ 305 et seq. Under § 310(3) 
no. 1, standard terms are deemed to have been presented by the entrepreneur, unless the 
consumer introduced them. In cases where both parties require independently from each other 
the application of the same standard terms, e.g., the VOB/B, §§ 305 et seq. are not applicable. 
The reason is that it is not possible to determine the parties' roles as user or other party.  
The irrelevant circumstances enumerated in § 305(1) 2nd sent. merely have a clarifying 
function. A negotiation in detail under § 305(1) 3rd sent. should be assumed where the parties 
are both able and willing to modify certain terms and finally decide not to change them because 
the user does not abuse its stronger position. The BGH applies a high standard for a 'negotiation 
in detail' (Aushandeln). § 305(1) 3rd sent. also applies to B2B contracts. A differentiated 
solution which considers the specific circumstances of B2B transactions should only be applied 
in cases where there is no need for protection of the commercial partner (e.g., in M&A 
agreements). 
§ 310(4) contains a number of exceptions from the scope of application. The legislator 
considered content control in terms of §§ 305 et seq. in the law of succession, family law and 
company law as unnecessary, inappropriate or incompatible. Content control according to 
§ 242 (good faith) remains possible, however. Since associations show some parallels with 
companies, the BGH also applies here a content control based on the bona fides principle. 
The scrutiny of employment contracts is not excluded from content control anymore, unlike 
collective agreements and private-sector work agreements or public-sector establishment 
agreements. In order to avoid an indirect content control of collective agreements, also clauses 
in employment contracts that refer to collective agreements are excluded from content control.  
Because of the special role of the VOB/B, which are strictly speaking standard terms, 
jurisprudence always treated them differently if they were applied as a whole because they 
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offer a fair balancing between the parties' interests due to negotiations of the various interest 
groups involved.  
As businesses and public entities do not have the same need for protection as individuals, a 
reduced protection standard is applied. The incorporation requirements, the prohibitions of 
§§ 308 and 309 or the extension of the international scope of application are therefore not 
applicable. The valuations of §§ 308 and 309 can be considered within § 307 though. 
The object of content control and the standard for the assessment of an unreasonable 
disadvantage are modified for consumer contracts (§ 310(3) no. 1 and 2). This provision is not 
limited to specific contract types so that consumption of the given item is not necessary, unlike 
for the Unfair Terms Directive. Employees are also regarded as consumers.  
Whether German clients can benefit from the high protection standard of §§ 305 et seq. in 
international contracts depends on the German private international law. The Rome-I 
Regulation offers an elaborate mechanism to identify the applicable law. It unifies the varying 
regimes of the Member States so that the courts within the EU must apply the same law. In this 
regard, the ECJ has developed guidelines for the Brussels I Regulation which might also be of 
assistance for Rome I, especially for e-commerce contracts. In terms of the favourability 
principle, the BGB consumer protection provisions only apply if they are more favourable to 
the consumer than the provisions of the selected law. 
Article 46b EGBGB transposes the conflict-of-law rules of the EU consumer protection 
directives into German law but is more extensive in that it applies to all consumer contracts. 
This provision is significant for choice-of-law clauses that provide that the law of a non-
member of the EU or the EEC shall be applicable. The provision also applies to consumers 
living outside the EU/EEC. 
Article 46b(1) EGBGB is a reference to domestic law. For all areas that are not covered by 'the 
provisions of this particular state that have been adopted in implementation of the consumer 
protection directives' the law that the parties have selected still applies under article 46b(1) 
EGBGB. If the directive offers higher protection than the selected law, the directive's standard 
should apply. Hence, a 'favourability comparison' between the law of the selected non-EU/EEC 
law and the law of the country with the closest connection to the contract is necessary in order 
to avoid a deterioration of the consumer's situation. Where the parties have chosen the 
application of a particular law for an employment contract, a comparison is also necessary 
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under article 8(2) 1st sent. of Rome I. Otherwise, the contract is generally governed by the law 
of the country in which or from which the employee habitually carries out his work in 
performance of the contract. If no connection to the selected law exists, except of the selection 
itself, Rome I provides that the ius cogens of the country with the closest connection shall 
apply. 
Where the standard terms of both parties contain contradicting choice-of-law clauses, article 4 
of Rome I should apply. This means that the parties should be treated in this case as if no choice 
has been made.  
If the parties selected the application of German law, the standard terms have to be incorporated 
into the contract. In B2B agreements, silence of the other party after reception of a commercial 
letter of confirmation does not imply acceptance of the choice-of-law clause if the law of the 
habitual residence of the other party does not have a similar mechanism for B2B relations. The 
validity of the choice-of-law clause is then determined by article 4 of Rome I. 
In terms of B2B contracts, the CISG provisions take precedence over national law to the extent 
that the CISG contains exhaustive provisions in the given area. The law applicable to the other 
areas has to be determined by the private international law. The conditions for the incorporation 
of standard terms are exclusively governed by the CISG, except for the rules for the non-
incorporation of surprising clauses since these concern the validity of the contract. Article 19 
CISG provides for rules concerning the incorporation of colliding standard terms. In this 
context, the 'last shot rule' should apply. Content control is governed by national legislation 
which has to be determined by the private international law rules, and not by the CISG. The 
parties can also expressly or impliedly exclude the application of the CISG. 
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CHAPTER 3 – INCORPORATION OF STANDARD TERMS INTO THE CONTRACT 
 
1. Incorporation agreement (§ 305(2)) or framework agreement (§ 305(3)) 
1.1   General remarks 
a) Content and purpose of § 305(2) 
Standard terms have, despite their often normative 'design' and their general purpose to regulate 
the legal relationship between the parties, no direct normative effect since they are no 'readily 
available legal order'3265 but 'contract terms' (§ 305(1) 1st sent.) that have been drafted by a 
party. Only if both parties agree on their application, they become part of the contract.3266 
§§ 305(2) and (3)3267 set out the minimal conditions for the use of standard terms in B2C 
contracts. In order to be valid, and except for paragraph (3) concerning framework agreements, 
the user must explicitly refer the other party to the standard terms and the other party must have 
the opportunity to take notice of their content. Both conditions must exist at the time of the 
conclusion of the agreement.3268 In addition, the other party must agree to their applying. 
With these provisions, the legislator aims to improve the protection of the user's clients as at 
the moment of the conclusion of the contract, both parties' wills must be concordant. This is 
only possible where the user discloses its standard terms and refers to them. Only then, the 
client is able to assess the scope of its declaration and protect itself against unfair conditions.3269 
On the other hand, the legislator was aware that too harsh conditions for the incorporation, 
especially for mass contracts, would be an obstacle for legal transactions.3270 Hence, too strict 
conditions for the incorporation which hamper the legitimate rationalising effect, for instance, 
must be avoided. When interpreting § 305(2) and (3), one has to ask the question of whether 
                                                             
3265 'Fertig bereitliegende Rechtsordnung' is a formulation often used by the courts. See, e.g., BGH NJW-RR 1997, 
1253. 
3266 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 27. 
3267 In terms of § 305(2), '[s]tandard business terms only become a part of a contract if the user, when entering 
into the contract, 1. refers the other party to the contract to them explicitly or, where explicit reference, due to the 
way in which the contract is entered into, is possible only with disproportionate difficulty, by posting a clearly 
visible notice at the place where the contract is entered into, and 2. gives the other party to the contract, in an 
acceptable manner, which also takes into reasonable account any physical handicap of the other party to the 
contract that is discernible to the user, the opportunity to take notice of their contents, and if the other party to the 
contract agrees to their applying.' § 305(3) provides that '[t]he parties to the contract may, while complying with 
the requirements set out in subsection (2) above, agree in advance that specific standard business terms are to 
govern a specific type of legal transaction.'  
3268 Stoffels AGB-Recht 94. 
3269 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 17. 
3270 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 13 and 17. 
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the conditions for the incorporation are reasonably justified in terms of customer protection.3271 
For certain contracts, a 'functional reduction' of § 305(2) must thus take place.3272 
Contrary to the German regime, the South African legislator chose to apply similar 
incorporation requirements only for notices to consumers limiting the supplier's risk or liability, 
for instance.3273 These incorporation requirements3274 do therefore not apply in a general 
manner to South African terms and conditions. The given notice must be drawn to the attention 
of the consumer in a manner and form that satisfies certain formal requirements, i.e., the notice 
must be written in plain language and the fact, nature and effect of the notice must be drawn to 
the attention of the consumer in a conspicuous manner and form. Furthermore, the consumer 
must be given an adequate opportunity to receive and comprehend the provision or notice.3275  
b) Relation between § 305(2) and general contract law 
The incorporation of standard terms must be seen against the backdrop of the general 
provisions for contracts contained in the BGB. Hence, § 305(2) presumes the application of 
§§ 104 to 185 on legal transactions and contains only some small modifications. The fact that 
the user has to refer the other party explicitly to the standard terms in terms of § 305(2) no. 1 
excludes the consideration of the surrounding circumstances of the conclusion of the agreement 
when assessing the incorporation of standard terms. It is thus not possible to assume, according 
to §§ 1333276 and 157,3277 that the other party agreed to the incorporation of the standard terms 
by the mere fact that it agreed to the conclusion of the contract because the intent to conclude 
a contract must include the incorporation of the given terms.3278 What is more, the minimal 
conditions for the conclusion of a contract under § 145 et seq. are modified in that it is not 
sufficient that the other party agrees to the application of certain terms without being informed 
                                                             
3271 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 102 argues that a cautious interpretation closely related to the general 
contract law of the BGB is therefore necessary. 
3272 The BGH decided that for bond terms for securities a modified application of the standard business terms 
legislation is necessary in order to ensure a functional trading of securities (BGH NJW 2005, 2917). This presumes 
a standardised content of securities. If the content of a securitised right would depend on the circumstances of 
their acquisition, their transferability would not be possible. An implied incorporation of bond terms is therefore 
sufficient. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 42. Ekkenga ZHR 160 (1996) 59 et seq argues that the unrestricted application 
of §§ 305 et seq BGB for bond terms is not possible because standard business terms legislation falls short of the 
factual circumstances of the issuance of bonds and that bond terms cannot be assessed for the lack of a normative 
control standard. In addition, the assessment of standard terms does not consider the collective relations of the 
market. 
3273 See s 49(1) in conjunction with subsection (3) to (5) CPA. 
3274 As regards the incorporation requirements in South African law, see Part I ch 2 paras 3 and 4. 
3275 See s 49 CPA. 
3276 § 133 concerns the interpretation of a declaration of intent. 
3277 § 157 concerns the interpretation of contracts. 
3278 Stoffels AGB-Recht 95. 
 555   
 
of their content beforehand. Thus, the legislator imposes in § 305(2) no. 2 that the user gives 
the other party the opportunity to take notice of their content.3279 
c) Incorporation within the order of assessment of standard terms 
The incorporation control takes place after the enquiry of the scope of application of §§ 305 et 
seq., and before the actual content control. First, the positive minimal standards of §§ 305(2) 
and (3) have to be assessed before the negative incorporation conditions of § 305c(1) 
(surprising and ambiguous clauses) and § 305b (priority of individually agreed terms) are 
examined. The courts can deviate from this logical order if procedural economy requires so.3280 
If, for instance, a standard clause obviously infringes one or several provisions set out in §§ 308 
or 309, it would be idle to undergo a lengthy discussion on its incorporation. In institutional 
actions, this issue does not exist since there, the manner in which the individual contract has 
been concluded is irrelevant.3281 
1.2   Incorporation agreement 
The incorporation conditions for standard clauses under § 305(2) applies to all kinds of 
standard terms3282 and have to be fulfilled cumulatively.3283 Despite this fact, the BGH is of the 
view that in form contracts,3284 the customer's signature at the end of an agreement includes his 
or her agreement to the contract as a whole.3285 Since the AGBG came into force, it is generally 
accepted however that also form contracts contain standard clauses and therefore have to be 
assessed in terms of §§ 305 et seq.3286 The BGH's view according to which this provision does 
not apply to form contracts must thus be dismissed. The argument that the standard clauses are 
already integrated into the contract, that therefore the customer has the opportunity to take 
notice of their contents, and that he or she agrees to them by signing the contract is not sufficient 
for a non-application of § 305(2) to form contracts.3287 What is more, only the application of 
                                                             
3279 Stoffels AGB-Recht 96. 
3280 Von Hoyningen-Huene Inhaltskontrolle § 9 AGBG para 73. See also BGH NJW 1989. 222 (223). 
3281 Stoffels AGB-Recht 96. 
3282 Stoffels AGB-Recht 96. 
3283 Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 251. 
3284 Form contracts are pre-formulated contracts, irrespective of whether all parts of the contract, the main 
obligations or merely ancillary agreements are pre-formulated. Typical form contracts are rental agreements of 
housing companies, agreements for the purchase or hire of vehicles, brokerage agreements, distant learning 
contracts or distribution agreements. See UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 66 and Creifelds 
Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Vertrag' (2). 
3285 See BGH NJW 1988, 2465 (2466 et seq); 1995, 190. See also UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 102.  
3286 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 66. 
3287 Stoffels AGB-Recht 96. 
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§ 305(2) affords the possibility of a transparency control. Besides, the BGH's view requires to 
apply (the presumably inapplicable) § 305(2) fractionally and inconsistently.3288 
By the explicit reference to standard terms and the opportunity to take notice of them in an 
acceptable manner, the legislator wants to exclude that standard clauses are foisted on the 
consumer.3289 This risk also exists for form contracts after all. 
a) Reference to standard terms 
aa)  Explicit reference 
In general, in terms of § 305(2) no. 1, the user has to refer the other party to its standard terms 
explicitly.3290 By this 'formalisation'3291 of the incorporation of the terms, a different 
interpretation of what the user has declared vis-à-vis the consumer is excluded. A reference 
that is not explicit thus has no legal meaning. The rationale of such an explicit reference is that 
the consumer should be informed that the user's standard terms will significantly govern the 
contract and that he or she has the opportunity to take notice of them.3292 
The user's reference to its standard terms is only explicit if it is unequivocal and clearly 
understandable for the consumer, regardless of whether it is oral or written.3293 The reference 
must be related to specific standard terms. If the user has several versions of standard terms in 
circulation, it must individualise the ones that are valid vis-à-vis the consumer, for instance by 
handing out a copy.3294 If it is not clear which standard terms should apply, the contract comes 
into force without any standard provisions. In any event, the consumer cannot be expected to 
'interpret' which standard clauses should apply.3295 
When the contract is concluded orally or by phone, which is regarded as a conclusion between 
persons that are present in terms of § 147(1),3296 the user generally has to refer orally to its 
standard terms. In order to ensure a smooth transaction, one should not place too many 
                                                             
3288 Heinrichs NJW 1995, 1396. 
3289 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 28. 
3290 Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 252, Brox and Walker BGB-AT 110. 
3291 Also the BGH refers to a 'formalisation' of the incorporation of standard terms in BGH NJW-RR 1987, 112. 
This formalisation is no formal requirement in the sense of § 125 (voidness resulting from a defect of form) 
though, which is the view of Schlosser in Staudinger/Schlosser (2006) § 305 para 102. The formalisation in terms 
of § 305(2) does not require a certain form, as also an oral reference suffices, but merely intensifies the meaning 
of it. In addition, the legal consequences of a violation of this incorporation requirement is set out in § 306, and 
not in § 125. See WHL/Wolf § 2 AGBG para 1. 
3292 BGH WM 1986, 1194 (1196). 
3293 BGH WM 1986, 1194 (1196). 
3294 WHL/Wolf § 2 AGBG para 8. 
3295 Stoffels AGB-Recht 97. 
3296 § 147(1): 'An offer made to a person who is present may only be accepted immediately. This also applies to 
an offer made by one person to another using a telephone or another technical facility.' See Schmidt BGB-AT 419. 
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obstacles in this regard. A 'gesture' of the user by which the other party can clearly understand 
that the standard terms should apply, is sufficient. This applies, for example, where the user 
personally hands over its standard terms to its client. It is however not sufficient that the 
standard terms are posted in the user's premises.3297 In the case of a written contract, the explicit 
reference to the standard clauses must be included in the offer. This is the case, e.g., where on 
the front page, above the field where the place, date and signature must be filled in, the sentence 
'The standard terms printed on the back of this page apply' is inserted.3298 On the other hand, it 
would not be sufficient to print the standard terms on the back of the page without any reference 
on the front page.3299 If the agreement is concluded via the internet, the order form or the screen 
page before must contain a clearly visible reference so that the client can see it even when 
superficially reading the page. This can be done either by linking the standard terms text with 
the offer or by an unambiguous reference at a place that the customer has to pass in order to 
conclude the contract.3300 Also in other contracts that are concluded between persons that are 
absent in terms of § 147(2),3301 the user must ensure that the other party can take notice of its 
standard terms, e.g., by sending them by post.3302 
bb)  Reference by posting a notice 
§ 305(2) no. 1 2nd var. makes an exception from the explicit reference where this is possible 
only with disproportionate difficulty. In this case, the user is allowed to post a clearly visible 
notice at the place where the contract is entered into.3303 The legislator inserted this possibility 
for every-day transactions where the application of standard terms is to be expected, and where 
an explicit reference would be an obstacle or simply not possible,3304 for instance, in mass 
contracts that are often concluded in an implied and automated manner without any personal 
contact3305 (e.g., the use of a deposit box at the train station by inserting a coin).3306 Also for 
every-day transactions that do not have any significant monetary value, where an explicit 
reference would be possible but an obstacle for a smooth transaction, the exception of § 305(2) 
                                                             
3297 WHL/Wolf § 2 AGBG para 8. 
3298 BGH NJW-RR 1987, 112. 
3299 BGH NJW-RR 1987, 112, UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 129. 
3300 OLG Hamburg WM 2003, 581 (583). 
3301 § 147(2): 'An offer made to a person who is absent may be accepted only until the time when the offeror may 
expect to receive the answer under ordinary circumstances.' 
3302 Schmidt BGB-AT 419. 
3303 Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 252. 
3304 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 18. 
3305 Palandt/Heinrichs § 305 para 29. 
3306 LG Essen VersR 1995, 955. 
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no. 1 2nd var. applies3307 (e.g., public swimming-pools or car-wash facilities).3308 Apart from 
that, the circumstances of the conclusion of the contract must be considered. Hence, the BGH 
accepted the reference to auction conditions by their posting at the premises where the auction 
took place.3309 
The posting of the notice is only clearly visible if the client can see it without further ado.3310 
This presumes a certain visual design and the posting at a visible place.3311 The post merely 
has to replace the explicit reference to the standard terms, and does not need to contain them.3312 
It is hence sufficient to post the following notice at the entrance of a car-wash facility in a 
clearly visible manner: 'Our standard business terms apply to all our contracts. These are 
available at the till booth'.3313 
b) Opportunity to take notice in an acceptable manner 
In terms of § 305(2) no. 2, the standard terms user must give the other party, in an acceptable 
manner, the opportunity to take notice of their contents. This obligation goes beyond the 
general principles of the contract law set out in the BGB.3314 In any event, the entire standard 
provisions must be made available to the client at the latest when concluding the contract. It is 
not relevant whether the latter actually takes notice of them or not.3315 
If the parties are both present when concluding the agreement, it is generally accepted that the 
user submits its standard terms to the client or offers at least their submission.3316 Stoffels 
legitimately averts that this interpretation is not mandatory and might create an unnecessary 
obstacle for a smooth transaction.3317 The client is already aware of the existence of the user's 
standard terms by the user's explicit reference to them or by the clearly visible posting of the 
notice on the user's premises. These circumstances show the user's readiness to make the 
standard terms available to the customer, and the client can thus be expected to ask for a copy. 
                                                             
3307 BGH NJW 1985, 850, UBH/Ulmer § 305 para 139. 
3308 OLG Hamburg DAR 1984, 260 (261). 
3309 BGH NJW 1985, 850. 
3310 Stoffels AGB-Recht 99.  
3311 See discussion on plain and understandable language in Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a). 
3312 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 142. 
3313 Stoffels AGB-Recht 99. 
3314 Stoffels AGB-Recht 99. 
3315 Stoffels AGB-Recht 99. 
3316 BGH NJW 1990, 715 et seq, Staudinger/Schlosser (2006) § 305 para 145. 
3317 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 148. 
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The courts are stricter in this regard though and require that the VOB/B be issued to the other 
party in order to achieve their incorporation in the contract.3318 
For contracts that are concluded in writing, and where the parties are not both present when 
entering into the contract, the standard terms must be sent to the other party so that it can take 
notice of their contents. This can be done simultaneously with the offer. It should be sufficient 
if the customer is in possession of the supplier's catalogue or prospectus that contains the user's 
standard terms.3319 It does not suffice though if the standard terms are available on the user's 
premises although the conclusion of the agreement takes places elsewhere.3320 The same 
applies to the user's notice that its standard terms can be purchased in a bookshop.3321 
The incorporation of standard terms in contracts concluded over the phone causes some 
problems. This applies above all for teleshopping where products are offered on television, the 
client has to contact a call centre to order them and pays by credit card. It would obviously not 
be practical to show the standard terms on the TV screen or to read them to the customer. 
Therefore, one should not be too strict so that the incorporation requirements do not hamper 
the conclusion of a contract. It is thus sufficient if the supplier's representative explicitly refers 
to the incorporation of the standard terms and offers their transmission. If the client does not 
want to wait with the conclusion of the contract until he or she receives the standard terms, this 
can be seen as a renunciation of the opportunity to take notice of their content.3322 
If the contract is concluded via the internet, the standard terms are incorporated into the contract 
if the client can consult them by clicking on a link on the order page and print them out, if 
necessary.3323 
For foreigners that are not able to understand standard terms written in German (although they 
might speak German), one has to distinguish between several cases. If the language of the 
contract is not German, the standard terms and the reference (notice) must also be drafted in 
this language too.3324 On the other hand, if the parties chose German as their language for the 
contract, the client accepts German as the contract language and the language in which the 
                                                             
3318 BGH NJW 1990, 715 et seq, NJW-RR 1999, 1246 (1247). VOB/B = Construction Tendering and Contract 
Regulations, Part B. 
3319 Staudinger/Schlosser (2006) § 305 para 145, UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 147. 
3320 OLG Saarbrücken NJW-RR 2001, 993 (994). 
3321 Faust BGB-AT 109. 
3322 UBH/Habersack § 305 para 149a. 
3323 BGH NJW 2006, 2976 (2977). 
3324 OLG Frankfurt/M. NJW-RR 2003, 704, PWW/Berger § 305 para 30. 
 560   
 
standard terms are drafted. If necessary, the customer must obtain a translation of its own.3325 
For transactions that have significant implications, the transparency requirement of the EU3326 
is only satisfied though if the standard terms are drafted in the client's language.3327 
Moreover, the other party must have the opportunity to take notice of the contents of the 
standard terms in an acceptable manner. This means that an average customer must be able to 
understand the standard terms. They must be presented in a clear manner and have a volume in 
proportion to the significance of the transaction, which is an aspect of the transparency 
requirement.3328 This is regularly not the case where the reading of standard terms is only 
possible by using a magnifying glass because of their typographical design (e.g., font size).3329 
Transparency further requires that the user does not use technical terms that make the 
understanding of the standard terms difficult.3330 It is arguable if the requirement of 'an 
acceptable manner' is fulfilled if the standard terms refer to another instrument. Although it is 
possible to refer to other, general provisions, the user must ensure that its clients are able to 
take notice of all relevant contractual conditions. Hence, a simple reference to other conditions 
that are not contained in the submitted standard terms is not sufficient with respect to their 
incorporation into the contract.3331 
The merely 'clarifying addition'3332 of the standard of reasonableness, according to which the 
user must also take into reasonable account any physical handicap of the other party that is 
discernible to the user, applies above all to the visually impaired. Where the user discerns that 
its client is visually impaired, e.g., because he or she is wearing a yellow armband, the user 
must offer a visual aid, suggest reading the standard terms loudly or offer a version in embossed 
printing or braille.3333 This provision has been inserted in the context of the modernisation of 
the law of obligations and aims to help people with handicaps to conclude transactions by 
themselves. In order to avoid that suppliers simply avoid transactions with disabled 
customers,3334 one should construe this provision restrictively. The fact that the 'discernibility' 
                                                             
3325 BGH NJW 1983, 1489. See also Schäfer JZ 2003, 879 et seq. 
3326 Articles 4(2) and 5 of the Unfair Terms Directive. See Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 26, with further 
references. 
3327 Palandt/Heinrichs § 305 para 40, Stoffels AGB-Recht 100. 
3328 OLG Schleswig NJW 1995, 2858 (2859). 
3329 Stoffels AGB-Recht 100. See discussion on the plain language requirement of s 22, Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a). 
3330 Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 254. 
3331 BGH NJW 2005, 1183 (1184 et seq); 1990, 3197. See also discussion on the plain and understandable language 
requirement in Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a). 
3332 This is at least the legislator's view. See BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 150. 
3333 Stoffels AGB-Recht 101. 
3334 Stoffels AGB-Recht 101. 
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and the 'reasonability' were inserted consciously in order to avoid excessive requirements 
speaks for this view.3335 Hence, the concrete circumstances of the situation must be considered. 
It is nonetheless deplorable that the legislator did not include illiterate persons and those who 
are not able to understand German, although these questions are largely discussed in German 
society (e.g., in the context of a better inclusion of disabled children in schools).3336 An 
application of this provision by analogy is unfortunately not possible because physical, mental 
or intellectual deficits cannot be regarded as being equal.3337 
c) Relevant moment 
The conditions set out in § 305(2) no. 1 and 2 must be met at the moment when the contract is 
concluded. This means that the user must explicitly refer to its standard terms when making a 
binding offer (no. 1), and the client must have had the opportunity to take notice of their content 
before accepting the offer (no. 2).3338 This is not the case where the notice is only printed on 
the invoice which has been sent to the client after the conclusion of the contract.3339 On the 
other hand, a transaction should not be artificially fragmented so that it is sufficient to hand 
over the vendor's standard terms at the till, together with the relevant invoice.3340 In this context, 
it is of importance that the client had the opportunity to take notice of the standard terms before 
concluding the agreement. If he or she decides not to read them, the standard terms are 
incorporated into the contract nonetheless. The same applies to tickets on which the standard 
terms are printed. This is sufficient if the front page contains a corresponding reference.3341 
If the previously mentioned conditions are not met, the standard terms are not incorporated into 
the contract.3342 Amended or subsequently valid standard terms must also fulfil the 
incorporation requirements of § 305(2).3343 Hence, amended standard provisions are valid if 
the supplier sends them to the client, and the latter continues the commercial relationship and 
                                                             
3335 See BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 52. 
3336 See, for instance, 'Inklusion ist keine Utopie' at http://www.spiegel.de/lebenundlernen/schule/inklusion-
warum-behinderte-kinder-regelschulen-besuchen-sollten-a-979079.html. 
3337 Palandt/Heinrichs § 305 para 38. Graf von Westphalen NJW 2002, 13 recommends an application by analogy 
for foreigners that are not able to understand German, and AnwK-Schuldrecht-Hennrichs § 305 para 11 argues in 
favour of an application for illiterate persons. For the above-mentioned reason, these views go too far though. 
3338 Locher Recht der AGB 43. 
3339 See BGH NJW 1978, 2243. 
3340 OLG Hamm NJW-RR 1998, 199 (200). 
3341 MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 78, WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 77, Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 121, 
Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 28. See discussion on the so-called 'ticket cases' in Part I ch 2 para 4 d). 
3342 Stoffels AGB-Recht 102. 
3343 See KG NJW-RR 1994, 1265. UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 164. 
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thus impliedly agrees to the new standard terms.3344 Many standard terms already contain a 
clause in respect to the right of their modification.3345 
It is noteworthy that a notice during a previous conclusion of an agreement is not sufficient 
because standard terms users must refer to them every time they conclude a new contract.3346 
This also applies to current business relationships. The only exceptions are agreements 
concluded in advance under § 305(3) and subsequent and inter-related deliveries within a 
successive delivery agreement.3347 
d) Agreement to the applying of the standard terms by the client 
§ 305(2) in fine provides that the other party must agree to the applying of the standard 
terms.3348 This is merely a clarification of the requirement of consensus set out in §§ 145 et 
seq.3349 The client's consent does not need to be proved for every single clause. It is thus 
sufficient that it covers the contract as a whole.3350 If the contract is concluded via the internet, 
it is sufficient if the customer agrees to the standard terms by ticking an 'OK-box' after having 
had access to the terms ('click-wrap').3351 A 'browse-wrap', i.e., a notice by which the user 
agrees to the standard terms by simply using the given site, is not sufficient though.3352 As long 
as there is no requirement for a specific form, the agreement can be also impliedly expressed. 
A client who enters a car-wash facility with a clearly visible sign at the entrance on which the 
supplier's liability is restricted or excluded impliedly agrees to the provider's standard terms by 
entering the facility.3353 
                                                             
3344 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 164, Locher Recht der AGB 51. 
3345 A clause by which the user reserves the right to amend its standard terms without restriction also for existing 
contracts is disadvantageous for the other party and therefore ineffective. This also applies if the terms are drafted 
by a third party, e.g., the Construction Tendering and Contract Regulations (VOB) (Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 
para 173, Palandt/Heinrichs § 305 para 47). This is also applicable for so-called 'dynamic references' such as 'the 
standard business terms in their currently valid version apply' (Locher Recht der AGB 50). Schlosser is of the view 
that this clause refers to the standard terms that are valid at the moment of the conclusion of the contract, and not 
to subsequent versions. Because of the ambiguous formulation, this view must be dismissed though 
(Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 173). On the other hand, standard terms of banks pursuant to which the 
amendment becomes valid unless the client does not disagree within 6 weeks, and where the customer is informed 
of this possibility, are valid (UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 165). 
3346 Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 159; BGH NJW-RR 1987, 112 (113). 
3347 Locher Recht der AGB 43 et seq. 
3348 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 111. 
3349 Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 159. 
3350 Stoffels AGB-Recht 103. 
3351 Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 166. 
3352 Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 166. 
3353 BGH NJW 1982, 1388 (1389), Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 161, Belke JA 1988, 479. 
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On the other hand, the silence of a non-commercial client after reception of an order 
confirmation in which reference is made to standard terms for the first time is no consent.3354 
If the customer accepts the delivery without reservation afterwards, he or she impliedly agrees 
to the standard terms though, provided that the confirmation fulfils the conditions of § 305(2) 
no. 1 and 2, the standard terms are enclosed to the order confirmation and the client can be 
expected to disagree to their applying, if necessary.3355 
e) Questions of proof 
The burden of proof as to whether the conditions of § 305(2) are met has the party who invokes 
the incorporation of the given standard terms, i.e., usually the supplier.3356 Problems often arise 
where the contract has been concluded over the phone. The supplier's instruction to his or her 
staff to refer systematically to the standard terms or to make them available is regularly not 
sufficient to prove their incorporation.3357 A clause by which the customer confirms that he has 
taken notice of the terms and declares that he agrees to their application is ineffective in terms 
of § 309 no. 12.3358  
1.3  Incorporation under facilitated conditions 
a) Exceptions under § 305a 
Under § 305a,3359 certain standard terms may become part of the contract even though they 
have not been incorporated according to the requirements set out in § 305(2), provided they 
meet the requirements of § 305a. This exemption does however not relieve the user from the 
fact that its counterpart must give its consent to the application of the given standard provisions 
                                                             
3354 BGHZ 18, 212 (215), MüKo/Kramer § 150 para 9. 
3355 BGH NJW 1963, 1248, BGHZ 18, 212 (215), MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 84. 
3356 BGH NJW 1991, 1750 (1753). 
3357 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 167. 
3358 Stoffels AGB-Recht 104. § 309 no. 12: '[A] provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party to the contract, in particular by a) imposing on the latter the burden of proof for 
circumstances lying in the sphere of responsibility of the user, or b) having the other party to the contract confirm 
certain facts (…)' is ineffective. See also discussion on s 51(1)(g)(ii) and reg 44(3)(w) CPA in Part I ch 3. 
3359 § 305a: 'Even without compliance with the requirements cited in [§] 305 (2) no. 1 and 2, if the other party to 
the contract agrees to their applying the following are incorporated, 1. the tariffs and regulations of the railways 
issued with the approval of the competent transport authority or on the basis of international conventions, and the 
terms of transport approved under the Passenger Transport Act [Personenbeförderungsgesetz], of trams, trolley 
buses and motor vehicles in regular public transport services, 2. the standard business terms published in the 
gazette of the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway 
[Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen] and kept available on the 
business premises of the user, a) into transport contracts entered into off business premises by the posting of items 
in postboxes, b) into contracts on telecommunications, information services and other services that are provided 
direct by the use of distance communication and at one time and without interruption during the supply of a 
telecommunications service, if it is disproportionately difficult to make the standard business terms available to 
the other party before the contract is entered into.'  
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in terms of § 145 et seq. ('if the other party to the contract agrees to their applying')3360 The 
other party can give its consent also impliedly, e.g., by accepting the supplier's delivery in the 
knowledge of its standard terms.3361 The following are examples of these exceptions. 
aa) Tariffs and regulations of regular passenger transportation services 
For the transportation of passengers against a remuneration or in the context of a business by 
means of tramways, busses or motor vehicles, the provision of the Passenger Transport Act,3362 
read with the regulation for the general conditions for the transportation with tramways, buses 
and regular services with motor vehicles3363 that was enacted in terms of § 57(1) no. 5 
PBefG,3364 are applicable. The regulation mentioned above has normative character, so that 
§§ 305 et seq. are not applicable.3365 Transportation companies can introduce particular 
conditions deviating from the general conditions with official approval in terms of § 39(6) 
PBefG, which fall under §§ 305 et seq. though. 
For these particular conditions, § 305a no. 1 provides for facilitated incorporation which 
concerns the tariffs and regulations of the railways issued with the approval of the competent 
transport authority. This means that § 305(2) no. 1 and 2 do not apply in these cases. On the 
other hand, the parties still have to agree on the validity of these conditions, even impliedly, 
because only the incorporation of the terms has been facilitated.3366  
The rationale behind this facilitated incorporation is that the previously mentioned tariffs and 
regulations are published in official gazettes, and that therefore the strict incorporation 
conditions of § 305(2) are not necessary for the protection of the other party to the contract.3367 
bb) Standard terms for the posting of items 
§ 305a no. 2 lit. a) provides for facilitated incorporation for transport contracts of the Deutsche 
Post AG and its competitors if the contracts have been concluded by posting items in post-
boxes (i.e., the delivery of letters, parcels etc.). The given standard terms must have been 
published in the gazette of the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
                                                             
3360 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 30, Stoffels AGB-Recht 104. 
3361 Graf von Westphalen NJW 2002, 14 et seq. 
3362 Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG). 
3363 Verordnung über die Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen für den Straßenbahn- und Obusverkehr sowie 
den Linienverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen of 27/02/1970, BGBl. I at 230. 
3364 PBefG = Personenbeförderungsgesetz (Passenger Transportation Act). 
3365 Stoffels AGB-Recht 105. 
3366 Stoffels AGB-Recht 105. 
3367 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 42. See also BGH NJW 1981, 569. 
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Telecommunications, Post and Railway3368 and kept available on the business premises of the 
user. The rationale of this provision is that the user of these standard terms is not able to refer 
to them and give the other party the opportunity to take notice each time it delivers an item. On 
the other hand, if a customer posts an item at the post office counter, § 305(2) still applies.3369 
In addition, the rights and obligations of providers of postal services and their final customers 
are normatively regulated in the Post Service Regulation.3370 Agreements deviating from this 
regulation to the client's disadvantage are void in terms of § 1(2) of the regulation.3371 
cc) Standard terms for certain telecommunication services 
§ 305a no. 2 lit. b) also refers to the manner in which the contract is concluded ('by the use of 
distance communication'). This provision is applicable for contracts on telecommunications, 
information services and other services that are concluded directly by means of distance 
communication3372 and simultaneously during the supply of a telecommunications service. 
This applies to so-called 'call-by-call' services and contracts on 'added-value and information 
services'.3373 'Added-value services' are special prefix numbers (e.g., 0900 for entertainment 
with or without adult content),3374 whereas information services are, e.g., directory enquiries. 
As is practically impossible to require that the conditions of § 305(2) be fulfilled in these cases, 
the incorporation of the given standard terms is facilitated.3375 It is important to note that § 305a 
no. 2 lit. b) does not apply to contracts for services concluded over the phone that are fulfilled 
only after termination of the call, e.g., the sending of a telegram.3376 
b) Incorporation of standard terms in B2B contracts 
In terms of § 310(1) 1st sent., the conditions set out in § 305(2) are not applicable to standard 
terms which are used in contracts with an entrepreneur, a legal person under public law or a 
special fund under public law. Instead, the laxer rules of the BGB governing the conclusion of 
a contract apply.3377 As discussed above, consent between the parties on the agreement and the 
                                                             
3368 Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen. 
3369 Stoffels AGB-Recht 106. 
3370 Postdienstleistungsverordnung (PDLV) of 21/08/2001, BGBl. I at 2178. 
3371 Stoffels AGB-Recht 106. 
3372 These are defined in § 312b(2): 'Means of distance communication within the meaning of this Code are all 
means of communication which can be used to initiate or to conclude a contract, without requiring the 
simultaneous physical presence of the parties to the contract, such as letters, catalogues, telephone calls, faxes, 
emails, text messages sent via the mobile telephone service (SMS) as well as messages broadcast and sent via 
teleservices.'  
3373 BT-Drs. 14/1640 at 153. 
3374 See '0900: Von sinnvoll bis Abzocke' at https://www.teltarif.de/i/sonderrufnummern-0900.html. 
3375 Stoffels AGB-Recht 106. 
3376 Graf von Westphalen NJW 2002, 16. 
3377 Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 166. See §§ 145 et seq BGB. 
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standard terms is still necessary, which can also be given impliedly.3378 Such an implied 
consent exists, e.g., where the parties maintain an ongoing business relationship for which 
always the same standard terms were used, and where the user has made it unambiguously 
clear that it regularly undertakes transactions only on the basis of its standard terms.3379 
It is generally accepted that where a custom of trade3380 exists according to which specific 
standard terms apply, these apply if the user's offer includes the standard terms, even if it does 
not expressly refer to them. The other party, who must be familiar with the customs of the given 
branch, must therefore expressly object to them if it wants to exclude their application.3381 
Generally, the courts are very hesitant to recognise certain practices as customs of trade.3382 
Standard terms in the previously mentioned situations are also incorporated where the recipient 
does not respond to a commercial letter of confirmation.3383 If a party refers to its standard 
terms in such a letter after the negotiations with the other party, its standard terms become part 
of the agreement if the commercial client does not reject their incorporation immediately or 
made clear in its order that it only will conclude the contract if its own standard terms apply.3384 
The constitutive effect of a commercial letter of confirmation also applies if the standard terms 
that are referred to had not been enclosed and were unknown to the client.3385 
                                                             
3378 BGH NJW 1992, 1232, NJW-RR 2003, 754 (755). 
3379 BGH NJW-RR 2003, 754 (755). 
3380 See also s 52(2)(h)(i) CPA.  
3381 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 173 et seq. The BGH recognised insofar the application of standard 
terms without explicit reference to them due to customs of trade for the General German Carrier Conditions 
(ADSp) and standard terms of the banks (BGH WM 2004, 1177). On the other hand, the BGH rejected this view 
for standard terms of utility companies (BGH NJW 2014, 1296). 
3382 For instance, the customs of the timber trade in the Tegernsee area (BGH BB 1986, 1395), or the conditions 
of the shipping companies for the shipping on the river Rhine (RheinSchiffahrtsOG Köln VersR 1978, 370). 
3383 'Schweigen auf ein kaufmännisches Bestätigungsschreiben'. Such a commercial letter of confirmation is a 
custom of trade (i.e., not regulated by law). Offers made over the phone are confirmed by letter by one of the 
parties in order to have a proof of the agreement. If the recipient does not oppose itself against the content 
('silence') of this letter, the agreement is concluded. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Bestätigungsschreiben'. 
A commercial letter of confirmation (kaufmännisches Bestätigungsschreiben) has to be distinguished from an 
acceptance or confirmation of order (Auftragsbestätigung). For an acceptance of order, the provision of § 150(2) 
applies, i.e., if the acceptance of order contains standard terms that were previously not submitted to the other 
party, the initial offer is refused, and this  refusal entails a new offer in terms of § 150(2). If the (commercial) 
client accepts this modified offer by accepting delivery, this has to be construed as a confirmation of its intent to 
accept (BGH NJW 1995, 1671 (1672); NJW-RR 2000, 1154 (1155), Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 52. § 150(2): 
'An acceptance with expansions, restrictions or other alterations is deemed to be a rejection combined with a new 
offer.' 
3384 BGHZ 7, 187 (190), Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 52. 
3385 BGHZ 7, 187 (190), MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 104. 
 567   
 
c) Incorporation of pre-formulated employment conditions 
Under § 310(4) 2nd sent. 2nd subclause, § 305(2) does not apply either to pre-formulated 
employment conditions.3386 The legislator decided to preclude such conditions from the strict 
incorporation requirements by referring to the Evidence Act for Employment Relationships 
(NachwG)3387 by which the employer would be obliged to hand over to the employee all 
significant conditions of the contract or to refer to the applicable collective agreement(s).3388 
The legislature misinterpreted thus the regulatory content of the NachwG.3389 Indeed, the 
employer has to present all the employment conditions that are essential for the employee and 
prove this fact, but he or she has no obligation to do this before the conclusion of the 
contract.3390 The NachwG thus aims at better legal security and clarity, but not at more 
transparency at the moment when the employment contract is concluded. Furthermore, the 
legal consequences of a violation of the NachwG is not the invalidity of the contract (as 
opposed to § 305(2)).3391 Despite the legislator's misjudgement as regards the regulatory 
content of the NachwG, § 305(2) cannot be applied by analogy,3392 so that the general legal 
provisions apply instead.3393 
1.4  Framework agreement 
a) Purpose and effect of framework agreements 
According to § 305(3), '[t]he parties to the contract may, while complying with the 
requirements set out in subsection (2) (…), agree in advance that specific standard business 
terms are to govern a specific type of legal transaction.' If the parties conclude such a 
framework agreement, the parties need not negotiate the terms of the agreement each time they 
enter into a contract, and the provisions apply without any further incorporation under 
§ 305(2).3394 This simplifies the relations between the parties, especially if they maintain a 
current business relationship with a multitude of similar contracts.3395 Particularly those 
agreements fall under subsection (3) for which the exception of § 305(2) no. 1 in fine does not 
apply (posting of a clearly visible notice). This is the case for standard terms of banks (AGB-
                                                             
3386 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 110. 
3387 Nachweisgesetz (NachwG) of 20/07/1995, BGBl. I at 946. 
3388 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
3389 Stoffels AGB-Recht 108, Annuß BB 2002, 460, Richardi NZA 2002, 1058 et seq. 
3390 See § 2(1) 1st sent. NachwG ('at the latest one month after the beginning of the employment relation'). My 
own translation. 
3391 Stoffels AGB-Recht 108. 
3392 BAG NZA 2008, 45 (47); 2013, 148 (150); NZA-RR 2009, 593 (594). 
3393 BAG NZA 2013, 148 (150), Thüsing AGB-Kontrolle im Arbeitsrecht para 200. 
3394 BGH WM 1986, 1194 (1195), Brox and Walker BGB-AT 112. 
3395 WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 114 
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Banken) which simultaneously are embedded in the applicable general business relation 
contract.3396 
b) Conditions of a valid framework agreement 
In order to be valid, a framework agreement in the sense of § 305(3) must meet the general 
conditions for the conclusion of a contract, e.g., two concurrent declarations of intent. In B2C 
contracts, repeated incorporation of standard terms in a multitude of individual agreements, or 
a recurring reference to the standard terms in invoices or order forms is not an offer to conclude 
a framework agreement for future transactions though.3397 Furthermore, the conditions set out 
in § 305(2) no. 1 and 2 must be fulfilled. In practice, this is usually done in writing, although 
there is no formal requirement in this regard.3398 
The framework agreement must also identify the type of transactions for which the standard 
terms shall apply. It is sufficient if it contains several types of related transactions.3399 In 
addition to that, the standard terms which shall be applicable for the transactions as mentioned 
above must be identified in the framework agreement. Such a concretisation does not exist if 
the agreement provides that the user's standard business terms in their currently valid version 
apply (dynamic reference).3400 The framework agreement must also meet the conditions set out 
in §§ 307 to 309 (general clause and prohibited terms).3401 
1.5  Colliding standard business terms in B2B contracts: The battle of forms 
a) Presentation of the problem 
Since §§ 305 et seq. are also applicable to B2B contracts,3402 both parties to the contract usually 
use standard business terms in these cases. In most instances, this does not cause any problems, 
either because the parties agree whose standard terms should apply (the business partner with 
more leverage in terms of bargaining power will mostly prevail), or they simply do not 
negotiate on this topic in order to not jeopardise the transaction. Mostly, this inactivity is 
unproblematic because most transactions are executed smoothly. After all, the parties' main 
objective is to execute the transaction with or without the standard terms, which is why they 
                                                             
3396 WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 114. Clause 1 AGB-Banken: 'The standard business terms apply to the entire 
business relation between the client and the domestic branches of the bank.' (My own translation). See, for 
instance, 'Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB-Banken' at psdbank-ht.de/mb314/AGB.pdf. 
3397 BGH WM 1986, 1194 (1195). 
3398 Stoffels AGB-Recht 110. 
3399 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 207. 
3400 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 208. 
3401 Stoffels AGB-Recht 110. 
3402 For the restrictions see § 310(3). 
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focus on the transaction itself and not on the content of their respective standard terms.3403 The 
problem of colliding standard terms in B2B contracts – in the English terminology this 
phenomenon is referred to as 'the battle of forms' – is significant though if the execution of the 
contract causes problems and the relevant clauses in the parties' standard terms would come to 
different results.3404 
This begs the question of whether the contract between the parties comes into force, in spite of 
the contradicting declarations of intent (different standard terms), and if so, which content 
would the given agreement have. Although the problem of colliding standard terms had been 
discussed long before the AGBG came into force,3405 the legislator consciously did not solve 
this problem3406 because the incorporation of standard terms does only concern B2C contracts 
(§ 310(1) 1st sent.), and the regulation of an incorporation problem concerning B2B contracts 
would have been unsystematic.3407 Therefore, the solution has to be found in the general 
provisions of the law of contract.3408 
b) Approach in case law 
The courts base their decisions in this regard on § 150(2), in terms of which an acceptance with 
expansions, restrictions or other alterations is deemed to be a rejection combined with a new 
offer. Their objective is to keep alive the contract regardless of colliding standard terms.3409 
The rulings of the judicature have undergone the following development. 
aa) Point of departure: Last shot doctrine 
Older BGH decisions3410 solve this problem by applying § 150(2) restrictively. They apply the 
last shot doctrine, which itself is based on the strict mirror approach in terms of which the 
acceptance must be a mirror image of the offer. If the acceptance is not congruent with the 
                                                             
3403 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 215. 
3404 Stoffels AGB-Recht 110 and 111. 
3405 Raiser Recht der AGB 224 et seq. 
3406 Schmidt BGB-AT 421. 
3407 See the official statement in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 17 et seq. The Bundesrat (at 47 et seq) suggested a provision 
by which colliding standard business terms would be ineffective and § 5(2) and (3) AGBG (now § 306(2) and 
(3) BGB) would be applicable by analogy, i.e., '[t]o the extent that the terms have not become part of the contract 
or are ineffective, the contents of the contract are determined by the statutory provisions [§ 306(2)]. The contract 
is ineffective if upholding it, even taking into account the alteration provided in subsection (2) above, would be 
an unreasonable hardship for one party.' [§ 306(3)]. For the statement of the government, see BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 
60. By contrast, other pieces of legislation have specific provisions dealing with the battle of form, such as §2-
207 of the American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Also art 2.22 of the UNIDROIT Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts (UP) refers to this problem. 
3408 Stoffels AGB-Recht 111. 
3409 Stoffels AGB-Recht 113 and 114. 
3410 BGH NJW 1951, 271; 1955, 1794; 1963, 1248. 
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offer, it constitutes a counter-offer which the other party must accept unconditionally.3411 
Hence, a contract is not concluded after the recipient of the offer (client) has accepted the 
conditions thereof and he or she refers to its own standard terms, which has to be construed as 
a new offer. If, on the other hand, the client accepts the delivery without objecting to the 
supplier's standard terms, it impliedly agrees to the other party's terms. This unreserved 
acceptance of the delivery would therefore be the implied acceptance of the modified offer of 
the other party. Since the party who refers at last to its standard terms prevails, this theory is 
referred to as 'last shot doctrine', or in the German terminology 'theory of the last word'.3412 
bb) Restrictions of this approach 
Newer BGH rulings still apply § 150(2) and the last shot rule, but with the restriction that where 
the customer's standard terms contain a so-called 'protective clause', or 'defence clause', 
(Abwehrklausel) § 150(2) is not applicable because according to such a clause this party wishes 
to conclude contracts only if its own standard terms apply.3413 
Unlike the last shot approach, if the supplier refers then to its own standard terms and the client 
accepts the delivery without reservations, the newer BGH decisions do not construe this as an 
acceptance of the modified offer. If the parties agree to execute the contract nevertheless, this 
would not affect the validity of the contract though. The 'gap' created by the contradicting terms 
is then not filled by applying the statutory law to the entire contract, but by application of those 
terms that have identical content and that the parties wish to apply.3414 Hence, the courts restrict 
the application of § 150(2) to cases in which the client's standard terms do not contain a defence 
clause, or where both parties' terms contain such a clause.3415 
c) Statement 
Despite its advantage of providing legal certainty, some authorities3416 legitimately assert that 
the last shot doctrine is not convincing because it is doubtful that the acceptance of delivery 
allows to conclude that the client actually accepts the supplier's standard terms.3417 
                                                             
3411 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 216 and 236, CISG-AC Opinon No. 13 Rule 10.5. 
3412 Theorie des letzten Wortes. UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 185. 
3413 BGH NJW 1991, 1604 (1606); NJW-RR 2001, 484, Faust BGB-AT 110. Such a clause could have the following 
content: 'Contrary standard terms, insofar they do not apply entirely to the present order, do not apply. According 
to the BGH, such a formulation excludes the supplier's standard terms entirely. See BGH NJW-RR 2001, 484. It 
seems that Brox and Walker (BGB-AT 111) apply the theory of the last word without restriction. 
3414 BGH NJW 1985, 1838 (1839 et seq). 
3415 Stoffels AGB-Recht 113. 
3416 See Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 221. 
3417 Raiser Recht der AGB 224, Wertenbruch BGB-AT 146, Stoffels AGB-Recht 113. 
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Furthermore, this theory creates a 'ping-pong play'3418 in which the parties' subsequent 
reference to their respective standard terms produces more or less accidental results, and where 
in most cases the supplier will prevail.3419 In cases where the parties correspond extensively 
with each other, the proof of whose standard terms prevail might be difficult too.3420 What is 
more, from an economic point of view, the last shot doctrine is unrealistic and anti-economical 
since it does not reflect the economic reality of business partners who rather aim to execute 
their transaction instead of bothering with their respective set of standard terms.3421 The newer 
court rulings that restrict this theory are more convincing but lack of a dogmatic foundation. A 
landmark decision of the BGH would be very welcomed in this regard by many authors.3422 
The problem of the battle of forms could be resolved by the following alternative solution. 
aa) Coming into being of a contract 
The courts correctly state that the collision of different standard terms itself does not prevent 
the conclusion of a valid contract. The point of departure for this jurisprudence should not be 
§ 150(2), but rather an inverse application of § 154(1).3423 This is because in practice, the parties 
do not want to prevent a valid conclusion of their agreement merely because of contradictory 
standard terms but aim at an exchange of their respective performances (delivery, payment).3424 
The application of the strict mirror approach or the last shot rule would destroy the contract 
though. Hence, it should be in the parties' interests to assume the valid conclusion of such a 
contract and to presume a dissent only where one party expressly wanted to have treated its 
standard terms as a condition for the validity of the contract. The crucial question of this 
approach is thus whether there is an agreement on the essentialia negotii and if the parties 
expressed their belief that the transaction is concluded.3425 For this purpose, a defence clause 
is not sufficient, however.3426  
                                                             
3418 L/GvW/T/Löwe § 2 AGBG para 41. 
3419 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 220. 
3420 Striewe JuS 1982, 729. 
3421 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 221. 
3422 Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 54, UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 188 et seq. 
3423 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 188, Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 54. § 154(1): 'As long as the 
parties have not yet agreed on all points of a contract on which an agreement was required to be reached according 
to the declaration even of only one party, the contract is, in case of doubt, not entered into. An agreement on 
individual points is not legally binding even if they have been recorded.'  
3424 Kegel (JZ 1952, 501) describes the following scene in a London court: Judge: 'Why did you not make clear 
to each other whose terms and conditions should apply, yours or those of your counterpart?' Party: 'Because we 
would not be able to manage any conclusion of an agreement if we did so. Furthermore, we don't have time for 
such things.' Judge: 'But why do you have terms and conditions at all?' Party: 'Why? Because everybody has them!' 
My own translation. 
3425 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 237. 
3426 Stoffels AGB-Recht 114. See also Comment 3 to art 2.1.22 of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
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§ 306(1)3427 speaks for this point of view because the remainder of the contract would be valid 
even if the standard terms of a party would not have been validly incorporated in a B2C contract  
under § 305(2).3428 
bb) Content of a contract (principle of congruency) 
The content of a contract is determined by taking into account the parties' consent. Their 
agreement does include not only the principal obligations but also parts of their respective 
standard terms which, after their comparison, might contain congruent clauses. This 'principle 
of congruency'3429 is concordant with the principle of freedom of contract. Only where their 
standard terms are different, § 306(2) should apply,3430 pursuant to which the ius dispositivum 
applies to the extent that the terms have not become part of the contract or are ineffective.3431 
In other words, colliding terms are deemed to knock each other out and therefore do not become 
part of the agreement.3432 When ascertaining the congruent clauses of the parties' respective 
standard terms, the rationale and objective of the given clause and the common interest of the 
parties should be considered when interpreting the clauses.3433 It is noteworthy that 'congruent 
clauses' are not submitted to content control since none of the parties has 'presented' such 
clauses in the sense of § 305(1) ('Stellen') to the other party in this form. 
Example:  The client's standard terms provide that the supplier will repair any defective 
items, exchange them against faultless goods or take them back against the 
issuance of a voucher free of charge. On the other hand, the supplier's standard 
terms provide that it will repair any defective items or redeliver them free of 
charge and at the choice of the supplier. 
In the example above, both standard clauses are congruent insofar that the supplier is not 
allowed to charge money for any repairs etc. of defective goods. Furthermore, they are identical 
with respect to the supplier's obligation to repair or redeliver defective goods. Only the client's 
clause providing that the supplier may take defective goods back against a voucher is not part 
of the supplier's terms. Therefore, the supplier must repair or redeliver the defective goods free 
of charge.3434 
                                                             
3427 § 306(1): 'If standard business terms in whole or in part have not become part of the contract or are ineffective, 
the remainder of the contract remains in effect.' 
3428 Stoffels AGB-Recht 114. 
3429 Prinzip der Kongruenzgeltung. 
3430 § 306(2): 'To the extent that the terms have not become part of the contract or are ineffective, the contents of 
the contract are determined by the statutory provisions.' 
3431 WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 143, UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 193. 
3432 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 216 and 238. 
3433 Stoffels AGB-Recht 114. 
3434 BGH NJW 1991, 1604 (1606). 
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It is submitted that the application of a consensual approach by which the parties' standard 
terms are excluded in their entirety, irrespective of whether they conform to each other or are 
in conflict,3435 would be too harsh. The commercial partners (tacitly) agree on the essentialia 
negotii and their similar standard terms. In other words, the actual content of the parties' 
agreement is formed by the essentialia negotii and the corresponding standard terms. 
On the other hand, the knockout approach3436 assures that the transaction is not destroyed 
because of conflicting standard terms, and that colliding terms are replaced by statutory 
provisions so that there is a viable contract in which the corresponding standard terms are 
upheld. Furthermore, this approach reflects the parties' intentions in commercial relations and 
leads to fair and predictable results by avoiding an arbitrary choice as it is the case for the last 
shot rule.3437 This contributes to legal certainty.3438 This is probably why, from an international 
point of view, the majority of the commentators and case law show a preference for this 
approach.3439 
2. Exclusion of surprising clauses 
2.1  General remarks 
As discussed further above,3440 customers often do not read the supplier's standard business 
terms and accept them without further ado because of the high transaction costs. Consumers 
often assume that the user's standard terms contain the usual clauses for the given kind of 
transaction without any surprises.3441 Nonetheless, consumers deserve protection in this regard 
because it would be unfair to apply the same standards in respect of the conclusion of contracts 
and individually negotiated agreements.3442 For this reason, § 305c provides that provisions in 
standard terms which in the circumstances, in particular with regard to the content or outward 
appearance of the contract, do not form part of the contract if they are so unusual that the 
                                                             
3435 See Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 224 et seq. 
3436 In terms of this approach, the parties' standard terms that are not in conflict form part of the agreement, and 
conflicting terms are replaced by the ius dispositivum. See Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 216. 
3437 CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 Rule 10.6. 
3438 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 227. 
3439 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 Rule 10.6, with further references. The knockout approach is also applied in 
terms of art 2.22 of the UNIDROIT Principles: '(Battle of forms) Where both parties use standard terms and 
reach agreement except on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the agreed terms and of any standard 
terms which are common in substance unless one party clearly indicates in advance, or later and without undue 
delay informs the other party, that it does not intend to be bound by such a contract.' 
3440 See the introduction to content control in Part I ch 3 para 1. 
3441 Wertenbruch BGB-AT 148, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 34. 
3442 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 19, Palandt/Grüneberg § 305c para 2. Medicus reminds of Canaris' statement according to 
which agreements that have been entirely negotiated are 'a ridiculous chimera' that are more suited for a bazaar 
than for a modern market and competitive economy. See Medicus BGB-AT 161, citing Canaris FS Steidorff (1990) 
519 and 548. 
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consumer need not expect to encounter them.3443 This even applies if the given terms have been 
properly included in the contract under § 305(2). If the customer can assert the existence of a 
surprising clause, he or she does not have to prove its ineffectiveness in terms of the general 
clause of § 307 or §§ 308, 309.3444 On the other hand, the user does not deserve any protection 
since it tries to throw its customers off their guard by using such standard terms.3445  
Therefore, § 305c is also an emanation of the transparency requirement3446 and of the general 
principle of good faith.3447 For instance, in 1996, the BAG3448 decided that a contractual 
preclusion period does not become part of the employment contract if it appears under a wrong 
or ambiguous heading and is not emphasised by a special notice or typographic means (bold 
and/or bigger font, different colour etc.).3449 
2.2  Position of § 305c(1) in the content control system 
§ 305c is a negative incorporation condition ('do not form part of the contract')3450 and must be 
distinguished from content control and the question of the 'unreasonableness' of a clause in 
terms of §§ 307 et seq.3451 
Note should be taken that surprising clauses need not necessarily also be 'unreasonably 
disadvantageous' with regard to content control, and vice versa, although there is an overlap in 
most cases.3452 Hence, the disadvantageous character of a clause must be distinguished from 
its unusualness.3453 Nonetheless, the enquiry under § 305c, as part of the incorporation control, 
must strictly be distinguished from content control.3454 However, § 305c, as a provision treating 
                                                             
3443 Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 256. 
3444 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 19. 
3445 Stoffels AGB-Recht 116. 
3446 WLP/Hau § 305c paras 11-17. It should be noted that before the AGBG came into force surprising clauses 
were treated as an aspect of content control (BGHZ 17, 1 (3); 33, 216 (219); 38, 183 (185); 54, 106 (109); BGH 
BB 1976, 157). § 3 AGBG (now § 305c(1) BGB) treated surprising clauses as a separate stage to be assessed prior 
to content control (Stoffels AGB-Recht 117). See also § 307(1) 2nd sent. where the transparency requirement is 
codified in terms of the content control: 'An unreasonable disadvantage may also arise from the provision not 
being clear and comprehensible.' The AGBG did not contain a similar provision to § 307(1) 2nd sent. For consumer 
contracts, the transparency requirement of art 5 of the Unfair Terms Directive was however applied in the past by 
interpreting § 3 AGBG (surprising clauses) in the light of art 5 of the Directive. The codification of the 
transparency requirement in § 307(1) 2nd sent. did however not aim at modifying this (Stoffels AGB-Recht 118). 
The fact that German consumers benefit from an additional requirement in terms of §§ 305 et seq protects them 
better than the Directive requires (Stoffels AGB-Recht 118). 
3447 BGH NJW 1993, 779 (780). 
3448 In terms of § 310(4), §§ 305 et seq are also applicable for employment contracts. 
3449 BAG NJW 1996, 2117. See also discussion on s 22 in Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a). 
3450 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 5. 
3451 Stoffels AGB-Recht 118. 
3452 Locher Recht der AGB 57. 
3453 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 34. 
3454 In cases where a clause obviously infringes § 307, the BGH sometimes leaves the question of incorporation 
open and directly assesses § 307 for reasons of procedural economy (e.g., BGH NJW 1989, 222 (223), or it bases 
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more formal aspects, should not be applied too strictly in order to make possible an 'open' 
content control treating more material questions.3455 In institutional actions though, this order 
has no importance because questions of incorporation do not arise.3456 
In terms of § 305c(2), any doubts in the interpretation of standard business terms are resolved 
against the user. The surprising effect of a clause must be assessed by interpreting its content 
first. If ambiguities remain, these must be solved by means of the ambiguity rule of § 305c(2). 
Hence, a clause that seemed to be surprising at first sight might be not surprising at all after 
applying paragraph (2) of this provision.3457 
The prohibition of surprising clauses of § 305c must be distinguished from the transparency 
requirement set out in § 307(1) 2nd sent. ('unreasonable disadvantage' due to a 'provision not 
being clear and comprehensible'). Wolf legitimately points out that both provisions have a 
different protective function. While transparency during the negotiations shall enable the 
customer to reach an informed decision, transparency in the context of content control aims to 
ensure an adequate balancing of the parties' interests and transparency during the execution of 
the contract.3458 This leads to different fields of application for both provisions. A clearly 
visible, not surprising clause that hence has been properly incorporated under § 305c can 
nonetheless infringe the transparency requirement of § 307(1) 2nd sent. because it falsely sets 
out the legal situation between the parties.3459 On the other hand, a clause with a completely 
unusual content may lose its surprising effect if the user explicitly draws the other party's 
attention to it.3460 
§ 305c also applies to B2B contracts. Since business people can be expected to have more 
experience in commercial matters, the threshold for assuming a surprising effect should be set 
higher for them.3461 
                                                             
its decision both on § 305c and § 307 (e.g., BGH NJW 1995, 2553). It is submitted that this approach should 
however not be applied by other practitioners in order to allow for a proper content control. 
3455 MüKo/Kötz 3rd ed § 3 AGBG para 2. 
3456 Stoffels AGB-Recht 119. 
3457 See, for instance BGHZ 103, 72 (80). 
3458 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 239. 
3459 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 240. 
3460 Faust BGB-AT 110. 
3461 BGH NJW 1988, 558 (560), UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 54. 
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2.3  Conditions of § 305c(1) 
The prevailing view in literature3462 requires that the clause in question is 'objectively unusual', 
and from a subjective point of view surprising. Whether a clause is unusual is determined by 
taking into consideration the overall picture of the contract and the typical expectations in legal 
relations of the same kind or based on the user's conduct when concluding the contract. 
Subjectively, the other party must have been taken by surprise.3463  
Although the BGH does not expressly split the conditions of § 305c into an objective and a 
subjective component, it comes quite close to such a distinction. The BGH takes the view that 
a clause is surprising if it differs significantly from the other party's expectations and that it 
does reasonably not anticipate such a clause.3464 The consumer's expectations are determined 
by general and individual surrounding circumstances, such as the degree in which they differ 
from statutory law and the provisions that are usually set out in contractual relations of the 
same kind (general circumstances),3465 as well as the progress and content of the negotiations, 
or the formal appearance of the contract (individual circumstances).3466 According to the BGH, 
the other party's individually existing or possible knowledge of the surrounding circumstances 
is significant, and the conclusions must be drawn from an objective-typifying standard.3467 
The division mentioned above into an objective and a subjective component is not convincing 
though. Stoffels3468 correctly alleges that the advocates of the prevailing view do not sharply 
confine both aspects. According to them, for the determination of whether a clause is 
objectively unusual, the course of the negotiations and the circumstances of the concrete 
conclusion of the contract must be considered.3469 This means however that the 'objective' 
element comes so close to subjectivity that a differentiation is not possible anymore. What is 
more, for the assessment of the subjective 'surprising' element, the prevailing view asserts that 
this determination is to be carried out by considering the understanding of a typical, average 
consumer,3470 which is an objective standard though. 
                                                             
3462 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 11 et seq, L/GvW/T/Löwe § 3 AGBG para 10 et seq, Palandt/Grüneberg 
§ 305c para 3 et seq,  
3463 BGH NJW-RR 2004, 1397 (1398), BAG NZA 2006, 37 (38); 2008, 170 (171). 
3464 BGH NJW-RR 2012, 1261. 
3465 BGH NJW-RR 2001, 195 (196). 
3466 BGH NJW 2001, 1416 et seq. 
3467 BGH NJW-RR 2002, 485 (486). 
3468 Stoffels AGB-Recht 120. 
3469 L/GvW/T/Löwe § 3 AGBG para 12. UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 12 and Palandt/Grüneberg § 305c 
para 3 even want to take into account the user's conduct during the conclusion of the contract. 
3470 L/GvW/T/Löwe § 3 AGBG para 13, UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 13, Palandt/Grüneberg § 305c 
para 4. 
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Stoffels thus suggests the following alternative solution: In a first step, one has to determine 
whether a clause is objectively unusual. This is done by considering the understanding of a 
typical consumer in the context of a contract that is concluded for the same kind of transactions. 
The understanding of an expert, such as a lawyer, is irrelevant in this regard.3471 Elements to 
be considered are the outer appearance of the agreement, such as the typical characteristics and 
the noticeable special provisions for the given type of agreement. In doing so, the content of 
the clause as well as its position within the contract (concealed or typographically highlighted) 
must be considered. The concrete circumstances of the conclusion of the agreement are not 
taken into account at this stage. 
In a second step, one has to distinguish two cases:  
1.) If the conclusion of the aforementioned scrutiny is that the clause is objectively unusual, 
one has further to enquire if the client's concrete expectations have been disappointed, i.e., 
whether the contractual relationship contains a surprising element. This is regularly not the 
case if he or she already was acquainted with the given type of clause due to contractual 
relations with the supplier in the past. Here, the concrete circumstances of the conclusion of 
the agreement are considered, for example, if the user had orally pointed out an unusual clause 
so that it loses its surprising effect to the other party.3472 What is more, a clause that has been 
typographically highlighted and positioned in a manner that one may expect so that the 
consumer takes notice of it is not surprising.3473 
2.) If the result of the enquiry is that the clause is not objectively unusual because it 
corresponds to the expectation of a typical client, one has to assess if the objective assessment 
can be amended by subjective circumstances of the individual case. Such subjective and 
concrete circumstances are considerations such as whether the given clause could not be 
expected in the course of the negotiations. Then, even the typographical accentuation of the 
clause in the written contract is not sufficient to 'extinguish' its surprising effect.3474 
Stoffel's argumentation is sound and duly draws the line between objective and subjective 
elements. It is also coherent with the wording of § 305c which is wide enough to support his 
view. In practice though, the different views have no relevance. Stoffels himself admits that 
                                                             
3471 BGH  NJW-RR 2012, 1261. 
3472 BGH NJW 1997, 2677, BAG NZA 2008, 1208.  
3473 BGH NJW-RR 2002, 485 (487). 
3474 BGH NJW-RR 2002, 485 (487). 
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the results, especially in jurisprudence, are 'consistently convincing', despite the lack of a 
logical structure.3475 
As already discussed in the South African part of this thesis,3476 the South African legislator 
did not provide for a clause concerning surprising terms and conditions in the Consumer 
Protection Act, although the common law already recognises such a principle.3477 Such a 
principle is also discussed in South African literature.3478 
2.4  Case groups 
Since all the previously mentioned views require that also the circumstances of the conclusion 
of the contract be taken into account for the enquiry of whether a clause is surprising, it is not 
possible to establish general rules. Nevertheless, some recurrent case groups can be identified 
when analysing the BGH rulings. These will be presented in the following. 
a) Establishment or significant modification of principal obligations 
Surprising are clauses that establish further principal obligations for the consumer, modify 
principal obligations or restrict the user's contractual obligations in a manner that is not to be 
expected in the view of the object and appearance of the contract. 
Hence, a clause in a sales agreement of a lightning protection system by which a long-term 
maintenance contract for this device is established is surprising because the consumer is forced 
to accept a further performance that is different from what he had expected. The same applies 
to a sales contract for a coffee maker containing a clause by which the customer is obliged to 
buy coffee of a certain brand on a regular basis.3479 Clauses in a security agreement by which 
the surety's liability is extended to future obligations also infringe § 305c as the surety cannot 
                                                             
3475 Stoffels AGB-Recht 120. 
3476 See discussion on the incorporation requirements under the CPA, Part I ch 2 paras 3 and 4. 
3477 Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) para [19]. In this case, the 
court held that an adhering party would not be bound by a[n unusual]  contract term to which it did not and could 
not reasonably have been thought to agree. 
3478 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 454 and 459. In Naudé’s and Lubbe’s opinion, a contract clause is unexpected or 
surprising where it purports to vary the consequences of the contract in a manner contrary to the essence of the 
contract by undermining the reciprocity between the essential obligations envisaged by the parties. For the 
determination of the ‘essence’ of the contract, the obligations which are essential in the light of the basic 
contractual purpose of the parties to the contract, must be examined. In their mind, the nature of the policy 
considerations with regard to each sub-type of contract must be taken into account. 
3479 These two examples are mentioned in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 19. 
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be expected to be liable for these debts. Such a liability with all personal assets is unpredictable 
and unusual and goes beyond the bank's need for protection.3480  
b) Modification of the character of the contract 
Surprising are also clauses modifying the character of a contract in a way that is fundamentally 
different from what one can expect from the appearance of the agreement, and by which a 
different regime from the one that had been expected applies partly or entirely to the 
agreement.3481 
For instance, a clause in a time-sharing contract which excludes the inscription of the buyer's 
permanent occupancy right in proportion to his or her share in the title register, and by which 
instead, a third is registered as a fiduciary is surprising. The contract is meant to be a time-
sharing agreement, and the clause modifies its character in a manner that is not compatible with 
the very essence of such a contract.3482 
c) Atypical accessory agreements 
A standard clause that serves as an accessory agreement in order to concretise the contract can 
also be surprising if it is atypical. Since accessory agreements interfere less with the consumer's 
rights than the clauses contained in the frame contract, the threshold for assuming a surprising 
effect is higher.3483 
A contract for the purchase of a house to be built includes a (surprising) standard clause 
concerning development costs that have nothing to do with the construction of the building.3484 
What is more, a standard clause in a lease by which the tenant assigns his or her salary to the 
landlord is completely unusual and goes far beyond the securities the tenant has to provide (a 
deposit).3485 On the other hand, a clause by which the buyer of a plot of land must pay interests 
for the use of the property after the transfer of possession (not ownership) and until the purchase 
price is due is not surprising because it is customary in business matters to pay interests or rent 
for the use of things if one is not the owner.3486 
                                                             
3480 BGH NJW 1994, 2145; 1997, 3230 (3232). The BGH is also of the view that such a clause infringes the 
general clause of § 307. This is important for cases where the user has pointed out such a liability clause to the 
surety so that it is not surprising anymore. See discussion on § 307 in ch 5. 
3481 Locher AGB-Recht 59. 
3482 BGH NJW 1995, 2637 (2638). 
3483 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 33 et seq. 
3484 BGH NJW 1984, 171. 
3485 LG Lübeck NJW 1985, 2958. 
3486 BGH NJW-RR 2001, 195. 
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d) Concealed clauses 
The courts consider that also standard clauses, due to the unusual appearance of the contract or 
the unexpected positioning of a clause within the contract might lead to the consequences set 
out in § 305c.3487 
The BGH decided that a standard clause on the backside of an advertising order according to 
which the contract is automatically extended if the other party does not cancel it in due time is 
surprising if the front side, bearing the parties' signatures, contains a typographically 
highlighted clause saying that the duration of the contract is one year.3488 What is more, a not 
highlighted clause in an employment contract stipulating a further time limitation besides the 
six-month trial period, which in turn is highlighted in the contract in bold print, is surprising.3489 
A receipt in full discharge3490 by which the employer certifies that the employee has received 
all necessary papers and payments after termination of the employment contract and that no 
further entitlements exist can contain surprising clauses too, especially when the employer 
inserts this receipt in a document by using a misleading heading, or without further notice or 
typographical accentuation.3491 Some authors already consider surprising the fact that the 
receipt contains a clause by which the employee waives his or her right to claim further 
payments (salary etc.).3492 With a view to the fact that it is usual practice in Germany to insert 
such a waiver, this opinion goes too far because employees usually know this practice.3493 
A clause by which the client has to pay for the basic entry of its professional contact details in 
an online business directory, although the insertion of such basic information is usually free of 
charge with other providers, is surprising if the given clause is not highlighted and the other 
party cannot spot this clause right away due to its position in the order form.3494 
3. Priority of individually agreed terms 
Although most agreements take the form of standard form contracts, many contain boxes to 
tick or blanks for insertions in order to enable the parties to insert individually agreed 
conditions, e.g., on the price or the specification of the performance. Sometimes, the parties 
                                                             
3487 BGH NJW 1982, 2309 (2310); 1989, 2255; NJW-RR 2012, 1261, BAG NZA 2006, 37 (39), UBH/Ulmer and 
Schäfer § 305c para 17. See also discussion on the plain language requirement of s 22 in Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a). 
3488 BGH NJW 1989, 2255 (2256). 
3489 BAG NZA 2008, 876. 
3490 Ausgleichsquittung. 
3491 BAG NZA 2005, 1193 (1198 et seq). 
3492 Preis/Bleser/Rauf DB 2006, 2812 et seq. 
3493 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Ausgleichsquittung'. 
3494 BGH NJW-RR 2012, 1261. 
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agree on terms deviating from the pre-formulated text. Such agreements can be made in writing 
or verbally, but also impliedly.3495 In practice, the parties often renounce to amend the wording 
of the contract (especially when the individual agreement is oral), or simply forget to modify 
it.3496 
For these cases, § 305b3497 provides that the individually agreed terms prevail over the pre-
formulated standard terms. Hence they are lex specialis to pre-formulated terms.3498 This 
'functional priority relation'3499 takes into account that pre-formulated standard terms that are 
set up for a multitude of contractual transactions do not consider the parties' individually agreed 
terms, but that there must be a simple way to make such terms valid.3500 Furthermore, 
individually agreed terms mirror the parties' will better than pre-formulated ones.3501 
3.1  Dogmatic foundation of the 'priority principle' 
In literature, the dogmatic foundation of § 305b is subject of controversial discussion,3502 and 
one can identify two main opinions: According to one view, this provision is a rule of 
interpretation for the validity of terms that have been incorporated into the contract.3503 When 
terms are individually agreed, the interpretation would lead to the result that pre-formulated 
terms would step back behind individually agreed clauses. Hence, § 305b is an aspect of the 
principles of interpretation that are partially codified in the ambiguity rule of § 305c(2).3504 
Indeed, § 305b aims to resolve the 'contradiction' between pre-formulated standard provisions 
and individually agreed terms in favour of the latter. The application of § 305b is mandatory 
though, and its application cannot be agreed by the parties; § 305b unambiguously sets out that 
individually agreed terms prevail.3505  
                                                             
3495 BGH NJW 1986, 1807. 
3496 Stoffels AGB-Recht 125. 
3497 § 305b: 'Individually agreed terms take priority over standard business terms.' 
3498 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 35. 
3499 Funktionales Rangverhältnis. This is how this priority rule is almost unanimously designated. See WLP/Hau 
§ 305b para 1, UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 7. The principle that individually agreed terms take priority 
over pre-formulated terms is a general principle of contract law which is valid without limitations in B2B contracts 
(BGH NJW-RR 1990, 613; NJW 2013, 2745) and applied by the BAG for employment contracts as well (see 
Stoffels AGB-Recht 125, with further references). Furthermore, art 21.1.21 of the UNIDROIT principles 
stipulates: 'In case of conflict between a standard term and a term which is not a standard term the latter prevails.' 
3500 Stoffels AGB-Recht 125. 
3501 BGH NJW 2013, 2745 (2747), PWW/Berger § 305b para 1. 
3502 See overview of the discussion in Zoller JZ 1991, 850. 
3503 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 7 et seq, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 4 AGBG para 1. 
3504 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 8. 
3505 Zoller JZ 1991, 852. 
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Another view thus argues that § 305b concerns a question of validity and that the interpretation 
of the standard terms and the individually agreed terms has already taken place,3506 without 
resolving the problem which ones prevail.3507 Hence, the validity of the colliding terms can 
only be resolved within the incorporation control. An argument for this view is the position of 
§ 305b between other provisions concerning the incorporation of terms into the contract 
(§§ 305(2), 305a and 305c(1)). This position was identical in the AGBG.3508 In addition, the 
parties do not wish that the pre-formulated terms that collide with the individually agreed ones 
be incorporated into the contract. Thus, their agreement on the terms that should be valid for 
their agreement should only extend to the individually agreed provisions from the beginning 
as far as they deviate from the pre-formulated terms.3509 The second view is more convincing.  
3.2  Conditions of the priority 
a) Existence of individually agreed terms 
Individually agreed terms are contractual terms that do not fall under the definition of standard 
business terms of § 305(1) 3rd sent. because they are not pre-formulated.3510 Company 
practices, on the other hand, are no individually agreed terms.3511 Individually agreed terms 
can be stipulated in writing, orally or impliedly.3512 They do not need to been agreed upon at 
the moment of the conclusion of the contract. If the parties agree on individually agreed terms 
after they have entered into the contract, it does not matter if they are aware of the contradiction 
between the standard terms and the individually agreed clauses.3513 In order to be valid, they 
must however not infringe any form requirements, or be negotiated by a person having no 
power of representation, for instance.3514 
What is more, individually agreed terms can be invalid for other reasons than the ones above.  
                                                             
3506 As will be discussed below in the chapter on the interpretational control (ch 4), the interpretation of standard 
terms takes place between the incorporation control and the content control. Only then, one can assess if the given 
clauses are valid in terms of the content control. See BGH NJW 1999, 1108; 1633 (1634); 1993, 2369, Stoffels 
AGB-Recht 131. It is submitted that 'interpretation' within the incorporation control simply means that it is 
determined which clauses (pre-formulated/standard clauses) of the agreement are valid and should find 
application. It is further submitted that at this stage the interpretation does not go any further in order to avoid any 
anticipated interpretation of the content of the given clauses. 
3507 MüKo/Basedow § 305b para 2. 
3508 See §§ 2 to 6 AGBG. 
3509 WLP/Hau § 305b para 2, Zoller JZ 1991, 853. BGH NJW 1984, 2468 comes to a similar conclusion. 
3510 WLP/Hau § 305b para 6. § 305(1) 3rd sent.: 'Contract terms do not become standard business terms to the 
extent that they have been negotiated in detail between the parties.' 
3511 BAG NJW 2009, 316. 
3512 BGH NJW 1986, 1807. 
3513 BGH NJW 2006, 138, BAG NZA 2007, 801 (803). 
3514 Stoffels AGB-Recht 126. 
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Example:  D, a second-hand car dealer, sells a used vehicle to B. Upon B's solicitation, D 
inserts a handwritten clause into its standard term contract according to which 
he will repair any defects free of charge that appear within one month after the 
purchase. Three weeks afterwards, B brings the car to D because of defective 
breaks. D repairs the vehicle but requires payment with reference to his standard 
terms in which exclusion of liability is stipulated. At first sight, one could 
assume that the individually agreed clause replaces D's standard clause 
providing for exclusion of liability. However, the individually agreed clause 
already infringes § 475 according to which in consumer contracts, an 
entrepreneur may not invoke an agreement that deviates, to the disadvantage of 
the consumer, from the provisions governing material and legal defects. Hence, 
the limitation period for used goods cannot be shorter than one year in terms of 
§ 475(2).3515 Therefore, the individually agreed clause is invalid under § 475(2) 
and cannot replace D's pre-formulated exclusion of liability (which is also void 
in terms of § 475).3516 
b) Differing contents from standard terms 
§ 305b comes into play when, after the interpretation of which clauses shall apply, it is still not 
clear which terms are applicable. In most cases, the individually agreed provisions will be in 
favour of the consumer. § 305b does not aim at consumer protection however but aims to 
resolve a contradiction between standard and individually agreed terms. Consequently, § 305b 
also applies in cases where terms are individually agreed in favour of the user. Not only 
apparent deviations between the pre-formulated and the individually agreed terms but also 
logical contradictions that come to light when comparing the regulatory content of both 
contractual parts fall under § 305b. 
Therefore, the clause 'delivery deadlines and dates are not binding' does not become part of the 
contract if the parties agreed on a certain delivery deadline or date.3517 Furthermore, an 
individually agreed and handwritten clause in a pre-formulated 'exclusive brokerage 
agreement', according to which the owner of the house is entitled to sell the house also by 
himself or by commissioning another broker, prevails over the standard term that excludes this 
                                                             
3515 § 475(2): 'The limitation of the claims cited in [§] 437 [rights of the buyer in case of defects] may not be 
alleviated by an agreement reached before a defect is notified to an entrepreneur if the agreement means that there 
is a limitation period of less than two years from the statutory beginning of limitation or, in the case of second-
hand things, of less than one year.'  
3516 Example from Schmidt BGB-AT 424. 
3517 BGH NJW 1983, 1320; 1984, 48 et seq; 2007, 1198 (1199). 
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possibility.3518 Besides, an individually agreed clause for a fixed price in a gas delivery contract 
replaces a pre-formulated revision clause in the standard contract.3519 
3.3  Written-form clauses 
a) Usage and forms 
As discussed above, individually agreed terms can take the form of a written or oral, or even 
implied agreement. If not agreed in writing, in practice this often causes problems of proof, 
especially if the contract has not been concluded with the user itself but with a representative. 
Therefore, standard business terms users often insert clauses stipulating that oral agreements 
are void or only valid under certain conditions.3520 If clauses requiring the written form are 
valid is subject to discussion. Two problems have to be distinguished in this regard, namely 
the priority principle of § 305b on the one side, and whether such a clause creates an 
unreasonable disadvantage in the sense of § 307(1) and (2), on the other.3521 In addition, the 
validity of a written-form clause depends on its legal content, which has to be assessed by 
interpretation due to their different forms.3522 
b) Priority of oral agreements 
The BGH has made clear that a written-form clause cannot prevent the validity of an 
individually agreed term if the parties expressly agreed that their oral agreement shall prevail 
over the pre-formulated written-form clause.3523 This even applies if the written-form clause is 
valid in terms of the general clause of § 307.3524 This is also the view in literature.3525 
                                                             
3518 BGHZ 49, 84 (87). 
3519 BGH NJW 2013, 2745. 
3520 See discussion on the caveat subscriptor rule in Part I ch 2 para 4.1 c). 
3521 Stoffels AGB-Recht 128. 
3522 Examples: 'Oral agreements need to be in writing in order to be valid' (so-called 'simple written-form clause', 
see AGB-Klauselwerke/Graf von Westphalen, Schriftformklauseln, para 1); 'Any modification of or addition to 
the present agreement, even if it was agreed orally, is only valid if it is in writing and signed by both parties. This 
also applies to a waiver of the written form requirement' (so-called 'qualified written-form clause', see BAG NZA 
2008, 1233); 'For accessory agreements our express written confirmation is required ('qualified written-form 
clause in the form of a confirmation clause', see BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 20). (My own translations). On the other hand, 
clauses by which the client declares that he or she has not made any oral declarations besides the written contract 
and that the user has not made any representations are not considered written-form clauses, but assessed in terms 
of § 309 no. 12 (see discussion of this provision in ch 5). See also the discussion on s 51(1)(g)(i) in Part I ch 3. 
3523 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (322). The UNIDROIT principles take a different approach. Article 2.1.17 reads: 'A 
contract in writing which contains a clause indicating that the writing completely embodies the terms on which 
the parties have agreed cannot be contradicted or supplemented by evidence of prior statements or agreements. 
However, such statements or agreements may be used to interpret the writing.' Article 2.1.18: 'A contract in 
writing which contains a clause requiring any modification or termination by agreement to be in a particular form 
may not be otherwise modified or terminated. However, a party may be precluded by its conduct from asserting 
such a clause to the extent that the other party has reasonably acted in reliance on that conduct.' 
3524 BGH NJW 2006, 138 et seq; NJW-RR 1995, 179 (180); UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 33. 
3525 WLP/Hau § 305b para 33, with further references. 
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This only applies though if the individually agreed terms are valid, which is not the case if the 
user's staff was not empowered to negotiate individual terms but had to stick to the pre-
formulated standard terms. Such a limitation of the power of representation must be apparent 
to the customer when concluding the agreement, however.3526 An additional 'representative 
clause'3527 by which such a power of representation is discernible is not necessary though.3528 
In this regard, persons holding a general commercial power of representation3529 are treated as 
if the principal had individually agreed on terms with the other party so that a contrary written-
form clause does not apply.3530 On the other hand, if the contract contains a qualified written-
form clause in the form of a prohibition to amend a concluded agreement, the power of 
representation of the supplier's agent might be limited in the sense of §§ 543531 and 55 HGB.3532 
Hence, oral representations made by an agent without a sufficient power of representation are 
generally invalid.3533 
c) Validity of written-form agreements 
As exposed above, a written-form clause does not prevail over orally and individually agreed 
terms if the parties have unambiguously expressed their wish that the oral agreement shall 
prevail.3534 Written-form clauses that aim to undermine individually agreed terms after the 
conclusion of the contract are invalid, particularly if they give the impression that oral 
                                                             
3526 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 35. 
3527 Such a 'representative clause' can read as follows: 'Our agents are only authorised to make written 
representations. Oral agreements require a written confirmation in order to be valid' See Stoffels AGB-Recht 129. 
See also discussion on reg 44(3)(c) in Part I ch 3. 
3528 Stoffels AGB-Recht 129. 
3529 Prokura. See § 54 HGB. 
3530 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 34. 
3531 § 54 HGB: '(1) Where a person is authorised, without conferment of a general commercial power of 
representation, to operate a commercial business, to undertake a particular kind of transaction relating to a 
commercial business or to undertake individual transactions relating to a commercial business, such power of 
attorney (commercial authority to act) shall extend to all transactions and legal acts which are normally involved 
in the operation of such a commercial business or in the undertaking of such transactions. (2) The holder of a 
commercial authority to act shall have authority to dispose of or encumber real property, to enter into bill of 
exchange commitments, to take out loans and to conduct litigation only if such authority has been specifically 
conferred on him. (3) A third party must allow other limitations on the commercial authority to act to be asserted 
against him only if he knew or ought to have known of such limitations.' 
3532 § 55 HGB: '(1) The provisions of [§] 54 shall also apply to holders of a commercial authority to act who are 
commercial agents or who in their capacity as commercial employees are entrusted with concluding transactions 
in the principal's name outside of the principal's business premises. (2) The authority conferred on such persons 
to conclude transactions shall not empower them to amend concluded agreements, especially as regards extending 
periods for payment. (3) Such persons shall be authorised to accept payments only if they have been specifically 
granted such authority. (4) Such persons shall be deemed to have authority to accept notice of defective goods, to 
accept declarations that goods will be made available and to accept similar declarations by which a third party 
asserts or reserves his rights arising from defective performance; they can assert rights of the entrepreneur 
(principal) to preserve evidence.' 
3533 Stoffels AGB-Recht 129. 
3534 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (322). 
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agreements are invalid in general.3535 What is more, clauses by which justified claims of the 
consumer are repelled by giving an incorrect presentation of the client's legal rights create an 
unreasonable disadvantage in terms of § 307.3536 
For instance, the 'conditions of sale and delivery' of a furniture store providing that 'any 
modification or addition needs to be in writing'3537 give the impression that any oral agreement 
is invalid and that the consumer's rights based on such oral agreements cannot be enforced.3538 
On the other hand, a clause in a life insurance contract according to which 'communications 
concerning the relationship between the insurer and the insured must always be in writing'3539 
does not inadequately infringe the insured person's right to exercise his or her rights. The BGH 
is of the opinion that in this case, the requirement of the written form serves the need for 
clarification and proof. Furthermore, in terms of the written and oral declarations that have to 
be made after the conclusion of the insurance contract, the problem of simultaneously existing 
written and oral declarations (which is a typical characteristic for the moment of the conclusion 
of the life insurance policy with an agent) does not exist.3540 
Written-form clauses can be valid in terms of § 307 if they concern oral agreements made 
before or at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. The user may have a legitimate 
interest to protect itself from agreements made by its agents that go beyond their power of 
representation, or against uncontrollable oral representations made by its representatives.3541 In 
any event, the user's and the other party's interests have to be balanced against each other. 
Therefore, the BGH decided that a clause by which all delivery deadlines and dates have to be 
'made in writing' and providing a special and clearly visible space for the insertion of the 
delivery date does not constitute an unreasonable disadvantage in terms of § 307.3542 
d) Effects of the Unfair Terms Directive 
Item (n) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive provides that terms which have the object 
or effect of limiting the supplier's obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his agents 
or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality are regarded as 
                                                             
3535 BGH NJW 1995, 1488 (1489); 2001, 292. 
3536 BGH NJW 1995, 1488 (1489). 
3537 My own translation. 
3538 BGH NJW 1995, 1488. See also BGH NJW 2001, 292 et seq concerning a written-form clause in the standard 
terms of a new cars dealer. 
3539 My own translation. 
3540 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634 et seq). 
3541 BGH NJW 1991, 2559. 
3542 BGH NJW 1982, 331 (333). 
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unfair in terms of article 3(3) of the Directive.3543 This confirms the restrictive tendency of 
German jurisprudence. It is unclear though if the validity of written-form clauses has to be 
further restricted in German law. Courts that consider the validity of a written-form clause in a 
consumer contract will have to refer the question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.3544 
4. Legal consequences of non-incorporation 
If standard clauses have not been properly incorporated into the contract or are ineffective, the 
remainder of the contract remains in effect. With this legal consequence set out in § 306(1), the 
German legislator decided to 'erase' merely ineffective terms. Only where an upholding of the 
contract would be an unreasonable hardship3545 for one party, the contract as a whole is 
ineffective under § 306(3).3546 
Pursuant to § 306(2), to the extent that the terms have not become part of the contract or are 
ineffective, the contents of the contract is determined by the statutory provisions. The residual 
rules can nonetheless only apply for contracts that are governed by statutory norms. An 
analogous application of these provisions suffices if the given agreement is somehow similar 
to a regulated contract-type though. Besides, unwritten legal principles, case law and customary 
law are functionally equal in this regard.3547 
Where no statutory provisions exist, one has to ask the question of whether the contract may 
be upheld without the incriminated standard clause, or if the judge has to fill the gap with a 
replacement provision. Such a replacement is dispensable where the subject covered by the 
invalid clause was not relevant for the contract. Where, for instance, a standard provision 
stipulates a contractual penalty, and it is void under § 309 no. 6 or § 307(1) and (2), the contract 
simply is uphold without the penalty clause. There is no need to 'correct' the parties' presumed 
will by means of a complementary interpretation3548 of the contract.3549 
If one or several standard clauses do not become part of the contract because of the existence 
of individually agreed clauses, § 306 is not applicable though because according to the parties' 
will, individually agreed clauses prevail over the standard terms from the beginning.3550 
                                                             
3543 See discussion on s 44(3)(c) in Part I ch 3. 
3544 MüKo/Basedow § 305b para 15 et seq. 
3545 'Unzumutbare Härte'. 
3546 Stoffels AGB-Recht 249. 
3547 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 70. 
3548 See also discussion on complementary interpretation in ch 4 para 3.3 b). 
3549 Wendland in: Staudinger/ Eckpfeiler E para 71. 
3550 Wertenbruch BGB-AT 150. 
 588   
 
The principle set out in § 306(1) is that the remainder of the agreement is upheld. § 306(1) is 
therefore a reverse application of § 139, according to which the entire legal transaction is void 
if a part of it is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without 
the void part.3551 If the provision of § 306 would not exist, the contract could be partially invalid 
under § 139.3552 In other words, in terms of § 139, the principle is the invalidity of an agreement, 
whereas the principle of § 306(1) is its upholding. The reason for this reversal of the rationale 
of § 139 is that consumers regularly have an interest in upholding the agreement, and having 
cut out only ineffective clauses.3553 A customer who buys a second-hand car, for example, is 
interested in the execution of the contract, even if single standard clauses are ineffective. 
Otherwise, the client would have to require the rescission of the agreement and the refund of 
the money already paid. This solution would be not only burdensome but also contrary to its 
interests, even more when considering that the reason for the ineffectiveness lies with the 
user.3554 The same rationale can be found in some other contracts for which the application of 
§ 305(2) is excluded, e.g., employment contracts,3555 where the employee has no interest to 
nullify the contract because of invalid clauses contained therein.3556 The courts thus apply the 
harsh consequences of § 139 more and more cum grano salis, by taking into consideration the 
protective purpose of the given contract. For standard terms that need to be incorporated in 
terms of § 305(2), the legislator has already considered this in § 306(1). Insofar, § 306 is lex 
specialis to § 139.3557 
§ 306(1) does however not only provide for the legal consequences of non-incorporated clauses 
in terms of § 305(2) or § 305c(1) (surprising clauses) but also applies in cases where a clause 
is invalid under §§ 307 to 309 or other legal provisions, such as §§ 11 UKlaG,3558 or 475, 487, 
506, 651h and k BGB or 38(1) ZPO.3559 The reason for the invalidity of the given clauses is 
                                                             
3551 Stoffels AGB-Recht 249. 
3552 § 139: 'If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed 
that it would have been undertaken even without the void part.'  
3553 Already before the AGBG came into force, the BGH restricted the cases where the entire contract was 
ineffective in order to honour the parties' will. See BGH NJW 1957, 17; 1969, 230. See also Raiser Recht der AGB 
320 et seq. who already saw this problem. 
3554 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 249. 
3555 See § 310(4) 2nd sent. 
3556 Zöllner et al Arbeitsrecht 131. 
3557 BGH NJW 2007, 3568 (3569), Wertenbruch BGB-AT 149. 
3558 § 11 UKlaG (Effect of the judgment): 'If the user against whom judgment has been given fails to comply with 
an injunction based on § 1, the provision in the standard contract terms is to be regarded as void insofar as the 
party concerned invokes the effect of the injunction. However, this party cannot invoke the effect of the injunction 
if the user against whom judgment has been given could contest the judgment under § 10.' 
3559 UBH/Schmidt § 306 para 9. 
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irrelevant so that § 306(1) and (3) also apply where a clause is ineffective because it is against 
public policy or contra legem.3560 
If the contract shall be maintained except for the non-incorporated or invalid clauses, it must 
be able to be split up into a valid and an invalid part.3561 The two parts must each form a sensible 
and comprehensible instrument. This is not the case where significant parts for the entering 
into a contract, i.e., the essentialia negotii, are affected by this splitting (e.g., an invalid price 
agreement due to a violation of the transparency requirement).3562 This problem regularly does 
not arise in standard term contracts because they typically contain ancillary agreements, which 
do not affect the essentialia negotii. On the other hand, where the statutory provisions do not 
offer a legal model for a certain type of agreements, especially for newer contract forms, and 
where this gap must be filled by the judge, the ineffectiveness of such a 'torso contract'3563 must 
be assumed.3564 
In some cases, the courts try to split up complex individual clauses into a valid and an invalid 
part. This is only acceptable though where the remainder of the provision still makes sense 
semantically and in terms of the content, e.g., where the word 'irrevocable' is erased in a power 
of attorney. The courts do not use this possibility where the remainder of the clause has to be 
reformulated completely as this is beyond their power.3565 
§ 306(3) provides that the contract is ineffective if upholding it, even taking into account the 
replacement of ineffective clauses by statutory provisions, would be an unreasonable hardship 
for one party. Contrary to § 139, the criterion for invalidity in § 306(3) is not the assumed will 
of the parties but an 'unreasonable hardship' should the contract be maintained.3566 It is subject 
to discussion whether § 306(3) applies to agreements that are entirely invalid because an 
upholding of the remainder of the contract is not possible because it is impossible to determine 
the (ineffective) contents of the contract by the ius dispositivum. Some authors suggest that a 
contract which cannot be upheld because the remainder does not make any sense is logically 
invalid as a whole. Hence, a subsequent hardship assessment in terms of § 306(3) would be 
                                                             
3560 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 69. 
3561 BGH NJW 1995, 2553 (2556 et seq). 
3562 UBH/Schmidt § 306 para 10, Erman/Roloff § 306 para 4. 
3563 Stoffels refers to such agreements as Torsoverträge, whereas Lindacher calls them Rumpfverträge. Both mean 
the same (torso contracts). See Stoffels AGB-Recht 251 and WLP/Lindacher § 306 para 54. 
3564 Stoffels AGB-Recht 251. 
3565 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 72. 
3566 Stoffels AGB-Recht 250. 
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unnecessary.3567 Others are of the opinion that § 306(3) is applicable because both parties have 
an interest in not maintaining the contract, which these authors qualify as an 'unreasonable 
hardship' ('unzumutbare Härte'). 
The scrutiny of 'hardship' requires a balancing of the parties' interests by considering the 
adverse effects the remaining contract would have. Since both parties are unlikely to have an 
interest in executing a 'fragmented' contract that in the worst case is very far from their initial 
agreement, hardship can be assumed in these cases.3568 Although both views come to the same 
result, the first opinion is more convincing. Logic requires that an agreement that cannot 
survive per se is invalid. Therefore, it would be idle to assess whether the continuation of the 
contract would be an unreasonable hardship under § 306(3).  
Where numerous clauses of a pre-formulated contract are ineffective, it is disputable whether 
not the agreement as a whole is invalid because a 'gap-filling' might lead to an illegitimate 
intervention and a substitution of the parties' will by the court. This is above all the case where 
no statutory provisions exist because the contract form has been developed praeter legem, and 
the content of the contract is mainly determined by standard terms. The courts had to decide 
on the validity of some newer contract forms, such as time-sharing contracts. Stoffels3569 
criticises that the standard terms drafter's (lawyer's) objective seems to be the safeguarding of 
the user's position at any cost, even by accepting obvious legal violations.3570 The courts have 
soon been confronted with this problematic in connection with vending machine installation 
contracts.3571 The BGH decided in these cases that invalidity of single clauses of a pre-
formulated contract does in principle not affect the applicability of the remaining standard 
clauses and the validity of the contract per se. Where the given agreement is however not 
regulated by legal provisions, and its essential content is determined by standard terms, the 
nonconsideration of single invalid clauses or their restricted application by means of 
interpretation could give a whole new meaning to the agreement. Such a remodelling of the 
contract is not the court's role, however. Hence, the BGH declared such contracts – with some 
reservations – void in terms of § 138(1) as they are against public policy.3572 The BGH's 
approach has lately seen a renaissance for intransparent time-sharing contracts that the courts 
                                                             
3567 WLP/Lindacher § 306 para 54, Stoffels AGB-Recht 251, Koch/Stübing § 6 AGBG para 8. 
3568 UBH/Schmidt § 306 para 42. 
3569 Stoffels AGB-Recht 251. 
3570 For time-sharing contracts see OLG Cologne NJW 1994, 59; NJW-RR 1995, 1333. 
3571 Automatenaufstellungsverträge. 
3572 See above all BGH NJW 1969, 230 (231 et seq); 1983, 159 (162). 
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declared invalid entirely.3573 Although a parallel application of § 138(1) and §§ 307 to 309 for 
intransparent contracts is possible as both have different objectives, the courts now rather apply 
§ 139 to declare the entire agreement void. This is because it is difficult to assume a contract 
void as a whole in terms of § 138(1) on the basis of transparency violations, which probably 
also explains the BGH's former hesitations.3574 The invalidity of the entire agreement in these 
cases is thus the logical consequence3575 and can thus be reached by recourse to § 139 and a 
teleological reduction of § 306(3).3576 
The BGH opposes to a 'partial retention',3577 i.e., the preservation of the invalid clause with the 
content that is still permissible. The reason is that otherwise the user's risk of ineffectiveness 
would be minimised as the courts would 'reduce' incriminated clauses to their valid part. This 
would incite users to formulate their standard clauses illegally in the hope that the courts will 
'correct' them where necessary (provided that these clauses are challenged). Then, § 306 would 
have no deterrent effect.3578 The prohibition of partial retention is necessary also because 
otherwise, the courts would be in the parties' shoes and reformulate their contract. What is 
more, the legal consequences set out in § 306(2) would be reversed as not the statutory 
provisions would apply, but the clause would be reformulated due to the court's 
intervention.3579 
Courts may also intervene by applying the principles of complementary interpretation. These 
have already been discussed elsewhere.3580 
Ineffectiveness due to non-incorporation or invalidity of a standard clause also has other 
consequences. If the other party had paid the user because the former did not know about the 
invalidity of the standard clauses, he or she might be entitled to reclaim the monies in terms of 
                                                             
3573 OLG Cologne NJW 1994, 59; NJW-RR 1995, 1333. 
3574 See Stoffels AGB-Recht 252. 
3575 MüKo/Basedow § 306 para 29, WLP/Lindacher § 306 para 54. 
3576 Stoffels AGB-Recht 252. 
3577 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. BGH BB 2017, 2254; NJW 2016, 560. See also Hager JZ 1996, 175. 
3578 See ECJ EuZW 2017, 148 ('Naranjo'); BB 2015, 257 ('Unicaja Banco'). 
3579 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 73. 
3580 See discussion on interpretational control, ch 4. 
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the provisions on unjust enrichment (§§ 8123581 and 8183582).3583 The use of ineffective standard 
terms may also entitle to a culpa in contrahendo claim under 311(2)3584 which might lead to 
damages in terms of § 241(2),3585 read with § 280,3586 if the occurrence of the damage is due to 
the invalid clause.3587 Finally, the use of ineffective standard clauses might constitute unfair 
competition in terms of § 3a UWG3588 and lead to injunctive relief in favour of competitors.3589 
  
                                                             
3581 § 812: 'Claim for restitution - (1) A person who obtains something as a result of the performance of another 
person or otherwise at his expense without legal grounds for doing so is under a duty to make restitution to him. 
This duty also exists if the legal grounds later lapse or if the result intended to be achieved by those efforts in 
accordance with the contents of the legal transaction does not occur. (2) Performance also includes the 
acknowledgement of the existence or non-existence of an obligation.'  
3582 § 818: 'Scope of the claim to enrichment - (1) The duty to make restitution extends to emoluments taken as 
well as to whatever the recipient acquires by reason of a right acquired or in compensation for destruction, damage 
or deprivation of the object obtained. (2) If restitution is not possible due to the quality of the benefit obtained, or 
if the recipient is for another reason unable to make restitution, then he must compensate for its value. (3) The 
liability to undertake restitution or to reimburse the value is excluded to the extent that the recipient is no longer 
enriched. (4) From the time when the action is pending onwards, the recipient is liable under the general provisions 
of law.'  
3583 BGH NZM 2011, 478; NJW 2009, 2590. 
3584 § 311(2): 'An obligation with duties under [§] 241 (2) also comes into existence by 1. the commencement of 
contract negotiations 2. the initiation of a contract where one party, with regard to a potential contractual 
relationship, gives the other party the possibility of affecting his rights, legal interests and other interests, or 
entrusts these to him, or 3. similar business contacts.'  
3585 § 241(2): 'An obligation may also, depending on its contents, oblige each party to take account of the rights, 
legal interests and other interests of the other party.'  
3586 § 280: 'Damages for breach of duty - (1) If the obligor breaches a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee 
may demand damages for the damage caused thereby. This does not apply if the obligor is not responsible for the 
breach of duty. (2) Damages for delay in performance may be demanded by the obligee only subject to the 
additional requirement of [§] 286. (3) Damages in lieu of performance may be demanded by the obligee only 
subject to the additional requirements of [§§] 281, 282 or 283.'  
3587 BGH NJW 2014, 854. 
3588 § 3a UWG: 'Breach of law - Unfairness shall have occurred where a person violates a statutory provision 
which is also intended to regulate market conduct in the interest of market participants and the breach of law is 
suited to appreciably harming the interests of consumers, other market participants and competitors.' 
3589 Stoffels AGB-Recht 153 and 154. 
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5. Conclusion 
Despite their often normative appearance, standard business terms are contractual provisions 
and therefore do not have a direct normative effect. In order to strengthen the other party's 
position vis-à-vis the user, § 305(2) modifies the general contract law for standard terms in that 
the conclusion of an agreement not only requires consent but also the formal incorporation of 
these provisions. The protective purpose of the incorporation requirements for B2C contracts 
is softened though where they would be an obstacle to the legitimate rationalising effect of 
mass contracts. In order to ensure transparency control, also form contracts should be subject 
to the incorporation requirements in terms of § 305(2) as the legislator intends to avoid that 
standard terms are foisted on the consumer. 
The incorporation is formalised by the fact that the user must refer to its standard terms 
explicitly so that the consumer is aware of them. For orally concluded contracts (e.g., 
teleshopping), the user must refer orally to its standard terms. In written agreements, the 
explicit reference must be found in the offer. In cases where the contract is concluded via the 
internet, there must be a clearly visible reference to the user's standard terms on the order form 
or the screen page. Where the agreement is concluded between persons that are absent in terms 
of § 147(2), the user must send its standard terms by post. In cases where an explicit reference 
is disproportionately difficult, especially for every-day transactions or mass contracts, the 
incorporation is facilitated, and a reference to the standard terms by posting a clearly visible 
notice at the user's premises, is sufficient. 
What is more, the user must give the other party the opportunity to take notice of the content 
of its standard terms. In every-day transactions, this requirement should not be interpreted too 
strictly though. For written contracts where both parties are not present at the moment of the 
conclusion, the user must send its standard terms to the other party, e.g., with the offer. It should 
be sufficient though if the consumer is in possession of the supplier's catalogue or prospectus 
containing such terms. As regards the language of the reference to the user's standard terms, 
one has to distinguish between cases where the language of the contract is German or in another 
language. Notwithstanding this, the transparency requirement of the Unfair Terms Directive 
necessitates the drafting in the client's language in transactions with significant implications. 
The consumer must be able to take notice of the standard terms in an acceptable manner, i.e., 
they must be presented clearly and understandably, without any unnecessary technical terms. 
With respect to the addition in § 305(2) no. 2 in terms of which the user must also take into 
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reasonable account any physical handicap of the other party, it is unfortunate that the legislator 
did not include illiterate persons and those who do not understand German. 
The incorporation requirements must be met at the moment when the parties enter into the 
agreement, although practical aspects should be considered so that a transaction is not 
artificially fragmented (ticket cases, transactions over the counter). Amended and subsequently 
valid standard terms must fulfil the incorporation requirements too. The user must refer to its 
standard terms each time it concludes a new contract, even in a current business relationship, 
except for subsequent and inter-related deliveries within a successive delivery agreement. 
The other party also has to agree to the application of the user's standard terms. This agreement 
can cover the contract as a whole. For contracts concluded via the internet a 'click-wrap' by 
ticking an OK-box is sufficient, as opposed to a 'browse-wrap'. The agreement can also be 
expressed in an implied manner. Nonetheless, a non-commercial customer's silence after 
reception of an order confirmation in which the user refers to its standard terms for the first 
time is not to be considered consent. 
§ 305a contains exemptions from the strict incorporation requirements of § 305(2). These 
concern, amongst others, the tariffs and regulations for the transportation of passengers by 
tramways, busses and motor vehicles. As these regulations have normative character and have 
been published in official gazettes, there is no need for the protection offered by the 
incorporation requirements. The parties still have to agree on the validity of these conditions 
though. Also for the posting of items into post-boxes, the incorporation of standard terms of 
the Deutsche Post AG and its competitors is facilitated for practical reasons. The same applies 
to standard terms for certain telecommunication services. 
In B2B contracts, the incorporation requirements of § 305(2) are not applicable, and the laxer 
rules of the BGB governing the conclusion of the contract (§§ 145 et seq.) apply. Where a 
custom of trade exists for a specific branch according to which certain standard terms apply, 
the other party must actively oppose their application as otherwise, they are applicable. The 
BGH is however hesitant in recognising certain customs of trade. If a B2B client does not 
immediately oppose to a commercial letter of confirmation, the user's standard terms apply. 
The legislator also excluded pre-formulated employment conditions from the strict 
incorporation requirements of § 305(2). This exemption is based on a misjudgement of the 
regulatory content of the Nachweisgesetz (NachwG). 
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For simplification, especially in ongoing business relations, the parties can agree on a 
framework agreement according to which specific standard terms govern a specific type of 
legal transactions.  
Since the legislature did not regulate the problem of colliding standard business terms in B2B 
contracts for dogmatic reasons, the courts have developed several solutions to solve this 
problem. The last shot rule produces accidental results and can lead to a 'ping-pong play'. The 
more recent BGH decisions restricting this theory where a party uses a defence clause' lack 
dogmatic foundation. Therefore, the point of departure should not be § 150(2) but rather an 
inverse application of § 154(1) BGB. The parties ultimately want that their agreement is valid 
and exchange their performances, even if their standard terms are incongruent. § 306(2) speaks 
for this solution too.  
In terms of § 305c, surprising terms do not form part of the contract. This negative 
incorporation provision is an emanation of the transparency requirement as well as the general 
bona fides principle. A surprising term must not necessarily be disadvantageous though, which 
is why the enquiry under § 305c must be distinguished from content control. Literature, and 
ultimately also jurisprudence, apply a test in order to determine whether a term is objectively 
unusual and subjectively surprising. As it is difficult to establish general rules, one can identify 
several case groups: Surprising are clauses that significantly modify the principal obligations, 
or that fundamentally alter the character of the contract so that ultimately a different regime 
applies. Atypical accessory agreements or clauses that are concealed in the contract due to their 
unexpected positioning might be surprising too. 
§ 305b provides that individually agreed terms prevail over pre-formulated standard terms. 
Company practices do not fall under this category, however. As § 305b does not aim at 
consumer protection, a possible contradiction between pre-formulated and individually agreed 
terms may also favour the user. 
Jurisprudence and literature agree that the validity of individually agreed terms cannot be 
questioned by a written-form clause if the parties expressly agreed that their oral agreement 
should prevail over the pre-formulated written-form clause. This presumes that the individually 
agreed terms are valid and that the user's representative was empowered to negotiate with the 
other party. If the user's agent has a general commercial power of representation, he or she is 
treated as if the supplier itself had negotiated with the customer, except where the power of 
representation is limited in terms of §§ 54 and 55 HGB. Written-form clauses with the objective 
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to undermine individually agreed terms after the conclusion of the contract are invalid. They 
may nonetheless be valid if the user has a legitimate interest to protect itself from agreements 
made by its agents that exceed their power of representation. When assessing such clauses, the 
parties' interests must be balanced against each other in order to achieve fair results. In any 
event, the Unfair Terms Directive confirms the rather restrictive tendency of German 
jurisprudence in respect of the recognition of written-form clauses. 
The legal consequences of non-incorporated terms are set out in §§ 306(1) to (3). The legislator 
chose to favour an upholding of the contract if single standard clauses are ineffective, instead 
of applying § 139 because the parties regularly are interested in maintaining the agreement 
even with single invalid clauses. § 306(1) not only applies to non-incorporated clauses but also 
to those that are invalid under §§ 307 to 309 or other legal provisions or principles. 
For the upholding of the agreement, it must be able to be split up in two comprehensible 
contracts, without affecting the essentialia negotii. This problem regularly does not exist in 
'classical' standard term contracts where the standard terms merely contain ancillary 
agreements. In newer contract forms that are not based on an existing legal model, the 
ineffectiveness of the 'torso contract' must be assumed as otherwise, the judge would have to 
fill the gaps which would create another contract contents than the one the parties wanted. 
Contracts for which the ineffective content cannot be substituted by the statutory law are 
invalid per se, and it is not necessary to assess whether an unreasonable hardship under 
§ 306(3) exists. 
Newer contract forms that have been developed praeter legem and which contain invalid 
clauses are void as otherwise, the courts would have to 'remodel' the whole agreement through 
interpretation. Invalidity can be reached in these cases by applying § 139 and a teleological 
reduction of § 306(3). 
The BGH rejects 'partial retention' of the still permissible remainder of invalid clauses with 
good reason. Otherwise, the deterrent effect of § 306 would be lost and standard terms users 
would attempt to formulate illegal clauses in the hope that the courts would 'correct' them. 
Ineffectiveness of standard clauses may also have further implications. The other party might 
reclaim the monies already paid in terms of the unjust enrichment provisions, and the user 
might be subject to a culpa in contrahendo claim which might lead to the payment of damages. 
Furthermore, competitors might demand an injunctive relief for unfair competition. 
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CHAPTER 4 – INTERPRETATIONAL CONTROL 
 
1. Introduction 
Contracts and declarations of intent are interpreted according to §§ 133 and 157 BGB. For 
standard business terms, this standard is modified, however. In this chapter, the natural and the 
normative interpretation will be discussed as well as the objective interpretational standard for 
standard business terms. In a first step, some general principles applicable for the interpretation 
of the law will be presented as in both cases – statutory interpretation and interpretation of legal 
transactions – the intention of the legislator or the person issuing a declaration of intent must 
be investigated, respectively. Moreover, the techniques used in statutory interpretation can also 
be applied to the interpretation of agreements. What is more, both the law and contractual 
provisions may contain gaps that must be filled by applying the techniques of complementary 
interpretation.3590 
2.  Statutory interpretation 
2.1   Meaning and method 
a)  Investigation of the provision's objective 
Statutory interpretation not only takes place where a legal provision is ambiguous, but every 
time a lawyer (judge, advocate etc.) has to investigate whether a provision applies to specific 
facts (subsumption).3591 For this, he or she has to investigate the meaning of the given 
provision. This might sometimes be challenging as the law not always applies terms that can 
be distinguished by logic, but also technical and colloquial terminology.3592  
b)  Approach 
For statutory interpretation, different approaches are applied in order to investigate the law's 
objective and meaning, namely the grammatical, the systematic, the historical and the 
teleological interpretation. These will be discussed in the following. 
aa)  Grammatical interpretation 
The starting point of statutory interpretation is always the wording of the given legal provision. 
Elements to be taken into account are the general meaning of the given word(s), the specific 
(legal or technical) jargon as well as grammatical rules (grammatical interpretation). Thus, 
editorial errors of the legislator become visible, i.e., words that differ from those that the 
                                                             
3590 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. 
3591 This also applies to the interpretation of contracts. See Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 45. 
3592 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 33. 
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legislator wanted to use for the provision. For instance, § 919(1) regulates that '[t]he owner of 
a plot of land may require from the owner of a neighbouring plot of land that the latter 
cooperates in erecting fixed boundary markers and, if a boundary marker has moved or become 
unrecognisable, in the restoration.'3593 In the German text, the verb used for '(has) moved' is 
''verrückt (geworden ist)'. It is obvious that the choice of this German verb that also means '(has 
become) insane' is an editorial slip.3594 
Contrary to the German approach (and other South African pieces of legislation), section 2(1) 
of the Consumer Protection Act provides that the Act must be interpreted in a manner that gives 
effect to the purposes set out in section 3 of the Act. This more paternalistic attitude towards 
the consumer can be explained by the fact that the Consumer Protection Act primarily is – as 
its title indicates – a consumer protection statute, unlike §§ 305 et seq. BGB. The German 
provisions primarily do not have the purpose of protecting the weaker party and of balancing 
the supplier's stronger bargaining power.3595 They rather aim at preventing abuse of freedom 
of contract-drafting and therefore protect all parties against the misuse of standard terms.3596 
Hence, §§ 305 et seq. BGB cannot be qualified as pure consumer protection provisions, with 
the exception of § 310(3) (consumer contracts).3597 
The South African approach of purposive interpretation seeks to look for the purpose of the 
legislation before interpreting the words. Other interpretative rules require the courts to apply 
the literal rule (grammatical interpretation) first and to analyse the wording of a statute, whereas 
the purposive approach starts with the mischief rule in seeking the legislator's purpose or 
intention. It is a much more flexible approach giving courts more freedom to develop the law 
in line with what they perceive to be the legislator's intention. The purposive approach readily 
embraces the use of extrinsic aids to work out Parliament's intention.3598 
In some cases, the BGB itself defines certain terms. The term 'negligently' in § 823(1)3599 is 
defined in § 276(2) in that 'a person acts negligently if he fails to exercise reasonable care'. The 
                                                             
3593 Emphasis added. 
3594 Better synonyms are, e.g., 'an eine andere Stelle setzen' or 'versetzen'. 
3595 Stoffels AGB-Recht 29. 
3596 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. 
3597 Locher JuS 1997, 390. See discussion in Part II ch 1 and in Part I ch 4. 
3598 'The Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation' at http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Purposive-approach.php. 
3599 § 823(1): 'A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, 
property or another right of another person is liable to make compensation to the other party for the damage arising 
from this.' Emphasis added. 
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same applies to 'ought to have known' ('Kennenmüssen') in § 1663600, which is defined in 
§ 122(2) as 'not knowing as a result of negligence'.3601 Another example is the legal definition 
of 'prior approval' or 'consent' ('Einwilligung') which is defined in § 183 1st sent.3602 'Subsequent 
approval' or 'ratification' ('Genehmigung') is defined in § 184(1).3603 On the other hand, the 
term 'approval' ('Zustimmung') is not defined in § 182(1).3604 Since prior and the subsequent 
approval are both defined, one can nevertheless conclude that 'Zustimmung' is the generic term. 
As one can see, the German words 'Zustimmung', 'Genehmigung' and 'Einwilligung' have no 
resemblance like in English where the translations all contain the word 'approval'. Hence, these 
legal definitions are important for lawyers in order to distinguish the moment when the 
approval has been given.  
Moreover, the use of certain formulations, such as 'must' ('müssen') or 'shall' ('sollen') indicates 
different legal consequences in case of non-compliance of the legal provision. If the provision 
contains the word 'must' the legal consequence in case of non-compliance is invalidity, whereas 
a violation of a provision where one 'shall' do or not do something does not impact the validity 
of the legal act. § 8 BeurkG3605 sets out that in the case where a testator wants to establish his 
or her last will with a notary public, the will must be recorded in the minutes of the notary 
public. The minutes must contain the name of the notary public and the name of the testator 
(§ 9(1) BeurkG). Non-compliance with these provisions thus leads to the invalidity of the last 
will. On the other hand, § 9(2) BeurkG provides that the minutes shall contain the place and 
date of the meeting. Hence, if the notary public's minutes does not contain the place and/or 
date, the last will is still valid. 
On the other hand, the South African approach is quite different in that definitions often precede 
the actual legislative provisions of a statute3606 and are not scattered in the given piece of 
                                                             
3600 § 166(2):' If, in the case of a power of agency granted by a legal transaction (authority), the agent has acted in 
compliance with certain instructions given by the principal, then the latter may not invoke the lack of knowledge 
of the agent with regard to circumstances of which the principal himself knew. The same rule applies to 
circumstances which the principal ought to have known, insofar as constructive notice is equivalent to knowledge.' 
Emphasis added. 
3601 § 122(2): 'A duty to pay damages does not arise if the injured person knew the reason for the voidness or the 
voidability or did not know it as a result of his negligence (ought to have known it).'  
3602 § 183 1st sent.: 'Prior approval (consent) may be revoked until the legal transaction is undertaken, unless the 
legal relationship on which this consent is based leads to a different conclusion.' 
3603 § 184(1): 'Subsequent approval (ratification) operates retroactively from the point of time when the legal 
transaction was undertaken, unless otherwise provided.'  
3604 § 182(1): 'If the effectiveness of a contract, or of a unilateral legal transaction to be undertaken in relation to 
another, depends on the approval of a third party, the grant and refusal of approval may be declared either to one 
party or to the other.'  
3605 Beurkundungsgesetz. 
3606 See s 1 CPA, for instance. 
 600   
 
legislation. As discussed in the South African part of this thesis,3607 this approach has certain 
advantages, but also disadvantages. The South African approach is certainly convenient in that 
all definitions can be easily located and referred to. This method is only efficient though if the 
list of definitions is complete, well-drafted and does not contain too many cross-references. 
bb)  Systematic interpretation 
In terms of § 133, when a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to ascertain the 
true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration. This principle is 
also valid for the interpretation of legal provisions.3608 For the enquiry of the legislator's true 
intention, one has to put the given provision into relation with other provisions and its position 
within a certain division in the statute. By this so-called 'systematic interpretation' the 
interpreter can ascertain whether the wording of the provision is too wide, for instance.3609 
Under § 495(1), in a consumer credit agreement,3610 the borrower has a right of withdrawal. 
From the simple reading of this provision results that the right of withdrawal applies for all 
non-gratuitous credit agreements between an entrepreneur (lender) and a consumer (borrower). 
The position of §§ 491 et seq. in Subtitle 1 (Loan contract) Chapter 1 of Title 3 reveals though 
that only loan contracts against a sum of money (Gelddarlehen) but not loans of fungible things 
(Sachdarlehen) are concerned. For the latter, §§ 607 et seq. apply.3611 
cc) Historical interpretation 
Historical interpretation concerns the history of a provision or statute in order to assess its 
intention. For this approach, legislative materials are drawn upon, such as legislative drafts, 
parliamentary protocols or even former legislative provisions that were in force in the various 
German monarchies before the BGB came into effect. For subsequent legislative changes, the 
official records of the two chambers of parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat,3612 can 
provide precious insights. Furthermore, the development of a legal provision with its 
subsequent modifications in the course of time can be significant for interpretation. 
Since the Consumer Protection Act promotes a purposive interpretation for which the use of 
extrinsic aids, such as legislative material, is necessary in order to assess the legislator's 
                                                             
3607 See Part I ch 4. 
3608 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 35. 
3609 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 35. 
3610 §§ 491 et seq BGB. 
3611 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 35. 
3612 Bundestagsdrucksache (BT-Drs.), Bundesratsdrucksache (BR-Drs.). 
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intention, it is suggested that historical interpretation is a necessary technique to carry out 
purposive construction.  
dd) Teleological interpretation 
Another approach is the teleological interpretation according to which one searches the 
meaning and the objective of a legal provision, the ratio legis. In doing so, one can assess, for 
instance, whether a provision has to be interpreted widely or narrowly. 
In terms of § 3 EFZG3613 in which the conditions for a continued remuneration of employees 
in the case of illness and other instances are set out, employees have a right of continued 
remuneration if they are unable to work due to illness and they are not responsible for this 
inability to work. The wording of this provision indicates that employees lose their right of 
remuneration in the case of a fault, even when causing their incapacity by negligence. This 
provision does however not aim to restrict employees unnecessarily from leisure activities. The 
term 'fault' in this provision rather includes activities that differ considerably from those that 
employees usually have to undertake in their own interest (e.g., respecting certain safety rules 
at work). If an employee hurts himself while exercising in his spare time, he thus keeps his 
right of continued remuneration in terms of § 3 EFZG.3614  
2.2   Gap-filling 
a)  Complementary interpretation 
Statutory interpretation does not merely concern the assessment of the legislature's intention. 
Sometimes the legislator did not regulate a specific question, or it unconsciously did not 
consider it. The filling of such a gap – or lacuna – is referred to as 'complementary 
interpretation'. 
b)  Determination of a lacuna 
A lacuna exists where the legislator did not consider a particular question or did not consider 
it correctly (primary lacuna),3615 or where the gap arose only after enacting the statute 
(secondary lacuna).3616 A court is not entitled though to close this gap by its own valuations 
but must take the legislator's standpoint and close the loophole in the law's spirit instead. Hence, 
the court must consider how the legislator would have regulated the question. By doing so, the 
                                                             
3613 EFZG = Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz (Act on Continued Employment Remuneration). 
3614 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 35. 
3615 Primäre Lücke. 
3616 Sekundäre Lücke. 
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court must not only consider the legislator's imperatives but also take into account its 
motivations and weighing of interests.3617 
Complementary interpretation might lead to an extensive construction of a legal provision if 
the given question is not covered by the provision (Gesetzesanalogie). In other cases, a gap can 
be closed by applying a principle that is contained in several legal provisions so that several 
provisions are applied by analogy (Rechtsanalogie). 
An example of extensive application is § 442(1) 2nd sent. In terms of § 442(1), the rights of the 
buyer due to a defect are excluded if he has knowledge of the defect at the time when the 
contract is entered into. If the buyer does not know of a defect due to gross negligence, the 
buyer may assert rights concerning this defect only if the seller fraudulently concealed the 
defect or gave a guarantee of the quality of the thing. This provision does not regulate the 
question though whether the buyer can assert his or her rights if the seller fraudulently gave the 
false impression that the merx is free of defects. The (not regulated) case where the seller 
fraudulently makes believe the purchaser that the sold item is free of defects, and the (regulated) 
case where he or she fraudulently concealed the defect, are similar, however. In both cases, the 
seller consciously takes advantage of the purchaser's ignorance with respect to the actual 
condition of the sold thing. The law thus contains a gap concerning this unregulated question. 
Had the legislator seen this problem, it would have regulated it in the same way as for concealed 
defects. Hence, § 442(1) 2nd sent. must be interpreted extensively.3618 
Several legal provisions are applied by analogy in the following example: Under § 1004(1), if 
the ownership is interfered with by means other than removal or retention of possession, the 
owner may require the disturber to remove the interference. If further interferences are to be 
feared, the owner may seek a prohibitory injunction. A prohibitory injunction can also be 
required where a right to a name is infringed in terms of § 12,3619 or where a possessor is 
disturbed in his or her possession by unlawful interference under § 862(1).3620 If the violation 
of another right, e.g., of general personal rights by untrue claims in the press media,3621 or a 
                                                             
3617 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 37. 
3618 Example from Palandt/Weidenkaff § 442 para 18. 
3619 § 12: 'If the right of a person to use a name is disputed by another person, or if the interest of the person 
entitled to the name is injured by the unauthorised use of the same name by another person, the person entitled 
may require the other to remove the infringement. If further infringements are to be feared, the person entitled 
may seek a prohibitory injunction.'  
3620 § 862(1): 'If the possessor is disturbed in his possession by unlawful interference, he may require the disturber 
to remove the disturbance. If further disturbances are to be feared, the possessor may seek a prohibitory injunction.'  
3621 Brox and Walker SchuldR-BT § 45 para 21 et seq, Brox and Walker BGB-AT 37. 
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disturbance of an established and operating business3622 by an unlawful strike,3623 is to be 
feared, there is no expressly regulated legal basis for stopping such an interference though. In 
this case, the interests are the same for the owner, name holder or possessor since it is not 
acceptable that the person in question must wait until a violation of its rights becomes a fact in 
order to claim damages under § 823(1). Hence, as §§ 1004, 12 and 862 are based on the same 
principle, they are applied by analogy with regard to a preventive right to an injunction.3624 
Moreover, a gap can also exist where a specific problem has not been regulated, although one 
would have expected that it has (open lacuna). Such an open gap is closed by an analogous 
application of other provisions. If in the example mentioned earlier concerning § 442 the seller 
fraudulently makes the false impression that the sold item has specific characteristics (instead 
of fraudulently concealing a defect or making believe that the merx is free from defects), this 
gap is closed by an analogous application of § 442.3625 
In other cases, a legal provision contains rules that do not fit all the problems the law is 
supposed to regulate. In these cases, the legislator did not consider particularities that some 
instances may present. Insofar there is a so-called 'concealed gap' which can – and must - be 
closed by the court. Then, the judge may derive from the unambiguous wording of the provision 
by restricting its application in the spirit of the law (restrictive interpretation or teleological 
reduction). 
Example:  In terms of § 398,3626A can assign the purchase price he can claim from B to C. 
However, § 400 provides that a claim may not be assigned to the extent that it 
is not subject to pledge. Hence, A would not be allowed to assign his unseizable 
wage entitlements (salary) that he has against his employer. The reason of this 
provision is to ensure a minimum subsistence level and to prevent that the person 
in question becomes a burden for the general public in terms of social welfare. 
The legislator assumed that these reasons exist for all assignments. It did not 
consider cases though where the norm's protective purpose is not jeopardized, 
e.g., where A transfers his claims to C and the latter pays him regularly a certain 
amount which is equal to the transferred claim. Therefore, § 400 must be 
interpreted restrictively in the sense that the assignment of an unseizable claim 
is not prohibited if the assignee receives equal payment.3627 
                                                             
3622 Eingerichteter und ausgeübter Gewerbebetrieb. 
3623 Brox and Walker SchuldR-BT § 45 para 15 et seq, Brox and Walker BGB-AT 37. 
3624 Brox and Walker SchuldR-BT § 53 para 5 et seq, Brox and Walker BGB-AT 37. 
3625 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 38. 
3626 § 398: 'A claim may be transferred by the obligee to another person by contract with that person (assignment). 
When the contract is entered into, the new obligee steps into the shoes of the previous obligee.'  
3627 BGHZ 4, 153 (163); 13, 360 = BGH NJW 1954, 1153. 
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3. Interpretation of contractual provisions 
3.1   Objective of interpretation 
Although generally, standard terms are sophisticated provisions that have been formulated by 
experts, certain formulations may not be clear or ambiguous, or the contract concluded on the 
basis of standard business terms is incomplete. Then, the terms have to be interpreted according 
to the rules of interpretation.3628 In the following, the interpretation of contractual provisions 
will be discussed before we will have a closer look at the interpretation of standard business 
terms. 
3.2   Distinction between interpretation and content control 
The German legislature favoured 'open content control',3629 i.e., the reasons for the inadequacy 
of standard terms must be unfolded within the content control, and not 'concealed' within the 
interpretational control, which then would serve as a 'correction' of standard terms. Hence, in 
German law, interpretational control takes place before content control.3630 This order can be 
explained by the fact that one can only assess the content of contract terms when knowing their 
meaning.3631 The opposite approach had been applied before the AGBG came into force.3632 
Inadequate interpretations of a clause were simply not taken into account which often led to 
the result that the focus was not the content that the parties 'wanted'3633 but the content that 
'ought to be'3634 according to the legal order.3635  
3.3  Objective standard of interpretation - The standard of the BGB 
As standard terms are of contractual nature, they are subject to the general rules of 
interpretation of contracts and declarations of intent set out in §§ 1333636 and 157.3637 On the 
basis of these provisions, certain principles have been developed over time.3638 
In terms of § 133, when a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to ascertain the 
true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration. In other words, 
                                                             
3628 Stoffels AGB-Recht 131. 
3629 Offene Inhaltskontrolle. 
3630 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634). 
3631 Stoffels AGB-Recht 131. 
3632 See Historical Overview in Part II ch 1. 
3633 'Das Gewollte'. 
3634 'Das Gesollte'. 
3635 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 21. 
3636 § 133: 'Interpretation of a declaration of intent ─ When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to 
ascertain the true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration.'  
3637 § 157: 'Interpretation of contracts ─ Contracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking customary 
practice into consideration.'  
3638 For an overview of these principles, see Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT §§ 28 and 33. 
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interpretation serves the assessment of the intention of a party. In order to be relevant in legal 
transactions, this (interior) intention must be 'communicated' to the exterior by means of a 
declaration, however. Therefore, the mere intention of a party can neither be the object nor the 
objective of interpretation.3639 This also applies for last wills which also must be 'declared' and 
even require a certain form (§ 2231).3640 
a) Simple interpretation 
aa) Objective, application and significance 
The interpretation has the objective to assess the parties' intention which is expressed in the 
contract by means of their declarations. This intention is relevant because of the principle of 
freedom of contract.3641 The point of departure of the interpretation of declarations of intent or 
contracts is the declaration of the party in question. Taking into consideration merely the 
wording of a party's declaration is not sufficient though, which is why § 133 sets out that it 'is 
necessary to ascertain the true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the 
declaration.' The enquiry of a party's true intention does not suffice though since it is important 
to ascertain the sense of a declaration by interpretation, and not – contrary to the wording of 
§ 133 – the unilateral intention of the declarant. Interpretation must thus take into consideration 
the interests of the recipient of the declaration.3642 By doing so, all circumstances beyond the 
declaration have to be considered, such as linguistic characteristics of the person, prospects, 
contractual negotiations and customary practice.3643 Seemingly unambiguous declarations 
must be interpreted too by taking into consideration all surrounding circumstances. If A sells 
'100 pianos' to B, and from the negotiations one can conclude that A and B deal with weapons 
which for confidentiality reasons they name after music instruments  (whereby 'pianos' stands 
for 'machine guns'), the 'unambiguous' declaration of '100 pianos' must be interpreted as '100 
machine guns'.3644 Interpretation is significant because it shows whether or not there is a 
declaration of intent.3645 Furthermore, it will show if a contract has been established, i.e., if the 
                                                             
3639 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 41. 
3640 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 41. 
3641 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. 
3642 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 42. 
3643 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. If it is not clear if a price in a contract of sale expressed in 'Dollars' means U.S.-
American, Australian or Canadian Dollars, and the seller acquired the items in Canada, one can conclude that the 
stipulated price is expressed in Canadian Dollars. 
3644 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 61. 
3645 If X replies to Y's question with 'yes', it very much depends on the question of whether this 'yes' means the 
acceptance of an offer or not. This is the case where Y asked X if he wanted to purchase his car for EUR 5,000, 
but not where Y asked X if he was at the zoo yesterday. Example (slightly modified) from Brox and Walker BGB-
AT 61. 
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offer and the acceptance of the offer are congruent.3646 Finally, it serves to establish the legal 
consequences of an agreement.3647  
There is a tension between the subjective standard of § 133 (true intention) and the objective 
standard of § 157 though which requires the consideration of good faith and which seems to 
apply only to contracts, whereas § 133 applies to all declarations of intent. The leading view 
aims to resolve this contradiction by applying § 157 beyond its wording to all declarations of 
intent that have to be received by the other party (e.g., an employer's notice), and § 133 only to 
those that need not to be received by another. This view does however not consider that also 
for contracts, the parties' true intention is relevant which is expressed by the falsa demonstratio 
non nocet principle. It would therefore not be appropriate not to apply § 133 also to 
contracts.3648 The relevance of the true intention is restricted for declarations that require a 
certain form (e.g., a last will), or for declarations of intent that need to be received by the other 
party in order to be effective. The same applies where the good faith principle of § 157 comes 
into play, i.e., the consideration of how the other party had to understand the declaration.3649 
By and large, the scope of application of §§ 133 and 157 is overlapping and cannot be separated 
in most cases.3650 
On the other hand, the controversy concerning the question of whether § 133 or § 157 takes 
priority over the other norm, as well the functional relation between these two norms are 
irrelevant in practice because the courts have developed a 'canon of interpretative principles' or 
'canon of construction'3651 that will be discussed in the following.3652 
bb) Method of interpretation 
The natural interpretation takes into consideration only the real intention of the party issuing a 
declaration of intent. In contrast, the normative interpretation also considers the interests of the 
recipient of the declaration.3653 If the parties' intentions cannot be concluded from their 
declarations through natural interpretation, declarations of intent that have to be received by 
                                                             
3646 Medicus BGB-AT 159 and 160. This is for instance not the case if both parties had a different currency for 
payment in mind. 
3647 Interpretation will come to the result that the tenant who writes to his landlord that he has found a better and 
cheaper apartment and therefore will move out by the end of the month means that he gives notice by the end of 
the month. Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 61. 
3648 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 43. 
3649 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 44. 
3650 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 2. 
3651 Kanon von Auslegungsgrundsätzen. 
3652 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 1. 
3653 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 62. 
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the other party to become effective are to be interpreted from the standpoint of the recipient of 
the declaration, i.e., by applying the standard of the normative interpretation. Where the 
contract contains an unintentional gap – or lacuna –, an objective-generalising standard taking 
into account the parties' hypothetical intention is applied (complementary interpretation).3654 
These different methods of construction as well as the modified interpretational standard for 
standard business terms will be presented below. 
(i)  Natural interpretation 
Natural interpretation of a declaration of intent takes place when only the intention of the party 
issuing a declaration of intent is taken into account (§ 133) and the recipient's interests are not, 
because the latter does not deserve or need protection. This is the case, for instance, for a last 
will, where only the testator's interests are worthy of protection.3655 
In most legal transactions however, also the other party's interests must be considered. This is 
namely the case where a declaration of intent has to be received by the other party in order to 
become effective,3656 such as the cancellation of a contract, or an offer or the acceptance of an 
offer for the conclusion of an agreement. In these cases, the recipient of the declaration of intent 
must be able to take measures in order to adjust to the legal situation created by the declaration 
of intent. However, if the declaration deviates from the real intention of the party issuing the 
declaration, one has to ask whether the recipient has to be protected and if the declaration is 
binding. This is not the case if the recipient realises what the other party meant. It is not 
important if he or she chose another formulation consciously or erroneously (falsa 
demonstratio non nocet).3657 The recipient of the declaration also deserves no protection if it 
does not recognise the actual intention of the other party, but could do so by applying 
reasonable care. The parties have an obligation of mutual consideration, which is why the 
recipient of a declaration of intent has to interpret the other party's declaration.3658 If this 
interpretation gives some indication that the other party's declaration does not correspond with 
                                                             
3654 Stoffels AGB-Recht 132. 
3655 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 62. 
3656 Empfangsbedürftige Willenserklärung. 
3657 See the example above where the parties consciously designated weapons by music instruments. Brox and 
Walker BGB-AT 63. 
3658 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 9. 
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its actual intention, the recipient cannot rely on the declaration and has to require 
clarification.3659 
(ii)  Normative interpretation 
Contrary to natural interpretation, normative interpretation does not aim to assess the actual 
intention of the party issuing a declaration of intent, but the objective meaning of the 
declaration in order to consider the interests of the recipient of the declaration.3660 Hence, it is 
significant how the recipient could understand or must have understood the meaning of the 
declaration.3661 
Unlike the natural interpretation which has its basis in the wording of § 133 ('real intention'), 
the legal basis for normative interpretation cannot be found in § 157 (nor in § 133) but results 
from the principle of legitimate expectations3662 and §§ 119 et seq.3663 
Like for statutory interpretation, the wording of the given declaration (provision in a contract) 
is the starting point for interpretation. This also applies to declarations that are assumingly 
unambiguous and clear, because only by interpretation one can ascertain that the declaration is 
congruent with the true intention. If not, the falsa demonstratio non nocet principle applies.3664 
The objective of grammatical interpretation is to find out the grammatical and ordinary 
meaning of the words of the contract.3665 This rationale is based on the assumption that the use 
of certain words or phrases of a language is based on a convention and that the parties to a 
contract, who know the conventional meaning of the words contained therein, will use them 
accordingly in order to be understood.3666 The language of an agreement offers a 'firmer 
                                                             
3659 If for instance, a seller from Cologne writes to the purchaser in Munich that he offers a certain painting for 
5,000 Dollars, the purchaser has to ask the seller if he means American or Canadian Dollars and cannot choose 
the currency that is more favourable for him. Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 63 and 64. 
3660 Stoffels AGB-Recht 132. 
3661 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 52. 
3662 Vertrauensschutz. 
3663 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 7. 
3664 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 45. 
3665 In South African common law, this is known as Lord Wensleydale's golden rule from Grey v Pearson (1857) 
10 ER 1216 at 1236, according to which '(…) the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered 
to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, 
in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and 
inconsistency, but no farther.' In this regard, see Crispette and Candy Co Ltd v Oscar Michaelis NO and Leopold 
Alexander Michaelis NO 1947 (4) SA 521 (A) at 543; N&B Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v British Trading 
Insurance Co Ltd 1966 (2) SA 522 (W) at 525C; Kalil v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1967 (4) SA 550 (A) 
at 556D; Western Credit Bank Ltd v Van der Merwe 1970 (3) SA 461 (C) at 463H. 
3666 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 256. See also Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Bekker 1992 (1) SA 617 (A) at 
624G-625B, Hirt & Carter (Pty) Ltd v Mansfield 2008 (3) SA 512 (D) at para [63]-[70]; African Products (Pty) 
Ltd v AIG South Africa Ltd 2009 (3) SA 473 (SCA) at para [13]. 
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footing' for the assertion of the parties' common intention at the time when they contracted than 
the assertion of their actual intention locked up in their minds, or what they maintain being 
their intention when a dispute arises.3667 Difficulties arise where the parties attribute different 
meanings to the same word or phrase.3668 In addition, the meaning of words changes over time 
or in different circumstances. The 'ordinary meaning' therefore describes the meaning of a word 
of phrase in the given contractual context. When reading the contract as a whole, this might be 
the everyday meaning, or a more unusual, technical one.3669  
Words have to be seen in their context and use of the parties in question,3670 and never in 
isolation (in vacuo).3671 Laypersons will use different terminology than business people or 
lawyers. If the recipient of a declaration of intent is someone familiar with legal terminology, 
it can be assumed that he or she understands the terminology with the meaning that the courts 
and legal literature attach to it. Laypersons too must research legal terminology to a certain 
extent (unlike, e.g., medical terminology) though because by concluding a contract they 
participate in a legal transaction (and not in a medical conversation) that by its mere nature 
involves legal terminology.3672 
Hence, similar to statutory interpretation, the context of the declaration has to be taken into 
consideration (systematic interpretation).3673 This is 'the context in which the word or phrase is 
used with its interrelation to the contract as a whole, including the nature and purpose of the 
                                                             
3667 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 215. See Hansen, Schrader & Co v De Gasperi 1903 TH 100 at 103. 
3668 This is the case, for instance, where the parties usually use the same word in different circumstances or 
domains. One party might use a term in its all-day meaning, whereas the other uses it in its meaning that it has 
acquired by trade usage or law. For instance, in every-day language 'owner' and 'possessor' have the same meaning, 
whereas their meaning is different in legal terminology. 
3669 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 216. Jansen JA's statement in Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 (A) at 646B, in words adopted in List v Jungers 1979 
(3) 106 (A) 119A-B are very instructive in this regard. 
3670 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 14. See also Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays 
National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 (A) at 646. In Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) 
SA 710 (A) at 726H-727A, Hefer JA remarked: 'Recourse to authoritative dictionaries is, of course, a permissible 
and often helpful method available to the Courts to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words. (…) But judicial 
interpretation cannot be undertaken (…) by excessive peering at the language to be interpreted without sufficient 
attention to the contextual scene.' In De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka 1980 (2) SA 191 
(T) at 196E-F, Nicholas stated in connection to the interpretation of a patent specification: 'A dictionary meaning 
of a word cannot govern the interpretation. It can only afford a guide. And, where a word has more than one 
meaning, the dictionary does not, indeed it cannot, prescribe priorities of meaning.' 
3671 See Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
3672 Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 52, with further references, Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 46. 
3673 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 14. See also Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
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contract.'3674 Grammatical and systematic interpretation cannot be separated however since the 
grammatical or literal meaning of words can only be assessed in their context.3675  
The recipient has to interpret the declaration in order to find out the actual intention of the other 
party (§ 133) and use all accessible material, such as negotiations, correspondence, preliminary 
information and even the invitatio ad offerendum etc.3676 For the recipient, it will not always 
be possible though to assess the other's intention. If the actual intention of the party issuing a 
declaration of intent is not congruent with the issued declaration, and the recipient cannot 
conclude from other material that the other party meant something different, the content of the 
declaration as expressed is valid. If A writes to B that he wants to sell a painting for 890 Euros, 
but actually means 980 Euros, and the potential purchaser cannot conclude from outside 
material that the price contains a typo and accepts this offer, the painting is sold for 890 Euros. 
If, on the other hand, the purchaser has corresponded with the seller before the sale, and in the 
seller's correspondence he always indicated 980 Euros as the sales price, the painting is sold 
for 980 Euros.3677 Where the recipient of the declaration of intent cannot assess the other party's 
real intention for lack of other indications outside the declaration, it is justified that the 
recipient's interests take precedence. This is because the deviation of the declaration and the 
actual intention of the other party originated in the other party's sphere.3678 In this case, it is not 
relevant what the party who issued the declaration of intent actually meant, but how the 
recipient had to understand the declaration (interpretation from the standpoint of the recipient 
of the declaration).3679 If a client calls a travel agency in order to book a trip to Porto in Portugal, 
and the agent understands 'Bordeaux' (in France) due to the client's Saxon accent (in which 
hard consonants are pronounced softly), the customer booked a trip to Bordeaux.3680 This result 
is supported by §§ 157 and 119(1) as '[c]ontracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, 
taking the customary practice into consideration', and the party issuing the declaration can void 
                                                             
3674 Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. Schreiner JA referred to this as 'linguistic treatment' 
in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 454-455. 
3675 See also discussion in Part I ch 4 para 4.1 a). 
3676 See BGH NJW 2003, 1317. 
3677 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 64. 
3678 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 64. 
3679 Auslegung nach dem Empfängerhorizont. See BGH NJW 2013, 598 (599); 2008, 2702 (2704); 1984, 721. 
3680 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 65. 
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its declaration pursuant to § 119(1).3681 Then, the contract is void from the outset in terms of 
§ 142(1).3682 
Other surrounding circumstances must be taken into account too when assessing the true 
intention, such as the genesis of the contract (pre-negotiation),3683 or the fact that the given 
parties have developed certain practices over time from former business relations.3684 
The South African approach3685 also includes extra-textual elements, i.e., the extended context 
of a contract, or the background circumstances so that useful conclusions with regard to the 
intended meaning from the nature of the contract, its purpose and background can be drawn.3686  
The consideration of extra-textual elements is restricted by the parol evidence rule though. This 
rule provides that where the parties intended to lay down their agreement fully and finally in 
writing, evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of the writing is 
inadmissible.3687  
The interpretation of a contract normally requires a reference to extraneous facts. In order to 
draw a line, South African courts traditionally distinguished between background 
circumstances and surrounding circumstances.3688 This distinction is blurred and artificial, 
however. This is why the courts no longer apply this distinction3689 and tend to allow all 
                                                             
3681 § 119(1): 'A person who, when making a declaration of intent, was mistaken about its contents or had no 
intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed 
that he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of the factual position and with a sensible 
understanding of the case.'  
3682 § 142(1): 'If a voidable legal transaction is avoided, it is to be regarded as having been void from the outset.'  
3683 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 16. 
3684 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 17. 
3685 See the discussion in Part I ch 4. 
3686 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257. 
3687 Union Government v Vianini Ferr Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 47; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 
(A) 938; Dreyer v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 548 (SCA). The parol evidence rule was first stated in 
Lowrey v Steedman 1914 AD 532 at 543: 'The rule is that when a contract has once been reduced to writing no 
evidence may be given of its terms except the document itself, nor may the contents of such document be 
contradicted, altered, added to or varied by oral evidence.' 
3688 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 260. 
3689 Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 2008 (5) SA 1 (SCA); 
KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA); Natal Joint Municipality 
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA); Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA); Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport 
(Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA); Airports Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd  2019 (2) 
BCLR 165. See also Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A); Boerne v Harris 1949 (1) SA 
793 (A); Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A). 
In Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk, Wallis JA summarises the 
development as follows at para [12]: 'Whilst the starting point remains the words of the document, which are the 
only relevant medium through which the parties have expressed their contractual intentions, the process of 
interpretation does not stop at a perceived literal meaning of those words, but considers them in the light of all 
relevant and admissible context, including the circumstances in which the document came into being. The former 
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evidence in order to determine the meaning of a word or phrase. This is because the relevance 
of evidence cannot be determined before the end of a case, which of course defies the purpose 
of the parol evidence rule.3690  
What is more, the imprecise definition of background and surrounding circumstances made it 
difficult for a judge not to consider also extrinsic evidence, such as previous negotiations and 
correspondence between the parties, their subsequent conduct, or direct evidence of their own 
intentions.3691 Extrinsic evidence can be a valuable source though. Often extrinsic documents, 
such as correspondence, are clear enough to read the parties' intentions, without digging in their 
respective state of minds at the time when the contract was concluded.3692  
For normative interpretation, one has to take the perspective of an honest and reasonable 
recipient.3693 According to the prevailing view, the recipient has an obligation to interpret the 
other's declaration diligently.3694  
The objective standpoint of the recipient is irrelevant though where the recipient is aware of 
the actual intention of the other.3695 If a client in a restaurant orders food on the basis of a wrong 
menu (e.g., the lunch menu with lower prices instead of the dinner menu) and is aware of this 
fact (e.g., because it is clearly written on the menu or the client knows the restaurant's policy), 
the client's actual standpoint is relevant, i.e., his or her knowledge of the owner's actual 
intention to sell food at the 'dinner prices'.3696 
Where the parties issue their respective declarations of intent by means of electronic 
communication, e.g., in an automatic booking system, it is not relevant for the interpretation 
how the system processes these declarations. It is relevant though how a human recipient 
understands it as required by good faith, taking the customary practice into consideration.3697  
                                                             
distinction between permissible background and surrounding circumstances, never very clear, has fallen away. 
Interpretation is no longer a process that occurs in stages but is ‘essentially one unitary exercise’. Accordingly 
it is no longer helpful to refer to the earlier approach'. In the summary, one can concisely read: '[I]nterpretation a 
unitary process commencing with the words and construing them in the light of all relevant circumstances – no 
distinction to be drawn between background and surrounding circumstances.' Emphasis added. 
3690 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 260.  
3691 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 261, Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767-768. 
3692 For the contrary view, see Hutchison et al Law of Contract 265. 
3693 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 52. 
3694 See Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 52, with further references, Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 18 
et seq. 
3695 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 53. 
3696 See Jhering school case in Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 20, with further references. 
3697 See § 157. BGH ZIP 2017, 928 para 23, with notes by Dornis JZ 2017, 637. Therefore, no contract of 
transportation has been established where a person fills in the indispensable case for the passenger's name with 
the indication 'not known yet'. BGH NJW 2013, 598 et seq, with notes by Hoppperdietzel and Schinkels LMK 
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Even if the party issuing a declaration of intent is not aware that he or she issues such a 
declaration, and  the recipient must conclude, by applying a reasonable standard of care, that 
the other party has the intention to enter into a legal transaction, the recipient deserves 
protection. Therefore, the transaction is concluded.3698 
The formulation that interpretation is superfluous where both parties' true intentions are 
concordant is mistakable in that the enquiry that the parties had the same intention inevitably 
necessitates an interpretation. What is more, their concordant intention might have a gap that 
requires to be filled.3699 
b) Complementary interpretation 
aa)  Definition 
If the parties did not stipulate one or several points in their agreement ─ either consciously 
because they were believed that the contract does not need to provide for this issue, or 
unconsciously because they overlooked the issue, or it did not exist at the time when they 
concluded their agreement ─ complementary interpretation comes into play. Complementary 
interpretation requires an unintentional lacuna, or loophole, which has to be filled by the court. 
In certain cases, the law itself is of help by providing for dispositive provisions.3700 For 
instance, if the contract of sale between the parties does not contain a provision for the case of 
a defective merx because the parties assumed that it was faultless, §§ 434 et seq. BGB provide 
for the legal consequences. The court therefore does not have to apply the principles of 
complementary interpretation.3701 Where these legal provisions are not suited in the particular 
circumstances, the judge has to fill the gap by applying the principles of complementary 
interpretation.3702 
                                                             
2013, 343553. In another case, the seller offered an e-bike on Ebay and indicated EUR 100 next to the buy-it-now 
button. Next to the price he added the indication 'New Pedelec EUR 2,600 ─ read description!!' At the end of this 
description one could read: 'Attention! Since I cannot put more than EUR 100 for this auction (because of the high 
transaction costs), you agree that by clicking on the offer for EUR 100 with the actual price of EUR 2,600.' The 
BGH decided that the purchaser had to interpret this offer insofar as the e-bike cost EUR 2,600, as from his 
standpoint he could assess the actual price (BGH ZIP 2017, 928 para 12 et seq). 
3698 In the (fictional) case of the wine auction of Treves, A rises his hand in order to wave his friend B, without 
knowing that this gesture in this particular auction taking place in Treves means that he is making an offer of EUR 
100 above the previous offer. The auctioneer must conclude that A made an offer as from his standpoint, he could 
not know that A had no intention to enter into a legal transaction. This case is cited, e.g., in Brox and Walker 
BGB-AT 45 and 66. See also BGHZ 91, 324 = BGH NJW 1984; 2279; BGHZ 109, 171 (177) = BGH NJW 1990, 
454; 2010, 861 (862); 2011, 1434 et seq (normative interpretation of a certain conduct as implied approval). 
3699 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 8, Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 45. 
3700 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 67. 
3701 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 67. 
3702 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 67. 
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bb)  Lacuna 
In order to perform complementary interpretation, there must be an unintentional lacuna which 
has to be assessed by the interpretation of the legal transaction. Not only the intention to enter 
into a legal transaction is to be assessed, but also the reasons and circumstances which led to 
this intention. Therefore, an unintentional lacuna only exists where the party issuing the 
declaration of intent did not consider ─ or considered wrongly ─ certain circumstances.3703 It 
is not relevant whether a party did not take into account certain circumstances which existed at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract (primary lacuna) or which came into being afterwards 
(secondary lacuna).3704 
cc) Gap-filling 
If the judge has established that the transaction contains an unintentional lacuna, he or she has 
to fill it by assessing what the parties would have agreed if they had considered the particular 
circumstance by applying the principles of good faith and customary practice in terms of § 157. 
Therefore, not the parties' actual intention is relevant, but what they would have reasonably 
stipulated if they had known of the loophole in their contract.3705 In doing so, the court has to 
take into consideration the particular circumstances of the case, such as the parties' reasons to 
enter into the contract, their interests as well as the customary practice.3706 
The term 'hypothetical intention' of the party that is often used to describe the objective of 
interpretation is misleading though as it insinuates that the parties' intention has to be assessed 
empirically. In reality, gap-filling by interpretation is very far from finding this intention since 
in fact, the explanatory value of the party's conduct must be found.3707 The same applies to 
statutory interpretation, where the analogous application of legal norms has nothing to do with 
                                                             
3703 If A and B, who both own bookstores in different cities, decide to swap their establishments, and B returns 
after a couple of months to his former city in order to open a new bookstore next to his old one (which now 
belongs to A), there is no lacuna if both parties anticipated B's return and B had made clear to A during their 
negotiations that he reserved his right to return and open a new bookstore next to his old shop. On the other hand, 
there is a lacuna if the parties both did not anticipate B's return and thus did not provide for a non-competition 
clause in the contract. For similar cases, see BGH NJW 2002, 2310, BGHZ 127, 138 (142) = BGH NJW 1994, 
3287. 
3704 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 67. 
3705 BGH NJW 2013, 678 (679). 
3706 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 68. In the aforementioned bookstore case, the judge has to consider that if the 
parties had anticipated B's speedy return, they had taken into account that for A it would be impossible to 
consolidate the commercial relationships and customers that previously were B's partners and clients in such a 
short time without suffering commercial losses due to B's return. Since B's speedy return jeopardizes the 
contractual objective, the parties would have stipulated a non-competition clause, and the lacuna has to be filled 
in this regard. See BGHZ 16, 71 (77 et seq) = BGH NJW 1955, 337.  
3707 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 9, Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 51. 
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the intention of the historical legislator. Both the interpretation of contractual provisions and 
statutory interpretation are a legal assessment and not fact-finding.3708   
Sometimes, a gap is filled by the application of the ius dispositivum. Applying this approach 
systematically would infringe the principle of private autonomy though because the parties' 
intention is not necessarily that statutory provisions fill a gap. The fact that they did not 
positively find a provision to fill the given gap does not mean that they did not wish to exclude 
the ius dispositivum. This applies above all for atypical or mixed-type contracts where it is 
difficult to find appropriate legal provisions that regulate this type of agreements. What is more, 
by choosing such an atypical contract type, the parties expressed their intention to submit their 
legal transaction to another order than the one expressed in the law. It is thus more appropriate 
to develop this order further and to use it as a model for the filling of the existing gap than 
drawing on statutory provisions.3709 
c) General principles of interpretation 
Besides the principles as mentioned above, several other principles and maxims exist that will 
be presented below. In South African terminology, these belong to the so-called 'secondary 
rules of interpretation'.  
In certain cases, the BGB provisions set out how a contractual provision has to be interpreted 
in case of doubt. This is usually expressed by the term 'unless'.3710 Hence, one can assume that 
§ 139 serves as an interpretational rule according to which certain transactions are void in their 
entirety, and that for contracts, the contrary is the case since § 20853711 provides only partial 
ineffectiveness for last wills.3712 In practice, the application of these clauses is circumvented 
by severability clauses3713 and for contracts containing standard business terms, §§ 306(1) and 
310(3) set out that the agreement is effective (which is the contrary legal consequence of 
                                                             
3708 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 51. 
3709 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 50. 
3710 § 139: 'If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed 
that it would have been undertaken even without the void part.' ('wenn nicht'); § 145: 'Any person who offers to 
another to enter into a contract is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being bound by it' ('es sei denn'); 
§ 149: ' If a declaration of acceptance received late by the offeror was sent in such a way that it would have 
reached him in time if it had been forwarded in the usual way, and if the offeror ought to have recognised this, he 
must notify the acceptor of the delay after receipt of the declaration without undue delay, unless this has already 
been done. If he delays the sending of the notification, the acceptance is deemed not to be late' ('sofern'), to 
mention but a few.  
3711 § 2085: 'The ineffectiveness of one of a number of dispositions contained in a will results in the ineffectiveness 
of the other dispositions only if it is to be assumed that the testator would not have made them without the 
ineffective disposition.'  
3712 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 54. 
3713 Staudinger/Roth § 139 para 22, with further references. 
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§ 139).3714 Other provisions that prescribe a certain interpretation are §§ 311c,3715 328(2)3716 
and 364(2).3717 
Moreover, jurisprudence has developed some interpretational maxims. The falsa 
demonstration non nocet principle according to which an erroneous declaration is irrelevant if 
the declarant's real intention was visible or could be ascertained by the other,3718  has already 
been discussed. Strictly speaking, the falsa demonstratio principle is no maxim in itself, but 
merely what § 133 sets out: the true intention must be ascertained, and the literal meaning of a 
declaration is irrelevant.3719 
According to the protestatio facto contraria maxim, a declaration cannot be restricted by a 
reservation that has not been expressly declared.3720 Reversely, a party that impliedly conducts 
unambiguously cannot destroy its declaration by a verbal counter-declaration.3721 In the second 
case however, one can put forward the argument against the application of the protestatio 
principle that an express declaration must be taken into account because of the principle of 
party autonomy.3722 Therefore, by a reservation to make a certain performance by a legal 
transaction, e.g., the agreement that the ownership shall pass onto the other party in terms of 
§ 929,3723 the legal consequence set out in § 8143724 (knowledge that the debt is not owned) can 
be avoided.3725 
                                                             
3714 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 54. 
3715 § 311c: 'If a person agrees to dispose of or charge a thing, that duty, in case of doubt, also applies to accessories 
of the thing.'  
3716 § 328: '(1) Performance to a third party may be agreed by contract with the effect that the third party acquires 
the right to demand the performance directly. (2) In the absence of a specific provision it is to be inferred from 
the circumstances, in particular from the purpose of the contract, whether the third party is to acquire the right, 
whether the right of the third party is to come into existence immediately or only under certain conditions, and 
whether the power is to be reserved for the parties to the contract to terminate or alter the right of the third party 
without his approval.'  
3717 § 364: '(1) The obligation expires if the obligee accepts, in lieu of performance of contract, performance other 
than that owed. (2) If the obligor assumes a new obligation to the obligee for the purpose of satisfying the latter, 
it is not to be assumed, in case of doubt, that he is assuming the obligation in lieu of performance of contract.'  
3718 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'falsa demonstration non nocet'. 
3719 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 56. 
3720 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'protestatio facto contraria', which refers to 'Willenserklärung' (1b bb). 
3721 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 57. 
3722 Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 60, with further references. 
3723 § 929: 'For the transfer of the ownership of a movable thing, it is necessary that the owner delivers the thing 
to the acquirer and both agree that ownership is to pass. If the acquirer is in possession of the thing, agreement on 
the transfer of the ownership suffices.'  
3724 § 814: 'Restitution of performance rendered for the purpose of performing an obligation may not be demanded 
if the person who rendered the performance knew that he was not obliged to do so or if the performance complied 
with a moral duty or consideration of decency.'  
3725 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 57. 
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According to another interpretational principle, where declarations are set out in a contract or 
another agreement only the written declarations apply.3726 For individuals that are not business 
people, evidence of the contrary, i.e., a differing intention, is permitted, however.3727 Where 
the law requires a certain form, the principle of the 'entirety of authentication'3728 applies.3729 
Therefore, agreements that are not contained in the contracts are ineffective, except for the cure 
set out in § 311b(1) 2nd sent., for instance.3730  
The rule that any doubts in the interpretation of standard business terms are resolved against 
the user (§ 305c) applies by analogy where a declaration of intent is transmitted by modern 
communication methods or where the text of the contract has been drafted by the party who is 
intellectually and economically superior to the other.3731  
In case of doubt, the interpretation that avoids the contract to be ineffective is to be preferred, 
or3732 that the parties aimed to stipulate legally relevant provisions without contradictions,3733 
or that they wanted to abide to the law and did not strive to agree to unlawful conduct.3734  
d) Result of interpretation 
If the result of the interpretational enquiry is that the declaration of intent remains unclear as 
regards crucial points and is thus not sufficiently definite or unambiguousness, it is void.3735 
By making an ineffective declaration, the declarant might infringe the pre-contractual 
relationship of trust that was built up during the negotiations. In this case, he or she is liable 
for damages according to §§ 311(2) no. 1, 241(2), 280(1).3736 
                                                             
3726 See the discussion on the parol evidence rule above, as well as in Part I ch 2 para 4.1.b) and ch 4 para 4.1 a). 
3727 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 58. 
3728 Grundsatz der Gesamtbeurkundung. 
3729 Staudinger/Hertel § 125 para 58. 
3730 § 311b(1): 'A contract by which one party agrees to transfer or acquire ownership of a plot of land must be 
recorded by a notary. A contract not entered into in this form becomes valid with all its contents if a declaration 
of conveyance and registration in the Land Register are effected.' In this regard, see the discussion on the parol 
evidence rule above, as well as in Part I ch 2 para 4.1 b) and ch 4 para 4.1 a). 
3731 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 23 and 26a. 
3732 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 267. 
3733 See, for instance, Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) at 429-430. 
3734 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 26. 
3735 Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 23. 
3736 § 311(2) no. 1: '(2) An obligation with duties under section 241 (2) also comes into existence by (…) the 
commencement of contract negotiations (…)'; § 241(2):'An obligation may also, depending on its contents, oblige 
each party to take account of the rights, legal interests and other interests of the other party.'; § 280(1): ' If the 
obligor breaches a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee may demand damages for the damage caused 
thereby. This does not apply if the obligor is not responsible for the breach of duty.'  
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On the other hand, if the result of the interpretation differs from the real intention of the 
declarant, the declaration is voidable for mistake in terms of § 119(1).3737 Then, the person 
declaring voidablity might be liable in damages under § 122.3738 The principle that 
interpretation takes precedence over voidability3739 applies though.3740 
3.4  The modified interpretational standard for standard business terms 
For the interpretation of standard terms, some particularities concerning the standard of 
interpretation exist. When interpreting standard terms, not the recipient's standpoint, i.e., how 
he or she had to interpret a clause or a contract while applying reasonable care, is relevant. 
Instead, one has to consider the standpoint of an average customer without legal knowledge, 
and under consideration of the relevant public who is normally confronted with these terms 
and conditions.3741 This means that the interpretation does not take into account the 
circumstances of an individual case or the individual understanding of a party.3742 In other 
words, certain means for the interpretation of standard terms are not applicable, such as the 
history of the instrument. On the other hand, the wording of a clause becomes more 
important.3743 Therefore, standard terms of an investment company are to be interpreted 
indifferently, irrespective of whether the other party is inexperienced in investment matters or 
a shrewd investor.3744 
If the parties both attach a meaning to a clause which differs from the objective meaning, the 
meaning attached by the parties is relevant. The courts often motivate this outcome by applying 
§ 305b (priority of individually agreed terms).3745 Stoffels legitimately averts that this 
                                                             
3737 § 119: '(1) A person who, when making a declaration of intent, was mistaken about its contents or had no 
intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed 
that he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of the factual position and with a sensible 
understanding of the case. (2) A mistake about such characteristics of a person or a thing as are customarily 
regarded as essential is also regarded as a mistake about the content of the declaration.'  
3738 § 122(1): 'If a declaration of intent is void under section 118, or avoided under sections 119 and 120, the 
person declaring must, if the declaration was to be made to another person, pay damages to this person, or failing 
this to any third party, for the damage that the other or the third party suffers as a result of his relying on the 
validity of the declaration; but not in excess of the total amount of the interest which the other or the third party 
has in the validity of the declaration.'  
3739 'Auslegung geht vor Anfechtung'. 
3740 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 59. 
3741 BGH NJW 2002, 285 (286); 2007, 504 (505); 2008, 2172 (2173). 
3742 BGHZ 33, 216 (218); 84, 268 (272), BGH NJW 1992, 2629; 2001, 2165 (2166), BAG NZA 2006, 324 (327), 
UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 73 et seq, Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
3743 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 73. The courts have different views on this point though. For an objective 
interpretation oriented towards the wording of a clause: BGH NJW 1988, 3149 (3150); 2002, 441. Standard terms 
of insurance companies have to be interpreted in line with the understanding of an average insured applying 
reasonable care when reading carefully the terms, taking into account how he or she had to understand them in 
their context: BGH NJW 1993, 2368; 1999, 1633, 1634; 2001, 3406. 
3744 BGH NJW 1980, 1947. 
3745 § 305b: 'Individually agreed terms take priority over standard business terms.'  
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reasoning is unnecessarily complicated since this is a case for natural interpretation which also 
for standard terms takes precedence over normative-objective interpretation. After all, also the 
interpretation of standard terms is rooted in §§ 133 and 157.3746 
There are good reasons for the modification of the interpretational standard for standard terms. 
The use of standard terms is characterised by the lack of individual particularities because they 
are designed for a great number of customers.3747 This becomes particularly clear in 
institutional actions where there is no reference to individual circumstances. In the context of 
individual proceedings too, usually no individual circumstances have to be taken into 
consideration for interpretational purposes.3748 In addition, the rationalising effect of standard 
terms would be jeopardised if the user had to fear that its instrument would not be applied in a 
unified manner because of differing interpretations.3749 The objective standard of interpretation 
does not restrict the parties unduly because they can agree on individual terms under § 305b or 
on a different meaning on which they exchange their standpoint during their negotiations. In 
the latter case, the principles of natural interpretation apply.3750 
4. The interpretation of clauses in consumer contracts 
It is arguable if the objective standard of interpretation must also be applied to consumer 
contracts since in terms of § 310(3) no. 3 'in judging an unreasonable disadvantage under 
section 307(1) and (2), the other circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must 
also be taken into account.' Some authors thus assert that the particular-personalised 
circumstances must also be considered for the interpretational control.3751 The wording and the 
position of this provision do not support the view that the objective standard is inapplicable in 
this case. Furthermore, § 310(3) no. 3 is a provision in the context of content control, and not 
interpretational control. Interpretational and content control have to be carried out separately, 
though. This means that the consideration of 'other circumstances' belongs to content control.  
What is more, the opposite view has the effect that the interpretational standards differ 
according to the type of proceeding. In institutional actions, § 310(3) no. 3 does not apply, 
whereas this provision applies to individual actions.3752 
                                                             
3746 Stoffels AGB-Recht 133. 
3747 Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
3748 Stoffels AGB-Recht 134. 
3749 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 75. 
3750 Stoffels AGB-Recht 134. 
3751 Locher Recht der AGB 61, Schmidt-Salzer JZ 1995, 230 et seq. 
3752 Stoffels AGB-Recht 134, PWW/Berger § 305c para 15. 
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5. Interpretational control by means of an appeal on points of law 
From a procedural point of view, one has to distinguish between the determination of the facts 
of the case in question and the interpretation based on these facts.3753 A court deciding on an 
appeal on points of law (Revision)3754 is only allowed to decide on questions of law, but not on 
those pertaining to the facts or to customary practice. Interpretational questions, on the other 
hand, are a matter of legal appreciation. They are reserved for the lower courts which are 
competent for the determination of the facts though. The court of appeal (Revisionsgericht) is 
only competent in these cases if a legal provision, a general rule of logic or an empirical 
principle have been incorrectly applied. It is furthermore competent where substantial material 
for the interpretation (negotiations, prospects, correspondence etc.) has not been considered, or 
a procedural rule has been infringed.3755 The reason for the lack of jurisdiction of the court of 
appeal for questions of fact is that the lower courts are much more familiar with the facts, e.g., 
because they heard evidence.3756 
The interpretation of standard terms is subject to the scrutiny by the BGH deciding on questions 
of law if certain conditions with regard to the territorial competence are fulfilled, whereby 
§ 545 ZPO3757 is applied by analogy. Is to be feared that several courts of appeal (which might 
be simultaneously competent for factual questions) could construe standard terms differently, 
the BGH is competent for the interpretation of standard terms in order to ensure a uniform 
interpretation.3758 The Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) even goes further by stating that 'typical 
clauses' are subject to an appeal on points of law (Revision) without restriction.3759 
6. Special rules of interpretation 
Besides the principles of interpretation mentioned earlier, special rules of interpretation exist. 
These will be discussed in the following. 
                                                             
3753 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 29. 
3754 In German civil procedure, an appeal on points of law (Revision) may only be based on the reason that the 
contested decision is based on a violation of the law (§ 545(1) ZPO). See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 
'Revision', Musialak ZPO 289. In terms of § 542(1) ZPO, '[s]ubject to the following provisions, an appeal on 
points of law may be filed against the final judgments delivered by the appellate instance on fact and law.' Hence, 
an appeal on points of law is permitted against appeal judgments of the Landgerichte (LG) and Oberlandesgerichte 
(OLG). In labour jurisdiction, they are permitted against decisions of the Landesarbeitsgerichte (LAG). 
3755 BGH NJW 1995, 45 (46); 1995, 1212 (1213); 2002, 3232 (3233), BAG NZA 2007, 940 (941). 
3756 Stoffels AGB-Recht 135. 
3757 § 545 ZPO (Grounds for an appeal on points of law): ' (1) An appeal on points of law may only be based on 
the reason that the contested decision is based on a violation of the law. (2) An appeal on points of law may not 
be based on the fact that the court of first instance was wrong in assuming that it had or did not have jurisdiction.' 
3758 BGH NJW 2005, 2919, MüKo/Basedow BGB § 305c para 45. According to the BGH, foreign standard terms 
are not subject to the assessment of the court of appeal stating on points of law. See BGH NJW 1994, 1408. 
3759 BAG NZA 2006, 324 (326). 
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6.1   Rule of ambiguity 
a) Meaning of the rule 
According to § 305c(2), any doubts in the interpretation of standard business terms are resolved 
against the user.3760 If the content of a clause cannot be clearly determined, the user bears the 
risk. This means that the user has the responsibility for the content of its standard terms. 
Furthermore, this means that § 155,3761 according to which a contract risks not being concluded 
in case of a hidden dissent, does not apply. 
§ 305c(2) sets out an interpretational rule which prepares content control, but which cannot 
serve as a content control standard.3762 
Even though the practical relevance of the ambiguity rule3763 of § 305c(2) cannot be 
overestimated,3764 there is a certain tendency to side-line this rule by the application of the 
'transparency requirement'3765 of § 305c(1).3766 Where an inadequate disadvantage arises from 
an ambiguous term, there is no need to interpret this term according to § 305c(2). Hence, the 
scope of application of the rule of ambiguity in terms of § 305c(2) is limited to cases in which 
an objective ambiguity of a clause does not also infringe the transparency requirement.3767 
§ 305c(2) cannot be waived or circumvented by standard terms, which is made clear in § 307(2) 
no. 1.3768 The ambiguity rule is applicable without restrictions to B2B contracts,3769 and the 
Bundesarbeitsgericht consequently applies this rule to employment contracts.3770 
b) Priority of the methods of interpretation 
Since the legislator favoured an open content control, a too wide application of the rule of 
ambiguity of § 305c(2) would encumber this principle. Too many problematic clauses would 
already be mitigated at this stage in favour of the other party, without the possibility to assess 
                                                             
3760 This provision corresponds to art 5 2nd sent. of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
3761 § 155: 'If the parties to a contract which they consider to have been entered into have, in fact, not agreed on a 
point on which an agreement was required to be reached, whatever is agreed is applicable if it is to be assumed 
that the contract would have been entered into even without a provision concerning this point.' 
3762 Report of the Law Commission BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 5, Roth WM 1991, 2086. Therefore, the BGH wrongly 
states in BGH NJW 1985, 53 that a certain clause 'infringes' § 305c(2). 
3763 Unklarheitenregel. 
3764 Roth WM 1991, 2086, Stoffels AGB-Recht 136. 
3765 Transparenzgebot. 
3766 Thamm/Pilger AGBG § 5 para 4. 
3767 Stoffels AGB-Recht 137, BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1062), where the rule of ambiguity was applied and an 
infringement of the transparency requirement negated. 
3768 BGH NJW 1999, 1865 (1866 et seq). 
3769 BGH NJW-RR 1988, 113 (114). 
3770 See, for example, BAG DB 1992, 383 (384). 
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their adverse impact within the content control.3771 Therefore, a cautious application of this rule 
is advised.3772 Hence, the courts apply § 305c(2) only in cases where despite the application of 
all other interpretational methods an irremovable doubt and at least two legally justifiable 
interpretational possibilities remain.3773 Schlechtriem, on the other hand, contends that a 
customer-friendly interpretation must be applied where the wording is unclear and several 
interpretational results are possible in the view of an objective interpretation which is oriented 
towards the comprehension of an average customer.3774 This view has the disadvantage that it 
encumbers an open content control and a real assessment of the clause in question. It is thus 
submitted that the courts' application of this rule is correct. What is more, § 305c(2) does not 
necessarily favour a customer-friendly interpretation, but rather an interpretation 'against the 
user'.3775  
On the other hand, where the parties agreed on a certain meaning of a particular clause, the rule 
of ambiguity does not apply since the parties' intentions are congruent (falsa demonstratio non 
nocet).3776 Apart from this application of the falsa demonstratio rule, one has to focus on the 
abstract comprehension of customers who typically conclude the concerned type of contracts, 
and not on the individual parties.3777 Therefore, § 305c(2) can be seen as a secondary 
interpretational standard with regard to the hierarchy of the interpretational maxims.3778 
For instance, the content of the clause 'purchased as seen, with the exclusion of any warranties' 
can be clearly interpreted by applying an objective standard (i.e., without the application of 
§ 305c(2)). The phrase 'as seen' normally refers to visible defaults that can be detected without 
difficulty. Nonetheless, the clause in general ('with the exclusion of any warranties') makes it 
sufficiently clear that the seller is not liable for any hidden defaults.3779 On the other hand, a 
clause contained in a standard contract for second-hand cars, in terms of which 'the seller 
warrants: … that the vehicle has a mileage status, according to his [the seller's] knowledge, of 
… km' cannot be clearly determined, according to the BGH, as the phrase 'according to his [the 
seller's] knowledge' contradicts the (objective) characteristics referring to the mileage. Hence, 
                                                             
3771 This problem had already be seen by Raiser in Recht der AGB 264 et seq, and later in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 15 
and 60. 
3772 Stein AGBG § 5 para 14. 
3773 BGH NJW-RR 1995, 1303 (1304); NJW 1997, 3434 (3435); 2002, 3232 (3233); 2007, 504 (506), BAG NZA 
2006, 923 (926). See also Palandt/Heinrichs § 305c para 18. 
3774 Schlechtriem FS Heinrichs 503 et seq. 
3775 Stoffels AGB-Recht 138. This problem will be discussed further below. 
3776 BGH NJW 2002, 2102 (2103), Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 8. 
3777 BGH WM 1984, 1228 (1229). 
3778 Raiser Recht der AGB 262, Roth WM 1991, 2086 et seq. 
3779 BGH NJW 1979, 1886 (1887), UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 95. 
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the application of § 305c(2) comes to the result that the seller has warranted the indicated 
mileage.3780 
The Consumer Protection Act seems to apply a harsher approach in this regard. Section 4(4) 
provides that the Tribunal or court must interpret any standard form, contract or other document 
of the supplier to the benefit of the consumer so that any ambiguity that allows for more than 
one reasonable interpretation of a part of such a document is resolved to the benefit of the 
consumer. In other words, as the Act does not favour an open content control, many clauses 
are interpreted in favour of the consumer at the stage of interpretational control. Thus, their 
disadvantageous consequences cannot be assessed within the content control.3781 
Section 4(4)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act must be read with the contra proferentem rule 
in mind in terms of which the terms of a contract, if capable of more than one meaning, must 
be interpreted against the party who proposed them.3782 The rationale of this rule is that the 
party who formulated or imposed the rule should suffer from an adverse construction as it had 
the opportunity to articulate the terms clearly.3783 The same rationale can be found in the quod 
minimum rule in terms of which ambiguous words must be interpreted narrowly in order to 
encumber the debtor or promisor (i.e., the consumer) as little as possible.3784 These rules 
normally serve as a last resort3785 since they do not consider the parties' actual intentions. In 
standard form contracts, this consideration is of no importance though because the terms 
included in such agreements are rarely negotiated or even read by the consumer.3786 
                                                             
3780 BGH NJW 1998, 2207. KG NJW-RR 1998, 131 is of the view that the clause 'insofar he has knowledge of it' 
is surprising in terms of § 305c(1). 
3781 See discussion in Part I ch 4. 
3782 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
3783 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268, De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 17. This is often the case, for instance, with insurance companies or public utilities. As regards insurance 
companies, see Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33 (A) at 38E. A good example where the Supreme 
Court of Appeal applied the contra proferentem rule is Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 
(SCA). In this case, the court held that the term 'driving' in the terms and conditions of a tour operator where any 
liability in connection with a loss experienced was excluded 'due to the nature of hiking (…), driving and the 
general third-world conditions on our tour/ventures', must be interpreted narrowly. The court held (at 88J-89A) 
that the condition quoted above was not intended to cover liability for negligent driving on a public road, but was 
rather aimed at indemnifying the company for the kind of risks encountered in off-road driving in 'exciting terrain'. 
3784 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
3785 According to the ordinary classification of interpretational rules, these rules are tertiary rules of interpretation 
'which are applied as a last resort, without any pretence at attempting to find the real intention of the parties'. See 
Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) 304. 
3786 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. 
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c) The ambiguity rule in institutional actions 
As briefly mentioned earlier, § 305c(2) does not necessarily lead to a customer-friendly 
interpretation, but rather to an interpretation 'against the user' in case of doubts. This is the 
predominant view as regards institutional actions.3787 In addition, a customer-friendly 
interpretation of the clause in question ─ which necessarily would maintain the problematic 
clause ─ would encumber its removal by way of an abstract institutional action. An 
interpretation that is adverse for consumers could lead to the result that other consumers will 
be able to refer to the clause in terms of § 11 UKlaG, however.3788 Hence, a seemingly 
unfavourable interpretation for the consumer leads to a more efficient and consumer-protective 
application of §§ 307 to 309.3789 
A clause in terms of which 'obvious defects must be brought forward within a week' is 
ambiguous since it could either mean that the customer has to make his or her declaration 
within a week, or that this declaration has to be received within a week. The wording and the 
context are not of help for solving this interpretational problem. The existing doubts in the 
interpretation of the clause are thus to be resolved against the user in terms of § 305c(2). This 
means for institutional actions that the most disadvantageous interpretation for the consumer 
must be favoured. Consequently, the consumer's declaration concerning the defect must be 
received within one week by the supplier. This leads to the result that the clause is ineffective 
in terms of the general clause of § 307(1).3790  
Usually, in institutional actions, the courts do not hesitate to find interpretational 'doubts' 
justifying the application of § 305c(2) and choose the interpretation that is the most 
unfavourable to the consumer. The BGH, for instance, ruled that a clause providing for the 
extension of the duration of a partnership agency contract, which did not contain the right to 
cancel the agreement in extraordinary circumstances under § 627, must be interpreted in the 
sense that the customer agrees on a contract without the possibility to cancel.3791 This, of 
                                                             
3787 BGH NJW 1991, 1887; 1998, 3119 (3121); 2003, 1237 (1238); 2005, 3567 (3568), UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer 
§ 305c para 66. 
3788 § 11 UKlaG (Effects of the judgment): 'If the user against whom judgment has been given fails to comply 
with an injunction based on § 1, the provision in the standard contract terms is to be regarded as void insofar as 
the party concerned invokes the effect of the injunction. However, this party cannot invoke the effect of the 
injunction if the user against whom judgment has been given could contest the judgment under § 10.' 
3789 Stoffels AGB-Recht 138. 
3790 BGH NJW 1998, 3119 (3121). 
3791 BGH NJW 1999, 276. 
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course, infringes § 309 no. 8 lit. a) and 9 so that such a clause has to be declared ineffective in 
the end. 
It must be underlined though that the application of § 305c(2) has to be preceded by an 
interpretation which applies the usual interpretational methods. Only if after this step, several 
interpretational results remain, § 305c(2) comes into play.3792 
d) The ambiguity rule in individual legal actions 
Until recently, in individual legal actions, the courts applied the consumer-friendliest 
interpretation. This consumer-focused interpretation was developed by jurisprudence before 
the AGBG came into force.3793 Even though this approach prevented an open content control 
in terms of §§ 307 to 309 (ex-§§ 9 to 11 AGBG), the courts stuck to it, until they applied the 
contrary approach for institutional actions, as discussed above.3794 The main criticism resulted 
from the unconvincing results of the former approach, due to the different application of 
§ 305c(2). If a court interprets a clause in favour of the consumer, the clause itself remains 
valid, and the other party (consumer) just would have to accept it in the interpreted form. On 
the other hand, in an institutional action, the court would have to choose the interpretation that 
is the most unfavourable for the consumer and declare it ineffective, after having assessed the 
clause in terms of content control. Then, the statutory rules would apply according to § 306(2). 
This means that this result might be more in favour of the consumer than a consumer-friendly 
interpretation.  
Such arbitrary results can only be avoided by harmonising the methods of interpretation in both 
institutional and individual proceedings.3795 In order to achieve that, the undifferentiated 
consumer-friendly interpretation has to make room for a 'split solution'.3796 Like in institutional 
actions, one has to assess first whether the clause in question allows for different 
interpretational solutions. If so, the court has to assert if the clause's most consumer-
unfavourable interpretation withstands content control in terms of §§ 307 to 309. If the clause 
is ineffective in terms of the content control, the enquiry is finished. This means that the enquiry 
within the individual proceedings has been harmonised with the one for institutional actions. 
If, on the other hand, the clause is valid after the control of its content, even while applying the 
unfavourable interpretation for the consumer, there can be no doubt that it is valid. The 
                                                             
3792 Stoffels AGB-Recht 139. 
3793 Sambuc NJW 1981, 314, Roth WM 1991, 2088, Thamm/Pilger AGBG § 5 para 3. 
3794 Von Olshausen ZHR 151 (1987) 639 et seq, Horn WM 1984, 451. 
3795 Stoffels AGB-Recht 140. 
3796 BGH NJW 2008, 2172 (2173); 2008, 2254 (2255), UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 90 et seq. 
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remaining question then is which interpretation has to be applied. Since there is no doubt 
anymore that the clause is effective, the traditional understanding of the ambiguity rule of 
§ 305c(2) can be applied at this stage. 
This approach allows for an open content control and is in harmony with the approach for 
institutional actions. As it results in a more stringent enquiry of the content of a clause and thus 
ensures a maximum degree of protection for consumers, this approach is furthermore 
compatible with article 8 of the Unfair Terms Directive.3797 
6.2  The validity of the principle of restriction 
Before the AGBG came into force, the principle of restriction,3798 according to which 
incriminatory standard terms, and above all clauses concerning waivers and exclusions or 
restrictions of liability, were interpreted restrictively.3799 When the AGBG came into effect, 
there was no legal ground for the application of this principle anymore.3800 First, the AGBG 
advocated an open content control. The principle of restriction eliminates the problematic part 
of the clause in the stage before though, i.e., in the interpretational control. Furthermore, a 
narrow interpretation would infringe the prohibition of partial retention,3801 i.e., the 
preservation of the unfair clause with the content that is still permissible. The BGH is clearly 
against partial retention in standard terms as clauses which infringe §§ 307 to 309 are 
ineffective. What is more, the law's objective is to advocate valid standard terms and not to 
offer the possibility for the user to choose a wording which infringes §§ 307 to 309, without 
fearing adverse consequences other than restricting the applicability of its clause to a 
permissible degree. Besides, retaining an ineffective clause by restricting its application would 
contravene transparency. Another objective of the law is that consumers obtain relevant 
information with respect to the scope of their rights and obligations. If they cannot obtain this 
information other than by instituting court proceedings, the principle of transparency is 
encumbered.3802 
Partial retention is also not compatible with the ambiguity rule under § 306c(2) since it does 
not advocate an interpretation which is not in favour of the consumer, and does not contribute 
                                                             
3797 Article 8 of the Directive: 'Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with 
the Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer.' 
3798 Restriktionsprinzip. 
3799 BGHZ 5, 111; 22, 90 (96); 24, 39 (45); 40, 65 (69); 62, 251 et seq. 
3800 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 100, Sambuc NJW 1981, 315, Bunte NJW 1985, 600. 
3801 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. 
3802 BGH NJW 1982, 2309 (2310); 1983, 1322 (1325); 1986, 1610 (1612); 1991, 2141 (2142 et seq); 1993, 326 
(330); 1998, 671 (673); 2000, 1110 (1113); 2006, 1059 (1060), UBH/Schmidt § 306 para 14. 
 627   
 
to the interpretation of clauses which allow for a position in favour of the consumer going 
beyond the ius dispositivum.3803 
For these reasons, the principle of partial retention has no place in the construction of standard 
business terms. The applicable objective interpretational standards and the rule of ambiguity 
are able to resolve interpretational problems in a satisfactory manner.3804 
6.3  Interpretation of standard terms with consideration of individual agreements 
It is controversial if in the area of standard business terms there is room for an autonomous 
interpretational principle that takes into consideration the given individual agreement.3805 By 
applying such an approach, the content of standard terms is 'harmonised' with an overriding 
individual agreement. 
The following example3806 serves as a demonstration for this problem: The seller and the 
purchaser agree to a fixed price of 500 Euros. This price is below the recommended standard 
price as well as below the usually required price for the given item. The delivery is scheduled 
in several months. The standard terms of the seller contain a clause by which in case of a 
general price increase in the seller's company, the recommended standard prices or the 
generally required prices applies. The question here is if the purchaser still benefits from its 
price advantage after the price increase. The criterion for the interpretation is the establishing 
of the conformity with the individual agreement, i.e., the fixed price. 
Stoffels3807 correctly points out that an autonomous interpretational principle for these cases is 
not necessary. The objective interpretation does not prevent from considering what content and 
significance of their agreement the parties had in mind. In the example above, the parties agreed 
on a firm price that was favourable for the customer. By this, they showed their mutual 
understanding of the price increase clause contained in the seller's standard terms. This can 
only be interpreted in that the advantage granted to the purchaser should not be lost in case of 
a general price increase. 
Hence, a natural interpretation can lead to reasonable results in these cases, and a specific 
interpretation, which takes into account the individual agreement, is superfluous. Furthermore, 
                                                             
3803 Stoffels AGB-Recht 141. 
3804 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 101. 
3805 Individualvertragskonforme Auslegung. For such an interpretation: WLP/Lindacher and Hau § 305c para 117, 
Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 c para 131 et seq. Against: UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 9 and § 305c para 
69, Erman/Roloff § 305c para 20. 
3806 Example from Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 c para 133. 
3807 Stoffels AGB-Recht 142. 
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cases like the example above should instead be solved within the next stage, i.e., the content 
control. What is more, the proponents of such a principle have difficulties in defining the 
demarcation between interpretational and content control and struggle to avoid a conflict with 
the provisions on content control and partial retention.3808 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the different techniques of statutory interpretation have been presented first 
because both statutory interpretation and the construction of agreements show similarities. The 
starting point for the interpretation of German legislative pieces is the literal rule (grammatical 
interpretation) where the meaning of the words and grammatical rules are taken into 
consideration. The Consumer Protection Act, on the other hand, favours purposive 
construction, looking first at the legislator's objectives before using other interpretative 
techniques.  
Many German statutes contain definitions of terms that can be found throughout the given 
legislative piece. These are important for the demarcation of words that have various meanings 
in legal and colloquial language, for instance. South African statutes contain a list of definitions 
at the beginning of the given piece of legislation instead. This technique has the advantage that 
all definitions can be found in one place. However, it is only effective if the list is complete, 
well-drafted and does not contain too many cross-references. 
Systematic interpretation puts a provision into relation with other provisions as well as its 
position within a statute so that it is possible to understand whether its wording is too wide, for 
example. In contrast, historical interpretation deals with the history of a legislative piece. For 
the performance of historical interpretation, legislative material must be analysed. This is also 
the case for purposive construction in the context of the Consumer Protection Act. It is 
suggested that historical interpretation is imperative for purposive construction. Teleological 
construction assesses the ratio legis of a provision, i.e., its objective and meaning. 
In cases where the legislator omitted consciously or unconsciously to regulate specific 
questions, there is a gap that must be filled by the court (complementary interpretation). Either 
such a lacuna exists because the legislator did not consider the question correctly (primary 
lacuna), or it arose after enacting the given statute (secondary lacuna). In both cases, the judge 
                                                             
3808 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. 
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must take the legislator's standpoint and close the gap in the law's spirit and not use his or her 
own valuations. A gap can be closed either by an extensive interpretation of a legal provision 
or by applying a principle that is contained in several legal provisions so that these are applied 
analogously. So-called 'open lacunas' are filled by an analogous application of other provisions. 
Where the legislator did not consider certain particularities (concealed gap), the court may 
derive from the unambiguous wording of the provision by restricting its application in the spirit 
of the law (restrictive interpretation or teleological reduction). 
In terms of the interpretation of contractual provisions and standard terms, the German 
legislator favoured an open content control. Thus, the reasons for the inadequacy of standard 
terms must be unfolded within the content control and not already within the interpretational 
construction. This is why interpretational control takes place before content control. 
§§ 133 and 157 serve as the basis for the interpretation of contracts, but the courts have 
developed certain principles. The leading view solves the tension between the subjective 
standard of § 133 (true intention) and the objective standard of § 157 (good faith) by applying 
§ 157 to all declarations of intent that have to be received by the other party, and § 133 only to 
those that need not be received by another. The scope of application of §§ 133 and 157 is 
overlapping though and cannot be separated in most cases. In practice, this controversy has no 
practical relevance because the courts have developed a canon of construction. Where only the 
intention of the party issuing a declaration of intent is to be considered (§ 133), one refers to 
natural interpretation. In such a case, the other party's interests are not worthy of protection 
(e.g., in a last will). On the other hand, normative interpretation, where also the other party's 
interests are considered, prevails in most cases. For the interpretation of contracts, the approach 
of legislative construction applies, i.e., the principles of grammatical, systematic, but also 
teleological and historical interpretation. 
Complementary interpretation of agreements applies where the contract contains an 
unintentional lacuna because the parties did not consider a particular point. Often, such a gap 
can be filled by the ius dispositivum. The systematic application of statutory provisions for the 
filling of gaps would infringe the principle of private autonomy however, above all in the case 
of atypical or mixed-type agreements. In these cases, it is more appropriate to develop the legal 
order chosen by the parties and to fill the gap in the contract's spirit. 
Like in South Africa, also in Germany, general principles of interpretation assist the judge in 
interpreting an agreement. In some cases, the BGB itself contains terms that provide guidance 
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to the courts, e.g., 'unless'. Furthermore, jurisprudence has developed some interpretational 
maxims, such as the protestatio facto contraria maxim. 
For standard terms, a modified interpretational standard applies. Not the recipient's standpoint 
is relevant here, but the perspective of an average consumer without legal knowledge and under 
consideration of the relevant public which is normally confronted with the given standard 
provisions. Hence, the individual understanding of the parties is not considered, and a more 
objective approach is applied. This leads to a unified interpretation. 
For standard terms, special rules of interpretation exist. § 305c(2) sets out the rule of ambiguity 
in terms of which any doubts in the interpretation of standard terms are resolved against the 
user. Since the German legislature favoured an open content control, the courts apply this 
provision only where after the exhaustion of all interpretational methods an irremovable doubt 
and at least two legally justifiable interpretational possibilities remain. What is more, the 
application of this provision does not necessarily lead to a customer-friendly interpretation but 
instead to one 'against the user'. This however leads to a more consumer-protective application 
of §§ 307 to 309 since the clause can be removed by an institutional action because consumers 
will be able to refer to the clause in terms of § 11 UKlaG. The courts apply this standard now 
to individual actions too and apply a 'split solution' in order to avoid inconsistent results. 
The view that individual agreements must be taken into account within the interpretational 
control is inconsistent because objective interpretation does not prevent from considering what 
content and significance of their agreement the parties had in mind. A natural interpretation is 
thus more satisfactory. Besides, the proponents of such a principle struggle to define the 
demarcation between interpretational and content control. 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONTENT CONTROL 
 
1. Introduction to content control in German standard business terms legislation 
1.1   Fundamentals of content control 
1.1.1 §§ 307 to 309 in contract law 
a) General remarks 
§§ 307 to 309 provide for a restriction in terms of the content of standard business terms and 
pre-formulated clauses in consumer contracts, and for a more intense control compared to the 
general provisions in contract law, such as §§ 1343809 (statutory prohibition) and 1383810 (public 
policy). As long as §§ 305 et seq. are applicable, these general provisions only play a secondary 
and supplementary role. In contracts between individuals, normally there is no content control 
because the contractual partners are on an equal footing with regard to their respective 
bargaining power. Where this balance is disturbed, the courts can exceptionally assess the 
content of the contract in terms of §§ 2423811 (good faith) and 138.3812 
Although §§ 305 et seq. are impregnated by the notion of 'unreasonableness', content control 
is legal control and not equity control, with the exception of § 315(3) 2nd sent. As such, the 
courts have to exercise this control ex officio, which means that a petition to the court in this 
regard is not necessary.3813 
The reasons for content control as well as the advantages and disadvantages have already been 
discussed in the South African part of this thesis and will therefore not be reproduced here.3814 
b) Relation to other provisions 
aa) Public policy in terms of § 138(1) BGB 
Since §§ 305 et seq. and 138(1) are both based on different evaluative standards, the parallel 
application of the general clause of § 138(1) is only possible where contractual clauses infringe 
the principles of public policy.3815 The threshold for the application of § 138(1) is nonetheless 
much higher than for §§ 305 et seq. as for § 138(1), individual interests must be significantly 
                                                             
3809 § 134: 'A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a different 
conclusion.' 
3810 § 138(1): 'A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void.' 
3811 § 242: 'An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice 
into consideration.' 
3812 Stoffels AGB-Recht 143. For the constitutional background see BAG NZA 2005, 1111 (1116). 
3813 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 42. 
3814 See Part I ch 3 para 1. 
3815 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 60. 
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affected and the contractual party must have acted in a subjectively reprehensible manner.3816 
What is more, an infringement of § 138 leads to the voidness of the entire contract pursuant to 
§ 139, whereas in terms of § 306(1), only those clauses are void that have not become part of 
the contract or that are ineffective; the remainder of the contract remains in effect.3817 
For the enquiry under § 138, all circumstances of the given case have to be evaluated, 
considering the content and the objective of, as well as the motives behind the clause. 
Therefore, when family members conclude a contract of surety with each other, not only the 
close relationship between the parties, but also the fact that the security is overstrained because 
of the high liability amount are factors to be considered. This is not the case in terms of § 307 
which applies an abstract-universal approach.3818 
For § 138(1), all contractual clauses must be evaluated, also the ones that would be ineffective 
or void on the ground of other provisions, such as §§ 305 et seq. The BGH legitimately argues 
in this context that otherwise, standard business terms legislation would reduce consumer 
protection if it would not be part of the assessment from the beginning.3819 
Contractual clauses are against public policy if performance and counter-performance show a 
significant imbalance, and other disadvantages in the form of forbidden standard clauses are 
present. Hence, a loan agreement is not necessarily contrary to the principles of public policy 
because of high interests. However, if it contains other excessive disadvantages, such as illegal 
standard terms according to which the borrower has to bear a significant burden, e.g., if his or 
her does not pay in time, they could be contrary to public policy.3820 
The courts decided that in a form contract or an agreement where a significant number of 
clauses are ineffective, the given clauses are void in terms of § 138(1) because a gap-filling 
interpretation would change the content and hence the character of the contract.3821 For the 
aforementioned reasons, and inspired by the work of Ludwig Raiser, the BGH preferred in the 
development of content control the application of § 242 (good faith) rather than § 138.3822 The 
BGH justified the application of § 242 by stating that a business could abuse its freedom of 
                                                             
3816 BGH NJW 1997, 3372 (3374); 2001, 2331 (2333), UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 58. 
3817 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 58. 
3818 BGH NJW 2005, 971. 
3819 BGH NJW 1981, 1206 (1207); 1986, 2564 (2565). 
3820 BGH NJW 1981, 1206 (1209). 
3821 BGH NJW 1983, 159; 1985, 53. 
3822 Raiser Recht der AGB 284.  
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contract by imposing its standard terms upon the customers because merely by the fact that it 
used standard terms, it claimed freedom of contract only for itself.3823   
bb) Good faith in terms of § 242 BGB  
§§ 307 to 309 are a concretisation of the principle of good faith (§ 242) and therefore more 
specific.3824 Nevertheless, § 242 plays a role in the excluded areas under § 310(4), such as the 
law of succession, family law, company law or collective agreements and private-sector works 
agreements.3825 What is more, this provision offers additional consumer protection in order to 
prevent an individual abuse of rights. This is regularly the case where the user abuses a right 
that he or she normally has. For instance, the BGH denied the enforcement of a (normally valid) 
preclusive time limit of a gas provider because the client's overpayments were due to the 
provider's fault. In order to stress the difference to content control, this control is referred to as 
'exercise control'.3826 
cc) Equity control in terms of § 315 BGB 
Before the AGBG came into force, content control was also based on § 315.3827 According to 
this norm, the exercise of this right is subordinated to equity control by the courts if one party 
has the right to determine the contractual contents unilaterally. This presupposes though that 
the other party (consumer) transfers its own contractual power to shape the contents of the 
agreement to the user, which is very far from reality.3828 Furthermore, content control under 
§§ 307 et seq. applies a supra-individual and generalising approach, whereas equity control 
provides for fairness in individual cases, which is not a suitable standard for mass contracts.3829 
What is more, § 315 provides for judicial correction of the given contract clause ('contractual 
assistance'),3830 whereas §§ 307 et seq. already provides for the legal consequences that cannot 
                                                             
3823 The application of the principle of good faith found later application in § 9 AGBG (= § 307 BGB). 
3824 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 35. 
3825 See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) bb) and ch 2 para 1.2. 
3826 Ausübungskontrolle. BGH BB 1991, 932, UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 63. 
3827 § 315: '(1) Where performance is to be specified by one of the parties to the contract, then in case of doubt it 
is to be assumed that the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of the party making it. 
(2) The specification is made by declaration to the other party. (3) Where the specification is to be made at the 
reasonably exercised discretion of a party, the specification made is binding on the other party only if it is 
equitable. If it is not equitable, the specification is made by judicial decision; the same applies if the specification 
is delayed.'  
3828 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 41, Stoffels AGB-Recht 145. 
3829 Staudinger/Rieble § 315 para 305. 
3830 Vertragshilfe. Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 41. 
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be deviated from.3831 For these reasons, the application of § 315 already stood on feet of clay 
before the implementation of the AGBG.3832 
In one case, § 315 is applicable though in terms of §§ 307 et seq. The courts are of the view 
that where standard business terms grant a right of specification of performance to one of the 
parties, the specification must be determined by taking into account equity considerations. This 
is the case for companies providing public services (utilities) on a contractual basis.3833  
dd) Voidability on the grounds of mistake, deceit or duress 
It is conceivable that the consumer had a false notion about the contents of the contract. Then, 
voidability for mistake in terms of § 1193834 is possible. In case of deceit or duress, the contract 
is voidable under § 123.3835 This is because the objective of §§ 305 et seq. differs from the one 
of §§ 119 and 123. Whereas §§ 305 et seq. aim to achieve contractual fairness, the objective of 
§§ 119 et seq. is the implementation of the party's intention free of any 'vice of consent'3836 
when entering into a legal transaction.3837 
Insofar, the courts have not reached any decisions on voidability of standard clauses on the 
grounds of mistake, deceit or duress. Apparently, the provisions contained in §§ 305 et seq. 
offer a sufficient protection in this area.3838 
ee) Consumer protection law 
The contractual content can also be limited by consumer protection provisions. These are 
mostly specific interventions by the legislator. § 475,3839 for instance, assures that certain legal 
rights of the buyer cannot be waived vis-à-vis the seller. 
                                                             
3831 See § 306. 
3832 Stoffels AGB-Recht 145. 
3833 BGH NJW-RR 2006, 133 (134). 
3834 § 119: '(1) A person who, when making a declaration of intent, was mistaken about its contents or had no 
intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed 
that he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of the factual position and with a sensible 
understanding of the case. (2) A mistake about such characteristics of a person or a thing as are customarily 
regarded as essential is also regarded as a mistake about the content of the declaration.'  
3835 § 123: '(1) A person who has been induced to make a declaration of intent by deceit or unlawfully by duress 
may avoid his declaration. (2) If a third party committed this deceit, a declaration that had to be made to another 
may be avoided only if the latter knew of the deceit or ought to have known it. If a person other than the person 
to whom the declaration was to be made acquired a right as a direct result of the declaration, the declaration made 
to him may be avoided if he knew or ought to have known of the deceit.'  
3836 Willensmangel. 
3837 Stoffels AGB-Recht 146. 
3838 Stoffels AGB-Recht 147. 
3839 § 475: '(1) If an agreement is entered into before a defect is notified to the entrepreneur and deviates, to the 
disadvantage of the consumer, from [§§] 433 to 435, 437, 439 to 443 and from the provisions of this subtitle, the 
entrepreneur may not invoke it. The provisions referred to in sentence 1 apply even if circumvented by other 
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The same applies to § 312a3840 that has been inserted due to the Unfair Terms Directive. This 
provision limits the content of certain agreements on the payment that are typically contained 
in standard terms.3841 In terms of subparagraph (4) of this provision, an agreement obligating a 
consumer to pay a fee for the use of a certain means of payment by way of fulfilling his 
contractual obligations is ineffective if the user does not offer a customary and reasonable 
payment method to the consumer that is free of charge, or the fee agreed exceeds the cost borne 
by the trader for the use of such means of payment. 
If a clause has not become part of the contract or is ineffective, it remains effective in all other 
respects according to § 312a(6). This is similar to § 306(1).3842 
1.1.2 Specific legal forms of standard business terms control 
Content control is not an exclusive matter of the civil courts, although the courts, namely the 
BGH, play an important role in this domain. Standard business terms can also be subject to the 
control of public authorities in areas where the legislator was already active before the AGBG 
came into force.3843 
                                                             
constructions. (2) The limitation of the claims cited in [§] 437 may not be alleviated by an agreement reached 
before a defect is notified to an entrepreneur if the agreement means that there is a limitation period of less than 
two years from the statutory beginning of limitation or, in the case of second-hand things, of less than one year. 
(3) Notwithstanding [§§] 307 to 309, subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply to the exclusion or restriction of 
the claim to damages.'  
3840 § 312a: '(1) Where the trader or a person acting in his name or on his behalf makes a telephone call to the 
consumer with a view to concluding a contract with same, he shall, at the beginning of the conversation, disclose 
his identity and, where applicable, the identity of the person on whose behalf he is making the call, as well as the 
commercial purpose of the call. (2) The trader is obliged to inform the consumer in accordance with the 
stipulations of Article 246 of the [EGZPO]. The trader may demand that the consumer cover freight, delivery, or 
postal charges and other costs only inasmuch as he has informed the consumer of these costs in accordance with 
the requirements established in Article 246 (1) number 3 of the [EGZPO]. Sentences 1 and 2 apply neither to off-
premises contracts nor to distance contracts nor to contracts relating to financial services. (3) A trader may 
conclude an agreement with a consumer that is directed towards obtaining extra payment from the consumer in 
addition to the remuneration agreed upon for the principal performance only if this is done expressly. Where the 
trader and the consumer conclude a contract in electronic commerce, such an agreement will form part of the 
contract only if the trader does not bring about the agreement by means of a default option. (4) An agreement 
obligating a consumer to pay a fee for the use of a certain means of payment by way of fulfilling his contractual 
obligations is ineffective if 1. no customary and reasonable payment method is available to the consumer that is 
free of charge, or 2. the fee agreed exceeds the cost borne by the trader for the use of such means of payment. (5) 
An agreement obligating a consumer to pay a fee for those cases in which the consumer contacts the trader via a 
telephone line that the trader operates for the purpose of answering questions or providing explanations regarding 
a contract concluded by the parties is ineffective if the fee agreed upon exceeds the fee charged for the use merely 
of the telecommunication service as such. Where an agreement is ineffective pursuant to sentence 1, the consumer 
is not bound to pay a fee for the call to the telecommunication services provider, either. The telecommunication 
services provider has the right to demand the fee for the use merely of the telecommunication services from the 
trader who has concluded the ineffective agreement with the consumer. (6) Where an agreement pursuant to 
subsections (3) to (5) has not come to form part of the contract or where it is ineffective, the contract remains 
effective in all other respects.'  
3841 See BGH NJW 2010, 2719. 
3842 Stoffels AGB-Recht 148. 
3843 See summary in Staudinger/Schlosser before §§ 305 et seq para 20 et seq. 
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a) Administrative authorisation 
The strictest form of administrative control is the submission of standard terms to a previous 
approval procedure.3844 This is the case for standard business terms of building societies,3845 
investment companies3846 and transportation companies.3847 The approval is only granted if the 
standard terms do not violate legal provisions. Once the approval is granted, the standard terms 
can still be subject to content control by the courts.3848 Before ruling on an action, the courts 
must hear the competent regulator according to § 8(2) UKlaG.3849 An authority's previous 
approval is without prejudice to a court's subsequent ruling though because the only standard 
for the court are §§ 307 to 309.3850 
b) Control by insurance regulator 
Until 1994, the general terms and conditions of any insurance company were subject to a 
previous approval procedure by the Federal Supervisory Authority of the Insurance Sector.3851 
Due to the transposition of European Directives, this administrative control ceased to exist. On 
the other hand, §§ 10 VAG3852 and 7 VVG3853 offer higher consumer protection by prescribing 
a minimum standard for insurance companies' standard terms and information requirements for 
the conclusion of an insurance policy.3854 
The Federal Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services3855 still is empowered though to 
intervene subsequently where occasional infringements take place, i.e., where insurance-
related standard terms unreasonably disadvantage the insured person.3856 The supervisory 
agency has the right to make any arrangements that are necessary and appropriate to avoid or 
eliminate any abuse. Abuse is any conduct of an insurer that is contrary to the supervisory 
                                                             
3844 Medicus rightly asserts that administrative control for any type of standard business terms was not the 
legislator's intention and is only limited to specific cases. With a view to the huge number of standard terms in 
circulation, this was certainly a wise decision. See Medicus BGB-AT 163.  
3845 § 9 BausparkG. 
3846 § 43(2) InvG. 
3847 § 39(6) PBefG. 
3848 Stoffels AGB-Recht 149. 
3849 § 8(2) UKlaG: '2) Before ruling on an action under § 1, the court shall hear: the competent insurance regulator, 
if the action relates to provisions in general terms of insurance, or the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, if the 
action relates to provisions in standard contract terms which have to be approved by that Office under the terms 
of the Building and Loan Associations Act, the Investment Companies Act, the Mortgage Bank Act or the Ship 
Mortgage Bank Act.' 
3850 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 96. 
3851 Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen. 
3852 Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG) 
3853 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG). 
3854 Stoffels AGB-Recht 149. 
3855 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. 
3856 See § 81(2) 1st and 2nd sent. VAG. 
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objectives enumerated in § 81(1) VAG. That is, inter alia, the respect of the needs of the insured 
person and the laws and regulations applicable to the operation of insurance transactions. 
§§ 305 et seq. are included in these laws, so that any infringement of these provisions are also 
a violation of the insured person's needs and rights.3857 The supervisory agency can prohibit 
the further use of the terms in question.3858 
c) Control by antitrust authorities 
Content control is focused on the protection of all market players, especially by the outstanding 
role of the transparency requirement and collective procedures according to the UKlaG, on the 
one hand, but also on the safeguarding of the market economy, on the other. The Act against 
Restraints of Competition (GWB)3859 and the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG)3860 
primarily focus on the protection of competition. However, the scope of control pursuant to 
§§ 305 et seq. BGB and the control of the antitrust authorities are more and more interleaved 
because standard terms tend to be more unified, due to the fact that they are often drafted by 
professional associations of the different sectors of the economy. Such antitrust tendencies 
might lead to restrictions in competition which is why the antitrust law comes into play.3861 
aa)   System of legal exemption of antitrust law 
The European Regulation no. 1/20033862 has been implemented into German competition law 
by the 7th amendment of the GWB.3863 Under § 1 GWB, agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are still prohibited. Exemptions 
are no longer only possible after notification to the antitrust authorities which could oppose 
themselves against such agreements though. If the conditions of § 2 GWB3864 are met, these 
                                                             
3857 BVerwG NJW 1998, 3216 (3217), 
3858 Stoffels AGB-Recht 150. 
3859 GWB = Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Act against Restraints of Competition). 
3860 UWG = Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act against Unfair Competition). 
3861 Stoffels AGB-Recht 150. 
3862 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
3863 Which came into force on 1 July 2005.  
3864 § 2 GWB: '(1) Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted 
practices which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which do not 1. impose on 
the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, or 
2. afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question shall be exempted from the prohibition of § 1. (2) For the application of paragraph 1, the 
Regulations of the Council or the European Commission on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices (block exemption regulations) shall apply mutatis mutandis. This shall also apply where 
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agreements are exempted ex lege. This means that companies now have to decide under their 
individual responsibility whether their standard terms fall under the exemption of § 2 GWB. 
Hence, although they have less bureaucratic efforts to make, in some way their legal security 
got lost.3865 
The conditions mentioned above concerning cartels have no major relevance in practice 
though. So-called 'recommended conditions', such as the General Conditions of Sale of the 
Electrical Wholesale Trade,3866 the Conditions of Purchase of the Association of the Car 
Manufacturer Industry or the Conditions for the Sale of new Motor Vehicles and trailers3867 
have by far a greater impact. As the former prohibition of recommendations (ex-§ 22(1) GWB) 
is no longer of existence, recommendations must be assessed pursuant to § 1 GWB. Therefore, 
recommended conditions are prohibited if they are mandatory for the members of a 
professional association or have the characteristics of concerted practices.3868 
bb)  The standard of antitrust control 
When exercising content control, the antitrust authority takes into account the disadvantages 
for the other market participants due to the standardisation of the business terms and the 
restriction of choices that comes along with it. This content control is not only limited to 
violations of the GWB, but also involves reasonableness control in terms of §§ 305 et seq.3869 
This dual control leads to a stricter enquiry by the antitrust authority.3870 
Nonetheless, the fact that a standard clause is valid in terms of §§ 305 et seq. does not 
necessarily mean that it conforms with antitrust law, and vice versa.3871 The control exercised 
by the antitrust authority is merely a prima facie control, and one cannot assume that full 
control in terms of §§ 307 to 309 BGB takes place.3872 What is more, because the antitrust 
authorities can apply the principle of discretionary powers,3873 the administration can decide 
                                                             
the agreements, decisions and practices mentioned therein are not capable of affecting trade between the Member 
States of the European Union.' 
3865 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 85. 
3866 Allgemeine Lieferbedingungen des Elektrogroßhandels, Promulgation no. 33/90 of 17 April 1990, BAnz no. 
78 of 25 April 1990 at 2229. 
3867 Einkaufsbedingungen des Verbands der Automobilindustrie e.V. (VDA) and Allgemeine 
Geschäftsbedingungen für den Verkauf von fabrikneuen Kranffahrzeugen und Anhängern, promulgated in BAnz 
no. 133/01 of 21 December 2002. 
3868 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 85, with further references. 
3869 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 117. 
3870 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 49. 
3871 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 49, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 117. 
3872 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 50. 
3873 Opportunitätsprinzip. 
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not to intervene at all if it has only slight doubts as regards the legality of the clause. For this 
reason, the civil courts have voided many clauses that had passed antitrust control.3874 
cc) Prohibition of discrimination in terms of § 20(1) GWB 
It is noteworthy that § 20(1) GWB3875 establishes the prohibition of discrimination for 
companies with superior or relative market power. The use of disadvantageous standard terms 
is not necessarily a violation of § 20(1) GWB since the standard terms might not infringe the 
normative objective of this statute, i.e., the protection of competition.3876 On the other hand, if 
the requisites of § 20(1) GWB are met, and there is discrimination or obstruction, one can 
regularly assume that the clause is unreasonable in terms of § 307 BGB.3877 
d) Protection against unfair competition in terms of the UWG 
Although the Act Against Unfair Competition (UWG) has another protective purpose than 
§§ 305 et seq. BGB, namely the protection against distorted competition, the use of unfair 
standard terms can also be unfair in the sense of § 3 UWG3878 and lead to a condemnation to 
eliminate, cease and desist the unfair practice (§ 8(1) UWG), as well as a condemnation to 
compensation for damage ($ 9 UWG) and a confiscation of profits (§ 10 UWG).3879  
Whether §§ 307 to 309 are to be seen as market conduct rules in the sense of § 4 UWG is 
controversial. Until recently, the BGH argued that § 475(1) 1st sent. BGB3880 (deviating 
agreements) was one of these market conduct rules of the UWG since their purpose is to 
                                                             
3874 Stoffels AGB-Recht 152. 
3875 § 20(1) GWB: '§ 19(1) in conjunction with paragraph 2 no. 1 shall also apply to undertakings and associations 
of undertakings to the extent that small or medium-sized enterprises as suppliers or purchasers of a certain type 
of goods or commercial services depend on them in such a way that sufficient and reasonable possibilities of 
switching to other undertakings do not exist (relative market power). A supplier of a certain type of goods or 
commercial services is presumed to depend on a purchaser within the meaning of sentence 1 if this supplier 
regularly grants to this purchaser, in addition to discounts customary in the trade or other remuneration, special 
benefits which are not granted to similar purchasers.' 
3876 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 60. 
3877 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 119. 
3878 § 3 UWG: '(1) Unfair commercial practices shall be illegal. (2) Commercial practices targeting or reaching 
consumers shall be unfair if they are not in compliance with professional diligence and are suited to materially 
distorting the economic behaviour of consumers. (3) The commercial practices in relation to consumers listed in 
the Annex to this Act shall always be illegal. (4) When assessing commercial practices in relation to consumers 
reference shall be made to the average consumer or, when the commercial practice is directed towards a particular 
group of consumers, to the average member of that group. Commercial practices which are likely to materially 
distort the economic behaviour only of a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable 
to these practices or the underlying goods or services because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity 
in a way which the entrepreneur could reasonably be expected to foresee shall be assessed from the perspective 
of the average member of that group.' 
3879 Stoffels AGB-Recht 153. 
3880 § 475(1) 1st sent.: 'If an agreement is entered into before a defect is notified to the entrepreneur and deviates, 
to the disadvantage of the consumer, from [§§] 433 to 435, 437, 439 to 443 and from the provisions of this subtitle, 
the entrepreneur may not invoke it.'  
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regulate market conduct in the interest of the market participants.3881 In a more recent ruling, 
the court underlines that the use of invalid standard business terms was against the necessary 
professional diligence, especially in the case of §§ 308 no. 1 (unreasonable period of time for 
acceptance and performance), 307 (as far as the liability regardless of negligence or fault is 
waived) and 309 no. 7 lit. a) (exclusion or limitation of liability for negligent injury to life, 
body or health). The BGH is of the opinion that such clauses might be an obstacle for 
consumers to claim their lawful rights.3882 
On the other hand, the assessment of whether a clause violates the BGB standard business 
terms legislation follows a different standard than the UWG.3883 In terms of the general clause 
of § 307, a breach of the rules contained in the UWG can be a relevant aspect within this 
enquiry, however.3884 For instance, a clause which says that the consumer agrees to receive 
commercials by text message or e-mail is invalid if the clause is not worded in the sense of a 
so-called opt-in declaration.3885 
1.1.3 Content control by notaries public 
According to the rules and regulations governing the professional conduct of notaries public, 
namely § 14(2) Bundesnotarordnung (BNotO)3886 and 4 Beurkundungsgesetz (BeurkG),3887 
notaries public have to assess form contracts against the backdrop of §§ 305 et seq. BGB. If a 
notary public is of the view that clauses in such a contract infringe the aforementioned 
legislation, he or she has to inform the parties and deny the authentication, if necessary.3888 
Where a notary public has to issue an enforceable record or document in terms of § 797(2) 
ZPO,3889 his or her assessment competence is limited though. In these cases, the notary public 
merely has to verify whether a formally valid title with an executable content exists. On the 
                                                             
3881 BGH NJW 2011, 76 (78). 
3882 BGH NJW 2012, 3577 (3580). 
3883 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 94, Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 53. 
3884 Stoffels AGB-Recht 154.  
3885 BGH NJW 2008, 3055. The opt-in solution originates from the Directive 2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications).  
3886 BNotO = Federal Code for Notaries. 
3887 BeurkG = Notarisation Code. 
3888 Palandt/Grüneberg § 305 para 17, UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 107 ('only in the case of an apparent 
violation'). 
3889 § 797(2) ZPO: 'The enforceable execution copy of notarial records or documents will be issued by the notary 
in whose safekeeping the record or document has remained. Should the record or document have remained in the 
safekeeping of a public authority, the latter is to issue the enforceable execution copy.' 
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other hand, the notary public is not entitled to assess the substantive content of a declaration of 
submission to immediate enforcement.3890 
1.1.4 Content control by the land registry 
It is controversial how far the land registry's3891 assessment competence reaches with respect 
to standard terms. The land registry as a body of administration of justice must take into account 
the applicable law, such as §§ 305 et seq. The functioning of this administration and the scope 
of its assessment is governed by the principles of the law of land registration procedures. This 
is why only obvious infringements against §§ 305 et seq. which are relevant for the land 
registration procedure must be assessed. The administration is not obliged though to perform a 
systematic and far-reaching scrutiny of the registration documents and their compatibility with 
standard terms legislation.3892 This is the case, for example, for a registration approval under 
§ 19 GBO3893 for a mortgage that refers to pre-formulated clauses for a loan agreement which 
infringe § 308 no. 6 BGB (fictitious receipt).3894 In general, only obvious violations against 
§§ 308 and 309, but also § 307 are relevant in relation to content control by the land registry.3895 
This administration often has not the necessary substantive knowledge in order to conduct an 
enquiry in terms of § 307, however.3896 
1.2  Restrictions for content control 
1.2.1 General remarks 
Under § 307(3) 1st sent., the general clause (§ 307(1) and (2)) as well as §§ 308 and 309 apply 
only to provisions in standard business terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating 
from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing those legal provisions, are agreed. 
1.2.2 Interpretation of § 307(3) 
The scope and legal content of § 307(3) is controversial because the wording of this provision 
is difficult to grasp. The prevailing opinion assumes that this provision excludes performance 
specifications and agreements on the price as well as declaratory clauses (which merely reflect 
legal provisions) from content control.3897 According to another view, § 307(3) has no 
                                                             
3890 BGH NJW 2009, 1887. 
3891 Grundbuchamt. 
3892 Stoffels AGB-Recht 155. 
3893 GBO = Grundbuchordnung (Land Registry Code). 
3894 BayObLG NJW 1980, 2818. 
3895 BayObLG NJW 1980, 2818 (2819). 
3896 UBH/Fuchs before § 307 para 108, Erman/Roloff before §§ 307-309 para 17. 
3897 BGH NJW 1998, 383, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 14, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 8 AGBG para 1, Palandt/Grüneberg 
§ 307 para 41, Locher Recht der AGB 85. 
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independent meaning and has a mere declaratory character. Therefore, standard clauses that do 
not pass the test of §§ 307 to 309 are open to content control.3898 A third, more recent view, 
presented by Joost, understands § 307(3) literally and excludes content control where legal 
norms are absent. According to this view, content control is only permitted where the given 
clause deviates from the assessment of the legal interests of the parties. Joost maintains that it 
is irrelevant whether the clause concerns a main or accessory performance or contains a main 
or accessory agreement.3899 
Which of these views has more merits will be discussed in the following. 
a) Official justification of the government draft 
The official motivation of the government draft excludes performance specifications, 
agreements on the price as well as declaratory clauses from content control3900 and therefore 
complies with the prevailing view. 
b) Two-fold ratio legis 
Also, when considering the ratio legis of this provision, one comes to the same result. 
aa)  Respect of the principles of the market economy 
Standard business terms legislation is an emanation of the principle of freedom of contract, 
which is a pillar of the market economy. Content control is necessary where unfair non-
negotiated terms other than core terms are incorporated into a contract3901 because non-
negotiated standard terms cannot be regarded as ‘the proper expression of the self-
determination of both parties’,3902 which is the prerequisite for enforcing agreements as the 
parties then have expressed their freedom of contract and autonomy. Consequently, where the 
user effectively claims freedom of contract for it alone, whereas the other party has no influence 
on the wording of non-negotiated terms, and where the ‘balancing’ of the parties' interests is 
purely formalistic and meaningless, real freedom of contract does not exist. 3903 The principle 
of freedom of contract would be jeopardised though if the courts could interfere with 
agreements on the price or the specification of the counter-performance.3904 In addition, there 
is no legal standard for the assessment of the principal contractual performance.3905 Therefore, 
                                                             
3898 Koch/Stübing § 8 AGBG para 3. 
3899 Joost ZIP 1996, 1685 et seq. 
3900 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 22. 
3901 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 365. 
3902 Zimmermann New German Law of Obligations 206. 
3903 See Naudé 2006 Stell LR 366, Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 143, 147, Lewis 2003 SALJ 348. 
3904 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 285. 
3905 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 1, MüKo/Wurmnest § 307 para 1. 
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the restriction of content control of standard terms is designed to ensure that the free market is 
not unnecessarily disturbed.3906 Besides this strengthening of the market by non-intervention, 
a 'substitution' of the market takes place by content control where the market mechanisms have 
not sufficiently proven strong enough to avoid one-sidedness at the expense of consumers. 
There is a constant tension between these two aspects that has to be balanced out by the 
courts.3907 The legislator assumes that the parties, and especially consumers, are particularly 
attentive to the essentialia negotii, i.e., the performance and the price, and safeguard their own 
interests in this regard. Thus, there should be a high threshold for the law to intervene. 
bb)  The courts' obligation to observe the law 
The legal principle that the courts have to observe the law (article 20(3) GG) is another 
argument for the exclusion of content control in the earlier mentioned cases.3908 If the courts 
were allowed to assess the reasonableness of standard clauses that merely reflect legal 
provisions, they would eventually assess the law itself. The law must nonetheless be the 
applicable standard for the judges' decisions and not the subject of their enquiry.3909 
Furthermore, a declaratory clause that has been declared invalid by the courts would have to 
be replaced by the statutory provisions (§ 306(2)), which is an argumentum ad absurdum in 
favour of the exclusion of content control of declaratory clauses.3910 
c) Conclusions from the EU Unfair Terms Directive 
The same conclusions can be drawn from the EU Unfair Terms Directive. Article 4(2) regulates 
that '[a]ssesment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the 
main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the 
one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these 
terms are in plain intelligible language.' Recital 19 of this Directive is formulated alike. 
Moreover, article 1(2) of the Directive regulates that '[t]he contractual terms which reflect 
mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the provisions or principles of international 
conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party (…) shall not be subject 
to the provisions of this Directive.' Pursuant to recital 13, the wording 'mandatory statutory or 
regulatory provisions' in article 1(2) also covers rules which, according to the law, shall apply 
between the contracting parties provided that no other arrangements have been established. 
                                                             
3906 Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 153. 
3907 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 41. 
3908 BGH NJW 2001, 2012 (2013); 2012, 2337 (2338), Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 290. 
3909 Stoffels AGB-Recht 158. 
3910 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 331, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 17. 
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This means that also the ius dispositivum is meant by this provision. Recital 13 also assumes 
that statutory or regulatory provisions are presumed not to contain unfair terms.3911  
For these reasons, articles 4(2) and 1(2) of the Directive serve as an interpretational guideline 
for § 307(3). Hence, the arguments of the prevailing view,3912 according to which performance 
specifications and agreements on the price as well as declaratory clauses are excluded from 
content control, is convincing and should be followed.  
1.2.3 Transparency as a condition for the absence of content control 
The legislator's assumption laid down in § 307(3) that the client pays especially attention to the 
core elements of the contract (essentialia negotii) and is able to safeguard its own interests is 
only given where the consumer is presented complete information on the core elements. Only 
then, he or she can compare other offers and, if necessary, walk away and choose another 
supplier or offer.3913 In cases where the user holds back essential information or misinforms its 
customer, transparency control in terms of § 307(3) is not only not excluded, but necessary.3914 
This position is enforced by the consumer directive 93/13/EEC. In its article 4(2) and in recitals 
19 and 29 it lays down that content control of the main subject matter of the contract, the 
adequacy of the price and remuneration and the services or goods supplied in exchange is only 
excluded in so far as these terms are in plain, intelligible language. For written consumer 
contracts, article 5 of the Directive says that these terms must always be drafted in plain, 
intelligible language.3915 
The German legislator adopted this position by inserting § 307(3) 2nd sent. In terms of this 
norm, other provisions (than those derogating from legal provisions, or arrangements 
supplementing those legal provisions) may be ineffective under subsection (1) sentence 2, in 
conjunction with subsection (1) sentence 1. This means that transparency control is not linked 
                                                             
3911 Stoffels AGB-Recht 159. 
3912 BGH NJW 1998, 383, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 14, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 8 AGBG para 1, Palandt/Grüneberg 
§ 307 para 41, Locher Recht der AGB 85. 
3913 BGH NJW 1990, 2383, WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 236. For Harker, the second option is a mere ‘fictious 
alternative’ though, as consumers most likely know that elsewhere they will find the same kind of presentation 
(Harker 1981 SALJ 17). Medicus is also of the view that the client's option to compare standard terms of different 
suppliers presupposes that the customer has different options at his or her disposal. However, this is not the case 
where suppliers of a specific industry use the standard business terms that have been recommended by the 
professional association of the given branch; these are identical. See Medicus BGB-AT 161. 
3914 Stoffels AGB-Recht 160. 
3915 Stoffels AGB-Recht 160. As to the plain language requirement under the CPA see Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a). 
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to the conditions of § 307(3), and that the conditions of the transparency requirement must be 
understood as preconditions for the absence of content control.3916 
1.2.4 Declaratory clauses 
According to § 307(3) 1st sent., subsections (1) and (2) of § 307, and §§ 308 and 309 apply 
only to provisions in standard terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating from legal 
provisions, or arrangements supplementing those legal provisions, are agreed. This means that 
provisions in standard terms that only reproduce the content of legal provisions, i.e., declaratory 
clauses, are excluded from content control. In practice, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
such declaratory clauses from other provisions, however.3917 
In order to determine the declaratory character of a provision, two legal situations must be 
compared.3918 In a first step, the legal content of a clause must be determined by means of 
interpretation and under consideration of any modifications by standard terms.3919 Then, one 
must examine the objective law with regard to any provisions that regulate this matter. If the 
legal order provides for a provision that has the same content as the standard clause, i.e., that 
regulates the same matter, the content of the standard clause is compared with the given legal 
provision(s). If there is conformity, the standard clause is not subject to content control, if there 
is no accordance, it is. On the other hand., standard clauses that fill a void, i.e., where no legal 
provisions regulate the given matter, are subject to content control, except they fall under the 
two exceptions of § 307(3), which are price agreements and performance specifications.3920 
Clauses providing that certain legal provisions are applicable, although they are not intended 
to regulate the given type of contract, are subject to content control too.3921  
§ 307(3) provides that 'legal provisions' are the basis for the above-mentioned comparison of 
two legal situations (i.e., the matter regulated by the law as well as the given standard clause). 
On the other hand, the Unfair Terms Directive speaks of 'mandatory statutory or regulatory 
provisions' in its article 1(2). The general view is that these two expressions mean both the 
same, namely substantive legal provisions. These are indubitably provisions based on formal 
laws, legislative decrees, statutes, customary law, collective agreements, as well as private-
sector work agreements and public-sector establishment agreements.3922 An administrative 
                                                             
3916 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 154. 
3917 Stoffels AGB-Recht 161. 
3918 Rechtslagenvergleich. Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 292, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 25. 
3919 BGH NJW 1986, 43 et seq, Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 292. 
3920 Stoffels AGB-Recht 161. 
3921 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 335. 
3922 Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 51. 
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authorisation can also be qualified as substantive law in this context.3923 According to the 
prevailing opinion, also unwritten legal rules, case law and even the rights and obligation 
arising from supplementary interpretation of the given contract under §§ 157, 242 BGB and 
the nature of the agreement are part of these legal provisions.3924 
Stoffels correctly maintains that the prevailing opinion goes too far because a comparison 
between two legal situations requires a comparative standard that has other sources than the 
matter which is itself the object of the comparison. The contractual content can thus not serve 
as the comparative standard.3925 Naudé argues in this regard that otherwise, courts would be 
able to indirectly attack the legal provision itself, which is rather the task of the Constitutional 
Court.3926 Also the rights and obligations of an agreement that are outlined by means of 
interpretation of the agreement according to §§ 157 and 242 cannot serve as the comparative 
standard because the contract itself contains discretionary rules set out by the parties.3927 
Hence, the decision of whether content control can take place should merely be taken by means 
of the criterion of the 'regulatory identity', that is the accordance between a legal provision and 
a standard clause.3928 
A clause by which the depositor of a cheque must pay the fee that collecting banks have to pay 
to banks drawn upon means nothing else than that the expenses that the bank can require in 
terms of §§ 670, 675 have to be reimbursed.3929 Such a clause is merely declaratory and hence 
not subject to content control.3930 
                                                             
3923 BGH NJW 2007, 3344. 
3924 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 282, Erman/Roloff § 307 para 39. 
3925 Stoffels AGB-Recht 162. 
3926 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. 
3927 Stoffels AGB-Recht 162. 
3928 Stoffels AGB-Recht 162. 
3929 § 670 BGB (Reimbursement of expenses): 'If the mandatary, for the purpose of performing the mandate, 
incurs expenses that he may consider to be necessary in the circumstances, then the mandator is obliged to make 
reimbursement.'  
§ 675 BGB (Nongratuitous management of the affairs of another): '(1) The provisions of [§§] 663, 665 to 670 and 
672 to 674 apply to a service contract or a contract to produce a work dealing with the management of the affairs 
of another to the extent that nothing else is provided in this subtitle and, if the person obliged is entitled to terminate 
without complying with a notice period, the provisions of [§] 671 (2) also apply with the necessary modifications. 
(2) A person who gives another person advice or a recommendation, notwithstanding the responsibility that arises 
from a contractual relationship, a tort or another statutory provision, is not obliged to pay compensation for the 
damage arising from following the advice or the recommendation. (3) A contract by means of which one party 
undertakes to effect the enrolment or registration of the other party to participate in games of chance operated by 
a third party must be in text form.'  
3930 BGH NJW 2012, 2337. 
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a) Contractual arrangements permitted by law 
Where the law provides for a certain margin within which the parties can agree on certain 
provisions, it is sometimes difficult to assess whether such clauses are merely declaratory 
clauses. Generally, such clauses only supplement the existing legal provisions and are therefore 
subject to content control.3931 Only where the legislator provides for a legal provision according 
to which certain agreements are permitted within strict limits, such clauses might be exempt 
from content control. Since such legal provisions can aim at individual agreements on the one 
hand, and standard clauses on the other, one has to analyse whether this legal permission is 
also valid for standard clauses. If so, the protective standard of §§ 305 et seq. must not be 
undermined, and the clause is subject to content control. The enquiry of the legislator's 
intention is done by taking into consideration the legislative materials, such as the drafting 
history of the norm.3932 
For this reason, a clause by which the probationary period in an employment contract is up to 
6 months is exempt from content control3933 as the parties merely make use of the margin 
contemplated in § 622(3) BGB.3934 Under § 651 lit. h(1) BGB, a travel organiser may, by 
agreement with the traveller, limit its liability for damage that does not constitute bodily 
injuries to three times the package price. The legislative materials expressly state that the 
legislature had standardised mass contracts in mind when drafting this provision.3935 Hence, a 
clause that limits the liability for damage in the aforementioned manner is controllable.3936 
b) Provisions that need to be supplemented  
Sometimes, the legislator only provides for a general framework that needs to be filled by the 
parties. In these cases, the standard terms user must provide for substantial provisions filling 
out this framework and cannot content with simply referring to the framework. Such 
declaratory clauses are exempt from content control. An insufficient concretisation of the 
framework might lead to intransparency under § 307(3) 2nd sent., however.3937 For example, a 
                                                             
3931 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 32 et seq, Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 301 et seq. 
3932 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 340, Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 303 et seq. 
3933 BAG NZA 2008, 521 (522). 
3934 § 622(3) BGB: 'During an agreed probationary period, at most for the duration of six months, the employment 
relationship may be terminated with a notice period of two weeks.'  
3935 BT-Drs. 8/2343 at 11 et seq. 
3936 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 33, Stoffels AGB-Recht 164. The BGH reached a contrary decision though in BGH 
NJW 1987, 1931 (1937). 
3937 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 36. 
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clause by which a life insurer only refers to ex-§§ 176(3) 1st sent. and ex-174(2) VVG3938 with 
regard to the repurchase value merely reflects the legal framework and thus provides for an 
insufficient and intransparent clause in terms of § 307(3) 2nd sent., read in conjunction with 
§ 307(1) 2nd sent.3939 
1.2.5 Determination of the principal obligations 
§ 307(3) excludes content control of the main subject matter of the contract (performance 
specification) as well as agreements on the price to be paid.3940 The statutory law does not 
contain provisions pertaining to the main subject matter and the price to be paid because of the 
freedom of contract of the parties.3941 These exclusions will be discussed in the following. 
As opposed to the German legislature, the South African legislator chose to include into the 
fairness enquiry also negotiated terms,3942 including the core terms (price, subject matter of the 
contract, warranty etc.).3943  
a) Performance specifications 
aa)   Core of contractual performance specifications 
Clauses which merely define the reason for the agreement, the main subject matter, the type, 
volume, quantity and quality of the goods or services to be delivered are not subject to German 
content control.3944 This also applies to so-called 'negative performance specifications' by 
which a certain performance is denied.3945 The courts define the content control-free area very 
narrowly by stating that without the given clause, there is no valid contract because of the lack 
of an identified or identifiable performance.3946 
                                                             
3938 Ex-§ 176(3) VVG provides, among other things, that the repurchase value is to be calculated for the end of 
the current insurance period. Ex-§ 174(2) VVG provides, for instance, that the calculation of the insurance payout 
that is free of premium is to be carried out pursuant to the recognised actuarial rules and principles. 
3939 BGH NJW 2001, 2012 (2013); 2014 (2015 et seq). 
3940 Stoffels AGB-Recht 164 and 165. 
3941 Schmidt BGB-AT 426, Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 562. 
3942 The concept of 'non-negotiated terms' is wider than the one of 'standard terms'. Pursuant to art 3(2) of the 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, '[a] term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated 
where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of 
the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.' In terms of § 305(1) BGB, '[s]tandard 
business terms are all contract terms pre-formulated for more than two contracts which one party to the contract 
(the user) presents to the other party upon the entering into of the contract.'  
3943 Naudé 2009 SALJ 531, Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 5, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 364. The reason for this choice could be that many South Africans are more vulnerable 
than consumers in other countries are, given their low level of education and bargaining power. 
3944 BGH NJW 1999, 2279 (2280); 3558 (3559); 2000, 3348. 
3945 Stoffels AGB-Recht 165. 
3946 BGH NJW 2001, 2014 (2016); 2014, 2269 (2273), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 41. 
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Building specifications or general information in prospects or catalogues are exempt from 
content control.3947 The same applies to a job description in an employment contract3948 or the 
determination of the working hours.3949  
bb)   Modifications of the promised performance 
On the other hand, standard business clauses that restrict, modify or undermine the main subject 
matter of the agreement can be challenged according to the BGH.3950 The demarcation between 
control-free performance specifications and modifications of the performance is nonetheless 
sometimes difficult to draw. The BGH puts forward the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. 
because § 307(2) no. 2 makes clear that the other party must be protected from clauses that 
limit essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that 
attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised.3951 
Therefore, a clause contained in general travel terms by which the scope of the contractual 
performance is determined by the performance specification of the tour operator and in 
consideration of the 'habitual practices' in the given country is subject to content control. The 
BGH decided that such a clause modifies the promised performance by submitting it to the 
habitual local practices. Without that clause, the operator would be obliged to ensure a delivery 
that is considered of average kind and quality (§ 243 BGB) according to German standards. 
With the 'filter' of the habitual local practices, that standard is undermined though since the 
foreign standard could fall behind the German one.3952 
Stoffels legitimately maintains that the BGH's criterion for the demarcation between clauses 
that are subject to content control and those that are exempt from it, i.e., whether the given 
clause restricts, modifies or undermines the main subject matter of the contract, is not suitable 
for the determination of the control-free area of the principal obligations in terms of § 307(3). 
In his view, such a criterion does not sufficiently consider the normative purpose of § 307(3), 
but rather loses itself in a terminological or descriptive debate.3953  
In order to decide whether such a clause can be challenged, one thus has to keep in mind the 
legislator's objective. The fundamental idea of content control is the consumer's protection in 
                                                             
3947 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 294. 
3948 BAG NZA 2007, 974 (975). 
3949 BAG NZA 2008, 45. 
3950 BGH NJW 2014, 2269 (2273), Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 45. 
3951 BGH NJW 1987, 1931 (1935). 
3952 BGH NJW 1987, 1931 (1935). 
3953 Stoffels AGB-Recht 170 and 171. 
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areas where the market does not offer sufficient protection against abuse by the user. Where a 
standard clause is subject to the market's forces and competition in a way that the average client 
takes notice of it and can include it in its decision, one can suppose that the market regularly 
offers a fair balance of the parties' interests so that any intervention is superfluous.3954 
In this context, it is helpful to take into account how the customer deals with the 'fine print' of 
a contract. Since the transposition of the Unfair Terms Directive and the insertion of § 310(3), 
consumer protection considerations are now part of German standard business clause 
legislation. A client that is confronted with standard terms should, according to ECJ case 
law,3955 be considered a reasonable average customer who must be able to reach decisions on 
the market on the basis of sufficient information. Although he or she has no noteworthy legal 
knowledge, he or she does not reach any decisions blindly. Therefore, the main subject matter 
of a contract is crucial for clients as they attempt to satisfy their needs to a price they are ready 
to pay. Hence, transparent prices and the core of the performance do form part of the control 
mechanisms of the market and competition.3956 Apart from transparency control, they are 
therefore not subject to content control, save where the legislator regulates certain prices, such 
as doctor's or lawyer's fees.3957 
The aforementioned distinction between the main subject matter of the contract (essentialia 
negotii) and ancillary stipulations (naturalia) is not sufficient, however. Other considerations 
should be included too. In certain cases, performance does not form part of the main subject 
matter of the contract but might convince the client to conclude the contract because the 
supplier's product offers an ancillary performance that other supplier's products do not offer, 
e.g., additional services of a credit card provider. Then, the given clause is submitted to real 
competition and there is no need for content control.3958 
In two recent rulings, the BGH affirmed that fees for the conclusion of building loan contracts, 
which are very popular in Germany, and those for the processing of consumer loan agreements 
are ancillary price agreements and therefore subject to content control.3959 Stoffels correctly 
contradicts the BGH's analysis and argues that in the case of building loan contracts, consumers 
generally pay attention to the financial impact of such a contract. The conclusion fee for such 
                                                             
3954 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 265, See also Canaris NJW 1987, 613. 
3955 E.g., ECJ NJW 1993, 3187 (Yves Rocher); 1995, 3243 ('Mars'). 
3956 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 41. 
3957 BGH NJW 1998, 1786 (1789). 
3958 Stoffels AGB-Recht 173. 
3959 BGH NJW 2011, 1801 (1802 et seq) (building loan contracts); 2014, 2420 (consumer loan agreements). 
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contracts is an essential cost factor. § 6(3) and (8) of the Preisangabenverordnung (PAngV)3960 
even requires that the supplier includes such fees in the effective annual percentage rate. What 
is more, many specialised magazines, such as Finanztest, Capital or Managermagazin as well 
as online services regularly publish comparisons of these products, so that one can argue that 
the aforementioned fees take part in the competition. The argument that in this sector there is 
no real competition and that consequently, the market does not function properly can be 
rebutted because consumers have the possibility to choose other long-term savings products 
instead, such as bank savings plans or fund saving products. Therefore, building loan contracts 
compete with these products.3961 
The same applies to consumer loan agreements since the fee for the processing of such 
contracts take part in the competition for the main subject matter. First, the supplier has the 
obligation to inform its client of the amount of these fees. Second, the credit institution must 
inform the borrower of the effective annual percentage rate before he or she signs the 
contract.3962 As discussed before, this rate must include all kinds of costs, also the processing 
fees (§ 6(3) PAngV). Hence, the processing fees are part of the client's considerations for his 
or her decision and thus take part in the competition in the relevant market. Because of the fair 
balance between the parties' interests, there is no need for content control.3963 
The BGH's argumentation that processing fees can be challenged since they are not agreements 
on the price for the contractual main subject matter or a remuneration for additional services, 
but rather the supplier's attempt to pass on costs to the client for services that the bank must 
perform in its own interest (such as the scrutiny of the creditworthiness) or because of its own 
legal obligations, ignores the normative purpose of § 307(3). In more recent decisions, the BGH 
has thus corrected its view and submits processing fees to content control.3964  
cc)   General insurance terms and conditions 
Whether and to what extent risk descriptions in general insurance terms and conditions are 
subject to content control is controversially discussed.3965 Insurance terms and conditions 
define the performance by describing the inclusions, exclusions and certain duties3966 of the 
                                                             
3960 PAngV = Price Indication Regulation). 
3961 Stoffels AGB-Recht 173 and 174. 
3962 § 491a(1) BGB, art 247 § 3(1) no. 3 EGBGB. 
3963 Stoffels AGB-Recht 175. See also the decision of LG Munich I of 17.09.2013 in ZIP 2014, 20. 
3964 BGH NJW 2014, 2420 (2421 et seq). 
3965 See UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 55 et seq. 
3966 Obliegenheit. Such duties can be defined as co-operation obligations, e.g., the obligation to notify an insured 
loss within a certain period of time. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Obliegenheit'. 
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insured party. Legal literature tends to exclude primary risk descriptions and a large part of 
secondary risk restrictions from content control.3967 The BGH has not reached any decisions in 
this regard but generally applies its jurisprudence on control-free performance specifications 
to general insurance terms and conditions.3968 Hence, only risk descriptions belonging to the 
'core of performance specifications', i.e., the general description of the insured object and the 
insured risk, are exempt from content control.3969 On the other hand, clauses restricting the 
promise of the principal performance of the insurer to fully cover the insured loss in a manner 
that is incompatible with the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. are subject to content 
control.3970 Clauses that define the co-operation obligations3971 of the insured are always 
subject to content control.3972 
Standard provisions of a private medical insurance that exclude examinations and treatments 
that are not generally accepted by the scientific community (so-called 'scientific character 
clause')3973 or that are not part of conventional medicine3974 are no performance descriptions 
but rather limit the scope of the insurance cover and therefore restrict the performance 
description. Hence, such clauses are subject to content control. 
According to the BGH, a clause by which the price for a one- or two-bed hospital room is fully 
charged also for the first and last day in hospital is exempt from content control as it merely 
stipulates the type and scope of the principal contractual obligation and its price.3975  
b) Price agreements 
aa)   Direct price agreements 
The actual or direct agreement between the parties on the price to be paid by the consumer for 
the delivery of the given goods or services is not subject to content control under § 307(3).3976 
In this context, the BGH expressly states that direct price agreements include not only the 
concrete indication of a price but also the methodology to be applied to calculate the price.3977 
                                                             
3967 Sieg VersR 1977, 491. 
3968 BGH VersR 1991, 175; NJW 1999, 3558 (3559). 
3969 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 55. 
3970 BGH NJW 2001, 1934 (1935). 
3971 Obliegenheitsklauseln. 
3972 Locher Recht der AGB 86 et seq, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 59. 
3973 Wissenschaftlichkeitsklausel. BGH NJW 1993, 2369. 
3974 Schuldmedizinklausel. BGH NJW 2003, 294. 
3975 BGH NJW 1999, 864. 
3976 Stoffels AGB-Recht 168. 
3977 BGH NJW 2000, 577 (579). 
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This applies, for instance, to the fees for the German telecommunication agency, the Deutsche 
Telekom AG.3978 Also, a clause stipulating a lump-sum for the remuneration of the delivery of 
water for the construction of a building is exempted from content control.3979 So-called 
'discount clauses' of an insurance company by which the latter offers a discount on the premium 
if it does not have to pay for a damage of the insured, or if the insured extends the insurance 
for another year, are control-free, too.3980 
Exceptionally, such direct price agreements can be challenged where a legal price regulation 
exists and pre-formulated clauses differ from it.3981 Since the legislator aimed to achieve a 
certain protective purpose when regulating such prices, any deviation from this regulation must 
be subject to content control, and it must be assessed whether the price clause corresponds to 
the fundamental idea behind the price regulation.3982 
On the other hand, section 48(1)(a)(i) of the Act expressly prohibits unfair prices. The courts 
should not be competent for price control however as consumers can be expected to be aware 
of the price as it is usually the first thing they look at. As long as the price it is prominently 
mentioned in South African terms and conditions, payable in circumstances the consumer 
reasonably expected, and its calculation is not surprising, there is no reason why courts should 
interfere unless the price is obviously unfair or gives an excessive advantage to the supplier.3983  
In German law, the threshold for an intervention of the courts is very high, e.g., for usury.3984 
Furthermore, excessive pricing control falls under the competency of competition authorities 
                                                             
3978 BGH NJW 1998, 3188 (3192). 
3979 BGH NJW 1999, 3260 et seq. 
3980 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1479. 
3981 Erman/Roloff § 307 para 45. 
3982 BGH NJW 1981, 2351 (deviation from officially established architect fees); 1998, 1786 (1789) (dentist's fees); 
1998, 3567 (lawyer's fees). 
3983 According to the common law, a court may set aside a price set by a third party appointed by the parties for 
that purpose as long as it was manifestly unjust. See Hurwitz and Others NNO v Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 1994 (3) SA 449 (C), Van Heerden v Basson 1998 (1) SA 715 (T). 
3984 § 138 (2) BGB: 'In particular, a legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament, 
inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable weakness of will of another, causes himself or a third party, 
in exchange for an act of performance, to be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly 
disproportionate to the performance.' The price must therefore not only be excessive ('disproportionate'), but the 
other party must also fulfil subjective conditions that are linked to its person. 
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which are more qualified in terms of empirical market and pricing analysis,3985 as well as the 
handling of market failure.3986  
bb)   Ancillary agreements on the price 
According to the BGH, ancillary agreements on the price, i.e., clauses that have an impact on 
the price and the performance but do not exclusively define the price to be paid for the principal 
performance, are also subject to content control. Such clauses generally differ from the ius 
dispositivum, and if they would not be contained in standard terms, their content could be 
determined by §§ 157, 242.3987 These are provisions that define the calculation or modification 
of the price by a party, payment conditions, as well as due date and indexation clauses.3988 
Clauses that define the value date for bank transactions by which not the percentage of the 
interests is stipulated but rather the date by which the interests are calculated, are such ancillary 
price agreements.3989 The same applies to bank fees for transactions at the counter,3990 or fees 
for inquiries concerning bank transactions.3991 Fees for the cancelling of a telephone line that a 
telecommunication agency charges can also be challenged. The BGH considers such fees as 
'an attempt to pass on charges for the safeguarding of the user's interests to the client'.3992 
cc)   Price agreements on ancillary and special performances 
Terms that stipulate a price or a fee for additional special performances, such for the use of a 
bank card abroad,3993 are control-free if such special performances are not regulated by law.3994 
The same applies to a clause by which a bank charges a fee for reissuing a savings book.3995 
On the other hand, clauses that do not define a special performance for the benefit of the client, 
but pass on charges for the fulfilment of legal or contractual obligations, are subject to content 
                                                             
3985 See s 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 which prohibits a dominant form to charge an excessive price to 
the detriment of consumers, that is a price for a good or service which bears no reasonable relation to the economic 
value of that good or service and is higher than that value. This must be determined by empirical analysis. As to 
the elements in order to determine such a price see Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and Another v Mittal 
Steel South Africa Limited and Another [2007] CPLR 37 (CT).  
3986 Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
3987 § 157 BGB: '(Interpretation of contracts) Contracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking 
customary practice into consideration.' § 242: '(Performance in good faith) An obligor has a duty to perform 
according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration.' BGH NJW 2000, 577 
(579); NJW-RR 2004, 1206. 
3988 Stoffels AGB-Recht 169. 
3989 BGH NJW 1989, 582. 
3990 BGH NJW 1994, 318 et seq. 
3991 OLG Schleswig ZIP 2000, 789 (790). 
3992 BGH NJW 2002, 2386 (2387). 
3993 BGH NJW 1998, 383. 
3994 BGH NJW 1996, 2032. 
3995 BGH BB 1998, 1864. 
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control.3996 By managing exemption instructions,3997 banks fulfil a legal obligation of public 
interest.3998 The management of a loan account is also in the bank's interest in terms of its 
organisation and bookkeeping.3999 Such terms are thus always subject to content control.4000 
It is submitted however that the BGH's (former) argumentation does not consider the normative 
purpose of § 307(3), i.e., the other party's protection where he or she is abused because the 
agreement does not represent a fair balance between the parties' interests. For fees that bank 
charge for the use of a credit card overseas, for instance, the question is if such fees take part 
in the competition in the relevant market, and not whether they are regulated by law. In a 
society where people can freely move and travel, especially in the EU, and where a huge part 
of the population actually has the means to do so, the use of credit cards abroad is part of the 
considerations average clients usually have. Hence, such fees are a crucial factor in the 
customer's decision. Furthermore, the standard terms must present these fees in a transparent 
manner. Finally, these fees take part in the competition in the relevant market because of the 
regularly published comparisons (e.g., Stiftung Warentest). Hence, there is no need for content 
control in these cases.4001 
1.2.6 Impact of §§ 308 and 309 on control-free clauses 
Since §§ 308 and 309 are a concretisation of the control standard of the general clause 
(§ 307),4002 one might ask the question of whether these provisions can give some guidance for 
the determination of whether certain clauses are subject to content control. The legislator aimed 
to eliminate certain clauses from legal relations that present a certain danger for the other 
party.4003 If these clauses were subject to another filter – in the form of § 307(3) – this objective 
would be watered down though. Hence, it is generally accepted that § 307(3) does not apply to 
the prohibitions contained in §§ 308 and 309.4004 
                                                             
3996 BGH NJW 2005, 1275; 2011, 1726 (1727). 
3997 Freistellungsaufträge. 
3998 BGH NJW 1997, 2753 et seq. 
3999 BGH NJW 2011, 2640 (2641). 
4000 Stoffels AGB-Recht 170. 
4001 Stoffels AGB-Recht 173 and 174. 
4002 Stoffels AGB-Recht 243. 
4003 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
4004 Niebling WM 1992, 852, Dylla-Krebs Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle 189. See e.g., BGH NJW 2001, 751 
(752). 
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Where however interdependences exist, i.e., where §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to a certain 
standard clause, but the latter shows certain similarities to a prohibition of §§ 308 or 309 
because of its thematic proximity, this question is more difficult to answer. 
A membership contract for a gym, for instance, contains a clause by which the membership is 
renewed automatically and implicitly for another six months if not cancelled in due time and 
form.4005 § 309 no. 9 lit. b)4006 is not applicable because it deals only with contracts for the 
regular supply of goods or the regular rendering of services or work performance by the user. 
In a gym contract, the main performance is not the supply of goods or services, but the client's 
right to use the equipment.4007 Therefore, the clause must be assessed by the general clause.4008 
Before this assessment can take place, one has to examine whether the renewal clause is subject 
to content control. This question can be answered negatively if the clause takes part in the 
competition of the relevant market because then, there is a fair balance between the parties' 
interests. A more normative evaluation can enrich this market-oriented approach. In concreto, 
the question is whether the thematic proximity of § 309 no. 9 lit. b) has an impact on the enquiry 
in terms of § 307(3). Especially the fact that § 307 only comes into play when §§ 308 and 309 
are not applicable speaks for the view that clauses for which §§ 308 or 309 are not directly 
applicable but which show a certain thematic proximity, generally should be open to content 
control under § 307. The fact that the legislator prohibits a tacit extension of contractual 
relationships in some instances also speaks for the argument that in this area, special attention 
should be given to clauses that deal with that matter, and that the legislator did not intend to 
limit the control of such a clause to transparency control.4009 
The integration of the market-oriented approach (competition in the relevant market) and the 
normative evaluation also makes sense because §§ 308 and 309 essentially deal with clauses 
that jeopardise a fair balance between the parties for the execution of the contract, and the other 
party usually does not take into consideration such issues when concluding the agreement. 
 
                                                             
4005 See BGH NJW 1997, 739. 
4006 § 309 no. 9 lit. b): '(Duration of continuing obligations) in a contractual relationship the subject matter of 
which is the regular supply of goods or the regular rendering of services or work performance by the user, (…) b) 
a tacit extension of the contractual relationship by more than one year in each case that is binding on the other 
party to the contract' is ineffective.  
4007 BGH NJW 1997, 739; 2012, 1431. 
4008 BGH NJW 2012, 1431. 
4009 Stoffels AGB-Recht 176. 
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1.3   Conclusion  
§§ 307 to 309 provide for a more intense content control compared to more general provisions 
in contract law, such as §§ 134 (statutory prohibition), 138 (public policy) or 242 (good faith). 
The latter therefore play a supplementary role, e.g., when the balance in an agreement between 
individuals is disturbed. § 138(1), for instance, has a different evaluative standard and a higher 
threshold of application than § 305 et seq. The legal consequences are also harsher as the entire 
contract is void should it violate the principles of public policy, whereas § 306(1) provides that 
only the ineffective clauses of the contract are void. For § 138, all clauses of the given contract 
and the concrete circumstances are part of the evaluation. By contrast, § 305 et seq. applies an 
abstract-universal approach. On the other hand, § 242 is applied in areas that are excluded in 
terms of § 310(4) and offers additional protection in instances where the supplier abuses a right 
it normally holds (exercise control). 
Voidability for mistake under § 119 is possible since this provision's objective is not contractual 
fairness but the implementation of the party's intention without any 'vice of consent'. Other 
provisions that apply in conjunction with §§ 305 et seq. are consumer protection provisions, 
such as §§ 475 (deviating agreements) and 312a(4) (restriction of certain payment clauses). 
Content control is legal control and, except for a narrow application of § 315(3) 2nd sent., no 
equity control, and must be performed by the courts ex officio. 
Besides the courts, certain standard terms can also be controlled by other entities, such as 
administrative bodies, by means of a previous approval procedure. When the approval is 
granted, the courts can nevertheless control the standard terms as the only standard applicable 
for them are §§ 305 et seq. In the insurance sector, such a previous content control does not 
exist anymore, but the Bundesanstalt für Finanzaufsicht can intervene subsequently if 
insurance-related standard terms unreasonably disadvantage the other party. 
So-called 'conditions cartels' are still prohibited in terms of antitrust law, but in practice, these 
cartels have no significant relevance. On the other hand, the 'recommended conditions' of some 
industries are much more relevant in practice. Content control by the antitrust authorities is 
double-folded since it assesses not only standard terms against the backdrop of the GWB but 
also under §§ 305 et seq. BGB. This is merely a prima facie control though because the 
authority does not undertake a full scrutiny in terms of the BGB. Besides, the antitrust 
authorities act on the principle of discretionary power. 
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The Act Against Unfair Competition (UWG) is also applicable along with the BGB standard 
terms legislation because it has another protective purpose. The BGH ruled that §§ 305 et seq. 
are market conduct rules in the sense of § 4 UWG. Although the applicable standard for both 
legislative pieces is different, a violation of the UWG can be a relevant aspect within the 
enquiry of the general clause of § 307 BGB. 
Also notaries public and the land registry have competence for the enquiry of standard business 
terms within certain limits. 
§ 307(3) 1st sent. provides that § 307 as well as §§ 308 and 309 apply only to standard clauses 
that derogate from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing those legal provisions. The 
prevailing view is that § 307(3) excludes performance specifications and agreements on the 
price as well as declaratory clauses. This view is supported, inter alia, by the ratio legis of this 
provision and the conclusions that can be drawn from the EU Unfair Terms Directive. This is 
only the case though if the clauses are transparent so that the consumer can reach an informed 
decision. Hence, transparency is a precondition for the absence of content control. 
In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish clauses that merely reproduce the content of legal 
provisions (declaratory clauses) from others. The 'regulatory identity' between the standard 
clause and the legal provision should be the decisive criterion in this regard. The prevailing 
view goes however too far by including also rights and obligations arising from a 
supplementary interpretation of the contract, because a comparative standard that has other 
sources than the matter which is the object of the comparison is needed. 
Contrary to the South African regime, the German legislator did not include negotiated terms, 
including the core terms. The German courts define the content control-free area narrowly as 
regards the core of contractual performance specifications. According to the BGH, terms that 
restrict, modify or undermine the main subject matter are subject to content control. This view 
does not take sufficiently consider the normative purpose of § 307(3) though. Hence, one 
should rather keep in mind the legislator's objective, i.e., the consumers' protection where the 
market fails to protect them sufficiently against abuses. Thus, where the market offers a fair 
balance between the parties' interests, there is no need for content control. Where real 
competition between suppliers on specific terms exist because of the fact that consumers 
usually pay attention to them, or the goods or services of various providers are regularly 
compared in the press so that there is transparency, there is no need for intervention. 
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Price agreements, including the calculation method for the price, are generally excluded from 
content control. This does not apply where a legal price regulation exists, and standard clauses 
differ from it. On the other hand, the South African legislator expressly prohibits unfair prices 
(section 48(1). Courts should not exert price control because they have not the necessary 
expertise, unlike the competition authorities. According to the BGH, ancillary price 
agreements, i.e., clauses defining the calculation or modification of the price, are subject to 
content control. On the other hand, price agreements on ancillary and special performances are 
generally exempt from this control if the given performances are not regulated by law. 
Nonetheless, also here, the criterion should rather be if such clauses take part in the competition 
in the market. 
§ 307(3) does not apply to the prohibitions of §§ 308 and 309 since the latter are a concretisation 
of the general clause. By the application of another 'filter', their protective purpose would be 
jeopardised. It is recognised though that a 'thematic proximity' might exist in certain cases, and 
that the legislator did not intend to limit the enquiry of such clauses to transparency control.  
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2. Prohibited clauses with or without the possibility of evaluation 
 
2.1  Introduction 
§§ 308 and 309 contain an 'exemplary enumeration of applications of the general clause of 
§ 307'4010 and certain clauses that are either invalid per se (§ 309) or after evaluation (§ 308). 
The German legislator was above all inspired by the practical relevance for consumers when 
drafting the two lists.4011 Although the general clause offers a flexible approach for content 
control, it has some disadvantages: it is very widely worded, and the judge has a very extensive 
scope of evaluation in terms of § 307. This leads to differing results, which might shy 
consumers away from risking legal procedures.4012 In order to offer more legal security and 
clarity, the legislator decided to draft a catalogue of exemplary clauses that are prohibited.4013  
What is more, §§ 308 and 309 offer precious guidelines for § 307 because the valuations 
contained in the two lists can be used for similar content control problems with respect to the 
general clause.4014 Some provisions contained in §§ 308 and 309 offer a reverse conclusion 
(argumentum e contrario) for the general clause, others a conclusion by 'analogy' or are rather 
neutral.4015 The BGH4016 decided that § 309 no. 94017 offers an argumentum e contrario in that 
clauses that do not fall under this provision can nonetheless be invalid under the general clause. 
The court held in connection with the extension clause in a gym membership contract that on 
the basis of the non-applicability of § 309 no. 9 lit. b) (tacit extension by more than one year) 
in the given case, it could not be excluded that the clause was invalid under the general clause. 
However, the legislator did not aim at stricter rules for contracts that were not covered by the 
                                                             
4010 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 6. 
4011 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
4012 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23, Stoffels AGB-Recht 243. 
4013 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. The advantages of so-called 'black-' and 'greylists' have already been discussed in Part 
I ch 3 para 1.2. 
4014 Stoffels AGB-Recht 244. 
4015 WLP/Dammann before §§ 308, 309 para 14 et seq. 
4016 BGH NJW 1987, 2012 (2013 et seq). 
4017 § 309 no. 9: The following standard business clauses are ineffective: '(Duration of continuing obligations) in 
a contractual relationship the subject matter of which is the regular supply of goods or the regular rendering of 
services or work performance by the user, a) a duration of the contract binding the other party to the contract for 
more than two years, b) a tacit extension of the contractual relationship by more than one year in each case that is 
binding on the other party to the contract, or c) a notice period longer than three months prior to the expiry of the 
duration of the contract as originally agreed or tacitly extended at the expense of the other party to the contract; 
this does not apply to contracts relating to the supply of things sold as belonging together, to insurance contracts 
or to contracts between the holders of copyright rights and claims and copyright collecting societies within the 
meaning of the Act on the Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights [by Collecting Societies 
(VGG)].' 
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prohibition of § 309 no. 9, which is why it was not admissible to 'turn upside down' the 
legislator's regulatory intentions.4018 
In cases of contractual penalty where § 309 no. 64019 does not apply, the evaluation of this 
provision can serve the evaluation for the general clause by means of a conclusion by 
'analogy'.4020 Contractual penalties bear enormous risks for the other party, and the possibility 
of a reduction of the penalty by the court under § 3434021 does not offer sufficient protection.4022 
§ 309 no. 14023 is an example of a neutral clause since one cannot conclude the validity or 
invalidity of price increasing clauses after the expiration of the 4-month period. 
In terms of § 310(1) 1st sent., most items of § 308 and all items contained in § 309 do not apply 
to B2B contracts. The requirements of such transactions between businesses on different levels 
(production, marketing, distribution) are too diverse and not comparable to relations with final 
consumers.4024 §§ 308 and 309 do apply neither to legal persons under public law, or special 
funds under public law.4025 Content control is performed here through the general clause.4026  
The legislator distinguishes between 'prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation' 
(§ 309) and those 'with the possibility of evaluation' (§ 308). The former are characterised by 
their general risks for the other party and are prohibited per se, whereas the latter necessitate a 
case-by-case evaluation.4027 A characteristic of the provisions of § 308 is that they all contain 
indeterminate legal terms, such as 'unreasonably long',4028 'without any objectively justified 
reason',4029 'reasonably'4030 or 'without undue delay'.4031 This indicates the possibility of 
                                                             
4018 BGH NJW 1997, 739 (740). 
4019 § 309 no. 6: '(Contractual penalty) [A] provision by which the user is promised the payment of a contractual 
penalty in the event of non-acceptance or late acceptance of the performance, payment default or in the event that 
the other party to the contract frees himself from the contract' is prohibited.  
4020 'Analogy' here is not an analogy in the technical legal sense because there is no unintended regulatory gap as 
§ 307 serves as a 'catch-all clause'. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 245. 
4021 § 343(1): '(Reduction of the penalty) (1) If a payable penalty is disproportionately high, it may on the 
application of the obligor be reduced to a reasonable amount by judicial decision. In judging the appropriateness, 
every legitimate interest of the obligee, not merely his financial interest, must be taken into account. Once the 
penalty is paid, reduction is excluded.'  
4022 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 61. 
4023 § 309 no. 1: '(Price increases at short notice) [A] provision providing for an increase in payment for goods or 
services that are to be delivered or rendered within four months of the entering into of the contract; this does not 
apply to goods or services delivered or rendered in connection with continuing obligations' is prohibited.'  
4024 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
4025 § 310(1) 1st sent., BT-Drs. 7/3019 at 24. 
4026 See § 310(1) 2nd sent. 
4027 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4028 E.g., § 308 no. 1 and 2. 
4029 E.g., § 308 no. 3. 
4030 E.g., § 308 no. 4. 
4031 E.g., § 308 no. 8. 
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evaluation by considering the circumstances of the given case.4032 Clauses that are subject to 
§ 308 generally contain a risk of a disturbed balancing of interests.4033 On the other hand, § 309 
does (generally) not contain any indeterminate legal terms.4034 Contrary to § 308, the enquiry 
under § 309 does not necessitate an evaluation of the circumstances of the case.4035 Such clauses 
are a concretisation of § 307(2) because they are not compatible with essential principles of 
statutory provisions or undermine cardinal rights and obligations.4036 
Content control should therefore begin with § 309, and if the given clause does not fall under 
this provision, continue with § 308.4037 If the clause still passes the test, an enquiry within the 
general clause is performed.4038  
The South African terminology distinguishing between a 'blacklist' and a 'greylist' is not used 
in Germany. Naudé legitimately argues that a blacklist is a catalogue of prohibited terms that 
are invalid per se, whereas a greylist contains clauses that may be unfair, but the final decision 
depends on the circumstances of the given case.4039 For the evaluative elements of § 308, the 
particular circumstances of the case have to be taken into consideration. Once this evaluation 
has taken place, and the court has decided that the requirements of an indeterminate (open) 
legal term are fulfilled, the given clause is invalid. In this case, there is no need for recourse to 
other surrounding circumstances or § 307.4040 In agreement with Naudé, it is suggested that 
§§ 308 and 309 can be qualified as black- and greylists, respectively, since the relevant factor 
is the evaluative element or the invalidity under all circumstances. 
The Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms 
in its Annex that the Member States can regard as unfair.4041 The meaning of this list for the 
design of the national legal orders and content control exercised by the courts is subject to 
discussion. Most authors opine that the list merely contains an indicative enumeration of 
clauses that tend towards being unfair.4042 There is consensus however that the Annex does not 
                                                             
4032 Stoffels AGB-Recht 245, BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4033 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4034 In § 309 no. 8 lit. b) dd), 'disproportionality' is an indeterminate legal term though. In these cases, an evaluation 
is not excluded. See MüKo/Wurmnest § 307 para 22. 
4035 Stoffels AGB-Recht 246. 
4036 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4037 Maxeiner 2003 Y. J. Int. Law 153. 
4038 Stoffels AGB-Recht 245. 
4039 Naudé 2007 SALJ 130. 
4040 Naudé 2007 SALJ 130. 
4041 Art 3(3) of the Directive. 
4042 Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 29, Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 120 et seq, WLP/Pfeiffer Art 3 RiLi para 75 
et seq. 
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contain a 'blacklist' with clauses that must be considered unfair in any event, and that 
unmentioned clauses are not necessarily fair. The Member States are particularly not precluded 
from branding further clauses as unfair.4043 More problematic is the question of whether the 
Member States must implement the clauses of the Annex that go beyond content control based 
on a general clause. The ECJ held that the Annex does not create rights that go further than the 
text of the Directive itself and refrained from applying its strict conditions set out in its 
judgment of 10/05/20014044 to the Annex.4045 According to the court, the Annex is merely a 
source of information for the national authorities as well as for individuals. In order to achieve 
the Directive's objective, the Member States must therefore choose a form and means of 
implementation that ensures that the public obtains knowledge of the list contained in the 
Annex.4046 §§ 308 and 309 include most of the clauses of the Directive's Annex and sometimes 
go beyond the protection offered by the Annex. In cases where §§ 308 and 309 do not contain 
clauses provided for in the Annex, the German legislator can fill this gap by applying the 
general clause.4047 Stoffels correctly alleges that the legislature should nonetheless endeavour 
to close this gap by inserting the 'missing' clauses from the Annex in order to harmonise the 
German law with the Directive.4048 
In terms of § 310(2), sections 308 and 309 do not apply to contracts of electricity, gas, district 
heating or water suppliers for the supply of electricity, gas, district heating or water from the 
supply grid to special customers to the extent that the conditions of supply do not derogate 
from orders on general conditions for the supply of standard-rate customers with electricity, 
gas, district heating and water to the disadvantage of the customer. § 39 of the Energy Industry 
Act (EnWG)4049 and article 243 EGBGB authorise the Ministry of Economy and Technology 
to adopt price regulations for utility companies. On this basis, in the last years, several 
regulations in this field have been adopted.4050 These are legal norms (and not standard business 
terms, even though their designations might sometimes be confusing) which directly regulate 
                                                             
4043 Art 8 of the Directive. 
4044 ECJ NJW 2001, 2244 – Commission/The Netherlands. 
4045 ECJ NJW 2004, 1647 ('Freiburger Kommunalbauten').  
4046 ECJ EuZW 2002, 465 (466) – Commission/Sweden. 
4047 Stoffels AGB-Recht 247. Others suggest a preliminary ruling by the ECJ in these cases. See MüKo/Wurmnest 
§ 308 para 12. 
4048 Stoffels AGB-Recht 247. 
4049 EnWG = Energiewirtschaftsgesetz. 
4050 Stromgrundversorgungsverordnung (StromGVV) and Gasgrundversorgungsverordnung (GasGVV) of 
26/10/2006, BGBl. I at 2391, Niederspannungsanschlussverordnung (NAV) of 01/11/2006, BGBl I at 2477, 
Niederdruckanschlussverordnung (NDAV) of 01/11/2006, BGBl. I at 2477, Allgemeine Bedingungen für die 
Versorgung mit Fernwärme (AVBFernwärmeV) of 20/06/1980, BGBl. I at 742, Allgemeine Bedingungen für die 
Versorgung mit Wasser (AVBWasserV) of 20/06/1980, BGBl. I at 750, 1067. 
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the content of the relation with the customers. Hence, they are not subject to content control in 
the sense of §§ 305 et seq.4051 On the other hand, vis-à-vis special customers4052 (mostly 
industrial consumers), these contracts only apply if they have been specifically incorporated. 
In this case, content control in terms of §§ 305 et seq. is possible. § 310(2) provides though 
that content control under §§ 308 and 309 is excluded so that only § 307 is applicable.4053 With 
this mechanism, the legislator wants to prevent that special customers are in a better position 
than standard-rate customers.4054 Since the liberalisation of the energy supply market, 
consumers can also conclude contracts with utility suppliers and become special customers.4055 
Here too, content control is possible only in terms of the general clause.4056 The level of 
protection must not fall behind the Unfair Terms Directive however, which is why §§ 310(2) 
and 307 must be interpreted in conformity with the Directive.4057 The courts have therefore 
recently decided that the validity of price adjustment clauses in gas-supply contracts with 
special customers must not only be assessed in terms of the Gasgrundversorgungsverordnung, 
but also in accordance with the Directive.4058 
2.2 Prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation (§ 309) 
2.2.1 Price increases at short notice (§ 309 no. 1) 
In terms of § 309 no. 1, a provision providing for an increase in payment for goods or services 
that are to be delivered or rendered within four months of the entering into of the contract is 
ineffective. This does not apply to goods or services delivered or rendered in connection with 
continuing obligations. 
2.2.1.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 1 
The determination of the payment for goods or services is part of the essentialia negotii. Pre-
formulated clauses that enable the standard terms user to increase the price originally agreed 
with its customer raise concerns because they infringe the pacta sunt servanda principle by a 
subsequent unilateral intervention in the originally agreed counter-performance.4059 What is 
more, price comparisons before the conclusion of the contract are less effective, which means 
                                                             
4051 Stoffels AGB-Recht 247. 
4052 Sonderabnehmer. 
4053 Stoffels AGB-Recht 247. 
4054 Tarifkunden. BGH NJW 1998, 1640 (1642). 
4055 MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 19. 
4056 BGH NJW 2013, 3647 (3650 et seq), Erman/Roloff § 310 para 9. 
4057 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 105, Erman/Roloff § 310 para 9. 
4058 ECJ NJW 2013, 2253 ('RWE') and BGH NJW 2013, 3647. 
4059 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 27. 
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that price competition is jeopardised.4060 Hence, no. 1 of § 309 blacklists price increases at 
short notice.4061 
Regulation 44(3)(h) of the Act and the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive (item (l) of no. 1) 
contain a similar provision. According to the South African regulation and the European 
Directive, a clause may be fair if the other party (consumer) is granted a right to cancel the 
agreement.4062 § 309 no. 1 prohibits price increases within the first four months after the 
conclusion of the contract per se. Price increases occurring after this period are assessed in 
terms of the general clause. To ensure a balance between the original and the increased price, 
the courts apply a standard that goes beyond the requisites of item (l) of the Unfair Terms 
Directive. Neither the Directive nor the Regulation explicitly exclude contracts concerning 
continuing obligations. Even if continuing obligations were included in the Directive or the 
Regulation, the protection granted by the German general clause would not fall short of the 
Directive or the Regulation, however. What is more, the BGB grants an ordinary right to revoke 
an agreement as well as an extraordinary right of withdrawal for continuing obligations in terms 
of § 3144063 for a compelling reason. An unacceptable price increase is such a compelling 
reason.4064 
2.2.1.2 Content of the provision 
§ 309 no. 1 contains an absolute prohibition for price increases in the given cases, without the 
possibility for the user to justify price increases. Therefore, price increases on the user's side 
(e.g., for material, raw materials or salaries) do not allow for a passing on to the consumer.4065 
                                                             
4060 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 27. 
4061 The conditions of § 309 no. 1 are the same as in § 1 Preisangabenverordnung (PAngV) of 2002 (BGBl. 2001 
I at 4197), but the legal consequence in the PAngV is not ineffectiveness of the clause, but consists in an 
administrative offence. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 331 and BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 27. 
4062 See BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 28. 
4063 § 314: '(1) Each party may terminate a contract for the performance of a continuing obligation for a compelling 
reason without a notice period. There is a compelling reason if the terminating party, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the specific case and weighing the interests of both parties, cannot reasonably be expected to 
continue the contractual relationship until the agreed end or until the expiry of a notice period. (2) If the compelling 
reason consists in the breach of a duty under the contract, the contract may be terminated only after the expiry 
without result of a period specified for relief or after a warning notice without result. [§] 323(2) number 1 und 2 
applies, with the necessary modifications, as regards the dispensability of specifying a period for such relief and 
as regards the dispensability of a warning notice. Specifying a period for relief and issuing a warning notice can 
also be dispensed with if special circumstances are given which, when the interests of both parties are weighed, 
justify immediate termination. (3) The person entitled may give notice only within a reasonable period after 
obtaining knowledge of the reason for termination. (4) The right to demand damages is not excluded by the 
termination.'  
4064 Stoffels AGB-Recht 331. 
4065 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (856), WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 52. 
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a) Price increase 
In order to fall under no. 1, the given clause must contain a direct increase of the originally 
agreed price. The term 'price' includes in mutual contracts the client's counter-performance, but 
also ancillary performances and VAT. Usually, the customer's performance consists of 
payment in the form of monies but also barter trades are included in no. 1.4066 There is an 
increase in the price if the quantity of the (nominal) amount rises. So-called 'escalator' (or 
indexation) clauses4067 and 'tension clauses'4068 stipulating an automatic adjustment of the 
agreed amount are also subject to no. 1.4069 On the other hand, indirect price increases, e.g., 
through a decrease of the promised performance while the price remains the same, are assessed 
in terms of § 308 no. 4.4070 
Hence, market price clauses ('the payable price is the list price of the delivery day') are 
ineffective. They do not indicate the payable price when the contract is concluded, which is 
required for delivery within 4 months in terms of no. 1.4071 The same applies to clauses such as 
'prices non-binding' because they enable the user to determine its price any time at will.4072 The 
formulation 'price plus VAT' is ineffective too because it would enable the user to adjust its 
prices after an increase of the VAT.4073 On the other hand, clauses by which the user reserves 
a right to adjust the amount of the reimbursement for its expenses are technically no prices, but 
expenses.4074 They are nonetheless controllable in terms of § 307.4075 
b) Goods or services 
The payment has to be intended for 'goods or services'. For 'goods', ex-§ 1(2) HGB contained 
a legal definition before the commercial law reform in 1998 according to which goods are 
movable objects. Hence, land plots are no goods in this sense,4076 but transactions relating to 
them are open to scrutiny in terms of § 307, and the evaluations of § 309 no. 1 can be taken 
                                                             
4066 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 30. 
4067 Gleitklauseln or Indexklauseln. 
4068 Spannungsklauseln. This type of clauses contains a 'tension' between different evaluation bases that are used 
for the calculation of a performance (e.g., civil servant pensions) in relation to another reference (e.g., a given 
salary group). In other words, the price of a certain good or service is dependent on the price of a similar good or 
service. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Spannungsklausel' and BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 27. 
4069 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 2. 
4070 Stoffels AGB-Recht 332. 
4071 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 3, UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 1 para 20. 
4072 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 1 para 14 in fine. 
4073 BGH NJW 1980, 2133. See also § 1(1) PAngV that sets out that the indicated price has to include VAT. 
4074 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 30. 
4075 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 1 para 16. 
4076 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 32. 
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into account within the general clause.4077 'Services' are all contractual performances that are 
neither goods nor immovable objects (land plots).4078 Therefore, § 309 no. 1 covers all types 
of transactions save those concerning immovable objects.4079 
c) Four-month period 
No. 1 is only applicable to price increase clauses in agreements of which the main performance 
has to be delivered within four months of the entering into the contract.4080 The reason for 
allowing price increases after four months is that the user might have a legitimate interest to 
readjust the price, notably in times of sharp cost increases.4081 This period is calculated on the 
basis of the time of performance set out in the pre-formulated clause or individually agreed by 
the parties.4082 If the parties have not agreed on a particular time of performance, the user may 
effect it immediately in terms of § 271(1).4083 The actual time of performance is irrelevant.4084 
A circumvention of § 309 no. 1 by an extension of the time of performance over four months 
is prevented by § 308 no. 1. This norm prohibits unreasonably long periods of time for 
rendering performance and enables an enquiry in terms of the general clause.4085 
d) Exception for continuing obligations 
No. 1 does not apply to agreements on continuing obligations (open-ended agreements),4086 
even if they cover a shorter period of time of performance than four months. Continuing 
obligations are those contained in insurance contracts, leases, subscriptions or loan agreements. 
Apportioned contracts4087 and recurring obligations4088 are qualified as continuing obligations 
in the sense of § 309 no. 1 too. Although these types of contracts are not assessed in terms of 
§ 309 no. 1, the general clause is applicable.4089 Despite this fact, the courts apply a more 
                                                             
4077 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
4078 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 33. 
4079 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
4080 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
4081 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 27. 
4082 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
4083 § 271(1): 'Where no time for performance has been specified or is evident from the circumstances, the obligee 
may demand performance immediately, and the obligor may effect it immediately.'  
4084 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
4085 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
4086 Dauerschuldverhältnisse. 
4087 Sukzessivlieferungsverträge or Teillieferungsverträge. In this type of agreement, a certain volume of goods, 
stipulated in advance, is delivered in portions. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Sukzessivlieferungsvertrag'. 
4088 Wiederkehrschuldverhältnisse. These are agreements with individual clients on water, gas or electricity, for 
instance. Since no total volume has been agreed on in advance, as for apportionate contracts 
(Sukzessivlieferungsverträge), they are renewed for each new contract period. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch 
s.v. 'Wiederkehrschuldverhältnis'. 
4089 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 27. 
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generous standard since price increase clauses in continuing obligations are an 'appropriate and 
accepted instrument to keep in balance price and performance'.4090 
2.2.1.3 Price increase clauses in package travel contracts 
§ 651 a to y (ex-§ 651(4) and (5)) contain specific provisions for price increases of package 
travel contracts.   
Under § 651f, the travel organiser may only increase the travel price if this is provided for in 
the contract with precise information on the calculation of the new price and if in doing this he 
is taking into account an increase in transport costs, charges for specific services, port or airport 
fees or a change in the foreign exchange rates relating to the travel package in question. The 
requirement of the information on the calculation of the new price corresponds to BGH 
jurisprudence according to which the terms for the calculation of the price increase must 
already be contained in the contract.4091 
In contrast to the former wording of § 651, the new provision does not provide that section 309 
no. 1 remains unaffected. Hence, price increase clauses in package travel contracts are assessed 
in terms of § 651f, as amended, and the general clause.4092 
2.2.1.4 Price increase clauses in long-term consumer contracts 
As the scope of application of no. 1 is restricted and does not apply to agreements on continuing 
obligations and contracts where the term of delivery is over four months, content control under 
the general clause plays a prominent function for closing these loopholes. The fact that item (l) 
of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive does not provide for a timeframe like § 309 no. 1 
also speaks for the necessity of content control. What is more, consumers need to be protected 
from unjustified price increases the longer the duration of their agreement is.4093 A standard 
provision is in conflict with § 307 in cases where standard terms not only allow for a price 
increase in order to pass on the user's own price increases and to avoid a lower margin. A term 
also violates the general clause where it enables the user to increase its margin.4094 
The BGH requires for B2C contracts that the consumer be able to identify the scope of possible 
price increases when entering into the contract by reading the given clause and assess whether 
                                                             
4090 BGH NJW 2012, 2187 (2189). 
4091 BGH NJW 2003, 507 (508). 
4092 BGH NJW 2003, 507 (508). 
4093 Stoffels AGB-Recht 335. 
4094 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (361). 
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the user is entitled to increase the price at a given moment.4095 In this regard, § 651f (ex-
§ 651a(4) and (5)) is of assistance. For so-called 'cost element clauses,'4096 the courts require 
that the clause contain the different cost elements and their weighting for the calculation of the 
total price so that the consumer is able to estimate possible price increases when concluding 
the agreement.4097 Where such a concretisation is not possible, the clause must contain the right 
to cancel the agreement in the case of a price increase.4098 This is also specifically set out in 
item (l) of the Annex of the Directive. In any event, if a price increase is foreseeable at the 
moment of the conclusion of the contract and the user could take into account this increase 
then, it cannot refer to a price increase clause at a subsequent stage.4099 
The BGH held that a market price clause4100 in contracts for the purchase of a new car is invalid 
if it says that the purchaser has to pay the price that is valid on the day of delivery if more than 
four months have passed between the conclusion of the agreement and the agreed day of 
delivery. Such a clause enables the user to put forward any price increase.4101 
Cost-element clauses by which the monthly fee for a pay-TV subscription can be increased are 
invalid if the clause does not contain the different cost elements and their weighting so that the 
consumer is not able to comprehend the calculation of the fee.4102 
2.2.1.5  Price adjustment clauses in energy supply agreements 
Price adjustment clauses of energy suppliers mostly take the form of cost-element clauses so 
that the strict requirements that the BGH developed for such provisions apply.4103 Clauses that 
do not contain the various cost elements and their weighting with regard to the price calculation 
do not become valid, even if they contain the consumer's right to cancel the agreement when 
the supplier adjusts its prices, and if the cancellation is only possible for the time after the price 
increase or is tied to unacceptable costs for the client.4104 Furthermore, the courts require that 
energy suppliers not only can adjust their prices within the legal limits but also must lower their 
prices if their own costs decrease.4105 
                                                             
4095 BGH NJW 1986, 3134 (3135). 
4096 Kostenelementeklausel. 
4097 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (361). 
4098 BGH NJW 1986, 3134 (3135). 
4099 In this case, according to Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 8, the clause should be invalid. 
4100 Tagespreisklausel. 
4101 BGH NJW 1985, 621 (622). 
4102 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (361). 
4103 Stoffels AGB-Recht 336. 
4104 BGH NJW 2007, 1054. 
4105 BGH NJW 2008, 2172 (2173). 
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So-called 'tension clauses'4106 require a projection that the market price for the given goods 
(e.g., natural gas) will typically develop in line with its reference (e.g., light fuel oil). If such a 
projection cannot be made, the user has no legitimate interest to increase its prices beyond the 
range of the actual costs increase. This range is exceeded where the user has an additional gain 
by the price increase.4107 
Recently, the ECJ decided that also gas supply contracts with special customers must be 
assessed in the light of the Unfair Terms Directive and that the transparency requirement of the 
Directive applies.4108 In the past, the BGH had decided that price adjustment clauses are valid 
in terms of § 307 if they fulfil the standard set out in § 5(2) GasGVV4109 (which gives the 
supplier the right to increase its prices without any justification).4110 The BGH now requires 
that the contract between the supplier and the special customer contains the reason and the 
mode for the price adjustment in a transparent manner so that the customer can project possible 
price increases.4111 The BGH will probably decide likewise for electricity supply 
agreements.4112 
Price increase clauses of suppliers holding a monopolistic position are subject to equity control 
under § 315.4113 In terms of § 315(3), the determination of the price can be made by judicial 
decision.4114 
Price adjustment clauses in distance-heating contracts are not subject to content control under 
§§ 307 et seq. but in terms of § 24(4) ABVFernwärmeV.4115 
2.2.1.6  Legal consequences in case of violation 
If a clause is invalid in terms of § 309 no. 1 the originally agreed price applies. A gap-filling 
interpretation under §§ 157 and 133 is excluded. Such a gap-filling interpretation is only 
                                                             
4106 Spannungsklauseln. See para 2.2.1.2 above. 
4107 BGH NJW 2010, 2793. 
4108 ECJ NJW 2013, 2253 ('RWE decision'). 
4109 Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Grundversorgung von Haushaltskunden und die 
Ersatzversorgung mit Gas aus dem Niederdrucknetz (Gasgrundversorgungsverordnung - GasGVV). 
4110 See, for instance, BGH NJW 2011, 1342 (1344). 
4111 BGH NJW 2013, 3647 (3651 et seq). 
4112 Büdenbender NJW 2013, 3604, Stoffels AGB-Recht 337. 
4113 BGH NJW 2009, 502 (504). 
4114 MüKo/Würdinger § 315 para 22, with further references. 
4115 BGH NJW 2011, 2501. Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Versorgung mit Fernwärme 
(AVBFernwärmeV). Pursuant to this provision, price increase clauses must take into consideration the cost 
evolution in the relevant market and contain the factors for the price calculation in a transparent manner, as well 
as the different cost factors. 
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possible in terms of the general clause, where, e.g., specific provisions such as § 632(2)4116 (for 
a contract to produce a work) are not applicable. Then, the court must assess what the parties 
would have agreed in their respective interest in good faith.4117 This could lead to the result 
that the user should have the right to determine the price pursuant to §§ 315 and 316,4118 that 
the price which is valid on the day of delivery shall apply4119 or that certain cost increases 
should be passed on to the consumer.4120 In return, fair balancing of the parties' interests 
requires that the consumer should have the right to cancel the contract if the price increase is 
significantly higher than the increase of the cost of living between the order and the delivery.4121 
2.2.1.7  B2B contracts 
The strict evaluations of no. 1 cannot be applied to B2B contracts and have no indicative 
effect.4122 In contracts between commercial partners, price calculation is a significant part of 
commercial success, and business partners can be expected to assess such clauses and refuse 
them if they are unfair.4123 
Standard clauses cannot undermine the agreement of a fixed price,4124 and list prices are not 
invalid per se in B2B agreements.4125 In long-term contracts, the reference to such list or market 
prices can be even necessary.4126 In B2B contracts, the other party needs not to be granted a 
right of cancellation.4127 Price increase clauses must be transparent and clearly spelt out and 
must not allow the user to increase its price at will.4128 
2.2.2 Right to refuse performance (§ 309 no. 2) 
2.2.2.1 Rationale of the provision 
§ 309 no. 2 sets out that a provision by which a) the right to refuse performance to which the 
other party to the contract with the user is entitled under § 320, is excluded or restricted, or b) a 
right of retention to which the other party to the contract with the user is entitled to the extent 
                                                             
4116 § 632(2): 'If the amount of remuneration is not specified, then if a tariff exists, the tariff remuneration is 
deemed to be agreed; if no tariff exists, the usual remuneration is deemed to be agreed.' 
4117 BGH NJW 1984, 1177 (1178). 
4118 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 1 para 31. 
4119 BGH NJW 1984, 1177 (1178). 
4120 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 1 para 31. 
4121 BGH NJW 1984, 1177 (1179). 
4122 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 1 para 45. 
4123 Stoffels AGB-Recht 338. 
4124 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 1 para 46. 
4125 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 1 para 47. 
4126 Stoffels AGB-Recht 338. 
4127 BGH NJW 1985, 853 (855). 
4128 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 162. 
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that it is based on the same contractual relationship, is excluded or restricted, in particular made 
dependent upon acknowledgement of defects by the user is ineffective. 
The legislator was of the view that the legal norms granting a right to refuse performance or a 
right of retention serve to protect a balance between the parties. A clause excluding or 
restricting these rights is therefore unilaterally to the disadvantage of the other party.4129 
The former UK Office of Fair Trading put forward another argument why such clauses might 
be dangerous for the consumer. Consumers might believe that they have no choice but to pay 
in full, even if the product or service in question is defective. Ultimately, they first have to 
obtain justice in court, which is costly, causes delays and entails an uncertain outcome. As a 
result, they simply might give up their claim, which amounts to a deprivation of their rights.4130 
Regulation 44(3)(n) greylists terms permitting the supplier, but not the consumer, to avoid or 
limit performance of the agreement. The practical relevance of this subregulation is however 
limited as item (b) already greylists clauses excluding or limiting the consumer’s right in the 
event of a breach of contract by the supplier. In practice, terms permitting the supplier to limit 
or avoid its performance may often have the same effect as terms obliging the consumer, unlike 
the supplier, to fulfil all its obligations.4131 
§ 320 contains a right to refuse performance and sets out that a person who is a party to a 
reciprocal contract may refuse his or her part of the performance until the other party renders 
consideration unless he or she is obliged to perform in advance. This objection aims to secure 
the purchaser's rights and enables him or her to apply pressure on her counterpart so that the 
latter fulfils its obligations.4132 The legislator wanted to ensure that this principle of 'fairness 
for the execution of contracts'4133 also applies to contractual relationships governed by standard 
terms, which is why it prohibited any exclusions or restrictions of this right in § 309 no. 2.  
The right of retention of § 2734134 is also based on the said principle of contractual fairness. 
This provision grants a right of retention for all rights stemming from the same legal 
                                                             
4129 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 28. 
4130 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.2 at 28. 
4131 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 280. 
4132 Palandt/Grüneberg § 320 para 1. 
4133 Vertragliche Abwicklungsgerechtigkeit. See BT-Drs 7/3919 at 28, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 1. 
4134 § 273: '1) If the obligor has a claim that is due against the obligee under the same legal relationship as that on 
which the obligation is based, he may, unless the obligation leads to a different conclusion, refuse the performance 
owed by him, until the performance owed to him is rendered (right of retention). (2) A person who is obliged to 
return an object has the same right, if he is entitled to a claim that is due on account of outlays for the object or on 
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relationship on which the obligor's duties are based. The courts construe the term 'same legal 
relationship'4135 in § 273 widely and assume such a relationship where both claims 
(performance and counter-performance) are based on 'inwardly related and uniform 
circumstances'.4136 It is sufficient that there is a natural and economical connection and that it 
would be against good faith if one claim could be asserted without the other.4137 The legislator 
considered this interpretation as too far-reaching for § 309 no. 2 which is why this provision 
only applies to a right of retention that is based 'on the same contractual relationship'.4138  
2.2.2.2 Content of the provision 
a)  Protection of the right to refuse performance (lit. a) 
For the application of § 309 no. 2, the given clause must refer to the customer's obligations as 
the counterpart of the user's duties, i.e., they must be synallagmatic. These are all principal 
obligations as well as secondary rights in case of a default,4139 such as the right of rectification 
or subsequent delivery4140 and the right to restitution in terms of a rescission (§ 348, read with 
§ 320).4141 If, on the other hand, the standard clause merely refers to cases in which the right 
of retention would be in any case excluded under § 320, § 309 no. 2 lit. a) does not apply (e.g., 
'the client must pay in advance', or 'if the supplier has performed in part, consideration may not 
be refused to the extent that refusal, in the circumstances, and particularly because the part in 
arrears is trivial, would be against the principle of good faith.').4142 
Standard terms that exclude the client's 'right of retention' generally have the objective to incite 
the other party to perform without consideration of his or her right to refuse performance. 
Usually, consumers do not understand the differentiated use of BGB terms such as 'right to 
refuse performance'4143 and 'right of retention'.4144 Hence, such clauses should also be 
considered as excluding the rights in terms of § 320.4145 
                                                             
account of damage caused to him by the object, unless he obtained the object by means of an intentionally 
committed tort. (3) The obligee may avert the exercise of the right of retention by providing security. The 
providing of security by guarantors is excluded.' 
4135 Emphasis added. 
4136 Innerlich zusammengehöriges und einheitliches Lebensverhältnis. 
4137 BGH NJW 1997, 2944 (2945). 
4138 Stoffels AGB-Recht 339. Emphasis added. 
4139 Palandt/Grüneberg Intro to § 320 para 7. 
4140 UBH/Schäfer § 309 no. 2 para 8. 
4141 UBH/Schäfer § 309 no. 2 para 7. 
4142 Examples from Stoffels AGB-Recht 340. My own translation. 
4143 Leistungsverweigerungsrecht. 
4144 Zurückbehaltungsrecht. 
4145 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 919 (920). 
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b) Protection of the right of retention (lit. b) 
The right of retention set out in § 273 is protected by § 309 no. 2 lit. b) to the extent that it 
concerns its core, i.e., only insofar that it is based on the same contractual relationship. 
Therefore, it does not protect a right of retention that is based on former contractual relations 
or other contracts as part of ongoing business relations between the parties.4146 Non-contractual 
claims are also excluded, such as the right of retention of the possessor (§ 1000). On the other 
hand, partial performances in terms of an apportioned contract4147 or open-ended agreements 
fall under no. 2 lit. b).4148 It is irrelevant whether the right of retention refers to principal or 
secondary obligations, or if the agreement is synallagmatic.4149 
c) Exclusions and restrictions 
§ 309 no. 2 not only prohibits clauses that exclude the assertion of the rights protected by this 
provision, but also any restrictions. The comparative standard in order to assess whether a 
clause contains such exclusion or restriction is the legal situation without the standard terms. 
If the user requires unacceptable or even unrealisable conditions for the recognition of the other 
party's rights, the given right is considered excluded under no. 2.4150 The conditions for 
assuming a restriction of the other party's rights are fulfilled where their assertion is only 
possible under certain conditions and the requirements are stricter than the statutory 
provisions.4151 The legislator expressly made clear in lit. b) in fine that a clause by which the 
assertion of the other party's rights is made dependent upon acknowledgement of defects by 
the user is ineffective. Often consumers refuse to pay because they do not accept the delivered 
item where it does not correspond to what was ordered. Making the assertion of the right of 
retention dependent on the user's acknowledgement would ultimately prevent such a right.4152 
Therefore, a clause which sets out that for the assertion of the other party's rights, a written 
notice4153 or complaint report4154 is required falls under no. 2. The same applies to clauses that 
prohibit the stopping of the customer's cheque in case of wrong delivery.4155 
                                                             
4146 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 28 and 29. 
4147 Sukzessivlieferungsvertrag. 
4148 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 34-36. 
4149 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 34-36. 
4150 Stoffels AGB-Recht 340. 
4151 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 2 para 6. 
4152 Stoffels AGB-Recht 341. 
4153 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 25. 
4154 LG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1991, 124 (126). 
4155 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (857 et seq). 
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On the other hand, for clauses in terms of which the user's right to refuse performance or right 
of retention is extended, not § 309 no. 2, but the general clause of § 307 is applicable.4156 
2.2.2.3 Relation to other provisions 
There is a partial overlap between § 309 no. 2 and no. 8 lit. b) dd)4157 because a clause that 
makes cure dependent upon prior payment also excludes the customer's right to refuse payment 
with regard to a faulty product or service.4158 The prohibition of no. 8 lit. b) dd) is insofar more 
extensive than no. 2 as it also excludes clauses by which the user may claim performance 
(payment) without rectifying the defect. On the other hand, the scope of application of no. 8 
lit. b) dd) is more restrictive because this provision only covers agreements relating to the 
supply of newly produced things and relating to the performance of work, as indicated at the 
beginning of lit. b). Which one of the two norms applies depends on the question of whether 
the user's right of payment (then § 309 no. 2) or the rectification of a default (then § 309 no. 8 
lit. b) dd)) is requested.4159 
The relation between § 309 no. 2 and no. 3 (prohibition of set-off)4160 is controversial. Contrary 
to the right to refuse performance according to §§ 273 and 320, the right to set-off a claim can 
be waived in standard terms because no. 3 concerns only 'a claim that is uncontested or has 
been finally and non-appealably established'. Problems arise where a client opposes the user's 
claim (payment) by asserting its claim of payment that arose from a primary claim of 
performance. If the user does not rectify timely a defect of an item the other party had ordered, 
and the client rectifies the defect itself, it is entitled to demand reimbursement of its expenses 
(§§ 634 no. 2 and 637).4161 If the user's standard terms contain a prohibition of set-off, the client 
would not be able to set-off its claim (reimbursement) with the user's claim (payment).4162 
                                                             
4156 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 4 and 42. 
4157 § 309 no. 8 lit. b) dd): '[A] provision by which in contracts relating to the supply of newly produced things 
and relating to the performance of work (…) dd) the user makes cure dependent upon prior payment of the entire 
fee or a portion of the fee that is disproportionate taking the defect into account' is ineffective. 
4158 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 56. 
4159 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 2 para 3. 
4160 § 309 no. 3: '(Prohibition of set-off) [A] provision by which the other party to the contract with the user is 
deprived of the right to set off a claim that is uncontested or has been finally and non-appealably established' is 
ineffective. 
4161 § 634 no. 2: 'If the work is defective, the customer, if the requirements of the following provisions are met 
and to the extent not otherwise specified, may (…) 2. under [§] 637, remedy the defect himself and demand 
reimbursement for required expenses.' § 637(1): 'If there is a defect in the work, the customer may, after the expiry 
without result of a reasonable period specified by him for cure, remedy the defect himself and demand 
reimbursement of the necessary expenses, unless the contractor rightly refuses cure.' 
4162 Stoffels AGB-Recht 342. 
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The other party's primary claim (performance) is therefore substituted by a secondary claim 
(reimbursement) so that two monetary claims are opposed to each other. If the client therefore 
refuses to pay for the defective item or performance, this refusal is considered a declaration of 
set-off.4163 Hence, not § 309 no. 2 but no. 3 is applicable in this case, and a prohibition of set-
off contained in the user's standard terms may apply. The legislator saw the problem that a 
monetary claim is treated differently than a claim of performance and accepted it without 
giving a guideline on how to solve it.4164 A teleological reduction of no. 3 in that a prohibition 
of set-off is ousted if the counter-claim stems from the right to refuse performance (payment) 
is not convincing.4165 The user would be obliged to formulate its standard terms in an even 
more complicated and inflated manner4166 to explicitly exclude the above-mentioned 
constellation from the scope of application of its prohibition of set-off. The general – and more 
convincing – view restricts the prohibition of set-off in terms of the good-faith provision of 
§ 242, i.e., where a prohibition of set-off would be abusive. This is regularly the case where 
the user wants to enforce its claim (payment) by referring to the valid prohibition of set-off in 
its standard terms although the other party has a counter-claim of the same nature that arose 
from a violation committed by the user and an original claim to perform.4167 
2.2.2.4 Non-applicability of no. 2 in case of the obligation to perform in advance 
Since § 309 no. 2 has to be read in conjunction with § 320, the prohibition of no. 2 is not 
applicable where the user's standard terms set out an obligation for the other party to pay in 
advance.4168 A prerequisite of § 320 is that the other party has no such obligation ('unless he is 
obliged to perform in advance'). The legislator did not wish to exclude agreements on the 
obligation to perform in advance per se.4169 If the user's standard terms set out an obligation to 
perform in advance for the other party, the scrutiny of such a clause has to be performed with 
the general clause.4170 The normative starting point for this enquiry is the obligation to perform 
upon counter-performance (§§ 320 and 322) as well as the obligation of the contractor to 
perform in advance in terms of § 641(1) 1st sent. ('The remuneration must be paid upon 
acceptance of the work').4171 Agreements deviating from these valuations require sufficient 
                                                             
4163 See § 388. BGH JZ 1978, 799 (800). 
4164 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29. 
4165 For this solution: Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 20. 
4166 WHL/Wolf § 11 no. 2 AGBG para 24. 
4167 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 55, MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 2 para 2, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 
no. 2 para 4. 
4168 BGH NJW 2006, 3134. 
4169 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 28. See also WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 11. 
4170 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 12 et seq. 
4171 Stoffels AGB-Recht 344. 
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justification, such as an objective reason that withstands a weighting of the interests of the other 
party and the disadvantages that it has to bear because of the existence of such a clause.4172 
A standard business clause by which the client has to pay the full price without deduction when 
the kitchen furniture is delivered deprives the customer of any leverage if the furniture is 
defective.4173 The protection offered by §§ 641(1) 1st sent. and 320(1) 1st sent. is completely 
waived without compensation so that such a clause is ineffective under § 307(2) no. 1.4174 The 
same applies to a clause by which the residual payment of the ordered item has to be made at 
delivery.4175 On the other hand, a clause in a marriage broking contract by which payment is 
due in advance is effective because according to § 656,4176 such a fee cannot be claimed 
afterwards.4177 
These examples also show that the given standard clause does not necessarily have to use the 
word 'set-off', and that it is sufficient that the clause's effect amounts to exclusion or restriction 
of a compensatio. 
It should be noted that a prohibition of clauses requiring performance in advance would go too 
far as many transactions could not be executed without payment in advance, such as entrance 
tickets or transport tickets.4178 
2.2.2.5 Legal consequences in case of violation 
A clause that is ineffective in terms of § 309 no. 2 is not applicable, and a teleological reduction 
is excluded.4179 Hence, the statutory provisions of §§ 273 and 320 apply.4180 
2.2.2.6 B2B contracts 
In B2B contracts, an exclusion of the right to refuse performance or the right of retention is 
generally accepted, and § 309 no. 2 has no indicative effect.4181 Even before the AGBG came 
into force, the BGH did not object to such exclusions in B2B contracts. On the other hand, an 
overall exclusion of the right of retention is also ineffective in B2B agreements because the 
                                                             
4172 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 13. 
4173 See also OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.8 at 30. 
4174 BGH NJW 2013, 1431 (1432). See also OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.3 at 28. 
4175 BGH NJW 1999, 2180 (2181). 
4176 § 656(1): 'No obligation is established by promising a fee for giving evidence of an opportunity to contract a 
marriage or for acting as a broker in arranging a marriage. What has been paid on the basis of such a promise may 
not be claimed back on the grounds that there was no obligation.' 
4177 BGH NJW 1983, 2817 (2819). 
4178 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 28. 
4179 BGH NJW 1986, 3199 (3201). 
4180 Stoffels AGB-Recht 343. 
4181 UBH/Schäfer § 309 no. 2 para 20, Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 16. 
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other party would be prevented from asserting its right of retention even if it is based on an 
uncontested or final and non-appealable counter-claim.4182  
Therefore, a clause by which a complaint of the other party has no impact on the agreed 
payment conditions is ineffective. It prevents the client from asserting its right of retention even 
if this right is based on an uncontested or final and non-appealable claim. The BGH requires 
that this exception be inserted in the user's standard terms. The BGH is also of the view that a 
partial retention (geltungserhaltende Reduktion) by which the clause is only ineffective to the 
extent that the right of retention is excluded in terms of final or uncontested counter-claims or 
those which are ready for decision is not permitted. 
In the case of a gross breach of contract committed by the entrepreneur,4183 or where it exerts 
itself a right of retention,4184 the entrepreneur cannot invoke the exclusion of the right of 
retention. 
In contrast to the German solution where clauses dealing with set-offs are prohibited without 
the possibility of evaluation, regulation 44(3)(b) in fine merely greylists such provisions.4185 
2.2.3 Prohibition of set-off (§ 309 no. 3) 
In terms of § 389, a set-off pursuant to § 3874186 has the effect that the claims, to the extent that 
they correspond, are deemed to expire at the time when they are set against each other as being 
appropriate for set-off (compensatio).  
Under §§ 387 et seq., the claims must be mutual, i.e., both parties must owe something to each 
other. Furthermore, the performances must substantially be of the same nature, which is the 
case with monies. The performances must also be due and enforceable,4187 and the set-off must 
                                                             
4182 BGH NJW 1985, 319 (320), 1992, 575 (577). 
4183 BGH DB 1972, 868. 
4184 BGH NJW 1978, 634. 
4185 See discussion on item (b) of regulation 44(3) CPA in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 b). 
4186 § 387: 'If two persons owe each other performance that is substantially of the same nature, each party may set 
off his claim against the claim of the other party as soon as he can claim the performance owed to him and effect 
the performance owed by him.' 
4187 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Aufrechnung'. 
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not be excluded.4188 Alimonies cannot be set off,4189 but a set-off with owed tax vis-à-vis the 
tax administration with a refund claim is not excluded in Germany (§ 226 AO).4190  
Technically, a set-off has a dual function. On the one hand, it settles the claim by the other 
party by substitution, 4191 and makes it possible that the debtor 'executes' its debt itself, on the 
other,4192 which may be useful when the person making use of the set-off has financial 
difficulties.4193 
Regulation 44(3)(b) in fine also provides for such a prohibition,4194 as well as item (b) of the 
Annex of the EU Unfair Terms Directive. 
According to the former UK Office of Fair Trading, the rationale behind the greylisting of 
provisions restricting set-offs is that consumers might believe that they have no choice but to 
pay in full, even if the product or service they have received has a defect. The effect of these 
clauses is that consumers first have to obtain justice in court, which is costly, causes delays and 
leads to an uncertain outcome. As a result, they might give up their claim, which is the same 
as a deprivation of their rights.4195  
2.2.3.1   Prohibited set-offs 
Often, users exclude the right to set off a debt in their standard terms. They fear that the 
customer makes use of this right on the basis of non-existing counterclaims in order to delay 
payment.4196 Then, the user bears the risk of litigation because it has to prove that the 
counterclaim is inexistent.4197 For this reason, the legislator did not outlaw clauses prohibiting 
the exertion of a right to set-off claims per se but only where this right is uncontested or has 
                                                             
4188 Statutory prohibitions are set out in §§ 392 BGB (set-off of a claim excluded in terms of a seizure if the obligor 
acquired his claim after the seizure), 394 (intentionally committed tort), 850 et seq ZPO (exemptions from 
attachment). 
4189 BGHZ 197, 326. 
4190 AO = Abgabenordnung, the German Fiscal Code. § 226 AO ('Set-off): '(1) Unless otherwise stipulated, the 
provisions of civil law shall apply mutatis mutandis with regard to using both claims from the tax debtor-creditor 
relationship and counterclaims to set off claims. (2) Claims arising from the tax debtor-creditor relationship may 
not be used as set-off where they have lapsed through limitation or the expiry of a period of exclusion. (3) 
Taxpayers may set off claims arising from the tax debtor-creditor relationship only with counterclaims which are 
uncontested and have been established as final and binding. (4) The political subdivision that administers the tax 
shall also be deemed to be creditor or debtor of a claim from the tax debtor-creditor relationship with respect to 
any set-off.' 
4191 Erfüllungssurrogat. 
4192 Palandt/Grüneberg § 387 para 1. 
4193 Stoffels AGB-Recht 345. 
4194 In this regard, see discussion on reg 44(3)(b) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 b). 
4195 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.2 at 28. 
4196 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29. 
4197 WHL/Wolf § 11 no. 3 AGBG para 1. 
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been finally and non-appealably established. What is more, the other party does not suffer a 
total loss of its legal rights in the case where set-offs are prohibited.4198 
a) Prohibited set-offs in commercial practice 
Prohibitions to set off a claim are mostly subject to an express agreement, such as 'the client 
only has the right to set off a claim of the bank against its own claim if the latter is uncontested 
or has been finally and non-appealably established'.4199 Whether the agreement between the 
parties contains an implied prohibition to set off the claims is a matter of interpretation.4200 
§ 391(2) contains such an implied exclusion: 'If it is agreed that the performance is to take place 
at a specified time and in a specified place, then it is to be assumed, in case of doubt, that set-
off against a claim for which there is another place of performance is to be excluded.'4201  
A standard clause by which only payment in cash is accepted can also be seen as an implied 
exclusion of set-off. The same applies to so-called 'net-cash clauses'. Provisions that establish 
that the customer has to pay in advance ('cash on delivery', 'charge forward') have the same 
effect, so that the client cannot set off claims in the case of defects of the merx.4202 In leases for 
other things than apartments, the provision of § 579, according to which the rent has to be paid 
at the end of the lease period, is regularly abrogated so that the tenant must pay its rent in 
advance. For the rent of an apartment, § 556b is applicable though. Under this provision, rent 
is to be paid at the commencement of the periods of time according to which it is computed but 
at the latest by the third working day of each such period. Consequently, the tenant cannot set 
off its claim by reducing the rent for the current month due to a defect of the apartment. A 
clause such as 'the rent has to be paid in advance on the 3rd day of each month'4203 is no 
                                                             
4198 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29. 
4199 No. 4 AGB-Banken. My own translation. 
4200 Stoffels AGB-Recht 345. 
4201 Stoffels AGB-Recht 345. 
4202 BGH NJW 1985, 550 and 1998, 3119 et seq. In Part I of this thesis it was submitted that reg 44(3)(b) must be 
interpreted widely, so that also a clause by which a supplier may require full payment before it has delivered the 
agreed service, such as the installation, is unfair. This different treatment vis-à-vis the situation in Germany seems 
to be justified, since otherwise the consumer bears the risk in case of the supplier's insolvency, which is not rare 
in South Africa, especially for artisans. A different treatment seems appropriate though where the monies to be 
paid by the client are held under secure arrangements (deposit account). See discussion on reg 44(3)(b) in Part I 
ch 3 para 3.4.1 b). 
4203 According to the BGH, such clauses are permitted, unless they create an unreasonable disadvantage for the 
other party when combining them with a prohibition to set off claims of the tenant on the basis of unjustified 
enrichment (§ 812 et seq). See BGH NJW 1995, 254 et seq and BGH NJW 2011, 2201). 
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exclusion of a set-off however because § 5364204 provides for a de lege adjustment of the 
contractual obligations in case of material or legal defects.4205 
b) Content of the prohibition of § 309 no. 3 
§ 309 no. 3 provides that a provision by which the other party to the contract with the user is 
deprived of the right to set off a claim that is uncontested or has been finally and no-appealably 
established is ineffective. 
The BGH held that the prohibition of such clauses also applies to those that restrict the right to 
set off to claims that have been recognised by the user.4206  
The claim must be uncontested or has been finally and non-appealably established. A claim is 
uncontested when its legal basis and amount are not disputed (cum certum est an et quantum 
debeatur).4207 Sometimes, standard terms users oppose set-offs of the other party by contesting 
the existence of the counterclaim. An argument often brought forward in this regard is that a 
set-off has already extinguished the other party's claim against another claim of the user. The 
BGH applies a high threshold for the conclusiveness of such arguments. Otherwise, the user 
would be able to contest every single counterclaim by its own allegedly existing claims.4208 
A claim has been finally and non-appealably established in case of an enforceable and final 
judgement in terms of § 704,4209 read in conjunction with § 794 ZPO.4210 
                                                             
4204 § 536(1): 'If the leased property at the time of surrender to the lessee has a defect which removes its suitability 
for the contractually agreed use, or if such a defect arises during the lease period, then the lessee is exempted for 
the period when suitability is removed from paying the rent. For the period of time when suitability is reduced, he 
need only pay reasonably reduced rent. A trivial reduction of suitability is not taken into account.'  
4205 Stoffels AGB-Recht 346. 
4206 BGH NJW 1994, 657 (658); 2007, 3421 (3422). See also Smith v Morum Bros (1877) 7 Buch 20 where it is 
also admitted that a set-off is possible in these cases as there is 'easy and speedy proof'. 
4207 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 3 para 31. 
4208 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 3 para 31 and note 35. 
4209 § 704 ZPO: 'Compulsory enforcement may be pursued based on final judgments that have become final and 
binding, or that have been declared provisionally enforceable.' 
4210 Stoffels AGB-Recht 346. § 794 ZPO: '(1) Compulsory enforcement may furthermore be pursued: 1. Based on 
settlements concluded by the parties, or between one of the parties and a third party, in order to resolve the legal 
dispute either in its full scope or as regards a part of the subject matter of the litigation, before a German court or 
before a dispute-resolution entity established or recognised by the Land department of justice 
(Landesjustizverwaltung), as well as based on settlements that have been recorded pursuant to [§] 118 (1), third 
sentence, or [§] 492 (3) for the record of the judge; 2. Based on orders assessing the costs; (…) 3. Based on 
decisions against which a complaint may be lodged as an appellate remedy; (…) 4. Based on writs of execution; 
4a. Based on decisions declaring arbitration awards as enforceable, provided that the decisions are final and 
binding or have been declared provisionally enforceable; 4b. Based on orders pursuant to [§] 796b or [§] 796c; 
5. Based on records or documents that have been recorded in accordance with the requirements as to form by a 
German court or by a German notary within the bounds of his official authority, provided that the record or 
document has been recorded regarding a claim that can be provided for by a settlement, that is not directed at 
obtaining a declaration of intent, and that does not concern the existence of a tenancy relationship for residential 
spaces, and furthermore provided that the debtor has subjected himself, in the record or document, to immediate 
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According to the majority view, also claims that are ripe – or ready – for judgment4211 are equal 
to those that have been finally and non-appealably established.4212 The exclusion of set-offs 
has the objective to protect the user vis-à-vis alleged and non-existing claims of the other party. 
For claims that are ripe for judgment though, i.e., those of which existence has been fully 
proved so that a decision can be made without further evidence, there is no need for such 
protection.4213 
c) Legal consequences in case of too extensive prohibitions of set-offs 
If the pre-formulated clause prohibiting a set-off is too far-reaching, it is invalid in its entirety 
and the other party can exert its right to set off its claim according to §§ 387 et seq. without 
restriction. Partial retention4214 of the clause in that a valid remainder is maintained is not 
permitted.4215 The courts tend to interpret too extensive clauses by a restrictive interpretation 
in order to save them from invalidity.4216 For example, a provision which allows only set-offs 
with uncontested claims also includes finally and non-appealably established claims. This is 
because uncontested claims are a sub-category of finally and non-appealably established claims 
since both are not contestable anymore.4217 The same applies to provisions which exclude only 
set-offs with finally and non-appealably established claims.4218 On the other hand, in cases 
where the standard terms do not include claims that are ready for judgment, like the earlier 
mentioned no. 4 AGB-Banken,4219 although the prevailing view treats them equally to finally 
and non-appealably established claims, such clauses cannot be held against the user because 
they merely reflect the wording of the law.4220 
                                                             
compulsory enforcement of the claim as specified therein; 6.  Based on European orders for payment that have 
been declared enforceable.' 
4211 Entscheidungsreif. 
4212 BGH WM 1978, 620 (621), Erman/Roloff § 309 para 29, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 3 para 31, 
Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 17. 
4213 Stoffels AGB-Recht 346. 
4214 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. 
4215 BGH NJW 2007, 3421 (3423). 
4216 Stoffels AGB-Recht 347. 
4217 BGH NJW 1989, 3215 (3216). 
4218 BGH NJW-RR 1993, 519 (520). 
4219 No. 11(1) AGB-Spark which are applicable to semi-public savings banks (Sparkassen) is similar to no. 4 
AGB-Banken. 
4220 BGH NJW 1986, 1757 et seq; 2002, 2779. 
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d) B2B contracts 
§ 309 no. 3 is a concretisation of § 307 because an exclusion of the possibility to set off claims 
is a severe restriction of the other party's rights that cannot be accepted in transactions between 
businesses either.4221 
2.2.3.2   Extension of the possibility to set off claims in favour of the user 
If the user extends its right to set off its claims against the other party's claims, the clause is not 
to be assessed in terms of § 309 no. 3 but according to the general clause.4222 Such provisions 
can be unreasonably disadvantageous for the other party in terms of mortgage accreditation. 
Hence, a standard clause of a large-scale manufacturer by which it is entitled to set off its claims 
not only against commercial customers but also against their group companies (so-called 'group 
set-off clauses')4223 might be disadvantageous because the claims of the given companies are 
not suitable to serve as security anymore. They are likely to be invalid in cases where the 
customers are not designated individually, or the number of the concerned group companies is 
too vast.4224 § 449(3)4225 that has been inserted after the modernisation of the law of contracts 
speaks in favour of a categorical invalidity of such clauses.4226 
Further examples for an extension of the possibility to set off claims are open account 
agreements4227 and clearing.4228 These set-off agreements are often met in the banking sector, 
where the participants mutually set off their claims. Both forms are seen as compatible with 
§ 307.4229 
2.2.4 Warning notice or setting of a period of time (§ 309 no. 4) 
§ 309 no. 4 provides that a provision by which the user is exempted from the statutory 
requirement of giving the other party to the contract a warning notice or setting a period of time 
for the latter to perform or cure is ineffective.  
                                                             
4221 BGH NJW 1985, 319 (320); 2007, 3421 (3422). 
4222 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 3 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 3 para 44. 
4223 Konzernverrechnungsklausel. 
4224 UBH/Hensen 8th ed § 11 no. 3 AGBG para 12. 
4225 § 449(3): 'An agreement on retention of title is void to the extent that the passing of ownership is made subject 
to the satisfaction by the buyer of third-party claims, including, without limitation, those of an enterprise 
associated with the seller.'  
4226 UBH/Schäfer § 309 no. 3 para 12. 
4227 Kontokorrentabreden. 
4228 Skontration.  
4229 WHL/Wolf § 11 no. 8 AGBG para 16 et seq, with further references. 
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2.2.4.1   Rationale of § 309 no. 4 
The objective of § 309 no. 4 is to prevent that users of standard terms liberate themselves from 
the necessity of issuing a warning notice4230 to the other party or setting a period of time for 
performance or cure.4231 Typically, the other party's performance consists in paying of the 
agreed sum and accepting the merx. If the customer has not performed, the user may claim 
damages for the damages caused4232 under §§ 280(1) and 286, or damages instead of 
performance under § 280(1), read with § 281. The user may also revoke the contract according 
to § 323. The user may claim its damages for the harm caused if the customer is in default. This 
is the case where the obligor (other party), following a warning notice from the obligee (user) 
that is made after performance is due, fails to perform, and the customer's non-performance is 
not  the result of a circumstance for which it is not responsible  (§ 286(1) and (4)).4233 
The requirement of the warning notice or setting a period of time not only has formal reasons, 
but serves above all the other party. Even though the other party is in delay with its performance 
(payment, acceptance), it deserves protection, and must be warned about the consequences of 
its delay and have the opportunity to perform.4234 Clauses exempting the supplier from issuing 
a warning notice are not fairly balanced because in case of a late delivery, the customer has no 
similar rights.4235 
The Consumer Protection Act or the regulations do not contain a similar provision. Therefore, 
the case law, and particularly mora debitoris, applies. The requirements and legal consequences 
are comparable to the BGB provisions.4236 
                                                             
4230 See § 286(1). 
4231 Nacherfüllung. See §§ 281, 321(2), 323, 637, 651c(3) or 651e(2). 
4232 Verspätungsschaden. 
4233 Stoffels AGB-Recht 354. 
4234 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29. 
4235 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29. 
4236 See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 280 et seq. 
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2.2.4.2   Contents of the provision 
§ 309 no. 4 prohibits an exemption from the user's obligation to warn the other party and to set 
a period of time to perform if he or she fails to perform timely, unless the user is exempted 
from this obligation in terms of §§ 286(2),4237 281(2)4238 and 323(2).4239 
Hence, clauses which stipulate 'Payment on delivery. If the due payment is not made timely, 
we charge a normal interest rate'4240 are not allowed in terms of no. 4. Also prohibited are 
clauses by which the user 'reserves the right to revoke the contract without being obligated to 
set an additional period of time'.4241  
The clause 'Payment due 30 days upon date of invoice. In case of late payment, the buyer is in 
delay without a previous warning notice issued by the seller. Then, default interest at a rate of 
… % is due'4242 could infringe § 309 no. 4. However, in terms of § 286(3), the obligor of a 
claim for payment is in default at the latest if he or she does not perform within thirty days after 
the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent statement of payment. The clause 
mentioned above is only valid though if the customer is duly informed on the invoice of this 
provision. Then, there is no content control because of § 307(3). According to the clause in 
question, the 30-day period starts at the date of the invoice, and not from its reception. Hence, 
it is subject to content control and infringes § 309 no. 4.4243  
§ 309 no. 4 also applies where a standard clause does not expressly declare that a warning 
notice or the setting of an additional period of time for performance is superfluous, but where 
                                                             
4237 § 286(2): 'There is no need for a warning notice if 1. a period of time according to the calendar has been 
specified, 2. performance must be preceded by an event and a reasonable period of time for performance has been 
specified in such a way that it can be calculated, starting from the event, according to the calendar, 3. the obligor 
seriously and definitively refuses performance, 4. for special reasons, weighing the interests of both parties, the 
immediate commencement of default is justified.'  
4238 § 281(2): 'Setting a period for performance may be dispensed with if the obligor seriously and definitively 
refuses performance or if there are special circumstances which, after the interests of both parties are weighed, 
justify the immediate assertion of a claim for damages.'  
4239 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 22. § 323(2): 'The specification of a period of time can be dispensed with if 1. 
the obligor seriously and definitively refuses performance, 2. the obligor does not render performance by a date 
specified in the contract or within a period specified in the contract, in spite of the fact that, according to a notice 
given by the obligee to the obligor prior to conclusion of the contract or based on other circumstances attending 
at the time of its conclusion, the performance as per the date specified or within the period specified is of essential 
importance to the obligee, or 3. in the case of work not having been carried out in accordance with the contract, 
special circumstances exist which, when the interests of both parties are weighed, justify immediate revocation.'  
4240 UBH/Schäfer § 309 no. 4 para 5. My own translation. 
4241 L/GvW/T/Graf von Westphalen § 11 no. 4 AGBG para 17. 
4242 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 354. My own translation.  
4243 Stoffels AGB-Recht 354. 
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the user makes use of a legal consequence that only occurs on the basis of a warning notice or 
additional period of time.4244 
The standard business terms of a furniture company read: 'Dunning expenses are due by the 
buyer and amount to EUR 2.50 plus postage fees for each warning notice'.4245 As the damage 
must be the consequence of the other party's default, the seller must not charge its expenses for 
its first reminder under § 280(1) and (2), read with § 286. The expenses for the first warning 
notice occurred before the other party's default though. In the clause above, the user liberates 
itself from these expenses, which infringes § 309 no. 4. It is irrelevant that the clause does not 
expressly mention that a warning notice is superfluous because it suffices that the user claims 
a legal consequence that can only occur after the issuance of a warning notice.4246 
2.2.4.3   B2B contracts 
The rationale behind § 309 no. 4 also applies indirectly to B2B contracts by applying the 
general clause.4247 Due to the particularities of relations between entrepreneurs, the contents of 
the clause must be assessed independently though, which is why one cannot assume an 
indicative effect of no. 4.4248 
2.2.5 Lump-sum claims for damages (§ 309 no. 5) 
2.2.5.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 5 
§ 309 no. 5 sets out that the agreement of a lump-sum claim by the user for damages or for 
compensation of a decrease in value is invalid if a) the lump sum, in the cases covered, exceeds 
the damage expected under normal circumstances4249 or the customarily occurring decrease in 
value, or b) the other party to the contract is not expressly permitted to show that damage or 
decrease in value has either not occurred or is substantially less than the lump sum. 
The EC Unfair Terms Directive4250 and regulation 44(3)(r)4251 contain similar items, although 
the Directive speaks of a 'disproportionally high sum in compensation' whereas the South 
African regulation speaks of 'significantly exceed the harm'. The German legislature chose the 
                                                             
4244 BGH NJW 1988, 258. 
4245 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 355. 
4246 BGH NJW 1998, 991 (992). 
4247 A direct application is excluded in terms of § 310(1) 1st sent. 
4248 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 4 para 60 et seq. 
4249 '[N]ach dem gewöhnlichen Lauf der Dinge'. 
4250 Directive 93/13/EEC, Annex lit. e): Terms which have the object or effect of 'requiring any consumer who 
fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation' may be regarded as unfair. 
4251 Regulation 44(3)(r): A term 'requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his or her obligation to pay damages 
which significantly exceed the harm suffered by the supplier' is presumed to be unfair. 
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formulation 'exceeds the damage expected under normal circumstances'. In South Africa, the 
item is greylisted, whereas in Germany it is prohibited outright. 
The agreement on lump-sum claims serves the need for a simplified and economic enforcement 
of these claims,4252 but also has a preventive effect vis-à-vis the other party.4253 Hence, standard 
terms users have a legitimate interest to insert such clauses in their standard clauses. However, 
there is an undeniable danger that users formulate such clauses to their own benefit. For this 
reason, the legislator aims to restrict this danger without going too far because of the legitimate 
interests of standard terms users in such clauses.4254  
2.2.5.2 Scope of application 
No. 5 is concerned with lump sums. A lump sum is the determination of an amount by using a 
generalised standard and by renouncing the use of concrete factors for the calculation of the 
actual damage for the given case.4255 
Sometimes it might be challenging to demarcate lump-sum claims from contractual 
penalties.4256 For the latter, no. 6 is applicable. The distinction is made by applying functional-
typological aspects. Hence, the type of claim on which the request for payment is based is 
relevant, and the objective of the agreement has to be found out by interpretation. Thus, a 
penalty is given where the objective is the fulfilment of the main claim and exerting effective 
pressure on the other party.4257 On the other hand, there is a lump-sum agreement where the 
objective is a simplified execution of the given claim. The designation of the claim as 
'compensation', 'indemnity' or 'damages' is irrelevant, even though it points out a compensative 
function. On the other hand, the amound of the claim is more critical. A penalty is rather a 
'harsh additional sanction' (and therefore higher), whereas a lump-sum claim is more a 
'simplified normal sanction' (which is orientated towards an actual damage).4258 
No. 5 includes only agreements of lump-sum claims or compensation of a decrease in value. 
The courts nevertheless also include travel package standard terms in which a compensation 
                                                             
4252 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29 et seq. See also Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 379. 
4253 Stoffels AGB-Recht 356. Naudé speaks of a 'proactive effect', although she refers to the Conventional Penalties 
Act. See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 99. 
4254 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 30, Stoffels AGB-Recht 356. See also OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 
5.1 at 40. 
4255 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 5 para 51-59. 
4256 See, for instance, BGH NJW 1992, 2625. Interestingly, South African and English literature refers in both 
cases to 'penalty clauses'. See, for instance, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 99 and OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 5.7 at 40 et seq. 
4257 Stoffels AGB-Recht 357. 
4258 Stoffels AGB-Recht 357. 
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under § 651(h) (ex-§ 651(i)(2) and (3))4259 is stipulated in the case of a revocation by the 
client.4260 
Agreements in standard terms of lumps-sum claims for the benefit of the other party do not fall 
under no. 5.4261 
2.2.5.3 Restrictions 
The restrictions for the agreement of a lump-sum claim are contained in no. 5 but can also 
emanate from the general clause.4262 The point of reference for an agreement of a lump-sum 
claim must also be a fact on which an actual claim for damages can be based.4263 No. 5 contains 
the following two restrictions. 
a) Excessive lump-sum 
§ 309 no. 5 lit. a) provides that a lump-sum agreement is invalid if the lump sum, in the cases 
covered, exceeds the damage expected under normal circumstances or the customarily 
occurring decrease in value. This standard replicates § 252 2nd sent.4264 which applies to the 
compensation of lost profit. The average damages of the given branch4265 or the average of the 
decreased value serve as the applicable comparative standard. 
Processing fees for return debit notes are based on a non-compliant conduct of the debtor 
triggering damages. In cases where the labour costs of the user are unduly included in such 
fees, they infringe § 309 no. 5. The BGH held that the staff costs are no damage caused by the 
other party's non-compliance but rather expenses that are necessary for the performance of the 
contract that cannot be included in the lump-sum claim for the given damage.4266 What is more, 
a prepayment penalty (sic)4267 that is based on a percentage exceeding the bank's net interest 
margin for the residual capital, or which does not include the interests of the damages paid by 
                                                             
4259 § 651(h)(1): 'Prior to commencement of travel, the traveller may revoke the contract at any time. If the traveller 
revokes the contract, then the travel organiser loses his claim to the agreed package price. He may however 
demand appropriate compensation.'   
4260 BGH NJW 1985, 633 (635). 
4261 Stoffels AGB-Recht 357. See also Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 98. 
4262 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 5 para 8. 
4263 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 44. 
4264 BGH NJW 1984, 2941. § 252 2nd sent.: 'Those profits are considered lost that in the normal course of events 
or in the special circumstances, particularly due to the measures and precautions taken, could probably be 
expected.'  
4265 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 5 para 21. 
4266 BGH NJW 2009, 3570. 
4267 Despite its designation, prepayment penalties are lump-sum claims (see discussion above on the demarcation 
between penalties and lump-sum claims). 
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the customer for the future period, is invalid.4268 Other examples are clauses stipulating that the 
consumer must pay excessive storage fees where it failed to take delivery as agreed, or saying 
that the supplier is entitled to claim all its costs and expenses and not just its net costs, or – 
more excessively – to claim both the supplier’s costs as well as its loss of profit. This would 
lead to a double compensation of the same loss.4269 
b) Express permission of counterevidence 
According to lit. b) of no. 5, a lump-sum claim is invalid if the other party is not expressly 
permitted to show that damage or decrease in value has either not occurred or is substantially 
less than the lump sum. For the former § 11 no. 5 lit. b) AGBG it was sufficient that counter-
evidence was not excluded. Now, it must be expressly permitted. § 309 no. 5 lit. b) is therefore 
more stringent than its previous version.4270 Neither no. 5 nor the official justification4271 
require though that the clause must reproduce the wording of lit. b) of this provision. It is 
therefore sufficient if the clause makes clear for not legally trained customers that they can 
show that the damage or decrease in value is non-existent or substantially less than the required 
lump sum.4272 A clause such as 'the amount to be paid is less if the client furnishes evidence 
that proves that the damage is less than stipulated in this clause' therefore fulfils the 
requirements of lit. b).4273 In practice, it might be difficult for the other party to prove that the 
user has not suffered any damage, however. If the client does not accept delivery of the ordered 
item but suggests another solvent client who would accept the ordered item instead, the user 
nevertheless bears some costs.4274 
2.2.5.4 Legal consequences in case of violation 
A provision that infringes no. 5 is invalid in its entirety. The user does not lose its material 
claim though, but for its calculation, § 252 is applicable.4275 
2.2.5.5 B2B contracts 
The agreement of a lump-sum claim exceeding the reasonable amount and leading to the user's 
enrichment is contrary to essential principles of the law of damages (§ 252), and unreasonably 
disadvantages the other party (§ 307(2) no. 1). Hence, in accordance with lit. a) of no. 5, such 
                                                             
4268 BGH NJW 1998, 592; NJW-RR 1999, 842. 
4269 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 5.2 and 5.3 at 40. 
4270 Stoffels AGB-Recht 358. 
4271 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 155. 
4272 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 309 no. 5 para 36, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 5 para 100. 
4273 The BGH had to decide on similar clauses in BGH NJW 2010, 2122 (2124); 2011, 1954 (1956). 
4274 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 30. 
4275 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 5 para 25. 
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clauses are also invalid in B2B agreements.4276 For the same reasons, also the exclusion of 
counter-evidence in terms of lit. b) is unreasonable. The express permission of the possibility 
of counter-evidence in B2B contracts is however not necessary.4277 
2.2.6 Contractual penalty (§ 309 no. 6) 
2.2.6.1 Distinction between contractual penalties and related forms of penalties 
In terms of § 309 no. 6, a provision by which the user is promised the payment of a contractual 
penalty in the event of non-acceptance or late acceptance of the performance, payment default 
or in the event that the other party to the contract frees himself from the contract is invalid.  
Regulation 44(3)(q) of the Consumer Protection Act4278 as well as item (d) of the Annex of the 
Unfair Terms Directive4279 contain items that include parts of § 309 no. 6. The 
German/European term for such clauses is 'asymmetric retention clauses',4280 whereas in South 
Africa they are referred to as 'one-sided forfeiture clauses'.4281Such clauses allow the supplier 
to retain payment in the case of breach without giving the consumer the right to be compensated 
in the same amount if the supplier commits a breach. Contrary to this type of clauses, the 
German provision only focuses on the supplier.4282 What is more, penalty clauses4283 in the 
sense of §§ 339 et seq. are regulated in South Africa in the Conventional Penalties Act. If the 
amount is out of proportion of the actual harm suffered by the supplier, the court may reduce 
it in terms of section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act.4284 Since financial penalties in terms 
of the Conventional Penalties Act are not submitted to content control under regulation 44(3) 
of the Consumer Protection Act, suppliers might want to insert penalty clauses rather than 
                                                             
4276 BGH NJW 1998, 592 (593); NJW-RR 1999, 842. 
4277 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 51, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 5 para 26. 
4278 Regulation 44(3)(q): A term 'allowing the supplier to retain a payment by the consumer where the latter fails 
to conclude or perform the agreement, without giving the consumer the right to be compensated in the same 
amount if the supplier fails to conclude or perform the agreement (without depriving the consumer of the right to 
claim damages as an alternative' is presumed to be unfair. In this regard, see discussion on this item in Part I ch 3 
para 3.4.3 a). 
4279 Item (d) of the Annex of Directive 93/13/EEC: Terms which have the object or effect of 'permitting the 
seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the 
contract, without providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or 
supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract' may be regarded as unfair. 
4280 Stoffels AGB-Recht 361. 
4281 See, e.g., Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 95. 
4282 Stoffels AGB-Recht 361. 
4283 Under s 1(2) of the Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962, a penalty is defined as '[a]ny sum of money for 
the payment of which or anything for the delivery or performance of which a person may so become liable (…).'  
4284 Section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act: ‘If upon the hearing of a claim for a penalty, it appears to the 
court that such penalty is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor by reason of the act or omission 
in respect of which the penalty was stipulated, the court may reduce the penalty to such extent as it may consider 
equitable in the circumstances: Provided that in determining the extent of such prejudice the court shall take into 
consideration not only the creditor's proprietary interest, but every other rightful interest which may be affected 
by the act or omission in question.’ This provision is comparable to § 343 BGB. 
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clauses that are presumed to be unfair with regard to item (q) of regulation 44(3).4285 A 
drawback of penalty clauses compared to forfeiture clauses is that the proactive and extra-
judicial effect of the items of the greylist is circumvented because suppliers probably will tend 
to put an unreasonably high penalty into their contracts hoping that the consumer will not go 
to court. If they do so, they bear the cost risk.4286 
Since neither the South African nor the EU provisions are entirely congruent with § 309 no. 6, 
the protection offered by these clauses can be reached in Germany by applying §§ 308 no. 7, 
309 no. 6 and 307, as the case may be.4287 
Where the obligor promises, in the event that it fails to perform its obligation or fails to do so 
properly, payment of an amount of money or performance other than the payment of a sum of 
money as a penalty, the penalty is payable if it is in default.4288 This type of agreement has a 
double function: first, it motivates the debtor to perform its obligation, and second, it enables 
the creditor to be indemnified in a simple manner (so-called 'double-function of contractual 
penalties').4289 
§§ 309 no. 6 and 339 et seq. are tailored for so-called 'dependent penalty agreements',4290 as 
opposed to 'independent penalty agreements'.4291 The former are dependent on the main 
                                                             
4285 See discussion on reg 44(3)(q) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 a). 
4286 The same arguments apply in Germany in terms of § 339 et seq (see discussion below in this chapter and on 
reg 44(3)(q) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 a).  
4287 WLP/Pfeiffer Anhang RiLi para 44. 
4288 §§ 339 and 342. § 339: '(Payability of contractual penalty) Where the obligor promises the obligee, in the 
event that he fails to perform his obligation or fails to do so properly, payment of an amount of money as a penalty, 
the penalty is payable if he is in default. If the performance owed consists in forbearance, the penalty is payable 
on breach.' § 340: '(Promise to pay a penalty for non-performance) (1) If the obligor has promised the penalty in 
the event that he fails to perform his obligation, the obligee may demand the penalty that is payable in lieu of 
fulfilment. If the obligee declares to the obligor that he is demanding the penalty, the claim to performance is 
excluded. (2) If the obligee is entitled to a claim to damages for non-performance, he may demand the penalty 
payable as the minimum amount of the damage. Assertion of additional damage is not excluded.' § 341: '(Promise 
of a penalty for improper performance) (1) If the obligor has promised the penalty in the event that he fails to 
perform his obligation properly, including without limitation performance at the specified time, the obligee may 
demand the payable penalty in addition to performance. (2) If the obligee has a claim to damages for the improper 
performance, the provisions of [§] 340 (2) apply. (3) If the obligee accepts performance, he may demand the 
penalty only if he reserved the right to do so on acceptance.' § 342: '(Alternatives to monetary penalty) If, as 
penalty, performance other than the payment of a sum of money is promised, the provisions of [§§] 339 to 341 
apply; the claim to damages is excluded if the obligee demands the penalty.' § 343: '(Reduction of the penalty) (1) 
If a payable penalty is disproportionately high, it may on the application of the obligor be reduced to a reasonable 
amount by judicial decision. In judging the appropriateness, every legitimate interest of the obligee, not merely 
his financial interest, must be taken into account. Once the penalty is paid, reduction is excluded. (2) The same 
also applies, except in the cases of [§§] 339 and 342, if someone promises a penalty in the event that he undertakes 
or omits an action.'  
4289 Bifunktionalität der Vertragsstrafe. UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 6 para 11. 
4290 Unselbständige Strafversprechen. 
4291 Selbständige Strafversprechen or selbständige Strafgedinge. 
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obligation, whereas the latter are merely a binding undertaking in terms of which an 
indemnification for a non-fulfilled expectation has to be paid.4292 In an independent penalty 
clause, someone promises a penalty in the event that he or she undertakes or omits an action 
without being the debtor (§ 343(2)). Nonetheless, no. 6 can be applied to independent penalty 
agreements by analogy. If a debtor with legal obligation must not be confronted with 
contractual penalty clauses in terms of no. 6, a fortiori a party which is not obliged must neither 
be confronted with such a provision.4293 
In terms of penalty agreements, the debtor is obliged to make an additional performance 
(mostly in the form of money) besides its main obligation, whereas so-called 'forfeiture 
clauses'4294 stipulate that the debtor loses a right.4295 In pre-formulated leases, for example, one 
can find clauses by which the tenant loses its right to reimbursement of its expenses if he 
terminates the lease before its expiry.4296 Despite the different denomination, technically the 
economic implications for the debtor are the same in both scenarios. This applies even more so 
if the clause has a penalising objective. Hence, § 309 no. 6 applies also to forfeiture clauses.4297 
If the clause provides that in case of an early termination of the contract, the other party loses 
all its rights, this has to be qualified as a revocation in terms of § 360 though. Such a clause 
has therefore to be assessed in terms of § 308 no. 3.4298 
According to the BGH, prepayment penalties according to which the repayment of a credit 
becomes immediately due when the debtor is in default of payment of the instalments do not 
fall under no. 6. Such clauses are no penalty clauses but rather a special form of a stipulation 
on the termination of the agreement. Hence, they are subject to the general clause. They are 
only valid if the requirements for this type of termination are comparable to those for a regular 
notice. Infringements that lead to the prepayment of the credit must be so significant that they 
justify an automatic termination of the contract without consideration of the individual case.4299 
In practice, terms such as 'compensation' ('Abstandssumme') or 'forfeit' ('Reuegeld') are often 
used. Technically, such agreements are penalty agreements so that no. 6 applies.4300 
                                                             
4292 Stoffels AGB-Recht 359. 
4293 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 15, Staudinger/Coester/Waltjen § 309 no. 6 para 7. 
4294 Verfallsklauseln. 
4295 Stoffels AGB-Recht 360. 
4296 Locher Recht der AGB 110. 
4297 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 33, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 16 et seq. 
4298 Stoffels AGB-Recht 360. 
4299 BGH NJW 1986, 46 (48). 
4300 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 30. See also UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 6 para 18. 
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2.2.6.2 Rationale of § 309 no. 6 
Penalty clauses are not prohibited per se, as shown by §§ 339 et seq., but when they are pre-
formulated, they have a clear potential to be worded against the other party's interests.4301 The 
conditions for the applicability of such clauses often contain a low threshold so that penalties 
have to be paid even for minor breaches. They offer a possibility to use this sanction in order 
to obtain an unjustified profit. Although § 343 offers the possibility to reduce an unreasonably 
high penalty by judicial condition, such a reduction depends on the other party's initiative, and 
he or she bears the cost risk.4302 In spite of these risks, the legislator did not generally prohibit 
penalty clauses.4303 The cases contained in § 309 no. 6 (non-acceptance or late acceptance of 
the performance, payment default or termination of the contract by the other party) generally 
lack a justifiable interest for the user because it has a legal claim for damages in these cases the 
enforcement of which is moreover facilitated within the restrictions of § 309 no. 5.4304 
2.2.6.3 Prohibitions contained in the provision 
No. 6 focuses on clients that have to pay a certain amount for the supplier's counter-
performance. Regularly, they have concluded a purchase or service contract or a contract to 
produce a work for which the supplier expects payment. The legislator disapproves of 
additional guarantees for the client's payment in the form of penalty clauses though since his 
or her expectation is already secured by the client's obligation to pay damages.4305 
a) Non-acceptance or late acceptance of the performance 
The term 'acceptance' has to be interpreted widely and includes all forms of acceptance of a 
performance, and not only acceptance in connection with a purchase contract (§ 433(2)) or a 
contract to produce a work (§ 640(1)). It is irrelevant if acceptance of the performance is a main 
or ancillary obligation.4306 
                                                             
4301 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 30. 
4302 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 30. 
4303 Stoffels AGB-Recht 360 and 361. 
4304 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 30. 
4305 Stoffels AGB-Recht 361. 
4306 Stoffels AGB-Recht 361. 
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b) Payment default 
'Payment default' means default in the sense of § 286.4307 No. 6 does however not require that 
the clause explicitly refer to default. It is therefore sufficient if payment default is included, for 
instance, by the formulation 'infringement of the contract'.4308 
c) Termination of the contract 
Termination of the contract is given where the client reveals that it does not feel being bound 
to the agreement anymore.4309 It is irrelevant whether it refers to a legal or contractual right to 
terminate the agreement. For the German legislator, it was important to prevent clauses 
combining the termination of a contract with a compensation ('Abstandssumme') or a forfeit 
('Reuegeld').4310 
2.2.6.4 Clauses to be assessed against the backdrop of § 307 
Penalty clauses for which no. 6 does not apply can nonetheless be ineffective in terms of the 
general clause if they are unreasonably disadvantageous for the other party.4311 
a) Amount of the penalty 
A penalty clause can be invalid in terms of § 307 if its amount is unreasonable. The possibility 
to reduce the amount by judicial ruling in terms of § 343 does not prevent a control under the 
general clause because § 339 et seq. are tailored for individual agreements. What is more, 
content control with respect to the general clause refers to the stipulated amount, and not to the 
payable amount.4312 The amount agreed upon in a penalty clause is unreasonable if it is 
disproportionate in relation to the infringement of the contract and the consequences for the 
                                                             
4307 § 286: '(1) If the obligor, following a warning notice from the obligee that is made after performance is due, 
fails to perform, he is in default as a result of the warning notice. Bringing an action for performance and serving 
a demand for payment in summary debt proceedings for recovery of debt have the same effect as a warning notice. 
(2) There is no need for a warning notice if 1. a period of time according to the calendar has been specified, 2. 
performance must be preceded by an event and a reasonable period of time for performance has been specified in 
such a way that it can be calculated, starting from the event, according to the calendar, 3. the obligor seriously and 
definitively refuses performance, 4. for special reasons, weighing the interests of both parties, the immediate 
commencement of default is justified. (3) The obligor of a claim for payment is in default at the latest if he does 
not perform within thirty days after the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent statement of payment; this 
applies to an obligor who is a consumer only if these consequences are specifically referred to in the invoice or 
statement of payment. If the time at which the invoice or payment statement is received by the obligor is uncertain, 
an obligor who is not a consumer is in default at the latest thirty days after the due date and receipt of the 
consideration. (4) The obligor is not in default for as long as performance is not made as the result of a 
circumstance for which he is not responsible.'  
4308 OLG Hamburg NJW-RR 1988, 651. 
4309 Erman/Roloff § 309 no. 6 para 55. 
4310 Stoffels AGB-Recht 362. 
4311 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 6 para 12, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 30. 
4312 BGH NJW 1983, 385 (387 et seq). 
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user.4313 The amount must particularly not be disproportionate in relation to the damage that is 
typically to be expected.4314 
For example, in construction contracts, penalty clauses that do not take into account the actual 
importance of the infringement, but which are increased with the duration of the infringement 
without any restriction with regard to the time and the amount are ineffective.4315 The BGH 
applies these principles also to authorised dealer contracts.4316  
b) Strict liability penalty 
Clauses providing strict liability penalties are not compatible with the essential principles of 
the statutory provisions and are therefore invalid. Such clauses are only valid where relevant 
circumstances exist that justify a deviation from the statutory principles.4317 
2.2.6.5 Legal consequences in case of violation 
Penalty clauses that infringe §§ 309 no. 6 or 307 are invalid in their entirety. A reinterpretation 
as a valid lump sum for damages or a 'reduction' to an acceptable degree is excluded.4318 
Clauses that are separable into different parts can be partly valid though, e.g., if the facts to be 
assessed are independent from each other. This does not apply to clauses that fulfil the 
prohibition of an accumulation of a penalty with damages.4319 
2.2.6.6 B2B contracts 
The prohibitions of § 309 no. 6 cannot be applied in terms of § 307 to contracts between 
business people.4320 Penalty clauses are ubiquitous in B2B contracts and have the function to 
motivate the other party to fulfil its obligations. The reasons for invalidity of such clauses 
drawn from § 307 can also be applied to B2B contracts, but the margin for entrepreneurs is 
wider. This is because they can be expected to assess such penalty clauses and their legal 
consequences correctly.4321 
                                                             
4313 BGH NJW 1998, 2600 (2606). 
4314 BGH NJW 2012, 2577. 
4315 BGH NJW 1983, 385 (387). The BGH assumes an unreasonable disadvantage for the other party if the penalty 
is 5 % of the contract value since the customer would suffer such a loss that it could have consequences for its 
cash flow (BGH NJW 2003, 1805 (1808 et seq)). Also invalid are penalty clauses stipulating 0.5 % of the contract 
value per working day (BGH NJW 2003, 2158 (2161)). Not unreasonably disadvantageous are penalty clauses 
stipulating an amount of 0.3 % per working day in case of late delivery (BGH NJW-RR 2008, 615). 
4316 BGH NJW 1997, 3233. 
4317 Staudinger/Rieble § 339 para 103, BGH NJW 2013, 2111 (2113). 
4318 Erman/Roloff § 309 no. 6 para 57. 
4319 BGH NJW 1992, 1096 (1097). 
4320 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 6 para 35, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 6 para 28. 
4321 Stoffels AGB-Recht 363. 
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Invalid in terms of the deviation from the guiding function of the statutory provision of § 307(1) 
no. 1 are B2B contracts on strict liability agreements,4322 the exclusion of the 'deduction' of the 
penalty from the damages that the other party has to pay,4323 or the waiver of the reservation of 
the penalty under § 341(3).4324 Furthermore, the amount of the penalty can be unreasonably 
high, although § 348 HGB sets out that a penalty that has been agreed between business people 
cannot be reduced in terms of § 343 BGB.4325 B2B penalties must be sufficiently high in order 
to be a perceptible sanction for the other party. The BGH therefore decided that a penalty clause 
by which an agent has to pay DM 250 (EUR 125) per non-communicated client if he or she 
does not hand over its clients' contact details is effective.4326 
2.2.7 Exclusion or restriction of liability for injury to life, body or health or for other 
damages (§ 309 no. 7) 
§ 309 no. 7 deals with the exclusion or restriction of liability for high-ranking rights and other 
damages. This field is traditionally the core of content control of standard business terms. 
In terms of § 309 no. 7, (a) any exclusion or limitation of liability for damage from injury to 
life, body or health due to negligent breach of duty by the user or intentional or negligent breach 
of duty by a legal representative or a person used to perform an obligation of the user, or (b) 
any exclusion or limitation of liability for other damage arising from a grossly negligent breach 
of duty by the user or from an intentional or grossly negligent breach of duty by a legal 
representative of the user or a person used to perform an obligation of the user is ineffective.  
The provision further sets out in fine that letters (a) and (b) do not apply to limitations of 
liability in terms of transport and tariff rules, authorised in accordance with the Passenger 
Transport Act,4327 of trams, trolleybuses and motor vehicles in regular public transport services, 
to the extent that they do not deviate to the disadvantage of the passenger from the Order on 
Standard Transport Terms for Tram and Trolley Bus Transport and Regular Public Transport 
                                                             
4322 BGH NJW 1998, 2600 (2601). 
4323 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 105. 
4324 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 105. § 341(3): 'If the obligee accepts performance, he may demand the 
penalty only if he reserved the right to do so on acceptance.'  
4325 BGH NJW 2014, 2180. 
4326 BGH NJW 1993, 1786 (1787 et seq). 
4327 Personenbeförderungsgesetz. 
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Services with Motor Vehicles4328 of 27 February 1970. What is more, letter (b) does not apply 
to limitations on liability for state-approved lotteries and gaming contracts. 
2.2.7.1 Prohibitions set out in § 309 no. 7 
a) Scope of application 
aa) Contractual and legal claims for damages 
No. 7 prohibits pre-formulated restrictions or exclusions of the user's liability for claims for 
damages that arise due to breach vis-à-vis the client as well as third parties involved in the 
contract, irrespective of their legal basis. Hence, claims for damages, namely those based on 
§ 280,4329 or on the delivery of faulty goods are included.4330 The prohibition also concerns the 
liability for breach at the moment of the conclusion of the contract (culpa in contrahendo) in 
terms of §§ 280 and 311(2),4331 as well as for tortious acts under § 823 et seq.4332 
bb) Exceptions related to the type of contract 
The 2nd half-sentence of no. 7 excludes the application of lit. a) and b) of the provision for the 
transport and tariff rules for regular public transport services on the road. The reason for this 
exemption is the normative character of the given Order of 27 February 1970 which sets out 
restrictions for liability in its § 14. If its application were not excluded, there would be a conflict 
with §§ 305 et seq. The exemption ensures that the conditions for the transport of passengers 
on the road and tariffs set out similar thresholds for liability, provided that they do not deviate 
from the Order.4333 The exemption does however not include the conditions for air transport; 
the latter can therefore be assessed in terms of §§ 305 et seq.4334 
                                                             
4328 Verordnung über die Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen für den Straßenbahn- und Obusverkehr sowie 
den Linienverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen. 
4329 § 280 (Damages for breach of duty): '(1) If the obligor breaches a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee 
may demand damages for the damage caused thereby. This does not apply if the obligor is not responsible for the 
breach of duty. (2) Damages for delay in performance may be demanded by the obligee only subject to the 
additional requirement of [§] 286. (3) Damages in lieu of performance may be demanded by the obligee only 
subject to the additional requirements of [§§] 281, 282 or 283.' 
4330 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 156. 
4331 § 311(2): '(2) An obligation with duties under [§] 241 (2) also comes into existence by 1. the commencement 
of contract negotiations, 2. the initiation of a contract where one party, with regard to a potential contractual 
relationship, gives the other party the possibility of affecting his rights, legal interests and other interests, or 
entrusts these to him, or 3. similar business contacts.' 
4332 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 40. § 823: '(1) A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures 
the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make compensation to the 
other party for the damage arising from this. (2) The same duty is held by a person who commits a breach of a 
statute that is intended to protect another person. If, according to the contents of the statute, it may also be breached 
without fault, then liability to compensation only exists in the case of fault.' 
4333 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 42. 
4334 BGH NJW 1983, 1322 (1324). 
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Furthermore, the 3rd half-sentence of no. 7 excludes its application to state-approved lotteries 
and gaming contracts for gross negligence (lit. b). The standard terms of such lotteries and 
gaming companies become part of the private-law gaming contract in terms of § 763.4335 The 
conditions of the various German lotteries provide for liability thresholds in the case of the loss 
or falsification of lottery slips. The legislator admitted clauses excluding liability also in the 
case of gross negligence because it was of the opinion that otherwise the danger of concerted 
manipulations by lottery agents and players would be too great (false slips etc.).4336 Wurmnest 
suggests that the true intention for this inclusion is to exclude any risk of the lottery organisers 
in terms of the employees of the lottery sales outlets.4337 This debate has no practical relevance 
though because such clauses are open to scrutiny pursuant to § 307.4338 
b) No exclusion or restriction for the violation of highest-ranking legal rights 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. a) provides that the exclusion or restriction of liability for the violation of 
highest-ranking legal rights, i.e., injury to life, body or health,4339 is not possible, not even when 
committed negligently. The provision even bars exclusions or restrictions of liability for 
intentional or negligent breach of duty by a legal representative or a person used to perform an 
obligation of the user in terms of §§ 278 et seq.4340 This absolute prohibition is based on no. 1 
lit. a) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive.4341 
The South African legislator chose another way in this regard by merely greylisting similar 
terms. Regulation 44(3)(a) of the Act refers to injury or death caused by a reason other than a 
defective good, e.g., harm caused by sub-standard service delivery, as it is not permitted in 
terms of section 61 to exclude liability for harm caused by defective goods or a product 
failure.4342 On the other hand, section 51(c)(i) blacklists terms that purport to limit or exempt 
a supplier from liability for any loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross negligence 
of the supplier or any person acting for or controlled by the supplier. Read together with 
                                                             
4335 § 763: 'A lottery contract or a gaming contract is binding if the lottery or the gaming has state approval. (…)' 
4336 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 14. 
4337 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 7 para 15 et seq. 
4338 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 4. 
4339 The definition of these terms corresponds to § 823(1). See Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 43. 
4340 Stoffels AGB-Recht 382. 
4341 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 156. 
4342 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. Section 61 CPA corresponds 
in part to the German ProdHaftG. According to § 1(1) ProdHaftG, '[I]n such case as a defect in a product causes 
a person's death, injury to his body or damage to his health, or damage to an item of property, the producer of the 
product has an obligation to compensate the injured person for the resulting damage (…).' § 1(2) ProdHaftG 
enumerates the cases when the producer's liability is excluded.  
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regulation 44(3)(a), it becomes clear that the latter only refers to exemption clauses excluding 
liability not based on gross negligence and which do not fall into the ambit of section 61.4343  
With regard to the discussion on the requirement of signing or initialling clauses pursuant to 
section 49(2)(c), it is referred to Part I.4344 
The fact that the limitation or exclusion of the supplier’s liability for any loss attributable to 
gross negligence is blacklisted in terms of section 51(c)(i), whereas the limitation or exclusion 
of its liability for death or personal injury – unless it concerns section 61(1) – is ‘only’ 
presumed to be unfair, although the common law and the Constitution attribute a very high 
rank to the sanctity of life,4345 is a systemic weakness that the legislature should correct. The 
former UK OFT took the stance that no contractual term can legally have the effect of excluding 
liability for death or injury caused by negligence in the course of business, and that such terms 
should not appear in consumer contracts.4346 For this reason, § 309 no. 7 lit. a) BGB and no. 1 
lit. a) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive outlaw such terms. 
Unlike § 309 no. 7 lit. a), regulation 44(3)(a) does not mention the liability of the supplier's 
legal representative or vicarious agent. In terms of item (d) of regulation 44(3), terms limiting, 
or having the effect of limiting, the supplier's vicarious liability for its agents, are greylisted. 
Item (d) only applies to the supplier's vicarious liability under the residual common law since 
section 113(1) applies to the supplier's joint and several liability in terms of the Act, e.g., the 
liability for defective goods pursuant to section 61.4347 
In terms of 'other damages' than personal damages, § 309 no. 7 lit. b) finds its corresponding 
provision in section 51(1)(c)(i) of the Act. The latter also deals with gross negligence of the 
supplier as well as to persons acting for or controlled by it. 
c) No exclusion or restriction for gross fault 
The exclusion or restriction of liability for other damages than those mentioned in lit. a) is not 
excluded per se, but lit. b) contains limits for such clauses. Hence, the user cannot exclude or 
restrict its liability for other damage arising from a grossly negligent breach of duty by the user 
or from an intentional or grossly negligent breach of duty by its legal representative or a person 
                                                             
4343 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
4344 Chapter 2 para 3.2 b) cc). 
4345 See, for instance, Johannesburg Country Club v Stott and Another 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) 518, Swinburne v 
Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZN). 
4346 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 1.10 at 16. 
4347 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 48. 
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used to perform an obligation of the user. The norm does not mention liability for intentional 
breach committed by the user. This is because under § 276(3), the obligor may not be released 
in advance from liability for intention.4348 
d) Exclusion and restriction of liability 
aa)  Exclusions 
No. 7 does not require that the exclusion be mentioned explicitly in the standard clause. It 
suffices if the clause gives the impression that it has the object or effect of excluding liability. 
This is the case where the objective obligation that is the basis for liability is excluded, and the 
risk is transferred solely to the other party.4349 
Therefore, a bank's standard terms pursuant to which the client bears the risk for temporary 
restrictions or disruptions of the bank's online services are ineffective. By that clause, the bank 
does not wish to be liable for damages arising from the realisation of such a risk.4350 
bb)  Restrictions 
A restriction of the user's liability is given where the client's claims for damages are reduced, 
for example, by excluding certain damages (indirect damages, subsequent damages etc.),4351 or 
by restricting the amount of the damages.4352 
Such a restriction exists in a standard clause of a photo development company according to 
which 'in the case of the loss of films, photos (…) or similar items, we are liable up to the value 
of the material'.4353 The same applies to a standard contract of a dry cleaner by which 'also in 
the case of a grossly negligent or intentionally caused loss of the items, only the current value, 
and not the replacement value is due'.4354 
cc) Restrictive modalities 
No. 7 is also applicable if the clause does not concern the claim for damages itself but contains 
restrictive modalities for its assertion.4355 Such formal hindrances, e.g., a very short preclusion 
period, can be harsher than an objective restriction of the due amount (that might be higher 
than the actual damage). What is more, in practice it is difficult to distinguish between objective 
                                                             
4348 Stoffels AGB-Recht 382. 
4349 BGH NJW 2001, 751 (752). 
4350 BGH NJW 2001, 751 (752). 
4351 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 7 para 23. 
4352 Stoffels AGB-Recht 383. 
4353 OLG Nuremberg NJW-RR 2000, 436. 
4354 BGH NJW 2013, 2502 (2503). 
4355 BGH NJW 2007, 674 (675). 
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and formal liability restrictions.4356 In order to ensure effective protection, Stoffel correctly 
suggests that no. 7 should apply to all clauses that create an obstacle for the user's liability.4357 
This is the case for a shorter prescription period than the legal prescription,4358 or a subsidiarity 
clause in terms of which the user's liability depends on the vain availment of a third party.4359 
2.2.7.2 Liability for negligent breach of duty in B2C contracts 
As clearly stated in no. 7 lit. a), the user cannot free itself from its liability for negligent conduct 
in terms of personal injuries (life, body, health). In general, it is possible to exclude or restrict 
the user's liability for negligent conduct for other damages, however. After all, § 309 no. 7 
lit. b) only rules out exclusions or restrictions of liability based on intentional or grossly 
negligent breach. Based on § 307, the BGH has determined a prohibited area 'proceeding' the 
forbidden domain in terms of no. 7. Therefore, also clauses excluding or restricting simple 
negligence in terms of lit. b) can be ineffective.4360 This is namely the case if a clause erodes 
essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment 
of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised in terms of § 307(2) no. 2. Moreover, the user is 
not allowed to restrict its liability by exempting itself from obligations that are necessary for 
the fulfilment of the agreement and that the other party regularly can rely on. Jurisprudence has 
coined the term 'cardinal obligations'4361 for these duties.4362 These are, besides the principal 
obligations that are characterised by reciprocity, also certain ancillary duties if they are 
significant for the 'integrity interest'4363 of the contractual partner, i.e., the interest of the 
contractual partner in the integrity of its legal interests which are outside the existing 
contractual relationship.4364 The term 'breach of cardinal obligations' must nonetheless not 
detract from the fact that the only standard of control is § 307(2) no. 2.4365 
A cardinal obligation is the seller's duty to deliver non-defective goods. Hence, it cannot 
exclude completely its liability for damages caused by a defective item or for consequential 
                                                             
4356 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 7 para 28. 
4357 Stoffels AGB-Recht 383. 
4358 BGH NJW 2013, 2584 (2585). 
4359 PWW/Berger § 309 para 42, Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 45. 
4360 BGH NJW 2013, 2502 (2503). 
4361 Kardinalpflichten. See, e.g., BGH NJW 2002, 673 (674); 2005, 1774. 
4362 Medicus BGB-AT 162. 
4363 Integritätsinteresse. 
4364 See Kaiser in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler I para 185 and 186. 
4365 Stoffels AGB-Recht 384.  
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damages, or for delivery in time.4366 It can restrict its liability to foreseeable and typical 
damages for the given type of contract though.4367 
A travel agency must unsolicitedly inform its clients about immigration requirements in the 
country of destination and cannot exclude its liability in this regard because the fulfilment of 
these requirements is sine qua non for the success of the travel. Such clauses are ineffective in 
terms of § 307(2) no. 2.4368 Furthermore, the exclusion of liability for simple negligence in a 
fund prospectus is contrary to the objective of such a document, namely to inform potential 
investors in a reliable, complete and truthful manner.4369 
A restriction of liability of a dry-cleaner for property damage to the 15-fold amount of the price 
the client has paid for the cleaning of its clothes does not sufficiently consider the value of the 
clothes and leads to an unjustified restriction in the case of valuable items. The fact that the 
company recommends its clients to sign an insurance policy is irrelevant in this regard.4370 In 
order to be effective, limitations of liability concerning the amount have to cover foreseeable 
damages that are typical for the given type of contract. The user cannot exclude its liability for 
such damages.4371 
Note should be taken that the liability of the producer under § 1(1) ProdHaftG4372 cannot be 
excluded according to § 14 ProdHaftG. Under § 14 ProdHaftG, 'the liability of the producers 
                                                             
4366 BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1062 et seq). 
4367 PWW/Berger § 307 para 27. 
4368 BGH NJW 1985, 1165 (1166). 
4369 BGH NJW-RR 2002, 915. 
4370 BGH NJW 2013, 2502 (2503 et seq). 
4371 BGH NJW 2002, 673 (675). 
4372 ProdHaftG = Produkthaftungsgesetz (Product Liability Act). § 1 ProdHaftG (Liability): (1) In such case as a 
defect in a product causes a person's death, injury to his body or damage to his health, or damage to an item of 
property, the producer of the product has an obligation to compensate the injured person for the resulting damage. 
In case of damage to an item of property, this shall only apply if the damage was caused to an item of property 
other than the defective product and this other item of property is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or 
consumption und was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or consumption. (2) The 
producer's liability obligation is excluded if 1. he did not put the product into circulation, 2. under the 
circumstances it can be assumed that the defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the 
producer put the product into circulation, 3. the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any other 
form of distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed by him in the course of his business, 
4. the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations at the time when the producer put 
the product into circulation or 5. the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the producer put 
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the defect to be discovered. (3) The obligation to pay 
damages of the producer of a component part is also excluded if the defect is attributable to the design of the 
product in which the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the product. 
The first sentence shall apply to the producer of a raw material mutatis mutandis. (4) The injured person bears the 
burden of proving the defect, the damage and the causal relationship between defect and damage. If it is disputed 
whether the obligation to pay compensation is excluded pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3, the producer bears the 
burden of proof.' 
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pursuant to th[e ProdHaftG] may not be excluded or limited in advance. Any agreements to the 
contrary shall be null and void.'4373 
2.2.7.3 Liability in B2B contracts 
Pursuant to § 310 (1) 1st sent., § 309 no. 7 is not directly applicable to B2B contracts. Its 
valuations have a radiating effect on the general clause of § 307 though.4374 
a) Exclusion of liability 
It is indisputable that an exclusion of liability for bodily harm in terms of lit. a) of no. 7 is also 
not possible in B2B contracts.4375 § 309 no. 7 lit. a) aims to protect high-ranking legal rights 
which do not allow for a differentiation between B2C and B2B contracts. What is more, the 
user's contractual party is a legal person so that claims for damages of the injured person are 
not concerned by such an exclusion because there is no concrete contractual relation with this 
natural person.4376 
In terms of liability for gross negligence (no. 7 lit. b), the user can neither exclude its own 
liability for gross negligence nor gross negligence of its management. This also applies to 
organisational negligence.4377 
The BGH decided that the user cannot exclude its liability for gross negligence of vicarious 
agents,4378 i.e., the persons used to perform an obligation of the user, if they violate cardinal 
obligations.4379 The court even made clear that an exclusion of liability for only simple 
negligence of these persons is not permitted.4380 This applies even more for the user's own 
simple negligence.4381 
If no cardinal obligations are concerned, an exclusion of liability for gross negligence of the 
user's vicarious agents requires a special justification that sometimes can be found in 
commercial practices and customs.4382 It would go too far though to say that exclusions that 
are typical for a certain industry and generally recognised always withstand content control.4383 
                                                             
4373 Stoffels AGB-Recht 385. 
4374 Stoffels AGB-Recht 385 and 386. 
4375 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 55. 
4376 Stoffels AGB-Recht 386. 
4377 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 7 para 45. 
4378 Erfüllungsgehilfen. 
4379 BGH NJW-RR 2006, 267 (269). 
4380 BGH NJW-RR 1998, 1426. 
4381 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 7 para 37. 
4382 Stoffels AGB-Recht 386. 
4383 UBH/Hensen (2001) § 11 no. 7 AGBG para 32. 
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b) Restriction of liability 
In terms of liability restrictions in B2B contracts, one generally may assume a more liberal 
stance as for exclusions of liability. The user's interest not to assume the risk of surprising and 
unusual damages has more weight here. Hence, a restriction of liability for negligently 
committed contractual violations may be permitted, except for gross negligence of the user or 
its management. Then, the maximum amounts must cover likely damages that are typical for 
the given type of contract.4384 Article 74 2nd sent. CISG by which '(…) damages may not exceed 
the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought 
to have known as a possible consequence of the breach of contract' also considers this aspect. 
Because of the radiating effect of lit. a) of no. 7, any liability restriction for personal damage 
is a priori prohibited.4385 
2.2.7.4 Legal consequences in case of violation 
A standard clause that infringes § 309 no. 7 is ineffective in its entirety. A retention of the part 
of the clause that still is in accordance with this provision is not possible.4386 
Therefore, a clause that does not differentiate between the category of persons involved (user, 
management, vicarious agents etc.) and the degree of liability (simple or gross negligence, 
intention) is ineffective because due its wording, the user's liability is excluded even if its 
contractual partner suffers a damage based on the user's intention or gross negligence. The 
same applies to standard clauses that exclude the user's liability for negligently caused damages 
because they do not differentiate between the high-ranking legal rights (lit. a) and the other 
rights (lit. b).4387 
2.2.7.5 Special provisions for liberal professions 
Because of their obligation to conclude a professional insurance policy and their special 
position of trust, lawyers (advocates), patent attorneys, tax advisors and chartered accountants 
cannot exclude their liability in their contracts with clients.4388 § 323(4) HGB expressly 
prohibits such an exclusion for chartered accountants.4389 
                                                             
4384 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 7 para 46. 
4385 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 7 para 46. 
4386 BGH NJW 2011, 139 (141). 
4387 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 54, HK/Schulte-Nölke § 309 para 24. 
4388 Stoffels AGB-Recht 388. 
4389 Stoffels AGB-Recht 388. 
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For liability restrictions, special provisions apply for these professions.4390 Members of such a 
profession may restrict their liability by written agreement up to the minimum insurance cover. 
For lawyers, patent attorneys and tax advisors, this amount is currently EUR 250,000,4391 and 
for chartered accountants, it amounts to EUR 1m.4392 As far as the standard terms of the 
members of these professions reflect these thresholds, they are not subject to content control in 
terms of § 307(3).4393 
2.2.7.6 Special provisions in transport law 
For liability restrictions in contracts for freight and forwarding, §§ 449 and 466 contain special 
provisions. For international carriage contracts, articles 234394 and 414395 CMR4396 contain 
                                                             
4390 See §§ 51a BRAO, 45a PatAnwO, 67a StBerG and 54a WiPrO. 
4391 §§ 51(3) BRAO, 45(4) PatAnwO. 
4392 § 54(1) WiPrG, read in conjunction with § 323(2) 1st sent. HGB. 
4393 UBH/Schmidt (2006) Annex to § 310 para 638, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 54. 
4394 Article 23 CMR: '1. When, under the provisions of this Convention, a carrier is liable for compensation in 
respect of total or partial loss of goods, such compensation shall be calculated by reference to the value of the 
goods at the place and time at which they were accepted for carriage. 2. The value of the goods shall be fixed 
according to the commodity exchange price or, if there is no such price, according to the current market price or, 
if there is no commodity exchange price or current market price, by reference to normal value of goods of the 
same kind and quality. 3. Compensation shall not, however, exceed 8.33 units of account per kilogram of gross 
weight short. 4. In addition, the carriage charges, Customs duties and other charges incurred in respect of the 
carriage of the goods shall be refunded in full in case of total loss and in proportion to the loss sustained in case 
of partial loss, but no further damage shall be payable. 5. In the case of delay if the claimant proves that damage 
has resulted therefrom the carrier shall pay compensation for such damage not exceeding the carriage charges. 6. 
Higher compensation may only be claimed where the value of the goods or a special interest in delivery has been 
declared in accordance with articles 24 and 26. 7. The unit of account mentioned in this Convention is the Special 
Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The amount mentioned in paragraph 3 of this 
article shall be converted into the national currency of the State of the Court seized of the case on the basis of the 
value of that currency on the date of the judgment or the date agreed upon by the Parties. The value of the national 
currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a State which is a member of the International Monetary Fund, 
shall be calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied by the International Monetary Fund in 
effect on the date in question for its operations and transactions. The value of the national currency, in terms of 
the Special Drawing Right, of a State which is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, shall be 
calculated in a manner determined by the State. 8. Nevertheless, a State which is not a member of the International 
Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit the application of the provisions of paragraph 7 of this article may, 
at the time of ratification of or accession to the Protocol to the CMR or at any time thereafter, declare that the 
limit of liability provided for in paragraph 3 of this article to be applied in its territory shall be 25 monetary units. 
The monetary unit referred to in this paragraph corresponds to the 10/31 gram of gold of millesimal fineness nine 
hundred. The conversion shall be made according to the law of the State concerned. 9. The calculation mentioned 
in the last sentence of paragraph 7 of this article and the conversion mentioned in paragraph 8 of this article shall 
be made in such a manner as to express in the national currency of the State as far as possible the same real value 
for the amount in paragraph 3 of this article as is expressed there in units of account. States shall communicate to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations the manner of calculation pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article or 
the result of the conversion in paragraph 8 of this article as the case may be, when depositing an instrument 
referred to in Article 3 of the Protocol to the CMR and whenever there is a change in either.'  
4395 Article 41 CMR: '1. Subject to the provisions of article 40, any stipulation which would directly or indirectly 
derogate from the provisions of this Convention shall be null and void. The nullity of such a stipulation shall not 
involve the nullity of the other provisions of the contract. 2. In particular, a benefit of insurance in favour of the 
carrier or any other similar clause, or any clause shifting the burden of proof shall be null and void.' 
4396 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) (1978 - the CMR 
Convention of Geneva, 19 May 1956 as amended by the CMR Protocol of Geneva, 5 July 1978).  
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mandatory provisions. These apply with the following restrictions: If the sender or recipient is 
a consumer, any liability restriction is ineffective, irrespective of whether it is part of a pre-
formulated contract or the result of an individual agreement between the parties. Only the 
carriage of letters and similar items is excluded from this restriction. In agreements other than 
consumer contracts, deviating liability agreements are possible if they have been negotiated in 
detail.4397 
2.2.8 Other exclusions of liability for breaches of duty 
§ 309 no. 8 contains seven items in lit. a) (one item) and b) (six items). These items will be 
discussed in the following. 
2.2.8.1 Exclusion of the right to free oneself from the contract (§ 309 no. 8 lit. a)  
2.2.8.1.1 Rationale of the provision  
Pursuant to § 309 no. 8 lit. a), a provision which, in case of a breach of duty for which the user 
is responsible and which does not consist in a defect of the thing sold or the work, excludes or 
restricts the right of the other party to free himself from the contract is ineffective. This does 
however not apply to the terms of transport and tariff rules referred to in no. 74398 under the 
conditions set out there. 
This provision has practical relevance for standard clauses that exclude or restrict the client's 
right to cancel its contract with the supplier if the supplier does not deliver within the agreed 
time.4399 
2.2.8.1.2 Content of the provision  
The provision only concerns clauses that exclude or restrict the other party's right to terminate 
the contract.4400 If the user's standard terms contain a clause by which the user may terminate 
the contract, § 308 no. 34401 applies.4402 
                                                             
4397 Stoffels AGB-Recht 388 and 389. 
4398 The enumeration in § 309 no. 7 refers to transport and tariff rules, authorised in accordance with the Passenger 
Transport Act [Personenbeförderungsgesetz], of trams, trolley buses and motor vehicles in regular public 
transport services, to the extent that they do not deviate to the disadvantage of the passenger from the Order on 
Standard Transport Terms for Tram and Trolley Bus Transport and Regular Public Transport Services with Motor 
Vehicles [Verordnung über die Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen für den Straßenbahn- und Obusverkehr 
sowie den Linienverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen] of 27 February 1970. 
4399 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 32. 
4400 BGH NJW 2009, 575 (576). 
4401 § 308 no. 3: '[T]he agreement of a right of the user to free himself from his obligation to perform without any 
objectively justified reason indicated in the contract' is ineffective. '[T]his does not apply to continuing 
obligations.' 
4402 Stoffels AGB-Recht 352. 
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§ 309 no. 8 lit. a) applies to all kinds of agreements, except for the terms of transport and tariff 
rules referred to in no. 7.4403 What is more, the exceptions contained in § 310(4)4404 apply.4405 
The phrase 'free oneself' from the contract' ('sich vom Vertrag zu lösen') does not only include 
the right to revoke the contract under §§ 323 (Revocation for non-performance or for 
performance not in conformity with the contract), 324 (Revocation for breach of a duty under 
section 241 (2)4406 and 326(5)4407 but all legal rights under which a contract may be terminated 
to the extent that they are based on a breach of the user. Hence, also the termination of contracts 
for the performance of a continuing obligation (open-ended agreement) for compelling reasons 
in terms of § 314 and other types of revocations which are at least partly based on the fact that 
the user committed breach (e.g., revocation of a mandate in terms of § 671) are included.4408 
On the other hand, any right to terminate an agreement that is based on a defect of the thing 
sold or the work is excluded in terms of no. 8 lit. a). For these cases, no. 8 lit. b)4409 applies 
because this provision primarily covers clauses dealing with defects.4410 
The right to free oneself from the agreement must neither be excluded nor restricted. A standard 
clause excludes this right if it expressly denies it, but also if it contains conditions that indicate 
the exclusion of the exercise of this right.4411 A restriction is given if the clause contains 
particular conditions for the exercise of the right to free oneself from the contract that are 
disadvantageous for the other party.4412 
Hence, a clause by which the revocation 'has to be declared immediately after expiry of the 
grace period, and at the latest within one week after expiry of this period' is invalid because 
                                                             
4403 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 59. 
4404 § 310(4): 'This division does not apply to contracts in the field of the law of succession, family law and 
company law or to collective agreements and private-sector works agreements or public-sector establishment 
agreements. When it is applied to employment contracts, reasonable account must be taken of the special features 
that apply in labour law; [§] 305 (2) and (3) must not be applied. Collective agreements and private-sector works 
agreements or public-sector establishment agreements are equivalent to legal provisions within the meaning of 
[§] 307 (3).' 
4405 Stoffels AGB-Recht 352. 
4406 § 241(2): 'An obligation may also, depending on its contents, oblige each party to take account of the rights, 
legal interests and other interests of the other party.' 
4407 § 326(5): 'If, under [§] 275 (1) to (3), the obligor does not have to perform, the obligee may revoke; [§] 323 
applies with the necessary modifications to the revocation, subject to the proviso that it is not necessary to specify 
a period of time.' 
4408 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 8 para 8, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. a) para 12. 
4409 See discussion of this item below. 
4410 Stoffels AGB-Recht 352. 
4411 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. a) para 31, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 9. 
4412 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. a) para 32 et seq, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 10. 
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§ 3494413 does not provide for any deadline for the declaration of a revocation.4414 Furthermore, 
a clause in terms of which the client has to pay an indemnity if it frees itself from the agreement 
is invalid because such a penalty also restricts the client's right to free itself from the 
contract.4415 If a clause stipulates that for the declaration of a revocation written form is 
necessary, the valuations of § 309 no. 13 have to be considered. Therefore, the imposition of 
the simple written form is possible, but a stricter form than the written form – such as notarial 
recording pursuant to § 128, or official certification in terms of § 129 – is invalid.4416 
2.2.8.1.3 Relation to other provisions 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. a) and § 308 no. 1 to 3 complete themselves mutually. The former ascertains 
that the other party's right to free itself from the contract is maintained in case of breach of the 
user in terms of statutory provisions, whereas the latter provisions protect the other party from 
abusive contract design in cases of impossibility of performance or delay, for instance.4417 
2.2.8.1.4 B2B contracts 
The exclusion and restriction of the right to free oneself from the agreement, resulting from the 
user's breach, are generally also invalid in B2B contracts in terms of § 307.4418 An 
entrepreneur's need for protection is not necessarily lower than for individuals because also 
entrepreneurs cannot be expected to be bound to an unacceptable contract.4419 
The Consumer Protection Act does not contain a similar provision. Item (k) of regulation 44(3) 
concerns the absence of reciprocity between the supplier's and the consumer's right to cancel 
an agreement. This item concerns the termination of contracts 'at will', whereas § 309 no. 8 
lit. a) deals with cases of termination where the supplier committed breach. Furthermore, this 
item does not apply to open-ended agreements.4420 The item does neither apply to a termination 
                                                             
4413 § 349: 'Revocation is effected by declaration to the other party.' 
4414 BGH NJW-RR 1989, 625 (625 et seq). 
4415 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 59. 
4416 BGH NJW-RR 1989, 625 (626). 
4417 Stoffels AGB-Recht 353. 
4418 BGH NJW 2009, 575 (576). 
4419 Stoffels AGB-Recht 353. 
4420 See reg 44(3)(l) CPA. 
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of an agreement for stated reasons, such as breach, and a cancellation clause (lex 
commissoria)4421 has to be assessed in terms of the general clause (section 48).4422 
2.2.8.2 Defects (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) 
2.2.8.2.1 General remarks 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) prohibits in its items aa) to ff) a number of clauses in contracts relating to the 
supply of newly produced things and the performance of work. 
In practice, the question of the supplier's warranty in case of defects of the supplied thing or 
performed work is very significant. It is recognised that the statutory provisions of §§ 434 et 
seq. and §§ 633 et seq. concerning the clients' rights in case of defects for purchase agreements 
or contracts to produce a work, respectively, are fairly balanced. Therefore, any deviation from 
these provisions must be under scrutiny.4423 
Because of the insertion of § 474 et seq.4424 due to the reform of the law of obligations of 2001, 
and despite only marginal modifications of § 11 no. 10 of the former AGBG, the German 
legislator excluded the application of the newly inserted § 309 no. 8 lit. b) to consumer contracts 
and the deviation from the statutory provisions. In terms of defects, consumers are now 
protected by §§ 474 et seq. which extensively refer to §§ 434 et seq.4425  Hence, the scope of 
application of no. 8 lit. b) has been reduced to contracts between consumers and those 
concerning real estate. Besides, for contracts of which the object are building works, no. 8 lit. 
b) bb) finds no application.4426 No. 8 lit. b) remains nevertheless significant for clauses in B2B 
contracts.4427 It even seems that the radiating effect of this provision on B2B contracts was the 
reason why the legislator did not much change the wording of lit. b).4428 
                                                             
4421 A forfeiture clause entitles the creditor to cancel the contract if the debtor fails to perform by the time fixed 
for performance. Such a clause is enforceable. See Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 534, Vessio LLD thesis 
425. Vessio points out that the meaning of the term lex commissaria has been widened through trade usage and 
nowadays encompasses all kinds of cancellation clauses, whereby the use of ‘forfeiture clause’ is reserved for 
certain kinds of clauses in relation to specific forfeiture of payments for breach. See Vessio LLD thesis 425 and 
426 note 2537. 
4422 See discussion on reg 44(3)(k) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 d). 
4423 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 8 para 17. 
4424 § 474: '(1) Sales of consumer goods are contracts by which a consumer buys a movable thing from a trader. 
A contract will likewise constitute a sale of consumer goods where its subject matter comprises, in addition to the 
sale of a movable thing, the provision of a service by the trader. (2) The following rules of this subtitle have 
concomitant application for the sale of consumer goods. This does not apply to second-hand things that are sold 
at a publicly accessible auction which the consumer may attend in person.' 
4425 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 80. 
4426 Stoffels AGB-Recht 365. 
4427 BT-Drs. 16/6040 at 158. 
4428 Stoffels AGB-Recht 366. 
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2.2.8.2.2 Material scope of application of the provision 
No. 8 lit. b) of § 309 is limited to two contract forms: the supply of newly produced things and 
the performance of works. 
a) Supply of newly produced things 
The provision is applicable to contracts concerning the supply of newly produced things. Such 
a supply includes purchase agreements (§ 433 et seq.), also contracts to produce a work (§ 631 
et seq.)4429 and contracts to produce a work and supply materials (§ 650, ex-§ 651),4430 but also 
agreements the object of which is the transfer of ownership is the object.4431 The definition of 
'things' of § 90, i.e., corporeal things, applies. Furthermore, buildings and installation fall under 
no. 8 lit. b), although they are essential components or immovable fixtures of real property. As 
animals are governed by provisions that apply to things (§ 90a), they are also things in terms 
of lit. b) of no. 8.4432 
The things to be supplied under the provision must be newly produced, and the warranty must 
be excluded or restricted. Newly produced is a thing only when it has not been exposed to a 
risk after its production that might inflict a defect by the use of the thing or the course of time. 
'New' therefore is not equivalent to 'as good as new' or 'as new'.4433 Hence, a demonstration 
vehicle of a car dealer might be 'as good as new', but because of its use by several drivers, the 
risk of defects is increased, which is why such a car is not 'new' anymore.4434 A renovated 
apartment is not new, except when significant modifications in its building structure have been 
undertaken,4435 or the seller accepts works that are equivalent to a newly constructed building 
or apartment.4436 An animal is 'new' when it is sold 'unused', i.e., right after its birth.4437 
b) Performance of works 
The second field of application of no. 8 lit. b) concerns contracts the object of which is the 
performance of a work. Hence, the provision only applies where the standard terms user owes 
the performance of a work, i.e., a specific result.4438 Developer contracts where the developer 
                                                             
4429 Werkverträge. 
4430 Werklieferungsverträge. 
4431 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. b) para 10. 
4432 Stoffels AGB-Recht 366. 
4433 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 21. 
4434 OLG Frankfurt/M. NJW-RR 2001, 780. 
4435 BGH NJW 1988, 490. 
4436 BGH NJW 1989, 2534 (2536). 
4437 BGH NJW 2007, 674. 
4438 Stoffels AGB-Recht 367. 
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owes the construction of one or several buildings on a real property that must still be transferred 
to the contractual partner also fall under the provision.4439 
2.2.8.2.3 Warranty clauses pertaining to the supply of used things 
Used things are typically sold without the use of standard business terms, except for pre-owned 
cars and art. Because these objects are not new, § 309 no. 8 lit. b) does not apply, but such 
clauses can be assessed under § 307. Generally, the exclusion of the user's liability for used 
things do not unreasonably disadvantage the other party4440 because the buyer is aware of the 
fact that the item has traces of wear and tear due to its previous use or because of its age. On 
the other hand, the seller generally cannot determine all defects and has no general obligation 
to assess the item.4441 Before the modernisation of the law of obligations,4442 the BGH 
authorised the complete exclusion of any warranties of used things.4443 The exclusion of the 
warranty for used things is now restricted, however, and the BGB does not distinguish between 
used and new things in sales of consumer goods (§§ 474 et seq.).4444 Hence, the entrepreneur 
cannot exclude its warranty for used things it sold to a consumer. Only the limitation period 
can be shortened to one year (§476(2)). The clause 'sold as seen, any warranties are 
excluded'4445 is therefore not permissible anymore in contracts on the sale of consumer goods 
because under § 476(1), the buyer's rights under §§ 434 et seq. cannot be excluded.4446 
Also in other contracts, such as in contracts between consumers, in real estate agreements or in 
B2B contracts, the exclusion of the warranty for used things is not permissible per se. This is 
because a general exclusion of the other party's rights infringes § 309 no. 7 (damages from 
injury to life, body or health as well as other damages arising from gross negligence).4447 Such 
clauses are also invalid in B2B contracts because they unreasonably disadvantage the other 
party (§ 307(1) and (2) no. 2)).4448 
                                                             
4439 BGH NJW 1998, 904. 
4440 WLP/Dammann Klauseln para G 75. 
4441 Stoffels AGB-Recht 374 and 375. 
4442 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts of 26 November 2001 (BGBl. I at 3138). 
4443 E.g., BGH NJW 1993, 657 (658 et seq). 
4444 § 474(1): 'Sales of consumer goods are contracts by which a consumer buys a movable thing from a trader. A 
contract will likewise constitute a sale of consumer goods where its subject matter comprises, in addition to the 
sale of a movable thing, the provision of a service by the trader.' 
4445 Before the modernisation of the law of obligations, such a clause was permissible: See BGH NJW 1979, 1886 
et seq. 
4446 Stoffels AGB-Recht 375. 
4447 Stoffels AGB-Recht 375. 
4448 BGH NJW 2007, 3774 (3775). 
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2.2.8.2.4 The prohibited provisions in detail 
The prohibited clauses in terms of § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) to ff) are discussed in the following. 
a) Exclusion and referral to third parties (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) 
Clauses providing that claims against the user due to defects in their entirety or in regard to 
individual parts are excluded, limited to the granting of claims against third parties or made 
dependent upon prior court action taken against third parties, are prohibited.  
The provision expresses the principle that the customer must remain entitled to warranties, and 
that its contractual partner, the user, must remain the primary obligated party for any 
warranty.4449 To achieve this purpose, the legislator has designed a threefold construction. 
aa)   Entire or partial exclusion of claims 
Standard clauses that exclude claims against the user in their entirety or with regard to 
individual parts are prohibited. The client must be allowed to the minimum standard set out in 
§§ 434 and 634 and be entitled to free itself from the agreement.4450 Therefore, a clause in a 
contract concerning newly produced items by which 'any warranty is excluded' is ineffective. 
The limitation to a reduction of the purchase price under exclusion of a rescission is prohibited 
too because the client must not be forced to keep a defective thing for which he or she has no 
use.4451 On the other hand, clauses that restrict the customer's right to a rescission are 
considered valid.4452 
The exclusion of claims is also prohibited where it is restricted to individual parts. These are 
not only physical parts of the thing or the performance (e.g., accessories), but also certain 
categories of defects.4453 Hence, a clause by which a developer restricts its liability against the 
purchaser to those defects for which the developer itself has recourse against the architect, 
artisans and/or companies involved in the project is ineffective.4454 
The South African greylist does not contain a similar item. Regulation 44(3)(b) is only 
applicable to exclusions or restrictions of legal rights or remedies in the event of breach by the 
supplier of obligations provided for in the agreement, i.e., contractual obligations. Non-
derogable rights that are granted under other legislation do not fall under this provision though. 
                                                             
4449 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) para 1. 
4450 Stoffels AGB-Recht 367. 
4451 BGH NJW 1993, 2436 (2438). 
4452 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 63. 
4453 Stoffels AGB-Recht 368. 
4454 BGH NJW 1976, 1934. 
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Sections 54(2) and 56(2) afford such non-derogable rights in the case of defective services or 
goods. For this reason, a similar provision to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) concerning the exclusion of 
the other party's rights could be section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii). This item blacklists clauses that 
purport to waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of the Act (i) or avoid a supplier's 
obligation or duty in terms of the Act (ii). Such rights are afforded to the consumer in terms of 
sections 54, 55 and 56 of the Act. 
It is submitted that in contrast to § 309 no. 8 lit. b), section 55 does not only apply to newly 
produced things. This becomes clear when reading section 55(4)(c), according to which the 
time when the goods were produced and supplied has to be taken into account when 
determining whether the goods satisfy the imposed requirements. What is more, 'service' in 
section 54 not only includes contracts relating to the performance of work, like in § 309 no. 8 
lit. b) aa), but all kind of services.  
bb)   Limitation to the granting of claims against third parties 
It is further not allowed that users refer their clients to a third party in order to assert their rights. 
Clients cannot be expected to deal with a third party that they do not know and that they did 
not choose, no matter how solvent the third party is.4455 
This item is also comparable to section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Consumer Protection Act. As 
discussed above, section 51 has a broader scope of application than § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) 
because it is not only applicable to newly produced things, and applies to all kind of services. 
cc)   Prior court action against third parties 
Thirdly, the user is prohibited from making the other party's claims dependent upon prior court 
action taken against third parties. On the other hand, provisions by which the user establishes 
only a subsidiary liability are not prohibited per se.4456 Hence, a clause by which the other party 
may only assert its claims against the user after a third has refused or is not able to meet the 
client's claims is not prohibited because the provision does not require any court action against 
the third party.4457 
On the other hand, clauses that require that clients sue a third party in order to assert their rights 
are not allowed. It is likely that the customer will not initiate proceedings because of the risk 
of litigation, and will lose its possibility to assert its claims against the user. Such clauses can 
                                                             
4455 Stoffels AGB-Recht 368. 
4456 Stoffels AGB-Recht 368. 
4457 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) para 40. 
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often be found in developer contracts where the developer tries to pass on its obligations to its 
subcontractors.4458 The BGH underlines the protectional purpose of this provision and declares 
clauses ineffective where the formulation fosters the danger that clients suppose that they first 
have to assert their claims vis-à-vis the third party by going to court before they can assert the 
user's liability.4459 Therefore, a clause by which the seller is only liable if the purchaser cannot 
enforce its claims for factual reasons (e.g., insolvency or closing-down) against the third party 
is ineffective. This clause is misleading. The term 'enforce' may lead the client to the conclusion 
that it has first to assert its rights against the third party against the third's will (i.e., by litigation) 
before the seller is liable under its subsidiary liability.4460 
The BGH also considers clauses in developer contracts prohibited in terms of lit. b) aa) by 
which the control standard of § 307(2) no. 2 is extended. According to the court, clauses by 
which the purchaser has to endeavour an extrajudicial enforcement of the ceded claims against 
the artisans infringe § 307(2) no. 2 (limitation of essential rights or duties inherent in the nature 
of the contract).4461 Such a clause takes away the advantages offered by a developer contract, 
i.e., the bundling of the obligations to perform in one person, the developer. The field of 
application of § 309 no. 8 b) aa) can therefore not be limited to its wording,4462 but the spirit of 
the provision has to be taken into account too. 
Regulation 44(3)(x) of the Act merely greylists clauses that exclude or hinder the consumer's 
right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, including by requiring that he or 
she take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by the Act. Unlike § 309 no. 8 lit. b) 
aa), item (x) of the Act does not concern standard clauses that make the granting of claims 
dependent upon prior court action taken against third parties. 
Section 51(1)(b)(i), (ii) of the Act seems to be similar though since such clauses waive or 
deprive the consumer of a right afforded by the Act or avoid the supplier's obligations or duties 
in terms of the Act (sections 54, 55 and 56). As discussed above, section 51 has a wider scope 
of application than § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa). 
                                                             
4458 Stoffels AGB-Recht 368. 
4459 BGH NJW 1998, 904 (905). 
4460 BGH NJW 1995, 1675 (1676). 
4461 BGH NJW 2002, 2470 (2471 et seq). 
4462 Stoffels AGB-Recht 369. 
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b) Limitation to cure (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) concerns provisions limiting the other party's claims to cure. A provision 
by which in contracts relating to the supply of newly produced things and relating to the 
performance of work claims against the user are limited in whole or in regard to individual 
parts to a right to cure, to the extent that the right is not expressly reserved for the other party 
to the contract to reduce the purchase price, if the cure should fail or, save where building work 
is the object of liability for defects, at its option to revoke the contract is ineffective. 
In the case of a defective thing, the buyer normally has the right to demand cure, revoke the 
agreement or demand damages or reimbursement of futile expenditure (§ 437). A customer of 
a defective work may demand cure, remedy the defect himself and demand reimbursement for 
required expenses, revoke the contract or reduce payment, and demand damages or 
reimbursement of futile expenditure (§ 634 no. 1). No. 8 lit. b) bb) provides that standard 
clauses limiting the customer's right to cure are ineffective if they do not provide that in the 
event of failed cure, the client's other rights do not revive.  
In order to be effective, the given standard clause must expressly grant the customer the right, 
after the user has failed to cure, to reduce the price or to revoke the agreement, i.e., the revival 
of the excluded rights.4463 It is sufficient that the clause uses the legal term 'failure'.4464 
Otherwise, the provision must enumerate all possible cases of failure (delivery of a 
thing/performance without defects, repair, impossibility to cure, further attempts to cure are 
unacceptable for the client, but also unjustified refusal or delay to repair or to deliver a 
thing/performance free of defects). In terms of § 440 2nd sent., a repair is deemed to have failed 
after the second unsuccessful attempt, unless in particular the nature of the thing or of the defect 
or the other circumstances leads to a different conclusion. Hence, clauses that define a failure 
after three unsuccessful attempts are ineffective.4465 
No. 8 lit. b) bb) does not mention a revival of the client's right to damages or reimbursement 
of futile expenditure. This means that these rights are not revived if the given standard clause 
has effectively excluded them. The standard of control for the exclusion or limitation of the 
right to damages or reimbursement is therefore particularly § 309 no. 7.4466 
                                                             
4463 Stoffels AGB-Recht 369 and 370. 
4464 See, e.g., § 636 in fine. 
4465 BGH NJW 1998, 677 (678). 
4466 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 8 para 45. 
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Because of the difficulties to revoke a contract of building work and the danger to destruct 
economic values and rights, no. 8 lit. b) bb) makes an exception for these clauses, and the user 
may limit the other party's rights to a reduction of the price.4467 The BGH does not consider 
developer contracts as being contracts of building work, however.4468 
The prohibition of no. 8 lit. b) bb) supposes that the client must at least be entitled to demand 
cure.4469 The user may define the form of cure (remedy of the defect or supply of a new thing 
that is free of defects) in its standard terms though.4470 
It is not clear whether for contracts to produce a work the customer's right to self-help in terms 
of § 637,4471 including the right to reimbursement of futile expenditure and advance payment, 
can be excluded or must be maintained as a minimal right. Stoffels legitimately indicates that 
although the right to cure builds on the right of self-help, it is an autonomous right which has 
to be assessed under the general clause. This right plays a significant role in contracts to 
produce a work and is closer to the claim for performance aiming at realising the contractual 
result, which is an 'essential principle of the [applicable] statutory provision' in terms of 
§ 307(1) no. 1.4472 
Regulation 44(3)(b) of the Act does not contain a similar item since the rights afforded by 
sections 54, 55 and 56 are non-derogable rights. Section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii), read in conjunction 
with sections 54 to 56, are however applicable with the caveats mentioned above. 
c) Expenses for cure (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) cc) 
Pursuant to no. 8 lit. b) cc), a provision that excludes or limits the duty of the user to bear the 
expenses necessary for the purpose of cure, in particular to bear transport, workmen’s travel,  
work and materials costs is ineffective. The seller or contractor must normally bear these 
expenses in terms of §§ 439(2) or 635(2), respectively. 
                                                             
4467 Stoffels AGB-Recht 370. 
4468 BGH NJW 2002, 511. 
4469 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 56. 
4470 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 68. 
4471 § 637: '(1) If there is a defect in the work, the customer may, after the expiry without result of a reasonable 
period specified by him for cure, remedy the defect himself and demand reimbursement of the necessary expenses, 
unless the contractor rightly refuses cure. (2) [§] 323 (2) applies with the necessary modifications. A period of 
time need not be specified even if cure has failed or cannot reasonably be expected of the customer. (3) The 
customer may demand from the contractor advance payment of the expenses necessary to remedy the defect.' 
4472 Staudinger/Peters/Jacoby § 639 para 64. 
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According to the BGH, clauses that pass these expenses on the customer, especially when the 
latter's rights have been limited to cure, are problematic.4473 The provision is also applicable to 
standard clauses that do not restrict or exclude the other rights of the purchaser or customer, 
and where the right to cure is only one amongst others.4474 
In terms of section 56(2) of the Act, the consumer may return the defective goods to the supplier 
within six months after delivery, without penalty and at the supplier's expense. 
A term stipulating that the consumers have to bear their expenses in connection to the transport 
of a defective good related to a service contract could be prohibited by section 54(2). This 
provision does not prohibit terms under which the consumer has to bring the defective good to 
the supplier’s place of business if the consumer exercises this right under section 54. A clause 
under which the consumer has to do so at his or her own expense falls under regulation 44(3)(b) 
though because it excludes the consumer’s common-law right to claim damages for breach by 
the supplier in cases where the consumer can show that he or she acted reasonably by incurring 
costs in transporting the goods for the repair, which would have been avoided had the service 
been adequately performed.4475  
d) Withholding cure (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) dd) 
In terms of item dd), a provision by which the user makes cure dependent upon prior payment 
of the entire fee or a portion of the fee that is disproportionate taking the defect into account is 
ineffective. 
Such clauses are an obstacle for clients for the enforcement of their right to cure because the 
user makes this right dependent on the payment of the stipulated price. Hence, the customer 
cannot exert economic pressure on the supplier by withholding a part of the price.4476 The 
provision is thematically linked to § 309 no. 2 that deals with the exclusion or restriction of the 
right to refuse performance and the right of retention.4477 Since these cases occur more often in 
practice, the practical relevance of no. 8 lit. b) dd)  is rather little.4478 
Section 51 and regulation 44(3) of the Act do not contain a similar item. Regulation 44(3)(m) 
mainly concerns provisions in terms of which the consumer has to continue paying although 
                                                             
4473 BGHZ 48, 264 et seq. 
4474 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 8 para 55. 
4475 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
4476 Stoffels AGB-Recht 371. 
4477 See discussion of this item above. 
4478 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 8 para 57. 
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the goods or services he had contracted for are not provided as agreed. Item (m) therefore 
concerns the supplier's principal obligation and not secondary claims such as warranties.4479 
Item (n) of regulation 44(3) does not correspond to the German provision either. This item 
refers to clauses that entitle the supplier to deliver only partially, whereas the consumer would 
have to pay the entire price. This item does thus not concern cure.4480 
e) Cut-off period for notice of defects (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) ee) 
Item ee) of no. 8 lit. b) concerns cut-off periods for notice of defects. In terms of this provision, 
standard clauses by which the user sets a cut-off period for the other party to the contract to 
give notice of non-obvious defects which is shorter than the permissible period of time under 
double letter (ff) of § 309 no. 8 lit. b) are ineffective. 
Such cut-off periods for the notification of defects are in the user's interest because they ensure 
speedy and certain execution of the agreement. For clients, they are dangerous however 
because they lose their rights if they miss the given deadline. Especially for non-obvious 
defects, the economic result is actually a shorter limitation period.4481 The legislator therefore 
designed item ee) in tandem with item ff) dealing with limitation periods. The general 
permissible period of time is one year (see item ff). For purchase agreements, it is five years in 
relation to a building, and in relation to a thing that has been used for a building in accordance 
with the normal way it is used and which has resulted in the defectiveness of the building 
(§ 438(1) no. 2). The permissible period in the context of a contract to produce a work is also 
five years in the case of a building and for a work of which result consists in the rendering of 
planning or monitoring services for this purpose (§ 634a(1) no. 2). Clauses setting out shorter 
cut-off periods are thus ineffective, even if the loss of the rights due to a missed deadline is not 
expressly mentioned in the clause. Hence, the provision 'the buyer must notify the company of 
any defects after they have been discovered' is ineffective, according to the BGH.4482 
A contrario, a clause setting out a cut-off period for notice of obvious defects that is shorter 
than the permissible limitation period might be effective, except in consumer contracts. A 
defect is obvious when it can be discovered without further ado by an average non-
                                                             
4479 See discussion of this item in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 f). 
4480 See discussion of this item in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 g). 
4481 Stoffels AGB-Recht 372. 
4482 BGH NJW 2001, 292 (300). 
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entrepreneurial customer.4483 Such clauses are subject to the general clause.4484 In this regard, 
standard business terms should therefore distinguish between latent and patent defects.4485 
In practice, the duration of the cut-off period for obvious defects is problematic. In any event, 
the period must be sufficiently long so that a typical customer has enough time to discover and 
assess any defects and consider which claims he or she might assert. Against the backdrop of 
the withdrawal period for consumer contracts contemplated in § 355(2), the cut-off period for 
patent defects must at least be two weeks.4486 A longer or shorter period might however be 
acceptable depending on the particularities of the given agreement and the parties' interests.4487  
Regulation 44(3)(z) of the Consumer Protection Act greylists clauses imposing a limitation 
period that is shorter than otherwise applicable under the common law or legislation for legal 
steps to be taken by the consumer. Section 56 of the Act is 'legislation' in terms of this 
regulation; the parties may not deviate from such provisions by agreement. 
In terms of section 56(2), the consumer may return defective goods within six months to the 
supplier who in return must repair or replace the defective item or refund the consumer. It is 
submitted that returning defective goods can be qualified as giving notice to the supplier of the 
defectiveness. Pursuant to section 55(5)(a), it is irrelevant whether a defect was latent or patent, 
or whether the consumer could have detected it before taking delivery of the item. Hence, the 
'cut-off period' of item (z) is at least six months in terms of defective products, irrespective of 
whether the defects are obvious or non-obvious, This is notably shorter than the limitation 
periods set out in §§ 438 and 634a BGB (two to five years) and the minimum limitation period 
of one year pursuant to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) in other cases. It is also shorter than the one-year 
minimum limitation period for the sale of consumer goods (§ 476). 
It is noteworthy that the consumer's right to good quality goods under section 55 of the Act 
does not apply to goods bought at an auction in terms of section 45. Because of the interplay 
between sections 55 and 56, it is suggested that this exclusion also applies to section 56. 
§ 474(2) excludes the application of provisions concerning contracts on the sale of consumer 
goods to used things bought at an auction, whereas section 55(1) does not distinguish between 
used and unused goods bought at an auction. In practice, this differentiation should only be 
                                                             
4483 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 8 para 92. 
4484 Stoffels AGB-Recht 372. 
4485 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. 
4486 BGH NJW 1998, 3119 (3120), Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 78. 
4487 Stoffels AGB-Recht 372. 
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relevant where new, unused things are offered at an auction, e.g., the warehouse stock of a 
company to be liquidated. 
f) Making limitation easier (§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) 
Pursuant to item ff), a provision providing that the limitation of claims against the user due to 
defects in the cases cited in § 438 (1) no. 2 and § 634a (1) no. 2 is made easier, or in other cases 
a limitation period of less than one year reckoned from the beginning of the statutory limitation 
period is attained is ineffective.  
Agreements on limitation periods are in principle subject to the freedom of contract. This does 
not result expressly from the wording of § 202,4488 but is the logical consequence of the 
maximal limits of limitation periods set out in this provision.4489 
On the other hand, for the sale of consumer goods, new provisions on the limitation have been 
inserted which aim to preserve the consumer's rights in the case of defects4490 as to the 
limitation period and the beginning of this period (§ 438).4491 A shortening of the limitation 
period of two years to one year is therefore only permissible for the sale of used goods (§ 476 
= ex-§ 475(2)).4492 Excepted from the prohibition of disadvantageous limitation periods in 
consumer sale contracts are claims for damages (§ 476(3) = ex-§ 475(3)).4493 
                                                             
4488 § 202: '(1) In the case of liability for intention, the limitation period may not be relaxed in advance by legal 
transaction. (2) The limitation period may not be extended by legal transaction beyond a period of thirty years 
from the beginning of the statutory limitation period.'  
4489 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. 
4490 § 437: 'If the thing is defective, the buyer may, provided the requirements of the following provisions are met 
and unless otherwise specified, 1. under [§] 439, demand cure, 2. revoke the agreement under [§§] 440, 323 and 
326 (5) or reduce the purchase price under [§] 441, and 3. under [§§] 440, 280, 281, 283 and 311a, demand 
damages, or under [§] 284, demand reimbursement of futile expenditure.'  
4491 § 438: '(1) The claims cited in [§] 437 no. 1 and 3 become statute-barred 1. in thirty years, if the defect consists 
a) a real right of a third party on the basis of which return of the purchased thing may be demanded, or b) some 
other right registered in the Land Register, 2. in five years a) in relation to a building, and b) in relation to a thing 
that has been used for a building in accordance with the normal way it is used and has resulted in the defectiveness 
of the building, and 3. otherwise in two years. (2) In the case of a plot of land the limitation period commences 
upon the delivery of possession, in other cases upon delivery of the thing. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) no. 
2 and 3 and subsection (2), claims become statute-barred in the standard limitation period if the seller fraudulently 
concealed the defect. In the case of subsection (1) no. 2, however, claims are not statute-barred before the end of 
the period there specified. (4) The right of revocation referred to in [§] 437 is subject to [§] 218. Notwithstanding 
the fact that a revocation is ineffective under [§] 218 (1), the buyer may refuse to pay the purchase price to the 
extent he would be so entitled on the basis of revocation. If he makes use of this right, the seller may revoke the 
agreement. (5) [§] 218 and subsection (4) sentence 2 above apply with the necessary modifications to the right to 
reduce the price set out in [§] 437.'  
4492 § 476: 'The limitation of the claims cited in [§] 437 may not be alleviated by an agreement reached before a 
defect is notified to an entrepreneur if the agreement means that there is a limitation period of less than two years 
from the statutory beginning of limitation or, in the case of second-hand things, of less than one year.' 
4493 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. § 476(3): 'Notwithstanding [§§] 307 to 309, subsections (1) and (2) above do not 
apply to the exclusion or restriction of the claim to damages.'  
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In terms of consumer sale contracts, § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) therefore finds no application, and 
for other contracts, one must differentiate. In relation to a building or building materials, the 
limitation period is five years (§§ 438(1) no. 2 and 634a (1) no. 2)) because defects in this area 
often show very late so that the customer must have a period long enough to ascertain its rights. 
Standard clauses making the limitation period in these cases easier are thus not permissible.4494 
The formulation 'making limitation easier' does not only include a shortening of the limitation 
period, but also any measures that have the same direct or indirect result, such as an earlier 
beginning of the limitation period.4495 
In all other cases, the limitation period must at least be one year reckoned from the beginning 
of the statutory limitation period. This minimal period also applies for claims for damages in 
consumer contracts that are normally excluded in terms of § 476(3).4496 
Another limit for the modification of limitation periods is set out in § 309 no. 74497 because 
according to the leading view, shorter limitation periods are equal to a restriction of liability.4498 
Therefore, a standard clause by which the limitation period for all possible claims is shortened 
infringes § 309 no. 7 because such a provision restricts personal rights (§ 309 no. 7 lit. a). Since 
partial retention of an ineffective clause is prohibited, such provisions cannot be partially 
effective.4499 When drafting standard business terms, users should therefore distinguish 
between different claims.4500 
Regulation 44(3)(z) of the Act contains a similar provision. The formulation 'a limitation period 
that is shorter (…)' is however more restrictive that the wording of § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) 'the 
limitation of claims (…) is made easier'. For defective goods, the prescription period in terms 
of section 56(2) is six months after delivery, which is notably shorter than the limitation periods 
set out in §§ 438 and 634a BGB (two to five years) and the minimum limitation period of one 
year pursuant to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) in other cases. It is also shorter than the one-year minimum 
limitation period for the sale of consumer goods (§ 476). 
                                                             
4494 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. 
4495 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 95. 
4496 BT-Drs. 14/1640 at 159. 
4497 See BT-Drs. 14/1640 at 159. 
4498 E.g., BGH NJW 2013, 2584 (2585), UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 7 para 28. 
4499 BGH NJW 2009, 1486 (1487). 
4500 HK/Schulte-Nölke § 309 para 40. 
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2.2.8.2.5 Warranty clauses in B2B contracts 
The rationale of the prohibited clauses contained in § 309 no. 8 lit. b) is to protect clients from 
standard terms undermining the right to receive items without defects. Entrepreneurs have to 
be protected from unbalanced provisions too, which is why the valuations of § 309 no. 8 lit. b), 
except from some modifications, influence the enquiry of clauses relating to the supply of 
newly produced things and relating to the performance of work in B2B contracts in terms of 
the general clause by § 310(1) 2nd sent.4501 
Since the practical relevance of no. 8 lit. b) has been restricted due to the insertion of the 
provisions pertaining to the sale of consumer goods (§§ 474 et seq.), the principal field of 
application of this provision is now B2B contracts by means of the radiating effect of no. 9 on 
the general clause.4502 The following modifications or restrictions apply to B2B contracts: 
Item aa) of § 309 no. 8 lit. b): In B2B contracts, the exclusion of claims against the user in 
their entirety in terms of §§ 437 or 634 is also prohibited.4503 The user can make its liability 
dependent on prior court action taken against third parties, however.4504 Item bb): Provisions 
by which claims against the user are limited to individual parts to a right to cure, are prohibited 
in contracts with entrepreneurs too.4505 It is disputable though whether the express reservation 
for the other party to reduce the purchase price is dispensable.4506 Item cc): The expenses 
necessary for cure cannot be passed on the other party to the contract also in B2B contracts.4507 
Item dd): Clauses that make cure dependent upon prior payment of the price are also prohibited 
in B2B contracts.4508 Item ee): The prohibition of setting a cut-off period for the other party to 
give notice of non-obvious defects which is shorter than the permissible period of time under 
item ff) does not apply to B2B contracts. The valuations for these contracts are contained in 
§ 377 HGB.4509 The BGH decided that a clause by which the buyer has to notify the seller of 
                                                             
4501 Stoffels AGB-Recht 375. 
4502 Stoffels AGB-Recht 376. 
4503 BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1066). 
4504 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 8 para 47. 
4505 BGH NJW 1998, 677 (678). 
4506 For dispensability: WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) para 56, against dispensability: UBH/Christensen 
§ 309 no. 8 para 70, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 66. The BGH has not decided yet in this regard. 
See BGH NJW 1998, 679 (680). 
4507 BGH NJW 1981, 1510. 
4508 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 112, Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 71. 
4509 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 309 para 71, Erman/Roloff § 309 para 112. § 377 HGB: '(1) If the purchase is a 
commercial transaction for both parties, the buyer must inspect the goods immediately after delivery by the seller, 
insofar as this is feasible in the ordinary course of business, and, if a defect becomes apparent, notify the seller 
immediately. (2) If the buyer fails to notify the Seller, the goods shall be deemed to have been accepted unless the 
defect was not identifiable during the inspection. (3) If such a defect becomes apparent later, the notification must 
be made immediately after discovery; otherwise the goods shall be deemed to have been approved even in view 
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any latent or patent defects within three days is ineffective because it is too short. A total loss 
of the buyer's claims can only be justified, according to the court, where the buyer does not 
fulfil its obligations for the normal execution of the contract.4510  Item ff): Before the law of 
obligations was modernised, the BGH was of the view that the prohibition of making limitation 
easier (then contained in § 11 no. 10 lit. f) AGBG) was also applicable to B2B agreements by 
application of the general clause.4511 It is not clear though whether this prohibition does now 
generally apply between entrepreneurs, especially after the extension of the limitation periods 
due to the modernisation of the law of obligations. The fact that many defects contained in 
buildings or building materials only show after a very long period of time speaks for 
maintaining the five-year period of §§ 438 no. 2 and 434a no. 2 also in B2B contracts.4512 For 
other defects and certain constellations in B2B agreements, it is imaginable though to go 
slightly below the minimum limitation period of one year.4513 
2.2.8.2.6 Manufacturer warranties 
Manufacturers of technical equipment often join warranty4514 vouchers to their items in which 
they warrant that the item sold is free from defects. These manufacturer warranties – which are 
legally independent warranty agreements – go beyond the seller's warranty and improve the 
purchaser's position. The buyer can choose if either the seller or the manufacturer should be 
liable for any defects. Therefore, content control is regularly excluded in terms of § 307(3) 
because the manufacturer's warranty does not derogate from the legal rights in terms of §§ 434 
et seq. but supplements them. Such warranties are not a performance (in the broad sense) in 
terms of § 309 no. 8 lit. b).4515 Manufacturers are thus free concerning the extent of such 
warranties. Nevertheless, they must formulate them in a fashion that does not infringe the 
transparency requirement of § 307(1) 2nd sent., e.g., by exactly describing the extent of their 
(manufacturer) warranty vis-à-vis the seller's (legal) warranty.4516 
                                                             
of this defect. (4) The timely dispatch of the notification shall suffice to preserve the purchaser's rights. (5) If the 
seller has fraudulently concealed the defect, he may not invoke these provisions. My own translation. 
4510 BGH NJW 1992, 575 (576). 
4511 BGH NJW 1984, 1750 (1751). Concerning the former law, see also BGH NJW 2014, 206 (207 et seq). 
4512 Stoffels AGB-Recht 376 and 377. 
4513 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 8 para 106, Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 84. 
4514 The German terminology distinguishes between 'Sachmängehaftungl' in the sense of §§ 434 et seq (i.e., legally 
granted warranties) and 'Garantien', such as the manufacturer warranty (i.e., contractual warranties). Both are 
translated by 'warranties' in English. 
4515 Stoffels AGB-Recht 377. 
4516 BGH NJW 1988, 1726 (1727). 
 724   
 
The BGH is of the view that these warranties are subject to content control if the client has to 
pay a fee for it, and it is merely a complementary performance.4517 Then, the same principles 
apply as for the seller's warranty in terms of §§ 434 et seq. Stoffels and Steimle rightly criticise 
the BGH's argumentation in that the characteristic of remuneration for a warranty should not 
determine whether it is subject to content control. They argue that the assessment should be 
limited to whether the mutual rights and obligations are transparently formulated in the 
warranty contract and whether their content is surprising in terms of § 305c(1).4518 
2.2.9 Duration of continuing obligations (§ 309 no. 9) 
Pursuant to § 309 no. 9, in a contractual relationship the subject matter of which is the regular 
supply of goods or the regular rendering of services or work performance by the user, a) a 
duration of the contract binding the other party to the contract for more than two years, b)  a 
tacit extension of the contractual relationship by more than one year in each case that is binding 
on the other party to the contract, or c) a notice period longer than three months prior to the 
expiry of the duration of the contract as originally agreed or tacitly extended at the expense of 
the other party to the contract is ineffective. This does not apply to contracts relating to the 
supply of things sold as belonging together or to insurance contracts. 
2.2.9.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 9 
The duration of contracts is significant for customers because they hardly can evaluate their 
needs, economic situation and interest in the distant future.4519 Restricting the duration of 
contracts in standard terms ensures not only the freedom of disposal4520 of consumers but also 
market mobility.4521 In standard business terms law, the other party is protected from too long 
durations by § 309 no. 9 and the general clause. § 309 no. 9 protects customers from entering 
into contracts with too long durations by limiting the initial duration to two years, tacit 
extensions to one year and notice periods to three months for certain continuing obligations (or 
open-ended agreements).4522 
Interestingly, neither the South African blacklist nor the greylist contain a similar item. 
Regulation 44(3)(i) only prohibits the supplier from terminating an open-ended agreement 
without reasonable notice, except for breach committed by the consumer. Item (o) greylists 
                                                             
4517 BGH NJW 2011, 3510. 
4518 Stoffels AGB-Recht 378, Steimle NJW 2014, 194. 
4519 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 9. 
4520 Dispositionsfreiheit. 
4521 HK/Schulte-Nölke § 309 para 43. 
4522 Stoffels AGB-Recht 301. 
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clauses in terms of which the supplier, but not the consumer, is permitted to renew or not renew 
the agreement. Section 14 of the Act is only applicable to fixed-term agreements.4523 
Hence, clauses stipulating the duration, tacit extension and/or termination of open-ended 
agreements must be assessed in terms of section 48. 
2.2.9.2 Concerned contract types 
No. 9 only applies to contractual relationships the subject matter of which is the regular supply 
of goods or the regular rendering of services or work performances by the user. This means 
that this provision does not target continuing obligations per se. This provision does not 
concern significant contract types such as lease, usufructuary lease, franchising agreements or 
leasing contracts. What is more, it clearly sets out that the person who renders performance 
must be the user and not a third party. Otherwise, the clause must be assessed under § 307.4524 
The given agreement must govern a continuing obligation, i.e., the more time has passed the 
more the total volume of the performance has increased.4525 This also applies to deliveries or 
performances that vary during the duration of the contract.4526 For the delivery of goods, the 
regularity of the deliveries is compelling for the application of no. 9. A key service contract, 
for instance, does not contain such an element of regularity because the performance is 
rendered randomly, i.e., when the client has lost its key.4527 Otherwise, the given contract can 
stipulate all sorts of movable tangible goods, such as liquid gas, software programmes or 
beer.4528 The official statement mentions newspaper and magazine subscriptions as well as 
'memberships' in book clubs where customers have to choose a certain book or product, or at 
least the 'product of the month' on a regular basis.4529 
§ 309 no. 9 is also applicable to contracts concerning the regular rendering of services4530 or 
work performances.4531 Since the legal consequences in terms of no. 9 are the same, a 
demarcation of both contractual types is superfluous in this regard. The crucial element is that 
                                                             
4523 See discussion of these provisions in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 h). 
4524 Stoffels AGB-Recht 301 and 302. 
4525 Palandt/Grüneberg § 314 para 2. 
4526 Martinek BB 1989, 1277 (1284). 
4527 KG NJW-RR 1994, 1267 (1268). 
4528 Stoffels AGB-Recht 302. 
4529 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 37. Some of these legal relationships between the 'member' and the book club are designed 
according to company law. However, the exception of § 310(4) BGB for company law in terms of the application 
of §§ 305 et seq only applies to performances that are based on the articles of association. Otherwise, § 309 no. 9 
is applicable. See BGH NJW-RR 1992, 379. 
4530 §§ 611 et seq. 
4531 §§ 631 et seq. 
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the performances are rendered within a single contractual relationship and that the parties do 
not have to enter into a new agreement for each performance.4532 
Examples are teaching contracts,4533 memberships of matrimonial agencies,4534 window or 
sidewalk cleaning contracts, or maintenance contracts for technical installations.4535 Exclusive 
real estate brokerage agreements do not contain the regular rendering of a service and therefore 
do not fall under no. 9.4536 The same applies to the so-called 'BahnCard' which grants train 
tickets at a lower fare. With a BahnCard, the client is only entitled to buy tickets at a lower 
price, and there is no element of regularity.4537 
§ 309 no. 9 is applicable to mixed contracts if in the overall view, the element of a purchase, 
rendering of a service or work performance is dominant with regard to the other contractual 
elements.4538 A contract on assisted living, for instance, is a mixed contract with elements of a 
service contract (dominant element) and those of a work performance contract and lease. 
Hence, § 309 no. 9 is applicable to those contracts.4539 In gym contracts, usually the fact that 
the gym owner offers its premises and the equipment for use to its clients is the predominant 
element. Nonetheless, the fact that a personal trainer gives initial instructions to the customers 
for the use of the equipment and that the contract often includes the participation in fitness 
classes has to be considered as well.4540 
On the other hand, no. 9 does not apply to employment contracts.4541 Although these contracts 
are not excluded from content control per se (§ 310(4)), fixed-term employment contracts are 
regulated in the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Act (TzBfG),4542 which is lex 
specialis to the BGB provisions. What is more, the legislator's intention with regard to the 
protection of employment contracts is another than for open-ended agreements under § 309 
no. 9. For the legislator, temporary employment is a 'flaw' and not the standard. This is 
expressed by the fact that fixed-term employments need a special justification,4543 and an 
                                                             
4532 Stoffels AGB-Recht 302. 
4533 For distance learning contracts, the compelling provisions of the Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz (FernUSG) 
which are leges speciales to the BGB provisions, apply. 
4534 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 37. 
4535 Stoffels AGB-Recht 303. 
4536 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 9 para 29, UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 11. 
4537 BGH NJW 2010, 2942 (2943). 
4538 BGH NJW 2007, 213 (214). 
4539 BGH NJW 2007, 213 (214). 
4540 Stoffels AGB-Recht 303. 
4541 Stoffels AGB-Recht 303. 
4542 Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge or Teilzeitbefristungsgesetz (TzBfG). 
4543 § 14 TzBfG. 
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invalid employment agreement with a limited duration is transformed ex lege into an open-
ended contract.4544 The temporal limitation of certain labour conditions must be assessed under 
the general clause though.4545 
2.2.9.3 Exceptions for certain contracts 
§ 309 no. 9 in fine sets out that the provision does not apply to contracts relating to the supply 
of things sold as belonging together or to insurance contracts. The reason for these exceptions 
is that not only the user but also the other party has an interest in a longer duration for these 
contracts.4546 This provision is idle though since contracts on things that are sold together (e.g., 
a multivolume encyclopaedia)4547 are no open-ended agreements in the sense of no. 9. For such 
instalment contracts, no. 9 merely has a clarifying function.4548 Although insurance policies are 
continuing obligations in the sense of no. 9, they do not concern the regular supply of goods or 
services or work performances.4549 
2.2.9.4 Duration 
§ 309 no. 9 lit. a) prohibits a duration of the contract binding the other party for more than two 
years. Agreements can be cancelled by giving an ordinary notice of termination. A clause 
granting a right to an extraordinary termination is not sufficient though because such a right 
depends on narrowly defined conditions.4550 Standard clauses that exclude the right to terminate 
an open-ended agreement not before the expiry of two years also infringe no. 9.4551 
The duration in the sense of no. 9 starts at the moment of entering into the agreement, and not 
when the goods are supplied or the service or work performance is rendered, because the 
onerous situation for the other party begins with the start of the duration during which it is 
bound to the contract.4552 If the parties agree to an initial trial period, such period is not taken 
into account.4553 
However, a standard clause that does not infringe no. 9 but provides for a duration of the 
contract longer than two years is not effective per se. The final assessment of the validity of 
                                                             
4544 § 16 TzBfG. 
4545 Stoffels AGB-Recht 303 and 304. 
4546 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 8. 
4547 This example is mentioned in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 42. 
4548 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 9 paras 16-21. 
4549 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 8. 
4550 L/GvW/T/Trinkner § 11 no. 12 AGBG para 19. 
4551 OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 1987, 438 (439). 
4552 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 9 para 12, UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 13. 
4553 BGH NJW 1993, 326 (327 et seq). 
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the clause must be undertaken by applying the general clause.4554 The legislator believed that 
'in the view of the diversity of agreements on continuing obligations'4555 a more generalising 
approach was necessary and only wished to set out maximum durations4556 an exceedance of 
which would always make the clause ineffective. A clause that does not stipulate the duration 
of the contract of more than two years speaks however for the validity of the clause, and the 
ineffectiveness of this clause should only result of particular circumstances that are not taken 
into consideration by no. 9.4557 For this reason, the BGH ruled that an initial contractual period 
of two years for newspaper or magazine subscription was valid.4558 
Agreements that do not fall under the scope of application of no. 9 are assessed in terms of the 
general clause, but the legal valuations of no. 9 are taken into account.4559 
No. 9 does not apply to continuing obligations for which the legislator has provided for 
particular norms that take into account the interests of both sides. Such a norm is the 
Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (WEG), the Act on the Ownership of Apartments and the 
Permanent Residential Right.4560 The owners of apartments have an interest that the duration 
of the mandate of the administrator is not too short, which is why, after a weighing of all 
interests, the legislator provided in § 26(1) 2nd sent. WEG that the administrator is appointed 
for a maximum of five years. A recourse to § 309 no. 9 is not permitted. The BGH assesses 
though if, despite the maximum duration of five years, the clause is valid in terms of § 307.4561 
The problem of standard forms containing blank fields to be filled out by the customer has 
already been discussed.4562 A client who can choose between several options given by the 
supplier concerning the duration of the contract does not have a real choice.4563 By doing so, 
the user could circumvent §§ 305 et seq. by giving several inadmissible options. Therefore, if 
the customer can choose between a duration of three years and a duration of four years for the 
subscription of a newspaper, both options are prohibited in terms of § 309 no. 9 lit. a) because 
they impose a contract duration longer than two years.4564 
                                                             
4554 Stoffels AGB-Recht 305. 
4555 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 9. My own translation. 
4556 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 37. 
4557 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 94. 
4558 BGH NJW 1987, 2012 (2012 et seq). 
4559 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 9 para 11. See also discussion below in this chapter. 
4560 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 9 para 8, UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 9. 
4561 BGH NJW 2002, 3240 (3246). 
4562 See ch 2 on the scope of application of §§ 305 et seq. 
4563 MüKo/Basedow § 305 para 16. 
4564 Stoffels AGB-Recht 45. 
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2.2.9.5 Tacit extension of the contractual relationship 
Many contracts contain a clause by which the duration of the agreement is tacitly extended by 
a certain period of time. § 309 no. 9 lit. b) prohibits tacit extensions by more than one year in 
each case that is binding on the other party. The legislator was of the view that this is the 
maximum duration that is still reasonable for consumers.4565 The BGH considers that a one-
year extension is generally effective.4566 
2.2.9.6 Notice period 
According to § 309 no. 9 lit. c), a notice period longer than three months prior to the expiry of 
the duration of the contract is ineffective. It is irrelevant whether the notice period refers to the 
contract as originally agreed or tacitly extended. It is also irrelevant if the duration has been 
agreed in standard business terms or by an individual agreement.4567 A clause providing that 
the other party can only give notice three months to quarter-end is also ineffective.4568 
No. 9 is completed by § 309 no. 13, according to which clauses under which a more stringent 
form than written form or special receipt requirements are not permitted.4569 
2.2.9.7 Legal consequences in the case of a longer extension or notice period 
A contract that contains a standard clause providing for an unreasonably long extension period 
(lit. b) cannot be upheld by assuming a shorter and reasonable period because the law does not 
provide for an automatic extension of contracts that have been concluded for a fixed term.4570 
Hence, the contract ends with the expiry of the initially agreed term.  
For clauses concerning the initial term (lit. a) and notice periods (lit. c) the filling of the existing 
gap can be delicate. Since in many cases the law does not provide for a duration or notice 
period, the given period must be ascertained by complementary interpretation.4571 This is 
relevant for contracts to produce a work because § 6484572 is often not applicable since the 
customer's obligation to pay the supplier might be more cumbersome than the ineffective 
                                                             
4565 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 37. 
4566 BGH NJW 1997, 739 (739 et seq). 
4567 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 93, UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 18. 
4568 KG NJW-RR 2009, 1212. 
4569 Stoffels AGB-Recht 306. 
4570 BGH NJW 2000, 1110 (1113 et seq), Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 para 23. 
4571 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 21. 
4572 § 648 (ex-§ 649): 'The customer may terminate the contract at any time up to completion of the work. If the 
customer terminates the contract, then the contractor is entitled to demand the agreed remuneration; however, he 
must allow set-off of the expenses he saves as a result of cancelling the contract or acquires or wilfully fails to 
acquire from other use of his labour. There is a presumption that the contractor is accordingly entitled to five 
percent of the remuneration accounted for by the part of the work not yet provided.' 
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clause.4573 In service contracts, a recourse to §§ 620(2) and 6214574 is possible. In other cases, 
legal provisions can be applied by analogy, e.g., the FernUSG.4575 
2.2.9.8 B2B contracts 
The valuations contained in no. 9 are no indication for contracts between entrepreneurs.4576 
Open-ended agreements often have longer durations in B2B contracts, and their effectiveness 
has to be assessed in terms of the general clause.4577 
2.2.9.9 Content control in terms of the general clause 
a) Contract duration clauses 
German courts generally do not consider a clause by which the other party is bound to an open-
ended contract for several years an unreasonable disadvantage for this party. The courts instead 
perform a weighing of interests. When assessing whether such a clause is generally fair or if 
the balance of the parties' rights and obligations is significantly disturbed, they take into 
account the parties' typical needs.4578 The maximum commitment period depends above all on 
how significant the user's counter-performances are. If the counter-performance involves high 
development and storage costs that are amortised only after a longer contract duration, a more 
extended commitment period is usually justified.4579 
Hence, a standard clause in a beer delivery contract in terms of which the other party is bound 
for ten years is generally not considered an unreasonable disadvantage for the innkeeper who 
is an entrepreneur in the sense of § 14.4580 Such a contract usually is concluded in conjunction 
with a loan for the development and continuation of the inn and by which the ongoing receiving 
                                                             
4573 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 para 21. 
4574 § 620(2): 'If the duration of the service relationship neither is specified nor may be inferred from the nature or 
the purpose of the services, then either party may terminate the service relationship under the provisions of 
[§§] 621 to 623.' § 621: 'In the case of a service relationship that is not an employment relationship within the 
meaning of [§] 622, termination is allowed 1. if the remuneration is assessed by days, on any day to the end of the 
following day; 2. if the remuneration is assessed by weeks, at the latest on the first working day of a week to the 
end of the following Saturday; 3. if the remuneration is assessed by months, at the latest by the fifteenth of one 
month to the end of the calendar month; 4. if the remuneration is assessed by quarters or longer periods of time, 
observing a notice period of six weeks, to the end of a calendar quarter; 5. if the remuneration is not assessed by 
time periods, at any time; in the case of a service relationship that completely or mainly takes up the economic 
activity of the person obliged; however, a notice period of two weeks must be observed.' 
4575 FernUSG = Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz (Distance Learning Protection Act). UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 9 
para 21. 
4576 BGH NJW 2003, 886 (887). 
4577 Stoffels AGB-Recht 307. 
4578 BGH NJW 1997, 3022 (3023). 
4579 BGH NJW-RR 2012, 249 (250). 
4580 § 14: '(1) An entrepreneur means a natural or legal person or a partnership with legal personality who or which, 
when entering into a legal transaction, acts in exercise of his or its trade, business or profession. (2) A partnership 
with legal personality is a partnership that has the capacity to acquire rights and to incur liabilities.' 
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of beer deliveries is amortised. A ten-year commitment is usual practice in this domain and 
takes sufficiently into consideration both parties' interests.4581 On the other hand, a ten-year 
duration of a consumption meter is disadvantageous in the sense of § 307.4582 Furthermore, a 
ten-year duration for a franchising agreement, which is the general practice in the fast-food 
industry, does hardly reflect a fair balancing of the parties' interests.4583 The same applies to a 
20-year duration for a 'supply contract' where the entrepreneur is entitled to install, operate and 
market telecommunication devices in apartment buildings.4584 Invalid are also clauses by which 
the insured person (personal liability insurance)4585 is bound for ten years.4586 Such a long 
duration impairs the insured person's freedom of disposal when its personal or economic 
situation changes within the duration of the contract and prevents it from reacting when the 
market changes (e.g., better premiums).4587 
b) Extension clauses 
aa)   Automatic extension clauses 
A pre-formulated extension clause infringes the transparency requirement if it might give the 
impression that the contract has a fixed term, and customers therefore might shy away from 
terminating the agreement at any time in terms of § 627 (termination without notice in the case 
of a position of trust).4588 In this regard, the BGH decided that the following standard clause of 
a gym membership contract does not disadvantage the other party unreasonably and is therefore 
not ineffective in terms of § 307: 'The contract is tacitly extended for a further six months if it 
is not terminated in due form and time.'4589 
bb)   Option clauses 
When confronted with an option clause in terms of content control, one has to consider the total 
duration of the contract because the unreasonableness might result from the initial and 
                                                             
4581 BGH NJW 2001, 2331. 
4582 BGH NJW-RR 2008, 818. 
4583 Stoffels AGB-Recht 308. 
4584 BGH NJW 1997, 3022. 
4585 The exclusion of § 309 no. 9 in fine concerning insurance contracts does not apply to § 307. 
4586 BGH NJW-RR 1997, 1000. 
4587 Stoffels AGB-Recht 308. 
4588 BGH NJW 1999, 276. § 627: '(1) In a service relationship that is not an employment relationship within the 
meaning of [§] 622, notice of termination is allowed, even without the requirement specified in [§] 626, if the 
person obliged to perform services, without being in a permanent service relationship with fixed earnings, must 
perform services of a higher nature with which people are customarily entrusted on the basis of special trust. (2) 
The person obliged to perform services may only give notice in such a manner that the person entitled to services 
can obtain the services elsewhere, unless there is a compelling reason for untimely notice of termination. If he 
should give notice in untimely fashion without such cause, then he must compensate the person entitled to services 
for damage arising from this.' 
4589 BGH NJW 1997, 739. My own translation. 
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subsequent duration of the agreement.4590 In this regard, it is referred to the aforementioned 
explanations. 
c) Termination clauses 
Termination clauses for which § 309 no. 9 lit. c) is not applicable are to be assessed in terms 
of the general clause. With regard to the diversity of such clauses, it is difficult to give a general 
assessment. Such clauses exclude the right to cancel the agreement or modify the conditions 
for the termination or the notice period. Hence, the mutual interests of the parties have to be 
taken into consideration. Sometimes, normative evaluations must be taken into account because 
they are mandatory, or offer at least an evaluative guideline.4591 
The employment protection norms, mainly laid down in the Kündigungsschutzgesetz 
(KSchG),4592 are mandatory and cannot be modified to the employee's disadvantage.4593 A 
standard clause in a commercial agency contract according to which the sideline agent can 
terminate the agreement only after three years and by giving notice twelve months before the 
end of the calendar year is ineffective under § 92b(1) 2nd sent. HGB.4594 In terms of § 89(2) 1st 
sent., the period of notice to be observed by the principal may not be shorter than that to be 
observed by the commercial agent.'4595 
2.2.10 Change of other party to contract (§ 309 no. 10) 
§ 309 no. 10 provides that a provision according to which in the case of purchase, loan or 
service agreements or agreements to produce a result a third party enters into, or may enter 
into, the rights and duties under the contract in place of the user, unless, in that provision, a) 
the third party is identified by name, or b) the other party to the contract is granted the right to 
free himself from the contract is ineffective.  
The fact that such a clause is valid if the third party is identified (lit. a) or the other party is 
granted the right to free itself from the agreement (lit. b) makes this provision much less 
acrimonious, however.4596 
                                                             
4590 BGH NJW 2000, 1110 (1112). 
4591 Stoffels AGB-Recht 309. 
4592 The German Kündigungsschutzgesetz (Protection Against Dismissal Act) is not to be confused with the 
Austrian Consumer Protection Act (Konsumentenschutzgesetz)  that is also abbreviated 'KSchG'. 
4593 ErfK/Oetker § 1 KSchG para 13. 
4594 BGH NJW 2013, 2111 et seq. § 92b(1) 2nd sent. HGB: 'Where the agency contract is entered into for an 
indefinite period, it can be terminated by giving one month’s notice of termination to become effective at the end 
of a calendar month; if a different period of notice is agreed upon, it must be the same for both parties.' 
4595 Stoffels AGB-Recht 309. 
4596 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 1. 
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Contrary to the BGB provision that prohibits such clauses (with the exceptions in lit. a) and 
b)), regulation 44(3)(t) greylists clauses giving the supplier the possibility of transferring his 
or her obligations under the agreement to the detriment of the consumer, without the consumer's 
agreement. The South African provision covers all types of agreements and is not limited to 
certain contract types, unlike the German BGB provision. What is more, contrary to the 
German or the similar EU4597 provision, the item in the South African greylist only refers to 
the transfer of obligations, and not to the transfer of rights. This means that the free assignability 
of claims (rights) – an important factor in the credit economy – is not concerned by item (t) of 
regulation 44(3).4598 On the other hand, item (t) contains the requirement of a 'detriment to the 
consumer', which is inexistent in § 309 no. 10. The German legislature considers all transfers 
of rights and obligations without the other party's consent detrimental to the consumer (with 
the exceptions set out in lit. a) and b)), whereas the South African item presumes such a clause 
unfair, if he or she relied on the supplier's market reputation, goodwill, or a personal relation 
with the supplier (e.g., in a contract with an architect or lawyer).4599 
2.2.10.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 10 
No. 10 has the objective to ensure that the other party is able to check, before entering into the 
contract or withdrawing from it in terms of § 355, that the third party who shall become its new 
contractual partner is reliable and solvent.4600 The customer shall be protected from a 
contractual partner that it does not know or that he expressly did not want to choose in the first 
place, e.g., because of a bad experience with this supplier in the past. The supplier's information 
given to the consumer in its offer, its ability to perform and its reliability would lose any 
meaning if it were possible to get rid of one's obligations easily.4601 Clauses such as 'we are 
entitled to transfer our rights and obligations under the contract to a third party' were quite 
common, above all in agreements for newspaper or book series subscriptions or distance 
learning contracts.4602 Today, the prohibition has rather little practical relevance.4603 
                                                             
4597 Under item (p) of the Annex to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 
5 April 1993 clauses 'giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under 
the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter's agreement' may 
be regarded as unfair. See also art II-9:410(o) of the Draft Common Frame of Reference. 
4598 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 104. 
4599 See discussion on reg 44(3)(t) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.4 a). 
4600 See BGH NJW 1980, 2518. 
4601 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 38. 
4602 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 38. 
4603 Stoffels AGB-Recht 310. 
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2.2.10.2 Contents of the provision 
a) Concerned contract types 
No. 10 includes purchase,4604 loan,4605 service agreements4606 and agreements to produce a 
result.4607 Not expressly mentioned, but also included are contracts dealing with the supply of 
movable things to be produced or manufactured.4608 Contracts concerning the cession of rights 
to use a thing, such as leasing agreements, are not included.4609 If clauses concerning a leasing 
agreement, for instance, are not already surprising under § 305c(1), content control takes place 
by applying § 307.4610 It is noteworthy that for leases concerning apartments and farm leases 
as well as employment contracts, the transfer of the contractual partner occurs ex lege.4611 A 
clause in such a contract is merely declaratory and not submitted to content control.4612 
b) Change of the contractual partner 
No. 10 concerns clauses by which the user is entitled to transfer its position under the contract 
with all its rights and obligations to a third party, without the other party's involvement.4613 
Typical cases are the transfer of the agreement,4614 which is a subrogation of the rights and 
obligations by the third party or substitution where the user is merely responsible for a careful 
selection of the third party.4615 The legislative purpose of no. 10 is fulfilled in these cases 
because the other party shall be protected from a change of its contractual partner so that he or 
she is always certain with whom it is conducting business.4616 
On the other hand, no. 10 is not applicable where the user remains the other party's contractual 
partner. This is namely the case where the user merely transfers single rights in terms of an 
assignment4617 (for such a transfer the consent of the debtor is not necessary either by the 
way),4618 or the use of subcontractors or vicarious agents.4619 The same applies to an 
                                                             
4604 Kaufvertrag, §§ 433 et seq. 
4605 Darlehensvertrag, §§ 488 et seq. 
4606 Dienstvertrag, §§ 611 et seq. 
4607 Werkvertrag, §§ 631 et seq. 
4608 Werklieferungsvertrag, § 650 (ex-§ 651). WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 para 10. 
4609 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 10 para 5, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 5. 
4610 Stoffels AGB-Recht 310. 
4611 In terms of §§ 566(1) for apartment leases, 581(2) for farm leases and 613a for employment contracts.  
4612 See § 307(3). Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 309 no. 10 para 5, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 10 para 10. 
4613 Stoffels AGB-Recht 310. 
4614 Vertragsübernahme. 
4615 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 para 12-15. 
4616 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 paras 12-15. 
4617 §§ 398 et seq. 
4618 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 6. 
4619 Erfüllungsgehilfen. WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 paras 12-15. 
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assumption of an obligation4620 in terms of § 3294621 and an assumption of debt4622 pursuant to 
§ 415(3)4623 where no change of the contractual partner takes place.4624 
An assumption of debt with a full discharge of the original debtor4625 has to be seen against the 
backdrop of no. 10 though.4626 In spite of the fact that merely the original debtor's obligations 
are transferred to the third party, the customer must be protected against the possibility that the 
new contractual partner is not willing or able to perform.4627  
If the user changes its legal personality (e.g., a former company with limited liability becomes 
a stock company), no. 10 does not apply because the contractual partner stays the same and 
only its legal 'framework' changes.4628 Notwithstanding, clauses by which the agreement shall 
also be applicable 'vis-à-vis a possible legal successor' are invalid.4629 
c) Identification by name 
§ 309 no. 10 lit. a) provides that the clause is valid if the third party is identified by name. The 
BGH decided however that the identification by name is not sufficient, and that the third party's 
address must be given too.4630 
d) Right to free oneself from the contract 
According to lit. b), the clause is valid if the other party to the contract is granted the right to 
free itself from the agreement. This right is either a right to withdraw from the contract in terms 
of §§ 346 et seq., or in open-ended agreements a right to give notice.4631 When exerting the 
                                                             
4620 Erfüllungsübernahme. 
4621 § 329: 'Where one party to a contract agrees to satisfy an obligee of the other party without assuming the 
obligation, then in case of doubt it may not be assumed that the obligee is to acquire the right to demand 
satisfaction from him directly.'  
4622 Schuldbeitritt. 
4623 § 415: '(1) If the assumption of the debt is agreed between the third party and the obligor, its effectiveness is 
subject to ratification by the obligee. Ratification may only occur when the obligor or the third party has informed 
the obligee of the assumption of the debt. Until ratification, the parties may alter or cancel the contract. (2) If 
ratification is refused, assumption of the debt is deemed not to have occurred. If the obligor or the third party 
requests the obligee, specifying a period of time, to make a declaration relating to the ratification, the ratification 
may only be declared before the end of the period of time; if it is not declared it is deemed to be refused. (3) As 
long as the obligee has not granted ratification, then in case of doubt the transferee is obliged to the obligor to 
satisfy the obligee in good time. The same applies if the obligee refuses ratification.' 
4624 Stoffels AGB-Recht 311. 
4625 Befreiende Schuldübernahme, §§ 414 and 415. § 414: 'A debt may be assumed by a third party by contract 
with the obligee in such a way that the third party steps into the shoes of the previous obligor.'  
4626 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 98, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 6. 
4627 Stoffels AGB-Recht 311, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 6. 
4628 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 para 16. 
4629 LG Cologne NJW-RR 1988, 1084. 
4630 BGH NJW 1980, 2518, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 10 para 14. 
4631 Stoffels AGB-Recht 311. 
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right to free itself from the contract, the other party must not suffer any negative consequences 
or enter into a contractual relationship with the third.4632 Hence, a clause which provides for a 
term of notice of one month is ineffective because the customer would be obliged to maintain 
a contractual relationship with the third party until the expiry of this period. The client must 
therefore have the right to terminate the contract immediately.4633 
The right to free oneself from the contract only exists if there is a change of the contractual 
partner. It is not sufficient if there is merely a possibility of such a change.4634 This would 
require a contractual clause by which the other party is entitled to give notice at any time. 
Stoffels maintains that the legislator's wording in the official report in terms of which the clause 
is valid if the other party is granted the right to liberate itself from the contract 'in the case of a 
change [of the contractual partner]' means that the legislator originally did not intend to require 
an actual change of the contractual partner, but that a possible change would suffice. It is 
submitted that the formulation 'für den Fall des Wechsels' is merely another way of saying that 
the right only exists in case of an actual change of the contractual partner though. This becomes 
clear when reading the passage in its entirety.4635  
2.2.10.3 Item (p) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 
According to item (p) of the Annex of the Directive 93/13/EEC, clauses giving the seller or 
supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations under the contract, where this 
may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, without the latter's agreement are invalid. 
This item goes further than § 309 no. 10. Harmonisation can be achieved by applying § 307.4636 
This applies to contracts that do not fall under no. 10 (e.g., leasing agreements), or a reduction 
of the consumer's guarantees.4637 The fact that the Directive declares clauses that infringe item 
(p) invalid, and that, on the other hand, no. 10 provides that it is sufficient that the other party 
is entitled to free itself from the contract so that the clause is valid, does not infringe the 
                                                             
4632 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 99, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 para 34. 
4633 LG Cologne NJW-RR 1987, 885 (886). 
4634 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 10 para 8, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 12. 
4635 'Klauseln über die Ersetzung des Vertragspartners sollen deshalb nur wirksam sein, wenn (…) dem Kunden 
für den Fall des Wechsls ein Rücktritts- oder Kündigungsrecht eingeräumt wird.' BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 38. 
4636 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 97, WLP/Pfeiffer Anhang RiLi para 139. 
4637 Stoffels AGB-Recht 312. 
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Directive. On the contrary, the German provision is more consumer-friendly because the 
consumer can decide whether he or she wishes to continue the contract with the third party.4638  
2.2.10.4 B2B contracts 
The application of the general clause may result in the invalidity of a transfer clause by 
balancing the parties' interests.4639 The other party has, for example, an interest in knowing the 
third party in advance in long-term agreements where the third party must be solvent and 
reliable.4640 This must be assessed on a case-to-case basis. An innkeeper who enters into a 
contract with a brewery for the delivery of beer has an interest that the beer brand to be 
delivered by the third party stays the same, for instance. Otherwise, such a clause is invalid in 
terms of § 307.4641 
2.2.11 Liability of an agent with the power to enter into a contract (§ 309 no. 11) 
2.2.11.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 11 
§ 309 no. 11 sets out that a provision by which the user imposes on an agent who enters into a 
contract for the other party to the contract a) a liability or duty of responsibility for the principal 
on the part of the agent himself, without an explicit and separate declaration to this effect, or 
b) in the case of agency without authority, liability going beyond § 179 is ineffective. 
No. 11 concerns provisions, such as 'the purchaser as well as the person who signs the order on 
behalf of the purchaser or in its own name are obliged to pay the amount due.'4642 
A declaration of intent made by an agent in the name of another takes effect directly in favour 
of and against the principal if the requisites of § 164(1)4643 are met. This means that an agent 
normally is not liable for legal transactions undertaken for another person.4644 Since the agent 
makes a declaration of intent in its own name though, the temptation for standard terms users 
                                                             
4638 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 10 para 17. According to art 8 of the Directive, Member States may 
adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by the Directive, to 
ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer. 
4639 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 10 para 18. 
4640 BGH NJW 1985, 53 (54). 
4641 BGH NJW 1998, 2286 (2288). 
4642 Example from BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 38. My own translation. 
4643 § 164(1): 'A declaration of intent which a person makes within the scope of his own power of agency in the 
name of a principal takes effect directly in favour of and against the principal. It is irrelevant whether the 
declaration is made explicitly in the name of the principal, or whether it may be gathered from the circumstances 
that it is to be made in his name.'  
4644 An exception of this principle is the culpa in contrahendo liability in terms of § 311(3), i.e., where the agent 
gives a particularly high degree of trust and substantially influences the negotiations or the entering into of the 
contract.  
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to foist liability on the agent is undeniable, which is why such clauses are rather widespread.4645 
Although the incorporation requirements of § 305(2) are regularly not met, there is still some 
risk that the agent is confronted with a civil procedure the outcome of which is uncertain. 
Hence, § 309 no. 11 aims at the agent's protection.4646 
This provision is a specification of the prohibition of surprising clauses in terms of 
§ 305c(1).4647 Such clauses are invalid because they are most of the time not duly incorporated 
into the contract in terms of § 305(2) because an explicit and separate declaration to this effect 
is required. Alternatively, they are surprising under § 305c(1), or individually agreed clauses 
according to § 305b take precedence.4648 No. 11 therefore rather has a clarifying and preventive 
function 4649 because it is aimed to protect agents from hidden liability clauses.4650 
The inclusion of an agent in another's liability is not reprehensible per se as long as certain 
transparency requirements are met. 4651 Situations may arise where the user has a reasonable 
interest in such an inclusion of the agent's liability.4652 This is the case, for instance, where 
parents conclude a contract for music lessons on behalf of their minor child, and where the 
music school's standard terms set out that the parents are liable for the payment of the fees.4653  
The Act does not contain a similar provision. Regulation 44(3)(c) concerns commitments 
undertaken by the supplier's agents, whereas item (d) the supplier's vicarious liability for its 
agents. On the other hand, § 309 no. 11 pertains to the other party's agents.4654 
2.2.11.2 Scope of application 
No. 11 of § 309 provides for two different cases in lit. a) and b). Both have in common that it 
is irrelevant whether the agent's power of attorney is based on an agreement or a legal 
provision.4655 
                                                             
4645 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 11 para 2. 
4646 Stoffels AGB-Recht 297 and 298. 
4647 BGH NJW 2006, 996 (997). 
4648 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 11 para 3, Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 101. 
4649 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 101. 
4650 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 38. 
4651 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 11 para 1. 
4652 Stoffels AGB-Recht 298. 
4653 Example found in Stoffels AGB-Recht 298. 
4654 See discussion on reg 44(3)(c) and (d) in Part I ch 3 paras 3.4.1 c) and d). See also item (n) in the Annex of 
the EU Unfair Terms Directive that largely corresponds to item (c) of reg 44(3) CPA. 
4655 MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 11 para 3, Erman/Roloff § 309 para 140. 
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a) Own liability or duty of responsibility of the agent 
§ 309 no. 11 lit. a) sets out that clauses that impose a liability or duty of responsibility for the 
principal on the part of the agent himself, without an explicit and separate declaration to this 
effect are ineffective. In other words, the agent's liability cannot be triggered by such a standard 
clause. This also applies to its joint and several liability, or subordinate liability (e.g., surety or 
guarantee).4656 
Hence, the following clause of a travel agent by which the teacher's liability is involved for the 
organisation of a school trip is invalid: 'By the booking, I agree to the standard business terms 
and expressly declare to be liable for the contractual obligations of the participants.'4657 Also 
invalid is a clause of a car rental company that says that 'the driver is liable for all obligations 
of the lessee'.4658 
From the inadmissible own liability of the agent, one has to distinguish the admissible 
obligation of several parties to the contract. No. 11 is therefore not applicable where the agent 
also concludes the contract in its own name.4659 If the director of a limited liability company 
concludes a franchise agreement not only in the name of the company but also in her own 
name, she becomes a party to the contract and is liable.4660 
The role of the acting person (principal or agent) can be judged in most cases by the 
circumstances. Persons that accompany the party do regularly not wish to be involved in the 
contract.4661 Hence, a standard clause of a hospital by which the person accompanying the 
patient is referred to as 'applicant' and which stipulates that this person has a joint and several 
liability together with the patient for the payment of the treatment is invalid. If the role of the 
given person cannot be evaluated by considering external circumstances, the wording of the 
clause must be assessed.4662 For instance, from the formulation 'tenant 2' in a lease one can 
conclude that this person is actually another party to the contract and not merely an agent.4663 
§ 309 no. 11 lit. a) requires an explicit and separate declaration in order to include the agent's 
liability. This provision has a warning function. This declaration does not need to be made in 
                                                             
4656 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 11 para 8. 
4657 OLG Frankfurt NJW 1986, 1941. My own translation. 
4658 LG Osnabrück NJW 1985, 389. My own translation. 
4659 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 11 para 7. 
4660 BGH NJW 2006, 996 (997). 
4661 LG Düsseldorf NJW 1995, 3062 et seq. 
4662 Stoffels AGB-Recht 299. 
4663 BGH NJW 1988, 1908 (1909). 
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a separate document. However, the text of the declaration and the signature referring to it must 
be clearly separate from the rest of the text so that it is obvious that the document is of a dual 
nature, i.e., the contract involving the principal on the one hand, and the agent's liability on the 
other.4664 This is not the case where the declaration is incorporated into the contract in a manner 
that makes it impossible to distinguish it from the actual agreement.4665 
b) Liability beyond § 179 
§ 1794666 sets out the liability of an unauthorised agent (falsus procurator). Pursuant to § 309 
no. 11 lit. b), a provision by which the user imposes on an agent in the case of agency without 
authority, liability going beyond § 179 is ineffective. 
In practice, such clauses deny the agent's liability that is restricted to the damage which the 
other party suffers as a result of relying on the power of agency4667 if it is not aware of its lack 
of power of agency (§ 179(2)), or is liable although the other party (user) knew or ought to 
have known of the lack of power of agency (§ 179(3)).4668  
In a pre-formulated hospital treatment contract, a clause by which the person who is 
accompanying the patient has to sign a clause by which the patient confers power of agency to 
the accompanying person is ineffective. If there are no family relations between the patient and 
the accompanying person, the hospital cannot presume this person's power of agency and 
therefore must have known its absence.4669 
2.2.11.3 B2B contracts 
As an emanation of the general rules of §§ 305c(1) (surprising clauses) and 305b (priority of 
individually agreed clauses), § 309 no. 11 indirectly also applies to B2B contracts in terms of 
§ 310(1) 2nd sent.4670 No. 11 typically applies in relations with final consumers. This provision 
                                                             
4664 BGH NJW 2001, 3186; 2002, 3464. 
4665 See BGH NJW 1988, 2465; 2001, 3186 et seq. 
4666 § 179: '(1) A person who has entered into a contract as an agent is, if he does not furnish proof of his power 
of agency, obliged to the other party at the other party’s choice either to perform the contract or to pay damages 
to him, if the principal refuses to ratify the contract. (2) If the agent was not aware of his lack of power of agency, 
he is obliged to make compensation only for the damage which the other party suffers as a result of relying on the 
power of agency; but not in excess of the total amount of the interest which the other or the third party has in the 
effectiveness of the contract. (3) The agent is not liable, if the other party knew or ought to have known of the 
lack of power of agency. The agent is also not liable if he had limited capacity to contract, unless he acted with 
the consent of his legal representative.'  
4667 Vertrauensschaden. 
4668 Stoffels AGB-Recht 300. 
4669 LG Düsseldorf NJW 1995, 3062 (3063). 
4670 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 11 para 14. 
 741   
 
does obviously not apply to the del credere liability of commercial agents under § 86b HGB,4671 
as it merely concerns the contractual relationship between the agent and the principal.4672 
2.2.12 Modification of the burden of proof (§ 309 no. 12) 
In terms of § 309 no. 12, a provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party to the contract, in particular by a) imposing on the latter the 
burden of proof for circumstances lying in the sphere of responsibility of the user, or b) having 
the other party to the contract confirm certain facts is ineffective. Letter b) does not apply to 
acknowledgements of receipt that are signed separately or provided with a separate qualified 
electronic signature. 
Before § 309 no. 12 lit. a) and b) are discussed, some general remarks on this provision are 
necessary. 
2.2.12.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 12 
Rules concerning the burden of proof are not merely considerations of expediency but an 
emanation of substantive principles of fairness and justice. This applies to general principles 
of burden of proof, e.g., that the party who claims a particular right has to prove it, or that the 
party who is closer to the facts to be proved bears the onus of proof.4673 A modification of these 
principles by standard business terms might jeopardise the other party's situation in that it might 
make its legal defence more difficult or even impossible. For this reason, no. 12 prohibits the 
modification of the burden of proof to the other party's disadvantage.4674 
Such modifications of the burden of proof came into the awareness of the expert public for the 
first time after a BGH ruling of 1964.4675 The court had to decide on a standard clause by which 
the depositor (client) had to prove the responsibility of the warehouse keeper's staff after stored 
items had disappeared. The BGH decided that the user could not relieve itself from 
                                                             
4671 § 86b HGB: '(1) If a commercial agent undertakes to guarantee performance of the obligation arising from a 
transaction, he shall be entitled to claim special remuneration (del credere commission); such right cannot be 
excluded in advance. The guarantee may be undertaken only for a specific transaction or for transactions with 
specific third parties which the commercial agent negotiates or concludes. Such undertaking must be in writing. 
(2) The right to del credere commission shall arise upon conclusion of the transaction. (3) Sub-[§] (1) shall not 
apply if the principal or the third party has his establishment, or, in the absence of such, his residence, abroad. 
Furthermore, it shall not apply to transactions for the conclusion and execution of which the commercial agent 
has unlimited authority.' 
4672 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 38. 
4673 BT-Drs. 7/ 3919 at 38. 
4674 § 309 no. 12 is the transposition of item (q) of the Annex of the Unfair terms Directive 93/13/EEC. 
4675 BGH NJW 1964, 1123. 
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circumstances lying in the sphere of its own responsibility to the client's disadvantage. This 
principle is now expressed in no. 12 lit. a).4676 
2.2.12.2 Conditions and scope of the prohibition 
a) Principles of burden of proof 
A modification of the burden of proof to the other party's disadvantage is prohibited per se, 
irrespective of whether the given burden of proof rule is a statutory provision or has been 
developed by jurisprudence.4677 This applies therefore to modifications of the 'objective' burden 
of proof concerning the effects of the unprovability of specific facts, but also to the 'subjective' 
burden of proof which determines which party bears the onus.4678 An increase in the 
requirements of the evidence modifies the burden of proof too because the given clause 
deviates from statutory provisions and affects the onus of proof.4679 
No. 12 applies to all principles of burden of proof, such as the general principle according to 
which each party must prove the facts entailing legal consequences that are advantageous for 
it. Furthermore, the BGB contains special burden of proof rules according to the sphere of 
responsibility, such as §§ 280(1) 2nd sent.4680 and 286(4).4681 Also other provisions contain such 
rules (e.g., §§ 269, 271, 891 and 1006). Further burden of proof rules are the prima facie 
evidence and the assumption that official documents are complete and correct.4682 
b) Modification to the disadvantage of the other party 
The question of whether there is a prohibited modification of the burden of proof must be 
assessed in two steps. First, one must determine which party would have the burden of proof 
without the given clause. Then, in a second step, it must be assessed whether the clause 
modifies the onus to the other party's disadvantage.4683 
The legislator wanted to exclude any disadvantageous modification of the burden of proof, 
irrespective of the wording of the clause. Hence, a modification of the burden of proof not only 
                                                             
4676 Stoffels AGB-Recht 404. 
4677 Stoffels AGB-Recht 404. 
4678 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 12 para 11 et seq. 
4679 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 12 para 15 et seq. 
4680 § 280(1): 'If the obligor breaches a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee may demand damages for the 
damage caused thereby. This does not apply if the obligor is not responsible for the breach of duty.' 
4681 § 286(4): 'The obligor is not in default for as long as performance is not made as the result of a circumstance 
for which he is not responsible.' 
4682 Stoffels AGB-Recht 404. 
4683 Stoffels AGB-Recht 404. 
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exists where the onus is reversed4684 but also other aggravations fall under this provision. A 
distinction between a reversal of the onus and other obstructions in terms of no. 12 is not 
necessary. Other aggravations are restrictions to certain evidence (e.g., a clause requiring the 
consumer to provide the original invoice in order to have corrected a defect on the purchased 
good)4685 as well as modifications of the principle of prima facie evidence.4686 On the other 
hand, also facilitations of the burden of proof concerning the user fall under this provision.4687 
The leading view does not apply this provision to promises to fulfil an obligation,4688 
declaratory acknowledgements of a debt4689 or submissions to execution.4690 Stoffels correctly 
points out in this regard that it is irrelevant that these are recognised legal institutes,4691 and 
that the determining factor is that these institutes create an independent title without modifying 
the burden of proof. Thus, §§ 305c and 307 apply in these cases.4692 
‘Conclusive proof certificates’ under South African common law4693 are invalid as they are 
against public policy, contra bonos mores and unenforceable.4694 Van Zyl argues that the 
legality of such certificates should be reconsidered because 'account should be taken of 
business and commercial efficacy in considering a 'conclusive proof provision'.4695 Such 
certificates are unilaterally established by the creditor though and therefore no equivalent to 
promises to fulfil an obligation4696 or declaratory acknowledgements of a debt4697 in German 
law. The latter are 'contracts' between the parties.4698 Hence, so-called 'conclusive proof 
certificates' should always be considered unfair.4699 
                                                             
4684 BGH NJW 1987, 1634 (1635), UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 8. 
4685 See Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ 
Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005)191. 
4686 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 11 et seq. This is also applicable in South African law as reg 44(3)(y) CPA 
expressly greylists 'clauses restricting the evidence available to the consumer'. 
4687 Stoffels AGB-Recht 405. 
4688 Abstrakte Schuldversprechen. See BGH NJW 1991, 1677. 
4689 Deklatorische Schuldanerkenntnisse. See BGH NJW 2003, 2386 (2388). 
4690 Vollstreckungsunterwerfungen. See BGH NJW 2002, 138 (139). 
4691 §§ 780, 781 BGB and § 794(5) ZPO. 
4692 Stoffels AGB-Recht 406. See also Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 5. 
4693 These are certificates established by the creditor and purporting to be conclusive proof of a certain balance 
due by the debtor, 
4694 Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 15A, Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd & Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1995 (3) SA 1 (A). 
4695 Van Zyl J in Society of Lloyd’s v Romahn 2006 (4) SA 23 (C) at para [125]. 
4696 Abstrakte Schuldversprechen. See BGH NJW 1991, 1677. 
4697 Deklatorische Schuldanerkenntnisse. See BGH NJW 2003, 2386 (2388). 
4698 See wording of §§ 780, 781 BGB. 
4699 In this regard, see discussion in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 b). 
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c) Teleological reduction of § 309 no. 12? 
Some authors are of the opinion that the other party's disadvantage is less if the user does not 
waive the client's claims for damages where this would be possible, but instead 'only' modifies 
the burden of proof. These authors therefore plead for a teleological reduction of no. 12 and 
argue that as long as the user could exclude its liability, it is permissible to uphold it while 
reversing the burden of proof.4700 Others correctly avert that such a clause is nevertheless 
ineffective because the modification of the burden of proof is not a 'less' compared to a waiver 
of the user's liability. A waiver of liability modifies the substantive legal position of the other 
party, whereas a modification of the burden of proof rather leads to a costly misjudgement of 
the other party because it most likely loses the trial for misjudging the requirements for proving 
certain facts. The other party is most likely to estimate its prospects of success, which is why 
burden of proof provisions are often in conflict with the transparency requirement.4701 What is 
more, also item (q) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive4702 does not contain such a 
restriction, although the problem was generally known before this EU provision was 
drafted.4703 
2.2.12.3 § 309 no. 12 lit. a) 
In terms of § 309 no. 12 lit. a), a provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof to 
the disadvantage of the other party to the contract, in particular by imposing on the latter the 
burden of proof for circumstances lying in the sphere of responsibility of the user is ineffective. 
No. 12 lit. a) has no autonomous significance vis-à-vis the general prohibition of modifications 
of the burden of proof but merely reflects a general principle. Otherwise, the other party would 
be hindered from proving certain circumstances because they lie in the user's sphere.4704 
The transport terms and conditions of the German carrier Lufthansa4705 contained a clause by 
which the carrier was only liable if the passenger could prove the carrier's negligence. Since 
                                                             
4700 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 107, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 7. 
4701 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 9, Erman/Roloff § 309 para 148. 
4702 Item (q) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive: 'Terms which have the object or effect of: (…) 
excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly 
by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly 
restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable 
law, should lie with another party to the contract' are ineffective. 
4703 Stoffels AGB-Recht 407. 
4704 Stoffels AGB-Recht 406. 
4705 Allgemeine Beförderugsbedingungen für Fluggäste und Gepäck. 
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the passenger bore the burden of proof for circumstances that lay in the carrier's sphere of 
responsibility, this clause was considered ineffective.4706 
Section 65 of the Act provides that when a supplier has possession of any property belonging 
to or ordinarily under the control of a consumer, the supplier is liable to the owner of the 
property for any loss resulting from a failure to comply with the requirements mentioned in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this provision. This provision seems to place the burden of proof on 
the consumer of whether the loss or damage of the goods in the supplier’s possession was 
caused by the supplier’s failure to take reasonable care. Section 65 therefore deviates from the 
common-law rule according to which the supplier who takes the goods of the consumer into its 
safekeeping in the context of a depositum or bailment for reward4707 will be presumed to be at 
fault if the goods are damaged. In terms of section 2(10), a consumer can however rely on the 
residual rules, and a term which excludes such common-law rules and places the onus on the 
consumer will be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(y). 
In this regard, it is referred to the discussion on terms changing the onus of proof in contracts 
for safekeeping and the related arguments drawn from the praetor’s edict on seamen, 
innkeepers and stablekeepers in Part I.4708 A term placing the burden of proof on the consumer 
will, in any case, be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(y). 
As a result, section 65 of the Act deviates from the principle expressed in § 309 no. 12 lit. a). 
Because of section 2(10) and the application of the common law rules, the same result is 
achieved though, and clauses shifting the burden of proof on the other party (consumer) are 
unfair in terms of item (y) of regulation 44(3). 
2.2.12.4 § 309 no. 12 lit. b) 
According to § 309 no. 12 lit. b), a provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof 
to the disadvantage of the other party to the contract, in particular by having the other party to 
the contract confirm certain facts, is prohibited. Letter (b) does not apply to acknowledgements 
of receipt that are signed separately or provided with a separate qualified electronic signature. 
                                                             
4706 BGH NJW 1983, 1322. 
4707 Bailment describes the transfer of the possession of goods from one person (the 'bailor') to another person (the 
'bailee') who subsequently has possession of the property. It arises when a person gives property to someone else 
for safekeeping, hiring of goods, the loan of goods, the pledge of goods, and the delivery of goods for carriage or 
repair. It is a cause of action independent of contract or tort. See Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Bailment'. 
4708 Chapter 3 para 3.4.6 b). 
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Regulation 44(3)(y) corresponds to § 309 no. 12 lit. a), and item (v) of regulation 44(3) 
corresponds to § 308 no. 5.4709 The effect of entire agreement and no-representation clauses 
that are targeted by section 51(1)(g)(i) as well as acknowledgements in terms of section 
51(1)(g)(ii) have the effect of modifying the burden of proof. 
a) Rationale of § 309 no. 12 lit. b) 
The fact that the legislator underlines the prohibition of the confirmation of certain facts by the 
other party as a special case of the modification of the burden of proof (§ 309 no. 12 1st sent.) 
is legitimate because of the substantial practical implications of this phenomenon.4710 The 
danger of such clauses lies in the fact that users usually present such confirmations as a mere 
formal matter, and the customer is not aware of the legal implications such a provision may 
have. Moreover, such clauses are often not immediately visible in the standard terms and thus 
easily overlooked.4711 These clauses lead to a factual shift of the burden of proof, and users 
have no legitimate interest to require such a declaration from their clients.4712 
b) Scope of application 
aa)   Modification to the other party's disadvantage 
As set out in the 1st half-sentence of no. 12, the confirmation of certain facts requires a 
modification of the burden of proof with regard to legally significant facts, the other party's 
knowledge about certain facts or factual events in order to be subject of this norm. In other 
words, the confirmation of facts that would have to be proven by the other party in any event, 
is not subject to no. 12 lit. b).4713 
The classification of so-called 'completeness clauses'4714 ('no oral collateral agreements have 
been made')4715 is subject to discussion. Because of the assumption that the written contract is 
complete, the other party has the onus in this regard, which means that such a clause does not 
shift the burden of proof to the customer's disadvantage. The argument that § 309 no. 12 lit. b)  
offers no connecting factor for completeness clauses is however erroneous because the scope 
of application of the norm goes further. Completeness clauses may prevent customers from 
                                                             
4709 See discussion on reg 44(3)(v) and (y) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.5 a). 
4710 Stoffels AGB-Recht 288. 
4711 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
4712 Stoffels AGB-Recht 288. 
4713 BGH NJW 1985, 2329 (2331). 
4714 Vollständigkeitsklauseln. 
4715 BGH NJW 2000, 207. See also BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
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referring to possible verbal agreements,4716 which means that to this extent, an indirect shift of 
the onus of proof exists, or at least a modification of the requirements for the production of 
evidence.4717 Such a broad comprehension of the phrase 'modification of the burden of proof' 
is the law's objective and the legislator's intention.4718 The objective of the provision is to 
prohibit clauses by which a contrary assertion of the client is 'impeded or made impossible'.4719 
This means that already an aggravation of the other party's position is prohibited.4720 
It is irrelevant whether the modification of the burden of proof comes in the guise of a reversal 
or a shift of the burden of proof or a refutable assumption.4721 The BGH pointed out that already 
the user's attempt to degrade the other party's position in terms of proof is sufficient.4722 
bb)   Forms of a confirmation of facts 
For the application of no. 12 lit. b) it is irrelevant whether the confirmation of a certain fact is 
a declaration of intent,4723 a declaration of knowledge4724 or a declaration of factual events.4725 
Hence, there is a wide array of prohibited clauses.4726 
A clause by which the client declares that he or she asked for a home visit in the context of a 
consumer contract (§§ 312 to 319) is ineffective under § 309 no. 12 lit. b) because such a 
provision excludes the right to revoke the agreement in terms of § 312g.4727 The standard clause 
of a gym by which the client declares that he or she has no health problems and is able to 
participate at the training is also prohibited because it has the objective to make the client's 
proof more difficult that he has been duly informed and advised by the gym staff.4728 
Furthermore, a clause in a contract of delivery of built-in furniture by which the client declares 
that the user's sketches and measurements are correct is ineffective. Without this clause, and 
under the general rules of evidence, the user would have to prove that it has duly performed 
                                                             
4716 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 22. 
4717 Stoffels AGB-Recht 289. 
4718 The BGH also referred to this fact, but in another context. See BGH NJW 1987, 1634 (1635). 
4719 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
4720 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 12 para 115 et seq. 
4721 BGH NJW 1987, 1634 (1635), UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 18. 
4722 BGH NJW 1987, 1634 (1635). 
4723 Willenserklärung. 
4724 Wissenserklärung. 
4725 Erklärung über tatsächliche Vorgänge. 
4726 Stoffels AGB-Recht 289. 
4727 OLG Zweibrücken NJW-RR 1992, 565, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 19. § 312g(1): '(Right of 
withdrawal) In the case of off-premises contracts and of distance contracts, the consumer has a right of withdrawal 
pursuant to [§] 355.'  
4728 BGH NJW-RR 1989, 817, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 22. 
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what has been ordered.4729  Numerous (invalid) clauses concern the circumstances in which the 
contract has been concluded, such as 'I have received a copy of the contract'.4730 Also invalid 
are so-called 'negotiation clauses'4731 that stipulate that the standard business terms have been 
negotiated in detail in the sense of § 305(1) 3rd sent. ('We agreed that you are not allowed to 
conclude agreements directly').4732 
cc) Acknowledgement of receipt 
Under § 309 no. 12 2nd sent., the prohibition does not apply to acknowledgements of receipt 
that are signed separately or provided with a separate qualified electronic signature. The 
objective of this exception is to permit pre-formulated acknowledgements of receipt for which 
the user has a legitimate interest.4733 This provision applies to receipts in the sense of § 368,4734 
i.e., a written confirmation that the other party has received performance.4735 
The acknowledgement of received has to be clearly distinguishable from the rest of the text 
and separately signed by the client.4736 It is not necessary to provide for a separate document 
though.4737 The requirement of a 'separate signature' means that the signature merely refers to 
the acknowledgement of receipt and not to other declarations, such as the legal evaluation of 
the performance.4738 
The clause 'goods received without defaults', followed by the client's signature is therefore 
ineffective because the client not only acknowledges receipt of the given performance (goods) 
but also declares that it is free of defects.4739 The same applies to the clause of a car rental 
company 'the lessee declares, when receiving the vehicle, that it is in a safe and roadworthy 
condition and has no defects'. The BGH decided that such clauses cannot relieve the company 
from its burden of proof with regard to the car's roadworthiness.4740 
                                                             
4729 BGH NJW 1986, 2574 (2575). 
4730 BGH NJW 1987, 2012 (2014). 
4731 Aushandlungsklauseln. 
4732 BGH NJW 1987, 1634. 
4733 Stoffels AGB-Recht 290. 
4734 § 368: 'Upon receiving performance, on demand, the obligee must issue a written acknowledgement of receipt 
(receipt). If the obligor has a legal interest in having the receipt issued in another form, he may demand issue in 
that form.' 
4735 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 12 para 61. 
4736 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 24. See also BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
4737 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 13. 
4738 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 109, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 24. 
4739 OLG Koblenz NJW 1995, 3392. 
4740 BGH DB 1967, 118. See also BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
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dd) Relation to other provisions 
§ 309 no. 5 (lump-sum claims for damages) and no. 6 (contractual penalty) are leges speciales 
to no. 12 in respect of the ineffectiveness of lump-sum claims for damages or compensation of 
a decrease in value.4741 § 308 no. 5 and no. 6 are also leges speciales to this provision.4742 
c) Legal consequences in case of violation 
If a clause is invalid under § 309 no. 12 lit. b), the legal rules of evidence developed by 
jurisprudence apply.4743 The ineffective clause has no indicative effect in court.4744 
d) B2B contracts 
Since the burden of proof rules are based on the principle of justice and fairness, one could 
assume that they are also applicable to B2B contracts by application of the general clause.4745 
One must distinguish between the two items mentioned in no. 12, however. Lit. a) is an 
emanation of the allocation of the burden of proof according to the sphere of influence of the 
parties, which is why it has an indicative effect on § 307.4746  
On the other hand, the evaluations contained in § 309 no. 12 lit. b) can be applied to B2B 
contracts in terms of the general clause only on a case-to-case basis. Because of the commercial 
experience of business people, one can assume that they will not be taken by surprise by clauses 
that modify the burden of proof.4747 With regard to so-called 'traditional naïve clauses'4748 ('I 
declare that I have not been persuaded')4749 entrepreneurs do not need protection.4750 A different 
evaluation is necessary for 'negotiation clauses' by which the conditions of § 305(1) 3rd sent. 
(individually agreed clauses) are confirmed by the client. Such clauses require a 'legal transfer 
capacity'4751 that cannot be expected from an entrepreneur.4752 
                                                             
4741 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 4, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 2. 
4742 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 2. 
4743 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 27. 
4744 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 153, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 14. 
4745 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 110. 
4746 BGH NJW 1964, 1123. 
4747 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 27. 
4748 'Klassische Naivklauseln'. The term has been coined by Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 12 para 11. 
4749 See BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
4750 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 27, Stoffels AGB-Recht 291. 
4751 Juristische Transferleistung. 
4752 Stoffels AGB-Recht 291. 
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2.2.13 Form of notices and declarations (§ 309 no. 13) 
2.2.13.1 Rationale of § 309 no. 13 
In terms of § 309 no. 13, a provision by which notices or declarations that are to be made to 
the user or a third party are tied a) to a more stringent form than written form for a contract for 
which the law requires notarial recording, or b) to a more stringent form than written form in 
other contracts than those mentioned under lit. a), or c) to special receipt requirements, is 
invalid.4753 
Clauses prescribing a stricter form than the written form are an obstacle for the other party to 
exercise its rights and are often overseen or forgotten.4754 Consumers should be free to choose 
a more stringent form than the written form in order to prove the reception of their notice or 
declaration.4755 § 309 no. 13 is the counterpart of § 308 no. 6. Where the former restricts the 
facilitation of the proof that the other party has received a declaration, the latter aims to impede 
restrictions for declarations of the customer vis-à-vis the user.4756 
2.2.13.2 Content of the prohibition of § 309 no. 13 
§ 309 no. 13 covers all kinds of declarations of the other party with regard to the conclusion, 
execution and termination of the agreement, such as declarations of intent (e.g., notice of 
rescission or termination) or acts similar to legal transactions4757 (e.g., overdue notice or notice 
of defect). The provision does not cover the declarations of the user.4758 
§ 309 no. 13 has no corresponding provision in section 51 or regulation 44(3) of the Consumer 
Protection Act nor in the Unfair Terms Directive. Item (c) of regulation 44(3) of the Act only 
applies to entire agreement and non-variation clauses and to conditions that depend exclusively 
on the supplier, which is not the case in § 309 no. 13 as the observance of a specific form 
prescribed by the user ultimately depends on the other party. What is more, both regulation 
44(3)(c) and item (n) of the Directive apply to commitments undertaken by the supplier's agent 
and thus have another scope of application. 
                                                             
4753 My own translation. 
4754 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
4755 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
4756 Stoffels AGB-Recht 285. 
4757 Geschäftsähnliche Handlungen. 
4758 Erman/Roloff § 309 para 156, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 13 para 11 et seq. 
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A 'more stringent form than written form' is any requirement that goes beyond the requirements 
set out in §§ 1264759 and 127,4760 i.e., the handwritten signature of the issuer. Therefore, a clause 
that prescribes notarial recording (§ 128)4761 or official certification (§ 129)4762 of the 
declaration is invalid under § 309 no. 13.4763 Other clauses too may prescribe a more stringent 
form than written form, for instance, if the other party has to draft its declaration personally or 
if the declaration has to indicate the place where it was drafted.4764 Restrictions to specific 
means of communication, e.g., 'in order to ensure prompt handling, declarations must be 
transmitted by telefax' are ultimately also a more stringent form than written form.4765 
It is subject to discussion whether the use of certain (pre-printed) forms of the user is permitted 
for the other party's declarations. The legal committee of the Bundestag was of the view that 
because of the replacement of the initially planned formulation 'simple written form' by 'written 
form', the requirement of the use of certain forms is allowed.4766 This view is however not 
supported by the legal text. The necessary elements for 'written form' are conclusively 
contained in §§ 126 and 127. An obligation to use only a particular standard form goes beyond 
                                                             
4759 § 126: '(Written form) (1) If written form is prescribed by statute, the document must be signed by the issuer 
with his name in his own hand, or by his notarially certified initials. (2) In the case of a contract, the signature of 
the parties must be made on the same document. If more than one counterpart of the contract is drawn up, it 
suffices if each party signs the document intended for the other party. (3) Written form may be replaced by 
electronic form, unless the statute leads to a different conclusion. (4) Notarial recording replaces the written form.'  
§ 126a: '(Electronic form) (1) If electronic form is to replace the written form prescribed by statute, the issuer of 
the declaration must add his name to it and provide the electronic document with a qualified electronic signature 
in accordance with the Electronic Signature Act [Signaturgesetz]. (2) In the case of a contract, the parties must 
each provide a counterpart with an electronic signature as described in subsection (1).' § 126b: '(Text form) If text 
form is prescribed by statute, a readable declaration, in which the person making the declaration is named, must 
be made on a durable medium. A durable medium is any medium that 1. enables the recipient to retain or store a 
declaration included on the medium that is addressed to him personally such that it is accessible to him for a 
period of time adequate to its purpose, and 2. that allows the unchanged reproduction of such declaration.'  
4760 § 127: '(Agreed form) (1) The provisions under [§§] 126, 126a or 126b also apply, in case of doubt, to the 
form specified by legal transaction. (2) For compliance with the written form required by legal transaction, unless 
a different intention is to be assumed, it suffices if the message is transmitted by way of telecommunications and, 
in the case of a contract, by the exchange of letters. If such a form is chosen, notarial recording in accordance with 
[§] 126 may be demanded subsequently. (3) For compliance with the electronic form required by legal transaction, 
unless a different intention is to be assumed, an electronic signature other than provided for in [§] 126a also 
suffices and, in the case of a contract, the exchange of a declaration of an offer and of acceptance which are each 
provided with an electronic signature. If such a form is chosen, an electronic signature in accordance with [§] 126a 
may be demanded subsequently, or if this is not possible for one of the parties, notarial recording in compliance 
with [§] 126.'  
4761 § 128: '(Notarial recording) If the notarial recording of a contract is prescribed by statute, it suffices if first the 
offer and then the acceptance of the offer is recorded by a notary.'  
4762 § 129: '(Official certification) (1) If the official certification of a declaration is prescribed by law, the 
declaration must be put in writing and the signature of the person declaring be certified by a notary. If the 
declaration is signed by the issuer making his mark, the certification of the initials provided for in [§] 126 (1) is 
necessary and sufficient. (2) The notarial recording of the declaration replaces the official certification.'  
4763 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 13 para 23 and 24. 
4764 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 13 para 5. 
4765 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 112, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 13 para 5. 
4766 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 10. 
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these requirements. Besides, this does not create an obstacle to a smooth business transaction 
as the user is free to suggest the use of certain forms. It only cannot make their use mandatory 
for the validity of the other party's declaration.4767  
On the other hand, the wording of the provision does not prohibit that the user prescribes the 
written form for the other party's declarations in general.4768 
Moreover, the prohibition of § 309 no. 13 includes clauses that prescribe special requirements 
for the reception of the other party's declaration. These are conclusively set out in §§ 1304769 et 
seq. According to § 130, a declaration has reached the other party to the contract when the 
declaration has reached its 'sphere of influence', and one can assume under normal 
circumstances that it will take knowledge of it.4770 Other clauses prescribing at which moment 
the declaration has reached the user in order to be valid are ineffective.4771 Hence, a clause by 
which 'the termination of the agreement is only valid if the notice has been sent by registered 
letter' is ineffective.4772 Since it is sufficient that the declaration reaches the user's 'sphere of 
influence', clauses prescribing that the declaration must be sent to a specific department, such 
as 'the notice of defect has to be sent to the management', are invalid.4773 
2.2.13.3 Legal consequences in case of violation 
If a clause is invalid in terms of § 309 no. 13, the statutory provisions apply under § 306(2), 
e.g., §§ 5684774 or 623.4775 Where these do not provide for a specific form, the declaration can 
be made informally, e.g., orally.4776 
2.2.13.4 B2B contracts 
The evaluations of § 309 no. 13 do not apply to B2B contracts 4777 because they are too diverse 
and not comparable to B2C agreements. As professionals are used to specific form 
                                                             
4767 Stoffels AGB-Recht 286. See MüKo/Wurmnest § 309 no. 13 para 4, UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 13 para 5, 
Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 112, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 13 para 5. 
4768 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 13 para 6. 
4769 § 130: '(Effectiveness of a declaration of intent to absent parties) (1) A declaration of intent that is to be made 
to another becomes effective, if made in his absence, at the point of time when this declaration reaches him. It 
does not become effective if a revocation reaches the other previously or at the same time. (2) The effectiveness 
of a declaration of intent is not affected if the person declaring dies or loses capacity to contract after making a 
declaration. (3) These provisions apply even if the declaration of intent is to be made to a public authority.'  
4770 BGH NJW 1983, 929 (930); 1999, 1633 (1635). 
4771 Stoffels AGB-Recht 286. 
4772 WLP/Dammann § 309 no 13 para 25. 
4773 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 13 para 8. 
4774 Prescribes written form for the termination of a lease. 
4775 Prescribes written form for the termination of employment or separation agreement. 
4776 Stoffels AGB-Recht 287. 
4777 See § 310(1) 1st sent. 
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requirements, a clause in a B2B contract by which declarations must be made by registered 
letter can therefore be valid.4778  
2.2.14 Waiver of a right of action (§ 309 no. 14)  
2.2.14.1 Content and rationale of the provision 
In terms of § 309 no. 14, a provision according to which the other party to the contract4779 may 
assert its claims against the user in court only after it has attempted an amicable settlement in 
a procedure for extrajudicial resolution is ineffective.4780 
This provision has been inserted into § 3094781 only in 2016 and is effective since 26 February 
2016. It is also applicable to contracts that already existed as of this date because the law does 
not provide for a transitory provision for these agreements.4782 
No. 14 prohibits standard clauses that require Alternative Dispute Resolution before the other 
party can assert its claims in court. The provision hence addresses mandatory arbitration and 
mediation clauses where the client cannot choose this type of dispute resolution voluntarily. 
The title of the provision ('Waiver of action')4783 is misleading since the provision also aims at 
clauses that merely lead to a temporary - or dilatory - waiver of action.4784 Naturally, the 
provision addresses standard clauses that intend to achieve permanent waivers of action, and 
where the client has no other choice than asserting its claims by ADR.4785 
Regulation 44(3)(x) of the Act contains a similar item, based on item (q) of the Annex of the 
Unfair Terms Directive.4786 Also in terms of item (x), the given clause must make arbitration 
mandatory. Although this provision does exclusively mention arbitration, it is submitted that it 
also applies to mediation because otherwise, the objective of the norm, i.e., greylisting clauses 
that are an obstacle for the consumer to take legal action, would not be attained. Item (x) seems 
to be more restrictive than § 309 no. 14 though in that it sets out that the clause requires the 
                                                             
4778 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 13 para 71. 
4779 Interestingly, the legislator refers to the 'other party to the contract' ('der andere Vertragsteil') instead of the 
'other party' ('andere Vertragspartei'). The same pattern can be found in § 305(1) ('other party') and § 307(1) 
('contractual partner'). It is submitted though that the different wording has no meaning in practice since the 
contractual partner, the other party to the contract or the other party are always the user's counterpart. 
4780 My own translation. To date, there is no official translation of this provision. 
4781 Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über alternative Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten und zur 
Durchführung der Verordnung über Online-Streitbeilegungen in Verbraucherangelegenheiten of 19 February 
2016, BGBl. 2016 I 254. 
4782 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 1. 
4783 Klageverzicht. My own translation of the title. 
4784 Dilatorischer Klageverzicht. 
4785 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 2. 
4786 See discussion of this item in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 a). 
 754   
 
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration. Thus, it targets permanent exclusions of a 
judicial dispute resolution, whereas no. 14 merely requires a dilatory clause, i.e., a temporary 
exclusion. 
No. 14 is not applicable to the standard terms of banks and saving banks,4787 or to standard 
clauses providing for ADR on a voluntary basis or referring to such proceedings.4788 
The rationale of the provision can be summarised as preventing any obstacle for the consumer 
for the assertion of its rights in court.4789 Another aspect is the consumers' protection from 
mandatory standard clauses that require ADR before they can go to court.4790 Without the 
prohibition contained in no. 14, clauses that make ADR compulsory before any court action is 
taken would lead to the result that the consumer's action would be dismissed as inadmissible 
'at present' if the user puts forward the clause as defence.4791 
Naudé correctly argues that compulsory arbitration clauses under which the consumer agrees 
in advance to submit any future disputes to ‘private arbitration’ bear the risk that the consumer 
is unlikely to have read them, especially when they are non-negotiated or pre-formulated terms. 
Furthermore, the consumer is unlikely to understand the usually higher costs involved with 
arbitration.4792 And if the consumer is aware of these higher costs, he or she is unlikely to 
proceed to arbitration, especially when the goods or services subject to the dispute are of 
comparatively low value. This will dissuade consumers from taking any legal action against 
the supplier.4793 A cooling-off period, as suggested by the South African Law Commission in 
2001 and implemented in the Dutch Civil Code,4794 would not protect consumers, especially if 
                                                             
4787 AGB Banken, AGB Sparkassen. 
4788 § 36 Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz (VSBG) provides, among other things, that a user of standard 
business terms must inform the consumer 'together with its standard business terms' of the possibility of such 
proceedings. § 36 VSBG came into effect on 1 February 2017 (see § 24(1) 2nd sent. of the Umsetzungsgesetz of 
19 February 2016, BGBl. 2016 I 254). 
4789 Ausschuss für Recht und Verbraucherschutz des Bundestages, BT-Drs. 18/6904 at 1, 36 and 74. 
4790 See Stellungnahme des Bundesrates zum Regierungsentwurf, BR-Drs. 258/15 (Beschluss) at 38 et seq and 
BT-Drs. 18/5760 at 22. 
4791 BGH NJW 1999, 647 (648), BGH NJW-RR 2009, 637. 
4792 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 109. 
4793 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 111. 
4794 Article 6:236(n) BW blacklists 'a stipulation which provides for the settlement of a dispute other than by a 
court with jurisdiction pursuant to law or by one or more arbitrators, unless it still allows the counterparty to 
choose for a settlement of the dispute by the court with jurisdiction pursuant to law and this choice can be made 
within a period of at least one month after the user has invoked the stipulation in writing.' 
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they are not aware of the high costs involved. In addition, the cooling-off period will most 
probably have lapsed before the dispute arises.4795 
It should be noted that item (x) does not greylist terms requiring compulsory arbitration covered 
by the Act or other legislation. § 309 no. 14 does not provide for such a caveat. What is more, 
clauses providing that the consumer first take a dispute to the applicable industry ombud in 
terms of section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act, are not greylisted either. 
The main function of no. 14 is not a 'market cleansing' from prohibited clauses because pre-
formulated compulsory arbitration and mediation clauses are scarcely found in consumer 
contracts. The provision's objective is rather to prevent widespread use of such mandatory 
clauses in the future because the ADR Directive4796 and the Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz 
(VSBG)4797 both encourage voluntary ADR. No. 14 is thus not in conflict with the Directive or 
the aforementioned law because it only prohibits clauses that make ADR mandatory. 
A differentiation between arbitration and mediation clauses is not necessary in terms of § 309 
no. 14 as both are prohibited to the extent that ADR is mandatory before any court action. 
Mediation often takes place in relationships that are characterised by a personal relationship 
between the parties, such as company law or family law. These areas are excluded from the 
application of no. 14 by § 310(4) so that mediation clauses have practically no relevance in this 
regard. On the other hand, the use of arbitration clauses in standard terms has more relevance 
in practice; hence, the emphasis of no. 14 lies here.4798 
                                                             
4795 Section 58 of the Bill published in SALRC Report on Domestic Arbitration (Project 94) (2001) at 161-162. 
See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 112. 
4796 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC 
(Directive on consumer ADR). 
4797 VSBG = Act on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Consumer Matters. 
4798 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 9. Mediation clauses with consumers must comply with § 1031 ZPO: 
'(1) The arbitration agreement must be set out either in a document signed by the parties, or in letters, telefax 
copies, telegrams, or other forms of transmitting messages as exchanged by the parties, and that ensure proof of 
the agreement by supporting documents. (2) The requirement as to form stipulated by subsection (1) shall be 
deemed to have been met also in those cases in which the arbitration agreement is contained in a document 
transmitted by one party to another party, or by a third party to both parties, the content of which document is 
regarded, in the event an opposition is lodged late and in accordance with customary standards, to be the content 
of an agreement. (3) Where an agreement that is in compliance with the requirements as to form set out in 
subsection (1) or (2) makes reference to a document containing an arbitration clause, this establishes an arbitration 
agreement wherever the reference is made such that this clause is included as a component part of the agreement. 
(4) (repealed). (5) Arbitration agreements in which a consumer is involved must be contained in a record or 
document signed by the parties in their own hands. The written form as set out in the first sentence may be replaced 
by the electronic form pursuant to [§] 126a of the [BGB]. The record or document, or the electronic document 
may not contain agreements other than those making reference to the arbitration proceedings; this shall not apply 
if the agreement is recorded by a notary. (6) Any failure to comply with formal requirements shall be remedied 
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Because of the wide wording of § 309 no. 14, this provision applies to all types of claims of 
the client, and a restriction of an 'ADR standard clause' to specific claims of the customer does 
therefore not exclude its application.4799 
Although the title of no. 14 ('waiver of action') indicates that the provision only concerns 
actions in court, it also includes other proceedings, such as for the preservation of evidence,4800 
dunning procedures4801 or preliminary injunctions.4802 A restriction to court actions would not 
sufficiently honour the normative objective of the provision.4803 
For the application of no. 14, the requirements of the given standard clause concerning the 
ADR proceedings and as regards the client's attempt to find an amicable solution, e.g., the 
seriousness and intensity of its efforts and readiness to find a solution or the duration of its 
efforts, are irrelevant. It is also irrelevant whether the client may terminate the ADR 
proceedings 'at any time' or by fulfilling only few preconditions.4804 
Standard clauses that fall under the ambit of no. 14 'hinder[…] the consumer's right to take 
legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take 
disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions' in terms of item (q) of the 
Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive. Therefore, the normative content of no. 14 does not fall 
behind item (q) of the Directive.4805 
2.2.14.2 Application to consumer contracts 
Under § 310(3) no. 2, § 309 no. 14 applies to pre-formulated contract terms to the extent that 
the consumer did not influence their contents due to the pre-formulation. Although § 310(3) 
no. 3 modifies the criteria for the evaluation for content control in terms of § 307(1) and (2) for 
contract terms by also considering 'other circumstances attending the entering into of the 
contract', such a modification does not apply to no. 14. This item does not allow for any 
evaluative criteria because § 309 aims at prohibited clauses without the possibility of 
evaluation.4806 
                                                             
by an appearance being made, in the hearing before the arbitral tribunal, on the merits of the case.' See 
Jauernig/Stadler § 309 para 23. 
4799 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 12. 
4800 Beweissicherungsverfahren. 
4801 Mahnverfahren. 
4802 Verfahren des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes. 
4803 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 13. 
4804 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 16. 
4805 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 2. 
4806 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 paras 6 and 7. 
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2.2.14.3 B2B contracts 
The evaluations contained in § 309 no. 14 do not apply to B2B contracts. Since this provision 
is characterised by the safeguarding of consumer interests, it has no radiating effect.4807 Where 
a standard clause provides for mandatory ADR proceedings between companies though, it is 
regularly not invalid because of its mandatory character but rather in terms of the general clause 
of § 307. This does not apply to cases where a particular contract type and the customs of the 
given branch justify extrajudicial dispute resolution before any court action is taken, and where 
this is in the interest of both parties. This is, e.g., the case for arbitration clauses in the 
construction business providing for a reasonably designed procedure (e.g., a neutral arbitrator, 
the right to be heard and a reasonable duration of the proceedings).4808 It is in the interest of 
the parties to avoid the high costs involved in this sector, and to attempt to achieve an 
extrajudicial solution first. The same applies to open-ended agreements, e.g., with an agent, or 
in commercial leases or franchise agreements,4809 where both parties are interested in 
maintaining good relations that could be affected by litigation. On the other hand, clauses that 
exclude a court action not only temporarily but also permanently are always void.4810 
2.2.14.4 Legal consequences in case of invalidity 
A standard clause that falls under the ambit of no. 14 is invalid and void. The client may take 
the user to court, and the latter cannot defend itself by putting forward the invalid ADR clause. 
Where the clause provides that both parties must undertake ADR proceedings before bringing 
the case before a court, the user is bound to the clause according to the principle of personal 
partial invalidity.4811 This principle concerns clauses that provide for a uniform provision for 
both parties, as opposed to content control that only concerns provisions that create an 
unreasonable disadvantage for the other party.4812 Therefore, in cases where the user asserts 
any claims against its client, it must carry out ADR beforehand. Otherwise, its action in court 
will be dismissed as inadmissible. The other party is however not obliged to accept such ADR 
proceedings that have been initiated 'by precaution'.4813 
                                                             
4807 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 paras 18. 
4808 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 paras 21. 
4809 OLG Saarbrücken 29/04/2015 – 2 U 31/14 = BeckRS 2015, 20819 (para 15). 
4810 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 paras 18.  
4811 Personale Teilunwirksamkeit. 
4812 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 306 para 16. 
4813 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 17. 
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2.2.15 Advance payment and security (§ 309 no. 15) 
Under § 309 no. 15, a provision according to which, in the case of a contract to produce a work, 
the user a) may demand part payments from the other party to the contract4814 for part 
performances which are substantially higher than the advance payments to be made pursuant 
to § 632a(1) and § 650m(1), or b) is not obliged to provide the security pursuant to § 650m(2) 
or is only obliged to provide the security to a lesser extent, is invalid.4815  
No. 15 was inserted into § 309 with effect of 1 January 2018.4816 Its objective is to prevent that 
standard terms users restrict the consumers' rights with regard to the modified § 632a and the 
newly inserted § 650m.4817 The provision hence concerns contracts to produce a work and 
construction contracts. 
In terms of § 632a, the contractor may demand a part payment from the customer for work 
carried out in accordance with the contract. If the performances rendered are not in accordance 
with the contract, the customer may refuse payment of a reasonable part of the part payment. 
This also applies to required materials or building components that are supplied or specially 
prepared and made available if ownership of the materials or building components is 
transferred to the customer or appropriate security is provided for this, at his option. 
§ 650m provides that, if the entrepreneur demands part payments pursuant to § 632a, the total 
amount of the part payments may not exceed 90 per cent of the agreed total remuneration. This 
provision also provides that upon the first part payment, the consumer shall be provided with 
security for the timely production of the work without significant defects in the amount of 
5 percent of the agreed total remuneration. 
The South African Consumer Protection Act does not contain a similar provision. 
 
                                                             
4814 Here too, the legislator refers to the 'other party to the contract' ('der andere Vertragsteil') instead of the 'other 
party' ('andere Vertragspartei'). The different wording has no practical meaning though as the other party to the 
contract or the other party are always the user's counterpart. 
4815 My own translation. To date, there is no official translation of this provision. 
4816 Gesetz zur Reform des Bauvertragsrechts, BGBl. 2017 I at 969. 
4817 Jauernig/Stadler § 309 para 24. 
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2.3 Prohibited clauses with the possibility of evaluation (§ 308) 
2.3.1 Period of time for acceptance and performance (§ 308 no. 1) 
2.3.1.1 Period of time for acceptance (§ 308 no. 1 1st sent. 1st var.) 
2.3.1.1.1 Rationale of § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 1st var. 
Pursuant to § 145, a person who offers to another to enter into a contract is bound by the offer, 
unless he or she has excluded being bound by it. If the offeror has determined a period of time 
for the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance may only take place within this period (§ 148). 
In terms of § 147(1), an offer made to a person who is present may only be accepted 
immediately. This also applies to an offer made by one person to another using a telephone or 
another technical facility. According to § 147(2), an offer made to a person who is absent may 
be accepted only until the time when the offeror may expect to receive the answer under 
ordinary circumstances.4818 For the calculation of this period of time, the necessary time for the 
communication of the offer, the time for processing the offer and for reflecting it as well as the 
time for the communication of the answer (acceptance or rejection) is taken into account.4819 
This means that the legal period of time for acceptance of the offer depends on the 
circumstances of the given case.4820 This uncertainty during the time the offeror is bound by its 
offer ends only after the other's rejection or the expiry of the acceptance period. In terms of 
§ 146, the offer expires if a refusal is made to the offeror, or if no acceptance is made to this 
person in good time.4821 
The first variation of § 308 no. 1 1st sent. prohibits provisions by which the user reserves to 
himself the right to unreasonably long or insufficiently specific periods of time for acceptance 
or rejection of an offer. This presumes that the offer is made by the other party, i.e., the client. 
This kind of situation may arise where the customer has to use a form (e.g., order form) in 
which the user stipulated an acceptance period. Contrary to the wording of § 148, it is the 
recipient of the offer who determines the acceptance period, which is possible because § 148 
is non-mandatory.4822 The user's 'offering' of its goods or services to the general public is no 
offer in the legal sense, but an invitatio ad offerendum.4823  
                                                             
4818 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4819 Palandt/Ellenberger § 146 para 6. 
4820 Stoffels AGB-Recht 292. 
4821 Stoffels AGB-Recht 292. 
4822 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 5, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 3. 
4823 Stoffels AGB-Recht 293. 
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The provision aims to prevent that the user binds the other party to its offer for a too long or 
insufficiently specific period of time, whereas the user allows itself an unreasonably long 
reflection period. During the period in which the client is bound to its offer, it is limited in its 
freedom of disposal and does not know whether the contract will be concluded. If she enters 
into an agreement with another supplier, she risks ending up with two binding contracts.4824 On 
the other hand, the user's position is strengthened as it may speculate at the client's costs.4825  
From a dogmatic point of view, standard provisions on acceptance periods are no contractual 
provisions but rather clauses stipulating the conclusion of the contract.4826 Since § 305(1) is 
extended by § 308 no. 1, an acceptance period that has been unilaterally set by the user is open 
to scrutiny in terms of content control under § 308 no. 1, however.4827 
The South African Consumer Protection Act or its Regulation does not contain a similar 
provision. Hence, section 48 of the Act applies. The Unfair Terms Directive contains in item 
(c) of its Annex a provision by which terms making an agreement binding on the consumer 
whereas provision of services by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation 
depends on his own will alone is ineffective. This provision is restricted to services and not 
applicable to goods though. The German provision thus goes beyond the protective purpose of 
the Directive. 
2.3.1.1.2 Scope of application of the provision 
§ 308 no. 1 applies to offers to conclude any type of contract, i.e., agreements under the law of 
obligations and real contracts.4828 The provision is also applicable to amendments or 
supplements of contracts already concluded.4829 
It aims to protect the other party of the contract, and not the user. Hence, in cases where the 
user offers to conclude an agreement which provides for an acceptance period for the other 
party, no. 1 finds no application.4830 If the conclusion of the contract depends on a suspensive 
condition, no. 1 applies by analogy because this is also a case in which the legislator wants to 
protect the other party: the contract has not yet come into being, whereas the other party is 
                                                             
4824 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 1, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 1. 
4825 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24, MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 1 para 5. 
4826 Vertragsabschlussklauseln. In this regard, see BGH NJW 2010, 2873. 
4827 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 8. 
4828 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 308 no. 1 para 4, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 3. 
4829 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 3. 
4830 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 9. 
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bound to its offer.4831 This can be expressed by a clause, such as 'the contract is concluded 
when the goods arrive from the importer or preliminary supplier'.4832 
Real estate contracts sometimes contain so-called 'continued validity clauses'.4833 These clauses 
provide that the other party is bound by its offer until the expiry of a certain period of time, 
whereas the user can accept this offer at any time, also after its expiry and until it has been 
revoked (which is possible at any time). The BGH is of the view that such provisions infringe 
no. 1 because they provide the contrary of §§ 147(2) and 146, i.e., a short-term decision in the 
transactional interest. According to the BGH, the possibility to revoke the offer at any time can 
by far not balance the disadvantages of an unlimited continued validity clause.4834 
Standard forms for credit card agreements often contain a clause by which the agreement comes 
only into being after the client has taken knowledge of the standard business terms and signed 
or used the credit card. In such a case, and despite its thematic proximity, § 308 no. 1 is not 
applicable. The deferral of the conclusion of the contract can be seen here as a rejection of the 
original offer of the client, in conjunction with a new offer in terms of § 150(2),4835 and not as 
a period of time that has been set in the standard form. Therefore, such clauses must be assessed 
under §§ 305c(1) and 307(2) no. 1, and not in terms of § 308 no. 1.4836 
2.3.1.1.3 Content of the provision 
a) Unreasonably long periods of time 
The enquiry of whether the period of time contained in the standard clauses is unreasonable in 
terms of § 308 no. 1 requires a balancing of the user's and the other party's interests and a 
consideration of the typical circumstances for the given contract type.4837 If the period of time 
is significantly longer than in § 147(2) (for the communication of the declarations and the 
processing and reflection), it is only effective if the user has an interest worthy of protection 
that is more significant than the other party's interests.4838 
                                                             
4831 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 24. 
4832 Example (modified) from WHL/Wolf § 10 no. 1 AGBG para 8. 
4833 Fortgeltungsklauseln. 
4834 BGH NJW 2013, 3434. 
4835 § 150(2): 'An acceptance with expansions, restrictions or other alterations is deemed to be a 
rejection combined with a new offer.' 
4836 OLG Nuremberg ZIP 1997, 1781. The court held that such a clause violates § 308 no. 1 and that it is also 
surprising. 
4837 BGH NJW 2001, 303. 
4838 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 1 para 5. 
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Such an interest of the user might exist where the user has to make calculations or negotiate 
with third parties beforehand,4839 assess the creditworthiness of the offeror, or make enquiries 
concerning the availability of the given goods. Besides, the time needed within a company with 
divided responsibilities4840 and the interest of rationalisation have to be considered.4841 The 
more complex the transaction is in terms of its financing and approval, the bigger is the user's 
margin for the acceptance period.4842 The user can nonetheless be expected to proceed as 
swiftly as possible.4843 On the other hand, the customer's interests not to stay too long in a state 
of uncertainty must be taken into account too,4844 since it is bound to its offer and cannot 
conclude an agreement with another supplier. This can have a significant impact where the 
agreement concerns goods with fluctuating market prices.4845 
For everyday transactions, a period of time of over ten days is considered unreasonable,4846 
whereas others are of the view that two weeks are not unreasonable.4847 Any generalisation of 
the duration of reasonable periods of time must be seen with scepticism though because the 
given circumstances might differ considerably.4848 
For contracts for the purchase of a new vehicle, a period of time of four weeks is considered 
reasonable.4849 If the car is available at the car dealer's premises and no further questions have 
to be clarified, four weeks are considered unreasonable in terms of no. 1.4850 For utility vehicles, 
a period of time of six weeks,4851 and for used cars, ten days are considered reasonable.4852 
Credit agreements require the checking of the client's creditworthiness so that a one-month 
period is still reasonable, whereas six weeks are too long.4853 The same applies to a purchase 
agreement for an apartment where the buyer has to finance its purchase, and where notarial 
                                                             
4839 BGH NJW 1986, 1807 (1808). 
4840 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 11. 
4841 WHL/Wolf § 10 no. 1 AGBG para 14. 
4842 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 1 para 10. 
4843 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 11. 
4844 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 12. 
4845 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 1 para 5. 
4846 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 1 para 11. 
4847 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 no. 4. 
4848 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 13. 
4849 BGH NJW 1990, 1784, with further references. 
4850 OLG Frankfurt/M. NJW-RR 1998, 566. 
4851 LG Marburg DAR 1996, 148 (149). In LG Lüneburg NJW-RR 2002, 564, a duration of four weeks is considered 
too long, however. 
4852 OLG Cologne NJW-RR 1993, 1404. 
4853 BGH NJW 1986, 1807 (1808). 
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certification is required. Hence, an acceptance period of four weeks is considered 
reasonable.4854 
b) Insufficiently specific periods of time 
Periods of time that are insufficiently specified in standard terms are also ineffective. Whether 
such a period of time is insufficient has to be assessed by applying the standard of an average 
contractual partner of the given transaction.4855 If the latter is able to calculate the acceptance 
period without any difficulties, it is sufficiently specified. This is however not the case where 
the beginning, the duration or the end of the period of time cannot be determined with certainty, 
but only with difficulties (e.g., if this is costly and time-consuming, or even requires legal 
counselling).4856 This is especially the case where for the determination of the period of time 
indeterminate temporal terms are used (e.g., 'reasonable time'), or where the calculation 
depends on circumstances in the user's sphere, or even on the discretion of the user or third 
parties.4857 Clauses that merely reword § 147(2) are not critical, however.4858 
A clause in a loan agreement, in terms of which 'I am bound by this request from today until 
two weeks after receipt of the offer by you. If further documents have to be submitted in order 
to examine the offer, this commitment period ends two weeks after you have received them' is 
ineffective under § 308 no. 1. The acceptance period cannot be calculated by the other party 
because its duration depends on circumstances that are not exclusively in its sphere of 
influence. For the period of time beyond the initial two weeks, the other party is still in a state 
of uncertainty of whether the contract will be concluded or not.4859 For the same reason, the 
clause 'the client is bound by its order until reception of an answer' is also ineffective.4860 The 
same applies to the provision 'the customer is bound by its offer until the offeree sends its 
acceptance within a reasonable period of time'.4861 
In any event, the interpretation of the given clause can have the result that a provision that 
merely reflects the statutory provisions, such as 'the order is irrevocable' can be construed in 
that the client is bound by the offer indefinitely, so that the provision is invalid under no. 1.4862 
                                                             
4854 BGH NJW 2010, 2873. 
4855 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 19. 
4856 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 19. 
4857 OLG Hamm NJW-RR 1992, 1075. 
4858 BGH NJW 2013, 926. 
4859 OLG Hamm NJW-RR 1992, 1075. 
4860 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4861 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4862 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 1 para 12. 
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2.3.1.1.4 Legal consequences in case of violation of the provision 
In terms of § 306(2), if a clause is ineffective pursuant to § 308 no. 1, the legal acceptance 
period set out in § 147(2) applies for offers made to a person who is absent. If the user accepts 
the offer within the ineffective period of time, but after the expiry of the period set out in § 147, 
its declaration must be considered a new offer in terms of § 150(1).4863 A partial retention in 
terms of which an unreasonably long period of time is shortened to a reasonable one is 
excluded. A complementary interpretation that has the same objective is not possible either.4864 
2.3.1.1.5 B2B contracts 
In B2B contracts, the direct application of § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 1st var. is excluded pursuant to 
§ 310(1). The acceptance periods set out in these contracts must be reasonable in terms of § 307 
though. B2B contracts are characterised by trust between the contractual partners as well as 
promptness and straightforwardness so that unnecessary long or insufficiently specific periods 
of time are rather to be seen as more unreasonable as in B2C contracts.4865 In this context, one 
must consider the expectations and knowledge of an average business partner as well as 
different interpretational standards for the given industry.4866 
2.3.1.2 Period of time for performance (§ 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var.) 
a) Rationale of the provision 
In terms of § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var., a provision by which the user reserves to himself the 
right to unreasonably long or insufficiently specific periods of time (…) for rendering 
performance is ineffective. This does not include the reservation of the right not to perform 
until after the end of the period of time for withdrawal provided for consumer contracts under 
§ 355(1) and (2). 
Regulation 44(3)(p) of the Consumer Protection Act contains a similar item.4867 
The period of time for performance is usually individually agreed4868 or contained in the user's 
standard terms and is part of the main modalities for the user's performance, besides the place 
of performance. Where no time for performance has been specified or is evident from the 
circumstances, the other party may demand performance immediately, and the user may effect 
                                                             
4863 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 52. 
4864 BGH NJW 2010, 2873 (2874). 
4865 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 63. 
4866 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 1 para 21 and 23. 
4867 For more details, see discussion on item (p) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 i). 
4868 This is quite common also in B2C contracts. See UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 17. 
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it immediately (§ 271(1)).4869 Standard terms users therefore try to have a generous margin for 
their time of performance which may lead to an aggravation of the customer's contractual 
position. If the legislature had not intervened by § 308 no. 1, it would be difficult for the other 
party to serve notice of default4870 because the user's standard terms provide for a lax 
determination of the period for performance and the performance is not due (yet). The customer 
could not free itself from the contract and would be restricted, whereas the user could freely 
determine the time of performance.4871 What is more, clients often face harsh consequences if 
they do not pay in time, whereas a too long period of time for the user's performance would 
lead to an obvious imbalance.4872 
The legislator has recognised this danger to the contractual balance. § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd 
var. supplements § 309 no. 8 lit. a) because this provision would be ineffective in certain 
circumstances.4873 
b) Contents of the provision 
aa)   Period for performance 
The period of time for performance in this provision only concerns periods of time that the user 
has determined for his or her performance.4874 All kinds of periods for performance are 
included, i.e., for the delivery of goods, the payment or the obligation to accept a work 
produced in terms of § 640. Besides 'real periods of time for performance'4875 (e.g., 'delivery in 
two weeks after the conclusion of the contract'), the provision also includes so-called 'quasi 
periods of time for performance'.4876 These are grace and extension periods that provide an 
                                                             
4869 Stoffels AGB-Recht 315. § 271: '(1) Where no time for performance has been specified or is evident from the 
circumstances, the obligee may demand performance immediately, and the obligor may effect it immediately. (2) 
Where a time has been specified, then in case of doubt it must be assumed that the obligee may not demand 
performance, but the obligor may effect it prior to that time.'  
4870 See § 280(3) read in conjunction with § 281; § 280(2) read in conjunction with § 286; § 323. 
4871 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 12. 
4872 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
4873 BGH NJW 1984, 2468 (2469). 
4874 WLP/Dammann § 308 no 1 para 37 et seq. 
4875 Echte Leistungsfristen. 
4876 Unechte Leistungsfristen. 
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additional period of time after the expiry of the actual period of time for performance,4877 or 
those applicable after a certain event (e.g., strike4878 or force majeure4879).4880 
Where the user reserves the right to delay its performance, one has to differentiate between two 
scenarios: If the clause merely concerns the due date ('period of time for performance subject 
to reservation', 'period of time for performance approximate' or 'reasonable extension of the 
period of time for performance'), § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. is applicable.4881 On the other 
hand, where the clause concerns an exemption from the obligation to perform ('delivery subject 
to reservation', 'delivery subject to prior sale'), § 308 no. 3 applies.4882 
bb)   Unreasonably long period for performance 
For the assessment of whether a period for performance is reasonable or not, one has to consider 
the type of performance, the given branch and the time necessary for the user to procure or 
produce the goods, but also the client's interests to receive delivery as soon as possible.4883 If 
the goods in question are easy to produce or to stock, the period for performance will likely be 
shorter than for goods produced according to the customer's special wishes.4884 
A period for delivery of furniture of 3 weeks is considered reasonable,4885 whereas three months 
after an 'approximate' date are unreasonably long.4886 For an individually assembled kitchen, 
an additional period of 4 weeks has been considered reasonable.4887 In a contract to produce a 
work, a clause by which the acceptance in terms of § 640 is stipulated for a date that lies two 
months after termination of the work is invalid.4888 
                                                             
4877 BGH NJW 1982, 331 (333); 1983, 1320. 
4878 The former OFT was of the view however that factors such as shortage of stock, labour problems, strike or 
labour shortage may be attributable to the supplier. Hence, clauses in terms of which these factors allow the 
supplier an unreasonably long time to perform are likely to be unfair. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance 
(2008) paras 2.6.1-2.6.7 at 31-32. 
4879 In a South African context, Hawthorne and Kuschke are of the view that terms such as 'force majeure' or 'Act 
of God' should be avoided since they are legal jargon. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 412. 
4880 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 34.  
4881 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 35. 
4882 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 20. 
4883 BGH NJW 2007, 1198 (1200). 
4884 Stoffels AGB-Recht 317. 
4885 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 7. 
4886 BGH NJW 1983, 1320 et seq; 1984, 48. 
4887 BGH NJW 2007, 1198 (1200 et seq). 
4888 BGH NJW 1989, 1602 (1603). 
 767   
 
cc)   Insufficiently specific period for performance 
The user has to determine the period of time for performance sufficiently specific. This is not 
the case where an average customer is not able to calculate the date of performance, or where 
he or she has no influence on, or cannot provoke delivery.4889 
Hence, a clause of a window maker by which the period of time for delivery only starts after 
its written confirmation by the producer is invalid because the client has no influence on this 
condition.4890 Clauses such as 'customary period of time for performance' are also ineffective 
because the other party is not able to calculate the date of performance.4891 On the other hand, 
so-called 'approximate clauses'4892 ('delivery in approximately one month') are considered 
effective,4893 but not clauses such as 'our goods are normally delivered in one month'.4894 
dd)   Exceptions for consumer contracts 
Pursuant to the 2nd sent. of § 308 no. 1,  the reservation of the right not to perform until after 
the end of the period of time for withdrawal under section 355 subsections (1) and (2)4895 is not 
prohibited in terms of § 308 no. 1. This provision concerns consumer contracts, and its rationale 
is to enable the user to withhold its performance until the other party's right to withdraw has 
expired in order to avoid an unnecessary back and forth of the performance.4896 This exception 
does however not apply to distance contracts4897 and distance learning contracts4898 where the 
right of withdrawal only begins after delivery.4899 
                                                             
4889 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 50. BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24 refers to clauses such as 'delivery as soon as 
possible', 'delivery after reception of the goods at the warehouse', considering them insufficiently specific. 
4890 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (856 et seq). 
4891 OLG Cologne BB 1982, 638. 
4892 Circa-Fristen. 
4893 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 8. 
4894 KG NJW 2007, 2266 (2267). 
4895 § 355(1) and (2): '(1) If a consumer is given, by statute, a right of withdrawal according to this provision, then 
the consumer and the trader are no longer bound by their declarations of intention to conclude the contract if the 
consumer withdraws from his declaration of intention within the period specified. The withdrawal is effected by 
a declaration being made to the trader. The declaration must unambiguously reflect the consumer’s decision to 
withdraw from the contract. The withdrawal does not have to provide any grounds. Dispatch of the withdrawal in 
good time is sufficient to comply with the time limit. (2) The withdrawal period is fourteen days. Unless otherwise 
provided, it begins upon the contract having been concluded.' 
4896 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 1 para 23. 
4897 Fernabsatzverträge. See § 312d. 
4898 Fernunterrichtsverträge. See § 4 FernUSG. 
4899 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 9. 
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c) Legal consequences in case of violation 
If a provision is ineffective in terms of § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var., the legal period of time for 
performance under § 2714900 applies. A partial retention of the clause by shortening the delay 
is not allowed.4901 
d) B2B contracts 
Usually, the parties to a B2B contract determine the time of performance by individual 
agreement, so that a pre-formulated clause would not apply in terms of § 305b.4902 If the time 
of performance is agreed on by a standard clause, the latter has to be assessed in terms of the 
general clause, however. The commercial experience of business partners justifies a more 
generous standard in this regard.4903 Clauses that hinder the other party from calculating the 
date of performance are invalid as well.4904 Hence, a clause such as 'date of delivery non-
binding' should also be invalid in B2B contracts.4905 
2.3.1.3 Period of time for payment, review and acceptance (§ 308 no. 1 lit. a), b) 
§ 308 no. 1 lit. a) and b) have been inserted into the BGB in 2014 on the basis of the Act for 
Fighting of Default of Payment in Business Transactions.4906 § 308 no. 1 lit. a) and b) are 
'special provisions'4907 to § 271a4908 which has also been inserted.4909 
In terms of no. 1 lit. a) (period of time for payment), a provision by which the user reserves the 
right to unreasonably long periods of time for the performance of his payment to his contractual 
partner4910 is ineffective. If the user is not a consumer, in case of doubt it is to be assumed that 
a period of more than 30 days after reception of the counter-performance or, in the case where 
                                                             
4900 § 271: '(1) Where no time for performance has been specified or is evident from the circumstances, the obligee 
may demand performance immediately, and the obligor may effect it immediately. (2) Where a time has been 
specified, then in case of doubt it must be assumed that the obligee may not demand performance, but the obligor 
may effect it prior to that time.' 
4901 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 56. 
4902 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 30. 
4903 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 30. 
4904 It is submitted that Grüneberg's view that these clauses are valid in B2B contracts must be rejected as also 
commercial business partners must be able to know when they can expect delivery in terms of their planning 
security. See Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 10. 
4905 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 30. 
4906 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Zahlungsverzug im Geschäftsverkehr, BGBl. I 2014 at 1218 et seq. 
4907 The legislative materials refer to a 'special provision' ('Sonderregelung'). See BT-Drs. 18/1309 at 20. 
4908 § 271a concerns agreements on periods of time for payment, review and acceptance. Unfortunately, to date 
no official translation of this provision exists. 
4909 Stoffels AGB-Recht 319. 
4910 Interestingly, the legislator refers to the 'contractual partner' ('Vertragspartner') instead of the 'other party' 
('andere Vertragspartei'). The same pattern can be found in § 305(1) ('other party') and § 307(1) and in the newly 
inserted § 309 no. 14 and 15 ('contractual partner'). It is submitted though that the different wording has no 
meaning in practice since both cases always concern the user's counterpart. 
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the obligor receives an invoice or an equivalent payment schedule after reception of the 
counter-performance, a period of more than 30 days after reception of that invoice or equivalent 
payment schedule is unreasonably long.4911 
Pursuant to no. 1 lit. b) (period of time for review and acceptance), a provision by which the 
user reserves the right to unreasonably long periods of time for review and acceptance of the 
counter-performance is ineffective. If the user is not a consumer, in case of doubt it is to be 
assumed that a period of more than 15 days after reception of the counter-performance is 
unreasonably long.4912 
In other words, no. 1 lit. a) and b) apply to cases where the user reserves the right to pay the 
other party only after an unreasonably long period of time, or to review or to accept the other 
party's performance after an unreasonably long period of time.4913 
The 2nd sent. of each of these provisions sets out what is to be considered an unreasonably long 
period of time (30 or 15 days, respectively) if the user is not a consumer. The formulation 'in 
case of doubt' means that the user has to argue why the period contained in its standard terms 
is reasonable. This 'case of doubt' provision is however restricted to cases where the user is not 
itself a consumer, following the European Directive 2011/7/EU.4914  
In terms of § 310(1), § 308 no. 1 lit. a) and b) are expressly applicable to standard terms which 
are used in contracts with entrepreneurs, legal persons under public law or a special funds under 
public law. The legislative materials suggest that the prohibitions of § 308 no. 1 lit. a) and b) 
are particularly aimed at standard clauses that are used for these entities.4915 The fact thatlit. a) 
and b) expressly set out periods of time for agreements that are not consumer contracts speaks 
for their main application to B2B contracts. 
2.3.2 Additional period of time (§ 308 no. 2) 
In terms of § 308 no. 2, a provision by which the user, contrary to legal provisions, reserves to 
himself the right to an unreasonably long or insufficiently specific additional period of time for 
the performance he is to render is ineffective. 
                                                             
4911 My own translation. Unfortunately, to date no official translation of this provision exists. 
4912 My own translation.  
4913 Stoffels AGB-Recht 319. 
4914 Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late 
payment in commercial transactions. 
4915 See BT-Drs. 18/1309 at 21. 
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No. 2 of § 308 concerns clauses such as 'if delivery is not made at the date specified above, 
after 2 months the customer has the right to set an additional period of time of … and declare 
that he or she will revoke the agreement unless delivery is made within the additional period 
of time.'4916 
The Act does not explicitly regulate this issue. Item (p) of regulation 44(3) rather corresponds 
to § 308 no. 1, i.e., 'a provision by which the user reserves the right to unreasonably long or 
insufficiently specific periods of time (…) for rendering performance.'4917 This item could 
nonetheless be interpreted in that a clause providing for an unreasonably long time to perform 
also covers unreasonable grace periods for the benefit of the supplier. 
2.3.2.1 Rationale of § 308 no. 2 
If an obligor (user) is non-compliant with a duty arising from the obligation, the obligee (other 
party) may demand damages for the harm caused thereby. Damages for the delay in 
performance may be demanded by the obligee only subject to the additional requirement of 
section 286.4918 The main obligation is not affected in this case. The other party cannot be 
expected to wait until the user is ready to perform. Hence, to the extent that the user does not 
render performance when it is due or does not render performance as owed, the other party 
may, subject to the requirements of § 280(1), demand damages in lieu of performance, if he 
has without result set a reasonable period for the obligor for performance or cure.4919 If in the 
case of a reciprocal contract, the obligor does not render an act of performance that is due, or 
does not render it in conformity with the contract, the obligee may revoke the contract, if he 
has specified, without result, an additional period for performance or cure.4920 What is more, 
damages in lieu of performance may be demanded by the obligee if the user is in breach.4921  
An additional period of time, or grace period, in terms of § 308 no. 2 aims not to enable the 
user to get underway the execution of its performance but to grant him or her the last 
opportunity to terminate a performance already underway. Thus, a grace period can be much 
shorter than the delivery deadline.4922 Granting an additional period of time is not necessary if 
                                                             
4916 Example from BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 25. My own translation. 
4917 See discussion on § 308 no. 1 above and reg 44(3)(p) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 i). 
4918 § 280(1) and (2). 
4919 § 281(1) 1st sent. 
4920 § 323(1). 
4921 §§ 280(1) and (3), 281. 
4922 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (323). 
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the user seriously and definitively refuses performance or where special circumstances exist 
which justify immediate revocation after weighing the interests of both parties.4923  
Standard terms users often wish to avert these legal consequences and therefore insert clauses 
that grant an unreasonably long or insufficiently specific additional period of time for the 
performance. Since §§ 281 and 323 are ius dispositivum provisions4924 users may insert a clause 
by which they stipulate a minimum grace period.4925 The danger of this type of clauses is that 
customers are ultimately confronted with unreasonably long delivery deadlines and that they 
are hindered from exerting their right to rescind from the agreement or to ask for damages. This 
regularly creates unfairness because the customer is nonetheless strictly bound to pay 
punctually.4926 Therefore, § 308 no. 2 – which complements the provisions of §§ 308 no. 1 and 
309 no. 8 – provides that clauses granting an unreasonably long or insufficiently specific 
additional period of time for the performance are ineffective.4927 A fortiori, clauses that oblige 
the other party to grant an additional period of time for the performance although this is 
unnecessary under §§ 323(2), 326(5), 6364928 are invalid. This can be deducted from § 307(2) 
no. 1 according to which an unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to 
exist if a provision is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision from 
which it deviates.4929 
 
2.3.2.2 Content of the provision 
'Additional period of time' in the sense of § 308 no. 2 only includes clauses that determine the 
moment from which the other party may ask for damages or revoke the contract.4930 
The enquiry of the unreasonableness of the additional period of time is done by a balancing of 
the parties' interests.4931 First, a reasonable additional period of time for the given transaction 
must be determined according to the applicable legal provisions. An adjustment of this period 
of time considering the unification of standard terms is nevertheless possible.4932 Then, in 
                                                             
4923 §§ 281, 323(2). 
4924 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 2. 
4925 Stoffels AGB-Recht 350. 
4926 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 25. 
4927 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 2 para 3. 
4928 This is the case where the user seriously and definitely refuses performance, or does not perform by a date 
specified in the contract or within a period of time specified in the contract, or special circumstances exist which, 
when the interests of both parties are weighed, justify immediate revocation.  
4929 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 2 para 5. 
4930 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 2 para 3. 
4931 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 2 para 8. 
4932 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 13. 
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consideration of the objective of the additional period of time and the particularities of the 
given branch, one must consider that the additional period of time does not become a 'surrogate 
delivery deadline' or significantly extents the originally agreed delivery deadline.4933 Where 
the original deadline is already generous, a rather short grace period is permitted.4934 The fair 
balancing of the parties' interests is obviously disturbed where the supplier's standard terms 
provide for a generous clause for its delay in performance, whereas the clause concerning the 
customer's late payment is very strict.4935 
The courts held, for instance, that an additional period of time of 4 weeks for the delivery of 
furniture was unreasonable.4936 A period of 6 weeks for the delivery of windows4937 or the 
renovation of a house façade4938 was also considered too long. For 'normal' consumer contracts, 
2 weeks are regularly considered reasonable.4939 This is merely a rule of thumb because a case-
by-case assessment is necessary.4940 
The criterion of an insufficiently specified additional period of time in terms of § 308 no. 2 is 
fulfilled if the other party is unable to calculate the duration of the period of time and therefore 
has no clarity of its legal position. This is similar to § 308 no. 1.4941 A clause which stipulates 
a 'reasonable' grace period is indeed uncertain (indeterminate legal term) but corresponds to 
the legal provision and is thus exempt from content control in terms of § 307(3).4942 
2.3.2.3 Legal consequences in case of violation 
If a clause is ineffective in terms of § 308 no. 2, the statutory provisions apply, namely §§ 281 
and 323, and a reasonable additional period of time has to be determined. Maintaining the 
clause by shortening the grace period is not allowed.4943 
                                                             
4933 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (857). 
4934 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 2 para 6. 
4935 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 25. 
4936 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (323). 
4937 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (857). 
4938 OLG Stuttgart NJW-RR 1988, 786 (788). 
4939 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 13, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 2 para 7. 
4940 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 2 para 5. 
4941 See discussion on § 308 no. 1 above. 
4942 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 2 para 7, Staudinger/Coester § 308 no. 2 para 8. In terms of § 307(3), content control 
only applies to provisions in standard business terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating from legal 
provisions, or arrangements supplementing those legal provisions, are agreed.  
4943 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 2 para 8. 
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2.3.2.4 B2B contracts 
For B2B contracts, the evaluations contained in § 308 no. 2 are an important indication for 
content control in terms of § 307.4944 In order to ensure speedy and smooth transactions, it can 
be reasonable to apply even shorter additional period of times than in B2C agreements.4945 
2.3.3 Reservation of the right to revoke ( § 308 no. 3 and 8) 
§ 308 no. 3 has the title 'Reservation of the right to revoke' and sets out that an agreement of a 
right of the user to free himself from his obligation to perform without any objectively justified 
reason indicated in the contract is ineffective. This does not apply to continuing obligations. In 
terms of § 308 no. 8, an agreement, admissible under no. 3, of the reservation by the user of a 
right to free himself from the duty to perform the contract in the absence of availability of 
performance, if the user does not agree to a) inform the other party to the contract without 
undue delay, of the unavailability, and b) reimburse the other party to the contract for 
consideration, without undue delay is also ineffective. 
2.3.3.1 Rationale of § 308 no. 3 and 8 
In principle, the parties have to honour their respective obligations set out in the contract. The 
agreement of a right to free oneself from the contractual obligations is not prohibited per se as, 
e.g., § 346(1)4946 sets out the conditions for such a right. Any reservation of the user to free 
itself from the agreement might infringe the pacta sunt servanda principle however, which is 
why such a disengagement requires the indication of an objectively justified reason.4947 
The rationale of no. 3 and 8 is to prevent the situation where the other party is bound to the 
agreement, whereas the user is entitled to free itself at any time from its obligations so that the 
client would be in a sort of limbo because the fulfilment of the contract is in the user's 
discretion.4948 
In this regard, § 308 no. 3 also aims to prevent that the user circumvents the other party's rights 
in terms of § 309 no. 7 lit. b)4949 and no. 8 lit. a) by freeing itself from the contract in order to 
                                                             
4944 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 2 para 40, with further references. 
4945 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 2 para 8. 
4946 § 346(1): 'If one party to a contract has contractually reserved the right to revoke or if he has a statutory right 
of revocation, then, in the case of revocation, performance received and emoluments taken are to be returned.' 
4947 Stoffels AGB-Recht 319. 
4948 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 25. 
4949 § 309 no. 7 lit. b): '(Gross fault) [A]ny exclusion or limitation of liability for other damage arising from a 
grossly negligent breach of duty by the user or from an intentional or grossly negligent breach of duty by a legal 
representative of the user or a person used to perform an obligation of the user' is ineffective. § 309 no. 8 lit. a): 
'(Exclusion of the right to free oneself from the contract) [A] provision which, where there is a breach of duty for 
which the user is responsible and which does not consist in a defect of the thing sold or the work, excludes or 
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escape the payment of damages. To the extent that the right to free oneself from the contract 
concerns the unavailability of the given performance, the additional conditions of § 308 no. 8 
must be considered. This provision completes § 308 no. 3.4950  
No. 3 and 8 are compatible with EU law 4951 but go beyond the provisions contained in the 
Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive. There, several clauses that enable the user to free itself 
from the contract are set out, namely items (c), (f) and (g).4952 Since continuing obligations are 
excluded from the scope of application of § 308 no. 3 and 8, they must be assessed under § 307. 
In this regard, the evaluations of the provisions contained in the Annex of the Directive must 
be taken into account.4953 
In contrast to § 308 no. 3 and 8, regulation 44(3)(k) of the Act has another legal purpose. The 
main criterion for greylisting terms according to which the supplier may terminate the contract 
at will where the same right is not granted to the consumer is the excessive one-sidedness,4954 
whereas § 308 no. 3 and 8 aim to ensure compliance with the pacta sunt servanda principle.4955 
2.3.3.2 Contents of § 308 no. 3 and 8 
a) The user's right to free itself from its obligation 
The heading of § 308 no. 3 is 'Reservation of the right to revoke'. The provision itself refers to 
'a right to free [one]self from [one's] obligations' though. Therefore, it applies to more scenarios 
than the heading suggests. In the BGB, the term 'right to free oneself' (Lösungsrecht) cannot 
be found, and as no. 3 suggests, it is to be interpreted widely.4956 Hence, it includes all 
possibilities for the user to free itself from the principal obligations or those which lead to their 
fulfilment, provided they are not merely declaratory. These are the right to revoke, to cancel, 
                                                             
restricts the right of the other party to free himself from the contract; this does not apply to the terms of transport 
and tariff rules referred to in no. 7 under the conditions set out there.' In this regard, see also discussion of these 
provisions. 
4950 BT-Drs. 14/2658 at 51. 
4951 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 14, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 3 para 2c. 
4952 Item (c) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC: Terms which have the object or effect of: 
'making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or supplier is subject 
to a condition whose realization depends on his own will alone' are ineffective. Item (f): Terms 'authorizing the 
seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where the same facility is not granted to the 
consumer, or permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where 
it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract' are ineffective. Item (g): Terms 'enabling the seller 
or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration without reasonable notice except where there are 
serious grounds for doing so' are ineffective. 
4953 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 3 para 2c. 
4954 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 75. 
4955 Stoffels AGB-Recht 319. 
4956 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 16. 
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to withdraw or to rescind as well as resolutive conditions.4957 If the conclusion of the contract 
depends on a suspensive condition, § 308 no. 3 does not apply because the contractual 
commitment does not cease after the parties have entered into their agreement.4958 
§ 308 no. 3 only applies to contracts but not where a standard clause excludes that the user 
makes an offer to enter into an agreement (invitatio ad offerendum) in terms of § 145.4959 This 
is the case for clauses such as 'without obligation', 'non-binding', and alike.4960 In some 
instances, the user intends by such clauses to have the option to revoke the offer until it has 
been accepted by the other party.4961 The content of these clauses must therefore be assessed 
by means of interpretation. Any doubts in the interpretation of whether the clause refers to the 
offer or the contract are resolved against the user, however (§ 305c(2)).4962 
It should be noted that in terms of § 307(3) 1st sent., § 308 no. 3 does not apply to a right to 
free oneself from the contract that has been granted by law.4963 
b) Indication of the reason in the contract 
The right to free oneself from the contract is not excluded per se, as shown above. However, 
no. 3 requires that the clause be transparent and that the reason for the disengagement be 
indicated explicitly in the clause so that an average client can assess when the user is entitled 
to use this right.4964 Clauses such as 'operational problems of any kind'4965 or 'for compelling 
reasons'4966 are too vague and hence insufficient. On the other hand, indications like 'in the case 
of force majeure, strike or shortage of raw materials'4967 sufficiently restrict the instances in 
which the user may free itself from the contract and give the other party a clear understanding. 
The former UK Office of Fair Trading took a similar stance. According to the Office, a clause 
which does not merely allow the supplier to cancel at will may be fair if it would be impractical 
or impossible to complete the contract, provided that it clearly and accurately describes the 
circumstances in which the supplier may terminate the contract, and require that the supplier 
                                                             
4957 BAG NZA 2006, 539 (541). 
4958 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 3 para 17. 
4959 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 308 no. 5 para 33. § 145: 'Any person who offers to another to enter into a contract 
is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being bound by it.' 
4960 Stoffels AGB-Recht 320. 
4961 BGH NJW 1984, 1885. 
4962 Stoffels AGB-Recht 321. 
4963 Stoffels AGB-Recht 321. 
4964 BAG NZA 2006, 539 (541). 
4965 See BGH NJW 1983, 1320 (1321). 
4966 See OLG Cologne NJW-RR 1998, 926. 
4967 See OLG Koblenz NJW-RR 1989, 1459 (1460). 
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find out and inform the consumer as soon as possible. The circumstances must be beyond the 
supplier’s control. In such circumstances, it may also be fair only to return prepayments without 
any further liability4968 This position corresponds to § 308 no. 8 lit. b) according to which the 
other party's counter-performance has to be reimbursed immediately in the performance is not 
available. 
c) Objectively justified reason 
The specifically indicated reason for the user's disengagement must also be objectively 
justified. This means that the reason indicated in the contract must concern – in an abstract 
manner – significant interests of the user in order to be legitimate. No. 3 therefore requires a 
weighing of both parties' interests. The user can only free itself from the contract if it has an 
outweighing or at least a reasonable interest to end the agreement. This is not the case if it could 
have predicted at the moment when entering into the contract, while applying due diligence, 
the circumstances that would lead to such a right.4969 For this reasons, a clause such as 
'revocable at any time' is ineffective as the right to free itself from its obligations merely 
depends on the user's will.4970 
What is more, one can distinguish between scenarios where the reason justifying the right to 
free oneself from the contract lies in the other party's or in the user's sphere. 
aa)   Other party's sphere 
A reason stemming from the client's sphere justifies to end the contract if the user cannot be 
expected to continue the agreement and is not in conflict with § 309 no. 4, i.e., the user must 
have given the other party a warning notice or have set a period of time for the latter to perform 
or cure.4971 As §§ 323 et seq. are applicable to cases of default and impossibility to perform 
and provide for a legal right to revoke, and, on the other hand, for warning notices and the 
determination of a period of time to perform or cure § 309 no. 4 applies, content control under 
§ 308 no. 3 takes place especially in case of the violation of other contractual obligations.4972 
Hence, a standard clause of a key service company according to which the latter is free to 
produce a spare key and to keep the money paid by the customer if he or she has not gotten 
back in touch for over four months is valid.4973 Furthermore, a clause in which the seller 
                                                             
4968 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 6.1.5 at 44. See also § 308 no. 8 BGB. 
4969 BGH NJW 1987, 831 (833), BAG NZA 2006, 539 (541). 
4970 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 3 para 27. 
4971 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 3 para 11. 
4972 Stoffels AGB-Recht 322. 
4973 BGH NJW 1992, 1628. 
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reserves the right to revoke from the agreement if the purchaser infringes the explicitly 
indicated obligations (e.g., to treat the item subject to a retention of title with care, to inform 
the owner of any address change or change of the possessor) is valid because the owner has a 
legitimate interest that its property be treated with care. A clause by which the owner must be 
informed of certain changes as otherwise, the user has the right to revoke the agreement, is 
effective too.4974 
For the scrutiny of a client's creditworthiness, loan providers usually require their clients to 
furnish extensive disclosures of their financial situation. If the user's standard clauses provide 
for a reservation to free itself from the contract in the case of wrong information given by the 
client, such a clause is only valid if it is restricted to information which is relevant for the 
assessment of the customer's creditworthiness. Hence, a clause by which the seller is entitled 
to revoke the contract if the buyer makes false or incomplete declarations on which its 
creditworthiness depends is valid.4975 On the other hand, a standard clause that grants the same 
right 'if the purchaser makes false declarations on its financial situation' is ineffective since it 
is not restricted to cases in which such false declarations are only minor or have no impact on 
the given contract at all.4976 Provisions by which the seller can revoke the agreement if the 
buyer provides wrong or incomplete personal data (e.g., marital status) are ineffective too 
because this kind of information has no relevance for the given agreement.4977 
For clauses concerning objective credit unworthiness or insolvency that appears subsequently, 
the standard of § 3214978 applies.4979 The credit unworthiness must actually occur and not only 
be potential.4980 The agreement of the right to revoke a contract by which the client buys 
furniture in the case of the customer's insolvency infringes § 308 no. 3. A revocation is not 
justified after the furniture has been delivered. The insolvent client is not in default yet and 
must have the possibility to prevent the severe consequences of revocation.4981 
                                                             
4974 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (325). 
4975 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (325). 
4976 BGH NJW 1985, 2271 (2272). 
4977 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (325); 1985, 2271 (2272). 
4978 § 321(1): 'A person who is obliged to perform in advance under a reciprocal contract may refuse to render his 
performance if, after the contract is entered into, it becomes apparent that his entitlement to consideration is 
jeopardised by the inability to perform of the other party. The right to refuse performance is not applicable if 
consideration is rendered or security is given for it.' 
4979 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 3 para 79, MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 3 para 12. 
4980 BGH NJW 2001, 292 (298). 
4981 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 3 para 15. 
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bb)   User's sphere 
Any obstacles that prevent the standard terms user from performing its obligations may justify 
a right to free itself from the agreement. The objective justification is measured against the 
distribution of risk provided for by the law.4982 An objective justification cannot be assumed 
where the user could already foresee the circumstances justifying a revocation when entering 
into the agreement.4983 The given clause must exclude temporary obstacles or those for which 
the user is responsible.4984 
This is why a clause entitling the user to revoke the contract in the cases of force majeure or 
strike must be restricted in that temporary disruptions, which only cause a momentary delay, 
do not entitle the user to free itself from its obligations.4985 A clause by which the user reserves 
the right to deliver can be interpreted in that the user must make all reasonable endeavours to 
perform. It is nonetheless ineffective because the impossibility of the delivery does not justify 
per se a right of revocation, and the user itself might be responsible for the impossibility.4986 
In B2C contracts, so-called 'supply clauses' that unrestrictedly grant the right to revoke the 
agreement are ineffective. The seller can only free itself from its obligation to deliver if it has 
concluded a congruent covering transaction4987 with its wholesaler and is let down by the third 
party. The clause must make clear that a non-delivery based on the user's fault does not entitle 
the latter to revoke the contract.4988 For so-called 'self-delivery clauses'4989 ('the right and timely 
self-delivery is reserved') and 'supply clauses'4990 ('while stock lasts'), also the formal 
conditions of § 308 no. 8 must be taken into account.4991 
d) No application to continuing obligations 
§ 308 no. 3 in fine regulates that this provision does not apply to continuing obligations. The 
legislator was of the view that it is the characteristic of open-ended agreements to be ended 
without any particular reason, by ordinary termination. According to the legislator, an ordinary 
termination would be an objectively justified reason for this type of agreements. If standard 
                                                             
4982 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 3 para 12. 
4983 BGH NJW 1987, 831 (833). 
4984 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 3 para 7. 
4985 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (857). 
4986 Baumbach/Hopt/Hopt § 346 HGB para 40. 
4987 Kongruentes Deckungsgeschäft. 
4988 BGH NJW 1983, 1320 (1321). See also BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 25. 
4989 Selbstbelieferungsklauseln.  
4990 Vorratsklauseln. 
4991 Stoffels AGB-Recht 324 and 325. 
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business terms provided for an ordinary termination of continuing obligations, it would not 
make sense to require also the indication of a justified reason.4992 
If the user reserves the right to end the agreement without objectively justified reason, the 
clause can be assessed in terms of § 307 as to the notice period and the reason to terminate the 
agreement. If the clause applies to a termination of the contract before the agreement is 
executed, § 308 no. 3 is applicable.4993 The same applies to preliminary contracts that are 
executed before the open-ended agreement.4994 
Regulation 44(3)(k) of the Act does not apply to open-ended agreements either (see regulation 
44(3)(l)) or fixed-term agreements. For the latter, section 14(2)(b) applies in terms of 
cancellation. Hence, item (k) is only applicable to ‘once-off’ transactions, such as the purchase 
of a product or service which is not continual. As section 14 does not apply to juristic persons, 
regardless of their annual turnover or asset value, juristic persons do not seem to have the 
protection of section 14.4995 
2.3.3.3 Legal consequences in case of a violation of the provision 
Clauses that do not contain the restrictions mentioned above are invalid in their entirety.4996 A 
partial retention4997 must be ruled out. If the wording and subject matter of the clause can be 
split into a valid and an invalid part, the BGH nevertheless upholds the valid part.4998 
2.3.3.4 B2B contracts 
No. 3 can serve as a guideline for clauses in B2B contracts where the user reserves the right to 
free itself from its obligations.4999 According to the BGH, also here this right requires an 
objective reason.5000 In agreements between entrepreneurs, the right to revoke is admitted more 
generally since commercial practice might justify a more lenient standard.5001 
So-called 'self-delivery clauses' in B2B contracts by which 'the right and timely self-delivery 
is reserved' are effective. In B2B agreements, they are to be interpreted restrictively though in 
                                                             
4992 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26. 
4993 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 3 para 17. 
4994 BAG NZA 2006, 539 (541). 
4995 Section 14(1) CPA. 
4996 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (857). 
4997 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. 
4998 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (325). 
4999 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 23. 
5000 BGH NJW 2009, 575 (576). 
5001 Stoffels AGB-Recht 325. 
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that the seller can only free itself from its obligations if he or she concluded a congruent 
covering transaction5002 and the third party (the seller's wholesaler) does not deliver.5003 
2.3.3.5 The complementary prohibition of § 308 no. 8 
By transposing the Distance Contract Directive,5004 the German legislator has imposed 
additional formal requirements for the user's right to free itself from the contract in the case of 
unavailability of performance. The said self-delivery and supply clauses are the most relevant 
cases in this regard. For these clauses, the requirements set out in no. 3 are completed by no. 8. 
The requisites of both provisions must be fulfilled cumulatively.5005 Under no. 8, the 
reservation of the user's right to free itself from its duty to perform in the absence of availability 
of performance is ineffective if the user does not agree to inform the other party without undue 
delay of the unavailability and reimburse the latter immediately for consideration. 
2.3.4 Reservation of the right to modify (§ 308 no. 4) 
§ 308 no. 4 sets out that the agreement of a right of the user to modify the performance promised 
or deviate from it, unless the agreement of the modification or deviation can reasonably be 
expected of the other party to the contract when the interests of the user are taken into account 
are ineffective. 
Regulation 44(3)(i) of the Act contains a similar item.5006 According to this provision, clauses 
enabling the supplier to alter the terms of the agreement including the characteristics of the 
product or service unilaterally are presumed to be unfair. The South African provision does not 
contain a reasonableness qualification like § 308 no. 4 BGB though.5007 
2.3.4.1   Rationale of the provision 
Pursuant to § 362(1), an obligation is extinguished if the performance owed is rendered to the 
obligee. If the user reserves the right to modify its performance, its obligation extinguishes 
despite a modification or deviation of the performance. Since such a performance would be 
contractual, the other party has to accept it and pay for it, and if the performance is without any 
defects, he or she cannot assert any warranty claims or claims for non-performance.5008 A right 
                                                             
5002 Kongruentes Deckungsgeschäft. 
5003 BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1062). 
5004 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts. 
5005 Stoffels AGB-Recht 325. 
5006 See discussion on reg 44(3)(i) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 b). 
5007 § 6(2) no. 3 of the Austrian KSchG also contains a reasonableness qualification. 
5008 Stoffels AGB-Recht 326. 
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to modify the performance promised can be more disadvantageous for the other party than a 
refusal to render performance.5009 What is more, if one party can alter the terms unilaterally, 
this balance is disturbed in favour of the party who alters the terms.5010 Moreover, the consumer 
should receive what he or she has bought and not merely something similar.5011 
The performance owed is defined in the contract. Where the user owes a thing defined only by 
class5012 in terms of § 243, it must supply a thing of average kind and quality. The other party 
must only accept minor deviations from the initially agreed performance in terms of § 242 
(good faith), provided that the client has no contrary legitimate interests and the economic 
objective of the contract is fulfilled.5013 
Insofar, no. 4 completes § 308 no. 3 in that the standard terms user cannot extend its 
possibilities with respect to fulfilment of its performance. The agreement of a modification of, 
or deviation from the performance is therefore only possible if it can reasonably be expected 
of the client to accept such modification or deviation.5014 
2.3.4.2   Scope of application 
No. 4 only concerns modifications of the user's performance.5015 For modifications of the other 
party's performance, the given clause has to be assessed by the general clause.5016 Hence, the 
BGH held that an interest rate adjustment clause in a mortgage contract according to which the 
bank is entitled to modify the interest rate if it deems necessary to do so (e.g., due to the 
evolution in the capital market) is ineffective in terms of § 307.5017 On the other hand, for 
saving contracts, the BGH decided that a pre-formulated interest adjustment clause by which 
the bank has the right to modify the interest rate at will infringes § 308 no. 4.5018 Unlike in the 
first example, the interests are here the client's, and not the bank's performance. 
Contrary to § 308 no. 3, no. 4 is also applicable to continuing obligations because the danger 
inherent to a modification or deviation is the same in this type of contracts.5019 In terms of 
                                                             
5009 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26. See also WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 para 1. 
5010 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.1 at 52. 
5011 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 70. 
5012 Gattungsschuld. 
5013 MüKo/Roth/Schubert § 242 para 179. 
5014 Stoffels AGB-Recht 326. 
5015 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 4. Regulation 44(3)(i) read in conjunction with reg 44(4)(c) comes to the same 
result in the case of interest rates and other financial charges payable by the consumer by simply excluding them 
from the application of reg 44(3)(i). 
5016 Stoffels AGB-Recht 326. 
5017 BGH NJW 2009, 2051 (2053 et seq). 
5018 BGH NJW 2004, 1588 (1589). 
5019 Stoffels AGB-Recht 327. 
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regulation 44(4)(c)(iv), open-ended agreements5020 are excluded from the scope of application 
of regulation 44(3)(i) provided that the supplier informs the consumer thereof and the consumer 
is free to dissolve the agreement immediately. 
2.3.4.3   Contents of the provision 
a)   Modification or deviation  
The differentiation between a modification of, and a deviation from the performance is not 
always simple, and sometimes both are overlapping. Generally, a modification of the 
performance is given where the characteristics or quantity delivered deviate from the originally 
agreed performance. In contrast, a deviation is to be assumed where the performance is not 
identical with the originally agreed performance as regards its type or nature.5021 In practice, 
this differentiation is idle as no. 4 covers both instances.5022 
The prohibition does however not only cover the principal obligation since the wording 
('modify the performance promised') covers any modifications of ancillary obligations and 
performances as well as the modalities of the performance.5023 What is more, also a clause by 
which the user is entitled to render part performance (§ 266) is subject to no. 4. 
b)   Reasonableness 
The modification of the performance must also be reasonable ('zumutbar') for the client. 
According to the BGH, pre-formulated and unilateral modification clauses of the user are only 
effective if the clause indicates serious grounds for the modifications, and if the conditions and 
the consequences for the other party are reasonably considered.5024 The user must produce 
evidence in this regard.5025 
When weighing the parties' interests, a generalised-typified standard has to be applied,5026 i.e., 
the circumstances of the given case are irrelevant.5027 A modification is reasonable if the user's 
                                                             
5020 These are contracts of indeterminate duration. See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 64. 
5021 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 4. 
5022 Stoffels AGB-Recht 327. 
5023 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 paras 5 and 7. 
5024 BGH NJW 2000, 515 (521). According to the OFT, variation clauses allowing minor technical amendments 
which do not affect the performance of the product, or amendments required by law should not be considered 
unfair. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.3 at 54. 
5025 This results from the wording of § 308 no. 4 ('unless'). WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 para 4, Palandt/Grüneberg 
§ 308 para 25. 
5026 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 9. The OFT also suggested such a generalised-typified standard by taking the 
stance that an alteration of terms is reasonable ‘where fair-minded persons in the position of the consumer and 
supplier would be likely to share a common view as to what would be 'reasonable'. See OFT Unfair Contract 
Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.5 at 53.  
5027 Stoffels AGB-Recht 327. 
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interests have more or at least equal weight with the other party's interests. Moreover, the clause 
must enable the other party to be prepared for a possible modification of the originally agreed 
performance.5028 This is the case where the modification or deviation is due to the particularity 
of the performance, or inevitable due to serious circumstances. A rise of the user's costs is 
irrelevant though because this would lead to a significant shift of the risks to the customer's 
disadvantage.5029 
The other party's interest in performance generally enjoys prior protection, and even if the user 
has a legitimate interest to modify its performance, the balance between performance and 
consideration5030 must not be disturbed.5031 
According to the wording of no. 4, and contrary to § 308 no. 3, the reason for the modification 
or deviation needs not to be mentioned in the contract. A clause by which the originally agreed 
performance is modified can only be reasonable though if the conditions and the scope of the 
modification or deviation are sufficiently indicated in the clause.5032 The standard for such a 
concretisation depends on the specific problems of the given branch.5033 It is not sufficient that 
the user reserves the right to modify its performance 'insofar that a modification can reasonably 
be expected of the client'.5034 
According to the BGH, a pre-formulated standard clause of a mail-order company stipulating 
that 'if a certain article cannot be delivered, we will deliver an article equivalent in quality and 
price' is invalid because this clause does not sufficiently consider that clients choose numerous 
articles according to their individual needs and wishes. Even if the user grants the right to 
exchange the product, the clause would still be ineffective.5035 A clause in a pay-TV contract 
by which the user may 'modify, complete or extend the programme offer, single channels or 
the use of certain channels as well as programme packages to the client's advantage' is also 
invalid because it does not sufficiently indicate the reasons for such a modification.5036 The 
same applies to a standard clause of a workshop according to which 'the client's agreement for 
necessary repairs is not necessary if the client could not be reached'. The notion of 'necessary 
                                                             
5028 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (362), WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 para 24. 
5029 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 9, Stoffels AGB-Recht 328. 
5030 Äquivalenzverhältnis. 
5031 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 4 para 7. 
5032 This was also the OFT's view. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 10.3 at 52. 
5033 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 4 para 8. 
5034 Erman/Roloff § 308 para 34. 
5035 BGH NJW 2005, 3567 (3569). 
5036 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (362). 
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repairs' is too vague and can go against the client's interests.5037 A clause by which the user is 
entitled to render part performance is likely to be invalid,5038 but if the user differentiates 
between the different performance objects, it might be valid.5039 For products that belong 
together (e.g., a furniture group) or 'packages' (e.g., a PC with its screen and software), a 
modification of performance is always unreasonable.5040 On the other hand, a clause by which 
the user reserves the right to deliver furniture that slightly deviates in colour and structure from 
the furniture exhibited in the store is valid as long the deviation is due to the material (e.g., 
wood) and it is customary in the given branch.5041 
Items (j) and (k) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive require a 'valid reason' for 
alterations. This corresponds with the 'reasonableness' requirement in § 308 no. 4 because 
where a modification of the performance is reasonable, there is a 'valid reason' for it.5042 
2.3.4.4   Legal consequences in case of violation 
If a clause is ineffective under no. 4, the promised performance is due without any modification 
or deviation. Where the other party has accepted the performance without reservation, she bears 
the burden of proof if she does not wish to have the performance considered contractual 
because it was different from the performance owed or incomplete (§ 363).5043 
A partial retention5044 of the invalid clause is not permitted. If the clause can be split into a 
valid and an ineffective part, the valid part can be maintained, however.5045 
2.3.4.5   B2B contracts 
The danger of modification clauses is not lesser in B2B contracts. Therefore, the idea based on 
no. 4 must be considered in the enquiry of the given clause in terms of § 307(2).5046 Where 
modifications or deviations are not customary, or where the performance is defined only by 
                                                             
5037 BGH NJW 1987, 2818 (2818 et seq). 
5038 OLG Stuttgart NJW-RR 1995, 116 (117). 
5039 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 10a. 
5040 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 10a. 
5041 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 25. 
5042 Stoffels AGB-Recht 329. The BGH sometimes also refers to a 'valid reason', e.g., in BGH NJW 2005, 3420 
(3421). 
5043 Stoffels AGB-Recht 330. 
5044 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. 
5045 Stoffels AGB-Recht 330. 
5046 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 4 para 13. 
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class5047 and is not of 'average kind and quality' in terms of § 360 HGB5048, the criterion of 
'reasonableness' is also applicable to entrepreneurs.5049 
A clause in a lease for an exhibition stand is invalid if it entitles the user to provide another 
stand than the one promised.5050 A clause by which the margin of an authorised dealer can be 
modified at will and without any other conditions is invalid too.5051 
2.3.5 Fictitious declarations (§ 308 no. 5) 
2.3.5.1 Rationale of the provision 
In terms of § 308 no. 5, a provision by which a declaration by the other party to the contract 
with the user, made when undertaking or omitting a specific act, is deemed to have been made 
or not made by the user unless a) the other party to the contract is granted a reasonable period 
of time to make an express declaration, and b) the user agrees to especially draw the attention 
of the other party to the contract to the intended significance of his behaviour at the beginning 
of the period of time is ineffective. 
Standard clauses, such as 'if the purchaser has taken the item into possession before it has 
accepted it, the item is deemed to have been accepted without defects on that date',5052 or 'a 
rebooking within 40 days before departure is considered to be a withdrawal from the contract 
in conjunction with a new booking'5053 are fictitious declarations that might have an adverse 
effect for the other party which it possibly cannot assess when concluding the agreement.5054 
For this reason, the law prohibits – with certain legal exceptions5055 – fictitious declarations 
and refers to the other party's declarations that it has actually made. One of the principles of 
private law is that silence is no declaration of intent. Thus, any deviation from this principle is 
problematic.5056 § 308 no. 5 is an emanation of this principle. 
                                                             
5047 Gattungsschulden. 
5048 § 360 HGB: 'If a thing defined only by class is owed, a thing of average kind and quality must be delivered.' 
My own translation. 
5049 Stoffels AGB-Recht 330. 
5050 OLG Cologne NJW-RR 1990, 1232 (1233). 
5051 BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1063). 
5052 BGH NJW 1984, 725 (726). 
5053 BGH NJW 1992, 3158. 
5054 Stoffels AGB-Recht 277. 
5055 Fictitious rejection: §§ 108(2), 177(2), 415(2), 451(1) BGB, fictitious consent: §§ 416(1), 455, 516(2) BGB, 
§§ 362(1), 377(2) HGB, fictitious agreement on payment: §§ 612, 632, 653, 689 BGB, fictitious contract renewal: 
§§ 545 and 625 BGB. To the extent that standard business clauses merely reflect the contents of these provisions 
in a declaratory manner, they are not submitted to content control (§ 307(3)). 
5056 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 28. 
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This provision does however not prohibit all fictitious declarations in order to facilitate the 
execution of mass contracts, particularly in the bank and insurance industries.5057 
§ 308 no. 5 BGB as well as § 6(1) no. 2 of the Austrian KSchG served as a model for regulation 
44(3)(v) of the Consumer Protection Act.5058 Apart from a different choice in the wording5059 
and the grammatical structure,5060 its content is identical. 
2.3.5.2 Application and content of the provision 
a) No application for declarations concerning the conclusion of the contract 
The prohibition only applies to fictitious declarations concerning the execution of the contract, 
but not concerning its conclusion.5061 For the conclusion of the agreement, the legal provisions 
set out in §§ 145 et seq. apply, which cannot be restricted by standard terms.5062 Furthermore, 
clauses concerning the renewal of an agreement that the parties agreed to when concluding the 
contract are not prohibited in terms of § 308 no. 5 either. The renewal is not based on a fictitious 
declaration, but on an agreement that in case of the other party's silence, the agreement is tacitly 
renewed.5063 The validity of such clauses must be assessed in terms of § 307.5064 
The same applies to regulation 44(3)(v) of the Act which is only applicable to declarations 
concerning the execution of the contract. Section 51(1)(g) already outlaws terms if they falsely 
express an acknowledgement by the consumer that before the conclusion of the contract, no 
representations or warranties were made by the supplier in connection with the agreement, or 
the consumer has received goods or services or a document that is required by the Act to be 
delivered to the consumer. Furthermore, section 31(1)(b) of the Act sets out that a supplier 
must not 'offer to enter into or modify an agreement for the supply of any goods or services 
(…) on the basis that the goods or services are to be supplied, or the agreement or modification 
will automatically come into existence, unless the consumer declines such offer (…).' Any 
                                                             
5057 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 7. 
5058 See discussion on reg 44(3)(v) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.5 a). 
5059 E.g., 'statement or acknowledgement' or 'conduct' (CPA) vs 'declaration' (BGB/KSchG) or 'behaviour' 
(BGB)/'conduct' (KSchG). 
5060 Active vs passive voice. 
5061 OLG Koblenz NJW 1989, 2951, Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
5062 Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
5063 BGH NJW 2010, 2942 (2943). 
5064 Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
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agreement or modification made in conflict with this provision is void.5065 Hence, item (v) is 
also not applicable to agreements that relate to amendments of the agreement itself.5066 
b) Fictitious declaration 
No. 5 only concerns fictitious declarations, i.e., clauses under which a certain declaration has 
been made or has not been made, and where the actual behaviour of the other party is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, fictitious facts where certain facts or circumstances are deemed to exist or 
not to exist are assessed in terms of § 309 no. 12, or if the confirmation of fact is a particular 
form of a fictitious receipt, under § 308 no. 6.5067 If the declaration is of substantive 
significance, no. 5 applies.5068 Moreover, fictitious declarations are characterised by the fact 
that evidence to the contrary is not possible.5069 
A clause in a real estate brokerage contract by which the client is deemed to not have known 
the object if he or she does not make a declaration to the contrary is a fictitious fact. Therefore, 
it must be assessed in terms of § 309 no. 12.5070 On the other hand, a clause by which the 
participation to a certain loyalty programme is based on the general terms and conditions which 
the clients receive with their loyalty card and which they accept by using the card for the first 
time is a fictitious declaration.5071 
It is noteworthy that no. 5 only concerns fictitious declarations of the other party. Declarations 
of the user are to be assessed in terms of the general clause of § 307.5072 
c) Exceptions 
The wording of § 308 no. 5 indicates two conditions that must be fulfilled cumulatively so that 
a fictitious declaration is valid. On the one hand, the other party must be granted a reasonable 
period of time to make an express declaration. On the other hand, the user must agree to 
especially draw the attention of the other party to the contract so that the letter can evaluate the 
intended significance of his behaviour and react accordingly5073. Besides, other requirements 
for the validity of fictitious declarations may be based on §§ 307 et seq.5074 
                                                             
5065 Section 31(2) and (3) CPA. 
5066 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 106. 
5067 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 9, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 28. 
5068 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 28. 
5069 Stoffels AGB-Recht 279. 
5070 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 9. 
5071 BGH NJW 2010, 864 (867). 
5072 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 5 para 25. 
5073 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 2. 
5074 Stoffels AGB-Recht 279. 
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aa)    Reasonable period of time  
The user's standard terms must contain a provision pursuant to which the other party is granted 
a reasonable period of time to make an express declaration (lit. a). The reasonableness of this 
period of time depends on the circumstances of the given case and contracts of the same kind. 
In most cases, a period of time of one or two weeks is considered sufficient.5075 For more 
complex transactions, a longer period of time might be reasonable.5076 A clause that requires 
that the other party make such a declaration immediately when concluding the contract is 
invalid,5077 save if the transaction is of an urgent nature where it can be expected that the client 
acts swiftly, such as a securities transaction.5078 It is sufficient that the standard clause stipulates 
a 'reasonable period of time' without further specification. Then, the user must specify this 
period of time when entering into the agreement with its client though.5079 
bb)    Drawing the attention to the significance of the other party's behaviour 
The second condition is that the clause itself must contain the user's obligation to draw the 
other party's attention to the significance of its behaviour (lit. b). Furthermore, at the beginning 
of the period of time, the client must be informed of the fictitious declaration. It must also be 
informed about the significance of its behaviour by pointing out the legal consequences and 
the possibility to reject. This information must be clear and unambiguous. In this regard, it is 
sufficient that the user cites the wording of § 308 no. 5 lit. b).5080 
Hence, no. 1 paragraph 2 of the Standard business terms of banks5081 is valid in terms of § 308 
no. 5 lit. b): 'Any amendment to these standard business terms (...) shall be offered to the 
Customer in text form at least two months before the proposed time of their coming into effect. 
(...) The customer shall be deemed to have given his consent if he has not notified his rejection 
before the proposed date on which the amendments take effect. In its offer, the Bank shall 
specifically draw his attention to the fact that this approval has this effect.'5082 
                                                             
5075 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 5 para 41 ('one week for normal transactions'), Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 29 
('minimum: one to two weeks'). 
5076 BGH NJW 1985, 617 (618). 
5077 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 29. 
5078 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 11. 
5079 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 5 para 13. 
5080 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 12. 
5081 AGB-Banken, 2012 version. 
5082 Example from Stoffels AGB-Recht 280. My own translation. 
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cc)    Legitimate interest of the user 
The fulfilment of the two aforementioned cumulative conditions is not sufficient, however. For 
fictitious declarations, the user must also have a legitimate interest concerning such a clause.5083 
This is the case if such fictitious declarations facilitate the execution of mass contracts, such as 
transactions with banks and insurance companies.5084 Also a clause in a hospital care contract 
according to which items that a patient has forgotten in the premises of the hospital and that 
were not picked up on the hospital's request, are transferred into the property of the hospital, 
are valid. This is because of the hospital's legitimate interest to facilitate the 'management' of 
such items, especially if the hospital provides care for a large number of patients.5085 
Clauses that significantly jeopardise the balance of performance and counter-performance to 
the benefit of the user require special attention. Such modifications necessitate an amendment 
agreement that fulfils the requirements of §§ 145 et seq. It is not sufficient that the standard 
clause provides for a fictitious agreement of the other party even if its legitimate interests are 
considered.5086 Hence, for price modifications, the user cannot refer to § 308 no. 5.5087 
dd)    Compatibility of the fictitious declaration with §§ 307 et seq. 
Lastly, the contents of the clause must be compatible with § 307. Hence, a provision which 
contains a fictitious renouncement of the warranties granted by §§ 434 et seq. is ineffective.5088 
2.3.5.3 Relation to other provisions 
Other provisions, such as the general clause, §§ 308 no. 6 and 309 no. 12 deal with similar 
problems. Unfortunately, the legislator did not succeed in systematically classifying 
confirmations of facts,5089 fictitious facts5090 and fictitious declarations.5091 A demarcation 
might therefore be difficult.5092 Confirmations of certain facts where certain facts or 
circumstances are deemed to exist or not to exist are assessed in terms of § 309 no. 12. If the 
confirmation of fact is a particular form of a fictitious receipt, the enquiry is done in terms of 
                                                             
5083 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 5 para 67, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 9, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 31. 
5084 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 7. 
5085 BGH NJW 1990, 761 (763). 
5086 BGH NJW-RR 2008, 134 (136). 
5087 Stoffels AGB-Recht 281. 




5092 Thamm/Pilger § 10 no. 6 AGBG para 1, Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
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§ 308 no. 6. If the declaration is of substantive significance, no. 5 applies.5093 Fictitious 
declarations are characterised by the fact that evidence to the contrary is not possible.5094 
2.3.5.4 Legal consequences in case of violation 
If one of the conditions mentioned above is not fulfilled in the given standard clause, the entire 
clause is invalid. Hence, a period of time stipulated in the standard terms that is too short is not 
altered into a longer period of time. Where the standard terms do not contain a specific period 
of time and the period of time granted later on is too short, the given period can be transformed 
into a reasonable one though.5095 
Since the law aims to prevent any surprising confrontation with fictitious declarations, these 
have no effect if the clause itself does not contain the user's obligation to grant a reasonable 
period of time and to draw the other party's attention to the intended significance of its 
behaviour at the beginning of the period of time.5096 Otherwise, the other party's reliance that 
the fictional effect only occurs under the conditions set out in the clause would be 
compromised.5097 
2.3.5.5 B2B contracts 
According to § 310(1) 2nd sent., clauses dealing with fictitious declarations are to be assessed 
in terms of § 307. From business people, a higher degree of diligence and business experience 
can be expected so that the application of the strict and formal requirements of § 308 no. 5 is 
not justified. Especially the requirement to draw the other party's attention to the intended 
significance of its behaviour might be dispensable in B2B contracts.5098 Moreover, in B2B 
agreements, silence can be equivalent to an agreement to the given transaction if the other party 
has a duty based on the principle of good faith to reject the offer explicitly. Hence, § 308 no. 5 
has no indicative effect on the general clause.5099 
2.3.6 Fictitious receipt (§ 308 no. 6) 
2.3.6.1   Rationale of § 308 no. 6 
§ 308 no. 6 provides that in standard business terms, a provision providing that a declaration 
by the user that is of special importance is deemed to have been received by the other party to 
                                                             
5093 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 28. 
5094 Stoffels AGB-Recht 279. 
5095 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 14. 
5096 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 10. 
5097 Stoffels AGB-Recht 281. 
5098 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 5 para 17, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 15. 
5099 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 15, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 5 para 70. 
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the contract is ineffective. Under § 130(1) 1st sent., a declaration of intent that is to be made to 
another becomes effective if made in his absence, at the point of time when this declaration 
reaches him. This provision is also applicable by analogy to 'acts similar to legal 
transactions'5100 such as overdue notices5101 or notifications of defects5102 in terms of § 377 
HGB. What is more, the reception of a declaration of intent is a condition for the fulfilment of 
information requirements. The burden of proof lies with the declaring person.5103 In German 
law,, there is no prima facie proof that a registered letter has actually reached the person for 
which it was intended.5104 Hence, it is not sufficient to present the transmission confirmation 
for the reception of an e-mail5105 or fax.5106  
There are only two legal exceptions to this principle, set out in §§ 132 BGB and 13 VVG.5107 
§ 132 BGB provides for two possibilities by which the sender can substitute the receipt by 
service. Under paragraph (1) of this provision, a declaration of intent is deemed to have been 
received if it is served through a bailiff as an intermediary. The service is effected under the 
provisions of the ZPO.5108 § 132(2) provides that if the person declaring is unaware, through 
no negligence on his part, of the identity of the person to whom the declaration is to be made, 
or if the whereabouts of this person are unknown, service may be effected in accordance with 
the provisions of the ZPO relating to service by publication. In the former case, the local court 
(Amtsgericht) competent for the approval is the one in whose district the person declarant its 
residence, or in the absence of a residence within the country, its abode. In the latter case, the 
local court competent for the approval is the one in the district of which the person to whom 
service is required to be effected had its last residence, or, in the absence of a residence within 
the country, its last abode. 
§ 13 VVG is relevant in cases where the policyholder changes its address or name. If the 
policyholder has not informed the insurer of a change of address, the dispatch of a letter sent 
recorded delivery to the policyholder's last known address shall suffice in respect of a 
                                                             
5100 Geschäftsähnliche Handlungen. 
5101 Mahnungen. 
5102 Mängelrügen. 
5103 BGH NJW 1978, 886; 1987, 2235 (2236). 
5104 BGH NJW 1996, 2033 (2035). 
5105 This is only different if the confirmation of receipt and the read receipt can be presented. See Mankowski 
NJW 2004, 1901. 
5106 BGH NJW 1995, 665 (667) sees the transmission confirmation merely as an indication for the reception, but 
not as a prima facie proof. 
5107 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz. 
5108 ZPO = Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure). 
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declaration of intention to be made to the policyholder. The declaration shall be deemed to 
have been received three days after the letter was dispatched. The first and second sentences 
shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of a change of the policyholder's name.5109 
Consequently, for these two legal exceptions, content control does not take place in terms of 
§ 307(3) because standard clauses reflecting these provisions do not derogate from the law.5110 
The South African legislator chose a different approach. In paragraph (w) of regulation 44(3) 
it is set out that a term providing that a statement made by the supplier which is of particular 
interest to the consumer is deemed to have reached the consumer, is presumed to be unfair, 
'unless such statement has been sent by prepaid registered post to the chosen address of the 
consumer'.5111 Hence, the discussions related to whether this item should be completed by also 
inserting other means of communication, such as e-mail, as Naudé suggests,5112 or the deeming 
provision of section 23 ECTA,5113 is irrelevant for § 308 no. 6.5114 
Standard business term users tend to get rid of this unfavourable evidence situation by inserting 
clauses by which the other party is deemed to have received a declaration of the user. Such 
clauses bear certain risks for consumers, although they might actually not have received the 
given declaration. Hence, the legislature inserted § 308 no. 6. In order to facilitate mass 
transactions of banks, only declarations of 'special importance' fall under this provision. 
                                                             
5109 § 13(1) VVG. 
5110 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 3. 
5111 Emphasis added. See Austrian Konsumentenschutzgesetz which provides in § 6(1) no. 3 that a declaration 
is deemed to have been received by the consumer, 'unless it is a matter of the validity of a declaration sent to the 
consumer's last known address in the event of the consumer not having notified the entrepreneur of a change of 
address'. Emphasis added. 
5112 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 107. 
5113 Section 23 ECTA: 'A data message (a) used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be 
regarded as having been sent by the originator when it enters an information system outside the control of the 
originator or, if the originator and addressee are in the same information system, when it is capable of being 
retrieved by the addressee, (b) must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the complete data 
message enters an information system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee and is capable of being 
retrieved and processed by the addressee; and (c) must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual 
place of business or residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual place of business or residence.' 
5114 See discussion on reg 44(3)(w) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.5 b). 
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§ 308 no. 6 is a special provision to § 309 no. 125115 that deals with provisions modifying the 
burden of proof.5116 Therefore, § 308 no. 6 is no autonomous restriction of freedom of contract 
but rather a limitation of § 309 no. 12 and a partial admission of fictitious receipts.5117 
2.3.6.2   Content of the prohibition of § 308 no. 6 
a)   Fiction 
§ 308 no. 6 applies where the actual receipt as a condition for the validity of a declaration is 
replaced by a fiction ('is deemed to have been received') or by a refutable or irrefutable 
presumption ('the receipt is irrefutably presumed').5118 The former AGB-Banken set out, for 
instance, that 'written notices of the bank are deemed to have been received by the customer if 
they have been sent to his or her last known address.5119 On the other hand, clauses by which 
contractual partners confer each other power of attorney for the reception of declarations vis-
à-vis the user are not considered fictitious receipts. Such powers of attorney can nonetheless 
be invalid under the general clause.5120 Fictitious receipts must be distinguished from fictitious 
declarations.5121 The latter fall under § 308 no. 5.5122 
b)    Declarations of special importance 
The wording 'declaration that is of special importance' might lead to the conclusion that the 
provision covers only declarations with a certain degree of relevance. The contrary is true 
though because all declarations that have negative consequences for the other party fall under 
§ 308 no. 6.5123 Adverse legal consequences can accrue from declarations concerning the 
termination of or rescission from a contract, but also from overdue notices5124 or the granting 
of a grace period.5125 
                                                             
5115 § 309 no. 12: '(Burden of proof) [A] provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party to the contract, in particular by a) imposing on the latter the burden of proof for 
circumstances lying in the sphere of responsibility of the user, or b) having the other party to the contract confirm 
certain facts [is invalid]; letter (b) does not apply to acknowledgements of receipt that are signed separately or 
provided with a separate qualified electronic signature.' 
5116 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 35, L/GvW/T/Graf von Westphalen § 10 no. 6 AGBG 
5117 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 35. 
5118 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 6 para 11, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 5. 
5119 No. 1 (2) AGB-Banken in the version applicable until 1992. The new version does not contain a fictitious 
receipt clause. 
5120 BGH NJW 1989, 2383; 1997, 3437 (3439 et seq). 
5121 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 6 para 16. 
5122 See discussion on § 308 no. 5. 
5123 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 7, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 37. 
5124 OLG Hamburg VersR 1981, 125. 
5125 Stoffels AGB-Recht 284. 
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The reason for this wide interpretation can be found in the legislative history of the norm. By 
the phrase 'of special importance', the legislator originally aimed to admit fictitious receipts for 
simple bank notices so that the provision actually only excludes few notices. These are to be 
assessed in terms of § 307, however. Although standard clauses by which 'declarations that are 
of no special importance are deemed to have been received if they have been sent to the 
customer', might be misleading for consumers, the courts decided that they are valid because 
they simply reflect the wording of the provision.5126 
2.3.6.3    Legal consequences in case of violation 
Under § 308 no. 6 two constellations are conceivable: First, where a clause provides for a 
fictitious receipt for all declarations of the user, the entire clause is ineffective.5127 Second, if 
the clause provides for several cases in which a declaration is deemed to have been received, 
only the ineffective parts of the clause are 'erased', whereas the others are valid.5128 Where the 
fictitious receipt is invalid, the user must prove the reception of its declaration in terms of 
§ 130.5129 
2.3.6.4    B2B contracts 
Since §§ 308 no. 6 does not apply to business-to-business transactions under § 310(1) 2nd sent., 
the clause has to be assessed in terms of § 307.5130 In order to assume a declaration of special 
importance, the adverse consequences must have some weight though.5131 
2.3.7 Reversal of contracts (§ 308 no. 7) 
2.3.7.1 Rationale of § 308 no. 7 
In terms of § 308 no. 7, a provision by which the user, to provide for the event that a party to 
the contract revokes the contract or gives notice of termination of the contract may demand a) 
unreasonably high remuneration for enjoyment or the use of a thing or a right or for 
performance rendered, or b) unreasonably high reimbursement of expenses is ineffective. 
Clauses that stipulate unreasonably high remuneration for the use of a thing or a right, or 
unreasonably high reimbursement of expenses are often used to deter consumers from 
terminating an agreement.5132 
                                                             
5126 OLG Hamburg WM 1986, 383 (385). See also UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 20. 
5127 Stoffels AGB-Recht 284. 
5128 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 8. 
5129 Stoffels AGB-Recht 285. 
5130 § 310(1) 1st sent. 
5131 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 9. 
5132 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 125. 
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A similar provision is item (s) of regulation 44(3) of the Act.5133 Regulation 44(3)(s) is to be 
read in conjunction with regulation 44(4)(d) which provides that item (s) does not apply to any 
penalty, fee or compensation which the supplier is entitled to charge under the provisions of 
the Act or any other law. Such a provision is section 20(6) pursuant to which the supplier may 
not charge the consumer if the goods are returned in the original unopened packaging. If the 
goods are in their original condition and repackaged in their original packaging, the supplier 
may charge the consumer a reasonable amount for the use of the goods during the time they 
were in its possession, or any consumption or depletion of the goods, unless that consumption 
or depletion is limited to a reasonable amount necessary to determine whether the goods were 
acceptable to the consumer (section 20(6)(b)). In any other case, the consumer may charge a 
reasonable amount for the use of the goods or any consumption or depletion, and for necessary 
restoration costs to render the goods fit for re-stocking, unless the consumer had to destroy the 
packaging in order to determine whether the goods conformed to the description or sample 
provided, or were fit for the intended purpose (section 20(6)(c)). 
Unlike § 308 no. 5 or regulation 44(3)(r), § 308 no. 7 and regulation 44(3)(s) respectively apply 
to cases where a contract is terminated for reasons other than breach and therefore have a wider 
scope of application that no. 5 or item (r).5134 
Contrary to § 309 no. 5 which prohibits agreements of a lump-sum claim by the user for 
damages or for compensation of a decrease in value under certain circumstances,5135 § 308 
no. 7 covers cases where the user demands a certain sum in the case of termination of the 
contract. The legislator prohibits unreasonably high remuneration or unreasonably high 
reimbursement of expenses so that the termination of the contract is not more attractive for the 
user than its execution. The other party shall not suffer adverse economic implications when 
cancelling5136 the contract or rescind5137 from it, which in fact would lead to a significant 
restriction of its freedom to terminate an open-ended agreement. What is more, the statutory 
provisions for a rescission of an agreement (§ 346) or its cancellation (§§ 628, 649) aim at a 
                                                             
5133 See discussion on reg 44(3)(s) CPA in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 c). 
5134 See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 100. 
5135 See discussion on § 309 no. 5. 
5136 The official English translation of § 308 no. 7 translates 'Kündigung' by 'giving notice'. In this chapter of this 
thesis, both terms are used indifferently. 
5137 The official English translation of § 308 no. 7 translates 'Rücktritt' by 'revocation'. In South African and 
English law, revocation is only applicable to offers though. Hence, the term 'rescission' is preferable. See Law 
Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'revocation' and Hutchison et al Law of Contract 54. 
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balancing of the parties' interests.5138 This becomes clear when reading § 346(2)5139 which 
provides that in case of a rescission of the contract only 'compensation for value'5140 is due, i.e., 
the 'actual value'. In a lease, this is usually the rent that would have to be paid.5141 In case of a 
cancellation, the other party to the contract may only ask for 'a part of his remuneration 
corresponding to his services performed thus far', and § 649 provides that the contractor is 
entitled to demand the agreed remuneration. He must allow set-off of the expenses he saves as 
a result of cancelling the contract or acquires or wilfully fails to acquire from other use of his 
labour though.5142 § 308 no. 7 aims to reflect the statutory model and to achieve a fair balancing 
of the parties' interests. Hence, this provision is an emanation of § 307(2) no. 1.5143 
It should be noted that the German heading of § 308 no. 7 ('Abwicklung von Verträgen') is 
ambiguous 5144 because it merely covers the reversal or early termination of an agreement. The 
official English translation takes this into account ('Reversal of contracts').5145 
2.3.7.2 Content of the provision 
a) Forms included by the wording of no. 7 
The provision covers cases where the user provides in its standard clauses for an unreasonably 
high remuneration or unreasonably high reimbursement of expenses in the case of a 
cancellation or rescission. The evaluative element of no. 7 is 'unreasonably'.5146 
No. 7 applies to an amount of money in the form of remuneration or reimbursement of expenses 
for the benefit of the user when a party (it does not matter which one) has cancelled the 
agreement or rescinded from it. 'Rescission' is the setting aside of a voidable contract ex tunc, 
which is thereby treated as if it had never existed.5147 The agreement is transformed into a 
'contractual obligation of restitution,' i.e., the primary obligations are revoked, and 
performances already rendered so far have to be restored. On the other hand, a cancellation 
                                                             
5138 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26. 
5139 § 346(2): 'In lieu of restitution or return, the obligor must provide compensation for value, to the extent that 
1. restitution or return is excluded by the nature of what has been obtained, 2. he has used up, disposed of, 
encumbered, processed or redesigned the object received, 3. the object received has deteriorated or has been 
destroyed; but deterioration that is caused by the object being used in accordance with its intended use is not taken 
into account. If consideration is specified in the contract, then this is to be used as a basis when the compensation 
for value is calculated; if compensation for value for the benefit of use of a loan is to be paid, it can be shown that 
the value of the benefit of use was lower.'  
5140 Wertersatz. 
5141 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26. 
5142 Stoffels AGB-Recht 390. 
5143 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 2a. 
5144 In fact, 'Abwicklung' also means 'execution', 'implementation' or 'liquidation'. 
5145 See UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 1. 
5146 Stoffels AGB-Recht 390. 
5147 Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'rescission', Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Rücktritt vom Vertrag'. 
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terminates an agreement ex nunc without the obligation to restore performances already 
rendered. It is not relevant for no. 7 if the right to cancel the agreement is based on statutory or 
contractual provisions, or if it is an ordinary or extraordinary termination of the contract.5148 
The terminology used by the user is also irrelevant (annulment, revocation, withdrawal, 
cancellation etc.) since merely the type of termination that actually applies is important.5149 
b) Other types of termination of contracts 
Although the wording of no. 7 only includes rescission or cancellation of the agreement, there 
is an undeniable need of protection of the other party in cases where the user terminates the 
contract by using another type of cancellation, and where such termination is more attractive 
to her than execution. Hence, an application of no. 7 by analogy to other forms of termination, 
such as voidability,5150 the occurrence of a resolutory condition or a revocation of a mandate 
in terms of § 671, is generally accepted.5151 The termination of the contract by mutual 
agreement is not covered by no. 7, however.5152 Furthermore, no. 7 is only applicable if the 
existence of the contract is concerned; otherwise § 307 is applicable.5153 If the standard terms 
of a bank provide that the client has to pay higher interest in case of an unauthorised overdraft, 
this does not concern the existence of the contract itself, and the general clause applies.5154 
c) Remuneration or reimbursement due to the termination of the contract 
§ 308 no. 7 concerns the user's claim to remuneration or reimbursement due to a termination 
of the contract. If the user's standard terms do not provide for such remuneration or 
reimbursement for the benefit of the user, but for another's benefit, not no. 7 but § 307 is 
applicable. As discussed further above, the BGB contains provisions that regulate the amount 
of the given remuneration or reimbursement,5155 according to which the contractor must allow 
set-off of the expenses she saves as a result of cancelling the contract or acquires or wilfully 
fails to acquire from other use of her labour. What is more, the contractor may demand a part 
of the remuneration that corresponds to the work performed and reimbursement of those 
expenses not included in the remuneration if the work, before acceptance, is destroyed or 
deteriorates or becomes impracticable as the result of a defect in the materials supplied by the 
                                                             
5148 Stoffels AGB-Recht 391. 
5149 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 8. 
5150 §§ 119 et seq. 
5151 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 39, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 7. 
5152 OLG Hamburg NJW-RR 1990, 909. Dammann is of the view that in these cases, § 308 no. 7 has to be applied 
by analogy (WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 11). 
5153 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 7 para 14. 
5154 BGH NJW 1992, 1751 (1752). 
5155 E.g., §§ 346 and 347 for a rescission, § 628 for a service contract, or § 649 2nd sent. 
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customer or as the result of an instruction given by the customer for the carrying out of the 
work, without a circumstance for which the contractor is responsible contributing to this (§ 645, 
read in conjunction with § 643). In principle, these statutory provisions cover all claims for 
remuneration or reimbursement in case of early termination of the agreement, except for lump-
sum damages and contractual penalties.5156  
d) Unreasonable amount 
No. 7 only concerns the amount of the remuneration or the reimbursement that the user 
requires, but not the reason for it. The latter has to be assessed in terms of the general clause.5157 
When assessing the reasonableness of the amount of the remuneration or the reimbursement, 
the statutory clauses which would apply if the given clause were inexistent serve as applicable 
standard.5158 For the enquiry, the circumstances of the concrete case are irrelevant. Only the 
typical situation for the given type of contract in the case of early termination is considered.5159  
Remuneration for the transfer or use of a thing or a rendered performance is unreasonably high 
if it significantly exceeds the objective value of the received performance or use, or if a 
reasonable compensation for an advantage the user had is not taken into consideration.5160 
Hence, a standard clause in a leasing contract by which the lessee has to pay immediately after 
giving notice the outstanding instalments, whereby only 90 % of the proceeds of the re-use of 
the vehicle by the user are taken into account, is in effect an unreasonable high remuneration 
for the use of the car, namely for the time in which the lessee cannot use it anymore. Therefore, 
it violates no. 7.5161 Also invalid are clauses in marriage agency contracts by which the agent 
is entitled to keep its success-based remuneration paid in advance also in the case of early 
termination of the contract.5162  
The amount of the reimbursement of expenses is reasonable if it is justifiable and 
appropriate.5163 Therefore, a standard clause of a travel agency by which the client has to pay 
100 % of the flight if he or she rescinds from the contract after the registration deadline is 
invalid in terms of no. 7. I because it unilaterally favours the user's interests. It does not consider 
                                                             
5156 See § 309 no. 5 and 6. 
5157 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 4. Others want to apply this provision by analogy: Staudinger/Coester-
Waltjen § 308 no. 7 para 7. 
5158 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 642 (643), UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 1. 
5159 BGH NJW 1983, 1491 (1492). 
5160 Locher Recht der AGB 137. 
5161 BGH NJW 1982, 1747 (1748). 
5162 BGH NJW 1983, 2817 (2819). 
5163 WHL/Wolf § 10 no. 7 AGBG para 19, Stoffels AGB-Recht 393. 
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the standard of § 649 that applies to typical situations with regard to early termination of a 
contract of such type.5164 
§ 308 no. 7 is interpreted in that the other party must have the possibility – by analogy to § 309 
no. 5 lit. b) – to prove that the actual amount was lower than the demanded sum.5165 A standard 
clause by which the expenses saved and to be deducted from the architect's fee in case of the 
client's notice amount to '40 % for the performances that the contractor has not rendered yet' 
does not include this possibility and is therefore invalid.5166 
2.3.7.3 Relation to other provisions 
It might be sometimes difficult to differentiate § 308 no. 7 from § 309 no. 5 which concerns 
lump-sum claims for damages.5167 It is conceivable that a standard clause contains elements of 
a lump-sum claim as well as those of a reimbursement of expenses. Stoffels legitimately argues 
that such a differentiation is of mere academic interest because of the similar requirements for 
lump sums in both provisions. The possibility of the other party to prove that the amount was 
actually lower than the lump sum set out in the clause also speaks for his argument.5168 The 
courts declare such clauses invalid in terms of both provisions and apply no differentiation.5169 
Also § 3575170 concerns the reversal of contracts, namely the legal consequences of withdrawal 
from off-premises contracts and distance contracts (save contracts relating to financial 
                                                             
5164 BGH NJW 1985, 633 et seq. Contracts of transportation of passengers or goods are considered contracts to 
produce a work (Werkverträge). See Palandt/Sprau before § 631 para 17d, with further references. In the given 
case, the travel agency in question only offered flights. If the case were to be decided today, and the travel agency 
would offer package travel contracts, it is submitted that the valuations contained in § 651i would have to be 
considered. § 651i: '(1) Prior to commencement of travel, the traveller may revoke the contract at any time. (2) If 
the traveller revoke the contract, then the travel organiser loses his claim to the agreed package price. He may, 
however, demand appropriate compensation. The amount of such compensation is determined by the price of the 
travel package minus the value of the expenses saved by the travel organiser and what he can gain by alternative 
deployment of the travel services. (3) In the contract, for each type of travel package, taking into account the 
customarily saved expenses and the customary potential savings from alternative deployment of the travel 
services, a percentage of the package price may be specified as compensation.'  
5165 Erman/Roloff § 308 para 60, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 4. 
5166 BGH NJW 1999, 418. 
5167 See discussion on § 309 no. 5. 
5168 Stoffels AGB-Recht 393 and 394. 
5169 E.g., BGH NJW 1997, 259 (260). 
5170 § 357: '(1) The performance received is to be restituted at the latest after fourteen days. (2) The trader must 
also restitute any payments the consumer may have made for the delivery. This does not apply inasmuch as the 
consumer has incurred additional costs because he opted for a type of delivery other than the least expensive type 
of standard delivery offered by the trader. (3) In making the repayment, the trader must use the same means of 
payment that the consumer used in making the payment. Sentence 1 does not apply if the parties expressly have 
agreed otherwise and the consumer does not incur any costs as a result. (4) In the case of a sale of consumer goods, 
the trader may refuse to make repayment until he has received the returned goods or the consumer has provided 
proof that he has dispatched the goods. This does not apply if the trader has offered to collect the goods. (5) The 
consumer is not obliged to arrange for the return shipment of the goods received if the trader has offered to collect 
the goods. (6) The consumer bears the direct costs of return shipment of the goods if the trader has informed the 
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services). § 4 FernUSG5171 is also a consumer protection provision and regulates that in a 
distance education contract, the client is entitled to rescind from the agreement pursuant to 
§ 355 BGB, and that §§ 356 und 357 BGB apply by analogy.5172 Any infringement of these 
consumer protection provisions makes the clause void in terms of § 1345173 so that the 
application of § 308 no. 7 is not necessary.5174 
2.3.7.4 Legal consequences in case of violation 
If the clause is invalid, the court cannot reduce the remuneration or reimbursement of expenses 
to a permissible degree since there is no legal basis for this. Where the clause merely provides 
that the amount of the claim is that regulated by law, the judge has to calculate the precise 
amount.5175 Where no statutory provisions exist, the court must balance the parties' interests by 
a gap-filling interpretation of the given standard clause.5176 
2.3.7.5 B2B contracts 
In terms of § 310(1), § 308 no. 7 is not directly applicable, but its evaluations are considered 
under § 307.5177 No. 7 is an emanation of § 307(2) no. 1 in that it concerns 'essential principles 
                                                             
consumer pursuant to Article 246a [§] 1(2) sentence 1 number 2 of the [EGBGB] of this obligation. Sentence 1 
does not apply if the trader has stated that he is prepared to bear these costs. In the case of off-premises contracts, 
in the context of which the goods were delivered to the consumer’s dwelling at the time the contract was 
concluded, the trader is obliged to collect the goods at his own costs if, by their nature, these goods cannot be 
returned by post. (7) The consumer shall be liable for any diminished value of the goods if 1. the diminished value 
results from the handling of the goods in any other manner than that necessary to establish the nature, 
characteristics, and functioning of the goods, and 2. the trader has informed the consumer pursuant Article 246a 
[§] 1 (2) sentence 1 number 1 of the [EGBGB] of his right of withdrawal. (8) Where the consumer withdraws 
from a contract for the provision of services or the supply of water, gas, or electricity, without their supply having 
been offered for sale in a limited volume or set quantity, or for the supply of distance heating, the consumer shall 
owe the trader compensation for the value of the performance provided until the time of the withdrawal in those 
cases in which the consumer has expressly demanded that the trader begin with the performance prior to expiry 
of the withdrawal period. The claim pursuant to sentence 1 exists only in those cases in which the trader has 
properly informed the consumer pursuant to Article 246a [§] 1 (2) sentence 1 number 1 and 3 of the [EGBGB]. 
For off-premises contracts, the claim pursuant to sentence 1 exists only in those cases in which the consumer has 
transmitted his request pursuant to sentence 1 on a durable medium. In calculating the compensation for value, 
the total price agreed upon is to be used as a basis. If the total price agreed upon is excessive, the compensation 
for value shall be calculated on the basis of the market value of the performance provided. (9) Where the consumer 
withdraws from a contract for the supply of digital content that is not contained in a tangible medium, he shall not 
compensate for value.'  
5171 Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am Fernunterricht (Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz - FernUSG). 
5172 Stoffels AGB-Recht 394. 
5173 § 134: 'A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a different 
conclusion.'  
5174 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 308 no. 7 para 4, MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 7 para 3. 
5175  Stoffels AGB-Recht 394. 
5176 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 308 no. 7 para 16, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 paras 40-49. 
5177 BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1067), UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 24, Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 308 no. 7 para 40. 
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of the statutory provision from which it deviates'. Particularities may arise from the customs 
for the given branch or commercial practice.5178 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Since the German general clause is worded very widely, the courts have an extensive scope of 
evaluation in terms of § 307. To provide for more legal security and clarity, the legislator has 
introduced §§ 308 and 309, which can be qualified as grey- and blacklists. They offer 
guidelines for the application of the general clause since they contain reverse conclusions or 
conclusions by analogy.  
The provisions of § 308 contain an evaluative element, expressed by indeterminate legal terms. 
Standard clauses that fall under § 308 usually include a risk of a disturbed balancing of the 
parties' interests. On the other hand, § 309 contains provisions that are outright prohibited as 
they are incompatible with essential principles of statutory provisions or undermine cardinal 
rights and obligations. § 309 is therefore a concretisation of § 307(2). 
According to the ECJ, the provisions contained in the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 
serve as an information source for national authorities and individuals. The Member States 
must hence implement them in a fashion that ensures that the public obtains knowledge of 
them. In some instances, the protection offered by §§ 308 and 309 goes further than the 
Directive, and where the German provisions lack clauses contained in the Directive's Annex, 
the courts can fill this gap by employing the general clause. 
§ 310(2) contains some exceptions for the application of §§ 308 and 309 (utility contracts). The 
price regulations adopted in this field are legal norms and not standard clauses. Hence, they are 
not subject to content control. Vis-à-vis special customers (industries), content control under 
§ 307 is possible if the given contracts have explicitly been incorporated. Hence, special 
customers are not in a better position than standard-rate consumers. §§ 310(2) and 307 must be 
interpreted in conformity with the Directive, however. 
§§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309 do not apply to B2B contracts, or contracts with a legal person 
under public law or a special fund under public law. In these cases, the general clause applies. 
However, § 307(1) and (2) apply vis-à-vis these entities to the extent that this leads to the 
ineffectiveness of the contract provisions set out in §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309. The norms 
                                                             
5178 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 24. 
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contained in § 309 may have an indicative effect on § 307 in some instances, or are a 
concretisation of the general clause. In some cases, the rationale of the provision set out in 
§ 309 applies to the general clause without having an indicative effect, or the given provision 
has no effect at all on § 307. In any event, in B2B agreements, it can be expected that the 
commercial partners have a high degree of business experience and knowledge, which justifies 
a more lenient standard. Moreover, these agreements are characterised by promptness and 
straightforwardness, and different interpretational standards than for B2C contracts may apply. 
If the court decides, after evaluation, that the conditions in the cases mentioned in § 308 are 
fulfilled, the clause is ineffective in its entirety. Then, the statutory provisions apply instead 
(§ 306(2)). A partial retention is excluded. In cases, where a clause can be split up into a valid 
and an invalid part, the effective part may be maintained, however.  
Prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation: 
§ 309 no. 1 prohibits price increases at short notice within four months of entering into the 
agreement. Contrary to regulation 44(3)(h) of the Act, the German provision does not apply to 
goods or services in connection with open-ended agreements. For these continuing obligations, 
the general clause is applicable though. Prohibited price increase standard clauses infringe the 
pacta sunt servanda principle and are an obstacle for price comparisons and competition. Price 
increases not only concern the actual, nominal price, but also ancillary performances and VAT. 
No. 1 also covers indexation clauses, 'tension clauses' and market price clauses, but not indirect 
price increases. This provision covers all transaction types, except those concerning immovable 
objects (land plots). § 651 a to y contain specific provisions for price increases of package 
travel contracts. 
When entering into a contract, consumers must be able to identify the scope of possible price 
increases, which is why the BGH requires for so-called 'cost element clauses' that the standard 
clauses contain the various cost elements and their weighting. Otherwise, the consumer must 
be able to cancel the agreement. This has practical relevance for adjustment clauses of energy 
suppliers. What is more, price increase clauses of monopolistic suppliers are subject to equity 
control under § 315. 
§ 309 no. 2 deals with the right to refuse performance. Under this provision, users are not 
allowed to exclude or restrict their client's right to refuse performance under § 320 or their right 
of retention in terms of § 273. Both, the right to refuse performance and the right of retention 
are based on the principle of 'fairness for the execution of contracts'. The legislator considered 
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the BGH's interpretation of 'the same legal relationship' as too far-reaching in terms of § 309 
no. 2 and applies the right of retention only if it is based to 'the same contractual relationship'. 
An exclusion of such a right is given where unacceptable or unrealisable conditions for the 
recognition of the other party's rights exist. A restriction can be assumed where the assertion 
is only possible under certain conditions, and the requirements set out in the clause are stricter 
than the law. Moreover, where the user links the assertion of the other party's rights to an 
acknowledgement of defects by the user, no. 2 applies. No. 2 does however not apply to cases 
where the customer has to pay in advance because the legislator did not wish to exclude 
agreements on the obligation to perform in advance per se. In these cases, § 307 applies. 
§ 309 no. 3 outlaws prohibitions of set-off. The legislator did not outlaw clauses forbidding the 
set-off of claims per se, but only where this right is uncontested or has been finally and non-
appealably established. In commercial practice, a prohibition of set-offs is expressly agreed in 
a standard clause, or it is impliedly contained in the parties' agreement. Implied prohibitions 
are net-cash clauses or clauses that require payment in advance. Claims that are ready for 
judgment are equal to those that have been finally and non-appealably established because their 
existence has been fully proved so that the user does not need protection against alleged 
counter-claims. 
So-called 'group set-off clauses' by which the user is entitled to set off its claims not only 
against its customer but also against its group companies are disadvantageous for the other 
party. This applies especially where the clients are not designated individually, or the number 
of the concerned group companies is too vast. The newly inserted § 449(3) speaks in favour of 
a categorical invalidity of such clauses. Other examples where the user extends its possibility 
to set off its claims are open account agreements and clearing, which are often found in the 
banking sector. Both forms are considered compatible with the general clause. 
In terms of no. 4 of § 309, standard terms users must no exempt themselves from the statutory 
requirements of giving the other party a warning notice or setting a period of time for the 
customer to perform or cure. This provision ensures a balanced relation between the parties. 
Customers must be warned about the consequences of their delay and granted the opportunity 
to perform. South African law does not have a similar provision, but the mora debitoris 
principles developed by the courts apply. No. 4 also applies where standard terms users use 
legal consequences that only occur on the basis of a warning notice or additional period of 
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time. It is therefore not necessary that a clause declare that a warning notice or the setting of 
an additional period of time for performance is superfluous. 
§ 309 no. 5 aims to strike a balance between the other party's need for protection against 
excessive claims of the user and the user's need for simplified and economic enforcement. For 
the distinction between lump-sum claims and contractual penalties, functional-typological 
aspects have to be applied, such as the type of the given claim and the objective of the 
agreement. The BGH extends the provision's application to compensations based on the 
traveller's revocation of the travel package contract. 
§ 309 no. 6 deals with 'asymmetric retention clauses', which are referred to in South Africa as 
'one-sided forfeiture clauses'. These allow suppliers to retain payment in the case of breach, 
without giving the consumer the right to be compensated in the same amount if the supplier 
commits breach. Penalty clauses have a double function: to motivate the debtor to perform, and 
enable the creditor to be indemnified in a simple manner. Even though no. 6 is tailored to so-
called 'dependent penalty agreements' which depend on the main obligation, it can also be 
applied by analogy to independent penalty clauses. It does however not apply to so-called 
'prepayment penalties' for the repayment of a credit. The BGH qualifies these as a special form 
of a stipulation on the termination of the agreement, and § 307 applies in these cases.  
The provision applies in cases of non-acceptance or late acceptance of the performance, 
payment default and termination of the contract. In cases where no. 6 does not apply, an enquiry 
in terms of § 307 is possible. Besides, strict-liability clauses are not compatible with the 
essential principles of the statutory provisions and thus invalid under the general clause. 
§ 309 no. 7 concerns the traditional core of content control: the exclusion or restriction of 
liability for high-ranking and other damages. The provision includes contractual claims for 
damages and those based on the delivery of faulty goods, but also liability for breach at the 
moment of the conclusion of the contract (culpa in contrahendo) and for tortious acts. 
No. 7 contains some restrictions for its application, namely for transport and tariff rules for 
regular public transport services on the road (i.e., not for air transport). The reason for this 
exclusion is the normative character of an applicable Order in which liability restrictions are 
already set out. The application to state-approved lotteries and gaming contracts is also 
excluded in order to avoid the danger of concerted manipulations by lottery agents and players. 
The exclusion or restriction of liability for the violation of highest-ranking legal rights (life, 
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health etc.) is not possible, even if committed by negligence or by a legal representative or a 
vicarious agent (lit. a). 
Regulation 44(3)(a) of the Act contains a similar item. Read in conjunction with section 
51(c)(i), item (a) of the Regulation only refers to exemption clauses excluding liability not 
based on gross negligence and which do not fall into the ambit of section 61. 
Lit. b) of no. 7 contains limits for clauses that exclude or restrict liability for other damages. 
Liability for intentional breach is not mentioned in this provision because § 276(3) prohibits 
any release from liability for intention in advance. 
It is not required that the standard clause explicitly mentions that liability is excluded; it is 
sufficient that the clause gives the impression that liability is excluded. Restrictions of liability 
concern the reduction of the client's claim for damages by excluding certain damages or 
restricting the amount of the damages. In addition, also restrictive modalities are covered since 
they are formal hindrances for the assertion of claims. 
The restriction of the user's liability for negligent conduct is possible only for other damages. 
In terms of the general clause, also clauses excluding or restricting simple negligence can be 
ineffective, namely where the clause erodes essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of 
the agreement, or where cardinal obligations are concerned. 
In terms of the Produkthaftungsgesetz, the producer's liability cannot be excluded. For the 
liberal professions and in transport law, special provisions concerning the exclusion or 
restriction of liability apply. 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. a) is relevant for standard clauses that exclude or restrict the client's right to 
cancel its contract with the supplier if the latter does not deliver within the agreed time. This 
provision applies to all kinds of agreements, save for those referred to in no. 7 and the 
exceptions contained in § 310(4). The phrase 'free oneself from the contract' includes all legal 
rights under which an agreement may be terminated to the extent that they are based on a breach 
committed by the user. The provision prohibits any exclusions or restrictions of this right. 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) contains six items and is only applicable to contracts relating to the supply 
of newly produced things and the performance of work. The scope of application of lit. b) is 
restricted to contracts between consumers and those concerning real estate because due to the 
modernisation of the law of obligations, consumer contracts are now excluded from its ambit. 
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The provision remains significant though for B2B agreements. The complete exclusion of any 
warranties of used things is not possible anymore.  
Lit. b) aa) to ff) concern the other party's legal rights in the event of defects. On the other hand, 
as manufacturer warranties are not subject to content control because they are legally 
independent warranty agreements that do not derogate from the customer's legal rights.  
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) expresses the principle that the customer must remain entitled to 
warranties, and that the user must remain the primary obligated party for any warranty. The 
provision aims to achieve that by a threefold construction. First, the entire or partial exclusion 
of claims is prohibited as the client must be allowed to a minimum standard of the warranties 
set out in §§ 434 and 634. Second, the limitation to the granting of claims against third parties 
is not allowed. Third, the user is prohibited from making the client's claims dependent upon 
prior court action taken against third parties. Clauses that establish merely the user's subsidiary 
liability are not forbidden per se though because such provisions do not require any court action 
against the third party. 
According to the BGH, clauses that extend the control standard of § 307(2) no. 2 (limitation of 
essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract) are prohibited. Hence, the field 
of application of no. 8 lit. b) aa) must not be limited to its wording. 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) deals with clauses limiting the other party's claims to cure, and excluding 
the other rights that it can assert if the bought or ordered item is defective. Such clauses are 
ineffective where they do not provide that in the event of failed cure, the client's other rights 
do not revive. The user can validly exclude the client's right to demand damages or 
reimbursement of futile expenditure though since no. 8 lit. b) bb) does not mention the revival 
of these rights. The provision makes an exception for contracts of building work because of the 
danger to destruct economic values and rights.  
Lit. b) cc) of § 309 no. 8 outlaws standard clauses that exclude or limit the user's duty to bear 
the expenses necessary for cure. This prohibition is also applicable where the other rights of 
the other party are not restricted or excluded, and where the right to cure is only one right 
amongst others. 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) dd) deals with provisions in standard terms that create an obstacle for clients 
for the enforcement of their right to cure because they must pay the stipulated price first and 
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cannot exert economic pressure on the supplier. The practical relevance of this item is 
somewhat limited as the thematically linked § 309 no. 2 applies more often in practice. 
No. 8 lit. b) ee) prohibits clauses in which the user provides for a cut-off period for the other 
party to give notice of non-obvious defects that is shorter than the permissible period of time 
under item ff) of the same provision. For visible defects, a shorter than the permissible 
limitation period might be effective. In this case, the clause must be assessed in terms of § 307. 
Item ff) of no. 8 lit. b) prohibits standard provisions providing that the limitation of claims 
against the user due to defects of the bought or ordered item is made easier, or in other cases 
providing for a limitation period of less than one year. Generally, the agreement on limitation 
periods is subject to the parties' freedom of contract. The provisions on the sale of consumer 
goods aim to preserve the consumer's rights in the event of defects concerning the limitation 
period and its beginning, however. A shortening of the limitation period from two years to one 
year is therefore only permitted for the sale of used goods. Hence, item ff) does not apply in 
these cases. The formulation 'making limitation easier' includes both the shortening of the 
limitation period and any measures that have the same result, e.g., an earlier beginning of the 
limitation period. Since shorter limitation periods are equal to a restriction of liability, the 
leading view argues that they also infringe § 309 no. 7 because such provisions also restrict 
personal rights. 
§ 309 no. 9 concerns the duration of continuing obligations (open-ended agreements). No. 9 
prohibits clauses providing for an initial duration of more than two years, tacit extensions of 
more than one year and notice periods of more than three months. The provision only concerns 
agreements on the regular supply of goods or the regular rendering of services or work 
performances by the user. Hence, continuing obligations are not targeted per se, and the 
prohibition does not concern significant contract types (lease, franchising agreements, leasing 
etc.). No. 9 is also applicable to mixed contracts where the provision covers the predominant 
element. It is however not applicable to temporary employment contracts. The provision is 
neither applicable to things sold as belonging together, or to insurance contracts. In this regard, 
no. 9 has merely a clarifying function. Where the legislator has provided for particular norms 
for the duration of the contract, like the WEG, no. 9 does not apply. 
Even if the duration set out in a standard clause is valid under no. 9, the final enquiry is to be 
made by means of the general clause. This is because the legislature was of the view that open-
ended agreements are too diverse so that a more generalising approach was necessary.  
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No. 10 of § 309 prohibits that the user's standard terms for certain contract types allow that a 
third party becomes the other party's contractual partner, save where the third party is identified 
beforehand, or the customer may free itself from the contract. The provision does not apply to 
assignments (transfer of single rights) or the use of subcontractors or vicarious agents since the 
other party's partner remains the same. This also applies where the user changes its legal 
personality.  
§ 309 no. 11 aims to protect agents and is a specification of the prohibition of surprising 
clauses. Since such clauses are also invalid because they have not been properly incorporated 
into the contract or are surprising, the provision has rather a preventive function. 
No. 12 of § 309 concerns clauses pertaining to the modification of the burden of proof and 
consists of two items (lit. a) and b)). The provision aims to protect the other party's position as 
otherwise its legal defence might be jeopardised. The prohibition applies to all principles of 
burden of proof, irrespective of whether they are applicable ex lege or have been developed by 
the courts. A teleological reduction of no. 12 in cases where the user 'only' modifies the burden 
of proof instead of waiving the client's claims for damages must be dismissed since the former 
is not a 'less' compared to the latter. Lit. a) merely reflects a general principle instead of having 
an autonomous significance. Lit. b) aims to prevent that clients confirm certain facts that are 
presented by the user as 'a mere formality'. As the legislator intended to prohibit clauses that 
aggravate the client's position, so-called 'completeness clauses' fall under this provision too. 
Already the user's attempt to degrade the customer's position in terms of proof is sufficient. 
Other cases are the reversal or a shift of the burden of proof or refutable assumptions.  
§ 309 no. 13 concerns standard terms by which certain declarations require a more stringent 
form than written form, or which set out special requirements for their receipt. The prohibition 
covers all kinds of declarations pertaining to the conclusion, execution and termination of the 
agreement. More stringent forms than written form, i.e., the handwritten signature of the issuer, 
are notarial recording or official certification, for instance. Besides, restrictions to certain 
means of communication are included. Standard clauses that prescribe that the other party has 
to use the user's forms are invalid as the requirements for 'written form' are conclusively 
contained in §§ 126 and 127. No. 13 also prohibits special requirements for the reception of 
the other party's declaration. Requirements beyond the conditions set out in § 130 are invalid. 
§ 309 no. 14 outlaws standard clauses that make ADR mandatory before the other party can 
assert its claims in court. ADR may have huge cost-implications that consumers often cannot 
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estimate. Despite its misleading title, the provision aims at permanent and temporary waivers 
of action. The primary function of no. 14 is not 'market cleansing' from prohibited clauses, but 
preventing the widespread of mandatory ADR clauses. It covers both arbitration and mediation. 
No. 14 applies to all types of claims of the client, and its normative objective covers all kinds 
of actions, i.e., court actions, preliminary proceedings and so forth. This prohibition is also 
applicable to consumer contracts, but since § 309 does not permit any evaluations, the 'other 
circumstances attending the entering into of the contract' are not taken into consideration. 
§ 309 no. 15 prohibits clauses that restrict the consumer's rights in contracts to produce a work 
and in construction contracts concerning advance payments that are substantially higher than 
permitted by the applicable BGB norms, and the user's obligation to provide sufficient security. 
Prohibited clauses with the possibility of evaluation: 
§ 308 no. 1 1st sent. 1st var. targets provisions by which the user reserves to himself the right 
to unreasonably long or insufficiently specific periods of time for acceptance or rejection of an 
offer. This provision presumes that the offer is made by the other party, e.g., by using an order 
form. No. 1 applies to all kinds of contracts. For suspensive conditions, no. 1 is applicable by 
analogy because the situation for the other party is the same in that it is bound to the contract 
whereas the user may meanwhile speculate on the client's costs. The user may have a legitimate 
interest for a longer period of time where it has to make calculations or undertake enquiries 
concerning the availability of the ordered goods, for example. A period of time is insufficiently 
specific where the customer is not able to calculate the acceptance period without any 
difficulties, where the clause contains indeterminate temporal terms, or where the calculation 
depends on circumstances in the user's sphere. 
The 2nd var. of § 308 no. 1 1st sent. concerns unreasonably long or insufficiently specific 
periods of time for rendering performance. The rationale of this provision is to avoid that the 
other party cannot serve notice of default to the user because the latter has reserved for itself a 
lax period of time for delivery. The prohibition covers 'real periods of time for performance' as 
well as 'quasi periods of time for performance' (grace and extension periods). An exception 
exists for consumer contracts where the user is allowed to withhold its performance until the 
other party's right to withdraw has expired. 
The relatively newly inserted § 308 no. 1 lit. a) and b) prohibit standard terms setting out 
periods of time that are considered unreasonably long (30 or 15 days, respectively) if the user 
is not a consumer. The legislative materials suggest that the prohibitions of lit. a) and b) are 
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particularly aimed at standard clauses that are used for contracts with entrepreneurs, legal 
persons under public law or special funds under public law. 
In terms of § 308 no. 2, provisions that grant an unreasonably long or insufficiently specific 
additional period of time for the user's performance are invalid. In the enquiry, both parties' 
interests, the objective of the grace period and the particularities of the industry are considered. 
The additional period of time must not become a surrogate delivery deadline though because 
this would unreasonably disadvantage the customer who is expected to pay swiftly. 
§ 308 no. 3 and its complementary provision of no. 8 prohibit clauses under which the user is 
entitled to free itself from its contractual obligations without objectively justified reason. This 
provision does not apply to continuing obligations, which must be assessed under § 307. The 
wording 'right to free [one]self from [one's] obligations' suggests that no. 3 and 8 apply to all 
kinds of terminations. The user must have a legitimate interest to disengage from the 
agreement. The two provisions have practical significance for supply and delivery clauses. 
Where the user's performance is unavailable, it must inform the other party without undue delay 
and reimburse it immediately (no. 8). 
§ 308 no. 4 only concerns modifications of the user's performance and applies to continuing 
obligations too, unlike regulation 44(3)(i), read with regulation 44(4)(c)(iv). Since no. 4 covers 
both modifications and deviations, a differentiation is not necessary. Covered are the principal 
obligation and ancillary obligations and performances, the modalities of the performance as 
well as clauses by which the user may render part performance. Unlike the South African norm, 
no. 4 contains a reasonableness requirement. The clause must therefore contain serious grounds 
for the modification or deviation, and the conditions and implications for the customer must be 
reasonably taken into account. For the weighing of the parties' interests, a generalised-typified 
standard applies. Contrary to the wording of no. 4, the modification or deviation can only be 
reasonable if the conditions and the scope of the modification are sufficiently indicated in the 
clause. 
§ 308 no. 5 deals with fictitious declaration clauses stipulating that a certain declaration has 
been made or has not been made, and where the actual behaviour of the other party is irrelevant. 
Such provisions must be distinguished from fictitious facts and fictitious receipts for which 
no. 5 does not apply. The demarcation might sometimes be challenging. Fictitious declarations 
are not prohibited per se and allowed where they facilitate the execution of mass contracts (e.g., 
banks). The prohibition only concerns the execution of agreements, not their conclusion. It 
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does not apply to renewals of contracts because these are not based on fictitious declarations, 
but on an agreement that the given agreement is tacitly renewed. To be valid, a standard clause 
providing for a fictitious declaration must contain three conditions of which two are mentioned 
in no. 5 lit. a) and b). The third (unwritten) condition is that the user must have a legitimate 
interest concerning such a clause, e.g., the execution of mass contracts.  
In terms of § 308 no. 6, fictitious receipts concerning declarations of the user that are of special 
importance are invalid. The provision applies by analogy to acts similar to legal transactions 
(e.g., overdue notices). It covers actual fictions, but also refutable or irrefutable presumptions. 
In German law, there is no prima facie proof that a registered letter has actually reached the 
recipient. The same applies to transmission confirmations for e-mail or fax. The law makes two 
exceptions of this principle, namely in §§ 132 BGB and 13 VVG. For these exceptions, content 
control does not take place because they merely reflect legal provisions. The phrase 'declaration 
of special importance' must be interpreted widely and applies to all declarations having adverse 
consequences for the customer. 
Despite the broad wording of the German heading of § 308 no. 7, this provision does not apply 
to all kinds of terminations of contracts, but foremost to cancellations and rescissions. As there 
is a need for protection of the customer also in other cases, no. 7 finds analogous application 
to other forms of termination, e.g., voidability. The rationale of the norm is to avoid that a 
termination of the contract is more attractive for the user than its execution. No. 7 aims to 
reflect the well-balanced statutory model and to achieve a fair balancing of the parties' interests. 
A remuneration is unreasonable if it significantly exceeds the objective value of the received 
performance, or if a reasonable compensation for an advantage the user had, is not taken into 
account. On the other hand, the amount to be reimbursed is reasonable if it is justifiable and 
appropriate. The courts do not distinguish between no. 7 and § 309 no. 5 which concerns lump-
sum claims for damages because the requirements for a lump sum are comparable in both 
provisions. They therefore declare such clauses invalid in terms of both norms. 
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3. The general clause of § 307 
3.1  Relevance and function of § 307(1) and (2) 
The general clause of § 307 plays a prominent role within the enquiry of standard terms. Not 
only the prohibitions contained in §§ 308 and 309 are built on the general clause, but they are 
also the concretisation of the standard defined by it. Hence, if a clause is forbidden in terms of 
§§ 308 or 309, the scrutiny under § 307 becomes superfluous to the extent that the conditions 
of §§ 308 or 309 are met (lex specialis derogat legi generali).5179 The general clause has a 
radiating effect on §§ 308 and 309.5180 For these reasons, it can be described as the core element 
of content control.5181 What is more, § 307 plays a significant role for the courts for the control 
of B2C and B2B agreements. In terms of § 310(1) 2nd sent., for the content control of B2B 
contracts only the general clause but not the prohibitions contained in §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 
309 apply. What is more, § 307 is a catch-all clause5182 which enables the judge to assess 
standard clauses according to the specific contractual context where no more specific 
prohibitions are applicable.5183 Even though §§ 308 and 309 contain the most critical 
prohibitions for standard terms, they only serve as examples and are not comprehensive. Since 
the German legislator aimed at comprehensive protection against unfair standard business 
terms, it 'completed' the protection granted by §§ 308 and 309 by a general clause.5184 The 
general clause must thus be assessed in cases where the more specific prohibitions of §§ 308 
and 309 do not apply.5185 
In practice, this means that one has to check first if the prohibitions contained in §§ 309 and 
308 apply before assessing the general clause.5186 Only in B2B contracts, the enquiry begins 
with § 307 because § 309 and certain items of § 308 are not applicable between business people. 
Nonetheless, the courts take into account the evaluations contained in §§ 308 and 307 in these 
                                                             
5179 Schmidt BGB-AT 425. 
5180 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 paras 10 and 83, Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 259. 
5181 MüKo/Kieninger BGB before § 307 para 1. 
5182 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 22, BGH NJW 1980, 2518 (2519), Staudinger/Coester (2006) before §§ 307-309 para 20, 
Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 791, Brox and Walker BGB-AT 114. 
5183 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 782. E.g., for a price-adjustment clause that is applicable only after 4 months after 
the conclusion of the contract, § 309 no. 1 finds no application, and the clause must be assessed in terms of § 307. 
5184 Stoffels AGB-Recht 182. 
5185 See also § 310(1) and (2). Brox and Walker BGB-AT 114. 
5186 Wertenbruch BGB-AT 138, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 23, Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 161. 
Since the conditions set out in § 309 are stricter than in § 308 (§ 308 contains evaluative elements), the assessment 
is done in the following (reverse) order: §§ 309 – 308 – 307. See Boecken BGB-AT 309. 
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cases too because they consider that a violation of §§ 308 or 309 in B2B contracts (if these 
provisions were applicable) is an indication for an infringement of § 307.5187 
In terms of § 307(3) 1st sent., '[paragraphs] (1) and (2) [of § 307], and [§§] 308 and 309 apply 
only to provisions in standard business terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating 
from legal provisions, or arrangements supplementing those legal provisions, are agreed.' This 
includes derogations from material legal provisions and customary law.5188 Positively 
formulated this means that content control only takes place for clauses that modify a legal 
situation that would be different if it were governed by statutory law. Negatively formulated, 
content control is not possible for clauses that do not modify existing statutory law.5189 
Therefore, clauses that merely reflect the contents of statutory provisions (declaratory clauses) 
are not subject to content control.5190 Furthermore, clauses stipulating the specification of the 
performance and the price are not submitted to content control either.5191 'Specification of the 
performance' refers to the type, the object, the amount or volume and the quality of the main 
performance, which is not determined by law.5192 For these cardinal obligations, no statutory 
provisions exist because they are an emanation of the principle of freedom of contract and 
therefore depend exclusively on the parties' will.5193 In these cases, the transparency 
requirements of § 307(1) 2nd sent. must be met though.5194 On the other hand, standard clauses 
by which cardinal obligations are restricted (e.g., limitation of the performance or exclusion of 
risk) are subject to content control.5195 In a market economy, the price for goods or services is 
agreed between the parties and not determined by law. Thus, the legislator did not want to 
submit price control to the courts.5196 Prices that are charged for a performance for which the 
supplier is obligated by law5197 or which he or she charges in its own interest are subject to 
content control, though.5198 Furthermore, ancillary price agreements, i.e., clauses concerning 
an object that can be determined by law through a gap-filling interpretation (e.g., the time of 
                                                             
5187 BGH NJW 2007, 3421 (3422 et seq), Schmidt BGB-AT 426. 
5188 Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 161. 
5189 Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 161. 
5190 Boecken BGB-AT 309. 
5191 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 783. 
5192 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 783. 
5193 Leenen BGB-AT 351. 
5194 For the transparency requirement of § 307(1) 2nd sent., see further below. 
5195 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 783. 
5196 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 22, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 784. 
5197 BGH NJW 2000, 651; 2001, 1419 (notification of the client that a debit order has not been honoured; banks 
have a duty to notify their clients of these facts under § 666). 
5198 BGH NJW 2001, 1419; 2002, 2386 (deactivation fee for a telephone line). 
 814   
 
performance, § 271; the place of payment, § 270; or payment conditions), are open to scrutiny 
in terms of § 307.5199 
3.2  Unreasonable disadvantage 
3.2.1 Applicable assessment standard 
In terms of § 307(1), 'provisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other party to the contract with 
the user.' The unreasonableness of the disadvantage leads to a two-step enquiry5200 which will 
be discussed in the following. 
In this context, it is reminded that contrary to the German general clause and recognised 
international standards, section 48 of the Act is very verbose and structured in an unnecessarily 
complicated way.5201 
a) Disadvantage 
The first step consists in the determination of whether the other party, usually the consumer, 
has suffered a disadvantage. This requires a legal comparison between the clause in question 
and statutory provisions.5202 A comparison with statutory provisions is obvious because content 
control is always a legal control.5203 In practice, this means that the standard clause in question 
has to be compared with the position in which the other party would be without this clause.5204 
If the result of this comparison is that the clause puts the other party in a worse position than it 
would be without it, there is a disadvantage to the detriment of the consumer. The determination 
of the disadvantage is only descriptive at this stage, i.e., without any evaluation.5205 
b) Unreasonableness 
The second step consists of the determination of the unreasonableness of the disadvantage and 
therefore contains a value judgment because this step is indissolvably linked with the principle 
of good faith.5206 The unreasonable disadvantage is the more specific aspect which refers to the 
                                                             
5199 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 785, Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 161. 
5200 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 90 et seq, Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 280 et seq, PWW/Berger § 307 
para 7. 
5201 See discussion on s 48 CPA in Part I ch 3 para 4. 
5202 Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 567, Stoffels Schuldverhältnisse 426. 
5203 Stoffels AGB-Recht 182. 
5204 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 90, BGH NJW 1994, 1069 (1070). 
5205 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 90. 
5206 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 90 and 95. According to von Hoyningen-Huene Inhaltskontrolle para 
173, the element of 'reasonableness' itself does not contain any value-judgment since only the principle of good 
faith delivers the standard of what is reasonable or not. In practice, this distinction should not lead to different 
results, however. 
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more general principle of good faith.5207 An unreasonable disadvantage in terms of § 307, or 
unfairness under article 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive, exists if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations 
to the detriment of the consumer.5208 This link expresses the legislator's objective to accept only 
contractual clauses that ensure a fair balancing of the parties' interests.5209 The courts have 
expressed this clearly by stating that a disadvantage must be assumed where the user is merely 
concerned with its own interests in an abusive manner, without considering the other parties' 
interests, and thus does not undertake any steps to balance both parties' interests.5210  
Therefore, this second step only consists of a weighing of interests. This is done by identifying 
the typical interests of the parties in the given type of contractual relationship. Here, the 
economic objective of the contract has to be considered as well as third parties' interests, if 
any.5211 The BGH refuses a systematic and general consideration of third-party interests, 
however.5212 This identification is merely descriptive.5213 The fact that certain clauses are 
widespread or even customary does not exclude their unreasonableness.5214 
Afterwards, the weighing of the typical interests of the contractual relationship in question 
takes place. In general, the bar for justifying an impairment of the other party's interests is a 
fortiori higher the more intense this interference is.5215 For example, the user can only impair 
the consumer's privacy, which is protected by the Constitution, if it can put forward significant 
interests. Hence, a (revocable) clause by which the consumer agrees to sales calls is an 
uncontrollable disturbance of his or her privacy, and the supplier's interests to promote its 
products and its profit-seeking cannot justify the existence of such a clause.5216 
When weighing the parties' interests, one must always keep in mind the statutory provisions 
from which the contract deviates. The more a clause deviates from the statutory provisions, the 
higher are the requirement for justifying such a deviation.5217 A slight disadvantage is not 
insignificant per se but can be neutralised by other interests of the user (e.g., rationalisation).5218 
                                                             
5207 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 787. 
5208 This is clearly set out in art 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
5209 BGH NJW 1997, 193 (195). 
5210 BGH NJW 2008, 1064 (1065), BAG NZA 2006, 324 (326), Schmidt BGB-AT 431, Bork BGB-AT 698. 
5211 BGH NJW 1999, 3558 (3559); NJW-RR 2006, 1258 (1259), Schmidt BGB-AT 432. 
5212 BGH NJW 1982, 178 (180), Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 12. 
5213 Stoffels AGB-Recht 183. 
5214 BGHZ 114, 15, BGHZ 106, 267, PWW/Berger § 307 para 7. 
5215 Stoffels AGB-Recht 183. 
5216 BGH NJW 1999, 1864 et seq; 1999, 2279 (2282); 2000, 2677 (2678). 
5217 Erman/Roloff BGB § 307 para 26. 
5218 Stoffels AGB-Recht 184. 
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It is therefore important not to assume an unreasonable disadvantage too quickly when being 
confronted with atypical contractual clauses, despite a certain degree of divergence between 
the contents of the clause and the statutory provision. It has to be considered that possibly the 
parties agreed upon alternatives to the statutory provision and that the balancing of their 
interests could be achieved by other means.5219 
The BGH decided that a clause in a lease for an apartment, according to which the tenant had 
to paint the interior walls in white when moving out constitutes an unreasonable disadvantage 
for the tenant. This clause would prevent price-conscious tenants from painting their walls in 
other discreet colours while staying in the apartment.5220 On the other hand, in another case, 
the BGH decided that a clause in a standard lease by which the tenant was not allowed to paint 
or varnish wooden parts (skirting, ceiling) in other colours than in those stipulated in the clause 
does not unreasonably disadvantage the tenant.5221 Furthermore, the LG Frankfurt held that a 
clause prescribing a rigid schedule for the renovation of an apartment by the tenant, without 
considering the actual condition of the apartment, violates § 307(1).5222 Clauses by which a 
tenant has to participate proportionally to a renovation that was not due yet after he or she 
moved out, constitutes an unreasonable disadvantage too because it is possible that the tenant 
barely used the apartment or took utmost care so that a renovation was not necessary.5223 
So-called 'price-adjustment clauses' are not disadvantageous per se. These clauses, which are 
primarily used in open-ended agreements, such as pay-TV subscriptions or for the provision of 
gas or electricity, ascertain that the supplier is allowed to adjust its price if its own costs rise. 
They have the advantage that the supplier must not undertake a long-term calculation but can 
adapt its prices to a changing environment. Furthermore, they protect the customer from being 
invoiced with a higher price from the beginning because the supplier wants to protect itself 
from shrinking margins in the future. Price-adjustment clauses infringe § 307(1) though if they 
do not limit price increases to the actual increase that the supplier has to bear and therefore 
allow for an actual increase of its margin as this creates a contractual imbalance between the 
parties' rights and obligations.5224 
                                                             
5219 Stoffels AGB-Recht 184. 
5220 'White paint clause' decision: BGH NJW 2011, 514. 
5221 BGH NJW 2009, 62 et seq. 
5222 LG Frankfurt/M.. NJW-RR 2004, 160. 
5223 LG Hamburg NJW 2005, 2462 et seq. 
5224 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (361); 2009, 578; 2009, 2667. 
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Since the South African general clause is structured in a more complex manner, it is not 
apparent whether for content control the balance of the parties' interest has to be considered 
here as well. It is submitted that for any fairness enquiry, this has to be the case. Fairness can 
only be ascertained where the interests of the parties are evenly balanced. This becomes clearer 
in section 48(2)(b) of the Act pursuant to which the terms of the agreement are so adverse to 
the consumer as to be inequitable. It seems that the adverseness in section 48(2)(b) is 
comparable to the 'disadvantage' in § 307(1) 1st sent. For the fairness enquiry, one has to assess 
whether the clause is equitable. Evaluative elements, such as good faith as well as the balance 
of the parties' interests have to be considered.5225 
As submitted in the South African part of this thesis, the list contained in section 52(2) of the 
Act is not exhaustive.5226 Thus, other factors, e.g., those which serve as the best international 
model, and which can be found in the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law 
Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission in 20055227 should also 
be considered by the courts. The Bill also contained the balance of the parties' interests as a 
fairness factor (item (c).5228 
3.2.2 Moment of evaluation 
In individual proceedings, the time of conclusion of the contract is the relevant moment for the 
assessment.5229 For consumer contracts this is expressly stated in article 4(1) of the Unfair 
Terms Directive ('at the time of conclusion of the contract') as well as in § 310(3) no. 3 BGB.5230 
This does not only apply to factual circumstances, but also to evaluative elements. Therefore, 
regulatory changes can neither make a clause valid if it was invalid at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract or vice versa.5231 The courts do not apply this principle in strictu senso and argue 
that the change of the standard of evaluation had already taken place at the moment when the 
                                                             
5225 See discussion on s 48(2)(b) in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.2 b). 
5226 Some authorities, like Naudé or Sharrock, are also of this opinion. See Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and 
Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11, Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 135. 
5227 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 373 and 374. 
5228 Section 14(4) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill published in Law Commissions of England and Wales and 
the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)(2005). 
5229 BGH NJW 2000, 1110 (1113), Medicus NJW 1995, 2579 et seq, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 100, 
Schmidt BGB-AT 431. 
5230 Article 4(1) of the Directive: '(…) the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed (…) at the time of 
conclusion of the contract (…).' § 310(3): 'In the case of contracts between an entrepreneur and a consumer 
(consumer contracts) the rules in this division apply with the following provisos: (…) 3. In judging an 
unreasonable disadvantage under [§] 307(1) and (2), the other circumstances attending the entering into of the 
contract must also be taken into account.' Emphasis added. 
5231 Stoffels AGB-Recht 184. 
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parties entered into the contract.5232 This view is problematic in terms of legal certainty though. 
The demarcation between a change of the standard of evaluation before or after a regulatory 
change is too difficult to undertake. Hence, the legislative situation, expressed by the laws in 
force, should be the only applicable standard. 
In contrast, in institutional actions (general use challenges) where no concrete contract has been 
entered into, the moment of the last oral proceedings is relevant.5233 
According to section 52(2)(c) of the Act, the court also must consider circumstances that 
existed when the agreement was made, irrespective of whether the Act was in force at that time. 
The fairness enquiry is thus shifted temporally forward. In practice, this could be relevant for 
agreements for the continuous supply of goods or services but should have less and less 
relevance. Here too, this applies only to factual circumstances but not to regulatory changes.5234 
3.2.3 Abstract-universal approach 
To answer the question of whether a clause raises concern, an abstract-general and typified 
approach is applied, which does not take into account the concrete circumstances of the 
individual case.5235 Hence, the user's interests are weighed against the interests of a typical, 
average consumer. In this context, the type and object of the contract, its objective as well as 
the particularities of this type of transaction are taken into consideration.5236 The evaluation 
concerns the question of whether the given type of transaction creates an unreasonable 
disadvantage to the other party considering the typical interests of the parties.5237 
For example, in a gym contract entered into for a year which provides that the client has to pay 
a monthly fee even if he or she does not use the gym, it is irrelevant if the gym owner would 
cancel the contract and reimburse a particular client who was unable to attend the gym due to 
a long illness. The actual application of the clause in an individual case is thus not relevant for 
the control of the clause.5238 
Where standard terms are used for different groups of customers, the typical interests for these 
different groups must be taken into consideration so that the results might be different for each 
                                                             
5232 BGH NJW 1995, 2553. 
5233 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 119. 
5234 See discussion on s 52(2)(c) in Part I ch 3 para 2.2. 
5235 BGH NJW 2000, 2106 (2107); 2002, 1713 /1715), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 110 et seq, PWW/Berger § 307 
para 9, Schmidt BGB-AT 430, Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 164. 
5236 BGH NJW 1987, 2575 (2576); 1990, 1601 (1602). 
5237 BGH NJW 1987, 487; 1990, 1601 (1602), Stoffels AGB-Recht 184. 
5238 BGH NJW 1997, 193 (194). 
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group.5239 A clause that is unproblematic in B2B contracts might hence raise concern in a 
consumer contract.5240 
Contrary to German legislation, the Act applies a particular-personalised approach where the 
particular consumer's situation is assessed. This becomes clear when reading the factors listed 
in section 52(2). These are geared towards procedural fairness, such as the nature of the parties, 
their relationship to each other and their respective education (item (b)), the parties' conduct 
(item (d)), or the consumer's knowledge of unfair terms (item (h)).5241 
3.2.4 Fairness control and consumer contracts 
a) Autonomous interpretation of art. 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive? 
Under article 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive, '[a] contractual term which has not been 
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirements of good faith, 
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer.' Article 4 concretises which elements have to be considered 
for the fairness enquiry. The question has been raised whether the standard for such an 
imbalance in the parties contractual rights and obligations is the same in article 3(1) and 
§ 307.5242 If this were not the case, a clause would have to be assessed both against the 
background of article 3 of the Directive and § 307 BGB.5243 
Since the German general clause is a widely formulated catch-all clause, most authors agree 
that a (theoretical) divergence between both provisions can be resolved by applying the 
methods of interpretation.5244 Some authors are of the view that the European Court of Justice 
has a prerogative in terms of article 267 TFEU (ex-article 234 TEC)5245 and that article 3(1) of 
the Directive has to be interpreted autonomously by the ECJ. They argue that the standards of 
                                                             
5239 BGH NJW 1990, 1601 (1602); 2000, 658 (660). 
5240 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 112, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 8. 
5241 See discussion on s 52 in Part I ch 3 para 2. 
5242 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 397, Ulmer EuZW 1993, 345 and Frey ZIP 1993, 575 are of the opinion that the level 
of protection of § 9 AGBG (now § 307 BGB) is not lesser than the one of art 3 of the Directive. 
5243 Stoffels AGB-Recht 185. 
5244 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 80. 
5245 Article 267 TFEU: 'The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union; Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal 
of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable 
it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending 
before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national 
law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. If such a question is raised in a case pending 
before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall act with the minimum of delay.' 
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the national statutory laws are irrelevant and that it is necessary to formulate a uniform 
European standard, which could only be undertaken by the ECJ.5246 
On the other hand, the contrary – and correct view – argues that such a standard can only be 
formulated by the national courts, including the national legal principles and case law because 
European law does not have a sufficiently concrete standard.5247 What is more, article 1(2) of 
the Directive and recital 13 underscore the role of the statutory or regulatory provisions of the 
Member States.5248 Finally, the ECJ has decided that the standard for content control is limited 
to the national legal order in question in which the contractual provision has effect.5249 
b) Hybrid solution pursuant to § 310(3) no. 3 
The aforementioned abstract-universal approach is modified for consumer contracts in terms 
of § 310(3) no. 3 because 'in judging an unreasonable disadvantage (…), the other 
circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must also be taken into account'.5250 
This modification is due to the transposition of article 4 of the Unfair Terms Directive into 
German law. 
§§ 305 et seq. do not define the formulation 'the other circumstances attending the entering into 
of the contract'. Recital 16 of the EU Directive gives some guidance though and makes clear 
that the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree 
to the term, or whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special order of the 
consumer have to be considered. Fuchs maintains that one can distinguish between three 
categories of circumstances attending the entering into the contract, namely 1) the personal 
qualities of the contractual party (level of personal business experience), 2) the particularities 
of the concrete situation when concluding the contract (e.g., pressure, taking the other party by 
surprise, explanations), and 3) particular atypical interests of the consumer (the intended use 
of the good known by the supplier).5251 
The modification of the abstract-general standard by taking into account also the earlier 
mentioned 'other circumstances' requires a two-step enquiry: In a first step, the usual abstract-
universal approach is applied. At this stage, the concrete circumstances of the conclusion of 
                                                             
5246 Nassall JZ 1995, 692 et seq. Also the ECJ decision Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero 
concerning the Unfair Terms Directive (NJW 2000, 2571 et seq) pointed in that direction. 
5247 H. Roth JZ 1999, 535 et seq, Heinrichs NJW 1996, 2196, Staudinger/Schlosser (2006) before §§ 305 et seq 
para 9 et seq, WHL/Horn § 24a AGBG para 59. 
5248 Stoffels AGB-Recht 185. 
5249 ECJ NJW 2004, 1647. 
5250 Grigoleit and Neuner BGB-AT 164. Emphasis added. 
5251 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 406 et seq. See also BAG NZA 2006, 324 (328). 
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the contract are not considered. This approach is justified because § 310(3) no. 3 ('also') does 
not require that the abstract-general approach be completely replaced. In addition, article 4(1) 
of the Directive does not exclusively require a particular-personalised enquiry, and recital 16 
speaks of 'general criteria'.5252 
The second step consists in the consideration of the concrete-individual circumstances of the 
conclusion of the contract. This step can influence the result in both directions, i.e., in favour 
of the customer or to its disadvantage.5253 Therefore, a clause that is not unreasonably 
disadvantageous for the consumer per se can be found unreasonably disadvantageous if the 
supplier conceals the disadvantages of the clause to the consumer. On the other hand, a clause 
with an unreasonably disadvantageous content in the sense of § 307 can pass the test if the 
consumer was familiar with this kind of clauses and the supplier informed him or her thereof. 
This solution might be unfavourable to the consumer but is consequent and in keeping with the 
Directive which requires that all other circumstances be considered.5254 Furthermore, it reflects 
the reality of the responsible consumer and promotes equal treatment between the parties.5255 
The consumer's knowledge of unfair terms is also a factor listed in section 52(2)(h) of the 
Consumer Protection Act.5256 
§ 310(3) no. 3 does not apply to institutional actions since they do not refer to a specific entering 
into a contract.5257 After such a decision, the parties must be able to refer to particular 
circumstances that existed during the conclusion of a particular contract, however, in order to 
reach a different decision in individual proceedings. Hence, § 11 UKlaG5258 must be interpreted 
restrictively in these cases.5259 
                                                             
5252 Stoffels AGB-Recht 188. 
5253 BAG NZA 2008, 170 (172), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 410, MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 75. 
5254 MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 75, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 410, OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 2001, 780. 
5255 Stoffels AGB-Recht 188. 
5256 See discussion on s 52(2)(h) in Part I ch 3 para 2.2. 
5257 BGH NJW 1999, 2180 (2182); 2001, 2971 (2973), Palandt/Grüneberg § 310 para 20, Michalski DB 1999, 
680. 
5258 § 11 UKlaG: 'Effects of the judgment - If the user against whom judgment has been given fails to comply 
with an injunction based on § 1, the provision in the standard contract terms is to be regarded as void insofar as 
the party concerned invokes the effect of the injunction. However, this party cannot invoke the effect of the 
injunction if the user against whom judgment has been given could contest the judgment under § 10.' 
5259 Stoffels AGB-Recht 189. 
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3.2.5 Aspects in respect of the fairness enquiry 
With respect to the long-time experience in the field of standard business terms, some 
principles for the application and evaluation have evolved. They give some guidance for the 
enquiry and will be discussed in the following. 
a) Scrutiny of individual clauses 
Content control always refers to a specific contractual clause and never to the entire contractual 
agreement.5260 This emanates from the wording of § 307(1) ('provisions in standard business 
terms') and the title of the Unfair Terms Directive ('Unfair terms in consumer contracts'). 
Another approach would not make sense since only the enquiry of individual clauses makes a 
differentiated result possible with regard to an unreasonable disadvantage for a party. This does 
not mean though that the other provisions of the agreement are not to be taken into account. A 
provision can only be evaluated by taking the remainder of the contract as well as individually 
agreed clauses into consideration.5261 This has two consequences, referred to as the 
'accumulative effect'5262 and 'compensational effect'5263. 
aa) Accumulative effect 
The disadvantageous effect of a clause that itself is still acceptable can be intensified by another 
clause so that the interplay between the two clauses creates an unreasonable disadvantage.5264 
In general, this leads to the ineffectiveness of both clauses,5265 irrespective of whether one 
clause was a standard clause and the other individually agreed.5266 If a standard clause is 
ineffective, and another clause that is intertwined with it is valid, the whole provision covered 
by both clauses might be ineffective.5267 For example, in a lease where the tenant has to 
undertake minor repairs on a regular basis (clause 1) and renovate the entire flat when moving 
out (clause 2), irrespective of the moment when he or she undertook the last repairs, the 
combination of both clauses constitutes an unreasonable disadvantage for the tenant. They are 
                                                             
5260 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 171. Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 89. 
5261 BGH NJW 1989, 582; 1993, 532, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 13, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 
124, PWW/Berger § 307 para 9. 
5262 Summierungseffekt or Verstärkereffekt. 
5263 Kompensationswirkung. 
5264 BGH NJW 2006, 2116 (2117); 2007, 997 (999), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 155, PWW/Berger § 307 para 10, 
von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 177. 
5265 BGH NJW 2007, 997 (999), Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 13. 
5266 BGH NJW 2006, 2116 (2117). 
5267 BGH NJW 2003, 2234; 2003, 3192. 
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both ineffective.5268 It would have been different if the final renovation was only due if the last 
renovation during the tenancy was overdue.5269  
bb) Compensational effect 
Contrary to the accumulative effect, the compensational effect refers to cases where a clause 
presenting a disadvantage for the consumer might be compensated by other, advantageous 
provisions so that the interaction between them does not constitute an unreasonable 
disadvantage. The consideration of such an advantageous clause is nonetheless only permitted 
if there is a material connection between the two provisions, and the advantageous clause has 
sufficient weight for adequate compensation.5270 
Therefore, the obligation of a magazine retailer set out in a standard business terms contract to 
carry the whole range of magazines of his wholesaler is an unreasonable disadvantage for the 
retailer. A clause by which the retailer has the right to give back the magazines not sold within 
a certain period compensates this disadvantage, however.5271 Another example is the practice 
of employers to present a form to be signed by their employees by which the latter declare that 
they are excluded from asserting any claims against the employer after the end of their 
employment contract. These clauses are unreasonably disadvantageous for employees, save 
where a similar declaration of the employer compensates them, or if the employer accepts to 
pay a severance package to the former employee.5272 
German courts are particularly generous with the application of the compensational effect with 
regard to contractual instruments that have been negotiated collectively, such as the 
Construction Tendering and Contract Regulations (VOB)5273 or the General German Carrier 
Conditions (ADSp).5274 The courts argue that these instruments came into being with the 
collaboration of all concerned economic actors and have been widely recognised for more than 
60 years. The ADSp, for instance, are a 'general contractual order' and have become a 'readily 
useable legal order'. This does not exclude them from content control but leads to the result 
that the normative objective of the entire regulation and the economic circumstances of the 
case must be considered. The individual ADSp norms can therefore not be assessed in isolation 
                                                             
5268 BGH NJW 2003, 2234; 2003, 3192. 
5269 Schmidt BGB-AT 433. 
5270 BGH NJW 2003, 888 (890 et seq), Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 125, PWW/Berger § 307 para 10. 
Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 173 does not require such a connection. 
5271 BGH NJW 1982, 644 (645). 
5272 LAG Schleswig-Holstein BB 2004, 608, LAG Düsseldorf DB 2005, 1463, 1465. 
5273 BGH NJW 1999, 942 (943). VOB = Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen. 
5274 Affirmative: Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 15. ADSp = Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteursbedingungen. 
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with regard to the statutory norms of the ius dispositivum. Instead, the interests of both parties 
in the context of the ADSp have to be evaluated.5275 Note should be taken that this is only valid 
if the entire collectively negotiated regulation is being agreed upon, and not only individual 
clauses or certain parts of it.5276 
In contrast, under section 48(2) in pr. of the Act, the fairness enquiry does not only cover 
individual clauses but also transactions or agreements as a whole.5277  
The idea of the compensational effect has also been expressed in Barkhuizen v Napier: ‘[T]he 
idea of balance suggests that an advantage obtained in ancillary terms, such as an exclusion of 
liability or a fixed measure of damage for breach, should be matched by corresponding benefits 
to the other party.5278 
More generally, also in terms of the Act, contract terms must not be seen in isolation. The 
circumstances and the context of the agreement must be considered too.5279 The contract ‘as a 
whole’ must thus be taken into account because a provision that confers a benefit on the 
consumer might be commensurate with the detriment caused by a clause alleged to be 
unfair.5280 
b) Rationalisation effect 
In principle, a high degree of rationalisation by standard business terms speak for their fairness 
because rationalisation is one of the main reasons for their existence.5281 If they involve 
disadvantages for the other party, one has to assess whether the consumer can be expected to 
accept the consequences.5282 Therefore, a direct debit order contained in the standard terms of 
a broadband provider is not presenting an unreasonable disadvantage.5283 For mobile phone 
contracts and the varying amounts to be paid each month this is however only valid if the 
                                                             
5275 BGH NJW-RR 1997, 1253 (1255). 
5276 BGH NJW 2003, 1321 (1322). With regard to the VOB/B, the BGH is now of the view that each modification 
is to be interpreted in that the regulation as a whole is not being agreed upon, irrespective of how intense the 
modification is (BGH NJW 2004, 1597). 
5277 Section 48(2): '(…) a transaction or agreement, or a term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a 
notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if (…)'. 
5278 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [165], where Sachs J cites Collins Law of Contract 253. 
5279 See s 52(2)(c) and (e). See also art 4 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC 
of 5 April 1993 and art 83(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Common European Sales Law COM (2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011 and art 32(2) of the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COM (2008) 614 final, submitted 
on 8 October 2008. 
5280 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 136. 
5281 Schmidt BGB-AT 409. 
5282 BGH NJW 1996, 988 (989), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 121. 
5283 BGH NJW 1996, 988, Häuser JZ 1997, 957 et seq.  
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provisions ensure that the customer has sufficient time between the reception of the invoice 
and the debit of the given amount in order to check the invoice and credit his or her bank 
account (minimum five working days).5284 
c) Risk control 
For the fairness review of a clause which passes a certain risk onto a party, it is relevant to 
enquire in whose sphere the risk is passed onto, and if the realisation of the risk can be avoided 
better and cheaper by the consumer or the supplier.5285 This criterion is confirmed by the so-
called economic analysis of the law which aims to allocate the risk of a breach or default of the 
contract to the 'cheapest cost avoider'.5286 Hence, a clause in the standard terms of a supplier of 
domestic fuel by which the user declines any obligation to check the customer's tank and 
excludes its liability for damages due to the overflowing of the tank is unreasonable. The 
customer cannot be expected to check his tanks since he has not the necessary expertise and 
means. What is more, the monitoring of the filling of the tank is incumbent to the fuel 
provider.5287 The same applies to the operator of a car wash facility who is obliged to check, 
control and monitor its installation regularly, and is in a position to choose its staff carefully. 
On the other hand, the client is not able to do this. This is why a clause that passes on the risk 
for damages on his or her car due to a defective car wash site is ineffective.5288 
d) Insurability 
Another factor for the fairness enquiry is the insurability of the risk. Hence, it is important to 
know whether the risks involved can be insured better by the user or the other party.5289 In this 
regard, the economic analysis of the law refers to the 'cheapest insurer'.5290 Not only the 
possibility to insure the risk is relevant in this context, but also the premiums to be paid as well 
as the coverage offered. In addition, the claims settlement must be acceptable for the party in 
question and be a widespread practice.5291 Where it is common practice that the consumer 
insures the risk belonging to a certain business sector, the supplier can rely on this, and the 
exclusion of the risk is not an unreasonable disadvantage for the consumer.5292 
                                                             
5284 BGH NJW 2003, 1237. 
5285 BGH NJW 2005, 422 (424), von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 190 et seq. 
5286 Schäfer and Ott Ökonomische Analyse 227 et seq, Stoffels AGB-Recht 192. 
5287 BGH NJW 1971, 1036. 
5288 BGH NJW 2005, 422, Leenen BGB-AT 354. 
5289 BGH NJW 1991, 1886 (1888); 2002, 673 (675), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 156 et seq, von Hoyningen-Huene 
§ 9 AGBG para 216 et seq. 
5290 Schäfer and Ott Ökonomische Analyse 407 et seq. 
5291 BGH NJW 1992, 1761 (1762), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 159. 
5292 BGH NJW 1992, 1761 (1762). 
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Therefore, a clause by which the operator of a car wash facility excludes damages to the 
exterior or the paintwork of its customers' vehicles raises concerns. The supplier can easily 
insure those risks without increasing its prices dramatically, whereas these risks are not even 
included in the customer's comprehensive insurance policy.5293  
On the other hand, a shift of the supplier's liability onto the consumer is not suspicious where 
usually the clients insure the risk(s) in question.5294 Hence, a standard provision by which the 
liability of a shipyard for damages arising during repairs is not problematic because they are 
common practice in this sector, and the customer is already fully insured against these risks by 
means of its mandatory insurance policy. If the shipyard had to insure these risks as well, the 
customer would not only have to bear its own insurance premiums but also an increase in the 
shipyard's prices in order to cover their premiums.5295 
According to section 52(2)(f) of the Act, the court must consider whether, as a result of conduct 
engaged in by the supplier, the consumer was required to do anything that was not reasonably 
necessary for the legitimate interests of the supplier.5296 
In any event, the assessment of the legitimate interest of the supplier begs the question of 
whether a term represents a proportionate response to the supplier’s interest, such as a risk 
faced by it, and other possible ways by which it could have protected its interest as well as 
market practice.5297 Where the supplier limits its liability, one has to consider whether it was 
reasonable to expect it to insure itself against the liability and whether the consumer could be 
expected to insure him- or herself. As regards the consumer, the question of whether the 
supplier had advised the consumer timeously to take insurance, or whether the consumer should 
otherwise have realised that it needed insurance, are important factors for this enquiry.5298  
                                                             
5293 BGH NJW 2005, 422. UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 159 argue that those damages are insurable for the customer; 
they come to the same result, though. 
5294 BGH NJW 2002, 673 (675). 
5295 BGH NJW 1988, 1785 (1787). 
5296 Two factors of the SA Law Commission's list implicitly refer to the legitimate interest criterion: '(m) whether 
a term is unduly difficult to fulfil, or imposes obligations or liabilities on a party which are not reasonably 
necessary to protect the other party' and '(n) whether the contract or term excludes or limits the obligations or 
liabilities of a party to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to protect his or her interests'. Emphasis added. 
5297 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 28. 
5298 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 30. 
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e) Irrelevance of the 'price argument' 
The so-called 'price argument'5299 in terms of which an unfair clause might become fair by 
compensating it with a lower price, is generally irrelevant.5300 The reasons put forward are that 
any legal disadvantage could somehow be justified economically and that the client is unlikely 
to receive fair compensation for this disadvantage. Furthermore, the advantage in terms of the 
price is not measurable with regard to the price that would be fair in the absence of the term.5301 
In addition, courts are not in the position to assess the 'normal' price which they would have to 
correlate with the 'reduced' price.5302 
The BGH5303 had to decide a case in which a doctor bought furniture for his waiting room to a 
very low price. The salesperson justified the low price by the fact that the standard terms of the 
supplier completely excluded its liability and that this cost-saving would be transferred to the 
clients. According to the court, such a clause is invalid under § 307(1).5304 It argued that the 
supplier has to calculate its prices within the limits of the principle of good faith, and even 
though the customer might benefit from a lower price, this would not justify a deviation from 
the seller's obligations. An exception is made where the consumer has a real choice between 
different versions of a contract entailing different prices, for example, with or without the 
seller's liability.5305  
Furthermore, the BGH puts some weight on the price argument and the exclusion of the 
supplier's liability in the electricity supply sector.5306 Such an exception of the irrelevance of 
the price argument can only be justified though if the exclusion of the supplier's risk merely 
concerns a manageable risk, the client is able to evaluate the extent to the risk that he or she 
must insure, and if the conclusion of an insurance policy is more economical than a price 
increase of its supplier, which would be onerous for all customers.5307 Fuchs doubts that this 
argumentation applies to all other mass contracts.5308 An assessment on a case-to-case basis is 
thus probably the most reasonable approach. 
                                                             
5299 Preisargument. 
5300 BGH NJW-RR 2008, 818 (820), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 145, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 179.  
5301 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 144 and 145. 
5302 Stoffels AGB-Recht 194. 
5303 BGH NJW 1957, 17 (19). 
5304 § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) is not applicable because of § 310(1) 1st sent. 
5305 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 148, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 18. 
5306 BGH NJW 1998, 1640 (1644). 
5307 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 137 in fine. 
5308 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 146. 
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The 'price argument' seems not to apply to the Act though as section 48(1)(a)(i) seems to 
introduce a price control mechanism. As already discussed in Part I, it is unlikely that the South 
African legislature intended to introduce a price control mechanism in section 48.5309  
In terms of section 52(2)(a) of the Act, the court must consider the fair value of the goods or 
services in question. The ‘fair’ value relates to the price of a good or a service and thus is a 
substantive fairness consideration. As already discussed elsewhere, courts should be careful to 
interfere with pricing issues as they do often not have the technical skills to assess the ‘fair’ 
price.5310 Therefore, South African courts should only interfere where the price is manifestly 
unjust or there is an excessive advantage for the supplier.5311  
The same applies to the suggested (and non-listed) factor in section 52(2) of the Act that greater 
costs for the supplier, if certain terms were to be omitted, should be taken into account in the 
fairness enquiry.5312 A term might be fair if it represents a fair balancing between the 
consumer’s and the supplier’s interests. A slight increase in costs due to the omission of the 
term would probably not make it fair. If the supplier can insure itself against the risk in question 
without materially increasing the price paid by the consumer, the term will probably be 
unfair.5313 In this regard, it is referred to the discussion above on risk control and insurability. 
f) Constitutional aspects 
When applying the general clause, also constitutional aspects must be considered because of 
the radiating effect of fundamental rights on other rights and obligations. 
In contracts with a personal aspect (e.g., dating agency agreements), the constitutional rights 
of articles 1 (human dignity) and 2 GG5314 (freedom of personal development) therefore have 
to be considered in the fairness enquiry as regards the duration of such a contract.5315 Moreover, 
in employment contracts, the constitutional right of professional freedom (article 12 GG) must 
be considered. A prohibition of any secondary employment is thus an unreasonable 
disadvantage under § 307(1).5316 Other problematic provisions in this field are repayment 
                                                             
5309 See discussion on s 48(1)(a)(i) in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.1 a). 
5310 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 309, Sharrock Judicial control 131. 
5311 Naudé ‘Introduction to Sections 48-52 and regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
5312 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 136. 
5313 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) ee). 
5314 GG = Grundgesetz, the German Constitution. 
5315 Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 18. 
5316 OLG Naumburg NZA-RR 2007, 521. 
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clauses for training costs borne by the employer,5317 gratifications5318 and non-competition 
clauses.5319 
3.3  The provision of § 307(2) 
§ 307(2) offers guidance as to when a clause is unreasonably disadvantageous and concretises 
paragraph (1) of the same provision. Consequently, paragraph (2) must be assessed before 
paragraph (1). The courts often do not distinguish between the two paragraphs and are content 
with merely stating that a clause is invalid in terms of § 307.5320 If a clause does obviously not 
fall under § 307(2), one can assess § 307(1) directly of course.5321 
3.3.1 § 307(2) no. 1 and 2 as self-contained specific provisions of content control 
§ 307(2) provides that '[a]n unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to 
exist if a provision' fulfils the conditions set out in no. 1 or 2 of § 307(2). The meaning of the 
phrase 'in case of doubt' is discussed controversially. The Government Bill for the AGBG5322 
states that the legislator intends not to assume unreasonableness eo ipso but that the user has 
the possibility to explain why a clause should exceptionally be valid. 
Some authors argue that § 307(2) is a provision governing the burden of proof.5323 According 
to this view, the user bears the onus of proof if he or she wants to assert that there is no 
unreasonable disadvantage for the other party. This opinion is contrary to the essence of proof, 
which can only concern facts, and not legal evaluations or the weighing of interests. The same 
applies to the viewpoint that paragraph (2) is a 'refutable assumption of ineffectiveness',5324 
since this term also refers to facts.5325 
The prevailing opinion classifies paragraph (2) as legal rule examples for paragraph (1) of 
§ 307.5326 Therefore, 'in case of doubt' is to be read as 'in general'. This means that an 
unreasonable disadvantage exists if the conditions of paragraph (2) are fulfilled, except where 
there are indications in the concrete case that this rule does not lead to fair results. 
                                                             
5317 BAG NZA 2008, 1004. 
5318 BAG NZA 2008, 40 (43). 
5319 BVerfG AP no. 65. 
5320 For example, BGH NJW 1984, 871 (872); NJW-RR 1998, 629. This practice is rightly criticised by some 
authors: von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 132, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 83. 
5321 Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 163. 
5322 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
5323 L/GvW/T/Löwe § 9 AGBG para 20, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 58. 
5324 Widerlegbare Unwirksamkeitsvermutung. Erman/Roloff BGB § 307 para 1. 
5325 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 238. 
5326 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 238, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
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The drawback of this opinion is that it is hardly imaginable that a clause creating an 
unreasonable disadvantage under paragraph (2) can still become valid in terms of paragraph 
(1). This would mean that paragraph (1) has a broader scope of evaluation than paragraph (2), 
and that the evaluation made in terms of paragraph (2) is only temporary, awaiting a final 
judgment by referring to paragraph (1).5327 With regard to the fact that the control under §§ 307 
et seq. requires a supra-individual and generalising approach which does not consider the 
concrete circumstances, but only the typical characteristics of an agreement, the question begs 
to be asked why paragraph (2), which contains many open concepts ('compatible', 'essential 
rights', 'attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised', 'nature of the contract') should 
not be able to integrate the given transactions and allow a final enquiry. Therefore, a correction 
of the evaluation obtained with regard to paragraph (2) by assessing the clause against the 
background of paragraph (1) is excluded from a methodological point of view. Paragraph (2) 
should thus be regarded as a self-contained provision of content control which determines 
unequivocally whether there is an unreasonable disadvantage.5328 Hence, the phrase 'in case of 
doubt' is superfluous.5329 
Because of the formulation ‘[w]ithout limiting the generality of subsection 1’ at the beginning 
of subsection (2) of section 48 of the Act, the ambit of section 48(1) is supposed to reach 
beyond the instances of unfairness set out in section 48(2)(a) and (b).5330  
In contrast to § 307(2), the objective of section 48(2) of the Act is to make sure that section 
48(1) is not interpreted restrictively, i.e. in a manner where only the instances of unfairness 
listed in section 48(2) are considered, but that also the deceptive standard embodied in section 
48(2)(c), read with section 41, as well as the procedural standard of section 48(2)(d)(ii) are 
included.5331 Hence, subsection (2) of section 48 is not lex specialis to subsection (1), but the 
two provisions complete each other. It is suggested that subsection (2) has a radiating effect on 
subsection (1), and is not a self-contained provision of content control.5332 
This 'radiating effect' is limited, though, and subsection (2) is not helpful in concretising 
unfairness in terms of subsection (1). Section 48(2) gives examples for when a clause is unfair. 
This is the case if it is excessively one-sided, or so adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable, 
                                                             
5327 Stoffels AGB-Recht 197, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 239. 
5328 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 226. 
5329 Schmidt-Salzer AGB para F 46 ('superfluous or ineffective'), Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 19 
('virtually without any relevance'). 
5330 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 249. 
5331 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 250. 
5332 See discussion on the basic unfairness standard of s 48(2) in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.2. 
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or if the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive representation or a statement of 
opinion to the detriment of the consumer, or the transaction or agreement was subject to a term 
or condition, or a notice to a consumer according to section 49(1), and it is unfair, unreasonable, 
unjust or unconscionable,5333 or the consumer has not been informed by its fact, nature and 
effect in a manner that satisfied section 49. Unfortunately, only the first paragraph, relating to 
one-sidedness, is helpful in defining the concept of ‘unfair, unreasonable or unjust’, whereas 
paragraph (b) only uses the synonym ‘inequitable’ and therefore creates a certain circularity.5334 
Therefore, it is submitted that the interlacing of these two subsections is limited. 
3.3.2 Relationship between § 307(2) no. 1 and 2 
Generally, 307(2) no. 1 takes precedence over no. 2.5335 In this regard, the character of content 
control as a form of legal control is underlined. The prohibition of jeopardising the attainment 
of the purpose of the contract (no. 2) is relevant where the judge cannot relate to a relevant 
statutory provision and has to determine the nature of the given contract.5336 The original scope 
of application of no. 2 is the limitation of cardinal obligations.5337 Cardinal obligations are 
those that have outstanding importance and weight within the contract.5338 Only in this respect, 
no. 2 can be qualified as lex specialis to no. 1.5339 In practice, a precise demarcation between 
no. 1 and 2 is not necessary and/or not possible, which is admitted by the prevailing view,5340 
because a deviation from essential principles of a statutory provision can also be a limitation 
of essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract, and vice versa.5341 
3.3.3 Incompatibility with the statutory concept, § 307(2) no. 1 
With the insertion of § 307(2) no. 1, the legislator built on Ludwig Raiser's work and the 
preceding case law5342 concerning the guiding function of the ius dispositivum, serving as a 
concretisation of the content control standard.5343 
                                                             
5333 'Unconscionable' is defined in s 1, when used with reference to any conduct, as '(a) having a character 
contemplated in section 40, or (b) otherwise unethical or improper to a degree that would shock the conscience of 
a reasonable person.' By inserting the concept of unconscionableness the legislator introduces questions related to 
ethics and unfortunately complicates the basic unfairness assessment unnecessarily. 
5334 In the same sense: Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
5335 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 28. Tending to the same result: von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG 
para 282, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 198. 
5336 Stoffels AGB-Recht 197. 
5337 BT-Drs 7/3919 at 23. 
5338 Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 565. 
5339 Stoffels AGB-Recht 197. 
5340 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 197, with further references. 
5341 Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 164. 
5342 Raiser Recht der AGB 293 et seq. See also the chapter 'Historical overview' in Part II ch 1. 
5343 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 787, Boecken BGB-AT 312. 
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a) 'Essential principles' of the statutory provision 
According to the courts, the limitation to 'essential principles' of the statutory provision means 
that only norms which express the requirement of justice and are not merely based on 
considerations of expediency must be considered.5344 Since this distinction is difficult to draw 
and often impossible, this view must be rejected. Provisions that seem to be merely technical, 
e.g., rules on limitation periods, also often contain considerations of justice.5345  
Another view postulates that this phrase means that only those norms are to be considered that 
serve the need for protection of the party or are a manifestation of the legal order of the 
applicable laws,5346 or constitute a field of the statutory law that is highly sensitive to questions 
of justice.5347 This view is also problematic as it suffers from the same problems as the 
judiciary's opinion.5348 The element 'essential principles' excludes legal provisions that do not 
offer a sufficient 'content of justice' before the proper evaluation of interests and draws a sharp 
line between 'essential principles' and 'non-compatibility', which is an artificial approach.5349 
A third approach combining the two elements (essential principles/non-compatibility) in a 
single assessment leads to better results.5350 The element of the 'essential principles' could be 
understood in that particular attention to the 'content of justice' of the statutory norm that has 
been replaced by a contractual term must be paid. A strong argument for this view is the 
statement of the Law Commission5351 that underscores that the formulation (which 
unfortunately is not expressed in the official BGB translation)5352 'essential fundamental ideas 
of the statutory provision', instead of 'essential principles', makes it clear that the 'content of 
justice' of the legal norm should serve as a guideline.5353 This means that the legislator did not 
intend to introduce an exclusionary criterion but one that is to be considered when weighing 
the interests, having regard to existing differentiations.5354 What is more, this view takes into 
account that certain provisions of the ius dispositivum have a significant protective function for 
                                                             
5344 BGH NJW 2001, 3480 (3481 et seq); NJW-RR 2004, 1206 (1207), BAG NZA 2007, 853 (854). 
5345 Stoffels AGB-Recht 198, Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 566. 
5346 UBH/Brandner (2001) § 9 AGBG para 133, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 35. 
5347 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 247, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 70. 
5348 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 222. 
5349 Stoffels AGB-Recht 198. 
5350 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 223. 
5351 BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 6. 
5352 The official translation of the Ministry of Justice translates 'wesentliche Grundgedanken' with 'essential 
principles'. 
5353 Richtschnur. 
5354 Stoffels AGB-Recht 199. 
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certain contract types but a negligibly weak one for others.5355 For these reasons, the element 
of 'essential principles' (or better translated as 'essential fundamental ideas') must not be 
understood as an autonomous element but rather as one indicating the significance of the 
'content of justice' and the protective character of the replaced statutory provision for the 
weighing of interests taking place within the following non-compatibility assessment.5356 
b) 'Statutory provision' 
The term 'statutory provision' from which a clause deviates is interpreted widely both by the 
courts and legal literature. Not only the norms contained in the BGB but also all unwritten legal 
principles, the principles developed by the courts, as well as the rights and obligations resulting 
from the nature of the given agreement or the gap-filling interpretation in terms of §§ 157 and 
242 fall under this term.5357 Others plead for a more restrictive interpretation of the term 
'statutory provision' in the context of § 307,5358 which has an impact of the content control of 
contract types that are not codified because the normative standard for these agreements are 
not laid down in written laws.5359 
The different types of 'statutory provisions' will be discussed in the following. 
aa) Provisions fulfilling formal and substantive requirements 
In terms of article 2 EGBGB,5360 a 'statute' of the BGB includes any legal rule, i.e., substantive 
provisions.5361 These are generally valid legal norms which are based on the community's will, 
irrespective of the form in which they are applied.5362 Therefore, also customary law is 
considered being equal to written laws.5363 
                                                             
5355 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 24, UBH/Brandner (2001) § 9 AGBG para 132, referring to 
BGH NJW 1989, 1479 where the BGH promotes a differentiating view with regard to § 627 (termination without 
notice for service contracts), since this provision includes various types of services. 
5356 Stoffels AGB-Recht 199, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 788. 
5357 BGH NJW 1993, 721 (722); 1998, 1640 (1642), WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 66, UBH/Brandner (2001) § 9 
AGBG para 140. 
5358 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 245 et seq, Zöllner RdA 1989, 159 et seq. 
5359 Stoffels AGB-Recht 199. 
5360 Article 2 EGBGB: '“Statute” under the Civil Code and under this Act means any legal rule.' 
5361 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 4. 
5362 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 2, Soergel/Hartmann Art 2 EGBGB para 2. 
5363 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 paras 88 and 231, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG at 83 et seq, 
Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 29. See also Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 93. 
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Only norms of the ius dispositivum are statutory provisions5364 as a violation of mandatory 
provisions (ius cogens) would be void in terms of § 134.5365 A further enquiry under § 307(2) 
no. 1 of such a void norm is not necessary.5366 
It is arguable however if the provisions of §§ 305 et seq. themselves can serve as a guidance 
for content control under § 307(2) no. 1.5367 This has to be rejected because of the mandatory 
character of these provisions. The prohibitions contained in §§ 308 and 308 are not 'statutory 
provisions' in the sense of § 307(2) no. 1 either because they take precedence over § 307.5368 If 
they are not applicable, e.g., in B2B contracts, the ideas contained in these provisions might be 
considered in the enquiry under § 307(1).5369 
bb) Unwritten legal principles and case law 
The function of content control, i.e., the protection against the realisation of freedom of contract 
to the benefit of only one party,5370 could not properly be fulfilled if 'statutory provision' would 
exclusively include provisions of the ius dispositivum. What kind of provisions are included 
beyond positively formulated statutory provisions is discussed controversially. 
The prevailing view is based on the materials for the AGBG5371 and considers all kinds of 
normative provisions of the written and unwritten law as well as legal principles as 'statutory 
provisions' in the sense of § 307(2) no. 1. Some authors also include case law.5372 This view is 
hardly compatible with the definition of 'statute' of article 2 EGBGB because general legal 
principles are only included in the term 'statute' if they are reliably developed from positive 
law by means of analogy and can be regarded as legal rules.5373 Judicial rulings are excluded 
from the meaning of 'statute' though because they have no mandatory general effect for an 
undetermined number of persons.5374 
                                                             
5364 Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 29, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 232. Differentiating: Fastrich 
Inhaltskontrolle 284 et seq. 
5365  § 134: 'A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a different 
conclusion.'  
5366 Stoffels AGB-Recht 199. 
5367 Pro: BGH NJW 1983, 1853 (1854), WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 68. Contra: von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG 
para 256 et seq, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 107 et seq, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 210. 
5368 Stoffels AGB-Recht 201. 
5369 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 257a, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 242.  
5370 PWW/Berger § 307 para 6. 
5371 Erster Teilbericht der Arbeitsgruppe beim Bundesminister der Justiz at 55; Begründung zum 
Regierungsentwurf BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
5372 BGH NJW 1998, 1640 (1642), Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 236 et seq. 
5373 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 112. 
5374 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 40. 
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The question begs to be asked whether the meaning of 'statutory provision' of § 307(2) no. 1 is 
congruent with the term 'statute' in article 2 EGBGB.5375 With regard to the fact that §§ 305 et 
seq. seek protection against contractual terms that often have no 'model' in statutory provisions, 
an identical meaning of 'statutory provision' and 'statute' is not necessarily meant. On the other 
hand, the meaning of 'statutory provision' should not be too extensive as otherwise, § 307(2) 
no. 2 would be of lesser importance, whereas no. 1 would gain undue significance.5376 Hence, 
general legal principles should be regarded as 'statutory provisions' only – like in article 2 
EGBGB – if they deviate from positive law by means of a methodologically reliable procedure. 
This is not the case, e.g., for principles that the courts base on the principle of good faith.5377 
Not only article 2 EGBGB ('legal rule'),5378 but also § 307(2) no. 1 ('provision')5379 requires a 
rule-like structure that is composed of one or several conditions as well as a legal 
consequence.5380 This is generally not the case for general legal principles. Even if general legal 
principles show the direction, they are no rules that can be subsumed under a given case.5381 
Therefore, the principle of proportionality,5382 the pacta sunt servanda principle,5383 or the 
principle of contractual justice5384 are no legal rules. On the other hand, principles that have 
attained such a degree of concretisation that they are no longer distinguishable from legal 
provisions can be regarded as 'statutory provisions' in terms of § 307(2) no. 1.5385 These are, 
for example, the principle that liability requires fault,5386 the principle according to which the 
aggrieved party, instead of performance, can require to be in a position it would have if the 
contract had been duly performed, but a better position,5387 or the principle of equivalence, 
according to which each party has to perform its contractual obligations.5388 
                                                             
5375 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 233 answers this question negatively. 
5376 Zöllner RdA 1989, 160. 
5377 BGH NJW 1983, 1671 (1672). 
5378 'Rechtsnorm'. 
5379 'Regelung'. 
5380 Stoffels AGB-Recht 201. 
5381 Stoffels AGB-Recht 201. 
5382 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 214. 
5383 BGH NJW 1984, 1182 (1183) and BAG NZA 2005, 465 (467) reach a contrary conclusion though. 
5384 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 214. 
5385 These principles are referred to as 'rechtssatzförmige Prinzipien'. Larenz and Canaris Methodenlehre 479. 
5386 'Haftungsrechtlicher Verschuldensgrundsatz'. This principle is derived from the civil law and contained in 
many provisions, such as §§ 280 and 823. 
5387 Therefore, a clause in a standard leasing contract by which in the case of a premature termination of the 
agreement only 90 % of the proceeds obtained from the used vehicle are considered – instead of 100 % like in the 
case of a termination after the contract had ended – is void. See BGH NJW 2002, 2713 (2714 et seq). 
5388 With regard to this principle, a standard clause limiting the validity of telephone cards without reimbursement 
or crediting of the remaining amount when purchasing a new card has been considered void. See BGH NJW 2001, 
2635 (2637 et seq). For such a clause in prepaid mobile phones, see Stoffels AGB-Recht 203. See also von 
Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 251, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 214 et seq. 
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cc) Specific fundamental principles of generally accepted contract types 
According to a common opinion, the scope of application of § 307(2) no. 1 also includes the 
'specific fundamental principles of generally accepted contract types', even if these are not 
statutorily regulated.5389 The supporters of this view argue that the low regulatory density is no 
reason to weaken content control.5390 Stoffels legitimately maintains that this view is not 
convincing because it assumes that the protective level of § 307(2) no. 2, which is applicable 
if no statutory provision exists, is insufficient. Since the conditions of no. 2 are far-reaching 
and quite flexible, it is hardly conceivable though that untypical and generally accepted 
contract types do not fall under this provision.5391 The scope of application of no. 1 should thus 
not include cases reaching beyond the wording of this provision ('statutory provision').5392 
c) Meaning of 'deviation' and 'non-compatibility' 
In the following, the meaning of the characteristics of non-compatibility of a contractual 
provision with the statutory provision as well as the meaning of 'deviation' from this statutory 
provision will be discussed. The legislator's choice of the terms 'deviates' and 'not compatible' 
requires a two-fold assessment.5393 
aa) Determination of a disadvantageous divergence of the legal situation 
A deviation from the statutory provision is given if a clause contains elements that modify the 
contents of the statutory provision that would apply in the absence of the clause in a 
disadvantageous manner.5394 Therefore, the legal situation which would exist with the statutory 
provision and the situation with the standard clause have to be compared.5395 The divergence 
can take the form of a replacement of the ius dispositivum by the clause, the modification of 
the statutory provision otherwise applicable, or an omission changing the sense of the statutory 
provision.5396 Furthermore, there is a deviation where the standard clause normally would be 
part of another type of contract,5397 e.g., a clause that makes the rules of the law of sales 
applicable in an arrangement that could be qualified as a service contract. It is important to note 
that the modification of the substantive contents has to be disadvantageous for the customer 
                                                             
5389 WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 67. 
5390 UBH/Brandner (2001) § 9 AGBG para 140. See also Weick NJW 1978, 11 et seq, Schapp DB 1978, 621 
et seq. 
5391 Stoffels AGB-Recht 204. 
5392 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 286, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 246 et seq. 
5393 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 243 et seq. 
5394 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 20. 
5395 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 243, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 263. 
5396 Von Hoyningne-Huene § 9 AGBG para 263. 
5397 'Umtypisierung'. Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 245. 
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because § 307 is aimed at clauses that are 'disadvantageous' to the other party. Thus, 
advantageous clauses do not violate § 307.5398 
The assessment of the 'guiding model' (Leitbild) that the statutory provision provides is not 
always obvious. German rental law (§§ 535 et seq.), for instance, provides that '[t]he lessor 
must surrender the leased property to the lessee in a condition suitable for use in conformity 
with the contract and maintain it in this condition for the lease period.'5399 In practice, lessors 
pass this obligation onto their lessees by means of a standard clause in the lease agreement. 
Thus, the question begs to be asked if one only can assume a lease agreement in terms of §§ 535 
et seq. in cases where the lessor surrenders the property and maintains it, and that lease 
agreements in which he or she only surrenders the apartment without being obliged to maintain 
it constitute a different kind of contract that is only similar to lease regulated in the BGB.5400 
The BGH held that for such provisions in standard lease agreements, an individual agreement 
between the parties is not necessary but that in this regard, the checking of a box is sufficient. 
The law of standard business terms does not aim to interfere with the calculation of leases. 
Hence, a stipulation that deviates from the statutory provision (here the passing of cosmetic 
repairs5401 onto the lessee) can be agreed on in standard terms.5402 The statutory provisions 
governing the lease (§§ 535 et seq.) thus still serve as a guiding model for such leases.5403 
For contracts that are not regulated by statute, or those that significantly deviate from statutory 
provisions, it is uncertain how a reference for the determination of a deviation can be 
determined. Most authorities are of the view that one has to fit the given agreement into the 
existing contract types by means of a 'general similarity comparison' so that the applicable 
provision of the somehow similar contract type serves as the 'statutory provision' in the sense 
of § 307(2) no. 1.5404 If the result seems inappropriate, the 'in case of doubt' wording of § 307(2) 
helps to refute the result. This solution seems to raise some concerns because the 'in case of 
                                                             
5398 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 20. See also BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 6. 
5399 § 535(1) 2nd sent. 
5400 Pawlowski BGB-AT 227. Such clauses are common practice in standard lease agreements. Often, the lessee 
simply has to check a certain box. According to the BGH, such clauses are customary practice and can thus not 
be considered unfair (BGHZ 92, 363 (368) = BGH NJW 1985, 480 (481). Leenen is of the view that this argument 
is not convincing since this customary practice came only into being after the BGH's decisions. See Leenen BGB-
AT 353. 
5401 'Cosmetic repairs' are: the decoration with wallpaper, the painting of walls, ceilings and floors, as well as 
radiators, interior doors and windows or exterior doors (interior side). See § 28(4) 3rd sent. Verordnung über 
wohnungswirtschaftliche Berechnungen nach dem Zweiten Wohnungsbaugesetz at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/bvo_2/gesamt.pdf. 
5402 BGHZ 92, 363 et seq. 
5403 Pawlowski BGB-AT 227. 
5404 Stoffels AGB-Recht 205. 
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doubt' formulation seems to have no proper meaning at all.5405 More importantly, this view 
overlooks that it is not necessary to cast clauses of an (unregulated) agreement artificially into 
an obviously inappropriate type of contract.5406 Such an approach is neither sufficient nor a 
requisite for content control under § 307. Instead, it is more appropriate to analyse the content 
of the given contract clause and to look out for a statutory provision (of any contract type) that 
regulates the 'subject' or 'theme' of this clause.5407 This view is more coherent with the fact that 
content control has primarily individual clauses in mind and not entire agreements.5408  
At this stage, it is not important whether the statutory provision can be applied directly or 
merely by analogy. This is to be clarified only at the end of the enquiry in terms of § 307(2) 
no. 1.5409 If there is no statutory provision that can serve as a reference, a deviation does not 
exist5410 and the content control has to be done by applying § 307(2) no. 2.5411 
bb) The assessment of non-compatibility as the final evaluative step 
Once a deviation between a contract clause and the statutory provision from which it deviates 
has been confirmed, the final step consists of the evaluation of whether this deviation is 
compatible with the essential principles of the statutory provision. Non-compatibility with the 
statutory provision requires that the balance be shifted in a not negligible way to the detriment 
of the consumer.5412 In this step, the rights and obligations set out in the statutory provisions 
are considered, and the contractual clause is evaluated in the light of the statutory provision.5413 
A factor in this scrutiny is the 'degree of justice'5414 contained in the statutory provision.5415 
Special attention must be given to the user's interest to deviate from the statutory provision.5416 
Such a deviation might be justified by the underlying circumstances of the conclusion of the 
contract and a different distribution of the risks and obligations involved.5417 In this regard, the 
degree of justification varies depending on the statutory provision and the concrete case. 
Therefore, one can expect a higher degree of justification for any deviation of the statutory 
                                                             
5405 See discussion above. 
5406 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 246. 
5407 Stoffels AGB-Recht 205. 
5408 See the wording of § 307(1) 1st sent. ('[p]rovisions') and art 3 ('contractual term') of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
5409 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 246. 
5410 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 244. 
5411 Stoffels AGB-Recht 205. 
5412 Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 566. 
5413 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 254, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 268. 
5414 'Gerechtigkeitsgehalt'. 
5415 Stoffels AGB-Recht 206. 
5416 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 253. 
5417 WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 80. 
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warranties for newly bought items in comparison to used items, for instance.5418 What is more, 
a deviation might be compatible with the statutory provision if the user modifies the 
distribution of risks and obligations differently.5419 Alternative solutions must be possible 
because the statutory provisions are not cast in stone. If in the result, the customer's interests 
are respected by means of a different contractual solution, this should not be regarded as non-
compatible with the statutory provision.5420 This is exemplified by the fact that long before the 
Act to Modernise the Law of Obligations5421 came into effect, it was generally accepted that 
the standard terms user could first offer a rectification of the defect before the consumer could 
require a reimbursement or a reduction of the purchase price. This was regarded as an adequate 
compensation, provided that the consumer's right to ask for a reduction or a reimbursement 
was 'revived' if the rectification failed.5422 
A suggested, non-listed factor in section 52(2) of the Act is the extent to which the term differs 
from what would have been in the case of its absence.5423 The South African Law Commission 
formulated this criterion in its list as follows: ‘(w) whether, to the prejudice of the party against 
whom the term is proffered, the party proffering the term is otherwise placed in a position 
substantially better than that in which the party proffering the term would have been under the 
regulatory law, had it not been for the term in question; (x) the degree to which the contract 
requires a party to waive rights to which he or she would otherwise be entitled’. Hence, the 
formulation in § 307(2) no. 1 BGB is much more comprehensive. 
The South African Law Commission's formulations require that a given term be compared with 
the residual rules, i.e. the provisions implied by law into the contract. The common law is 
considered residual rules as well.5424 In German law, principles that have attained such a degree 
of concretisation that they are no longer distinguishable from legal provisions can be regarded 
as 'statutory provisions' in terms of § 307(2) no. 1.5425 In this regard, the German law is more 
restrictive that the South African provisions. 
                                                             
5418 Stoffels AGB-Recht 206. In this regard, see §§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) and 434 et seq BGB. 
5419 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 268, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 257 et seq. 
5420 Stoffels AGB-Recht 206. 
5421 Schuldrechtsmoderniesierungsgesetz. 
5422 Staudinger/Coester (1980) § 9 AGBG para 24, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 78. See also § 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb). 
5423 This is the formulation of s 14(4)(g) of the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005). 
5424 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 45. 
5425 These principles are referred to as 'rechtssatzförmige Prinzipien'. Larenz and Canaris Methodenlehre 479. 
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d) Examples from case law for non-compatible provisions 
In the following, some examples of clauses that are not compatible with the essential principles 
of the statutory provisions from which they deviate will be presented. 
a) Under § 286(3), the obligor of a claim for payment is in default at the latest if he does not 
perform within thirty days after the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent 
statement of payment. Most authorities are of the view that this provision is a guiding 
principle in law. Hence, clauses that provide for a different agreement to the consumer's 
disadvantage constitute an unreasonable disadvantage in terms of § 307.5426 
b) A provision in the standard terms of a bank according to which the value date for a credited 
amount is only one business day after the actual date at which the payment has been made 
violates the ius dispositivum in terms of which the value date has to correspond with the 
actual date of crediting.5427 Otherwise, the client might be put in a position in which he or 
she has to pay interests for a debit that actually does not exist.5428 
c) Banks are not allowed to require the payment of fees for services which they are legally 
obliged to perform. Thus, a special fee for payments a client makes at the bank counter 
cannot be required.5429 The same applies to fees for the verification of sufficient funds in 
the account in the context of standing orders, transfers, cheques or debit orders since this 
kind of verifications is in the bank's interests.5430 
d) A clause in a brokerage contract under which the broker can claim a fee irrespective of 
whether he or she entered successfully into a contract, is ineffective because it is not 
compatible with § 652(1).5431 
e) In terms of § 649 1st sent.,5432 a customer may terminate a contract to produce a work at 
any time since he or she has an interest that the work be executed. If this cannot be assured, 
a continuation of the contract would be unreasonable. This applies above all to long-term 
                                                             
5426 Stoffels AGB-Recht 207. See also BT-Drs 14/2752 at 11. 
5427 Argumentum e §§ 667, 271(1). § 667: 'The mandatary is obliged to return to the mandator everything he 
receives to perform the mandate and what he obtains from carrying out the transaction.' § 271(1): 'Where no time 
for performance has been specified or is evident from the circumstances, the obligee may demand performance 
immediately, and the obligor may effect it immediately.' 
5428 BGH NJW 1989, 582; 1997, 2042. 
5429 BGH NJW 1994, 318 (319). 
5430 BGH NJW 1998, 309 (310); 2005, 1645. 
5431 § 652(1): 'A person who promises a brokerage fee for evidence of the opportunity to enter into a contract or 
for negotiating a contract is obliged to pay the fee only if the contract comes into existence as a result of the 
evidence or as a result of the negotiation of the broker. If the contract is entered into subject to a condition 
precedent, the brokerage fee may only be demanded if the condition is fulfilled.'  
5432 § 649 1st sent.: 'The customer may terminate the contract at any time up to completion of the work. If the 
customer terminates the contract, then the contractor is entitled to demand the agreed remuneration (…)'. 
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contracts in the building sector.5433 The contractor can require the agreed amount less not 
incurred expenditures, though.5434 If this claim is excluded, the parties' interests are 
unbalanced and § 649 is violated.5435 
f) The standard terms of a supplier of a kitchen that it has to install in the client's house contain 
a clause according to which the customer 'has to pay the purchase price in full at delivery 
without deduction'. This clause is not compatible with § 641 and is therefore ineffective 
because '[t]he remuneration must be paid upon acceptance of the work'.5436  
3.3.4 Limitation of fundamental rights and duties that jeopardises the contractual 
purpose 
According to § 307(2) no. 2, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed to exist if a provision 
limits essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that 
attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised. Because of the vagueness of this 
provision, the prohibition of undermining the contractual purpose will be concretised 
dogmatically in the following.5437 
a) The prohibition of undermining the contractual purpose as an emanation of the 
prohibition of contradictory conduct 
§ 307(2) no. 2 is mainly relevant for atypical, non-codified contracts that cannot refer to a pre-
cast guiding model, such as leasing or franchising agreements.5438 Nonetheless, a comparative 
standard is necessary in order to be able to assess the contractual purpose. The analysis of the 
contractual content and the economic objectives of the agreement are crucial in this regard.5439 
Legal literature5440 and some BGH decisions draw a line between the prohibition of 
undermining the contractual purpose and the prohibition of contradictory conduct (venire 
contra factum proprium). According to the BGH, § 307(2) no. 2 is based on the principle that 
standard clauses must not restrict the contractual parties' position that must be granted with 
regard to the content and objective of the agreement.5441 Hence, if the supplier assumes the 
                                                             
5433 BGH NJW 1999, 3261 (3262), OLG Düsseldorf NJW-RR 2000, 166 (167). 
5434 § 649 2nd sent.: '(…) however, he must allow set-off of the expenses he saves as a result of cancelling the 
contract or acquires or wilfully fails to acquire from other use of his labour. There is a presumption that the 
contractor is accordingly entitled to five percent of the remuneration accounted for by the part of the work not yet 
provided.'  
5435 BGH NJW 2007, 3423 (3424). 
5436 BGH NJW 2013, 1431, 1432, Brox and Walker Schuldrecht AT 49. 
5437 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 27 speaks of an 'unfortunate formulation'. 
5438 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 789, Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 164. 
5439 Stoffels Schuldverhältnisse 427. 
5440 Lieb DB 1988, 953, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 272. 
5441 BGH NJW-RR 1986, 271 (272). 
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accounting in terms of the contract, for instance, it cannot provide in its standard terms that it 
does not assume any responsibility for irregular accounting.5442 
The prohibition of contradictory conduct is a subcategory of the unlawful exercise of a right,5443 
according to which a rights holder cannot claim its right if it would violate the trust of the other 
party that it had built. Dogmatically, most authorities see the institute of the unlawful exercise 
of a right as a manifestation of the principle of legitimate expectations,5444 which itself is 
expressed in the principle of good faith (§ 242) and § 307.5445 What is more, the prohibition of 
contradictory conduct is also based on the venire contra factum proprium prohibition because 
the fundamental idea is the same: Users of standard terms offer their products or services on 
the market and put forward their main advantages vis-à-vis their clients. When concluding a 
contract, the client has certain expectations concerning the performance of the product and his 
or her legal position, based on the information that the supplier has given in its commercials 
and during the sales talks. Clients do usually not verify such information and trust that the 
supplier is honest regarding the minimal rights the customer is granted. If the standard terms 
restrict the customer's legal position or the promised performance,  they violate the venire 
contra factum proprium maxim because of the contradiction between the contractual terms and 
the information given beforehand.5446 
Thus, it can be said that the legislator did not enter new territory by inserting § 307(2) no. 2 but 
based this provision on the prohibition of contradictory conduct, which itself is an emanation 
of the principle of legitimate expectations (good faith).5447 
b) Conditions of § 307(2) no. 2 
Now that the dogmatic grounding of the prohibition of contradictory conduct has been 
presented, the discussion of the conditions of § 307(2) no. 2 can be undertaken with less 
difficulty. 
aa) Essential rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract 
The prohibition of contradictory conduct and the underlying principle of legitimate 
expectations direct the attention to the expectation of the rights holder, and conversely to the 
                                                             
5442 BGH NJW 1985, 914 (916). 
5443 MüKo/Roth § 242 para 255. 
5444 'Vertrauensgrundsatz'. Staudinger/Looschelders/Olzen (2006) § 242 para 288, Palandt/Heinrichs § 242 
para 56. 
5445 The same applies to the principle of good faith in terms of art 3(1) of the EU Unfair Terms Directive which 
also is based on the principle of legitimate expectations. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 216. 
5446 Stoffels AGB-Recht 216. 
5447 Stoffels AGB-Recht 216. 
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obligations of its counterpart.5448 The purpose of § 307(2) no. 2 is to ascertain that standard 
terms user does not infringe the 'nature of the contract' by using standard terms that are contrary 
to the sense of the agreement.5449 The 'nature of the contract' is defined by the cardinal 
obligations contained therein as well as accessory obligations that are significant for the 
consumer.5450 If a business owner instructs an IT firm to write for her a tailor-made software 
programme for the management of her orders, and the IT company excludes any liability for 
programming errors in its standard terms, this clause violates § 307(2) no. 2 because a 
functioning software programme for the order management was the object of the contract, i.e., 
a cardinal obligation, and an exclusion of programming errors would lead to the result that the 
IT firm would bear no risk for bad performance.5451 
The courts apply a test according to which they ask if the obligations are indispensable for the 
duly fulfilment of the contract and if the party of the contract (consumer) relies – and may 
rely – on their execution.5452 
The two characteristics of § 307(2) no. 2, i.e., the 'essential rights and duties' and the 'nature of 
the contract', cannot be separated as they are inseparably linked. Indeed, the starting point for 
the enquiry is the agreement between the parties, but the control standard must detach from it 
and also integrate extra-contractual and normative evaluations.5453 Hence, one has to find an 
external control standard which does not necessarily consist in a specific contract type but in 
the development of problem-related partial solutions. It is suggested that this is a similar 
approach to the determination of divergence of the legal situation in terms of no. 1 where a 
statutory provision of any contract type is compared to the 'subject' of the given contract. This 
is what the legislature wanted to express by 'nature of the contract'.5454 The contrary view,5455 
                                                             
5448 Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 43, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 272, von Hoyningen-Huene 
§ 9 AGBG para 291. 
5449 Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 566, Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 259. 
5450 BGH NJW 2005, 1774 (ineffectiveness of a standard clause according to which the client who booked a coach 
trip is not entitled to transportation if he or she lost the ticket, although the company maintains nominative lists of 
their customers). Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 163. 
5451 Example from Schmidt BGB-AT 431. 
5452 BGH NJW-RR 1986, 271 (272); 1993, 560 (561), von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 286. This concept 
can also be found in art 25 CISG: 'A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results 
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the 
contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.' 
5453 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 268. 
5454 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 287, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 268, Stoffels AGB-Recht 218. Emphasis 
added. 
5455 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 283, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 42, Palandt/Grüneberg 
§ 307 para 34. 
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according to which a proper contractual order for the given contract type is to be developed 
must therefore be refuted. 
In a first step, the customer's expectations, based on the agreed principal obligations, have to 
be analysed. Furthermore, secondary obligations can also be part of the client's expectations 
because § 307(2) no. 2 does not limit the enquiry to cardinal obligations.5456 Other interests 
that might be affected are the client's expectation as regards its physical integrity, and that its 
property will not be affected.5457 
(i)  Expectations of the average consumer 
When assessing the typical expectations of a consumer, an abstract and objective standard is 
applied and the concrete situation or the personal circumstances of the other party are 
disregarded. Hence, the typical expectations of an average consumer for the given transaction 
serve as a reference for this assessment.5458 An exception is made for individually agreed 
clauses, even if they are not part of a consumer contract.5459 Otherwise, the contract would be 
seen and analysed in a fashion that distorts the actual agreement between the parties.5460 Other 
differentiations are also possible, such as the type of client (commercial client or consumer).5461 
In the case of tailor-made contracts, a more lenient application of the abstract approach is 
inevitable. These cases will mostly be qualified as singular contracts and not as standard term 
agreements though.5462 
(ii)  The agreed set of obligations as a starting point 
In cases where the statutory law does not provide for a reference, the standard of content control 
must be developed in consideration of the set of obligations agreed, against the backdrop of 
freedom of contract. Hence, the nature of the contract is foremost determined by the provisions 
agreed by the parties.5463 These are determinative for the consumer's expectations insofar as he 
or she will adapt his or her expectations accordingly and develop certain ideas about the content 
of the agreement. On the other hand, the standard terms user who regularly uses terms that 
were drafted under its influence has a particular responsibility for the effects its terms might 
                                                             
5456 Stoffels AGB-Recht 219. 
5457 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 272, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 84, BGH NJW 1985, 3016 (3018). 
5458 Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 42, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 83, BGH NJW 1986, 2428 (2429) 
('relevance of the perspective of an average bank customer'). 
5459 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 246. 
5460 Stoffels AGB-Recht 219. 
5461 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 247. 
5462 Stoffels AGB-Recht 220. 
5463 Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 42. 
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have in legal relationships. The trust the customer puts in the supplier, based on the contractual 
arrangement, is hence attributable to the supplier.5464 
The enquiry of the concrete contractual content can only be the first step, however. If content 
control were executed only by taking a standard that is orientated towards the clauses of the 
agreement, as postulated by Lieb,5465 only obvious violations against the internal contractual 
logic could be determined, and the standard for content control of non-codified contracts would 
be lower in comparison to those having a normative model. The consequence would be a 
significantly lower protection against unreasonably disadvantageous terms.5466 Content control 
is legal control5467 and cannot take place without the consideration of external references. 
Therefore, a positive comparison in the form of a 'righteous order' is necessary.5468 In practice, 
this means that not the individual expectations of a customer are evaluated, but what an 
objective observer in the situation of the consumer could typically expect.5469 
The standard of content control in terms of § 307(2) no. 2 requires that various sources be 
considered, namely the agreed price, the expectations typically based on this price as well as 
the principles and evaluations of the legal order. The considerations that follow within the 
content control must therefore be detached from the concrete agreement and the particular 
clause, but without losing it completely out of sight.5470 
(iii)  External factors influencing the other parties' expectations and expectations of 
justice based on statutory provisions 
The expectations of the consumer are normally influenced by many external factors that cannot 
be differentiated. The typical client understands the presented contract as a certain contract 
type that is commonly agreed upon in the given type of legal transaction.5471 The average 
consumer's idea of the relevant contents of a contract is therefore typically shaped both by 
                                                             
5464 Stoffels AGB-Recht 220. 
5465 Lieb DB 1988, 953 et seq. Lieb postulates a limitation of content control with the 'internal coherence' serving 
as a reference. 
5466 Stoffels AGB-Recht 220, Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 282, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 268. 
5467 Stoffels Schuldverhältnisse 416 and 417. 
5468 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 268, Roussos JZ 1988, 1003. 
5469 Stoffels AGB-Recht 221. 
5470 Stoffels AGB-Recht 221. 
5471 This becomes clear in the first partial report of the working group of the Ministry of Justice which 
complemented 'in the nature of the contract' by the formulation 'or the guiding model ('Leitbild') that [the 
consumer] had with regard to generally accepted standards ('Verkehrsanschauung')'. See Erster Teilbericht at 26 
(§ 6) and CDU/CSU draft (BT-Drs. 7/3200 at 3). 
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empirically verifiable circumstances and by expectations of justice based on statutory 
provisions.5472 
What an average consumer can typically expect of such a contract can be evaluated by means 
of commonly used clauses and provisions of new contract types that have become part of the 
public mind. This also applies to customary and commercial practices. Due to their constant 
use and practice, they create the expectation that they are 'just' or 'righteous'.5473 
Case law contributes to the expectations of an average consumer too.5474 The content and the 
limitations of non-codified agreements, such as the leasing contract, were developed by the 
courts, in conjunction with the work of legal literature. Over the years, consumers developed a 
certain idea concerning the content of these agreements.5475 
Legitimate interests in terms of § 307(2) no. 2 are not only limited to psychological aspects but 
must also contain objective and normative factors.5476 Already the abstract-universal approach 
of content control generally ensures that the assessment is not personalised/individualised with 
regard to a particular customer. Effective protection against ineffective clauses can only be 
achieved though where also the principles of the legal order are taken into account for the 
enquiry of the consumer's legitimate expectations. The clients' expectations must therefore be 
checked against the valuations of the objective law and adjusted accordingly.5477 Although 
mere common practice does not establish legal recognition of a clause,5478 the danger could 
otherwise exist that clauses created by the legal professions5479 and establishing lower 
standards for clients could be regarded as legitimate expectations. Hence, the clients' 
expectations must be adjusted to the minimal normative standards.5480 
Normative factors not only have a corrective function but can also serve for the concretisation 
of his or her expectations. This is primarily the case for contract forms that have not been fully 
                                                             
5472 Stoffels AGB-Recht 221. 
5473 Contrary to § 242, customary practice is not expressly referred to in § 307, but the standard of good faith 
understood with the element of legitimate expectations and the formulation contained in § 310(1) 2nd sent. 
('reasonable account must be taken of the practices and customs that apply in business dealings'), the consideration 
of customary practice is obvious. See von Honingen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 212 et seq, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG 
para 131, BGH NJW 1985, 480 (481). 
5474 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 270, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 42. 
5475 Stoffels AGB-Recht 222. 
5476 Fikentscher Schuldrecht para 163, Stoffels AGB-Recht 222. 
5477 Stoffels AGB-Recht 222. 
5478 BGH NJW 1987, 1931 (1935); 1991, 2414 (2416), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 251, Staudinger/Coester (2006) 
§ 307 para 266, Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 288. 
5479 In German law, the term 'Kautelarjurisprudenz' is used in this regard. See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 
'Kautelarjurisprudenz'. 
5480 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 289, Erman/Roloff § 307 para 32, 
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developed yet, where no established concept exists, and where the courts have not yet reached 
any decisions so far. It is unclear though how the relevant normative valuations can be found 
for this 'unfolding of expectations of justice for the specific type of contract'.5481 On the basis 
of a detailed analysis of the economic objective of the agreement and the typical interests of 
the parties, various normative aspects can be relevant.5482 This means that also the user's 
interests come into play. Thus, only those rights and obligations should be recognised that serve 
the parties' interests and are a reasonable encumbrance for a party.5483 Factors to be considered 
can be risk control,5484 insurability,5485 rationalisation5486 and the type of the given contract5487 
(e.g., long-term agreement or contract with personalised elements). Furthermore, it is relevant 
if one deals with a bi- or a multilateral contract (e.g., franchising or credit card agreement). If 
more than two parties are involved, the interests of all parties have to be considered so that the 
functioning of the agreement is ensured.5488  
bb) Limitation of essential rights and duties by standard terms: Disappointed 
expectations 
As discussed further above, the client's legitimate expectations are disappointed if the orally 
agreed promises or those contained in the supplier's commercials are not reflected in the 
supplier's standard terms, i.e. when the provision 'limits essential rights or duties inherent of 
the nature of the contract'.5489 Therefore, a comparison between the legal situation with and 
without the given clause (i.e., between the actual and the hypothetical situation) must be 
undertaken.5490 The latter is described in § 307(2) no. 2 by the formulation 'essential rights or 
duties inherent in the nature of the contract'. These rights or duties are limited if the standard 
clause grants lesser rights or duties than one could legitimately expect.5491 A contractual 
obligation is also limited if its violation has no consequences.5492 
                                                             
5481 'Entfaltung vertragstypenspezifischer Gerechtigkeitserwartungen'. See Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 
AGBG para 28, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 271, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 285. 
5482 Stoffels AGB-Recht 223. 
5483 WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 85. 
5484 BGH NJW 1997, 1700 (1702); 2002, 673 (675), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 156 et seq, von Hoyningen-Huene 
§ 9 AGBG para 216 et seq, Sieg BB 1993, 149. 
5485 BGH NJW 2002, 673 (675). 
5486 BGH NJW 1996, 988 (989), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 121. 
5487 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 285, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 271. 
5488 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 253, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 110. 
5489 Stoffels AGB-Recht 226. 
5490 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 277, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 290. 
5491 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 291. 
5492 BGH NJW 2002, 673 (675). 
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cc) Jeopardising the purpose of the contract 
Under § 307(2) no. 2, the limitation of essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the 
contract must also jeopardise the purpose of the contract. The courts and legal literature are 
mostly of the opinion that this step must be examined separately.5493 Consequently, two aspects 
have to be considered: First, the intensity of the interference is crucial because negligible 
impairments are not sufficient. The threshold must not be too high though as otherwise, 
§ 307(2) no. 2 cannot unfold its meaning.5494 Second, the determination of the jeopardising of 
the purpose of the contract necessitates the control of the entire agreement. In this regard, one 
must consider that the contractual purpose can also be achieved by compensatory clauses.5495 
c) Examples from case law 
The prohibitions contemplated in § 307(2) also come into play where clauses exclude or restrict 
the user's liability. These will be discussed under § 309 no. 7.5496 Other cases where a provision 
limits essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that 
attainment of the purpose of the contract is jeopardised were decided by the courts as follows: 
a) Clauses that extent the surety's liability so that also interests, commissions and costs are 
included, and by which the maximum amount stipulated in the suretyship is exceeded are 
ineffective. Such clauses create an incalculable risk for the surety and are not compatible 
with the rationale and objective ('nature of the contract') of a maximal liability 
suretyship.5497 
b) A standard clause by which a bank reserves the right to credit a transferred amount to 
another account of the recipient violates § 307(2) no. 2. Such clauses have the potential 
that the transfer has no redemptive effect for the remitter so that he might be forced to pay 
twice. Furthermore, they are not compatible with the remitter's legitimate interest 
according to which the bank has to execute the remitter's order exactly.5498   
                                                             
5493 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 261, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 278, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG 
para 293 et seq, BGH NJW 1993, 335 (336); 1998, 671 (673). Some authors are of a different view: 
Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 27, Becker Auslegung des § 9 Abs. 2 AGBG 182 et seq. 
5494 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 295, Stoffels AGB-Recht 227. 
5495 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 280. 
5496 See discussion of this item in this chapter. 
5497 BGH NJW 2002, 3167 (3168 et seq). 
5498 BGH NJW 1986, 2428 (2429). 
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c) The exclusion of ex-§ 6 VVG5499 (now § 28 VVG) by an insurance company with the 
effect of being released even for slight negligence of the insured person or a breach of 
obligations having no consequences are considered ineffective under § 307(2) no. 2.5500 
d) A developer contract for the purchase of real estate is usually concluded with the 
expectation that the developer coordinates the necessary actions and steps. A clause by 
which the purchaser him- or herself is obliged to take extra-judicial measures for the 
enforcement of claims against the artisans goes against the rationale of such an agreement 
and violates § 307(2) no. 2.5501 
e) The exclusion of the replacement of a lost ticket for a bus trip in the standard business 
terms of a coach travel company undermines the main mutual obligations of the 
contractual parties. Such a clause practically invalidates the client's right to be transported 
after the loss of his or her ticket without being justified by the company's interests.5502 
f) A contract of safe custody (e.g., for a cloakroom in a theatre) which excludes in its standard 
terms the staff's or theatre's liability for 'careful safekeeping' for clothes that had been 
deposited against payment contradicts the cardinal obligations of the keeper and makes 
the agreement senseless. The same applies to guarding contracts for parked vehicles in 
parking lots for which the customer has to pay a ticket.5503 Similarly, a car wash operator 
cannot exclude its liability for ordinary negligence because it is its contractual duty to 
protect its clients' cars from damage.5504 
3.4  Remaining scope of application of § 307(1) 1st sent. 
After having discussed the scope of application of § 307(2), the question begs to be asked if 
for § 307(1) an autonomous scope of application remains. Schlosser5505 negated this question 
because all cases that had been decided so far could be solved by applying paragraph (2) of 
§ 307. However, the prevailing opinion today is that paragraph (2) has a proper scope of 
application.5506 In practice, several contractual arrangements have evolved that are not captured 
by § 307(2) or §§ 308 and 309,5507 such as legally regulated contractual arrangements and the 
                                                             
5499 VVG = Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Insurance Contract Act). 
5500 BGH NJW 1985, 559 et seq. 
5501 BGH NJW 2002, 2470 (2471). 
5502 BGH NJW 2005, 1774. 
5503 Rüthers and Stadler BGB-AT 260. 
5504 BGH NJW 2005, 422, Leenen BGB-AT 354, Faust BGB-AT 112. 
5505 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 14. 
5506 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 94, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 83 et seq, von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG 
para 122 et seq, Becker Auslegung des § 9 Abs. 2 AGBG 197 et seq, BGH NJW 1981, 117 (118); 2000, 2103 
(2105). 
5507 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 83. 
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evaluation of the interaction of various onerous contractual clauses. Furthermore, paragraph 
(1) applies to clauses that cannot be assessed against the background of a legal provision in 
terms of § 307(2) no. 1 because the contract type has no codified model, or a similar regulation 
is not applicable due to the atypical character of the contract and paragraph (2) no. 2 does not 
apply either.5508 
For the autonomous scope of application of § 307(1) 1st sent., pre-formulated standard clauses 
for the extension of gym membership agreements serve as an example. The BGH could not 
identify any codified model for these contracts that could be applied as a standard. Particularly 
§§ 620 et seq. (termination of services relationship), if they were applicable for gym 
membership contracts, cannot serve as a guiding model because the cancellation periods set 
out there only apply if the duration of the service agreement is not determined. For the 
application of § 307(2) no. 2, there were no indications. The BGH decided that clauses for the 
extension or duration of a gym membership contract might indeed bind the member to the 
agreement for a long time, but in doing so, they do not limit his or her essential contractual 
rights or duties.5509 
3.5  Application of the general clause in B2B contracts 
Since § 310(1) 1st sent. only excludes § 305(2) and (3), as well as §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309 
from content control in B2B contracts, §§ 307(1) 1st sent., 307(2) and the transparency control 
pursuant to § 307(1) 2nd sent. apply to contracts between businesses. The rationale of the 
application of the general clause in B2B contracts is that §§ 305 et seq. are not aimed at merely 
offering consumers protection but at ascertaining the principle of good faith in contractual 
relationships based on standard business terms.5510 
3.5.1 Standard of reasonableness 
For content control in B2B contracts, the same standard as for B2C agreements is 
applicable.5511 Also in contractual relationships between entrepreneurs, a generalised-abstract 
standard is applied, regardless of the individual need for protection of a party.5512 Because of 
customs of trade and the experience business people have in commercial affairs, B2B 
relationships require a more flexible approach in comparison to consumer contracts though, 
                                                             
5508 Stoffels AGB-Recht 229. 
5509 BGH NJW 1997, 739. The same applies to BGH NJW 2000, 1110 (1112) for a service station agreement. 
5510 Stoffels AGB-Recht 229. Before the AGBG came into force, this was not clear and debated. See Erster 
Teilbericht der Arbeitsgruppe beim BMJ 1974 at 30, Referentenentwurf DB 1974, supplement no. 18 at 4 and 23. 
5511 Erman/Roloff § 307 para 35, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 9 AGBG para 47. See also BGH NJW 1976, 2345 (2346), 
a decision before the AGBG came into force. 
5512 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 372, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 39. 
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even if one has to distinguish between different business sizes and types (e.g., wholesale trader 
or retailer).5513 This is expressed in § 310(1) 2nd sent. 2nd half-sentence, according to which 
'reasonable account must be taken of the practices and customs that apply in business 
dealings'.5514 Hence, a long-term B2B practice in terms of which in certain circumstances 
liability is excluded might be considered reasonable under § 307. Also clauses that are 
considered unreasonable in B2C contracts might be judged as reasonable in B2B contracts as 
otherwise, the particular interests and needs of the participating businesses, such as a speedy 
and smooth business processing, might be obstructed.5515 The same applies to a unilateral 
distribution of risk in B2B contracts that is often counter-balanced with other advantages that 
are stipulated in other existing contracts between the firms in question. In B2C contracts, where 
the parties only conclude one single agreement, such counter-balancing between various 
contracts is not possible.5516  
The BGH considers the previously mentioned situations as exceptions5517 because it maintains 
that one should not apply two different standards for B2C and B2B contracts.5518 In recent 
literature,5519 the court's view has been heavily criticised because it questions the importance 
of freedom of contract in B2B agreements. In order to avoid any difficulties, German 
businesses thus tend to choose foreign law, e.g., Swiss law.5520 Stoffels correctly points out that 
the point of departure must be § 310(1). This provision is not aimed to lower the threshold of 
protection for businesses5521 because neither the fact that entrepreneurs are more seasoned in 
commercial affairs nor the exclusion of §§ 308 and 309 in terms of § 310(1) 1st sent. allows 
considering that only significant or obviously unreasonable disadvantages lead to the 
ineffectiveness of a clause.5522 On the other hand, the courts should differentiate more between 
the regulatory requirements of different business sectors, without applying blindly 
requirements which are motivated by consumer protection to B2B agreements.5523 
According to section 5(2)(b), the Act does not apply to any transaction in terms of which the 
consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or annual value, at the time of the transaction, 
                                                             
5513 Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 39. 
5514 See BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 14. Rob BGB-AT 389. 
5515 Stoffels AGB-Recht 230. 
5516 See argumentation of Regierungsentwurf BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 43. 
5517 BGH NJW-RR 1997, 1253 (1255); NJW 2007, 3774 (3775). 
5518 Stoffels AGB-Recht 230. 
5519 Berger/Kleine BB 2007, 2137, Lischek/Mahnken ZIP 2006, 158, Staudinger/Schlosser (2006) § 310 para 12. 
5520 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. 
5521 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 373. 
5522 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 302, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 373 note 1393. 
5523 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. 
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equals or exceeds the threshold value in terms of section 6 of the same Act. Therefore, the Act 
does not apply to all B2B agreements in South Africa.5524 
3.5.2 The radiating effect of §§ 308 and 309 on B2B contracts 
By virtue of § 310(1) 1st sent., the prohibitions contained in §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309 do not 
apply to B2B contracts. Since these prohibitions are a specific manifestation of the evaluative 
standard laid down in the general clause, based on the principle of good faith, it is not excluded 
though that clauses that are problematic in terms of §§ 308 or 309 could be ineffective under 
§ 307. This is explicitly expressed in § 310(1) 2nd sent., according to which '[§] 307(1) and (2) 
as well as [§] 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 nevertheless apply to these cases in sentence 1 to the extent that 
this leads to the ineffectiveness of the contract provisions set out in [§§] 308 and 309'.5525 
In order to draw conclusions from the prohibitions and evaluative standards contained in 
§§ 308 and 309 for B2B, one has to distinguish between the different types of prohibitions.5526 
§ 308 contains prohibitions based on a significant disadvantage for a contractual party. The 
result depends here on an evaluation ('prohibited clauses with the possibility of evaluation') 
which takes into account the contract type, the parties and their typical needs. These 
considerations can be integrated without problems into B2B relationships so that the 
evaluations contained in § 308 are not problematic for this kind of contracts.5527 
On the other hand, § 309 contains more restricted formulations, which make their application 
for B2B contracts more difficult. Nevertheless, the BGH5528 and a part of the current 
literature5529 assert that § 309 has an indicative effect so that clauses that would be ineffective 
in B2C contracts would probably also be void in B2B agreements. This view raises concerns 
because it distorts the differences between B2C and B2B contracts.5530 Therefore, it would be 
better to comprehend the prohibitions of § 309 as criteria for encompassing content control.5531 
In practice, standard terms drafters should always enquire if their B2B clauses also withstand 
the test of §§ 308 and 309. If not, they should consider alternative formulations in order to be 
on the safe side.5532 
                                                             
5524 See discussion on the scope of application of the CPA in Part I ch 2. 
5525 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. 
5526 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. 
5527 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 383, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 40. 
5528 BGH NJW 1984, 1750 (1751); 2007, 3774 (3775). 
5529 Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 40, BGH NJW 2007, 3774. 
5530 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 382, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 121. 
5531 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 382. 
5532 Stoffels AGB-Recht 234. 
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Since the greylist contained in regulation 44(3) of the Act does not apply to B2B contracts in 
terms of regulation 44(1), the factors contained in this list do not have a radiating effect on the 
general clause. The Act does not contain a similar clause to § 310(1) 2nd sent. In such cases, 
section 48 applies, and the consumer has the onus of proof.5533 The reason for this is probably 
that businesses are more seasoned in commercial affairs. On the other hand, the blacklist of 
section 51 of the Act applies to B2B contracts, provided that section 5(2)(a) does not apply.5534 
3.6   The transparency requirement of § 307(1) 2nd sent. 
3.6.1 Fundamental aspects 
a) Normative basis of the transparency requirement 
In terms of § 307(1) 2nd sent., '[a]n unreasonable disadvantage may also arise from the provision 
not being clear and comprehensible.' This provision has been inserted in the wake of the 
modernisation of the law of obligations5535 but its content had been a principle applied by the 
courts for quite a long time before that.5536 The EU Unfair Terms Directive confirmed this 
German case law.5537 With regard to the various manifestations of the transparency requirement 
in the AGBG and the case law based on the former general clause of § 9 AGBG, the German 
legislator first considered it not being necessary to cast the transparency requirement into a 
legislative provision.5538 This standpoint was however debated by some authors,5539 and finally 
not supportable anymore after an ECJ ruling of 2001.5540 In summary, the court held that for 
the transposition of the Unfair Terms Directive, the Member States could not rely on national 
case law, but for the sake of legal certainty and clarity they had to transpose the Directive into 
legislative norms and administrative provisions. In the following, the German legislator 
inserted the transparency requirement into the general clause and made clear in § 307(3) 2nd 
sent. that this requirement also applies to areas where content control is not applied. 
Consequently, the transparency requirement is also applicable to clauses that are not submitted 
to content control.5541 Hence, also provisions concerning the price and the specification of the 
performance (e.g., catalogues, prospects, building specifications), which are essentialia 
                                                             
5533 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
5534 See discussion on the scope of application of the CPA in Part I ch 2. 
5535 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts of 26 November 2001 (BGBl. I at 3138). 
5536 BGH NJW 1989, 222 (calculation of interests for mortgage loans) and BGH NJW 1989, 582 (value date in 
giro contracts), then settled case law. 
5537 Article 4(2): '(…) in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language') and art 5 1st sent. of the Unfair 
Terms Directive: '(…) these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language') . 
5538 See argumentation of the Government Draft BT-Drs. 13/2713 at 6. 
5539 See Stoffels AGB-Recht 235, with further references. 
5540 ECJ NJW 2001, 2244, decision of 10 May 2001. 
5541 Faust BGB-AT 112, Bork BGB-AT 699. 
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negotii, must be clear and comprehensible.5542 Because of freedom of contract, the statutory 
law does not contain provisions determining the object of the contract or the performance to 
provide.5543  
The transparency requirement is also reflected in various other provisions. According to 
§ 305(2) no. 2, standard terms are only incorporated into a contract if the client had the 
opportunity to take notice of their contents. Under § 305c, surprising clauses do not become 
part of the agreement. Furthermore, any doubts in the interpretation of standard terms are 
resolved against the user (§ 305c(2)). These mechanisms take place before the transparency 
control in terms of § 307(1) 2nd sent. and therefore concern transparency during the conclusion 
of a contract, and not transparency during the execution.5544 As these provisions merely cover 
specific aspects of the transparency requirement, § 307 is not superfluous.5545 In institutional 
actions, for instance, only §§ 307 to 309 apply.5546 
§§ 308 and 309 contain aspects of the transparency requirement as well. According to § 308 
no. 1 and 2, 'insufficiently specific periods of time' and an 'insufficiently specific additional 
period of time' are prohibited. § 309 no. 12 2nd sent. sets out that provisions that modify the 
burden of proof to the disadvantage of the consumer, in particular by having the other party to 
the contract confirm certain facts, are prohibited, save where an acknowledgement of receipt 
is signed separately. The prohibition of § 308 no. 4 must also be interpreted in the light of the 
transparency requirement ('can reasonably be expected').5547 
Note should be taken that transparency control also takes place in terms of § 310(1) 2nd sent. 
for B2B contracts as well as for pre-formulated, i.e., not individually agreed contract clauses 
in consumer contracts (§ 310(3) no. 2).5548 
The purpose of the transparency requirement is to make sure that the client is able to reach an 
informed decision.5549 If customers are not able to see their rights and obligations to a full 
extent due to unclear provisions, they suffer two disadvantages: Firstly, they cannot fully 
comprehend the content of the clause(s) when entering into the contract and thus cannot defend 
themselves against their incorporation. Secondly, they do not know their rights and obligations 
                                                             
5542 Wertenbruch BGB-AT 150, Stoffels AGB-Recht 235, Schmidt BGB-AT 426, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
5543 Schmidt BGB-AT 426. 
5544 'Abschlusstransparenz' and 'Abwicklungstransparenz'. See Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 568. 
5545 MüKo/Kieninger § 307 para 52, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
5546 § 1 UKlaG. 
5547 Stoffels AGB-Recht 236. 
5548 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
5549 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 785. 
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during the execution of the agreement so that they are not able to adapt to the legal situation 
and respond accordingly.5550 
Clauses that withstand content control under § 307 might therefore be invalid nonetheless 
because they do not meet the required transparency.5551 
In the Act, the transparency requirement is expressed in various provisions, such as section 
52(2)(g), read in conjunction with section 22 (plain and understandable language), section 
48(2)(c), read with section 41 (false, misleading or deceptive representations), or section 
48(2)(d)(ii), read with section 49 (terms must be drawn to the consumer's attention). 
b) Unreasonable disadvantage due to insufficient clarity 
One may ask the question of whether mere formal incompliance with the transparency 
requirement is sufficient to declare a clause ineffective, or if the client also has to suffer a 
disadvantage from the unclear clause.5552 Fuchs and Stoffels legitimately argue that 
incompliance with the transparency requirement leads to ineffectiveness of a provision if the 
intransparency leads to an unreasonable disadvantage.5553 Brox and Walker argue that 
intransparency does not automatically lead to ineffectiveness, which is also expressed in the 
wording of § 307(1) 2nd sent. ('may also arise').5554 The determination of such an unreasonable 
disadvantage is dispensable though if there is an irrefutable presumption that such a 
disadvantage exists.5555 The objective for the existence of the transparency requirement is to 
increase the perception and comparability of contract clauses.5556 Only informed customers are 
able to reach informed decisions and to choose another supplier, if necessary. A lack of 
information, or even targeted disinformation, disturbs the market and necessitates transparency 
control, also in the field of prices and performances. Since the enquiry of the existence of an 
unreasonable disadvantage is performed in an abstract way, without having a particular 
consumer in mind, there is an irrefutable presumption of an unreasonable disadvantage in cases 
where an abstract danger of the loss of market opportunities exists.5557 This is even more so 
where intransparency results in the concealment of the real legal position as the customer might 
                                                             
5550 Wolf and Neuner BGB-AT 568, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
5551 Faust BGB-AT 113. 
5552 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 174 et seq, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 326 et seq. 
5553 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 330, Stoffels AGB-Recht 236. 
5554 Brox and Walker Schuldrecht AT 51. 
5555 Stoffels AGB-Recht 236. According to Fuchs (UBH § 307 para 331), this view goes too far, and Coester 
(Staudinger (2006) § 307 para 174) is of the view that this irrefutable presumption exists 'as a general rule'. 
5556 Köndgen NJW 1989, 946 et seq and 952. 
5557 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 175 et seq, OLG Celle NJW-RR 1995, 1133. 
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be deterred to claim his or her rights.5558 The actual realisation of this danger is not necessary 
because in terms of § 307(1) 2nd sent., an unreasonable disadvantage is already given if the 
provision is unclear. Hence, it can be argued that intransparency leads to ineffectiveness of a 
standard clause where the determination of a disadvantage due to intransparency is not 
necessary. This view is covered by the wording of § 307(1) 2nd sent. and by the governmental 
argumentation according to which intransparent clauses are to be considered ineffective per se 
without a material unreasonable disadvantage.5559 In Stoffel's view, this formulation is 
misleading though since the unreasonableness of a disadvantage is necessarily a consequence 
of the clause's intransparency.5560 
3.6.2 Standard of evaluation 
In order to assess whether the user's standard terms are clear and comprehensible, an abstract-
general approach is applied. Nonetheless, an unclear provision can be compensated by 
information given individually to the client before entering into the contract.5561 For consumer 
contracts, the circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must be taken into 
consideration in any event (§310(3) no. 3).5562 
In this context, it is irrelevant how a specialist for standard terms (e.g., a lawyer) might 
comprehend the clause, but what understanding an average client has when concluding the 
agreement.5563 For an insurance contract, for example, this would be an average insurance taker 
who can be expected to read the insurance clauses carefully, evaluate their meaning and 
consider the obvious context in which the individual clauses are embedded.5564 Between 
business people, the requirements are more lenient because of their experience and customs of 
trade.5565 
                                                             
5558 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 178. 
5559 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 154. 
5560 Stoffels AGB-Recht 237. 
5561 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 346 et seq, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 202 et seq. 
5562 Erman/Roloff § 307 para 21. 
5563 BGH NJW 1999, 2279 (2280), BAG NZA 2005, 1111 (1113), WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 148, PWW/Berger 
§ 307 para 13. 
5564 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 903 (903). 
5565 BGH NJW 1999, 942 (944); 2007, 2176 (2177). 
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3.6.3 Application and manifestations of the transparency requirement 
By analysing the relevant case law, certain recurring patterns become apparent. These allow a 
more precise determination of the transparency requirements for practical use. These patterns 
are not limitative and might overlap though.5566 
a) Requirement of clarity and transparency 
An emanation of the transparency requirement is that the standard terms user has to present the 
other party's rights and duties in a clear and comprehensible manner.5567 This concerns 
especially economic disadvantages and financial charges.5568 The less a customer can expect a 
particular provision, the higher is the requirement to formulate the given provision clearly and 
comprehensibly. Transparency does not only apply to particular clauses, but also to a 
framework of provisions which make it difficult to detect negative consequences because of 
the interaction between certain clauses. 
Therefore, a clause in a life insurance policy concerning the repurchase is ineffective if it does 
not inform the consumer of the adverse consequences of a cancellation of the contract or the 
exemption to pay the premium in terms of the repurchase value.5569 What is more, the 
agreement of an hourly fee for a lawyer infringes the transparency requirement if the provisions 
do not contain an estimation of the total amount the client is expected to pay until the 
termination of the mandate.5570 Another example is a clause in a leasing agreement in terms of 
which the calculation of the residual value of the vehicle is calculated, among other factors, by 
applying the 'annuity value formula' ('Rentenbarwertformel'). According to the BGH, even 
business people cannot be expected to understand the meaning of such a highly technical 
term.5571 The BGH decided in another case that a standard clause of an online mail-order shop 
by which it reserved the right to ship an 'equivalent item' if the ordered product was not 
available infringes the transparency requirement because the customer could not assess what 
was meant by an 'equivalent item'.5572 Severability clauses by which the parties agree that a 
statutory provision should replace a contract clause if the former is void are also ineffective 
because such clauses are not transparent. The customer is not able to know what the statutory 
                                                             
5566 See also UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 355 et seq where these patterns are classified in a similar fashion. 
5567 'Verständlichkeitsgebot'. See PWW/Berger § 307 para 14, with further references. 
5568 BGH NJW 2000, 515 (519); 2006, 2545 (2547), BVerwG NJW 1998, 3216 (3219), WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG 
para 148. 
5569 BGH NJW 2001, 2012 (2013 et seq). 
5570 OLG Frankfurt/M. NJW-RR 2000, 1367. 
5571 BGH NJW 1996, 455 (456). 
5572 BGH NJW 2006, 211. 
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provisions are.5573 Price-adjustment clauses must be so clear and comprehensible that the 
customer is able, when concluding the contract, to evaluate the scope of future price increases, 
and under which circumstances the supplier is entitled to increase its prices.5574 
These examples demonstrate that the transparency requirement has (also) some significance 
for ancillary agreements concerning the price. The latter is normally not part of content control 
in terms of 307(3) 1st sent. since the law assumes that customers pay attention to the core terms 
of a contract (essentialia negotii) and safeguard their financial interests, e.g., by comparing 
prices.5575 This is not possible though where ancillary clauses impede a comparison between 
different prices because of their intransparency. Thus, when formulating standard terms, the 
drafter should pay special attention to a clear and comprehensible wording so that customers 
can understand the provisions without further ado. Only then, consumers are enabled to 
negotiate and benefit from market opportunities.5576 
b) Requirement of extensive concretisation and certainty 
Especially in cases where the standard terms user reserves the right to benefit from several 
options, the conditions and legal consequences must be so concrete and certain that the 
consumer can apprehend in which sense the user might use his or her rights.5577 Such unilateral 
reservations can only be accepted if the trigger for one option or another and the directives and 
limits for its application are precisely formulated.5578 
Thus, a clause of an automobile manufacturer in a contract with an independent car dealer 
without territorial protection according to which the manufacturer has the right to reduce the 
dealer's territory unilaterally 'for reasons of market coverage' violates the transparency 
requirement if the application of the contract clause is not restricted to cases that present serious 
reasons for the reduction of the territory, does not limit the extension of the reduction and does 
not provide for compensation.5579 
Furthermore, the provision of a 'cover charge' ('Rahmengebühr') 'up to 75 DM' in the standard 
clauses of a financial institution, without further defining in which circumstances such a fee 
must be paid is a violation of the transparency requirement. In the given case, the bank charged 
                                                             
5573 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
5574 BGH NJW 2003, 507 (509), Neuner and Grigoleit BGB-AT 165. 
5575 Wertenbruch BGB-AT 150. 
5576 BGH NJW 1990, 2383, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 336. 
5577 'Bestimmtheitsgebot'. See PWW/Berger § 307 para 14, with further references, Boecken BGB-AT 312. 
5578 BGH NJW 2000, 651 (652), BAG NZA 2006, 1149 (1152). 
5579 BGH NJW 1984, 1182; 2000, 515 (516 et seq). 
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such a fee for the treatment of attachments (in the legal sense). The court held that this kind of 
activity is generally known to be performed by banks (i.e., not exceptional) and that the bank 
had to define in its standard terms for which activities precisely and to which exact amount it 
would charge such a fee.5580 
c) Requirement of legal clarity (prohibition of fraudulent misrepresentation) 
Transparency also means that the standard business terms user must not formulate the other 
party's legal position unclearly. According to the courts, a clause that wrongly or unclearly 
presents the consumer's legal position so that the user can repel possibly justified claims are 
not transparent because they disadvantage the consumer unreasonably. The objective 
possibility of such a disadvantage is sufficient in this regard.5581 
A clause in an insurance contract that excludes claims if the insured does not formulate the 
given claim in writing violates the transparency requirement as such a clause might prevent the 
insured from ensuring his or her rights effectively before the introduction of legal 
proceedings.5582 
3.6.4 Limits of the transparency requirement 
The requirement to formulate standard clauses transparently has its limits, though. The 
transparency requirement exists only to the extent that it is possible and reasonable to 
follow.5583 Furthermore, the standard terms user is not required to explicitly repeat legal 
provisions or rights that are linked to the nature of the contract, or corresponding information 
to the other party.5584 Otherwise, the transparency requirement would be counterproductive 
because the standard terms would be too lengthy and detailed, which is not in the consumer's 
interest. Fuchs formulates this postulate as follows: Transparency also means 'to focus on the 
presented information on certain central parameters or the core of a clause'.5585 What is more, 
one must not lose sight of the supplier's interests, which is why the divulgation of the internal 
calculation can generally not be required, for instance.5586 
A provision in standard terms under which the calculation of the residual value is disclosed is 
not required in terms of transparency as long as the client is able to understand clearly which 
                                                             
5580 BGH NJW 2000, 651 (652). 
5581 'Täuschungsverbot'. PWW/Berger § 307 para 14, BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1500. 
5582 BVerwG NJW 1998, 3216 (3220). 
5583 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1496 (1498). 
5584 BGH NJW 2000, 2103 (2106), PWW/Berger § 307 para 15. 
5585 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 349. My own translation. 
5586 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 350. 
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amount he or she will owe and the contract includes all necessary information for the 
calculation of this amount.5587 The same applies to insurance contracts where it is not required 
that the calculation of the surplus participation be disclosed as long as it is apparent that the 
amount of this participation might vary.5588 Standard provisions referring to legal norms or 
provisions of other instruments are not intransparent per se.5589 The supplier's rationalising 
interest might justify such cross-references. In any case, one has to assess if the user had 
alternative formulations at hand.5590 Generally, dynamic references (i.e., where the contents of 
the instrument to which is referred to might change without the client being able to influence 
this) are more problematic than static references.5591 A contract of employment which contains 
references to provisions of the applicable collective agreement is not intransparent as such 
references serve the unification of employment contracts within a company.5592 
3.6.5 Legal consequences of the violation of the transparency requirement 
An unclear and incomprehensible, i.e. intransparent, clause leads to its ineffectiveness because 
an unreasonable disadvantage due to intransparency leads to this consequence in terms of 
§ 307(1) 2nd sent. If the gap created by the ineffective provision cannot be closed by statutory 
law, it might be closed by way of a gap-filling interpretation of the contract.5593 
Furthermore, one could argue that the Unfair Terms Directive suggests that the customer has 
the right to cancel the entire agreement unilaterally if a clause defining the performance is 
intransparent, or where the transparency requirement aims to ascertain an informed decision of 
the client.5594 This solution can be justified either by assuming that a violation of the 
transparency requirement constitutes a fault of the supplier, or by assuming that the remaining 
clauses do not constitute a valid legal transaction in terms of § 306(1).5595 The latter solution 
might be pertinent if the core of the performance is intransparent, and the client should therefore 
be able to cancel the entire agreement.5596 
                                                             
5587 BGH NJW 1997, 3166. 
5588 BGH NJW 2001, 2014 (2017 et seq). 
5589 BGH NJW 1995, 589 et seq (reference to the business plan in the standard terms of an insurance company), 
BGH NJW 2002, 507 (dynamic reference to the framework contract in a pre-formulated contract for the care in a 
nursing home). 
5590 Oethker JZ 2002, 337. 
5591 PWW/Berger § 307 para 14. 
5592 Thüsing/Lambrecht NZA 2002, 1364. 
5593 BGH NJW 2005, 3559 (3565). 
5594 Stoffels AGB-Recht 243. 
5595 Rosenow/Schaffelhuber ZIP 2001, 2215 et seq. 
5596 Stoffels AGB-Recht 226. 
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3.7  Conclusion 
The German general clause of § 307 is the core element of content control. The prohibitions 
contained in §§ 308 and 309 are built on § 307 and are a concretisation of the latter. The general 
clause is also essential for content control of B2B contracts as § 309 does not apply to these 
contracts at all, and § 308 only partly. Finally, § 307 completes the protection granted by §§ 308 
and 309 since these specific prohibitions merely serve as examples and are not comprehensive. 
Declaratory clauses, i.e., provisions that merely reflect the contents of statutory provisions, are 
not subject to content control. The same applies to clauses providing for the specification of 
the performance and the price. These are core elements of the given agreement (cardinal 
obligations) to which the principle of freedom of contract applies. They must nonetheless 
conform to the transparency requirement set out in § 307(1) 2nd sent. Standard clauses 
restricting cardinal obligations can be assessed under § 307, though. 
§ 307 requires that the other party suffers an unreasonable disadvantage. Unreasonableness is 
assumed where there is a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the 
detriment of the other party, and where the user is merely concerned with its own interests. The 
typical interests of the parties in the given type of contract as well as the economic objective 
are considered, among other factors. What is more, the statutory provisions from which the 
agreement deviates must not be lost of sight. The parties might also have agreed upon 
alternatives to the statutory provision so that the balancing of their interests could be achieved 
by other means. Price-adjustment clauses, primarily used in continuing obligations, are not 
disadvantageous per se and allow that suppliers can adapt their prices automatically to a 
changing market environment. They also protect consumers as they avoid higher prices from 
the outset because the supplier wants to protect its future margins. 
In individual proceedings, the moment of evaluation is the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. Although the courts do not strictly apply this principle in the case of regulatory 
changes, this raises concern in terms of legal certainty as the demarcation between changes of 
the standard of evaluation before or after a regulatory amendment is too difficult to undertake. 
In institutional actions, the moment of the last oral proceedings is relevant. 
In contrast to section 48 of the Consumer Protection Act, for the general clause of § 307, an 
abstract-universal approach is applicable. Where standard terms are used for different groups 
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of consumers (individual consumers or companies), the typical interests of these groups must 
be considered so that the result may be different for B2B or B2C agreements. 
Theoretical divergences between § 307 and the 'general clause' of article 3(1) of the Unfair 
Terms Directive can mostly be resolved by applying the methods of interpretation. Since 
European law does not have a sufficiently concrete fairness standard, this standard can only be 
formulated by the national courts. Therefore, there is no place for an autonomous interpretation 
of article 3(1) of the Directive by the ECJ. 
The abstract-general approach does not apply to consumer contracts because there, 'the other 
circumstances attending the entering into of the contract' must be taken into consideration too. 
Unlike the Consumer Protection Act, content control always refers to a specific contractual 
provision and never to the entire agreement. The individual provisions must not be assessed in 
isolation however, but by taking into account the remainder of the agreement. In this regard, 
the accumulative and the compensational effects have been discussed. In the case of 
collectively negotiated contractual instruments, German courts are rather generous with the 
application of the compensational effect. These instruments are considered a 'general 
contractual order' that has become a 'readily useable legal order'.  
When assessing a standard clause that passes the risk onto the other party, risk control is a 
relevant factor. In these cases, one has to ask which party can avoid the risk better and cheaper, 
and by which party the risks involved can be insured better ('cheapest insurer'). 
In German standard business terms legislation, the so-called 'price argument' is generally 
irrelevant because any legal disadvantage could somehow be justified economically, and 
clients are unlikely to receive fair compensation for this disadvantage. This applies with the 
exception where consumers have a real choice between different versions of an agreement 
entailing different prices. The price argument is also relevant, according to the BGH, where 
suppliers of electricity exclude their liability, with the provisio that the risk passed onto the 
client is manageable and the latter can evaluate the extent of that risk. 
§ 307(2) can be regarded as a self-contained provision. The formulation 'in case of doubt' has 
no effect because § 307(2) is able to integrate the given transactions. In general, § 307(2) no. 1 
takes precedence over no. 2. A precise demarcation is not always necessary or possible though 
as a deviation from essential principles of a statutory provision (no. 1) can also be a limitation 
of essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the contract (no. 2), and vice versa. 
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The term 'essential principles' in § 307(2) no. 1 means the 'content of justice' of the statutory 
norm that has been replaced by a contractual provision. 'Statutory provision' in § 307(2) no. 1 
comprises substantive provisions, customary law and principles developed by case law that 
have attained such a degree of concretisation that they are no longer distinguishable from legal 
provisions. On the other hand, the ius cogens, §§ 305 et seq. themselves and general legal 
principles are not considered 'statutory provisions' in terms of this norm. 
For the determination of a (disadvantageous) divergence of the legal situation, the enquiry of 
the 'guiding model' of the statutory provision might be challenging. For agreements that have 
no model in the statutory law, a 'general similarity comparison' where the given agreement is 
artificially fitted into a somehow similar contract type must be rejected. Instead, one should 
look out for a statutory provision of any contract type that regulates the 'subject' or 'theme' of 
the given clause. For the evaluation of whether the deviation is compatible with the essential 
principles of the statutory provision, factors such as the degree of justice of the given statutory 
provision and the user's interest to deviate from the ius dispositivum have to be considered.  
The rationale of § 307(2) no. 2 is that standard clauses must not restrict the parties' position in 
terms of the contents and objective of an agreement, which defines the nature of the contract. 
For the enquiry of the typical expectations of a consumer, an abstract standard is applied, with 
the exception of individually agreed clauses. The provisions agreed by the parties determine 
the nature of the contract, but since content control is legal control, external references must be 
taken into account, too.  
External factors also influence the expectations of the customer. The typical expectations can 
be evaluated by means of commonly used clauses and provisions of new contract types as well 
as customary and commercial practice. Non-codified agreements developed by the courts (e.g., 
leasing contracts) are also part of the client's typical expectations. These expectations must be 
checked against the valuations of the objective law and adjusted accordingly so that a more 
objective approach is ascertained. The legitimate expectations are disappointed if the supplier's 
promises (e.g., in commercials) are not reflected in its standard terms. The evaluation requires 
the assessment of the entire contract so that the contractual purpose might also be attained by 
compensatory clauses. 
§ 307(1) 1st sent. has a proper scope of application, especially where the given contract type 
has no codified model, or the agreement is so atypical that no similar regulations can be found. 
This is the case for gym membership contracts, for instance. 
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Although the application of certain provisions is excluded for B2B contracts in terms of 
§ 310(1), §§ 307(1) 1st sent., 307(2) and the transparency control under § 307(1) 2nd sent. apply 
to these agreements. This is because content control aims to ensure that the principle of good 
faith is adhered to by applying a more flexible approach in B2B contracts. In agreements 
between businesses a generalised-abstract approach applies. § 310(1) sets out that reasonable 
account must be taken of the practices and customs that apply in business dealings though. The 
prohibitions contained in §§ 308 and 309 have a radiating effect on the general clause because 
they are an emanation of the principle of good faith.  
§ 307(1) 2nd sent. provides that a standard clause may also be ineffective due to its 
intransparency. The objective of the transparency requirement is that customers can reach an 
informed decision by increasing the perception and comparability of contract clauses. § 307(3) 
2nd sent. even regulates that this requirement is also applicable to areas where content control 
does not take place (essentialia negotii). B2B contracts are subject to transparency control too, 
as well as pre-formulated contract clauses in consumer contracts. 
Generally, incompliance with the transparency requirement leads to ineffectiveness of the 
clause if the other party suffers an unreasonable disadvantage therefrom. The determination of 
such a disadvantage is dispensable though where an irrefutable presumption exists for such a 
disadvantage, e.g., where an abstract danger of the loss of market opportunities exists. 
For the evaluation of the transparency requirement, an abstract-general stance must be taken. 
Not only individual clauses but also their interplay is subject to transparency control. In 
addition, transparency has some significance for ancillary agreements concerning the price, 
which are generally excluded from content control.   
The transparency requirement has its limitations, however. Suppliers are not required to repeat 
legal provisions or rights that are linked to the nature of the contract. What is more, the 
supplier's interests must be considered because it is not required to divulge its internal 
calculation, for instance.   
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CHAPTER 6 – ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER RIGHTS IN GERMAN STANDARD 
BUSINESS TERMS LEGISLATION 
 
1. Individual proceedings 
1.1  Court actions 
Where individual parties are involved, the court decides whether a standard business clause is 
effective in a so-called 'incidental control', i.e., within the given proceedings (individual 
action). Hence, the legal force of the judgement only applies inter partes, and where other 
individuals wish to attack the same clause, they have to bring a new court action.5597 
Example:  Client A orders a kitchen with company B for EUR 5,000. Because of the high 
demand of this model the kitchen can only be delivered in 3 months. Both parties 
agree on a date of delivery. One month after the conclusion of the contract, B 
requires a supplement of EUR 800 because of higher costs for materials. Client 
A refuses to pay the additional EUR 800, and B sues A under § 433(2)5598 and 
its standard clauses which provide for the possibility to increase prices 
'reasonably' due to higher costs for the user. In the individual proceedings, the 
court then has to decide if B's claim is justified in terms of § 433(2). To do so, 
it has to assess 'incidentally' whether B's standard clause is valid. The court will 
conclude that the given clause is ineffective in terms of § 309 no. 1 and will 
dismiss the action.5599 
As regards individual proceedings and the incidental control, no special requirements apply. 
Since the beginning, the German legislator, unlike the South African legislator,5600 has been 
concerned with measures designed to prevent the use of unfair terms rather than eliminating 
these terms ex post facto. In order to achieve such a 'positive enforcement', it considered that 
individual proceedings were not sufficiently effective, and that the introduction of a novel 
procedural solution, the institutional action, would be a better solution.5601  
                                                             
5597 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 20.   
5598 § 433(2): 'The buyer is obliged to pay the seller the agreed purchase price and to accept delivery of the thing 
purchased.'  
5599 My own example. 
5600 The CPA focuses on individual proceedings and leaves it rather to individual consumers to fight unfair terms. 
See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.1. 
5601 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 157. 
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1.2  Industry ombuds 
In Germany, many industries have implemented ombuds procedures, such as banks and 
insurance companies.5602 Their procedure is quite similar. In the following, the procedure of 
the ombudsman for private banks5603 is described as an example: 
The Private Banks Ombudsman is responsible for disputes between banks that have joined the 
conciliation procedure and consumers (applicants) concerning all products and services offered 
by the bank, in particular disputes under § 14 (1) UKlaG.5604 
First, the ombuds' office examines all complaints received for admissibility and responsibility. 
If these criteria are met, the ombud checks the documents for completeness. If the documents 
are not complete, the ombud will contact the customer and request the missing information. As 
                                                             
5602 Ombudsmann der privaten Banken (https://bankenombudsmann.de), Ombudsmann der Öffentlichen Banken 
(www.voeb.de), Ombudsmann der genossenschaftlichen Bankengruppe (www.bvr.de), Schlichtungsstelle beim 
Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverband (www.dsgv.de/schlichtungsstelle), Schlichtungsstelle der Deutschen 
Bundesbank (www.bundesbank.de), Versicherungsombudsmann (www.versicherungsombudsmann.de), 
Ombudsmann Private Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung (www.pkv-ombudsmann.de), Ombudsstelle 
geschlossene Fonds (www.ombudsstelle-gfonds.de), Ombudsleute der Privaten Bausparkassen 
(www.schlichtungsstelle-bausparen.de), Büro der Ombudsstelle des BVI - Bundesverband Investment und Asset 
Management e.V. (www.ombudsstelle-investmentfonds.de), Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(www.bafin.de), to name but a few. 
5603 The term 'ombudsman' is used when used in German terminology. It also includes ombudswomen. 
5604 § 14 UKlaG: '(1) In case of disputes arising from the application 1. the provisions of the BGB concerning 
distance contracts for financial services 2. §§ 491 to 508, 511 and 655a to 655d of the BGB and article 247a(1) of 
the EGBGB, 3. the provisions concerning payment service contracts (' ), 4. the provisions of the Payment Services 
Supervision Act (Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz - ZAG), insofar as they create obligations for electronic money 
issuers or payment service providers vis-à-vis their customers 5.the provisions of the Payment Accounts Act 
(Zahlungskontengesetz - ZKG) governing the relationship between a payment service provider and a consumer 
6. the provisions of the Investment Companies Code (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch - KAG), if consumers are involved 
in the dispute, or 7. of other provisions in connection with contracts concerning banking transactions (...) between 
consumers and enterprises supervised under the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz - KWG), the parties may, without 
prejudice to their right to take action in the courts, take recourse to a private consumer arbitration board recognised 
by the Federal Office of Justice for such disputes or to the consumer arbitration board established at the Deutsche 
Bundesbank or the consumer arbitration board established at the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. (…). 
(2) Each consumer conciliation body referred to in paragraph 1 must be composed of at least two conciliators who 
are qualified to hold judicial office. The arbitrators shall be independent and shall conduct the arbitration 
proceedings fairly and impartially. They shall base their mediation proposals on the applicable law and they shall 
in particular comply with mandatory consumer protection laws. A consumer may not be required to pay a fee for 
the arbitration procedure. (3) Upon request, the Federal Office of Justice shall recognise a conciliation office as a 
private consumer conciliation office pursuant to paragraph 1 sentence 1 if 1. the institution of the conciliation 
body is a registered association (eingetragener Verein) 2 the conciliation body is responsible for the disputes 
under paragraph 1 sentence 1 and 3.the organisation, financing and rules of procedure of the Conciliation Body 
comply with the requirements of this Act and the statutory ordinance issued on the basis of this Act. The rules of 
procedure of a recognised conciliation body may be amended only with the consent of the Federal Office of 
Justice. (4) The Federal Office of Justice shall include the consumer conciliation bodies under paragraph 1 in the 
list under § 33(1) of the Act on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Consumer Matters 
(Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz – VSBG) and shall publish the recognition and the revocation or withdrawal 
of recognition in the Federal Gazette. (5) (…).' My own translation. 
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soon as the client's documents are complete, it forwards the complaint to the management of 
the bank concerned. The bank must respond to the complaint within one month. 
If the bank agrees with the complainant and resolves the disagreement in the interests of the 
customer, the conciliation procedure is closed. Otherwise, the complainant will be informed of 
the bank's rejection and referred to the possibility to comment on the bank's rejection within 
one month.  
The case is then submitted to the conciliator for a decision. If the conciliator is unable to obtain 
further information from the parties on the basis of the opinions or documents submitted, he or 
she may request further information. The conciliator forwards his or her decision directly to 
the parties, which concludes the conciliation procedure. There is no legal remedy against the 
conciliation decision. If the complainant is not satisfied with the conciliation decision, he or 
she may submit the dispute to court at any time. The procedure is free of charge for bank 
customers and without risk. If a client does not agree with the ombud's decisions, the way to 
the ordinary courts remains open for him or her. 
If the appeal is successful, customers are granted their rights quickly and easily. Legal 
disadvantages, e.g., due to statute of limitations, cannot occur during the conciliation procedure 
because the statute of limitations is considered to be suspended for the duration of the 
procedure. 
The banks have undertaken to accept arbitration claims up to an amount in dispute of 
EUR 10,000. This binding effect is not mandatory as binding decisions are not part of the 
general standard for conciliation bodies voluntarily supported by the industry. Banks often also 
accept non-binding arbitration decisions made against them with a value in dispute in excess 
of EUR 10,000, however.5605 
According to the information accessible on the website of the ombudsmen for private banks, 
about half of the complaints end in favour of the customers. The outcome of the proceedings 
shifted in 2014 and 2015 due to the wave of complaints on the subject of 'processing fees for 
consumer loans' though. In 2014, more than 100,000 complaints reached the office of the 
ombudsman for private banks. This is because the limitation period was to be suspended by the 
initiation of proceedings and the banks would repay the processing fees justifiably demanded 
in accordance with the rulings of the BGH. A very high proportion of these complaints have 
                                                             
5605 The procedure for ombudsmen of the private bank is accessible at 
https://bankenombudsmann.de/ombudsmannverfahren/ablauf-des-verfahrens. 
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been settled in advance in favour of the customers as the banks have followed the recovery 
claims.5606 
Hence, this kind of pre-trial procedure is very efficient with regard to the high number of 
complaints handled, its speediness and cost-effectiveness. Since this procedure not only 
concerns §§ 305 et seq. BGB but all consumer-relevant matters, it is however difficult to say 
which proportion of standard business terms related matters are resolved by ombuds. As 
already mentioned, the banks' and insurance companies' standard terms are much more in line 
today than before due to institutional actions. As the example above concerning the justifiably 
demanded reimbursement of processing fees demonstrates, this kind of pre-trial proceedings 
seems to have its justification. 
2. Institutional action 
2.1 Institutional actions as a significant complement of the substantive standard terms 
legislation 
In order to tackle unfair standard terms more efficiently, the German legislature provided for 
the possibility to file institutional actions.5607 
In German law, four different types of institutional actions (Verbandsklagen) aiming at 
consumer protection have been created in the last decades. The oldest one of these institutional 
actions is set out in § 8 UWG5608 and has the purpose of combating unfair competition. 
                                                             
5606 See https://bankenombudsmann.de/ombudsmannverfahren/beschwerde-statistik. 
5607 The term 'Verbandsklage' can be translated as 'action in the collective interest (Naudé 2010 SALJ 517), 'general 
use challenge' (Naudé 2010 SALJ 528), 'abstract challenge' (Naudé 2009 SALJ 515) or 'legal action taken by an 
association' (Dietl Legal Dictionary  s.v. 'Verbandsklage'). In the German part of this thesis, the term 'institutional 
action is preferred.  
5608 UWG = Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Unfair Competition Act). § 8 UWG: 'Elimination; 
injunctive relief: (1) Whoever engages in an illegal commercial practice pursuant to [§] 3 or [§] 7 can be sued for 
elimination, and in the event of the risk of recurrence, to cease and desist. The claim to cease and desist shall 
already pertain in the event of the risk of such contravention of [§] 3 or [§] 7. (2) Where the contraventions are 
committed in a business by a member of the staff or by a person exercising a mandate, the claim to cease and 
desist and the claim to elimination shall be deemed to apply in relation to the owner of the business as well. (3) 
The claims under [paragraph] (1) shall vest in 1. every competitor; 2. associations with legal personality which 
exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, if a considerable number of 
entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same 
market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and 
financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or 
independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; 
3.  qualified entities that prove that they are entered in the list of qualified entities pursuant to [§] 4 of the Injunctive 
Relief Act or on the list of the European Commission pursuant to Article 4(3) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests 
(OJ L 110 of 1.5.2009, p. 30); 4. Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. (4) The assertion of 
the claims referred to in [paragraph] (1) shall be inadmissible where such assertion is improper having regard to 
all the circumstances, especially where it predominantly serves the purpose of generating a claim for 
reimbursement of expenses or of the costs of taking legal action against the contravening party. In such cases the 
party against which the claim is directed may demand reimbursement of the costs of his legal defence. Further 
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Furthermore, the former AGBG contained the institutional action against users and persons 
who recommend standard business terms, and which is now set out in § 1 UKlaG.5609 Relatively 
new is the right to require refrainment from practices infringing consumer protection legislation 
under § 2 UKlaG.5610 The so-called 'model declaratory proceedings' (Musterfeststellungsklage) 
is the fourth type of institutional action. It has been introduced into German law in 2018.5611 
The focal provision for the combating of ineffective standard terms by means of institutional 
actions is § 1 UKlaG,5612 which also shapes the character of the UKlaG.5613 Therefore, this type 
of institutional action will be discussed in the following. 
                                                             
claims for reimbursement shall remain unaffected. (5) [§] 13 of the Injunctive Relief Act shall apply mutatis 
mutandis; in [§] 13 (1) and (3), second sentence, of the Injunctive Relief Act the claims listed therein under the 
Injunctive Relief Act shall be replaced by the claims under this provision. In all other respects, the Injunctive 
Relief Act shall not apply, unless one of the cases listed in [§] 4a of the Injunctive Relief Act applies.' Official 
translation of the UWG by the Federal Ministry of Justice, accessible at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_uwg/englisch_uwg.html#p0116. 
5609 UKlaG = Unterlassungsklagengesetz (Injunctions Act). There is currently no official translation of this statute 
by the Federal Ministry of Justice. In this thesis, the English translation of the EU Consumer Law Acquis 
Compendium No. 8 (IPR Verlag GmbH Munich 2005) is used. Where necessary, the author of this thesis has 
updated this translation to the current version of the UKlaG. This translation seems not to be available online 
anymore (28 March 2020). 
5610 § 2 UKlaG: '§ 2 Right to require refrainment from practices infringing consumer protection legislation - (1) 
In the interests of consumer protection, those who infringe provisions serving to protect consumers (consumer 
protection laws) in a manner other than by use or recommendation of standard contract terms may be required to 
refrain from doing so. If the infringements are committed by an employee or agent in a business, this right can 
also be asserted against the owner of the business. (2) Consumer protection laws for the purposes of this provision 
are: the provisions of the [BGB] applying to sales of consumer goods, doorstep selling, distance selling contracts, 
time-share contracts, travel contracts, consumer loan contracts and to financial accommodation arrangements, 
instalment supply contracts and loan brokerage contracts between a businessperson and a consumer, the provisions 
transposing Articles 5, 10 and 11 of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market ("Directive on electronic commerce"), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1), the Distance Learning 
Protection Act, the provisions of Federal and Land law transposing Articles 10 to 21 of Council Directive 
89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (OJ L 298, 
17.10.1989, p. 23) as amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 
1997 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities 
(OJ L 202, 30.7.1997, p. 60), the pertinent provisions of the Medicines Act and Article 1 §§ 3 to 13 of the Medical 
Advertising Act, § 23 of the Investment Companies Act and §§ 11 and 15h of the Foreign Investment Act. (3) An 
action cannot be brought if, in view of all the circumstances, it is abusive, and in particular if its primary purpose 
is to create a claim for legal expenses or costs against the infringing party.' 
5611  Gesetz zur Einführung einer zivilprozessualen Musterfeststellungsklage of 12 July 2018. See §§ 606-614 
ZPO. See discussion on the Musterfeststellungsklage in Part III ch 6 para 4. 
5612 § 1 UKlaG: '§ 1 Right to require refrainment from use and withdrawal of recommendation of standard contract 
terms - Those who use provisions which are invalid under §§ 307 to 309 of the [BGB] in standard contract terms 
or who recommend such provisions for commercial use may be required to refrain from using such terms and to 
withdraw any recommendation made.' 
5613 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz before § 1 UKlaG para 12. 
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In the wake of the Modernisation of the Law of Obligations,5614 the provisions governing the 
institutional action against ineffective standard terms has been systematically separated from 
the substantive standard terms provisions and inserted into the newly created UKlaG of 2002. 
The institutional action is a core element of German standard business terms legislation. Its 
objective is to make content control more efficient and to allow for a broader effect. The UKlaG 
protects not individual consumers but the public in general.5615 Moreover, institutional actions 
have the effect of inciting standard terms users to draft irreproachable clauses, and they often 
step in when customers refrain to take legal action because of the wording of certain clauses. 
When assessing standard clauses within an institutional action, an abstract-universal approach 
is applied. Contrary to individual proceedings, the given clause is not declared invalid, but the 
user is required to refrain from using it, and persons who recommended the clause are required 
to withdraw any recommendation made. The court rulings of institutional actions have not only 
an inter partes effect but are also valid for the benefit of the contractual partners of the given 
standard terms user (§ 11 UKlaG).5616 
The restriction of the scope of application of §§ 305 et seq. under § 310(4), according to which 
contracts in the field of the law of succession, family law and company law or to collective 
agreements and private-sector works agreements or public-sector establishment agreements5617 
are excluded, also has an impact on the scope of application of the UKlaG. Furthermore, under 
§ 15 UKlaG,5618 the Act does not apply to labour law. This clarification was necessary because 
according to § 310(4), for content control of employment contracts, reasonable account must 
be taken of the special features that apply in labour law. 
The reasons for the exclusion of labour law from institutional actions are two-fold. First, the 
legislator wished to avoid that the civil courts had to decide on ineffective clauses in 
employment contracts because the labour courts are more specialised in this field. Second, the 
interests of employees are traditionally represented by unions and employee representatives in 
                                                             
5614 Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz of 26 November 2001, BGBl. I at 3138. 
5615 Consistent case law. See, e.g., BGH NJW 1994, 2693. 
5616 § 11 UKlaG: 'Effects of the judgment - If the user against whom judgment has been given fails to comply 
with an injunction based on § 1, the provision in the standard contract terms is to be regarded as void insofar as 
the party concerned invokes the effect of the injunction. However, this party cannot invoke the effect of the 
injunction if the user against whom judgment has been given could contest the judgment under § 10.' See 
Schmidt E. NJW 2002, 25-30. 
5617 See s 5(2)(f) and (g) CPA under which transactions giving effect to a collective bargaining agreement  and 
collective agreements are excluded from the scope of application of the Act. 
5618 § 15 UKlaG: 'Exclusion of labour law – This Act shall not apply to labour law.' 
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the companies, and not by consumer associations.5619 Hence, the legislator did not wish to add 
another actor in the already complicated labour law relations.5620  
This is similar to section 5(2)(e) of the Consumer Protection Act that entirely excludes services 
to be supplied under an employment contract from the application of the Act.5621 
The existence of institutional actions is not unanimously praised. The opponents argue that 
institutional actions do not serve private interests but rather a public interest. The UKlaG and 
the ZPO where the procedural aspects of the institutional action are set out are designed for 
civil procedures though. Hence, the parties are in a position to continue or abandon their 
lawsuits at will. The opponents therefore assert that public interest litigation such as 
institutional actions would be better conducted in administrative proceedings.5622 With a view 
to the fact that preventive control by administrative bodies has not reached the expected 
efficiency where it had been established,5623 it is submitted that the conduction of institutional 
action by public entities would not lead to satisfactory results and that the institutional action 
is more effective. 
2.2  Impact of European legislation 
The field of law governing institutional actions has been and is being shaped by European law. 
The Directive 2009/22/EC of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests5624 aims to enable the 'free movement of actions for an injunction'5625 within the EU 
and to improve consumer protection in cross-border transactions. Difficulties arising in the 
field of consumer protection and having their source in the fact that standard terms users are 
located in other Member States than the country where the standard terms are used, shall be 
prevented by this Directive.5626 Although the Directive suggests two possible models for 
ensuring cross-border consumer protection, i.e., independent public bodies or private consumer 
organisations,5627 the German legislator chose the second option. This is because in Germany, 
                                                             
5619 BT-Drs. 14/7052 at 189. Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 20 criticises the exclusion of employment 
contract from content control in terms of § 15 UKlaG, though. 
5620 Stoffels AGB-Recht 478. 
5621 See discussion of the application of the CPA in Part I ch 2. 
5622 E. Schmidt NJW 2002, 25. 
5623 See MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 13, with further references. 
5624 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests. This Directive replaced Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests. 
5625 This phrase was coined in the Green Paper of the Commission of the European Communities on access of 
consumers to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the single market of 16 November 1993 (KOM 
(93) 576 at 77 et seq. 
5626 See Recitals (4) to (8) of the Directive. 
5627 Article 3 of the Directive. 
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private consumer protection organisations have ascertained consumer protection from the 
beginning. What is more, in a 'private law society', this option is more system-compatible. In 
addition, preventive control by administrative bodies has not reached the expected efficiency 
where it had been established.5628 Stoffels contends not without good reason that the tendency 
within EU law to shift the execution of consumer protective measures more towards 
administrative organisations5629 has thus to be seen critically.5630 
By and large, the institutional action is an effective tool in the fight against unfair standard 
clauses, although it has not realised its full potential.5631 Still many illegal and 'invented' clauses 
are used, and due to the Modernisation of the Law of Obligations which made a revision of 
many standard clauses necessary, the number of ineffective standard provisions might even 
have increased. The creation of the institutional action has not been in vain though because the 
standard business terms of financial institutions5632 and insurance companies,5633 for example, 
are much more in keeping with the legislation today than they were before.5634 This fact was 
often preceded by spectacular and high-profile court actions brought by consumer 
associations.5635 
Besides, when transposing the Directive into German law, the legislator adapted the locus 
standi of consumer organisations for cross-border transactions and created a registration 
procedure for eligible organisations.5636  
Finally, due to the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of 
2004,5637 the legislator completed the UKlaG by inserting § 4a5638 which extends punctually 
active legitimation for transnational transactions. 
                                                             
5628 See MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 13, with further references. 
5629 E.g., by the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of 27 October 2004. 
5630 Stoffels AGB-Recht 480. 
5631 From 2000 to 2005, for instance, there were only 62 appeals on points of law (Revisionen) where consumer 
associations were involved. In the same period, there were 354 court actions in total, which is not a very high 
number either. This trend continued in subsequent years. The very active Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband, 
for example, issued in 2009 105 warnings and 15 court actions. See UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
5632 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
5633 E.g., BGH NJW 1994, 2693. 
5634 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
5635 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8, with further references. 
5636 § 3 UKlaG. 
5637 Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (the 
Regulation on consumer protection cooperation). 
5638 Currently, there is no official translation in English of this provision. 
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It can be expected that in the future, the development of the institutional action in Germany 
will probably more depend on Brussels than on Berlin. Stoffel doubts however with good 
reason that the realisation of the objective of the ''free movement of actions for an injunction' 
is realistic because the already overstrained consumer protection organisations are unlikely to 
be able to take on further cases. He therefore advocates for better financial resources of these 
organisations in order to improve their work in the long term.5639 
There are also tendencies within EU law to harmonise the various national procedural 
provisions in order to improve consumer protection.5640 It is suggested that Stoffel's arguments 
mentioned above also apply here as long as consumer organisations are not granted more 
financial resources. 
2.3  Abstract-general enquiry in institutional actions 
The decision of inserting an abstract-universal approach into the former AGBG that came into 
force in 1977 was significant. After a very fruitful debate, the legislator opted for this approach 
because it was of the view that a particular-personalised approach would not lead to satisfactory 
results with respect of the combat of abusive standard clauses. If the individual clients would 
have to go to court, the following decisions would only have an inter partes effect, and other 
customers would not be able to benefit from the judgment. Experience has shown that 
individuals rather shy away from court proceedings. They often think that standard business 
terms have quasi-legislative authority. They also cannot evaluate the risks involved and are 
afraid of the costs involved with individual proceedings.5641 Hence, it was logical to create an 
institutional control procedure with a broad effect that is disconnected from the particular 
contractual relationship between the user and the other party.5642 
The South African legislator opted for another approach instead. Individual consumers have to 
file individual proceedings rather than consumer organisations bringing abstract-use 
challenges. Although section 77 of the Act sets out various support mechanisms for consumer 
protection groups, which might represent consumers in court 'either specifically or generally', 
the Act does not provide for any proceedings similar to institutional actions.5643 
                                                             
5639 Stoffels AGB-Recht 481. Also Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 20 is of the view that the biggest 
obstacle for an effective work of consumer associations is their weak financial resources. 
5640 See Report of the Commission concerning the application of Directive 93/13/EEC, KOM (2000) 248. See also 
MüKo ZPO/Micklitz before § 1 UKlaG para 53 et seq. 
5641 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 2. 
5642 Stoffels AGB-Recht 480. 
5643 See discussion in Part I ch 5. 
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2.3.1 Injunctive relief against the user 
In the following, the requisites for institutional actions will be discussed. First, the injunctive 
relief, i.e., the refrainment from the use of standard terms, will be presented. Afterwards, the 
claim for withdrawal of recommendations of standard provisions will be discussed. 
Despite its more academic relevance, the legal nature of the injunctive relief and the claim of 
withdrawal shall be shortly presented. The prevailing view has always qualified these claims 
as substantive claims in the sense of § 194(1).5644 The BGH also advocated this opinion.5645  
Others merely qualified these claims as a 'right to take legal action'5646 or a 'private-law control 
competence'.5647 Eike Schmidt argues that these claims serve the protection of consumer 
interests and therefore a public interest, which would be hardly compatible with a 'private 
individualisation'.5648 This dispute has been decided in favour of the prevailing opinion by the 
Act of 27 June 2000.5649 By this statute, the legislator replaced the phrase 'claims can only be 
exercised by (…)' ('Ansprüche … können nur geltend gemacht werden') in § 13(2) AGBG by 
the formulation 'the right to require' ('Ansprüche … stehen zu') in § 3(1) UKlaG. The 
modification of this formulation makes it clear that the given claims are not of a procedural but 
of a substantive nature.5650 What is more, § 3(2) 2nd sent. UKlaG provides for a restricted right 
to assign the right of action. According to § 398, only (substantive) 'claims may be transferred 
by the obligee to another person by contract with that person (assignment)', but no procedural 
legal positions. The only caveat of this substantive claim opposed to others is that not the 
substantive rights of the plaintiff are concerned, but the rights of the concerned public.5651 
a) Ineffective standard business terms 
Subject to institutional actions in terms of § 1 UKlaG are standard terms that are invalid under 
§§ 307 to 309 BGB as well as parts thereof that can be separated without the clause becoming 
inoperative. Clauses that are intended for non-recurrent use on only one occasion under 
                                                             
5644 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 4, UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 32, NK/Walker § 1 UKlaG para 2, 
Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 3. § 194(1) BGB: 'The right to demand that another person does or refrains 
from an act (claim) is subject to limitation.'  
5645 E.g., BGH NJW 1995, 1488. 
5646 Prozessführungsbefugnis. Hadding JZ 1970, 305 and 307 et seq. 
5647 Privatrechtliche Kontrollkompetenz. Göbel Prozesszweck der AGB-Klage at 125 et seq. 
5648 E. Schmidt NJW 2002, 25 (28). 
5649 BGBl. I at 897, with rectification at 1139. 
5650 See BT-Drs. 14/2658 at 52. 
5651 Stoffels AGB-Recht 487. 
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§ 310(3) no. 2 cannot be assessed in terms of the UKlaG since in abstract proceedings, the 
extent to which the other party could influence the clause's content cannot be evaluated.5652 
The wording of § 1 UKlaG is too restrictive in that not only clauses that are ineffective under 
§§ 307 to 309 are subject to an institutional action, but also infringements against statutory 
prohibitions in terms of § 1345653 or formal requirements according to § 125.5654 The 
restrictions set out in § 307(3) also limit the claim for refrainment in terms of § 1 UKlaG, which 
is significant for clauses stipulating the price and the specification of performance. The latter 
are nonetheless subject to the transparency requirement in terms of § 307(3) 2nd sent., read in 
conjunction with § 307(1) 2nd sent.5655 
The claim in terms of § 1 UKlaG requires that the given clause be invalid. Therefore, 
institutional actions cannot be based on provisions the legal consequence of which is merely 
the non-incorporation of a clause.5656 On the other hand, provisions that aim to override the 
incorporation requirements in terms of §§ 305(2) to 306 violate mandatory law and are subject 
to institutional actions.5657 The reason for the restrictive wording of § 1 UKlaG is that the BGB 
provisions for the incorporation of standard clauses, and especially § 305c(1) (surprising 
clauses), generally require an enquiry of the circumstances of the given case, which is not 
compatible with the general-abstract approach of the UKlaG. The surprising character of a 
clause can be eliminated where the user informs the other party of its content, for instance.5658 
When evaluating a clause within an institutional action, one has to interpret the provision in 
the most unfavourable manner to the consumer.5659 The enquiry of the reasonableness of the 
clause is done in a general-abstract way that does not take into consideration the circumstances 
of the individual case.5660 Hence, the other circumstances attending the entering into of the 
contract according to § 310(3) no. 3 can also be considered in individual proceedings.5661 
                                                             
5652 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 6, Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 2. 
5653 § 134 BGB: 'A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a 
different conclusion.'  
5654 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 17. § 125 BGB: 'A legal transaction that lacks the form prescribed by statute 
is void. In case of doubt, lack of the form specified by legal transaction also results in voidness.'  
5655 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 6. 
5656 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 13, Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 12. 
5657 Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 12. 
5658 Stoffels AGB-Recht 482 and 483. 
5659 See discussion of interpretational control, Part II ch 4. 
5660 Stoffels AGB-Recht 483. 
5661 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 7. 
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b) 'Use' of standard business terms 
Besides the requirement of an invalid standard clause, the latter also must be used. A use in 
terms of § 1 UKlaG is given where the standard provision is used in commercial 
transactions.5662 Since institutional actions aim to prevent the use of invalid clauses, it is not 
necessary though that the given clause has been incorporated into the agreement. It is sufficient 
that the intention of incorporating the standard provisions into contracts in the future is 
apparent.5663 This wide interpretation corresponds to article 7(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive 
according to which the abstract control must be designed for 'contractual terms drawn up for 
general use'.5664 Thus, a commercial offer or the invitation to make an offer concluding standard 
business terms,5665 or an invoice on which standard terms are printed, without the latter being 
incorporated,5666 fulfil the conditions of the 'use' of standard clauses in terms of § 1 UKlaG. 
A distinction between the first and the recurrent use of standard terms does not take place. 
Hence, the use of standard terms does not end with their incorporation into the contract but also 
includes the reference to not incorporated or ineffective standard clauses when executing 
agreements that already have been concluded.5667 As a consequence, the user's intention not to 
present the given clauses to the other party in future transactions does not mean that there is no 
'use' in terms of § 1 UKlaG.5668 
'User' is generally the person that shall be a party to the contract. This is in most cases the 
company using the standard terms, and not the acting company organ (e.g., the managing 
director).5669 There is an exception in cases in which the representative of the company – or of 
the party – has a significant interest in the incorporation of the standard terms. Then, the 
representative is considered the user. This is the case, for instance, for a construction 
management company with respect to all standard provisions that aim to keep the construction 
costs low and therefore increase the company's profit. Furthermore, an architect who inserts 
clauses in its standard terms that are valid between its client and the construction company, and 
which are favourable in terms of his legal position vis-à-vis its client, is considered a user.5670 
                                                             
5662 BGH NJW 1987, 2867. 
5663 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 7, UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 24. 
5664 WLP/Pfeiffer Art 7 RiLi para 7. Emphasis added. 
5665 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 1 UKlaG para 20. 
5666 LG Munich BB 1979, 1789. 
5667 BGH NJW 2013, 593 et seq. 
5668 Stoffels AGB-Recht 483. 
5669 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 28. 
5670 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 29. 
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c) Danger of recurrent use 
A further and unwritten requisite of § 1 UKlaG is an existing danger of the recurrent use5671 of 
incriminated standard terms.5672 Such a danger can be assumed where the user already has used 
its terms in transactions.5673 The mere modification of the incriminated clause does not 
eliminate the danger of recurrence, neither does the user's declaration not to use the given 
clause anymore. In order to eliminate the danger of recurrence, there must be circumstances 
the existence of which regularly speaks for the assumption based on general experience that 
the user will not use the clause in the future anymore. The danger of recurrence persists 
however if the user insists during litigation that the clause it has used was valid and where the 
user is not ready to make a declaration of discontinuance the infringement of which is 
punishable.5674 Generally, a user can only dispel the danger of recurrent use if it makes a serious 
declaration of discontinuance and by expressing the seriousness of its declaration by accepting 
a contract penalty.5675 A short period in which the user can implement the modifications is 
acceptable, but not a period of permitted use of the remaining standard forms.5676 
For the assumption of a danger of recurrent use, a seriously impending first use is sufficient. 
These cases shall be rather rare in practice though.5677 Hence, an entrepreneur who plans to 
create a 'pizza taxi company' and orders the printing of a flyer which presents its future business 
and includes invalid standard clauses creates a seriously impending first use. Injunctive relief 
is possible at this stage.5678 
d) Content of the claim 
The standard terms user must cease any conduct that can be qualified as 'use' of the given 
clause. This includes the prohibition of incorporating invalid clauses into new contracts and 
referring to them when executing already concluded agreements.5679 Usually, users fulfil these 
requirements by 'simply doing nothing'.5680 If the incriminated standard provisions are 
physically posted in the user's premises, a positive action is required, i.e., the removal or 
modification of the said terms. If the user employs agents, it must ensure, by taking appropriate 
                                                             
5671 Wiederholungsgefahr. 
5672 BGH NJW 2002, 2386. 
5673 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 1 UKlaG para 27, Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 20. 
5674 Stoffels AGB-Recht 484. Strafbewehrte Unterlassungserklärung. 
5675 OLG Cologne NJW-RR 2003, 316. 
5676 OLG Cologne NJW-RR 2003, 316. Aufbrauchfrist. 
5677 Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 20a. 
5678 Example found in Stoffels AGB-Recht 484. 
5679 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 9. 
5680 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 48 ('schlichtes Nichts-Tun'). 
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organisational measures, that they do not use the invalid terms.5681 The claim does not include 
the restitution of the remaining standard forms.5682 The injunctive relief is immediately 
effective, and the user may not claim a period of allowed use.5683  
2.3.2 Withdrawal of recommendation of standard terms  
§ 1 UKlaG also provides that a person who recommends invalid provisions for commercial use 
may be required to withdraw such recommendation. The conditions for this claim are similar 
to those for the injunctive relief.5684 
The claim for withdrawal of recommendation is a claim for elimination of the danger of 
continued use of invalid standard terms for which the withdrawal of recommendation is an 
appropriate and necessary measure.5685 It ceases to exist where the user unambiguously ceases 
its recommendation before litigation.5686 
a) 'Recommendation' of standard terms 
The BGB or the UKlaG do not contain a legal definition of 'recommendation'. Unlike the user, 
a person recommending standard terms is not a party to the contract but has the objective that 
third parties use its terms. He or she therefore recommends the use of specific standard 
provisions to a number of others, suggests their use or incites them to use such terms.5687 
Examples are professional associations that design contract forms themselves or have them 
designed by others. This also applies to public corporations, such as law societies, medical 
associations or architect chambers.5688 Landowner associations which publish and circulate 
model lease forms are concerned too.5689 On the other hand, legal opinions published in law 
journals on the validity of specific standard terms are not 'recommendation'5690 because authors 
of scientific contributions do not intend their articles for commercial use.5691 Moreover, 
lawyers who design standard terms for their clients or notaries public using form compendiums 
for the insertion of certain standard clauses into contracts do so for individual clients, but not 
for numerous persons. This is different though where lawyers or notaries public recommend 
                                                             
5681 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 48.  
5682 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 35. 
5683 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 12. 
5684 Stoffels AGB-Recht 485. 
5685 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 12. 
5686 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 51. 
5687 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 1 UKlaG para 35. 
5688 Staudinger/Schlosser § 1 UKlaG para 30. 
5689 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 28. 
5690 WLP/Lindacher § 1 UKlaG para 41, Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 12. 
5691 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 31. 
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standard terms to several clients, even if this is done in the context of individual mandates.5692 
The authorisation of administrative bodies for the use of certain standard terms cannot be 
qualified as recommendation either.5693 
b) Content of the claim 
Persons who recommend the use of invalid standard terms have to cease any conduct in this 
regard that can be qualified as a recommendation. Furthermore, they have to withdraw their 
recommendation in the same fashion as the recommendation (§ 9 no. 4 UKlaG). The obligation 
to withdraw the recommendation has a much broader effect than the simple cessation of the 
recommendation and has thus a greater impact.5694 The injunction judgment must be made 
known in the same way as the recommendation.5695 
2.3.3 Information for injunction proceedings under § 13 UKlaG 
§ 13 UKlaG5696 grants a right of eligible bodies to information of the name and address for 
service of a party vis-à-vis providers of postal, telecommunications, television or media 
services if that information is necessary and cannot be obtained by other means. 
The rationale of this provision is to safeguard the right of action under the UKlaG. It ensures 
that the plaintiff knows the user's address for service.5697 The eligible body must declare in 
writing that this information is necessary in order to assert a right under the UKlaG and cannot 
obtain it elsewhere. Eligible bodies are qualified consumer associations, associations with legal 
personality for the promotion of commercial and independent professional interests, as well as 
the Chambers of Trade and Industry or the Chambers of Crafts and Labour. 
                                                             
5692 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 31. 
5693 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 28. 
5694 Stoffels AGB-Recht 486. 
5695 § 9 no. 4 UKlaG. 
5696 § 13(1) UKlaG: '(1) Any party which by way of business provides postal, telecommunications, television or 
media services or contributes to the provision of such services shall, provide 1. eligible bodies that demonstrate 
that they are registered in the list pursuant to § 4 or the list of the qualified entities pursuant to article 4(3) of the 
Directive 2009/22/EC, 2. associations with legal personality for the promotion of commercial or independent 
professional interests, 3. the Chambers of Trade and Industry or the Chambers of Crafts and Labour on request 
with the name and address for service of a party involved in postal, telecommunications, television or media 
operations if the body or association declares in writing that this information is necessary in order to assert a right 
under §§ 1 to 2a or § 4a and cannot be obtained elsewhere.' (Translation edited by myself, as the official translation 
was not up-to-date). 
5697 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 39 (no. 145). 
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2.3.4 Limitation period 
The legislator did not insert the special limitation periods of § 13(4) AGBG5698 in the UKlaG 
because they were dispensable due to the revision of the limitation periods in the BGB.5699 
Hence, §§ 194 et seq. BGB are applicable. This means that for the claim for injunction and 
withdrawal of recommendation the standard 3-year limitation period of § 195 BGB5700 applies. 
If a user reuses its standard terms or the latter are recommended again, the limitation period 
starts from the beginning.5701 As § 195 provides for the standard limitation period, it also 
applies to individual actions. 
2.3.5 Eligible bodies 
The claims contemplated in § 1 UKlaG are only granted to particular bodies, but not to partners 
to the given contract or competitors.5702 § 3(1) UKlaG5703 governs the eligible bodies which 
will be discussed in the following. 
a) Qualified entities 
The German legislator took the term 'qualified entities' used in § 3(1) no. 1 UKlaG from articles 
3 and 4 of Directive 98/27/EC. It includes consumer associations that are inscribed in the list 
of the Federal Agency of Justice.5704 The inscription in the list is done on request5705 and is 
constitutive. Consumer associations that are inscribed in the list of the European Commission 
of the European communities are equal to German associations.5706 In Germany, the request 
for inscription in the national list entails the automatic forwarding of the request for inscription 
to the European Commission in the European list and inscription in this list.5707 The European 
                                                             
5698 § 13(4) AGBG provided for a limitation period of two years from the moment at which the eligible body had 
knowledge of the user or recommendation of the invalid terms, otherwise a limitation period of four years. 
5699 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 275. 
5700 § 195: 'The standard limitation period is three years.'  
5701 Erman/Roloff § 1 UKlaG para 12, Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 15. 
5702 Stoffels AGB-Recht 488. 
5703 § 3(1) UKlaG: '(1) The following shall have the right to require refrainment and withdrawal as mentioned in 
§§ 1 and 2: 1. qualified entities which demonstrate that they are inscribed in the list of qualified entities as per § 4 
or in the list of the European Commission as per Article 4(3) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests (OJ L 110, 
01/05/2009, p. 30), 2. associations with legal personality for the promotion of commercial and independent 
professional interests, insofar as their membership includes a considerable number of businesses marketing goods 
or commercial services of the same or a similar type on the same market, insofar as their staffing, material and 
financial resources enable them actually to perform the interest promotion functions laid down in their statutes, 
and insofar the infringement relates to the interests of their members, 3. the Chambers of Trade and Industry or 
the Chambers of Crafts and Labour. The right of action may be assigned only to bodies within the meaning of 
sentence 1.' 
5704 Bundesamt für Justiz. 
5705 § 4(2) 1st sent. UKlaG. 
5706 § 3(1) 1st sent. no. 1 2nd alt. UKlaG. 
5707 § 4(1) 2nd sent. UKlaG. 
 881   
 
list is published in the Official Journal of the EU and updated every six months.5708 In contrast, 
the German list is updated once a year and published on 1 January in the Federal Gazette 
(Bundesanzeiger).5709 The Federal Agency (Bundesjustizamt) publishes a list on its homepage 
that is updated at quarterly intervals though.5710 Witt correctly indicates that there is a 
divergence between the publishing dates of the Bundesanzeiger and the Official Journal of the 
EU, and that the Federal Agency of Justice immediately forwards the names and addresses of 
newly inscribed associations to the Commission. One should therefore exclusively refer to the 
EU list in order to know whether an association has locus standi. The informative value of the 
German list in this regard is thus limited.5711 
In legal proceedings, the complaining qualified entity must demonstrate its locus standi by 
presenting a certification showing that it is inscribed in the given list, or an excerpt of the 
Official Journal of the EU.5712 The court must also verify whether the standing is covered by 
the statutory object of the given entity.5713 
An association must be inscribed in the list if it fulfils the requirements of § 4(2) UKlaG. Hence, 
it must have legal personality, which is regularly the case for registered associations5714 under 
§ 21 BGB.5715 Their functions as laid down in their statutes must include the promotion of 
consumers’ interests by education and advice on a non-commercial and non-temporary 
basis.5716 These functions must actually be exercised.5717 This field of activity must not 
necessarily be their main activity, but it must not play a minor role in the entity's functions.5718 
Furthermore, the association must at least have 75 natural persons or three associations as 
members and actually exist. It must also afford assurance that it performs its function correctly 
due to its previous activity. 
                                                             
5708 Article 4(3) Directive 98/27/EC. 
5709 § 4(1) 2nd sent. UKlaG. 
5710 https://www.bundesjustizamt.de. The English version of this homepage is accessible at 
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/EN/Home/homepage_node.html. 
5711 UBH/Witt § 4 UKlaG para 6. 
5712 § 4(3) 2nd sent. UKlaG. 
5713 In BGH NJW 2012, 1812 (1813 et seq), the BGH decided that the area of activity of the consumer protection 
association of Rhineland-Westphalia (Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen) is not geographically limited. 
5714 Eingetragene Vereine (e.V.). 
5715 § 21 BGB: 'An association whose object is not commercial business operations acquires legal personality by 
entry in the register of associations of the competent local court [Amtsgericht].'  
5716 Section 77(a) CPA contains the same requirements for the support for consumer protection groups by the 
Commission. 
5717 Palandt/Bassenge § 4 UKlaG para 6. 
5718 BGH NJW 1986, 1613. 
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Examples for qualified entities are tenant associations5719 or automobile clubs such as the 
ADAC,5720 but not homemakers' associations because the representation of consumer interests 
is only of minor significance for them.5721 Since employees are considered consumers vis-à-vis 
their employers under § 13 BGB5722 and unions have a special interest in defending the interests 
of their members, also unions can be inscribed as qualified entities in terms of § 3 UKlaG.5723 
In this regard, § 15 UKlaG, which excludes the application of the UKlaG to labour law, must 
be considered.5724 There is an irrefragable presumption that consumer centres and other 
consumer associations supported by public funding satisfy these requirements.5725 
In terms of § 3(2) UKlaG, eligible entities may not seek injunctions requiring refrainment and 
withdrawal under § 1 UKlaG where standard contract terms are applied in relations with an 
entrepreneur,5726 or if they are recommended solely for use in relations between entrepreneurs. 
Where the use of the recommendation of standard terms concerns both consumers and 
entrepreneurs, the qualified entity can only restrict its claim to the use or recommendation 
concerning consumers.5727 
b) Associations for the promotion of consumers' interests 
§ 3(1) no. 2 UKlaG also includes associations with legal personality for the promotion of 
commercial and independent professional interests.5728 This activity must not necessarily be 
the main function of the association but should not be merely accessory. It is sufficient if the 
promotion of commercial and independent professional interests is impliedly included in the 
statute.5729  
Under no. 1 of the same provision, registered associations in terms of § 21 BGB fulfil this 
requirement, but also associations that obtained their legal personality by State awarding or by 
                                                             
5719 BGH NJW 1998, 3114 (3115). 
5720 BGH NJW-RR 1988, 1443. 
5721 Palandt/Bassenge § 4 UKlaG para 6. 
5722 § 13 BGB: 'A consumer means every natural person who enters into a legal transaction for purposes that 
predominantly are outside his trade, business or profession.'  
5723 Stoffels AGB-Recht 489 and 490. Palandt/Bassenge § 4 UKlaG para 6 is of a different view, without giving 
any reasons. 
5724 Stoffels AGB-Recht 490 note 12. 
5725 The Homepage of the Federal Consumer Centre (Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.) contains a list 
with the addresses of all consumer protection associations in Germany, accessible at https://www.vzbv.de. 
5726 § 14 BGB: '(1) An entrepreneur means a natural or legal person or a partnership with legal personality who 
or which, when entering into a legal transaction, acts in exercise of his or its trade, business or profession. (2) A 
partnership with legal personality is a partnership that has the capacity to acquire rights and to incur liabilities.'  
5727 Stoffels AGB-Recht 490. 
5728 This concerns the liberal professions. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 490 note 22. 
5729 Palandt/Bassenge § 3 UKlaG para 7. 
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other public-law provisions, which is the case, e.g., for the chambers of commerce and 
industry.5730  
Their membership must include a considerable number of businesses marketing goods or 
commercial services of the same or a similar type on the same market. This condition is aimed 
at preventing abuse of the locus standi. Therefore, the number of members is not exclusively 
to be considered, but rather the association's representativeness on the relevant market.5731 The 
BGH therefore does not apply this condition as it does not consider it objectively justified.5732 
In addition, their staffing, material and financial resources must enable them actually to 
perform the interest promotion functions laid down in their statutes, and insofar the 
infringement relates to the interests of their members.5733 The association does not need to 
employ lawyers in this regard as it is sufficient if it can recognise and handle simple cases 
without external help.5734 The main part of the association's financial resources must come from 
membership fees or donations.5735 The activity must actually be exercised. For regularly 
created and active associations, there is a presumption that this is the case.5736 
Examples for associations under § 3(1) no. 2 UKlaG are bar associations,5737 medical 
associations, architect chambers5738 and trade associations whose legal personality is based on 
State awarding.5739 
c) Chambers of Trade and Industry and Chambers of Crafts and Labour 
The reference to the chambers of trade and industry and the chambers of crafts and labour in 
§ 3(1) no. 3 is superfluous because these entities are already included in no. 2 of this 
provision.5740 Witt beliefs that the legislator inserted the given bodies in no. 3 because their 
activities have a different objective. He contends that associations in terms of no. 2 only exert 
their activities in the interests of all their members as a group, whereas the chambers mentioned 
in no. 3 exercise their activities also in other parties' interests in order to safeguard good 
                                                             
5730 Stoffels AGB-Recht 490. 
5731 Stoffels AGB-Recht 491. 
5732 BGH NJW 2003, 1241 (1242). 
5733 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 3 UKlaG para 31, WLP/Lindacher § 3 UKlaG para 19. 
5734 BGH NJW 2000, 73 (74). 
5735 BGH NJW-RR 1990, 102 (104). 
5736 BGH NJW-RR 2001, 36 (37). 
5737 OLG Bamberg NJW 2012, 2282 (2285). 
5738 BGH NJW 1981, 2351. 
5739 Stoffels AGB-Recht 491, with further references. 
5740 Stoffels AGB-Recht 491. 
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commercial and artisanal practice.5741 No. 2 seems to be wide enough to cover these 
organisations too, however. In practice, this debate has no relevance as both types of 
associations are included in § 3. 
d) Assignment of claims 
Under § 3(1) 2nd sent. UKlaG, the right of action may be assigned only to the bodies as 
mentioned earlier. Since in terms of the law only the eligible bodies mentioned in § 3 are 
entitled, this provision has no proper meaning.5742 With the insertion of this provision, the 
legislator aimed to end the debate of the legal nature of the claims according to § 1 UKlaG5743 
and wanted to prevent a commercialisation of these claims.5744 
2.3.6 Procedural aspects 
a) Warning 
Before an eligible body takes legal action against a user, it usually sends him a warning first. 
§ 5 UKlaG5745 refers to § 12(1) 1st sent. UWG, according to which parties entitled to assert a 
claim to cease and desist should warn the debtor prior to initiating court proceedings and should 
give him the opportunity to resolve the dispute by incurring the obligation to cease and desist 
subject to a reasonable contractual penalty. The warning set out in § 5 UKlaG, read in 
conjunction with § 12(1) UWG, corresponds to the 'prior consultation' in Directive 98/22/EC. 
The issuing of a warning is not mandatory but a mere Obliegenheit.5746 Although the issuing 
of a warning has no impact on the admissibility and merits of the court action,5747 it can avoid 
the adverse consequences with regard to the costs according to § 93 ZPO, which is applicable 
in terms of § 5 UKlaG.5748 In fact, most incriminated standard clauses where consumer 
associations are involved are modified not after court actions, but by compliance by the user 
after an issued warning.5749 § 93 ZPO provides that 'where the defendant has not given cause 
for an action to be brought, the plaintiff shall bear the costs of the proceedings should the 
defendant immediately acknowledge the claim.' The defendant has given cause for an action if 
he or she does not act according to a justified warning. Apart from that, in most cases, the 
                                                             
5741 UBH/Witt § 3 UKlaG para 10. 
5742 Stoffels AGB-Recht 491. 
5743 See discussion above. 
5744 BT-Drs. 14/2658 at 52. 
5745 § 5 UKlaG: 'Application of the [ZPO] and other provisions - The provisions of the [ZPO] and § 12(1), (2), 
(4) and (5) of the [UWG] shall apply to the procedure unless otherwise provided by this Act.' (Translation updated 
by myself). 
5746 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 1. 
5747 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 5 UKlaG para 9, Maxeiner 2003 J. Yale Int. Law 158. 
5748 Stoffels AGB-Recht 492. 
5749 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
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statutes of the eligible bodies under § 3 UKlaG provide for such a prior warning.5750 A warning 
is dispensable however if it is in vain or unreasonable, e.g., where the infringement is so 
significant that the claimant cannot be expected to issue a warning before going to court.5751 
A warning consists of the five following elements: 
aa)  Reclamation 
The claimant has to describe the infringement in a way that enables the user to assess whether 
the claim is justified. It therefore has to mention the given standard clause(s) and the infringed 
provision(s) under §§ 305 et seq. In cases where the infringement concerns an absolute 
prohibition, it is sufficient to refer to § 309.5752 Infringement against the general clause or § 308 
require a short explanation though so that the user or the recommender of the given standard 
clause can check whether the claim is justified.5753 
bb)  Invitation to issue a declaration to cease and desist 
The invitation to issue a declaration to cease the use or recommendation of the given standard 
provision consists of requiring that the person refrains from using or recommending the 
standard terms in question according to § 9 no. 2 UKlaG. This also includes the referral to 
standard terms by the user that are contained in contracts that have already been concluded.5754 
cc)  Promise to pay a contractual penalty in case of infringement 
In order to avoid the costs in terms of § 93 ZPO, it is customary and reasonable5755 to include 
in the warning the invitation of the promise to make by the user or recommender of the given 
standard terms to pay a contractual penalty in case of further infringements. Besides, by 
requiring such a promise, the claimant has a leverage against the user or recommender. Usually, 
the eligible body – and not the court – determines the given amount (e.g., EUR 2,500 for the 
use of each ineffective clause, or EUR 5,000 for each recommended clause).5756 According to 
Witt, a discount or a maximum amount in the case of numerous clauses that infringe legislation 
                                                             
5750 Stoffels AGB-Recht 492. 
5751 Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 7, WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 12. 
5752 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 4. 
5753 Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 3. 
5754 WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 18. 
5755 The indication is not necessary however in order to avoid the negative consequences of § 93 ZPO, since they 
occur automatically. 
5756 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 5. Lindacher is of the view that the determination of the amount to be paid should 
be made by the court as the latter is neutral. He does not exclude though that the eligible bodies in terms of § 3 
UKlaG or even third parties may determine this amount (WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 18). 
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should not be granted.5757 This view is correct as otherwise, the seriousness of the violations 
would be weakened and the wrong signal given to users or recommenders. 
dd)  Deadline 
The warning should also contain a reasonable deadline for the issuing of the declaration to 
cease and desist. A deadline of two weeks should be appropriate and corresponds to article 5(1) 
3rd sent. of Directive 2009/22/EC.5758 If the deadline is too short, it is replaced by a reasonable 
timeframe.5759 
ee)  Threat of taking legal action 
It is sufficient if the warning merely contains a threat to take legal action in the case where the 
user or recommender does not issue a declaration to cease and desist. It is not necessary though 
that the type of legal action is indicated.5760 
In addition, the body issuing the warning should provide details with regard to its locus standi 
since § 3(2) UKlaG excludes claims concerning standard terms that have been used vis-à-vis, 
or recommended to an entrepreneur.5761 
Under § 5 UKlaG, which refers to § 12(1) 2nd sent. UWG, reimbursement of the necessary 
expenses can be demanded. These expenses are necessary if they actually occurred and were 
objectively necessary in the given case from the eligible entity's standpoint.5762 The 
reimbursement of lawyer fees can only be demanded if hiring a lawyer was necessary with 
regard to the difficulty of the case.5763 The legislator is of the opinion that this is regularly not 
the case for the eligible bodies in terms of §§ 3 and 3a UKlaG.5764 The costs for the issued 
warning are no recoverable costs under § 91 ZPO5765 and must be demanded in a separate court 
action.5766 
                                                             
5757 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 5. 
5758 WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 18, UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 5. Art 5(1) 3rd sent. Directive 2009/22/EC: 
'If the cessation of the infringement is not achieved within two weeks after the request for consultation is received, 
the party concerned may bring an action for an injunction without any further delay.' 
5759 WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 21. 
5760 Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 5. 
5761 See discussion above. 
5762 BGH NJW 2012, 3023 (3030). 
5763 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 5 UKlaG para 12. 
5764 See Stoffels AGB-Recht 494, with further references. 
5765 § 91(1) 1st sent. ZPO: 'The party that has not prevailed in the dispute is to bear the costs of the legal dispute 
(…).' 
5766 Erman/Roloff § 5 UKlaG para 4, Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 6. 
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b) Provisional injunction 
In terms of article 2(1) lit. a) of Directive 2009/22/EC, the Member States shall implement 'an 
order with all due expediency, where appropriate by way of summary procedure, requiring the 
cessation or prohibition of any infringement'. With the reference in § 5 UKlaG to § 12(2) UWG, 
the German legislature has inserted the procedure of a provisional injunction at least indirectly 
into the UKlaG. Under § 12(2) UWG, 'provisional injunctions can be granted in order to secure 
the claim to cease and desist specified in th[e UWG], also without exposition and substantiation 
of the conditions required by sections 9355767 and 9405768 [ZPO].'5769 
Stoffel5770 argues that the reference in § 5 UKlaG to § 12(2) UWG will most likely not give 
more meaning to provisional injunctions within institutional actions because the prevailing 
view always asserted that provisional injunctions were already possible before the amendment 
of the law.5771 To date, the insertion of the given UWG provision into the UKlaG had certainly 
no significant impact on the number of provisional injunctions.5772 
Note should be taken that only the injunctive relief under § 1 UKlaG can be subject to a 
provisional injunction, but not the right to require withdrawal. Otherwise, the decision in the 
principal proceedings would be anticipated, which would be equal to a final decision.5773 For 
the injunctive relief, the decision reached in a provisional injunction is only temporary, 
though.5774 
The requisites for the provisional injunction are set out in the ZPO.5775 The claimant has to 
provide legitimate justification of the grounds for an injunction, i.e., that it is necessary in order 
to avert significant disadvantages.5776 Since § 12(2) UWG finds application by reference in § 5 
UKlaG, the provisional injunction 'can be granted (…) without exposition and substantiation 
                                                             
5767 § 935 ZPO: 'Injunction regarding the subject matter of the litigation - Injunctions regarding the subject matter 
of the litigation are an available remedy given the concern that a change of the status quo might frustrate the 
realisation of the right enjoyed by a party, or might make its realisation significantly more difficult.' 
5768 § 940 ZPO: 'Injunction serving to provide a temporary status - Injunctions are also admissible for the purpose 
of providing for a temporary status concerning a legal relationship that is in dispute, to the extent this provision is 
deemed to be necessary in order to avert significant disadvantages, to prevent impending force, or for other 
reasons, in particular in the case of legal relationships of a long-term nature existing.' 
5769 The necessary amendment had already taken place by the Gesetz über Fernabsatzverträge of 2000 (BGBl. I at 
897, with rectification at 1139), see § 15(1) AGBG in its last effective version. 
5770 Stoffels AGB-Recht 494. 
5771 For the initial debate on this question, see UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 9. 
5772 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 9. 
5773 WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 48, Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 9. 
5774 Stoffels AGB-Recht 495. 
5775 §§ 936, 920(2) and 294 ZPO. 
5776 Glaubhaftmachung des Verfügungsgrunds. 
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[of the grounds for an injunction]' though. It is therefore sufficient if the claimant brings 
forward that a danger of recurrent use of the incriminated standard provisions, or of their first 
use exists. As there is a public interest to eliminate invalid standard clauses, the presumed 
urgency of the matter is not refuted where the claimant had knowledge of the given clause and 
did not intervene for a long time. 
According to § 937 ZPO and 6 UKlaG, the court of the principal proceedings has jurisdiction. 
It decides either after an oral hearing by judgment or without a hearing for oral argument being 
held in urgent cases or if the petition that an injunction be issued is to be dismissed.5777 In this 
case, the court issues an ordonnance (Beschluss). For injunctions, an appeal on points of law 
(Revision) is excluded in terms of § 542(2) ZPO.5778 
c) Court action / Principal proceedings 
For the principal proceedings at court, the ZPO provisions are applicable in terms of §§ 12(1), 
(2), (4) and (5) UWG, if not otherwise provided in § 5 UKlaG. The reference to the ZPO 
provisions only has a clarifying function. These provisions would apply in any event because 
the given claim is a matter of private law (§§ 3(1) EGZPO and 13 GVG).5779 
Directive 98/27/EC5780 does not require that the national legislator implement a pre-trial 
conciliation procedure. The German legislator did therefore not provide for a mandatory 
procedure (arbitration, conciliation or mediation), despite the current tendency to encourage 
such procedures.5781 
Section 69 of the Act contains an implied hierarchy in terms of which consumers are 
encouraged to first approach an alternative dispute resolution agent before approaching the 
Commission. The Commission may promote informal dispute resolution by first referring the 
matter to an alternative dispute resolution agent according to section 72(1)(b).5782 In terms of 
                                                             
5777 § 937(2) ZPO. 
5778 Stoffels AGB-Recht 495. § 542(2) 1st sent. ZPO: 'No appeal on points of law may be filed against rulings by 
which a decision was taken on the issuance, modification, or repeal of a seizure or an injunction.' 
5779 Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 1, WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 1. EGZPO = Einführungsgesetz zur 
Zivilprozessordnung (Introductory Act to the Code of Civil Procedure), GVG = Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz 
(Judicature Act). 
5780 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests. 
5781 E.g., § 15a(1) 1st sent. in pr. EGZPO: 'The laws of the federal States may stipulate that an action may only be 
brought after an attempt has been made  to settle the dispute amicably before a conciliation office that is 
established or recognised by the administration of justice of the federal State.' (My own translation). Stoffels AGB-
Recht 496. 
5782 Naudé 2010 SALJ 524. 
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section 69(d) of the Act, consumers may approach a court with jurisdiction over the matter 
only if all other remedies available to that person in terms of national legislation have been 
exhausted. The contradiction of this provision with section 52, which favours the competence 
of ordinary courts has been discussed in Part I. Nonetheless, section 69 promotes ADR and 
other solutions before courts are involved.5783 
Since § 5 UKlaG refers to the ZPO provisions, § 890 ZPO5784 is applicable.5785 In terms of this 
provision, a user who violates its obligation to cease and desist from actions can be sentenced 
to a coercive fine and, for the case that such payment cannot be obtained, to coercive detention 
of up to six months. The individual coercive fine may not be levied in an amount over EUR 
250,000, and the coercive detention may not be longer than a total of two years. 
aa)  Exclusive competence 
Under § 6(1) UKlaG, the Regional Court (civil chambers) in whose district the defendant has 
his place of business or, failing that, his domicile shall have sole competence for actions under 
the UKlaG, irrespective of the amount in dispute.5786 As this provision establishes an exclusive 
jurisdiction, choice-of-court agreements are inadmissible in this regard.5787  
In the interests of an efficient process or speedier litigation, the Land governments are 
empowered to assign, by statutory order, competence for the districts of several Regional 
Courts with respect to cases under this Act to a single Regional Court (§ 6(2) UKlaG). So far, 
Bavaria,5788 Hesse,5789 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania,5790 Northrhine-Westphalia5791 and 
Saxony have made use of this provision.5792 
The competence under § 6(1) UKlaG refers to the functional and regional competence and 
includes both claims for the refrainment from use and withdrawal of recommendation of 
                                                             
5783 See discussion in Part I ch 5. 
5784 § 890(1) ZPO: 'Should the debtor violate his obligation to cease and desist from actions, or to tolerate actions 
to be taken, the court of first instance hearing the case is to sentence him for each count of the violation, upon the 
creditor filing a corresponding petition, to a coercive fine and, for the case that such payment cannot be obtained, 
to coercive detention or coercive detention of up to six (6) months. The individual coercive fine may not be levied 
in an amount in excess of 250,000 euros, and the coercive detention may not be longer than a total of two (2) 
years.' 
5785 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 159. 
5786 Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. 
5787 § 40(2) 1st sent no. 2 ZPO. Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. 
5788 Competence has been conferred to Landgericht Munich I, Landgericht Nuremberg and Landgericht Bamberg, 
depending on the district of the competent Oberlandesgericht (OLG). 
5789 Landgericht Frankfurt/M. 
5790 Landgericht Rostock. 
5791 Landgericht Düsseldorf (for the district of the OLG Düsseldorf), Landgericht Dortmund (for the district of the 
OLG Hamm) and Landgericht Cologne (for the district of the OLG Cologne). 
5792 Stoffels AGB-Recht 496, with further references. 
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standard terms under §§ 1 and 2 UKlaG as well as pleas of divergent decision under § 10 
UKlaG.5793 With regard to § 937(1) ZPO, also provisional injunctions fall under this 
competence. On the other hand, § 6(3) UKlaG provides that the competence is excluded for 
actions concerning a right of eligible bodies to information in terms of § 13 UKlaG.5794 
bb)  Hearing of administrations 
Under § 8(2) UKlaG, the court shall hear, before ruling on an action under § 1 UKlaG, the 
competent regulator for financial services5795 if the action relates to provisions in general terms 
of insurance or provisions in standard contract terms that are subject to approval under the 
Building and Loan Associations Act5796 or the Investment Companies Code.5797 This provision 
finds analogous application in declaratory actions5798 brought to court by the user or 
recommender as well as in provisional injunctions. In urgent cases, the decision may be issued 
without a hearing (§ 937(2) 1st alt. ZPO).5799 
The existence of § 8(2) UKlaG demonstrates that content control is not excluded in cases where 
standard terms must be approved by an administration but are subject to legal control by the 
courts to a full extent. The given administration shall have the opportunity to explain its 
position in the hearing, but is not a party and can therefore not make applications. The rationale 
of § 8(2) is that the court should benefit from the administration's insight and technical 
knowledge.5800 
The court must hear the administration before the ruling and has no discretion in this regard. 
Since the administration's technical knowledge is the reason for such a hearing, hearings are 
only necessary where a decision on the merits of the case is expected.5801 Where the court 
merely rules on the admissibility of the action, a hearing is superfluous. The court has a certain 
discretion on how it prepares the hearing. It is sufficient if the court informs the administration 
of the given standard clause and of the extent of a possible prohibition to use it, and demands 
that the administration take position until the expiry of a deadline set by the court.5802 It is 
                                                             
5793 Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. 
5794 Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. 
5795 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (www.bafin.de). 
5796 Bausparkassengesetz (BauSparkG). 
5797 Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB). 
5798 Feststellungsklagen. 
5799 Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 5 et seq, WLP/Lindacher § 8 UKlaG para 5. 
5800 Staudinger/Schlosser § 8 UKlaG para 13, WLP/Lindacher § 8 UKlaG para 11. 
5801 Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 5. 
5802 Stoffels AGB-Recht 499. 
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advisable that the court also forwards the most important exchanges between the parties to the 
administration. It is reasonable to inform it of the outcome of the court action.5803 
If the court renounces to carry out the mandatory hearing, it commits a procedural violation 
that is not remediable by subsequent approval of the parties or a statement without 
objection.5804 
cc)  Amount in dispute 
Contrary to other civil actions, the amount in dispute in institutional actions is not calculated 
on the basis of the interest of a party with regard to the matter in dispute. The public has an 
interest to have eliminated illegal standard terms, however.5805 Thus, consumer associations 
are protected from the risk of costs involved.5806 Under § 3 ZPO, the court assesses the value 
at its sole discretion. The maximum amount for disputes according to the UKlaG is EUR 
250,000.5807 
The relatively low amounts have a rather symbolic significance.5808 In practice, the courts have 
developed 'flat fees'. For each clause that the user shall refrain from using in the future, an 
amount of EUR 3,000 to EUR 5,000 is considered reasonable.5809 Exceptionally, the economic 
significance for the consumer association in terms of the attacked clause can be taken into 
consideration. The BGH ruled that EUR 25,000 for a clause stipulating a processing fee for 
consumer credits is reasonable.5810 In cases where the claimant wishes that the judgment be 
published according to § 7 UKlaG, this application is an independent matter in dispute and 
must be considered with 1/10 of the amount already determined for the principal matter.5811 
For court actions aiming at refraining from, and withdrawal of a recommendation of standard 
clauses, a minimum amount of EUR 10,000 is considered appropriate because of the wide-
ranging impact of such recommendations. Witt refers to an 'avalanche-like effect' in this 
regard.5812 Stoffels is however of the opinion that small businesses (e.g., an independent gym) 
should be granted a discount. In contrast, for bigger companies, the amount should be higher 
                                                             
5803 Stoffels AGB-Recht 499. Some authors are of the view that these steps are mandatory for the court: 
Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 6, UBH/Witt § 8 UKlaG para 9, Erman/Roloff § 8 UKlaG para 8. 
5804 Rügelose Einlassung. WLP/Lindacher § 8 UKlaG para 29, Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 5. 
5805 BGH NJW-RR 2007, 497. 
5806 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 29. 
5807 § 48(1) 2nd sent. GKG. 
5808 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 29 ('mere symbolic value'). 
5809 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 30. 
5810 BGH BKR 2014, 330, Stoffels AGB-Recht 500. 
5811 BGH NJW 2013, 995 (1001). 
5812 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 30. 
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so that the economic significance of the given clause is taken into account.5813 This opinion is 
convincing, also with a view to § 5 UKlaG. Under § 5 UKlaG, read in conjunction with § 12(4) 
UWG, the court may, upon the application of a party, order that said party’s obligation to pay 
court costs shall be proportionate to a part of the value in dispute as adjusted to its economic 
situation. With regard to the relatively low amounts in dispute, courts should apply their 
discretion with reservation, however. 
Witt criticises that despite these 'flat fees', no clear line is visible as regards the determination 
of these values. He argues that courts lack the practice to assess standard clauses depending on 
their economic impact.5814 In this regard, it shall be reminded that the same problem exists in 
terms of price-control mechanisms that have been discussed earlier in Part I.5815 For instance, 
for a standard clause of a car dealer of second-hand vehicles stipulating a waiver, the amount 
of DM 20,000 (approximately EUR 10,000) was set.5816 In contrast, the value for six 
incriminated clauses of the transportation conditions of the air carrier Lufthansa was only DM 
180,000 (EUR 90,000).5817 This is very low with regard to the economic significance of these 
six clauses. At any rate, the maximum amount of EUR 250,000 should be reached where the 
entire instrument of an economically significant company is ineffective.5818 To date, this 
amount has only been set once for the (entirely ineffective) terms and conditions of a concert 
organiser.5819 
d) Application and operative part of the judgment 
§§ 8(1) and 9 UKlaG contain specific provisions for the application and the operative part of 
the judgment which will be presented in the following. 
aa)  Application 
In terms of § 8(1) UKlaG, in actions under § 1, the application must contain, inter alia: the 
wording of the standard contract term provisions to which objection is made and the 
identification of the type of transaction for which objection is made to the provisions. The 
provision therefore complements § 253(2) ZPO.5820 If the application is – and remains – 
                                                             
5813 Stoffels AGB-Recht 500. 
5814 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 30. 
5815 Chapter 3 para 4.1.1 a). 
5816 BGHZ 74, 383 = BGH NJW 1979, 1886. 
5817 BGHZ 86, 284 = BGH NJW 1983, 1322. 
5818 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 30. 
5819 OLG Celle NJW 1995, 890. 
5820 § 253(2) ZPO: 'The statement of claim must include: 1. The designation of the parties and of the court; 
2. Exact information on the subject matter and the grounds for filing the claim, as well as a precisely specified 
petition.' 
 893   
 
incomplete after an indication by the court according to § 139(3) ZPO,5821 the action is 
inadmissible.5822 § 8(1) no. 1 should not lead to formalistic sophistry though. If the claimant 
presents a copy of the given standard terms and individualises the clause he or she wants to 
challenge, this should be sufficient.5823 
As standard clauses are not ineffective per se if they are seen in isolation, the application must 
contain the type of legal transactions for which the use of the clause should be prohibited. The 
concretisation should be concise and distinguish between contract types, types of transactions 
or case groups (e.g., 'apartment leases', 'contracts for delivery in instalments').5824 Furthermore, 
the application should indicate whether the refrainment or withdrawal only applies to B2C 
agreements, and/or to B2B contracts. This distinction is essential in terms of § 3(2) UKlaG 
which restricts the locus standi of consumer organisations.5825 
bb)  Operative part of the judgment 
Complementary to § 313(1) no. 4 ZPO, § 9 no. 1 to 4 UKlaG provides for the particular features 
of the operative part of the judgment. In terms of this provision, the operative part of the 
judgment must contain, inter alia: the wording of the standard contract term provisions to 
which objection was made (no. 1) and the identification of the type of transaction for which 
the standard contract term provisions to which the action relates may not be used (no. 2).  
It should be noted that § 9 no. 2 is also applicable to prohibitions concerning the 
recommendation of standard terms. The absence of this kind of prohibition in this provision is 
due to the legislator's negligence.5826 
Furthermore, the operative part must contain an injunction to refrain from using standard 
contract terms having the same content. This shall prevent the user from rewording its 
incriminated standard clauses, and enable the claimant to enforce the judgment if this were the 
case. This provision has merely a clarifying function though as the user cannot evade a court 
ruling if the incriminating action is perpetuated only in a different wording of the clause.5827  
                                                             
5821 § 139(3) ZPO: 'The court is to draw the parties’ attention to its concerns regarding any items it is to take into 
account ex officio.' 
5822 Erman/Roloff § 8 UKlaG para 1, Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 1. 
5823 WLP/Lindacher § 8 UKlaG para 3. 
5824 UBH/Witt § 8 UKlaG para 4. 
5825 Stoffels AGB-Recht 501. 
5826 Palandt/Bassenge § 9 UKlaG para 3. 
5827 Palandt/Bassenge § 9 UKlaG para 4. 
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Where the user's condemnation is based solely of the intransparency of a clause, the user might 
assert to furnish oral or written information to its clients in order to eliminate the 
intransparency.5828 
§ 9 also provides that where the judgment requires the withdrawal of a recommendation, it 
must be made known in the same way as the recommendation. If it is not clear in which way 
the recommendation was performed, the court has to interrogate the recommender.5829 Where, 
how and to what extent the injunction must be made known is in the court's discretion. It is 
however not imperative to require the 'publication' of the entire judgment with its grounds.5830 
e) Costs 
In civil procedures like actions under the UKlaG, the succumbing party has to bear the costs 
according to §§ 91 et seq. ZPO. For UKlaG actions, eligible bodies such as consumer 
associations have in interest to hire a lawyer in the district of the competent court because travel 
expenses for an external lawyer to the court are generally not considered 'expenditures' under 
§ 91(2) 1st sent. ZPO.5831 The travel expenses of an attorney who has not established him- or 
herself in the judicial district of the court hearing the case and who does not reside at the 
location of the competent court, shall be compensated only insofar as it was necessary to 
involve him or her in order to bring an appropriate action, or to appropriately defend against 
an action brought by others (§ 91(2) 2nd sent. ZPO). 
f) Authorisation to publish 
Under § 7 UKlaG, if the application is upheld, the applicant may, on request, be authorised to 
publish the operative part of the judgment, identifying the defendant against whom judgment 
was given, at the defendant’s expense in the Federal Gazette and otherwise at his own expense. 
The court may set a time limit on this authorisation. 
As provisional injunctions in terms of § 5 UKlaG, read in conjunction with § 12(2) UWG, only 
have a temporary effect, there is no need, according to most authors, to interpret § 7 UKlaG 
beyond its wording and to extend the authorisation to publish to this form of legal remedy.5832 
Others argue that the authorisation to publish should always be granted for provisional 
                                                             
5828 Palandt/Bassenge § 9 UKlaG para 4. 
5829 § 139 ZPO. 
5830 WLP/Lindacher § 9 UKlaG para 9. 
5831 BGH NJW-RR 2013, 242. 
5832 Erman/Roloff § 7 UKlaG para 1, Palandt/Bassenge § 7 UKlaG para 1, UBH/Witt § 7 UKlaG para 3, Stoffels 
AGB-Recht 503. 
 895   
 
injunctions in cases where the invalidity of the clause has significant implications for many 
consumers.5833 Even though both opinions have their merits, in practice, this debate should not 
have a significant impact. Because of the temporary character of a provisional injunction, the 
main action usually follows quite promptly, which means that the authorisation to publish 
should be granted then.  
Although the wording of § 7 UKlaG indicates that the judge has no obligation to grant this 
authorisation ('may'), a refusal to do so is only justified if the adverse impact of the given clause 
for the public is so minor that a publication is not necessary.5834 
Many authors are of the view that the benefit of the provision is rather limited because it is 
doubtful if the 'interested public' also is part of the 'enthusiast readership' of the Federal 
Gazette.5835 A publication in newspapers is not very efficient either because the publication of 
the operative part of the judgement is not always very conclusive read in isolation. 
Furthermore, the costs for the publication are to be borne by the claimant. Consumer protection 
groups with rather limited resources might therefore tend to do without a publication. 
g) Effects of the judgment 
Because of § 11 UKlaG, the court's ruling has a broad effect. Typically, the judgments of civil 
courts have only an inter partes effect.5836 According to § 11 UKlaG though, if the user against 
whom judgment has been given fails to comply with an injunction based on § 1 UKlaG, the 
provision in the standard contract terms is to be regarded as void insofar as the party concerned 
invokes the effect of the injunction. Since the effect of § 11 UKlaG only occurs if the concerned 
party refers to the effect of the injunction, the prevailing view correctly asserts that this is a 
'specific case of the legal force of the judgment'.5837 Individual consumers that are concerned 
with the ineffective clause in question therefore can assert a substantive objection.5838 
This 'extension of the legal force of the judgment' does however only apply to decisions reached 
within an institutional action that have reached the state of legal force, and not those that can 
still be subject to an appeal. Even though provisional injunctions may have the form of a 
                                                             
5833 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 7 UKlaG para 2, NK/Walker § 7 UKlaG para 4. 
5834 WLP/Lindacher § 7 UKlaG para 8. 
5835 Staudinger/Schlosser § 7 UKlaG para 2, WLP/Lindacher § 7 UKlaG para 4, Stoffels AGB-Recht 503. 
5836 Stoffels AGB-Recht 503. 
5837 Besonders ausgestalteter Fall der Rechtskrafterstreckung. Palandt/Bassenge § 11 UKlaG para 2, 
Staudinger/Schlosser § 11 UKlaG para 4, Erman/Roloff § 11 UKlaG para 2. 
5838 Erman/Roloff § 11 UKlaG para 7, Stoffels AGB-Recht 503. 
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judgment, the extension of the legal force does not apply to them because they have not the 
same binding effect as final judgments.5839 
Furthermore, infringements of the court ruling must take place after the judgment has become 
final. Hence, the extension of the legal force of the judgment does not apply to contracts that 
already have been executed. § 11 UKlaG includes agreements though that have not yet been 
performed because the 'use' of the invalid clause takes place after the conclusion of the contract 
and before its execution.5840 
Finally, § 11 UKlaG only applies to customers of the user in question. A user can therefore not 
refer to a dismissed action vis-à-vis its clients.5841 A user can assert the validity of a clause by 
referring to the individual circumstances of a given case (that were not considered within the 
institutional action), however.5842 
h) Action to oppose enforcement in terms of § 10 UKlaG 
In terms of § 10 UKlaG, the user of a provision who has been forbidden to use it may plead by 
means of an action under § 767 ZPO5843 that a decision has subsequently been reached by the 
Federal Court of Justice or the Common Senate of the Supreme Courts of Justice5844 which 
does not prohibit the use of this provision for the same type of transaction and that enforcement 
of the judgment against him5845 would cause unreasonable harm to his business. 
                                                             
5839 UBH/Witt § 11 UKlaG para 4, Erman/Roloff § 11 UKlaG para 4. 
5840 Staudinger/Schlosser § 11 UKlaG para 6, UBH/Witt § 11 UKlaG para 4, MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 11 UKlaG 
para 7. 
5841 UBH/Witt § 11 UKlaG para 9. 
5842 UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 44. 
5843 § 767 ZPO: 'Action raising an objection to the claim being enforced - (1) Debtors are to assert objections that 
concern the claim itself as established by the judgment by filing a corresponding action with the court of first 
instance hearing the case. (2) Such objections by way of an action may admissibly be asserted only insofar as the 
grounds on which they are based arose only after the close of the hearing that was the last opportunity, pursuant 
to the stipulations of the present Code, for objections to be asserted, and thus can no longer be asserted by entering 
a protest. (3) In the action that he is to file, the debtor must assert all objections that he was able to assert at the 
time at which he filed the action.' 
5844 Gemeinsamer Senat der Obersten Gerichtshöfe des Bundes. 
5845 § 890 ZPO: 'Forcing the debtor to cease and desist from actions, or to tolerate actions- (1) Should the debtor 
violate his obligation to cease and desist from actions, or to tolerate actions to be taken, the court of first instance 
hearing the case is to sentence him for each count of the violation, upon the creditor filing a corresponding petition, 
to a coercive fine and, for the case that such payment cannot be obtained, to coercive detention or coercive 
detention of up to six (6) months. The individual coercive fine may not be levied in an amount in excess of 250,000 
euros, and the coercive detention may not be longer than a total of two (2) years. (2) The sentence must be preceded 
by a corresponding warning that is to be issued by the court of first instance hearing the case, upon corresponding 
application being made, unless it is set out in the judgment providing for the obligation. (3) Moreover, upon the 
creditor having filed a corresponding petition, the debtor may be sentenced to creating a security for any damages 
that may arise as a result of future violations, such security being created for a specific period of time.' 
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§ 10 UKlaG is an exception in civil procedures with regard to the fact that an objection 
concerning a change of the common law is sufficient, as opposed to a substantive objection. In 
addition, the plaintiff (user) does not object the enforceability of the judgment prohibiting the 
use of its standard terms under § 767 ZPO but the extended binding effect by virtue of § 11 
UKlaG. Academia evaluates the plea of divergent decision very critically5846 as it is not system-
compatible. In any event, the practical significance of § 10 UKlaG is very low.5847 
i) Register of decisions 
§ 20 AGBG provided that the court had to inform the Federal Cartel Office of any pending 
court actions under §§ 13 and 19 AGBG (now §§ 1 and 10 UKlaG) and court actions under 
§§ 13 and 19 AGBG with legal force as well as of any other terminations of the matter. 
The UKlaG does not contain a similar provision because the legislator feared data protection 
infringements and was of the view that the AGBG register had lost its significance due to 
publications in legal journals.5848 The rulings that were contained in this register had to be 
deleted at the latest at the end of the year 2004 (ex-§ 16(2) UKlaG). 
Stoffels indicates that the former AGBG register never fully fulfilled its function because it 
was designed only for court decisions and therefore only was useful ex post facto, i.e., too late. 
What is more, since the concerned actors did not – or simply could not – keep track of the 
register and the decisions contained therein, the latter were not sufficiently implemented, and 
infringements were only discovered by chance.5849 He therefore legitimately advocates the 
implementation of an 'information pool'. Such a pool could help to support the financially weak 
consumer protection organisations5850 by saving their resources and excluding the multiple 
engagements of several consumer associations for the same matter.5851 
Such an information pool could be accessible via a website where a search by keywords, type 
of transactions or field of application of a given standard clause is possible, and where relevant 
research (by consumer associations and academia) and former court rulings are visible. Hence, 
a 'matrix approach'5852 could be applied where the site contains a catalogue of specific terms 
                                                             
5846 Staudinger/Schlosser § 10 UKlaG para 1. 
5847 UBH/Witt § 10 UKlaG para 1, Staudinger/Schlosser § 10 UKlaG para 1. 
5848 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 276. 
5849 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz before § 1 UKlaG para 36. 
5850 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 12 notes 27 and 42 qualifies consumer protection 
associations as 'overstrained' due to their weak financial allocation. 
5851 Stoffels AGB-Recht 481. 
5852 See Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 156. 
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across all type of controls in terms of §§ 307 to 309 with a categorisation by their legal nature 
and business sector. This would help to identify specific standard terms in their context. This 
approach would be similar to the structure of many specialised commentaries on standard 
business terms.  
 
3. Conclusion 
Individual consumers' complaints about unfair standard terms are assessed within a so-called 
'incidental control' which takes place within the assessment of the plaintiff's claim (e.g., for 
delivery). Unlike South Africa, the German legislator chose the path of positive enforcement 
consisting of measures designed to prevent the use of unfair terms rather than their ex post facto 
elimination. Therefore, it introduced a novel procedure, the institutional action. 
Before going to court, consumers quite often use the path of alternative dispute resolution. 
Many industries, such as the bank and insurance industries, provide for ombuds procedures. 
Although there are no statistics on the number of ombuds procedures concerning §§ 305 et 
seq., pre-trial dispute resolution undoubtedly relieves the courts from many proceedings. 
The institutional action this thesis is concerned with is set out in § 1 UKlaG, a statute containing 
the procedural aspects in relation to §§ 305 et seq. BGB. Institutional actions have a broader 
effect than individual actions and incite standard terms users to use clauses that are in line with 
legal provisions. For the enquiry of the given standard provisions, a strict abstract-general 
approach applies. The given standard terms are not declared invalid, but the user is required to 
refrain from further using them, and recommenders of standard provisions must withdraw any 
recommendation made. 
The restricted scope of application of §§ 305 et seq. in terms of § 310(4) for certain fields of 
law also has an impact on the scope of application of the UKlaG. What is more, the UKlaG 
does not apply to labour law at all, unlike § 310(4) BGB where reasonable account must be 
taken of the special features that apply in labour law. The reason for this absolute exclusion in 
the UKlaG is that the legislator did not wish to add another actor in the already complex labour 
law relations where many other actors (unions etc.) are already involved. 
The German legislator chose to opt for consumer protection ascertained by private consumer 
protection organisations rather than preventive control by administrative bodies. Preventive 
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control by the administration would not have been compatible with the German 'private law 
society' and has not reached the same efficiency where it has been implemented.  
EU law has – and will have – a significant impact on German standard terms legislation. As 
discussed, the objective of free movement of actions for an injunction is however not realistic 
as long as consumer protection organisations are not funded properly in order to fulfil their 
functions.  
The institutional action has not reached its full potential because many illegal clauses are still 
in circulation. On the other hand, it was very effective with respect to standard clauses of 
financial institutions and insurance companies. The legislator's decision to opt for an abstract-
universal approach was significant in combatting unfair business terms because a particular-
personalised approach would have led to an inter partes effect, and other customers would not 
have benefitted from court rulings. 
In order to achieve an injunctive relief against the user under § 1 UKlaG, the given terms must 
be ineffective in terms of §§ 307 to 309 BGB. Clauses which are intended for non-recurrent 
use can however not be assessed in terms of the UKlaG because this statute does not take into 
account the other party's influence on the clause's content (strict abstract-general approach). 
Besides, the non-incorporation of a clause as the legal consequence is not sufficient in terms 
of the UKlaG since ineffectiveness of the clause is necessary. 
For the use of standard business clauses in terms of § 1 UKlaG, it is sufficient that the intention 
of incorporating the given provisions into the contract in the future be apparent. This wide 
interpretation corresponds to the Unfair Terms Directive according to which the abstract 
control must be designed for 'contractual terms drawn up for general use' (art. 7(2)). By way 
of exception, also representatives of the other party are considered 'users' if they have a 
significant interest in the incorporation of certain standard terms. 
The danger of recurrent use is an unwritten condition of § 1 UKlaG and is assumed where the 
user already has used the terms before. A seriously impending first use is sufficient though. 
If the other party's claim is successful, the user must cease any conduct that can be qualified as 
'use' in terms of § 1 UKlaG. He must not incorporate the invalid terms into new contracts or 
refer to them when executing already concluded agreements. 
§ 1 UKlaG also provides for a claim for withdrawal of recommendation of standard business 
terms. Recommenders are generally professional associations that design contract forms for 
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third parties, but also bar associations or medical associations. Legal opinions published in law 
journals or standard terms designed by lawyers for their clients are not considered 
recommendations in terms of this provision. 
If the claim is successful, the recommender has to cease any recommendation and withdraw its 
already issued recommendations. The withdrawal of a recommendation has a broader effect 
and is more significant than the simple cessation of the recommendation. 
Under § 13 UKlaG, eligible bodies have a right to information regarding the name and address 
of a party vis-à-vis telecommunication providers etc. This possibility safeguards the right of 
action under the UKlaG because it ensures that the plaintiff has a valid address for service. 
The eligible bodies for institutional actions are set out in § 3(1) UKlaG. In this regard, consumer 
associations that are inscribed in the list of the European Commission are equal to German 
associations in terms of their locus standi. In order to be inscribed in these lists, the given 
association must have legal personality and promote consumers' interests by education and 
advice on a non-commercial and non-temporary basis. Also associations promoting 
commercial and independent professional interests, or those that have obtained their legal 
personality by State awarding (e.g., the chambers of commerce and industry) are eligible. 
Before eligible bodies institute an action at court, they usually issue a warning in which the 
user is invited to issue a declaration to cease and desist from the use of the given terms and to 
promise to pay a contractual penalty in case of infringement. Warnings also contain a deadline 
and the treat of taking legal action if the user or recommender does not issue a declaration to 
cease and desist. Warnings are not mandatory but can avoid negative cost consequences for the 
eligible body. 
In order to secure the claim to cease and desist, the court can grant a provisional injunction, 
also without exposition and substantiation of the conditions normally required for such 
injunctions in terms of the ZPO. It thus suffices that the claimant argues that a danger of 
recurrent or first use of the given terms exists. Provisional injunctions are not supposed to 
anticipate the court's final decision, which is why only the injunctive relief in terms of § 1 
UKlaG can be subject to a provisional injunction, but not the right to require the withdrawal of 
a recommendation. 
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The national legislator did not implement a mandatory conciliation procedure prior to court 
proceedings because the Directive on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests does 
not require such a procedure. 
In court proceedings, the Regional Court of the defendant's place of business or domicile has 
exclusive competence, irrespective of the amount in dispute. Some Federal States have 
assigned sole competence to a single Regional Court in their territory. 
In terms of § 8(2) UKlaG, where standard terms are subject to the approval of the regulator for 
financial services, the court must hear this administration before any ruling. The rationale of 
this provision is that the jurisdiction can benefit from the administration's insight and technical 
knowledge. It also shows that content control is not excluded where standard terms are to be 
approved by an administration, but are subject to legal control by the courts to a full extent. 
In institutional actions, the amount in dispute is calculated on the basis of the public's interest 
to have eliminated illegal standard terms. Hence, the given amounts are relatively low, which 
protects consumer protection associations from the risk of costs involved. The courts have 
developed flat-fees over time. These are often criticised though since no clear line is visible 
regarding their determination and the economic impact of the given clauses. 
According to § 7 UKlaG, the operative part of the judgment can be published in the Federal 
Gazette and otherwise. The benefit of this provision is rather limited though because the reach 
of such a publication is restricted in terms of the number of readers. 
§ 11 UKlaG enhances the effect of the court's ruling tremendously as it grants an extension of 
the legal force of the judgment. Individual consumers that are concerned with the given clauses 
can assert a substantive objection. 
The register of decisions provided for in the former AGBG has not been inserted into the 
UKlaG because of data protection concerns and the loss of its significance due to other forms 
of publication. What is more, this register was never very efficient. Therefore, an information 
pool using a 'matrix approach' which is applied in German legal commentaries could be more 
effective. 
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PART III – COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 





After the presentation of the South African and the German regimes on unfair terms and 
conditions in Parts I and II, in the present Part III, the applicable Consumer Protection Act 
provisions will be compared to the corresponding BGB norms. As far as procedural questions 
are concerned, the applicable provisions of the UKlaG will be discussed in a comparative 
perspective too. Since Parts I and II already contain some comparative evaluations, it shall 
suffice to refer to these where possible in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions. 
The legislative history of both countries is very different for historical reasons and due to the 
different legislative traditions in both countries. Germany is a civil law country with a codified 
law. Although the courts may develop the law, as we have seen in Part II,5853 there is no 
common-law tradition in the narrow sense like in South Africa. South Africa, on the other hand, 
has a mixed, or 'hybrid', legal system that has developed from various distinct legal traditions, 
namely a civil-law system inherited from the Dutch, a common-law system introduced by the 
British, and a customary law system originating from indigenous Africans.5854  
A comparison of the legislative history of both countries might thus seem idle and a purely 
academic exercise at first sight. Hence, such a comparison should be more yielding with 
countries having historical links with South Africa, such as the Netherlands or the United 
Kingdom. To some extent, even a comparison with Roman law would be enlightening, even 
                                                             
5853 See Part I ch 1 para 1.1. 
5854 For customary law, no generally accepted definition exists. Various South African authors discuss its contents 
and distinguish it from custom as such without formulating a definition. Olivier defines it as follows: 'Customary 
law denotes those legal systems originating from African societies as part of the culture of particular tribes or 
groups that have continued to exist, supplemented, amended and or superseded in part by: (a) changing community 
views and the demands of a changing world; (b) contact with societies that function within other legal 
backgrounds; (c) contact with and influence by other legal systems; and (d) direct and indirect influence of foreign 
(non-indigenous) government structures.' See Joubert and Kuhne LAWSA Vol 32 Intro Def 1.  
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from a practical point of view.5855 Nonetheless, some historical parallels and differences should 
be highlighted here before the actual comparison of the material norms is undertaken. 
After emphasising some historical points, both regimes will be compared in terms of their 
substantive content. The point of departure will be the South African legislation.  
 
CHAPTER 1 – HISTORICAL PARALLELS AND DIFFERENCES  
 
1. The courts' role 
Before the field of standard business terms5856 was codified in Germany and South Africa, the 
courts of both countries tried to fill this gap. In order to invalidate unfair terms, South African 
courts exclusively relied on common-law concepts at the beginning, such as the exceptio doli 
generalis, whereas German jurisprudence could also refer to codified principles, such as good 
faith (§ 242).5857 
In this context, it is somehow striking that South African courts applied the exceptio doli 
inconsistently5858 and tried to uphold this defence stoically until the Bank of Lisbon case,5859 
although it had never been clear whether it had been received in South African law. This 
defence certainly had been useful as a device for the achievement of equitable results in 
particular circumstances, i.e., the use of a contract for an end that was not intended when it was 
concluded. Despite the shortcomings of the exceptio doli and its unclear scope of application, 
the courts did not grasp the opportunity to develop other defences. Instead of ‘look[ing] forward 
rather than back’5860 and seeking other solutions, such as a different approach to the 
                                                             
5855 The debate on the reception of the exceptio doli generalis in South African law is an example. See Part I ch 1 
para 2. 
5856 In the following, South African and German terminology is used indiscriminately if it means the same (e.g., 
terms and conditions/standard (business) terms, open agreements/continuing obligations, supplier – 
user/consumer – other party. 
5857 In this chapter, provisions preceded by the word 'section' are those of the CPA, whereas those preceded by the 
'§' symbol are those of the BGB, if not indicated otherwise. 
5858 The inconsistent application of the exceptio doli defence is illustrated in the following cases: Weinerlein v 
Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 285; Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (A); North Vaal 
Mineral Co Ltd v Lovasz 1961 (3) SA 604 (T); Von Ziegler and Another v Superior Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 399 (T); Paddock Motors v Igesund 1976 (3) SA 16; Aris Enterprises (Finance) (Pty) Ltd 
v Waterberg Koelkamers (Pty) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 436; Rand Bank Ltd v Rubenstein 1981 (2) SA 207 (W). See 
discussion in Part I ch 2 para 2.2. 
5859 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
5860 Lewis 1990 SALJ 29. 
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interpretation of contracts, they kept on applying the exceptio doli. Only in 1988, Joubert JA 
referred to it as 'a superfluous, defunct anachronism' which had to be 'bur[ied]'.5861  
On the other hand, the German Reichsgericht, and later the Bundesgerichtshof, soon developed 
different approaches to tackle unfair contract terms. This jurisprudence applied, for instance, a 
restrictive interpretation of clauses in the other party's favour, the invalidation of unusual or 
inequitable contract provisions based on the consumer's 'declaration of submission',5862 or, for 
monopolies, the application of the principle of public policy. Other clauses were invalidated 
by the application of the principle of good faith of § 242.5863 Although this jurisprudence was 
very complex and varied, and some solutions were dogmatically unsatisfactory, it had a single 
objective, namely to invalid inappropriate, inequitable or abusive standard clauses. In 
retrospect, this approach is seen today as a 'highly commendable performance of German 
jurisprudence'.5864 
Today, in both countries, the area of standard business terms is regulated in pieces of 
legislation. In this regard, German courts enquire fairness within an incidental control. In 
individual proceedings, the court dealing with the principal matter is competent. This 
competence depends on the amount in dispute.5865 In institutional actions, the civil chambers 
of the Regional Court (Landgericht) in whose district the defendant has its place of business 
or, failing that, his or her domicile shall have sole competence for actions under the UKlaG, 
irrespective of the amount in dispute (§ 6(1) UKlaG).5866  
On the other hand, the South African picture is more complex and characterised by a multitude 
of entities that are competent in this field. Under section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act, 
the civil courts merely serve as a 'last resort' after exhaustion of all other available remedies. 
As discussed earlier, this provision is problematic in terms of the constitutional right of access 
to the courts, however.5867 
                                                             
5861 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). To emphasise the image of a ‘burial’ of 
the exceptio doli, Joubert JA even used the phrase ‘Requiescat in pace’ (let it rest in peace) (607A-B). 
5862 Unterwerfungserklärung. 
5863 See discussion in Part II ch 1 para 1.1. 
5864 Zweigert and Kötz Rechtsvergleichung 329. 
5865 Up to an amount in dispute of EUR 5,000, the Amtsgerichte, otherwise the Landgerichte are competent (§§ 23 
and 71 GVG). 
5866 Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. See discussion on the German redress procedures in Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6 c) aa). 
5867 See Part I ch 4 para 2.5. 
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2. Pacta sunt servanda principle 
After a period of strict application of the pacta sunt servanda principle in both countries, it 
soon became apparent that it produced unfair results where the parties have no equal bargaining 
power and consumers were presented a de facto take-it-or-leave-it situation. Whereas in South 
Africa jurisprudence felt a need 'to protect the poor and the ignorant',5868 which only can be 
explained by the socio-economic pattern of this country, in Germany, the observation was made 
that the legal characteristics of agreements did not reflect the statutory law anymore, and that 
a 'self-made law of the economy'5869 prevailed in this field. Raiser was of the view that the use 
of standard terms makes sense from an economic point of view, but their use must consider the 
public interest and the legal consciousness of the community. According to him, the existing 
statutory norms constitute an appropriate balance between the parties' interests and are thus the 
'normal order' of the given circumstances.5870 A legal system based on balance through control 
by entities such as courts cannot accept structural imbalances of this order.5871 Hence, 
imbalances must be tackled and cannot be accepted in the name of freedom of contract.5872 The 
German approach was thus more dogmatic and systematic, which is also due to Ludwig Raiser's 
work.5873 
3. Mitigation of freedom of contract by the principles of good faith and public policy 
In both countries it became clear that the unfettered application of the pacta sunt servanda 
principle was an obstacle to the maxim of contractual fairness (volenti non fit iniuria).  
South African courts tried to mitigate the unrestricted application of the pacta sunt servanda 
principle by introducing the concept of fairness in ticket contracts,5874 restraints of trade5875 and 
cases such as misrepresentation,5876 duress5877 and undue influence,5878 where consensus had 
been improperly obtained. In this regard, the exceptio doli defence played an essential role in 
order to prevent inequitable results. Its inconsistent application and abolition in 1988 has been 
                                                             
5868 Hahlo 1981 SALJ 70. 
5869 Großmann-Doerth Selbstgeschaffenes Recht der Wirtschaft, passim. 
5870 Raiser Recht der AGB 293 et seq. See also Eiselen Control of Unfair Standard Terms and CISG 172. 
5871 Raiser Recht der AGB 98 et seq. 
5872 WLP/Pfeiffer Introduction para 4. 
5873 Raiser Recht der AGB passim. 
5874 Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (A). 
5875 Magna Alloys & Research (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
5876 Bayer South Africa Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 (A). 
5877 Broodryk v Smuts 1942 TPD 47. 
5878 Hofer v Kevitt 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA). See Stoop LLD thesis 2012 at 72. The appeal court did not recognise 
‘commercial bribery’ as a ground for rescission in Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 
719 (SCA). See Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 110. 
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discussed in Part I of this thesis.5879 After the abolition of the exceptio doli defence, it had 
become clear that the existing principles to ascertain fairness and reasonableness, like the 
principle that agreements must be obtained properly, the concept of legality, or the rules of 
interpretation, were insufficient in order to ensure justice.5880 South African courts thus also 
applied the principles of good faith and public policy, but from a different dogmatic angle 
compared to Germany. The Supreme Court of Appeal preferred a contextual, rather than a 
normative bona fides standard, and held that good faith operates only as an informing principle 
that shapes the nature and content of specific doctrines, such as public policy. The principle of 
good faith was hence not seen as an independent ('free-floating') principle.5881 
In Germany, a defence similar to the exceptio doli never existed. German courts never 
developed such a device and relied instead on codified principles, such as good faith (§ 242)5882 
and public policy (§ 138).5883 The Reichsgericht applied an approach for clauses that were 
'contrary to accepted principles of morality', i.e., public policy5884 in cases where a business 
imposed its standard terms upon a client by taking advantage of its monopoly.5885 Other cases 
were based on unconscionability under § 242.5886 This approach became possible because 
courts had a statutory basis for intervention due to the introduction of the BGB in 1900.5887 The 
drawback of this approach was that it was restricted to monopolistic positions and that the 
application of public policy alone did not allow for the determination of a fair balance between 
the parties' rights and obligations.5888 Inspired by Raiser's ground-breaking work, the BGH 
therefore extended content control based on § 242 to all kinds of companies and abandoned its 
restriction to monopolies. According to the BGH, the principle of good faith limits the content 
of standard delivery terms5889 and requires that businesses consider the interests of potential 
                                                             
5879 Part I ch 2 para 2.2. 
5880 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2012) 274-275. 
5881 Magna Alloys & Research (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A), Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 
1 (A); Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Beperk v Saayman NO 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA); Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA). See discussion 
in Part I ch 3. 
5882 § 242: 'An obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice 
into consideration.'  
5883 § 138: '(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void. (2) In particular, a legal transaction 
is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament, inexperience, lack of sound judgement or considerable 
weakness of will of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to be promised 
or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to the performance.'  
5884 In German, 'Verstoß gegen die guten Sitten'. 
5885 The first decision in this regard was RGZ 20, 115 (117). See also RGZ 62, 264 (266); 99, 107 (109); 102, 396 
(397); 103, 82 (83); 115, 218 (219 et seq). 
5886 RGZ 168, 329. 
5887 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 109 (142). 
5888 WLP/Wolf Introduction para 6. 
5889 BGHZ 22, 90 et seq. 
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clients as well, and not exclusively their own interests.5890 The BGH justified the application 
of § 242 by the fact that businesses could abuse their freedom of contract by imposing their 
standard terms upon their customers and therefore claimed freedom of contract only for 
themselves. The guiding function of the ius dispositivum for the specification of the principle 
of good faith, based on Ludwig Raiser's concept, was another milestone in German 
jurisprudence.5891 
The difference in tackling unfairness in both countries is certainly based on the fact that the 
principles of good faith and public policy are codified in the BGB (§§ 242 and 138), whereas 
in South Africa, they have been developed by the courts, without a statutory basis. 
In South Africa, also constitutional aspects played a role. In Barkhuizen v Napier,5892 the 
Constitutional Court held that the enquiry of whether a clause is reasonable requires a 
weighing-up of public policy on the one hand, and the specific fundamental right involved in 
a case, on the other. The application of the pacta sunt servanda principle was regarded as 
subject to constitutional control. Thus, the values enshrined in the Constitution served to 
achieve a balance between the parties' interests. Hutchison legitimately maintains though that 
the question of fairness or reasonableness only became relevant where fundamental rights, such 
as the right to access to the courts, were at stake.5893 In Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot 
Investments 777 (Pty) Limited,5894 it was held that the longstanding in duplum rule, according 
to which the debtor's interests cannot exceed the double amount of the capital, should be 
applicable during the litigation process. The debtors’ right of access to courts and other valid 
policy considerations have to be considered, and a proper balancing of these rights must be 
undertaken. The application of constitutional aspects did not lead to an overarching fairness or 
reasonableness principle though. 
In Germany, a direct referral to constitutional aspects was never necessary. Of course, all legal 
actions and legislation have to be measured against the Grundgesetz, the German Constitution. 
As the principles of good faith and public policy have been enshrined into the BGB since the 
beginning, the courts could refer to them in order to find solutions in terms of fairness of 
                                                             
5890 BGH NJW 1965, 246; 1969, 230 
5891 BGHZ 41, 151 et seq.  
5892 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007(5) SA 323 (CC). 
5893 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 32. 
5894 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC). 
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standard provisions. Contrary to South Africa, public policy and good faith always have been 
seen as two separate principles that do not necessarily have to inform each other. 
4. Legislative intervention 
In order to achieve fairness and legal certainty, both countries decided to legislate the field of 
standard business terms. 
In South Africa, the motivation was the fact that the common law had not succeeded in finding 
an overarching concept providing for equitable solutions but had ever since struggled with the 
dogmatic classification of concepts, such as the exceptio doli, public policy and good faith. 
There was an apparent need for legislative intervention in all contractual phases.5895 Moreover, 
the values reflected in the existing legislation did not mirror democratic values in the newly 
created South Africa and were especially at the expense of consumers and small businesses.5896 
Hence, many statutes that had been enacted during the Apartheid area were repealed.5897 The 
enactment of the Consumer Protection Act was thus a necessary and logical step.  
On the other hand, German jurisprudence had developed quite a respectable set of principles 
before the AGBG came into force. Although many of the courts' findings and principles were 
directly inserted into the AGBG (and later into the BGB), the need for legislation existed, 
however. The courts controlled only the most flagrant abuses, and because of the inter partes 
effect of court decisions, other consumers could not benefit from these rulings. The consumer 
protection movement in the 1970s also served as a catalyst.5898 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this introductory chapter, some historical parallels and differences have been discussed. The 
courts' role in both countries was very different from the beginning, above all due to the fact 
that South Africa has a much more developed common-law tradition, whereas in Germany, the 
courts' role in developing the law is more restricted due to the fact that the basis of their rulings 
is the codified law. 
                                                             
5895 SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 
(1998) at 60. 
5896 Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill, 2008, point 1at 80. 
5897 See Part I ch 1 para 5. 
5898 See Part II ch 1 para 1.2. 
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Before the legislators of both countries codified the field of standard business terms, the courts 
tried to tackle the problem of unfair terms and conditions from different angles in both regimes. 
South Africa heavily relied on the exceptio doli generalis until it was abandoned in 1988, 
without developing further this defence though. German courts applied other mechanisms, such 
as good faith, public policy (as a self-standing principle) or the restrictive interpretation of 
standard clauses. 
Today, the area of standard business terms is codified in both countries. In Germany, the 
enforcement procedures are much more streamlined though, whereas in South Africa various 
entities besides the civil courts are competent. 
The mitigation of the pacta sunt servanda dogma has also been discussed. The reason for a less 
strict approach to this principle was that consumers are confronted with a take-it-or-leave-it 
situation. The socio-economic situation in South Africa required the protection of vulnerable 
consumers. In contrast, in Germany, a more systematic and dogmatic view prevailed, also due 
to Ludwig Raiser's seminal work. The 'self-made law of the economy' did not reflect the 
delicate balance of the ius dispositivum anymore because public interest and legal 
consciousness of the community were not sufficiently taken into account by standard term 
drafters. 
In order to achieve contractual fairness, also the principle of freedom of contract had to be 
mitigated. This was done by applying the principles of good faith and public policy. South 
African courts applied a more contextual bona fides standard, whereas German courts put this 
principle in a more normative context. In German legislation, public policy and good faith were 
codified, and in South Africa, they were developed by jurisprudence. 
The need to legislate existed in both countries. As in South Africa, the courts had not succeeded 
in developing an overarching concept providing for equitable solutions, and existing legislation 
did not mirror the democratic values of the new constitutional era, there was an apparent need 
for legislative intervention. The result was the Consumer Protection Act of 2008. 
German courts already had developed a respectable set of principles before the AGBG came 
into force. Since only the most apparent abuses were brought before the courts, and because of 
the inter partes effect of court rulings, the need for legislation was felt also here. This led to 
the AGBG of 1976. The AGBG norms were integrated, with minor changes, into the BGB in 
2002. 
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CHAPTER 2 – SCOPE OF APPLICATION  
 
In this chapter, the scope of application of sections 48 et seq. CPA and §§ 305 et seq. BGB will 
be discussed in a comparative perspective. 
1. Territorial scope of application 
Section 5 of the Act is an emanation of the South African legislature's will to ensure the 
application of the Act and thus to protect consumers in a wide range of circumstances. This 
becomes clear, e.g., in section 5(8), in terms of which the Act applies irrespective of whether 
the supplier resides or has its principal office within or outside the Republic, operates on a for-
profit or non-profit basis, is owned or directed by an organ of state, or is licenced in terms of 
any public regulation for the supply of goods or services to the public. The simultaneous 
physical presence of both parties is not necessary when they conclude their agreement because 
the transaction can 'occur' within the Republic several times. It is therefore sufficient if the 
supply of the goods or services takes place in South Africa.5899 
The BGB provisions undoubtedly apply if the contract is concluded in Germany and both 
parties reside in the country. For international transactions, the applicability of the high 
protective standard of §§ 305 et seq. depends on German private international law. The 
elaborate mechanism of the Rome-I Regulation5900 unifies the different legislation of the EU 
Member States and solves conflict-of-law questions so that the courts can apply the same 
law.5901  
The parties are allowed to select the law applicable to their contract under article 3(1) of 
Rome I. This free choice of law even applies if the parties have no connection to the chosen 
law other than the choice of law itself.5902 On the other hand, regulation 44(3)(bb) CPA 
greylists terms providing that a law other than that of South Africa applies to a consumer 
agreement concluded and implemented in the Republic, where the consumer was residing in 
the Republic at the time when the agreement was concluded.5903 Clauses providing that the law 
of a particular country will apply therefore only have an effect on the consumer's rights that are 
                                                             
5899 See Part I ch 2 para 2.1. 
5900 Regulation (EC) no. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I). 
5901 See Part II ch 2 para 3.3.1. 
5902 See Part II ch 2 para 3.1.2. 
5903 See discussion on reg 44(3)(bb) CPA in Part I ch 3. 
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not regulated in the Act.5904 Hence, in South Africa, freedom of contract is curtailed in this 
regard. It is suggested that this can only be explained by the legislator's concerns about 
consumer protection. Suppliers could otherwise circumvent the high protective standard of the 
Act by choosing the application of the law of another, more lenient country. This is 
understandable with respect to a country where consumers are more vulnerable due to their 
socio-economic situation, lacking experience in business matters and the fact that many of them 
live in remote areas. Since the EU offers a more unified approach for transactions within the 
EU and generally offers a very high consumer protection standard, the risk that suppliers 
choose a less protective law is lesser than in legislation where a harmonised approach does not 
exist. 
Rome I also provides that where the parties have not made a choice as to the applicable law, 
different criteria for specific contract types, such as consumer contracts, have to be applied. 
For other contracts, the law of the country is applicable to which the contract has the closest 
connection, such as the supplier's habitual residence (article 4). In consumer contracts, 
mandatory provisions of the national law from which the parties cannot derogate are still 
applicable.5905 
The favourability principle ensures that the BGB consumer protection provisions apply if they 
are more favourable to the consumer than the provisions of the selected law. What is more, 
consumers living outside the EU/EEC who conclude a contract within the EU/EEC are afforded 
the high protective standard of article 46 EGBGB.5906 
The guidelines developed by the European Court of Justice applicable to e-commerce 
transactions assist in the determination of the applicable law where the supplier 'directs' its 
activities to an EU Member State.5907 These guidelines have been initially developed for the 
Brussels I Regulation,5908 which is similar to article 6(1) of the Rome-I Regulation.5909 The 
                                                             
5904 See Part I ch 2 para 2.1. 
5905 For more details, see discussion on the mechanism of Rome I in Part II ch 2 para 3. 
5906 Stoffels AGB-Recht 82. See Part II ch 2 para 3.1.3. 
5907 See Part II ch 2 para 3.1.3. 
5908 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I). Art 15(1): 'In matters relating to a contract 
concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, 
jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Article 4 and point 5 of Article 5, if: (a) it is 
a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or (b) it is a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, 
or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or (c) in all other cases, the contract has been 
concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer's 
domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including that Member 
State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.' 
5909 Staudinger/Magnus Art 6 Rom-I-VO para 115. 
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South African ECTA does not contain specific provisions for the determination of the 
applicable law. Sections 22(2), 23(b) and 23(c) provide for the possibility to determine the 
moment of the conclusion of the contract though, which is significant for the question of 
whether the consumer resided in South Africa when entering into the contract. Since it is 
irrelevant whether the supplier resided or has its principal office within or outside the Republic 
in terms of section 5(8)(a) CPA, the Act applies in cases where a consumer has entered into an 
electronic transaction while residing in South Africa. 
For e-commerce transactions, both the CPA and BGB provisions thus afford their protection 
to consumers residing in South Africa or within the EU/Germany when entering into the 
contract. 
In B2B contracts, German entrepreneurs can stipulate that the CISG should apply for the 
formation of their agreement. For the validity of the contract, the national law is applicable. As 
South Africa is not a signatory of the CISG, South African businesses cannot opt out of the 
application of the Consumer Protection Act in cases where the Act is applicable under the 
threshold provision of section 5(2)(b). 
Thus, it can be said that for international transactions, both countries apply different approaches 
to ensure high consumer protection. The South African provisions ascertain that the Consumer 
Protection Act applies in a wide range of cases, whereas the German norms are part of a 
complex mechanism of European and international law. German law does not necessarily apply 
though where the protective standard is comparable with §§ 305 et seq. BGB.  
2. Material scope of application 
2.1.  General scope of application 
The Consumer Protection Act is not an overarching consumer protection statute since it does 
not repeal all statutes related to consumer protection.5910 Under section 2(8), other legislation 
applies in conjunction with the Act.5911 What is more, in terms of section 2(10), consumers still 
have the right to rely on rights they may have under the common law. Because of the common-
law principle of freedom of contract, the parties can exclude most of the residual rules of the 
                                                             
5910 E.g., credit agreements under the NCA. The goods and services which form the subject of the credit agreement 
are subject to the CPA though. Other pieces of legislation which have not been repealed are the Long-Term 
Insurance Act of 1998, the Short-Term Insurance Act of 1998 and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act of 2002. 
5911 This applies to the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999), the Public Service Act, 1994 
(Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 and the Public Service Act, 1994. 
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common law of contract by agreement.5912 Contrary to common law, the Act mostly affords 
rights that cannot be derogated, alienated or waived by the consumer. Hence, the Act grants a 
higher level of protection to consumers. 
On the other hand, §§ 305 et seq. BGB aim to prevent abuse of freedom of contract-drafting 
and therefore protect all parties against the misuse of standard terms.5913 The BGB provisions 
thus cannot be qualified as pure consumer protection provisions, with the exception of § 310(3) 
(consumer contracts).5914  
The provisions of the Act and §§ 305 et seq. BGB thus have a different rationale. 
Once the Act covers an agreement, all terms contained therein are subject to a fairness review. 
In other words, all negotiated terms, e.g., those concerning the price or the definition of the 
main subject matter, as well as non-negotiated terms (‘small print’) are covered by the Act and 
may be challenged.5915  
On the other hand, individually agreed terms are expressly excluded from the fairness enquiry 
in terms of §§ 305(1) 3rd sent. and 305b. Clauses stipulating the specification of the 
performance and the price are not submitted to content control in German law either.5916 
'Specification of the performance' refers to the type, the object, the amount or volume and the 
quality of the main performance, which is not determined by law.5917 For these cardinal 
obligations, no statutory provisions exist because they are an emanation of the principle of 
freedom of contract and therefore depend exclusively on the parties' will.5918 The transparency 
requirements of § 307(1) 2nd sent. must be met in these cases, however.5919 
The inclusion of negotiated terms as well as the core terms pertaining to the price and the 
performance can be justified in the South African context to a certain degree with the relative 
inexperience of consumers. One must consider though that consumers tend to check the price 
and the performance first. The possibility to overreach consumers in this regard cannot be 
excluded though, which is why the fairness enquiry of such terms might be justified. The courts 
must consider all the relevant factors in this enquiry, and the fact that these terms may have 
                                                             
5912 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 432. See Part I ch 2 para 1. 
5913 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. 
5914 Locher JuS 1997, 390. See Part II ch 1 para 2.3. 
5915 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 d). 
5916 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 783. 
5917 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 783. 
5918 Leenen BGB-AT 351. 
5919 See Part II ch 5 para 1.6. 
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been negotiated should be factored in. This was also the position of the South African Law 
Commission of which one of the guidelines for the determination of unfairness was 'whether 
or not prior to or at the time the contract was made its provisions were the subject of 
negotiation'.5920 
Since section 48 et seq. does not contain any provisions with respect to the material scope of 
application, one must refer to section 5(1) which defines the ambit of the Act. This definition 
is thus more extensive than the definition contained in § 305 BGB, which merely defines the 
scope of application for standard business terms. On the other hand, the Consumer Protection 
Act does not contain a provision that defines 'terms and conditions', unlike § 305(1). In terms 
of § 305(1), contract terms must be pre-formulated for a multitude of contracts and presented 
to the other party in order to be qualified as standard business terms. The 2nd sentence of this 
provision sets out that the form of the agreement, volume and visual characteristics are 
irrelevant in this respect. Moreover, individually negotiated terms are not considered standard 
terms under § 305(1) 3rd sent. 
The Consumer Protection Act defines in section 5 to what kind of transactions the Act, and 
consequently, sections 48 et seq. apply. 'Transactions' under section 5(1)(a) does not include 
once-off transactions.5921 Hence, the protection of sections 48 et seq. is not granted to these 
transactions. The same applies to §§ 305 et seq. BGB. This is expressed by the requisite that 
standard terms must be intended 'for a multitude of contracts' ('für eine Vielzahl von 
Verträgen'),5922 which indicates that mass contracts are targeted.5923 On the other hand, if a 
clause has been drafted for a single contract and is later inserted in other agreements, the 
qualification as a standard clause only extends to the subsequent use, and not to the first 
contract.5924 It seems however that sections 48 et seq. CPA even apply if the given standard 
terms have been drafted for a single contract. As the supplier has to act in the ordinary course 
of its business, which means that in practice, such a case is likely to be the exception, this 
should have no practical relevance though. 
The BGB provisions do not only apply to consumer contracts, but to contracts in general. Only 
with the insertion of § 310(3) due to the Unfair Terms Directive, the scope of application was 
                                                             
5920 SALRC Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) 
(1998) at 168. 
5921 Jacob/Stoop/Van Niekerk 2010 PELJ 312. 
5922 According to Geoffrey Thomas' and Gerhard Dannemann's translation (reprinted in Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 
177 et seq.) which is more accurate in this regard than the official translation of the German Ministry of Justice.  
5923 Stoffels AGB-Recht 45. 
5924 BGH NJW 1997, 135. See Part II ch 2 para 1.1.1 b) bb). 
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extended to consumers.5925 Since sections 48 et seq. CPA refer to suppliers and consumers, the 
ambit of the Act is narrower in this regard. 
What is more, for consumer contracts in terms of § 310(3) no. 2, a non-recurrent use on one 
occasion is sufficient for the application of §§ 305 et seq.5926 Therefore, the BGB widens the 
material scope of application as regards consumer contracts because also once-off transactions 
are included in this case. 
The definition of 'transaction' in section 1 requires that the supplier act in the ordinary course 
of business. As discussed, 'ordinary course of business' is not defined in the Act, but a purposive 
interpretation can be useful on a case-to-case basis. In any event, 'ordinary' requires a certain 
degree of regularity.5927 
The BGB contains a similar requirement only for consumer contracts in the sense of § 310(3), 
read with § 312. Consumer contracts are defined as contracts between an entrepreneur and a 
consumer (§ 310(3) in pr.). Under § 14(1), an entrepreneur means a natural or legal person or 
a partnership with legal personality who or which, when entering into a legal transaction, acts 
in exercise of his or its trade, business or profession. The phrase 'in exercise of his or its trade' 
is similar to 'in the ordinary course of business'. For other agreements than consumer contracts, 
this requirement does not exist in German standard business law, even though in practice the 
user will regularly be an entrepreneur. 
The requirement of consideration in terms of the definition of 'transaction' in the Act is also 
non-existent in §§ 305 et seq. The BGH applies these provisions to unilateral legal acts by 
analogy, such as declarations of termination of a contract, a binding promise in terms of § 657 
or a bank transfer form by which the bank reserves the right to credit the amount also to another 
account of the customer. In these cases, no consideration is due.5928 An exception in respect of 
the consideration requirement of the Act is section 5(6)(a). This provision includes the supply 
of goods or services with regard to members of a club etc. whether for fair value consideration 
or otherwise. The reason for this exception is that each consumer should be granted protection, 
for instance, in the case of a faulty product which causes damage to the consumer, in terms of 
sections 53 to 61.5929 
                                                             
5925 See Part II ch 2 para 2.2.2. 
5926 See Part II ch 2 para 1.1.1 b) cc). 
5927 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 a) aa). 
5928 See Part II ch 2 para 1.1.1. 
5929 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 a) aa). 
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'Goods' in section 5(1)(b) is widely defined and includes legal interests in land or any other 
immovable property, as well as gas, water and electricity (section 1). For 'goods', ex-§ 1(2) 
HGB contained a legal definition before the commercial law reform in 1998 according to which 
goods are movable objects. Hence, immovable property are not goods in this sense,5930 but 
transactions relating to them are open to scrutiny in terms of § 307.5931  
Under § 310(2) BGB, the black- and greylists of §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to contracts of 
electricity, gas, district heating or water suppliers concerning the supply to special 
customers.5932 With this mechanism, the legislator wants to prevent the preferential treatment 
of special customers in comparison to standard-rate customers.5933 Since the liberalisation of 
the energy supply market, consumers can also conclude contracts with utility suppliers and 
become special customers.5934 In this case, content control is possible only in terms of the 
general clause.5935 The level of protection must not fall below that of the Unfair Terms 
Directive however, which is why §§ 310(2) and 307 must be interpreted in conformity with the 
Directive.5936 
In this respect, the BGB provisions are more restrictive in terms of utilities than the provisions 
of the Act as the German provisions only allow the application of the general clause. 
The scope of application of the Consumer Protection Act in terms of goods is thus broader than 
in German law as it unrestrictedly includes immovable property and utilities. 
'Services' in terms of §§ 305 et seq. are all contractual performances that are neither goods nor 
immovable objects (land plots).5937 The definition of 'services' in section 1 of the Consumer 
Protection Act is also very extensive and includes, among other things, any work or 
undertaking performed by a person for another, the provision of education, banking and 
financial services (with some exceptions), the transportation of persons and goods, the 
provision of accommodation, the letting of immovable property and the rights of a franchisee 
in terms of a franchise agreement. What is more, in terms of the Act, also intermediaries are 
included in the definition of 'services' ('irrespective of whether the person (…) participates in, 
supervises or engages directly or indirectly in the service'). Although in German law, a cessio 
                                                             
5930 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 32. 
5931 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
5932 See discussion in Part II ch 5 para 1.1. 
5933 Tarifkunden. BGH NJW 1998, 1640 (1642). 
5934 MüKo/Basedow § 310 para 19. 
5935 BGH NJW 2013, 3647 (3650 et seq), Erman/Roloff § 310 para 9. 
5936 UBH/Schäfer § 310 para 105, Erman/Roloff § 310 para 9. 
5937 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 33. See discussion on § 309 no. 1 in Part II ch 5 para 1.2.1. 
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legis is possible, i.e., the recourse of the former obligor who satisfied the creditor against a 
third party,5938 in contract law, a direct recourse against a person who did not directly 
participate in a contract is generally excluded. § 651v(3) contains an exception for tour 
operators that do not have their registered office within the EU or the EEC. In this case, the 
travel agent has the same obligations in terms of §§ 651i to 651t in case of a defective trip. In 
addition, for distance learning contracts, the compelling provisions of the 
Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz (FernUSG) which are leges speciales to the BGB provisions, 
apply.5939 
The German understanding of service is therefore more inclusive because it does not positively 
enumerate the performances included in the definition, unlike the Consumer Protection Act. In 
terms of §§ 305 et seq., a differentiation of the type of transaction is not necessary because the 
German provisions apply to all contract types (with the exceptions mentioned in § 310(4)).  
The definition of 'service' in section 1 of the Act excludes services that are regulated by the 
Long-Term Insurance Act5940 or Short-Term Insurance Act,5941 for example. Section 1 of the 
Long-Term Insurance Act defines 'long-term insurance' and covers, for instance, life, health 
and disability policies. The same applies to liability, property or transportation policies in terms 
of the Short-Term Insurance Act. These types of insurances are thus excluded from the 
application of the Consumer Protection Act. On the other hand, the German VVG5942 also 
covers these types of policies.5943 The applicable insurance standard terms are not excluded 
from the application of §§ 305 et seq. BGB though.   
The demarcation between 'goods' and 'services' is therefore not necessary when determining 
the scope of application of §§ 305 et seq., but only in terms of the content control provisions 
(§§ 307, 308 and 309). In German standard business terms legislation, the discussion of 
whether the rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise agreement are qualified as a 'service' 
is therefore irrelevant in this regard. For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that 
the rights of a franchisee are not treated differently than other contractual claims of the law of 
obligations. They are thus not considered 'services' in German law. It is suggested that the 
South African legislator included them in the definition of 'service' since the Act applies to 
                                                             
5938 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Regress'. 
5939 See discussion on § 309 no. 9 in Part II ch 5 para 1.2.9.2. 
5940 52 of 1998. 
5941 53 of 1998. 
5942 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz. 
5943 See §§ 150 to 171 (life insurance), 192 to 208 (health insurance), 172 to 177 (occupational disability 
insurance), 100 to 112 (liability insurance), 88 to 99 (property insurance) and 130 to 141 (transport insurance). 
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transactions on goods or services. As franchise agreements are included in the Act's protection 
too, the legislator had to make this somewhat artificial choice and include them either in the 
definition of 'goods' or in the definition of 'services'. 
As discussed in Part I, the Act does not contain a definition of 'terms and conditions'.5944 The 
suggested definition5945 would cover all possible kinds of terms and conditions and ascertain a 
uniform application of the Act and unfairness control. It would also remove all ambiguities of 
whether certain terms and conditions are part of an agreement. Subsidiary agreements, side 
letters and other arrangements would be included so that suppliers would not be able to 
circumvent the application of the Act by ‘swapping out’ specific terms and applying other 
‘creative’ contract design measures. The BGB prevents these difficulties by defining the 
conditions and characteristics and providing a negative demarcation to individually negotiated 
terms in § 305(1). Since this definition is quite extensive, its rationale should always be kept 
in mind, i.e., the unilateral usage of freedom of contract by the user.5946  
The Consumer Protection Act promotes consumer protection comparable to the Unfair Terms 
Directive. Its application is thus limited to consumer contracts. It applies an individual 
approach where the circumstances of the given contract are taken into account. This is 
particularly expressed in section 52(2) where the factors that the court can consider are 
indicated. 
On the other hand, §§ 305 et seq. apply the so-called 'contract model'5947 which does not assess 
a term's fairness, but whether the user's standard terms serve as a good faith basis for the parties' 
contractual relationship.5948 The scope of the contract model focuses on the challenged terms, 
the relevant statutory provisions and the contract concerned. On the other hand, the 
circumstances of the parties involved in a particular transaction are not taken into account, but 
rather the transactions of the type and classes of the participants.5949 This approach is thus 
'supra-individual and generalising (or 'abstract-universal', 'abstract-general' or 'generalised-
                                                             
5944 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 a) ff). 
5945 '"Terms and conditions” means any general and special arrangements, provisions, requirements, rules, 
specifications and standards contained in an agreement between a consumer and a supplier, irrespective of their 
denomination, content and presentation.' See also Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. ‘terms’ and The 
Business Dictionary online: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/terms-and-conditions.html s.v. ‘terms 
and conditions’. See Part IV II. para 1. 
5946 BGH NJW 2010, 1277, UBH/Habersack § 305 para 5 et seq. See Part II ch 2 para 1.1.1. 
5947 Vertragsmodell. 
5948 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 109 (148). 
5949 BGHZ 22, 91 (98); 17,1 (3). 
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typified),5950 and not 'particular-personalised'.5951 The relevant statute has a 'classifying and 
guiding function' in this regard.5952 The BGB makes an unsystematic exception for consumer 
contracts (§ 310(3)) due to the requirements of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
The abstract approach applied by §§ 305 et seq. is more suited for standard business terms 
because they have been drafted for mass contracts.5953 In a particular-personalised approach, 
the individual client has to go to court. The following decision only has an inter partes effect, 
and other consumers cannot benefit from the judgment.5954 Hence, the German approach is 
more efficient and effective to fight unfair standard terms than the South African one. The 
South African legislator could balance this deficiency by introducing an abstract-challenges 
mechanism similar to the German institutional action. By doing so, the courts would apply a 
supra-individual and generalising approach, detached from individual consumers, and unfair 
terms could be eradicated for all the given supplier's customers. 
2.2.  Exceptions 
Both the Act and the BGB contain several exceptions concerning the scope of application. 
a) State 
Section 5(2) of the Act excludes the State from the protection of the Act where it is a consumer. 
As discussed in Part I,5955 it is not clear whether 'State' includes organs of state, or whether 
'State' merely comprises departments of state at the national, provincial and local level, as De 
Stadler opines.5956 Although this question has little practical relevance because parastatals are 
most likely excluded from the application of the Act due to their annual turnovers or asset 
values, the legislator should clarify this question and insert a definition of 'State' in the Act. 
Besides, where the State is a shareholder of private companies and exerts a direct influence on 
the policies of the given company, the entity in question should not afford the protection of the 
Consumer Protection Act, as discussed.5957 
§ 310(1) excludes the application of the incorporation requirements set out in § 305(2) and (3) 
as well as the application of most provisions of § 308, and all provisions of § 309 where legal 
                                                             
5950 Abstrakt-generell. 
5951 Konkret-individuell. Heinrichs NJW 1993, 1817, 1820. 
5952 Ordnungs- und Leitbildfunktion. Schmidt-Salzer Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen 186-189. 
5953 Staudinger/Rieble § 315 para 305. See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) cc). 
5954 This will be discussed later in chapter 6 of Part III. 
5955 Part I ch 2 para 2.2 b) aa). 
5956 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 79. 
5957 Part I ch 2 para 2.2 b) aa). 
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persons under public law and special funds under public law are customers. These entities thus 
enjoy only reduced protection. Legal persons under public law are the State (government), 
public corporations (e.g., municipalities), public agencies (e.g., universities or social security 
agencies), foundations of public law and the churches.5958 Special funds concern the Federal 
Railway Fund (Bundeseisenbahnvermögen – BEV) and the Fund of the European Recovery 
Program (ERP-Sondervermögen).5959 It is therefore irrelevant whether the given public entity 
is located on a national, federal or local level. Schools and universities, for instance, are 
governed by the Länder (federal states).5960 German private-law companies the shares of which 
are 100 per cent held by the State, such as the Deutsche Bahn AG, are not considered public 
entities or parastatals. Their protection is reduced in terms of §§ 305 et seq. however because 
they are entrepreneurs. The latter are also mentioned in § 310(1). 
Due to the special relationship between the German State and the churches,5961 the latter are 
also excluded from the scope of application of the given BGB provisions. In South Africa, such 
a link does not exist. 
b) Businesses 
The German provisions have no turnover or asset value requirements concerning businesses, 
unlike section 5(2)(b) of the Act. German entrepreneurs enjoy reduced protection if they are 
the 'other party' so that the general clause of § 307 is applicable, and the evaluations contained 
in §§ 308 and 309 are taken into account within the general clause. This allows for a flexible 
application of the law and the consideration of the practices and customs of the given 
industry.5962 
This approach seems more appropriate than the formalistic approach of the Act which refers to 
the turnover or asset value of a company. This different approach is justified by the fact that 
the BGB and the Consumer Protection Act pursue different purposes. The Act is essentially 
consumer protection law, with an extended understanding of what constitutes a consumer. It 
therefore aims at protecting small businesses that are similarly vulnerable as natural persons. 
The Act hence assumes that entities that are not juristic persons deserve the same protection as 
other consumers. This approach takes into account the socio-economic realities in South 
                                                             
5958 Stoffels AGB-Recht 71. Concerning the Roman-Catholic Church, see BGHZ 124, 174. 
5959 The ERP Fund is based on a convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of 
Germany for economic cooperation. It was concluded in 1949 (BGBl. 1950 at 9). See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch 
s.v. 'ERP-Sondervermögen'. 
5960 Article 70(1) read with art 73(1) GG. 
5961 See Art 140 GG read with art 136-141 WRV. 
5962 See Part II ch 2 para 2.1.3. 
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Africa. The application of turnover and asset thresholds to juristic persons excludes companies 
that do not need protection and assures that the majority of companies who need protection are 
actually protected. This has the consequence that a sole proprietorship-consumer with a 
sizeable annual turnover exceeding the threshold is protected by the Act, whereas a company, 
i.e., a juristic person, with a similar annual turnover is excluded from its protection.   
The more formalistic approach of the Act thus seems to be a better solution for South Africa. 
As discussed in Part II,5963 in terms of the so-called 'battle of forms', the last shot doctrine is 
not convincing because of its numerous drawbacks (e.g., 'ping-pong play'5964 with accidental 
results,5965 difficulties of proof,5966 economically unrealistic5967). Furthermore, the application 
of the strict mirror approach or the last shot rule would destroy the contract, whereas it is in the 
parties' interests to assume the valid conclusion of such a contract and to presume a dissent 
only where one party expressly wanted to have treated its standard terms as a condition for the 
validity of the agreement. 
On the other hand, the knock out approach5968 assures that the transaction is not destroyed 
because of conflicting standard terms, and that colliding clauses are replaced by statutory 
provisions so that a viable contract in which the corresponding standard terms are upheld is the 
result. Furthermore, this approach reflects the parties' intentions in commercial relations and 
leads to fair and predictable results by avoiding an arbitrary choice as it is the case for the last 
shot rule.5969 This contributes to legal certainty.5970 This is probably why, from an international 
point of view, the majority of the commentators and case law show a preference for this 
approach.5971 
                                                             
5963 See Part II ch 3 para 1.5. 
5964 L/GvW/T/Löwe § 2 AGBG para 41. 
5965 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 220. 
5966 Striewe JuS 1982, 729. 
5967 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 221. 
5968 In terms of this approach, the parties' standard terms that are not in conflict form part of the agreement, and 
conflicting terms are replaced by the ius dispositivum. See Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 216. 
5969 CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 Rule 10.6. 
5970 Eiselen/Bergenthal 2006 CILSA 227. 
5971 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 13 Rule 10.6, with further references. The knock out approach is also applied in 
terms of art 2.22 of the UNIDROIT Principles: '(Battle of forms) Where both parties use standard terms and 
reach agreement except on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the agreed terms and of any standard 
terms which are common in substance unless one party clearly indicates in advance, or later and without undue 
delay informs the other party, that it does not intend to be bound by such a contract.' 
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Because of its undeniable advantages, this approach should thus be applied both in Germany 
and in South Africa. 
c) Employment contracts 
Section 5(2)(e) CPA excludes services under an employment contract from the scope of 
application of the Act. As submitted in Part I, the Act applies though where an employee buys 
a sub-standard service from its employer at a discount price. Only services supplied by the 
employee in terms of the employment contract should be excluded according to section 5(2)(e). 
The reason for this exemption is not to put too much burden on the relationship between an 
employer and an employee in terms of the fulfilment of the contract. Where an employee buys 
services from the employer, this does not concern the fulfilment of the employment contract, 
however.5972  
It is suggested that the inclusion of employment contracts into the scope of application of the 
Act would be superfluous. A comparison of the South African and the German approach would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, it should be sufficient to note that other pieces 
of legislation, such as the Labour Relations Act5973 the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act,5974 the Employment Equity Act5975 or the Occupational Health and Safety Act,5976 already 
offer extensive protection for employees so that the inclusion of employment contracts into the 
Act is not necessary.  
§ 310(4) limits content control in labour law. Under this provision, for employment contracts, 
reasonable account must be taken of the special features that apply in labour law.5977 The 
incorporation requirements of § 305(2) or § 305(3) (framework agreements) do not apply in 
this case. The inclusion of employment contracts is justified because, despite the protection by 
collective agreements and legal provisions to a certain extent, employees need protection 
because of their existential dependence on their employment.5978 Furthermore, there must be a 
counter-weight of the employer's power to determine the employment conditions 
unilaterally.5979 What is more, the inclusion of labour law into content control ascertains that 
                                                             
5972 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 b) ee). 
5973 66 of 1995. 
5974 75 of 1997. 
5975 55 of 1998. 
5976 85 of 1993. 
5977 See Part II ch 2 para 1.2.4 c). 
5978 See Part II ch 2 para 1.2.4. 
5979 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
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courts will no longer reach varying rulings leading to legal uncertainty. This also contributes 
to an equalisation of the level of protection of content control between labour and civil law.5980  
For the meaning of 'special features that apply in labour law', the prevailing view legitimately 
asserts that content control in labour law takes place, but where a prohibitive provision is not 
adapted to labour law, corrections must be made.5981 Such corrections can originate from the 
legislature's evaluations in labour and social law, deviating factual situations in labour law5982 
or special features of ecclesiastical labour law.5983 They can also originate from the fact that 
some prohibitions in §§ 308 and 309 are geared towards short-term relations having a paying 
customer in mind (e.g., the prohibition of contractual penalties in § 309 no. 6). Customary 
practise is not a special feature of labour law, however.5984 In this context, it should be reminded 
that the wide BGB definition of 'consumer' in § 13 means that employees are 'consumers' vis-
à-vis their employers in terms of their contracts of employment.5985  
A consequence of the previously mentioned inclusion of labour law is that the courts now 
differentiate between pre-formulated and individually agreed employment contract clauses.5986 
Where employees can negotiate their working conditions to a certain degree, one must assume 
that they are able to defend their interests. This 'more' of freedom of contract must however not 
be nullified by considerations of equity (§ 315(3))5987 or public policy (gute Sitten) 
(§ 138(1)).5988  
As mentioned earlier, an inclusion of labour law into the Act would be superfluous because of 
the sufficient protection offered by other South African pieces of legislation.  
d) Collective agreements 
Under section 5(2)(f) and (g), collective bargaining agreements and collective agreements are 
excluded from the ambit of the Act. As mentioned above, a comparison of the exclusion of this 
                                                             
5980 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
5981 Thüsing NZA 2002, 591 et seq, ErfK/Preis §§ 305-310 para 11. 
5982 BAG NZA 2008, 129 (133); 2011, 206 (209). 
5983 BAG NZA 2011, 634 (637 et seq).  
5984 Staudinger/Krause Annex to § 310 para 144, Junker FS Buchner 378 et seq. 
5985 BAG NZA 2005, 1111 (1115), confirmed by BVerfG NZA 2007, 85, 86; BAG NZA 2011, 89 (90); 2013, 1265 
(1266), ErfK/Preis § 611 para 182, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 15. Hence, the specific provisions 
for consumer contracts in § 312(3) must also be taken into consideration. 
5986 Hanau NJW 2002, 1242, Stoffels AGB-Recht 63. 
5987 § 315(3): 'Where the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of a party, the 
specification made is binding on the other party only if it is equitable. If it is not equitable, the specification is 
made by judicial decision; the same applies if the specification is delayed.' 
5988 § 138(1): 'A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void.' Thüsing/Leder BB 2005, 940, Stoffels 
AGB-Recht 63. 
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field from content control goes beyond the scope of this thesis. South African employees are 
sufficiently protected in this area by other pieces of legislation, such as the Labour Relations 
Act5989. 
§ 310(4) in fine also excludes the application of collective agreements from §§ 305 et seq. The 
rationale of this norm is that since the bargaining power of the parties is balanced, there is no 
need for protection in terms of content control. Besides, neither party is the 'user' in the sense 
of § 305.5990 More importantly, the autonomy of collective bargaining5991 is a constitutional 
right (article 9(3) GG),5992 and the parties' power to shape their agreements must not 
unnecessarily be restricted by content control.5993 
Both regimes thus exclude collective agreements from content control because employees are 
already sufficiently protected in this regard, either by other pieces of legislation or the fact that 
the parties' bargaining power is balanced through the negotiations already undertaken by their 
representatives (e.g., unions and employer organisations). 
e) Other exclusions 
According to section 5(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, transactions for which the Minister 
has granted an exemption (paragraph (c)) as well as credit agreements under the National Credit 
Act (item (d)) are excluded from the scope of application of the Act.5994 The Consumer 
Protection Act is intended to offer a default regime of consumer protection. Its purpose is not 
to override industry-specific laws that contain more specific consumer protection schemes. If 
the National Consumer Commission advises that the specific industry scheme protects 
consumers at least as much as the Consumer Protection Act, the Minister may grant an 
exemption.5995 
                                                             
5989 66 of 1995. 
5990 Stoffels AGB-Recht 63, with further references. 
5991 Tarifautonomie. 
5992 Article 9(3) GG: 'The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions 
shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or profession. Agreements that restrict or seek to 
impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be unlawful. Measures taken pursuant 
to Article 12a [Compulsory military and alternative civilian service], to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35 [Legal 
and administrative assistance and assistance during disasters], to paragraph (4) of Article 87a [Armed Forces], or 
to Article 91 [Internal Emergency] may not be directed against industrial disputes engaged in by associations 
within the meaning of the first sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic 
conditions.' 
5993 BT-Drs. 14/6857 at 54. 
5994 See Part I ch 2 paras 2.2 b) cc) and dd). 
5995 Section 5(4). See Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill, 2008, point 3.2 at 82.  
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The Minister has granted such an exemption for banks concerning the application of section 14 
(expiry and renewal of fixed-term agreements).5996 Furthermore, the pension fund industry,5997 
the collective investment scheme industry5998 and the security services industry5999 had been 
exempted from the majority of the provisions of the Act for 18 months form 1 April 2011. 
These industries are now permanently exempt in terms of the Financial Services Laws General 
Amendment Act.6000 
The German provisions do not contain similar exclusions.   
Melville is of the opinion that the fact that the National Credit Act has not been repealed along 
with other statutes like the Long-Term Insurance Act of 1998,6001 the Short-Term Insurance 
Act of 19986002 and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act of 20026003 is a result 
of a resolute lobbying on the part of the financial sector.6004 In fact, section 90 of the National 
Credit Act dealing with unfair contract terms has not been repealed by the Consumer Protection 
Act. Generally, sections 89 and 90 of the National Credit Act offer less protection than sections 
48 and 51 of the Consumer Protection Act. Better consumer protection in terms of the NCA 
could therefore be achieved by repealing section 90 of the NCA and making it subject to an 
amended Consumer Protection Act. Another solution could consist of amending section 90 by 
aligning it with the CPA provisions. Section 121, read with Schedule 1 of the Consumer 
Protection Act, and section 172, read with Schedule 1 of the National Credit Act, would have 
to be amended for this purpose. It is suggested that the amendment of section 90 NCA would 
be the better solution because a cross-referencing between the two pieces of legislation would 
be avoided. 
On the other hand, § 310(4) BGB excludes contracts in the field of the law of succession, family 
law and company law from the ambit of §§ 305 et seq.6005 Similar exclusions are not contained 
in the Consumer Protection Act. The rationale of the exclusion of family law is that in this 
                                                             
5996 GN 532 in GG 34399 of 27 June 2011. 
5997 Regulated by the Pensions Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
5998 Regulated by the Collective Investments Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002. 
5999 Regulated by the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2002. 
6000 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 107. See Part 1 (amendment of the 
Pension Funds Act), Part 9 (amendment of the Collective Investments Schemes Control Act) and Part 12 
(amendment of the Financial Markets Act) of the General Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013. 
6001 52 of 1998. 
6002 53 of 1998. 
6003 37 of 2002. 
6004 Melville Consumer Protection Act 3.  
6005 See Part II ch 2 para 1.2. 
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field, prescribed contract types prevail, and restricted possibilities of varying from legal 
provisions would not be appropriate. Like in the law of succession, contracts in this area are 
quite individualised, so that there is no need for strict content control.6006 The fact that these 
areas are not excluded in terms of the Consumer Protection Act should not have a significant 
effect, though, because in the given constellations, the parties usually are not consumers or 
suppliers. What is more, in the South African law of succession, the principle is that an 
agreement by a testator not to revoke a will is invalid (pactum successorium). Hence, 
provisions in a contract under which a person purports to regulate how his or her assets would 
be dealt with after death will not be binding. The rationale of this principle is that the testator 
should be entitled to determine how or to whom property should be left on death, and to revoke 
a will or other testamentary document at any time.6007 In South African family law, the question 
is whether a transaction between family members has been concluded at arm's length, i.e., 
under normal market conditions.6008 Only then, the given contract is valid. 
Thus, the South African regime too excludes de facto contracts concluded in the areas of the 
law of succession and family law, with certain exceptions applying to family law. 
§ 310(4) also excludes company law from the application of the German standard business 
terms regime since the application of these provisions would not be appropriate for provisions 
concerning the organisation of companies. Where legal provisions in this field are mandatory, 
they offer a balanced solution. Besides, company agreements are usually drafted by specialists. 
Only if specific instruments or provisions concerning the organisation of these structures, such 
as company agreements or articles of association, or constructions pertaining to the 
membership of the legal structure, are concerned, §§ 305 to 310 do not apply.6009 
An exclusion of company law would not have been necessary in the context of the Consumer 
Protection Act since the parties cannot be defined as suppliers and consumers under section 1. 
Franchise agreements are an exception (section 5(6)(d)). Such agreements are often concluded 
between large franchisors and smaller juristic persons who can easily be overreached so that 
the protection afforded by the Act seems reasonable.6010 In German law, §§ 305 et seq. are 
                                                             
6006 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 41. 
6007 Christie Law of Contract 374 and 375.  
6008 See 'What is an Arm's-Length-Transaction?' at https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-is-an-arms-length-
transaction-398128. 
6009 Stoffels AGB-Recht 57. 
6010 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2. a) aa). 
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applicable to franchise agreements as long as they do not concern the organisational structure 
but standard form contracts with supplementary provisions for the operation of the business.6011 
3. Personal scope of application 
Sections 48 et seq. of the Act apply to consumers and suppliers, whereas §§ 305 et seq. BGB 
refer to the user and the other party. 
3.1   Consumer / other party 
The term 'consumer' is defined in section 1 of the Act and includes the beneficiary or recipient 
of services as well as franchisees. Hence, consumers who had no knowledge of the transaction 
are protected too. What is more, also bystanders seem to be covered by the protection of the 
Act when they suffer harm as a result of unsafe goods.6012 Goods are unsafe if they, due to a 
characteristic, failure, defect or hazard, present an extreme risk of personal injury or property 
damage to the consumer or to other persons.6013 What is more, section 61(5) refers to injury, 
death or illness of any natural person6014 and damage or loss of any property and does not limit 
it to harm to consumers or their property. The Act therefore expands the term 'consumer' to a 
wide range of persons, even if the term is not consistently used throughout the Act and 
sometimes replaced by the term ‘person’.6015 The extension of the term 'consumer' to 'any 
natural person' in section 61(5) aims to make provision for products liability where the common 
law of delict has been deficient. What is more, no specific other legislation dealing with 
products liability exists. 
The term 'other party' is also not consistently used in the BGB. Sometimes, the legislator refers 
to the 'other party to the contract' ('der andere Vertragsteil'), 'contractual partner' 
('Vertragspartner') instead of the 'other party' ('andere Vertragspartei').6016 The different 
wording has no meaning in practice though since these terms always refer to the user's 
counterpart. The supplier's counterpart is either the 'other party', or a 'consumer' in terms of a 
consumer contract under § 310(3). 
The term 'other party' is not defined in the BGB but means the user's counterpart. § 13 defines 
the word 'consumer' as every natural person who enters into a legal transaction for purposes 
                                                             
6011 UBH/Schmidt Part 2 ch 13 (franchise agreements) para 7. 
6012 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 36. 
6013 Section 53(1)(d). Emphasis added. 
6014 Emphasis added. 
6015 De Stadler ‘Section 5’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 38. See Part I ch 2 para 2.3 a). 
6016 See, e.g., §§ 307(1) or § 309 no. 14. 
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that predominantly are outside his trade, business or profession though. § 13 defines 'consumer' 
negatively since the legal transaction must be concluded neither for a commercial nor for an 
independent activity.6017 Unlike the Unfair Terms Directive, § 310(3) does not require the 
parties to conclude a specific type of transaction, such as a sales agreement. Hence, for the 
German provision, consumption of the given item is not necessary, even though consumption 
will be the ultimate purpose of the contract for the consumer in most cases. On the other hand, 
the definition of 'consumer' in section 1 CPA only relates to goods and services. In this regard, 
this definition is thus more restrictive and only refers to certain agreements. 
As long as a company does not exceed the thresholds in terms of section 5(2)(b) CPA, they can 
also be consumers so that the Act applies to them without restriction. On the other hand, the 
application of certain BGB provisions to entrepreneurs is excluded in terms of § 310(1) BGB 
(incorporation requirements, framework agreements, most items contained in § 308 and all 
items of § 309). This means that in German B2B contracts, the general clause of § 307 plays a 
more prominent role than in South Africa. 
Hence, the German term '[the] other party' and its synonyms is more restrictive in that the South 
African regime expands the notion of 'consumer' to persons who are not directly involved in 
the transaction as well as to any natural person who suffers injury, death or illness in terms of 
section 65. This expansion aims to balance deficiencies of the common law of delicts and the 
fact that no other legislation dealing with product liability exist in South Africa. In Germany, 
these areas are already covered by §§ 823 et seq. BGB and the Produkthaftungsgesetz 
(ProdHaftG). An extension of the term 'other party' was thus not necessary for §§ 305 et seq. 
On the other hand, a 'consumer' in the Act merely relates to agreements related to goods or 
services. In contrast, for the German regime, such a restriction does not exist. In practice, most 
contracts deal with goods or services, however, which is why most transactions should be 
covered in the South African regime. 
3.2   Supplier / user 
In terms of section 1, a supplier is a person who markets any goods or services. When reading 
this definition with the definition of 'market' (verb) and 'promote' it becomes clear that the 
supplier must do so in the ordinary course of its business. Section 5(8)(c) provides that the legal 
                                                             
6017 In the English translation, this is not sufficiently clear though as the German negatively formulated phrase for 
'der weder ihrer gewerblichen noch ihrer selbständigen beruflichen Tätigkeit zugerechnet werden kann' (neither 
for … nor for) is translated in English by a positive grammatical structure that is closer to art 2 lit. b) of the 
Directive: 'for purposes that predominantly are outside his trade, business or profession'. Emphasis added.  
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nature of the supplier is irrelevant (individual, juristic person, partnership, trust, organ of state 
etc.). 
§ 305(1) contains a legal definition of 'user' by providing that this is the party to the contract 
that presents pre-formulated contract terms to the other party upon entering into the contract. 
A restriction to goods or services is not required. As long as the user is not an entrepreneur 
under § 14, it is also not necessary that the user 'acts in exercise of his or its trade, business or 
profession'. 
Hence, the South African definition of 'supplier' is more restrictive than the German term 'user' 
in that it only includes activities performed in the ordinary course of business and related to 
goods or services. 
 
4. Conclusion 
For the territorial scope of application of the Consumer Protection Act, the South African 
legislator aims to protect consumers in a wide range of circumstances. Hence, both parties do 
not need to be simultaneously present during the conclusion of their agreement for that the Act 
applies; it is sufficient if the supply of the given goods or services takes place in the Republic. 
Because of the embedding of German law into European law and the Rome-I Regulation, a 
more unified approach for transactions within the EU is possible. A circumvention of the high 
EU consumer protection standards is thus unlikely. Therefore, Rome-I makes it possible that 
the parties select the law applicable to their agreement. In consumer agreements, the parties 
cannot derogate from mandatory national provisions, however. What is more, the favourability 
principle ensures that in the case where the BGB provisions are more favourable to the 
consumer than the provisions of the selected law, the former apply. For e-commerce 
transactions, both the Act and the BGB afford protection to consumers residing in South Africa 
or within the EU/Germany when concluding their agreement.  
Concerning the material scope of application, and even though the Act does not afford an 
overarching consumer protection mechanism because other legislation applies in conjunction 
with the Act, and consumers still may claim their rights in terms of the common law, consumers 
cannot derogate from most of the rights contained in the Act. Thus, it grants a higher level of 
protection to consumers than the common law or other legislation. Unlike the CPA, the BGB 
provisions cannot be qualified as pure consumer protection provisions, though (with the 
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exception of § 310(3) dealing specifically with consumer contracts). The provisions of the Act 
and §§ 305 et seq. BGB thus have different objectives. 
Unlike German law, the South African regime covers all terms contained in an agreement, i.e., 
also negotiated terms and those pertaining to the price and the performance. In German law, 
negotiated terms and those pertaining to the main subject matter are considered to be an 
emanation of the principle of freedom of contract. Since South African courts must consider 
all the relevant factors in the fairness enquiry, they should consider the fact that these terms 
have been negotiated.   
In order to apply, German standard business terms must have been drafted 'for a multitude of 
contracts', i.e., once-off transactions are not subject to content control. This does not apply to 
consumer contracts though where a non-recurrent use on one occasion is sufficient for the 
application of §§ 305 et seq. On the other hand, the CPA seems to apply even if the standard 
terms have been designed for a single contract. As the Act only refers to suppliers and 
consumers, its ambit is narrower than in §§ 305 et seq. though because the German provisions 
not only apply to consumers but to 'the other party', which is a broader concept. 
The German provisions do not contain any requirement of consideration, unlike the Act, where 
the exchange of consideration is a requisite for a transaction in terms of section 1. An exception 
is section 5(6)(a), which qualifies the supply of goods or services with regard to members of a 
club etc. as a transaction, irrespective of whether there is an exchange of consideration or not. 
§§ 305 et seq. are more restrictive with respect to utilities than their South African counterpart 
because for electricity, gas, district heating or water suppliers, only the general clause can be 
applied. The definition of 'goods' in South African legislation also includes immovable 
property, which is not the case in Germany. 
The Consumer Protection Act contains an extensive definition of 'services' which also includes 
intermediaries. This is not the case for the German regime where a direct recourse against a 
third party that is not directly involved in the contract is generally excluded. The German 
understanding of 'services' is more inclusive, and a differentiation of the type of transaction is 
unnecessary. The demarcation between 'goods' and 'services' is not necessary for the 
determination of the scope of application, but for content control. 
The Consumer Protection Act lacks a definition of 'terms and conditions', unlike § 305(1). In 
order to remove any ambiguities and to include subsidiary agreements, side letters or other 
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arrangements that enable the supplier to circumvent the application of the Act, a definition 
should be inserted into section 1. 
Unlike the Act, which applies a particular-personalised approach, German standard terms are 
subject to an abstract-general enquiry where the particular circumstances of the case are 
irrelevant, except for consumer contracts. 
Section 5(2) excludes the State from the personal scope of application and hence the protection 
of the Act. Under § 310(1), certain entities, such as persons under public law, enjoy reduced 
protection in terms of §§ 305 et seq. In this context, it is irrelevant whether the given entity is 
located on a national, federal or local level. The special relationship between the German State 
and the churches does not exist in South Africa, however. 
The German approach concerning the renunciation of a turnover or asset value requirement in 
respect of businesses is less formalistic than the South African mechanism. This difference can 
be explained by the different purposes of both pieces of legislation. What is more, the South 
African approach is suited to reflect the socio-economic reality of this country and to protect 
most consumers that need protection. 
With respect to the 'battle of forms' in B2B contracts, the internationally recognised knockout 
approach should apply both in South Africa and in Germany. 
Employment contracts are excluded from the scope of application of the Act. South African 
employees already benefit from extensive protection afforded by other pieces of legislation. 
On the other hand, § 310(4) restricts content control in labour law, but reasonable account must 
be taken of the special features that apply in labour law. The German legislator justified this 
restricted protection with the existential dependence of employees and because employers 
determine the employment conditions mostly alone. Where employees can negotiate their 
working conditions to a certain degree, it is to be assumed that they can defend their interests. 
German courts thus differentiate between pre-formulated and individually agreed employment 
contract clauses. 
Both the South African and the German regimes exclude collective bargaining agreements and 
collective agreements from content control.  
The BGB excludes contracts in the field of the law of succession, family law and company law 
from the scope of application of §§ 305 et seq. The South African regime does not contain 
similar exclusions. The pactum successorium principle in the law of succession and the fact 
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that agreements between family members must be at arm's length exclude de facto the validity 
of most contracts in these areas. Excluding company law would not be necessary under the 
CPA as the parties cannot be defined as suppliers and consumers under section 1. Contrary to 
the Act, content control for franchise agreements is possible as long as they do not concern the 
organisational structure. 
The Act expands the concept of 'consumer' to a wide range of persons, but only in relation to 
goods and services. Thus, the definition of the Act is somewhat restrictive and only refers to 
specific agreements. As in practice, most contracts deal with goods or services, the majority of 
transactions should be covered in the South African regime, however. 
The Act unrestrictedly applies to companies that do not exceed the threshold requirements 
contained in section 5. On the other hand, the application of certain BGB norms to 
entrepreneurs is excluded, and the general clause applies. 
The South African legislation defines 'supplier' more restrictively than the German regime 
defines 'user' in that it only includes activities performed in the ordinary course of businesses 
and related to goods or services. 
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CHAPTER 3 – INCORPORATION CONTROL  
 
The following chapter deals with the comparison between the incorporation requirements 
according to the Consumer Protection Act and §§ 305 et seq. BGB. 
1. Substantive incorporation prerequisites 
§ 305(2) BGB strengthens the other party's position vis-à-vis the user by applying a formalistic 
approach that deviates from general contract law. This is done by requiring not only consent 
between the parties but also that certain conditions must be met. Only then, the user's standard 
terms become part of the agreement.6018 The incorporation requirements apply to all standard 
business terms, irrespective of their content or form. 
Too strict conditions for the incorporation of standard terms must be avoided though in cases 
where this might be an obstacle for legal transactions. This applies especially to mass contracts, 
where the rationalising effect is a significant factor to be taken into consideration.6019 When 
interpreting § 305(2) and (3), one has thus to ask the question of whether the incorporation 
requisites are reasonably justified in terms of customer protection,6020 or whether a 'functional 
reduction' of § 305(2) must take place for specific contracts.6021 
Furthermore, § 305a contains several exceptions in which a facilitated incorporation of certain 
standard terms applies, namely to tariffs and regulations of regular passenger transportation 
services, the standard terms for the posting of items or the standard terms for certain 
telecommunication services. The reasons for such facilitation are of legal or practical 
nature.6022 
§ 310(1) 1st sent. provides that the incorporation conditions set out in § 305(2) do not apply to 
standard terms which are used in contracts with an entrepreneur, a legal person under public 
                                                             
6018 See Part II ch 3 para 1.1 b). 
6019 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 13 and 17. 
6020 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 102 argues that a cautious interpretation closely related to the general 
contract law of the BGB is therefore necessary. 
6021 The BGH decided that for bond terms for securities, a modified application of the standard business terms 
legislation is necessary in order to ensure a functional trading of securites (BGH NJW 2005, 2917). This presumes 
a standardised content of securities. If the content of a securitised right would depend on the circumstances of 
their acquisition, their transferability would not be possible. An implied incorporation of bond terms is therefore 
sufficient. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 42. Ekkenga ZHR 160 (1996) 59 et seq argues that the unrestricted application 
of §§ 305 et seq for bond terms is not possible because standard business terms legislation falls short of the factual 
circumstances of the issuance of bonds and that bond terms cannot be assessed for the lack of a normative control 
standard. In addition, the assessment of standard terms does not consider the collective relations of the market. 
6022 See Part II ch 3 para 1.3 a). 
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law or a special fund under public law. Instead, the laxer rules of the BGB governing the 
conclusion of a contract apply.6023 In these cases, the persons mentioned above have a lesser 
need for protection than individual customers do.6024 
§ 305(2) does also not apply to pre-formulated employment conditions (§ 310(4) 2nd sent. 2nd 
subclause).6025 This caveat is due to the legislator's misjudgement concerning the regulatory 
content of the Evidence Act for Employment Relationships (NachwG).6026 Nonetheless, 
§ 305(2) cannot be applied by analogy6027 so that the general legal provisions apply.6028 
§ 305(3) provides that for certain transactions, the parties can conclude a framework agreement 
in advance according to which specific standard terms govern a specific type of legal 
transaction. This applies, for example, for current business relationships, especially between a 
bank and its clients.6029 
The South African legislator chose to apply similar incorporation requirements in section 49 
CPA. These apply only to four types of terms however, namely: 1.) exemption clauses, 2.) 
clauses by which the consumer assumes a risk or liability, 3.) indemnity clauses imposing an 
obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier or any other person for any cause, and 
4.) acknowledgements of any fact by the consumer.6030 What is more, the incorporation 
requirements concern provisions or notices concerning activities or facilities that are subject to 
any risk of an unusual character or nature, that are unexpected, or that could result in serious 
injury or death.6031 Besides these requirements, the incorporation requirements of the common 
law must be considered too. These apply to the extent that they have not been amended by 
section 49 as regards contracts and notices governed by the Act. According to the common 
law, the party who alleges the agreement bears the onus of establishing the content of the 
contract, i.e., what the terms are.6032 This even applies to cases where a party wants to prove 
that a specific provision has not been incorporated into the contract.6033 If the supplier can prove 
                                                             
6023 Maxeiner Yale J. Int. Law 166. See §§ 145 et seq. 
6024 See Part II ch 3 para 1.3 b). 
6025 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 110. 
6026 Nachweisgesetz (NachwG) of 20/07/1995, BGBl. I at 946. Stoffels AGB-Recht 108, Annuß BB 2002, 460, 
Richardi NZA 2002, 1058 et seq. 
6027 BAG NZA 2008, 45 (47); 2013, 148 (150); NZA-RR 2009, 593 (594). 
6028 BAG NZA 2013, 148 (150), Thüsing AGB-Kontrolle im Arbeitsrecht para 200. See Part II ch 3 para 1.3. c). 
6029 See Part II ch 3 para 1.4. 
6030 See s 49(1) in conjunction with subsection (3) to (5). 
6031 See s 49(2). 
6032 Naudé ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11. 
6033 Stocks & Stocks (Pty) Ltd v TJ Daly & Sons (Pty) Ltd 1979 (3) SA 754 (A), Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) 
Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA982 (SCA). 
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that it had taken reasonable steps to bring the given clauses to the consumer's notice, the 
consumer is bound to the terms irrespective of whether it had read them or not.6034 In other 
words, reasonable reliance on the part of the supplier that the consumer had accepted the terms 
is sufficient. It suffices that the consumer knew that the document in question contains relevant 
clauses for the agreement.6035 Reasonable reliance of consensus under the common law is 
notably given if the consumer signed the document.6036 An exception exists for surprising terms 
of which the consumer was not specifically informed when concluding the agreement; the 
consumer will not be bound to them.6037 
For transactions concluded electronically, the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act (ECTA)6038 applies. Since the ECTA contains specific provisions for consumer rights 
within the e-commerce context, its provisions apply only to electronic transactions and not to 
consumer agreements generally. Thus, the ECTA and the Consumer Protection Act must be 
read and applied together.6039 Under section 22(1) ECTA, agreements concluded partly or in 
whole by means of data messages are generally valid. Section 12 ECTA equates documents or 
information in the form of data messages with written documents or information, and section 
13 ECTA sets out the requirements for electronic signatures in cases where the signature of a 
person is required by law. Documents or information that must be produced by law may also 
be produced in electronic form.6040 The ECTA still goes further in that specific information 
must be provided to the consumers,6041 such as the opportunity to review the entire agreement 
before finally concluding it, or the right of a cooling-off period. Furthermore, the supplier must 
perform within 30 days after having received the order.6042 If these requirements are not met, 
the consumer may cancel the agreement.6043 Hence, even though the ECTA simplifies the 
conclusion of the agreement by recognising the electronic form of the writing, signature and 
information, it provides for more incorporation requirements than the Consumer Protection Act 
in that the supplier must provide certain information before the conclusion of the contract. 
                                                             
6034 Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 (1) SA982 (SCA), Sonap Petroleum (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonareg (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Papadogianis 1992 (3) SA 234 (A). 
6035 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 42, George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A). 
6036 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 42, Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun 
Couries 2007 (2) SA 599 (SCA). 
6037 Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
6038 25 of 2002. 
6039 Eiselen ‘Section 121’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. 
6040 Section 17 ECTA. 
6041 Section 43 ECTA. 
6042 Section 46 ECTA. 
6043 Sections 43(4), 44(1) or 46(2) ECTA. See Eiselen ‘Section 121’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 7. 
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Otherwise, the consumer may cancel the agreement. Therefore, the ECTA is stricter with 
respect to the incorporation requirements than the Consumer Protection Act. 
The incorporation requirements of the Consumer Protection Act6044 do therefore not apply in a 
general manner but only in the limited number of cases mentioned above, whereas § 305(2) 
applies to all standard business clauses. The incorporation requirements of the South African 
common law are laxer than the Act in that reasonable reliance on the part of the supplier that 
the consumer had accepted the terms is sufficient. For electronically concluded transactions in 
terms of the ECTA, additional incorporation requirements are required. 
2. Formal incorporation requirements 
2.1   Drawing the consumer's attention to certain facts 
Where the substantive conditions for incorporation are fulfilled, specific formal requirements 
must be met. 
In terms of section 49(1) of the Act, read in conjunction with subsection (4), the supplier must 
specifically draw the fact, nature and potential effect of the notice or provision to the attention 
of the consumer.6045 Under § 305(2), such a specific indication is not necessary because the 
incorporation requirements apply to all kinds of standard business terms, with the exception of 
the cases mentioned earlier.6046 
The CPA and BGB provisions thus differ in that § 305 merely requires that the user refer to its 
standard terms (without explaining their content). In contrast, section 49 requires that the 
supplier draw the consumer's attention to 'the fact, nature and potential effect' of a provision, 
notice or risk under section 49(2) and (3). It is suggested that this difference is justified because 
the reference to the potentially harmful effects of the given South African terms and conditions 
requires a higher standard with regard to the attraction of the consumer's attention to them. 
§ 305(2) requires though that the user explicitly refer the other party to its standard terms. The 
user's reference to its standard terms is only explicit if it is unequivocal and clearly 
understandable for the consumer, irrespective of whether it is oral or written.6047 In cases where 
an explicit reference is possible only with disproportionate difficulty, a clearly visible notice at 
the place where the contract is entered into is sufficient.6048 The posting of the notice is only 
                                                             
6044 As regards the incorporation requirements in South African law, see Part I ch 2 paras 3 and 4. 
6045 See Part I ch 2 para 3.2 b). 
6046 See Part II ch 3 para 1.2. 
6047 BGH WM 1986, 1194 (1196). 
6048 § 305(2) no. 1. 
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clearly visible if the client can see it without further ado.6049 This presumes a particular visual 
design and the posting at a visible place.6050 The post merely has to replace the explicit 
reference to the standard terms and does not need to contain the standard terms themselves.6051 
This condition is expressed in section 49 CPA by the fact that the reference to the given notice 
or provision must be made in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the 
consumer's attention, having regard to the circumstances (section 49(4)(a)).  
This is different from § 305(2) no. 1 as the fact that the user has to refer the other party explicitly 
to the standard terms excludes the consideration of the surrounding circumstances of the 
conclusion of the agreement when assessing the incorporation of standard terms.6052  
Besides, the notice, condition or provision must be written in plain language (section 49(3)). 
As discussed, the plain language requirement concerns not only the vocabulary and sentence 
structure but also the organisation, form and style of a document as well as the use of 
illustrations and usage of legible font size, i.e., the visual design.6053 
In summary, it can be said that the German provision has a broader effect than the South 
African one as it applies to all standard terms and not only to provisions in which specific risks 
are set out. The level of protection of section 49 is higher though because the consumer must 
not only be informed of the 'fact', i.e., the existence of the given provision, but also of the 
'nature and potential effect' of it. What is more, German standard terms users do not have a 
similar obligation for standard terms applying to potentially dangerous activities or objects. 
The level of protection of the South African regime is therefore higher in this regard too. 
Similar to both regimes is the fact that the reference to the user's standard terms under § 305(2) 
and to the notice or provision in terms of section 49 must meet the transparency and plain 
language requirements. 
Even though the South African provision gives more leeway and flexibility to suppliers in that 
the surrounding circumstances are considered with regard to the conspicuous manner and form 
in which the consumer's attention must be attracted, this might cause interpretational problems. 
                                                             
6049 Stoffels AGB-Recht 99.  
6050 See in this regard the discussion on plain and understandable language in Part I ch 3 para 3.2 a). 
6051 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 142. 
6052 Stoffels AGB-Recht 95. 
6053 See Part I ch 3 para 3.2. a) aa). 
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The legislator should therefore give more guidance to suppliers in this regard and prescribe at 
least a minimum standard for the requirement of a 'conspicuous manner and form'. 
2.2   Adequate opportunity 
Under section 49(5), the supplier must give the consumer an adequate opportunity in the 
circumstances to receive and comprehend the given provision or notice. As discussed,6054 
‘adequate opportunity’ can be defined as the possibility given to a consumer to receive and 
understand a term in consideration of the surrounding circumstances, such as the type of the 
given agreement, its complexity, or the type of consumer. To a certain extent, the factors 
contained in section 52(2), applied analogously, can serve as a guideline for the determination 
of the surrounding circumstances. 
Under § 305(2) no. 2, the user must give the other party, in an acceptable manner, the 
opportunity to take notice of the contents of the standard terms. The standard terms must 
entirely be made available to the client at the latest when concluding the contract. It is irrelevant 
whether the latter actually takes notice of them or not.6055 If both parties are present when 
concluding the contract, it is generally accepted that the user submits its standard terms to the 
client or offers at least their submission.6056 Where this might create an unnecessary obstacle 
for a smooth transaction between the parties, this is not mandatory6057 because the client is 
already aware of the existence of the standard terms by the user's explicit reference to them or 
the posting of the notice on the user's premises. These circumstances show the user's readiness 
to make the standard terms available to the customer, and the client can thus be expected to ask 
for a copy. In every-day transactions, the requirement that the user must give the other party 
the opportunity to take notice of the content of its standard terms under § 305(2) no. 2 should 
hence not be interpreted too strictly. The courts are stricter though with regard to the 
Construction Tendering and Contract Regulations (VOB/B) that must be issued to the other 
party in order to achieve their incorporation in the contract.6058 
By doing so, the user must take into reasonable account any physical handicap of the other 
party that is discernible to the user. Section 49 does not specifically mention a physical 
                                                             
6054 See Part I ch 3 para 3.2 c). 
6055 Stoffels AGB-Recht 99. 
6056 BGH NJW 1990, 715 et seq, Staudinger/Schlosser (2006) § 305 para 145. 
6057 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 148. 
6058 BGH NJW 1990, 715 et seq, NJW-RR 1999, 1246 (1247). 
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handicap. It is suggested that any disabilities of the consumer that are discernible to the supplier 
are part the 'circumstances' that the supplier has to take into consideration. 
The South African and German regimes differ thus insofar as in terms of § 305(2), the other 
party does not necessarily need to receive a copy of the given standard terms, except for the 
VOB/B. None of the regimes requires though that the customer take notice or understand the 
terms and conditions as long as he or she has been granted an (adequate) opportunity to do so. 
Concerning the language of the reference to the user's standard terms, one has to distinguish 
between cases where the language of the contract is German or in another language. In any 
event, the transparency requirement of the Unfair Terms Directive necessitates the drafting in 
the client's language in transactions with significant implications.6059 
In contrast to section 63(1) NCA, the Consumer Protection Act does not contain a provision 
that a contract or other document has to be drafted in a language or official language that the 
consumer understands.6060 With regard to the disproportionate financial burden for suppliers 
and the high number of official languages in South Africa, nearly all contractual documents 
are written in English at least, which can be seen as the lingua franca.6061 
Consumers have a certain degree of protection by section 40(2). According to this provision, a 
supplier must not knowingly take advantage of the fact that a consumer was unable to protect 
its own interests because of illiteracy, ignorance, inability to understand the language of an 
agreement and so forth. Hence, the supplier must ascertain that the consumer understands the 
agreement fully. If need be, the supplier must provide additional explanations and information, 
an interpreter, or even a (written) translation of the document.6062 Otherwise, the agreement 
may be challenged under section 40(2).6063 
Thus, except for transactions with significant implications where the agreement must be drafted 
in the client's language, the German regime offers less protection for customers since the given 
document will probably be written in German also in cases where the other party does not 
understand this language. In this regard, the Consumer Protection Act provides for protection 
                                                             
6059 See Part II ch 3 para 1.2. b). 
6060 See Part I ch 2 para 3.2 a) ee). 
6061 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 536. 
6062 De Stadler Consumer Law Unlocked 112. 
6063 Stoop/Chürr 2013 PELJ 536; Stoop ‘Section 22’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. See 
Part I ch 2 para 3.2. a) ee). 
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in terms of section 40(2), by which the non-existing requirement that documents have to be 
written in the consumer's language is somewhat counter-balanced. 
2.3   Signing or initialling 
The BGB provisions do not require that the other party sign or initial the notice to the user's 
standard terms, in contrast to section 49 of the Act. The agreeing of the other party to the user's 
standard terms can be done impliedly as long as there is no requirement to honour specific 
formalities.6064 § 305(2) in fine provides that the other party must agree to the applying of the 
standard terms.6065 The client's consent does not need to be proved for every single clause; it is 
thus sufficient that it covers the contract as a whole.6066  
As discussed, the South African legislature probably wanted to differentiate between the 
circumstances mentioned in section 49(1) and those indicated in section 49(2) and therefore 
imposed the additional requirement of signing or initialling the given provision and express 
assent in this way. The supplier is relieved of this obligation if the consumer acts in a manner 
consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the 
provision. (section 49(2) in fine).6067 This corresponds to the German regime where the client 
can impliedly agree to the user's standard terms where no specific formalities are required, e.g., 
when entering a car-wash facility.6068 
Initialling or counter-signing of exemption clauses can be a double-edged sword, however. 
This requirement may strengthen the supplier’s position because he or she could ultimately 
argue that they are always fair. What is more, exemption clauses for bodily injury or death 
caused negligently could be unfair even if the consumer had signed the given notice. In cases 
where the supplier is dispensed with this requirement, the question arises how the consumer's 
conduct dispensing the supplier can be proved.6069 
It can thus be said that the formal requirement of signing or initialling potentially dangerous 
terms and conditions has many drawbacks for the consumer and does not grant any additional 
advantages with regard to consumer protection. Instead, it strengthens the supplier's position. 
In practice, clients will act in a manner from which the supplier can deduct that the consumer 
                                                             
6064 BGH NJW 1982, 1388 (1389), Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 161, Belke JA 1988, 479. See Part II ch 3 para 
1.2 d). 
6065 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 111. 
6066 Stoffels AGB-Recht 103. 
6067 Section 49(2) in fine. 
6068 BGH NJW 1982, 1388 (1389), Staudinger/Schlosser § 305 para 161, Belke JA 1988, 479. 
6069 See Part I ch 3 para 3.2 b) cc). 
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assents to the provisions in question so that no signing or initialling is necessary, however. The 
difficulties of proof involved with this dispense can only be avoided by posting clearly visible 
warning signs at the entrance of a potentially dangerous facility, or by warning the consumer 
otherwise.  
2.4   Relevant moment 
The conditions set out in § 305(2) no. 1 and 2 must be met at the moment when the contract is 
concluded. This means that the user must explicitly refer to its standard terms when making a 
binding offer (no. 1), and the other party must have had the opportunity to take notice of their 
content before accepting the offer (no. 2).6070  
In this regard, the Consumer Protection Act distinguishes between the moment in which the 
fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice contemplated in section 49(1) must be drawn 
to the consumer's attention, on the one hand (section 49(4)(b)), and the granting of an adequate 
opportunity to receive and comprehend the given provision or notice (section 49(5)), on the 
other.  
Section 49(5) does not require that the consumer be given an adequate opportunity before the 
conclusion of the agreement. Hence, it should be sufficient if the supplier grants a cooling-off 
period after the conclusion of the contract.6071 On the other hand, under section 49(4)(b), the 
supplier must draw the consumer's attention to the given notice or provision before the earlier 
of the time at which the consumer enters into the transaction, begins to engage in the activity, 
or enters or gains access to the facility, or is required or expected to offer consideration for the 
transaction or agreement.6072 
This means that the supplier must draw the consumer's attention to the document in question 
before the conclusion of the agreement, but that the opportunity to take notice of this document 
does not necessarily have to be concurrent with, or before the conclusion of the contract. The 
moment in which the consumer receives and comprehends the provision can thus be 
afterwards. 
Both provisions are therefore different with respect to the moment in which the consumer/other 
party must have an 'opportunity to take notice' of the contents of the standard terms (§ 305(2) 
                                                             
6070 Locher Recht der AGB 43. 
6071 De Stadler ‘Section 49’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
6072 See Part I ch 3 para 3.2 b) bb). 
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no. 2) or an 'adequate opportunity (…) to receive and comprehend the provision or notice' 
(section 49(5)). 
2.5   Written consumer agreements 
For written consumer agreements in terms of the Act, irrespective of whether the written form 
is required by the Act or voluntarily, the consumer's signature is not required under section 
50(2). The supplier must provide the consumer with a free copy or free electronic access to a 
copy of the provisions of the agreement, however. If written form is not prescribed by the Act 
or has been agreed between the parties, it is no prerequisite for the validity of the agreement.6073 
In common law too, the written form is a constitutive or formal requirement only for particular 
legal acts (suretyship etc.). The formality requirements must be interpreted according to the 
law's objective (proof, legal certainty, the parties' protection etc.).6074 
Also in German law, the principle of freedom of form prevails. Only in specific cases that are 
exhaustively regulated by law, or where the parties agree on a specific form, certain form 
requirements (written form, text form, notarial certification etc.) apply.6075 
In 2001, the German legislator introduced the text form in § 126b.6076 In contrast to the written 
form, no signature is required so that the text form facilitates certain transactions. On the other 
hand, the evidential and warning function is reduced compared to the written form. Thus, the 
legislator allows text form mostly for quasi-contractual acts,6077 such as revocational 
instructions for consumer contracts (article 246(3) no. 1 EGBGB) or the new employer's 
information of the employees in case of a transfer of the company (§ 613a(5)).6078 
The declaration in text form must be legible. This is the case if the parties are able to read the 
declaration made on a durable medium (paper) without further ado, or if a declaration made in 
an electronic document can be read employing a software.6079 In this regard, the plain language 
                                                             
6073 See Part I ch 3 para 4.2. 
6074 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1. 
6075 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 141. 
6076 BGBl. 2001 I 1542. § 126b: 'If text form is prescribed by statute, a readable declaration, in which the person 
making the declaration is named, must be made on a durable medium. A durable medium is any medium that 
1. enables the recipient to retain or store a declaration included on the medium that is addressed to him personally 
such that it is accessible to him for a period of time adequate to its purpose, and 2. that allows the unchanged 
reproduction of such declaration.' 
6077 Rechtsgeschäftsähnliche Handlungen. 
6078 § 613a(5): 'The previous employer or the new owner must notify employees affected by a transfer in text form 
prior to transfer: 1. of the date or planned date of transfer, 2. of the reason for the transfer, 3.  of the legal, economic 
and social consequences of the transfer for the employees, and 4.  of measures that are being considered with 
regard to employees.' Brox and Walker BGB-AT 142. 
6079 BT-Drs. 17/12637 at 44. 
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requirement contained in section 50(2)(b)(i) concerning the free copy or free electronic access 
to a copy is a similar prerequisite to § 126b. 
Moreover, the person issuing the declaration must be named in the declaration. It is sufficient, 
though if this person can be identified within the given text.6080 
The declaration must be made on a durable medium. § 126b defines 'durable medium' as any 
medium that enables the recipient to retain (paper) or store (electronic medium) a declaration 
included on the medium that is addressed to him or her personally such that it is accessible to 
him or her for a period of time adequate to its purpose (i.e., as long as the recipient can claim 
rights on the basis of the declaration), and that allows the unchanged reproduction of such 
declaration. The last condition is fulfilled for paper, USB sticks, CD-ROM, DVD, hard or 
external disks, for instance.6081 On the other hand, the accessibility of the declaration on a 
website for the recipient is not sufficient because he or she cannot retain or store the declaration, 
and it cannot be excluded that the declaration will be modified at a later stage by the website 
owner.6082 
In contrast to German law, for the free electronic access to a copy of the consumer agreement, 
under section 50(2)(b) it seems to be sufficient that the supplier provides the given document 
on its website. Hence, subsequent changes in the agreement made by the supplier are 
possible.6083  
Section 50(2)(b) does not contain any provision in terms of which the electronically accessible 
copy has to be printable. Today, it is possible to upload documents that are not printable but 
only visible on screen.6084 Section 65 of the National Credit Act is unambiguous in this regard 
because the document has to be made available to the consumer through one or more of the 
means mentioned in this section, for instance ‘by printable web-page’.6085  
§ 126b BGB does neither require that the document be printable, but that the recipient is able 
to retain or store the document so that he or she can visualise it for a time adequate to its 
purpose. Section 50(2) does not contain such a requirement. The South African norm is 
therefore weaker with respect to the consumer's protection in that only access to the electronic 
                                                             
6080 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 143. 
6081 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 143. 
6082 BGH NJW 2014, 2857 (2858 et seq). 
6083 See Part I ch 3 para 4.2 b). 
6084 For instance, Google Books (https:/books.google.com). 
6085 Section 65(2)(a)(iv) NCA. Emphasis added. 
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copy must be granted, but not that the copy must be printable (unlike section 65 of the NCA), 
or that the consumer must be able to retain or store the copy (unlike § 126b). 
Section 19(1) ECTA considerably extends the meaning of 'copy' though by including data 
messages.6086 Therefore, no 'materialised' copy is necessary. What is more, section 15 ECTA 
gives data messages the same evidential weight as other documents. As long as the conditions 
of § 126b BGB are met in the form of a data message containing the document in question 
which can be retained or stored, the German provision is thus similar to section 19(1) ECTA. 
The German provisions do not contain any requirements regarding a financial breakdown of 
the consumer's financial obligations or a record of transactions.6087 Since in German law, text 
form is mostly admitted for quasi-contractual acts and not for agreements, these prerequisites 
would make no sense for the German regime. 
Hence, in both regimes, the principle of freedom of form prevails and written (or a stricter) 
form is only required by law in specific cases. Since text form (i.e., a written document without 
signature) entails a reduced evidential and warning function, the German legislator permitted 
this form only for certain documents involving mostly quasi-contractual acts. In South Africa, 
such a restriction does not exist, which might create some evidential problems. On the other 
hand, in both regimes, the plain language requirement must be fulfilled. Section 50(2) does not 
provide for the requirement that the declaration must be made on a durable medium, unlike the 
German regime; instead, the access to free electronic access to a copy of the agreement on the 
supplier's website is sufficient. With regard to subsequent modifications by the supplier, the 
level of protection of the German provision is thus higher. The level of protection of section 
50(2) is also weaker in that it does not require that the document must be printable, retainable 
or storable by the consumer. For electronically concluded transactions in the form of data 
messages (e.g., e-mails) this problem should not exist, however. Problems thus rather exist 
where agreements are concluded on the supplier's website, and the contractual documents are 
not printable, storable or retainable and the supplier does not send a confirmation by e-mail 
with the exact content of the contract. The fact that South African suppliers must provide a 
financial breakdown assists consumers in their understanding of their financial obligations, 
                                                             
6086 Section 19(1) ECTA: 'A requirement in a law for multiple copies of a document to be submitted to a single 
addressee at the same time, is satisfied by the submission of a single data message that is capable of being 
reproduced by that addressee.' 
6087 Section 50(3). 
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especially for recurrent payments or those containing ancillary fees. The introduction of such 
a requirement was thus a wise choice of the South African legislature. 
2.6   Non-variation clauses 
Non-variation clauses admitted by the South African common law must be interpreted 
restrictively since they curtail freedom of contract, and harsh outcomes are possible.6088 By 
such clauses, the parties can prescribe writing as a formal precondition for variation of the 
agreement. When it is worded wide enough, no part of the contract, including the non-variation 
clause itself, may only be varied in writing.6089 
According to the BGH and legal literature, written-form clauses cannot prevent the validity of 
an individually agreed term if the parties expressly agreed that their oral agreement prevails 
over the pre-formulated written-form clause.6090 This even applies if the written-form clause is 
valid in terms of the general clause of § 307.6091 If there is a need for clarification and proof, 
e.g., in life-insurance contracts, the written form clause may be valid, however.6092 It may also 
be valid if it is made before the conclusion of the contract in order to protect the supplier from 
agreements made by its agents that go beyond their power of representation.6093 In any event, 
the user's and the other party's interests have to be balanced against each other.6094 
It can thus be said that both regimes restrict the validity of non-variation/written-form clauses. 
In South Africa, this restriction serves to ensure the principle of freedom of contract and to 
avoid harsh and unfair results. In contrast, in Germany, the legislator aims to make sure that 
written-form clauses cannot overturn individually agreed stipulations made orally. 
3. Unexpected terms 
The Consumer Protection Act does not provide for a provision dealing with surprising terms. 
This principle is recognised by the common law though as a party is not bound by an unusual 
contract term to which it did not and could not reasonably have agreed.6095 
Naudé and Lubbe argue that a contract clause is surprising where it purports to vary the 
consequences of the contract in a manner contrary to the essence of the contract by undermining 
                                                             
6088 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1 a). 
6089 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 131, Hutchison 2001 SALJ 720. 
6090 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (322), WLP/Hau § 305b para 33, with further references. 
6091 BGH NJW 2006, 138 et seq; NJW-RR 1995, 179 (180); UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 33. 
6092 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634 et seq). 
6093 BGH NJW 1991, 2559. 
6094 See Part II ch 3 para 3.3 c). 
6095 Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) para [19]. 
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the reciprocity between the essential obligations envisaged by the parties.6096 For this purpose, 
the underlying contractual purpose of the parties to the contract and the nature of the policy 
considerations of the given agreement must be determined.6097 
The 'essential obligations' Naudé and Lubbe refer to are congruent with the 'essential principles 
of the statutory provision from which a provision of an agreement deviates in terms of § 307(2) 
no. 1. In German law, these considerations are therefore not taken into account when 
determining whether a clause is surprising, but whether an unreasonable disadvantage under 
the general clause of § 307 exists. § 307(2) no. 1 is merely a concretisation of the German 
general clause.6098 
For the determination of whether a standard clause is surprising, the German legislator chose 
another way instead. § 305c provides that provisions in standard business terms which in the 
circumstances, in particular with regard to the outward appearance of the contract, are so 
unusual that the other party to the contract with the user need not expect to encounter them, do 
not form part of the contract. The provision of § 305c is an emanation of the transparency 
requirement6099 and the principle of good faith.6100 Hence, a substantial contract term that 
appears under a wrong heading and is not emphasised by special typographical means does not 
become part of the agreement.6101 There is a clear link in this case with the South African plain 
language requirement of section 50(2)(b)(i), read in conjunction with section 22 CPA. 
It is important to note that Naudé's and Lubbe's argument in terms of the 'essential obligations' 
to be determined in the context of surprising terms cannot be applied in the context of the 
German incorporation control, but only within content control (§ 307(2) no. 1). This is because 
surprising terms need not necessarily be 'unreasonably disadvantageous' with respect to content 
control.6102 Therefore, the assessment under § 305c, as part of the incorporation control, must 
strictly be distinguished from content control.6103 This applies with the caveat that § 305c, as a 
                                                             
6096 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 454. 
6097 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 459. 
6098 See discussion on the general clause in Part II ch 5. 
6099 WLP/Hau § 305c paras 11-17.  
6100 BGH NJW 1993, 779 (780). 
6101 BAG NJW 1996, 2117.  
6102 Locher Recht der AGB 57. 
6103 In cases where a clause obviously infringes § 307, the BGH sometimes leaves the question of incorporation 
open and directly assesses § 307 for reasons of procedural economy (e.g., BGH NJW 1989, 222 (223), or it bases 
its decision both on § 305c and § 307 (e.g., BGH NJW 1995, 2553). It is submitted that this approach should 
however not be applied by other practitioners in order to allow for a proper content control. 
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provision treating more formal aspects, should not be applied too strictly because otherwise an 
'open' content control treating more material questions could not be performed anymore.6104  
As already discussed,6105 § 305c must be distinguished from the transparency requirement set 
out in § 307(1) 2nd sent. (existence of an 'unreasonable disadvantage' because of a 'provision 
not being clear and comprehensible'). This is because both provisions have a different 
protective function,6106 which leads to different fields of application. A clearly visible, not 
surprising clause that therefore has been incorporated properly in terms of § 305c can 
nonetheless infringe the transparency requirement of § 307(1) 2nd sent. because it falsely sets 
out the legal situation between the parties.6107 On the other hand, a clause with an utterly 
unusual content may lose its surprising effect if the user explicitly draws the other party's 
attention to it.6108 
It can therefore be said that the Consumer Protection Act only achieves similar protection in 
terms of surprising terms where the plain language requirement is not respected. This does not 
necessarily lead to the voidness of the given clause however as the plain language requirement 
is merely a factor among others that the court may consider under section 52(2). 
As already discussed above,6109 the Consumer Protection Act applies irrespective of whether 
or not the applicable terms and conditions have been individually agreed between the parties. 
In German law, individually agreed terms take priority over standard business terms (§ 305b) 
since they mirror the parties' will better than pre-formulated terms.6110 In other words, 
individually agreed terms are not considered standard business terms. § 305b does not aim at 
consumer protection. Instead, it aims to resolve the contradiction between standard and 
individually agreed terms. The latter may thus be in the supplier's favour.6111 
4. Legal consequences in the event of non-compliance with incorporation requirements 
The South African legislation distinguishes between non-compliance with the incorporation 
requirements set out in section 49 and those provided for in section 50 of the Act.  
                                                             
6104 MüKo/Kötz 3rd ed § 3 AGBG para 2. 
6105 See Part II ch 3 para 2.3. 
6106 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 239. 
6107 WLP/Pfeiffer § 307 para 240. 
6108 Faust BGB-AT 110. 
6109 See Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
6110 BGH NJW 2013, 2745 (2747), PWW/Berger § 305b para 1. 
6111 See Part II ch 3 para 3.2 b). 
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Under section 49(2)(d), a term, agreement, condition or notice that was subject to a term, 
condition or notice to a consumer contemplated in section 49(1) is unfair if the term, condition 
or notice is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. The same applies if the fact, nature and effect of that 
term, condition or notice were not drawn to the attention of the consumer according to section 
49. The court may therefore sever any part of the relevant agreement, provision or notice. It 
may also alter it to the extent required to render it lawful if it is reasonable to do so having 
regard to the transaction, agreement, provision or notice as a whole (section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa)). 
Alternatively, the court may declare the entire agreement, provision or notice void as from the 
date that it purportedly took effect (section 52(4)(a)(i)(bb)). In the case of a provision or notice 
that fails to satisfy any provision of section 49, the court may sever the provision or notice from 
the agreement, or declare it to have no force or effect with respect to the transaction (section 
52(4)(a)(ii)).6112 
As discussed in Part I, in the case of non-compliance with the written-form requirements set 
out in section 50, the agreement is not void since the written form is not constitutive.6113 The 
same applies to non-compliance with the plain-language requirement set out in section 
50(2)(b)(i) as this is merely a factor the court has to take into account under section 52. Since 
nullity of a non-written agreement for which the supplier did not keep a record of transactions 
in terms of section 50(3) would be unfair vis-à-vis the consumer who did not influence the 
supplier's conduct, the contract should not be declared void in these cases either.6114 
According to § 125, a legal transaction that lacks the form prescribed by statute is void. In case 
of doubt, lack of the form specified by legal transaction also results in voidness. The German 
provisions are therefore stricter than the South African legislation in this regard. 
In terms of § 306(1), if standard terms that have not been validly incorporated into the 
agreement, the remainder of the contract remains in effect so that only the ineffective terms are 
'erased'.6115 Ineffective terms are replaced by statutory provisions. Where the given contract 
type is not regulated by law, an analogous application of the ius dispositivum is possible. 
Unwritten principles, case law and customary law may also be drawn upon in this case. Only 
where a clause is irrelevant for the contract (e.g., a penalty clause), there is no need for such a 
                                                             
6112 See Part I ch 2 paras 3.3 and 4.3. 
6113 Generally, only alienation of land, suretyship and executory donations require the written form in order to be 
valid and enforceable. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 115 and 161 et seq., Christie and Bradfield Law of 
Contract (2011) 134 
6114 See Part I ch 2 para 4.3. Naudé ‘Section 50’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
6115 Stoffels AGB-Recht 249. 
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replacement under § 306(2).6116 Finally, when after a weighing of the parties' interests 
upholding the contract would be an unreasonable hardship for one party, the entire agreement 
is ineffective.6117  
For non-regulated contracts that are entirely regulated by standard terms (e.g., time-sharing 
agreements), the non-consideration of a single (invalid) clause could give an entirely new 
meaning to the agreement that the parties did not intend. Such an agreement would therefore 
be void as it is not the courts' role to remodel such a partly invalid agreement.6118 
In terms of section 52(4)(a)(i)(aa), South African courts are entitled to alter the agreement to 
the extent required to render it lawful. This provision does not specify whether such an 
alteration has to be undertaken by replacing the invalid clauses with statutory provisions or by 
interpretation. The court has merely take into consideration the transaction, agreement, 
provision or notice as a whole. It is thus suggested that due to the broad wording of this 
provision, the courts are free to alter the agreement both by replacing invalid clauses with 
statutory provisions or by a consumer-friendly interpretation. Hence, the Consumer Protection 
Act seems to enable the courts to take the parties' position, unlike German courts. 
Under subsection (aa), South African courts may also sever any part of the relevant agreement, 
provision or notice. This is also the case for German courts because if the contract shall be 
maintained, it must be able to be split up into a valid and an invalid part. 
The difference between the German and South African legislation lies thus above all in the fact 
that German courts are not allowed to take the parties' position and alter the agreement in the 
case of invalid clauses. Both regimes aim to maintain the agreement, however. In the case of 
non-compliance with written-form requirements such as text form, the German legislator 
provided for a stricter legal consequence than South African literature: non-compliance leads 
to voidness in Germany, whereas in South Africa, this form requirement is not constitutive. 
Section 52 seems to allow for partial retention of a clause, i.e., the preservation of the invalid 
clause with the content that is still permissible. This is not the BGH's position.6119 The fact that 
South African courts may alter invalid provisions to render them lawful dilutes the deterrent 
effect for suppliers to draft clauses that withstand incorporation control (and, of course, content 
                                                             
6116 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 71. 
6117 Stoffels AGB-Recht 250. 
6118 See above all BGH NJW 1969, 230 (231 et seq); 1983, 159 (162). 
6119 Geltungserhaltende Reduktion. BGH BB 2017, 2254; NJW 2016, 560. 
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control). South African suppliers might hence hope that their invalid clauses might be 
reformulated by the courts so that the given provisions are still applicable, only with a different 
content (which might still be in the supplier's interest). 
 
5. Conclusion  
The incorporation requirements for terms and conditions set out in section 49 of the Consumer 
Protection Act merely concern notices to consumers or provisions with regard to certain risks 
or liability. The incorporation requirements of the South African common law still apply 
insofar as they have not been amended by section 49. They are laxer than those set out in the 
Act as reasonable reliance on the part of the supplier that the consumer had accepted the terms 
is sufficient. For electronically concluded transactions in terms of the ECTA, additional 
incorporation requirements must be met, e.g., the information of a cooling-off period or the 
opportunity to review the entire agreement before finally entering into the contract. The ECTA 
is thus stricter in respect of incorporation than the Consumer Protection Act. 
In contrast, the German legislator chose a more formalistic approach by requiring that for the 
incorporation of all kinds of standard business terms, certain conditions must be met. 
Exceptions concern only cases where a functional reduction of § 305(2) is necessary, or where 
other legal provisions contain laxer incorporation rules. In certain cases, the parties can 
conclude a framework agreement in order to facilitate the incorporation of the terms, which is 
not possible under the South African regime. The German provision has thus a broader effect 
than the South African one because it applies to all standard terms.  
The level of protection of section 49 is higher than the one offered by the BGB provisions since 
the consumer must not only be informed of the 'fact', i.e., the existence of the given provision, 
but also of the 'nature and potential effect' of it. § 305 merely requires that the user refer to its 
standard terms. This difference is justified because for section 49, a higher standard is 
necessary with regard to potentially harmful effects. What is more, German standard terms 
users do not have a similar obligation for standard terms applying to potentially dangerous 
activities or objects. The level of protection of the South African regime is therefore higher in 
this regard too. 
Even though the South African provision gives more leeway and flexibility to suppliers in that 
the surrounding circumstances are considered with regard to the conspicuous manner and form 
in which the consumer's attention must be attracted, this might cause interpretational problems. 
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The legislature should give more guidance to suppliers in this regard and prescribe at least a 
minimum standard for the requirement of a 'conspicuous manner and form'. 
Similar to both regimes is the fact that the reference to the user's standard terms under § 305(2) 
and to the notice or provision in terms of section 49 must meet the transparency and plain 
language requirements. 
In the German regime, the other party does not necessarily need to receive a copy of the 
standard terms. Both regimes are alike in that a granting of an (adequate) opportunity to take 
notice or to understand the terms and conditions is sufficient; the actual comprehension of the 
terms is not required. 
Except for transactions with significant implications where the agreement has to be drafted in 
the client's language, the German regime offers less protection for customers who do not 
understand German and who are confronted with documents written in this language. The 
Consumer Protection Act provides at least protection under section 40(2) by which the non-
existing requirement that documents have to be written in the consumer's language is somewhat 
counter-balanced. 
The requirement of signing or initialling of certain provisions in South African consumer 
protection legislation is inexistent in the German regime. This requirement is a double-edged 
sword that entails more disadvantages than advantages, however. The German, more 
formalistic regime, offers a more balanced solution in this regard. 
Both provisions differ in terms of the moment in which the supplier's client must have an 
'opportunity to take notice' of the contents of the standard terms (BGB) or an 'adequate 
opportunity (…) to receive and comprehend the provision or notice' (CPA). 
In both regimes, the principle of freedom of form prevails. Specific form requirements have to 
be fulfilled in the German regime in particular and exhaustively regulated cases, or if the parties 
agree on a specific form. The written form in terms of section 50(2) is comparable to the text 
form in § 126b, but the latter is mostly allowed for quasi-contractual acts. In South Africa, such 
a restriction does not exist, which might create evidential problems.  
For the free electronic access to a copy of the (South African) consumer agreement, it seems 
to be sufficient that the supplier provides the given document on its website. Subsequent 
changes of the agreement made by the supplier are thus possible. The German regime excludes 
subsequent modifications by requiring that the declaration must be made on a durable medium. 
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In this regard, the level of protection of the German provision is higher. The South African 
regime is also weaker in that only access to the electronic copy is to be granted; a printable 
copy is not required. Unlike § 126b, there is no requirement that the consumer must be able to 
retain or store the copy. As long as the requisites of § 126b are met in the form of a data message 
containing the given document, which can be retained or stored, the German provision is 
however similar to section 19(1) ECTA which considerably extends the meaning of 'copy' by 
including data messages. 
The financial breakdown required by section 50 would not make sense in the German regime 
where text form applies mostly to quasi-contractual acts, which typically do not contain 
financial information. On the other hand, such a financial breakdown assists South African 
consumers in their understanding of their financial obligations, especially for recurrent 
payments or those containing ancillary fees. The introduction of such a requirement was thus 
a wise choice of the South African legislature. 
Both the South African and the German regimes restrict the validity of non-variation (written-
form) clauses. While in South Africa this restriction serves to ensure the principle of freedom 
of contract and to avoid harsh and unfair results, the German legislator aims to ascertain that 
individually agreed stipulations made orally cannot be overturned by written-form clauses. 
Unlike § 305c, the Act does not provide for a provision dealing with surprising terms. This 
principle is recognised by the common law, however. Since surprising terms need not 
necessarily constitute an unreasonable disadvantage, Naudé's and Lubbe's argument in terms 
of the 'essential obligations' to be determined in the context of surprising terms – which in the 
German regime is an element of the general clause – cannot be applied to German incorporation 
control, but within content control. The Act achieves similar protection with regard to 
surprising terms where the supplier does not comply with the plain language requirement.  
Concerning the legal consequences of infringements of incorporation requirements, both 
regimes differ in that German courts are not allowed to take the parties' position and alter the 
agreement in the case of invalid clauses. Both pieces of legislation aim to maintain the 
agreement though. In the case of non-compliance with written-form requirements such as text 
form, the German regime entails a stricter legal consequence than South African literature, 
which considers this form requirement not constitutive. 
Section 52 seems to allow for partial retention of a clause. Partial retention is not permitted 
according to the BGH. 
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CHAPTER 4 – INTERPRETATIONAL CONTROL 
 
1. Statutory interpretation 
a) Purposive interpretation of the Consumer Protection Act 
Contrary to the German approach, section 2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act provides that 
the Act must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the purposes of the Act set out in 
section 3.6120 This paternalistic attitude towards the consumer can be explained by the fact that 
the Act primarily is – as its title indicates – a consumer protection statute, unlike §§ 305 et seq. 
BGB. The German provisions primarily do not have the purpose of protecting the weaker party 
and of mitigating the supplier's stronger bargaining power.6121 Instead, they aim to prevent 
abuse of freedom of contract-drafting and therefore protect all parties against the misuse of 
standard terms.6122 For this reason, §§ 305 et seq. cannot be qualified as pure consumer 
protection provisions, with the exception of § 310(3) (consumer contracts).6123 
The South African approach of purposive interpretation seeks to look for the purpose of the 
legislation before interpreting the words contained therein. Other interpretative rules require 
the courts to apply the literal rule (grammatical interpretation) first and to analyse the wording 
of a statute. On the other hand, the purposive approach starts with seeking the legislator's 
purpose or intention. It is a more flexible approach that gives the judge more freedom to 
develop the law in line with what he or she perceives to be the legislator's intention. For the 
purposive approach, also extrinsic aids are consulted in order to work out Parliament's 
intention.6124 
Section 4(3) of the Act fosters the purposive construction by providing that the court or 
Tribunal must give preference to interpretations that favour vulnerable consumers.6125 In other 
words, where a court is confronted with a situation where ─ after the interpretation of a 
provision ─ two outcomes are possible, it must adhere to the interpretational result that favours 
the consumer. On the other hand, sections 2(1) and 3(1) must be read with section 4(2)(b)(i) in 
terms of which the Tribunal or court must promote 'the spirit and purposes' of the Act. Kellaway 
observes that words without a precise (or various) meaning must be interpreted by looking at 
                                                             
6120 See Part I ch 4 para 2. 
6121 Stoffels AGB-Recht 29. 
6122 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. 
6123 Locher JuS 1997, 390. See discussion in Part II ch 1 and in Part I ch 4. 
6124 'The Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation' at http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Purposive-approach.php. 
6125 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13. 
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the object of the statute in question in order to find the legislature's intention.6126 In law, the 
word 'spirit' means 'the real meaning or the intention behind something as opposed to its strict 
verbal interpretation'.6127 Therefore, Van Eeden is correct when stating that '[i]t may be inferred 
that the word "spirit" was employed to indicate a policy that the Act should not be interpreted 
overly literally'.6128  
This also corresponds to § 133. When a declaration of intent is interpreted, it is necessary to 
ascertain the real intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration. This 
principle is also valid for the construction of legal provisions.6129 For the assessment of the 
legislator's real intention, one has to put the given provision into relation with other provisions 
and its position within a particular division in the statute. By this so-called 'systematic 
interpretation', the interpreter can ascertain whether the wording of the provision is too wide, 
for instance.6130 An overly literal construction is thus not desirable.6131 
For German legislative acts, historical interpretation is applied. This technique concerns the 
history of a provision or statute in order to assess its intention. For this approach, legislative 
materials are drawn upon, such as legislative drafts, parliamentary protocols, or even former 
legislative provisions. Furthermore, the development of a legal provision with its subsequent 
modifications over time can be significant for interpretation.6132 
Since the Consumer Protection Act promotes a purposive interpretation for which the use of 
extrinsic aids, such as legislative material, is necessary in order to assess the legislator's 
intention, it is suggested that historical interpretation is a necessary technique to carry out 
purposive construction.  
The same applies to teleological interpretation according to which one searches the meaning 
and the objective of a legal provision, the ratio legis. In doing so, one can assess, for instance, 
whether a provision has to be interpreted widely or narrowly. The search for the ratio legis of 
a norm is also crucial for the search for the purpose of the Act and therefore purposive 
interpretation.6133 
                                                             
6126 Kellaway Legal Interpretation 72. 
6127 Stevenson and Waite Oxford Dictionary s.v. 'spirit' (4). 
6128 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 40. 
6129 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 35. 
6130 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 35. 
6131 See Part II ch 4 para 2.1 b) bb). 
6132 See Part II ch 4 para 2.1 b) cc). 
6133 See Part II ch 4 para 2.1 b) dd). 
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Even though the Consumer Protection Act must be interpreted by applying a purposive 
approach first, this approach cannot be undertaken without borrowing techniques that are also 
necessary for the construction of BGB provisions. These are systematic, historical and 
teleological interpretation. The first step applied in the German regime, i.e., grammatical 
interpretation, is applied in the context of the Consumer Protection Act only after the purposive 
construction of a norm. Even when applying purposive interpretation, it is difficult to imagine 
though how this can be done without giving a meaning to the words contained in the Act. This 
shows that the interpretational techniques are overlapping and cannot be undertaken in 
isolation. 
b) Definitions 
With some exceptions,6134 the definitions of the Consumer Protection Act are grouped together 
in section 1. The pros and cons of this legislative technique have been discussed in Part I.6135  
On the other hand, German statutes define terms within the section they relate to or which deals 
with a related question. The legal definition might also apply to other sections in the given 
piece of legislation, however, which makes it sometimes difficult to be aware of its 
existence.6136 The BGB itself defines certain terms ('negligently' ('fahrlässig') in § 276(2); 
'ought to have known' ('Kennenmüssen') in § 122(2); 'prior approval' or 'consent' 
('Einwilligung') in § 183 1st sent.; or 'subsequent approval'/'ratification' ('Genehmigung') in § 
184(1)). This approach has the advantage that the meaning of certain terms, such as 'approval' 
('Zustimmung'), which are not defined, can be concluded by their position in the given 
statute.6137  
Unfortunately, many terms contained in the Consumer Protection Act are ambiguous and have 
various meanings.6138 What is more, as discussed in Part I,6139 the use of extensive definitions 
in the Act is not logical. This is because the purpose of enumerative definitions is to enumerate 
the objects included in the definition conclusively. This objective cannot be achieved where 
the words 'includes' or 'including' are used. From a terminological point of view, many terms 
                                                             
6134 See, e.g., s 61(5) for the definition of 'harm'. 
6135 See Part I ch 4 para 2.1. 
6136 For instance, §§ 183 and 184(1) define 'consent' and 'ratification' as prior or subsequent approval, respectively: 
§ 183: 'Prior approval (consent) may be revoked until the legal transaction is undertaken, unless the legal 
relationship on which this consent is based leads to a different conclusion (…)'. § 184(1): 'Subsequent approval 
(ratification) operates retroactively from the point of time when the legal transaction was undertaken, unless 
otherwise provided.' These terms operate throughout the BGB and other civil law statutes, however. 
6137 See Part II ch 4 para 2.1. b) aa). 
6138 See ss 3(1) or 4(2)(b)(i) for 'promote', for instance. 
6139 See ch 4 para 2.1. 
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contained in section 1 of the Act are no definitions at all, but rather precisions. For 
interpretational purposes and legal certainty, it would have been beneficial to define the terms 
in section 1 neatly. Furthermore, the definitions scattered elsewhere in the Act should be 
inserted into section 1 by honouring the applicable techniques in this field. This way, all 
definitions would be integrated into section 1, which would be a more coherent approach 
considering that the Act contains an entire section dedicated to definitions. 
In other words, the two different approaches applied by the two regimes have both their pros 
and cons. The potential of the approach applied by the Act, which consists of grouping together 
most definitions in section 1 has not reached its full potential though. The legislator should thus 
reconsider certain definitions in section 1, especially the extensional definitions, and insert the 
definitions that can be found elsewhere in the Act in section 1. 
c) Signatures 
Section 2(3) provides that if a provision of the Act requires a document to be signed or initialled 
by a party to a transaction, that signing or initialling may be effected in any manner recognised 
by law, including the use of an advanced electronic signature, or an electronic signature. 
Electronic and advanced electronic signatures are both defined in the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA).6140  
The BGB does not contain a specific provision dealing with signatures. Instead, it provides in 
§§ 125 to 129 for form requirements that apply to contracts. If written form is prescribed by 
statute, the document must be signed by the issuer with his name in his own hand, or by his 
notarially certified initials (§ 126). In cases where electronic form replaces the written form 
prescribed by statute, the issuer of the declaration must add his or her name to it and provide 
the electronic document with a qualified electronic signature (§ 126a).6141 If text form is 
                                                             
6140 25 of 2002. See also discussion in Part I ch 4 para 3.1. 
6141 'Electronic signature' is defined in art 3 of the Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal 
market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC as data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated 
with other data in electronic form and which is used by the signatory to sign. This Regulation is complemented 
by the German Vertrauensdienstegesetz (VDG) which has repealed the former Signaturgesetz (SigG) on 29 July 
2017. Under art 25 of the Regulation, '1. [a]n electronic signature shall not be denied legal effect and admissibility 
as evidence in legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in an electronic form or that it does not meet the 
requirements for qualified electronic signatures. 2. A qualified electronic signature shall have the equivalent legal 
effect of a handwritten signature. 3. A qualified electronic signature based on a qualified certificate issued in one 
Member State shall be recognised as a qualified electronic signature in all other Member States.' Article 26 sets 
out the requirements for advanced electronic signatures: ' An advanced electronic signature shall meet the 
following requirements: (a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory; (b) it is capable of identifying the signatory; (c) 
it is created using electronic signature creation data that the signatory can, with a high level of confidence, use 
under his sole control; and (d) it is linked to the data signed therewith in such a way that any subsequent change 
in the data is detectable.'  
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prescribed by statute, a readable declaration, in which the person making the declaration is 
named, must be made on a durable medium (§ 126b). The provisions under §§ 126, 126a or 
126b also apply, in case of doubt, to the form specified by legal transaction (§ 127). If the 
notarial recording of a contract is prescribed by statute, it suffices if first the offer and then the 
acceptance of the offer is recorded by a notary (§ 128). Where the official certification of a 
declaration is prescribed by law, the declaration must be put in writing and the signature of the 
person declaring be certified by a notary. If the declaration is signed by the issuer making his 
mark, the certification of the initials provided for in § 126(1) is necessary and sufficient (§ 129). 
Finally, § 125 provides that a legal transaction that lacks the form prescribed by statute is void. 
In case of doubt, lack of the form specified by legal transaction also results in voidness. 
Both South African and the German legislation provide for a regime where specific formal 
requirements have to be met. The formulation 'in any manner recognised by law' in section 2(3) 
indicates however that provisions in terms of the Consumer Protection Act may be signed or 
initialled in various ways, including by the use of electronic signatures. On the other hand, 
§§ 125 to 129 BGB provide that if a certain type of formality is prescribed by statute or 
agreement, the parties have to adhere to the given conditions for the given form (written, text, 
notarial form, electronic signature etc.). The Act thus permits more ways in which a document 
may be signed or initialled, whereas the BGB requires that the specific formal conditions 
prescribed by the applicable provisions must be met. In this regard, the Act is thus more flexible 
than the BGB. 
d) Business days 
Section 2(6) sets out how time periods measured in business days between two events are 
calculated.6142 According to this provision, when a particular number of business days is 
provided for between the happening of one event and another, the number of days must be 
calculated by (a) excluding the day on which the first such event occurs, (b) including the day 
on or by which the second event is to occur, and (c) excluding any public holiday, Saturday or 
Sunday that falls on or between the days contemplated in paragraphs (a) and (b), 
respectively.6143 
                                                             
6142 This provision correlates with s 2(5) NCA. 
6143 See Part I ch 4 para 3.2. 
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This differs from section 4 of the Interpretation Act,6144 which applies to the calculation of a 
number of days in general, and not only of business days. The calculation itself is also different 
in that the Consumer Protection Act excludes any public holiday and Sunday during the entire 
period of time but also any Saturday. The Interpretation Act, on the other hand, only refers to 
public holidays and Sundays and excludes only public holidays and Sundays that happen to fall 
at the end of the given period, and not in-between. Hence, the Consumer Protection Act 
excludes more days from the calculation than the Interpretation Act. 
§§ 187 and 188 contain similar provisions. Similar to the South African Interpretation Act, the 
German provisions concern the calculation of periods of time in general and not merely of 
business days. 
§ 187 concerns the calculation of the beginning of a period of time. If a period commences on 
the occurrence of an event or at a point of time falling in the course of a day, then the day on 
which the event or point of time occurs is not included in the calculation of the period. This is 
the case, for example, where a contract provides that a period of time starts to run from the 
moment in which the supplier delivers the item. If the beginning of a day is the determining 
point of time for the commencement of a period, then this day is included in the calculation of 
the period. An example of this type of calculation is a provision in a lease agreement in which 
the first rent has to be paid on 1st of January of a given year. The same applies to the date of 
birth when the age of a person is calculated.6145 
§ 188 deals with the calculation of the end of a period of time. According to this provision, a 
period of time specified by days ends on the expiry of the last day of the period. A period of 
time specified by weeks, by months or by a duration of time comprising more than one month 
─ year, half-year, quarter ─ ends, in the case of § 187(1), on the expiry of the day of the last 
week or of the last month which, in its designation or its number, corresponds to the day on 
which the event or the point of time occurs, or in the case of § 187(2), on the expiry of the day 
of the last week or of the last month that precedes the day which corresponds in designation or 
number to the first day of the period of time. If in the case of a period of time determined by 
                                                             
6144 33 of 1957. Section 4 of the Interpretation Act: 'When any particular number of days is prescribed for the 
doing of any act, or for any other purpose, the same shall be reckoned exclusively of the first and inclusively of 
the last day, unless the last day happens to fall on a Sunday or on any public holiday, in which case the time shall 
be reckoned exclusively of the first day and exclusively also of every such Sunday or public holiday.' 
6145 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 360. 
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months, the day on which it is due to expire does not occur in the last month, the period ends 
on the expiry of the last day of this month. 
Section 2(6) and §§ 187 and 188 differ hence in that the South African provision only concerns 
the calculation of business days, whereas the German norms apply for periods of time in 
general. On the other hand, the South African Interpretation Act too applies periods of time in 
general. Besides, for the beginning of a period of time, § 188 distinguishes between two cases, 
namely whether a period commences on the occurrence of an event or at a point of time falling 
in the course of a day, on the one hand, or whether the beginning of a day is the determining 
point of time for the commencement of a period, on the other. In contrast, section 2(6) excludes 
the day on which the first such event occurs in any event. Moreover, for the end of a specific 
period of time, § 188 distinguishes between periods specified by weeks, months and durations 
such as years, a half-year and a quarter of a year. The calculation of a given number of days 
according to the Interpretation Act differs from the Consumer Protection Act in terms of the 
days excluded. 
In practice, these differences in the calculation methods should have no major impact, however. 
They are clear enough in all three pieces of legislation to determine a specific period of time 
so that legal certainty is achieved. 
2. Interpretation of agreements 
a) Primary rules of interpretation ─ Determination of the parties' intention 
The primary purpose of the classical approach in the field of interpretation of contracts is to 
determine the parties' common intention and give effect to it, and not what only one or the other 
had in mind.6146 The parties' intention is relevant because of the principle of freedom of 
contract.6147 The courts assess the parties' common intention by applying the so-called 'primary 
rules of interpretation' in order to construe the meaning of the words used in the given 
agreement.6148  
In terms of § 133, for the construction of declarations of intent, it is necessary to ascertain the 
true intention rather than adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration. Therefore, 
interpretation serves the enquiry of the intention of a party. In order to be relevant in legal 
                                                             
6146 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 255, Joubert v Enslin 1910 AD 6 at 37. 
6147 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. 
6148 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 199. See also Part I ch 4 para 4. 
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transactions, this (interior) intention must be 'expressed' in the form of a declaration. Thus, the 
mere intention of a party can be neither the object nor the objective of interpretation.6149  
Taking into consideration merely the wording of a party's declaration is not sufficient though, 
which is why § 133 sets out that it 'is necessary to ascertain the true intention rather than 
adhering to the literal meaning of the declaration.' However, the assessment of a party's true 
intention does not suffice because it is important to ascertain the sense of a declaration by 
interpretation, and not – contrary to the wording of § 133 – the unilateral intention of the 
declarant. Hence, the interpretation must take into consideration the interests of the recipient 
of the declaration.6150 By doing so, all circumstances beyond the declaration have to be 
considered, such as linguistic characteristics of the person, as well as prospects, contractual 
negotiations and customary practice.6151 Seemingly 'unambiguous' declarations must be 
interpreted too by taking into account all surrounding circumstances. Furthermore, it will show 
if a contract has been established, i.e., if the offer and the acceptance of the offer are 
congruent.6152 Finally, it serves to establish the legal consequences of an agreement.6153  
There is however a tension between the subjective standard of § 133 (true intention) and the 
objective standard of § 157 which requires the consideration of good faith and which seems to 
apply only to contracts, whereas § 133 applies to all declarations of intent. The scope of 
application of §§ 133 and 157 is overlapping though and cannot be separated in most cases.6154 
In practice, the controversy whether § 133 or § 157 takes priority over the other norm and the 
functional relation between these two norms are irrelevant since the courts have developed a 
'canon of interpretative principles' or 'canon of construction'.6155  
In this context, German law distinguishes between natural and normative interpretation. 
Natural interpretation takes into consideration only the real intention of the party issuing a 
declaration of intent. It applies where the recipient's interests are not worthy of protection, e.g., 
for last wills. In contrast, normative interpretation also considers the interests of the recipient 
of the declaration.6156 Where the contract contains an unintentional gap (lacuna), an objective-
                                                             
6149 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 41. See also Part II ch 4 para 3. 
6150 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 42. 
6151 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60.  
6152 This is not the case if both parties had a different currency for payment in mind, for instance. 
6153 Interpretation will come to the result that the tenant who writes to his landlord that he has found a better and 
cheaper apartment and therefore will move out by the end of the month means that he gives notice by the end of 
the month. Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 61. 
6154 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 2. 
6155 Kanon von Auslegungsgrundsätzen. Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 1. 
6156 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 62. 
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generalising standard that considers the parties' hypothetical intention applies (complementary 
interpretation).6157  
As in South African law, the wording of the given declaration (provision in a contract) is the 
starting point for the interpretation of agreements. This also applies to declarations that are 
assumingly unambiguous and clear. This is because only by interpretation one can ascertain 
that the declaration and the intention behind it are congruent. If this is not the case, the falsa 
demonstratio non nocet principle applies.6158 
The objective of grammatical interpretation is to find out the grammatical and ordinary 
meaning of the words of the contract.6159 Difficulties arise where the parties attribute different 
meanings to the same word or phrase.6160 In addition, the meaning of words changes over time 
or in different circumstances. The 'ordinary meaning' therefore describes the meaning of a word 
of phrase in the given contractual context. When reading the contract as a whole, this might be 
the everyday meaning, or a more unusual, technical one.6161  
Words have to be seen in their context and use of the parties in question6162 and never in 
isolation (in vacuo).6163 If the recipient of a declaration of intent is someone familiar with legal 
terminology, it can be assumed that he or she understands the terminology with the meaning 
that the courts and legal literature attach to it. Also laypersons must research legal terminology 
to a certain extent though (contrary to, e.g., medical terminology) because by concluding a 
                                                             
6157 Stoffels AGB-Recht 132. See Part II ch 4 paras 3.3 a) bb) (i) and (ii). 
6158 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 45. 
6159 In South African common law, Lord Wensleydale's golden rule from Grey v Pearson (1857) 10 ER 1216 at 
1236 applies: '(…) [T]he grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead 
to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the 
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, 
but no farther.' In this regard, see Crispette and Candy Co Ltd v Oscar Michaelis NO and Leopold Alexander 
Michaelis NO 1947 (4) SA 521 (A) at 543; N&B Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v British Trading Insurance 
Co Ltd 1966 (2) SA 522 (W) at 525C; Kalil v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1967 (4) SA 550 (A) at 556D; 
Western Credit Bank Ltd v Van der Merwe 1970 (3) SA 461 (C) at 463H. 
6160 This is the case, for instance, where the parties usually use the same word in different circumstances or 
domains. One party might use a term in its all-day meaning, whereas the other uses it in its meaning that it has 
acquired by trade usage or law. For instance, in every-day language 'owner' and 'possessor' have the same meaning, 
whereas their meaning is different in legal terminology. 
6161 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 216. Jansen JA's statement in Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 (A) at 646B, in words adopted in List v Jungers 1979 
(3) 106 (A) 119A-B are very instructive in this regard. 
6162 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 14. See also Sassoon Confirming and Acceptance Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays 
National Bank Ltd 1974 (1) SA 641 (A) at 646; Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) SA 
710 (A) at 726H-727A; De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Pty) Ltd v Ishizuka 1980 (2) SA 191 (T) 196E-F. 
6163 See Joubert JA in Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
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contract, they participate in a legal transaction (and not in a medical conversation) that by its 
mere nature involves legal terminology.6164 
Hence, similar to statutory interpretation, in German law, the context of the declaration has to 
be taken into consideration (systematic interpretation).6165 This is 'the context in which the 
word or phrase is used with its interrelation to the contract as a whole, including the nature and 
purpose of the contract.'6166 Grammatical and systematic interpretation cannot be separated 
however since the grammatical or literal meaning of words can only be assessed in their 
context.6167  
The recipient has to interpret the declaration in order to find out the actual intention of the other 
party (§ 133) and use all accessible material, such as negotiations, correspondence, preliminary 
information and even the invitatio ad offerendum.6168 Where the recipient of the declaration of 
intent cannot assess the other party's real intention for lack of other indications outside the 
declaration, it is justified that the recipient's interests take precedence. This is because the 
deviation of the declaration and the actual intention of the other party originated in the other 
party's sphere.6169 In this case, it is not relevant what the party who issued the declaration of 
intent actually meant, but how the recipient had to understand the declaration (interpretation 
from the standpoint of the recipient of the declaration).6170 This result is supported by §§ 157 
and 119(1) as '[c]ontracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking the customary 
practice into consideration', and the fact that the party issuing the declaration can void its 
declaration under § 119(1).6171 Then, the contract is void from the outset under § 142(1).6172 
Other surrounding circumstances must be taken into account too when assessing the true 
intention, such as the genesis of the contract (pre-negotiation),6173 or the fact that the given 
parties have developed certain practices over time from former business relations.6174 
                                                             
6164 Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 52, with further references, Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 46. 
6165 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 14. See also Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767E-768E. 
6166 Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 768. Schreiner JA referred to this as 'linguistic treatment' 
in Delmas Milling Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 454-455. 
6167 See also discussion in Part I ch 4 para 4.1 a). 
6168 See BGH NJW 2003, 1317. 
6169 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 64. 
6170 Auslegung nach dem Empfängerhorizont. See BGH NJW 2013, 598 (599); 2008, 2702 (2704); 1984, 721. 
6171 § 119(1): 'A person who, when making a declaration of intent, was mistaken about its contents or had no 
intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed 
that he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of the factual position and with a sensible 
understanding of the case.'  
6172 § 142(1): 'If a voidable legal transaction is avoided, it is to be regarded as having been void from the outset.'  
6173 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 16. 
6174 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 17. See discussion in Part II ch 4 para 3.3. 
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The South African approach6175 also includes extra-textual elements, i.e., the extended context 
of a contract, or the background circumstances so that useful conclusions with regard to the 
intended meaning from the nature of the contract, its purpose and background can be drawn.6176  
The consideration of extra-textual elements is restricted by the parol evidence rule, however. 
This rule provides that where the parties intended to lay down their agreement fully and finally 
in writing, evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of the writing is 
inadmissible.6177  
South African courts do no longer apply the distinction between background and surrounding 
circumstances.6178 Instead, they tend to allow all evidence in order to determine the meaning 
of a word or phrase. This is because the relevance of evidence cannot be determined before the 
end of a case, which of course defies the purpose of the parol evidence rule.6179 What is more, 
the imprecise definition of background and surrounding circumstances made it difficult for a 
judge not to consider also extrinsic evidence, such as previous negotiations and correspondence 
between the parties, their subsequent conduct, or direct evidence of their own intentions.6180  
For the interpretation of agreements, both regimes start with the construction of the words of a 
provision. This grammatical interpretation is inseparably linked with the context in which the 
given words have been used though so that also the systematic interpretation is applied in 
tandem. The abolition of the distinction between background and surrounding circumstances 
                                                             
6175 See the discussion in Part I ch 4. 
6176 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 257. 
6177 Union Government v Vianini Ferr Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 47; Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 
(A) 938; Dreyer v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (5) SA 548 (SCA); Auckland Park Theological Seminary v 
University of Johannesburg (1160/2018) [2020] ZASCA 24 (25 March 2020); Kooij and Others v Middleground 
Trading 251 CC and Another (1249/18) [2020] ZASCA 45 (23 April 2020).  
6178 Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 2008 (5) SA 1 (SCA); 
KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd and Another 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA); Natal Joint Municipality 
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA); Dexgroup (Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) 
Ltd and Others 2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA); Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport 
(Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA 494 (SCA); Airports Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd  2019 (2) 
BCLR 165. See also Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A); Boerne v Harris 1949 (1) SA 
793 (A); Johnston v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A). In Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun 
Transport (Edms) Bpk, Wallis JA summarises the development as follows at para [12]: 'Whilst the starting point 
remains the words of the document, which are the only relevant medium through which the parties have expressed 
their contractual intentions, the process of interpretation does not stop at a perceived literal meaning of those 
words, but considers them in the light of all relevant and admissible context, including the circumstances in which 
the document came into being. The former distinction between permissible background and surrounding 
circumstances, never very clear, has fallen away. Interpretation is no longer a process that occurs in stages but 
is ‘essentially one unitary exercise’. Accordingly it is no longer helpful to refer to the earlier approach'. In the 
summary, one can concisely read: '[I]nterpretation a unitary process commencing with the words and construing 
them in the light of all relevant circumstances – no distinction to be drawn between background and surrounding 
circumstances.' Emphasis added. 
6179 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 260.  
6180 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 261, Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767-768. 
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in South African legislation and the permission of all evidence in order to determine the 
meaning of a word or phrase approaches both regimes. The permission of all available evidence 
enhances greatly the determination of the parties' intention, which is the primary objective of 
the construction of agreements. 
b) Secondary rules of interpretation  
Both regimes apply rules that in Germany are referred to as 'general principles of 
interpretation',6181 and in South Africa as 'secondary rules of interpretation'.6182 These are 
guidelines that come into play where the primary rules of interpretation (grammatical, 
systematical, teleological and historical interpretation) do not lead to a satisfactory result. For 
secondary rules of interpretation, no specific order or limitation exists. They overlap with the 
primary rule of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the context of the agreement in 
question as a whole, however.  
Examples in South African legislation are the eiusdem generis, the noscitur ad sociis or the ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat rules. Another rule states, for instance, that handwritten words 
prevail over printed words.6183  
In certain cases, the BGB provisions set out how a contractual provision must be interpreted in 
case of doubt. This is usually expressed by the term 'unless'.6184 This is also the case for the 
                                                             
6181 See Part II ch 4 para 3.3 c). 
6182 See Part I ch 4 para 4.1 b). 
6183 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 267. 
6184 § 139: 'If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed 
that it would have been undertaken even without the void part.' ('wenn nicht'); § 145: 'Any person who offers to 
another to enter into a contract is bound by the offer, unless he has excluded being bound by it' ('es sei denn'); 
§ 149: ' If a declaration of acceptance received late by the offeror was sent in such a way that it would have 
reached him in time if it had been forwarded in the usual way, and if the offeror ought to have recognised this, he 
must notify the acceptor of the delay after receipt of the declaration without undue delay, unless this has already 
been done. If he delays the sending of the notification, the acceptance is deemed not to be late' ('sofern'), to 
mention but a few.  
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Consumer Protection Act, which also uses the term 'unless'.6185 Other provisions that prescribe 
a certain interpretation are §§ 311c,6186 328(2)6187 and 364(2).6188 
Moreover, jurisprudence has developed some interpretational maxims, such as the falsa 
demonstratio non nocet principle, according to which an erroneous declaration is irrelevant if 
the declarant's real intention was visible or could be ascertained by the other.6189 According to 
the protestatio facto contraria maxim, a declaration cannot be restricted by a reservation that 
has not been expressly declared.6190 Conversely, a party that impliedly conducts 
unambiguously cannot destroy its declaration by a verbal counter-declaration.6191  
In terms of another interpretational principle, where declarations are set out in a contract or 
another agreement, only the written declarations apply.6192 For individuals that are not business 
people, evidence of the contrary, i.e., a differing intention is permitted, however.6193 Where the 
law requires a specific form, the principle of the 'entirety of authentication'6194 applies.6195 
Therefore, agreements that are not contained in the contracts are ineffective, with some 
exceptions, such as the cure set out in § 311b(1) 2nd sent.6196  
The rule that any doubts in the interpretation of standard business terms are resolved against 
the user (§ 305c) applies by analogy where a declaration of intent is transmitted by modern 
                                                             
6185 See the definition of 'consumer' in s 1 (b), or ss 2(7), 4(5)(c), 5(1)(a) and (b), 9(1)(b) or 42(3)(b), for instance. 
6186 § 311c: 'If a person agrees to dispose of or charge a thing, that duty, in case of doubt, also applies to accessories 
of the thing.'  
6187 § 328: '(1) Performance to a third party may be agreed by contract with the effect that the third party acquires 
the right to demand the performance directly. (2) In the absence of a specific provision it is to be inferred from 
the circumstances, in particular from the purpose of the contract, whether the third party is to acquire the right, 
whether the right of the third party is to come into existence immediately or only under certain conditions, and 
whether the power is to be reserved for the parties to the contract to terminate or alter the right of the third party 
without his approval.'  
6188 § 364: '(1) The obligation expires if the obligee accepts, in lieu of performance of contract, performance other 
than that owed. (2) If the obligor assumes a new obligation to the obligee for the purpose of satisfying the latter, 
it is not to be assumed, in case of doubt, that he is assuming the obligation in lieu of performance of contract.'  
6189 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'falsa demonstratio non nocet'. See also Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler 
C para 56. 
6190 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'protestatio facto contraria', which refers to 'Willenserklärung' (1b bb). 
6191 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 57. 
6192 See the discussion on the parol evidence rule above, as well as in Part I ch 4 para 4.1 a). 
6193 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 58. 
6194 Grundsatz der Gesamtbeurkundung. 
6195 Staudinger/Hertel § 125 para 58. 
6196 § 311b(1): 'A contract by which one party agrees to transfer or acquire ownership of a plot of land must be 
recorded by a notary. A contract not entered into in this form becomes valid with all its contents if a declaration 
of conveyance and registration in the Land Register are effected.' In this regard, see the discussion on the parol 
evidence rule above, as well as in Part I ch 4 para 4.1. a). 
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communication methods or where the text of the contract has been drafted by the party who is 
intellectually and economically superior to the other.6197  
In case of doubt, the interpretation that avoids the contract to be ineffective is to be preferred, 
or6198 that the parties aimed to stipulate legally relevant provisions without contradictions6199 
that they wanted to abide by the law and did not strive to agree to unlawful conduct.6200  
Both regimes have developed maxims to guide the courts where the primary rules of 
interpretation fail. Even though some of these rules might not be applicable in one or the other 
legislation, they assist the courts tremendously. 
c) Tertiary rules of interpretation 
In the South African context, tertiary rules of interpretation apply as a last resort. These do not 
attempt to find the actual or presumed intention of the parties but aim to provide a fair 
outcome.6201 The contra proferentem and the quod minimum rules belong to this category.6202 
According to the contra proferentem rule, ambiguous terms must be interpreted against the 
party who proposed them.6203 In contrast, the quod minimum rule provides that words that have 
different meanings must be narrowly interpreted in order to encumber the debtor or promisor 
as little as possible.6204  
A term may however not be construed contra proferentem if it is clear and unambiguous. In 
the event where a term, e.g., an exemption clause, is ambiguous, the courts will try to minimise 
its effect by reducing its scope or the exempted legal grounds for responsibility for the damaged 
caused.6205 In any event, the court must not adopt a meaning that would be strained or forced, 
in order to import some kind of ambiguity into the given clause.6206 Where a clause is 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to it, even if the consequences are harsh,6207 except in 
                                                             
6197 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 23 and 26a. 
6198 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 267. 
6199 See, for instance, Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA) at 429-430. 
6200 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 26. 
6201 Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 304. 
6202 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268.  
6203 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. This will be often an insurance company or a public utility. See Fedgen 
Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33 (A) at 38E. In Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 
(SCA), e.g., the court interpreted the term 'driving' narrowly, stating that although the terms and conditions of the 
adventure tour company expressly excluded Drifter's liability from time of departure to time of return, due to the 
nature of tours offered by the company (adventure tours), this exclusion could hardly cover driving on a public 
road, but rather in 'exciting terrain' (at 88J-89A). 
6204 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
6205 ER24 Holdings v Smith 2007 (6) SA 147 (SCA).  
6206 Walker v Redhouse 2007 (3) SA 514 (SCA). 
6207 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 271.  
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cases where the 'provision is so gratuitously harsh and oppressive that public policy could not 
tolerate it.'6208 
If the court cannot find the true meaning of the contract, it will declare the agreement void for 
vagueness, however.6209 
In the German regime, if the declaration of intent remains unclear in crucial points after the 
interpretational enquiry and is thus not sufficiently definite or unambiguousness, it is void.6210 
On the other hand, if the result of the interpretation differs from the real intention of the 
declarant, the declaration is voidable for mistake in terms of § 119(1). Then, the person 
declaring voidability might be liable in damages under § 122. The principle that interpretation 
takes precedence over voidability6211 applies though.6212 
It seems that German courts do not have to apply tertiary rules of interpretation because they 
can fill gaps by means of complementary interpretation. This approach does not consider the 
parties' actual intention either. Complementary interpretation requires an unintentional 
loophole to be filled by the court, especially where the ius dispositivum does not provide for 
provisions that could apply.6213  
An unintentional lacuna only exists where the party issuing the declaration of intent did not 
consider ─ or considered wrongly ─ certain circumstances.6214 It is not relevant whether a party 
did not take into account certain circumstances which existed at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract (primary lacuna) or which came into being afterwards (secondary lacuna).6215 
If the judge has established that the transaction contains an unintentional lacuna, he or she has 
to fill the gap by assessing what the parties would have agreed if they had considered the 
particular circumstance by applying the principles of good faith and customary practice in 
terms of § 157. Therefore, not the parties' actual intention is relevant, but what they would have 
reasonably stipulated if they had known of the loophole in their contract.6216 In doing so, the 
                                                             
6208 Freddy Hirsch Group (Pty) Ltd v Chickenland (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 276 (SCA) at 286F-G, Swinsburne v 
Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296 (KZD) at 312 (obiter). 
6209 Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 227, Hutchison et al Law of Contract 269. 
6210 Staudinger/Singer § 133 para 23. 
6211 'Auslegung geht vor Anfechtung'. 
6212 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 59. 
6213 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 67. 
6214 See BGH NJW 2002, 2310, BGHZ 127, 138 (142) = BGH NJW 1994, 3287, for example. 
6215 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 67. 
6216 BGH NJW 2013, 678 (679). 
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court has to take into consideration the particular circumstances of the case, such as the parties' 
reasons to enter into the contract, their interests as well as the customary practice.6217 
In reality, gap-filling by interpretation is very far from finding this intention because the 
'explanatory value' of the party's conduct – and not its intention – must be found.6218 The same 
applies to statutory interpretation, where the analogous application of legal norms has nothing 
to do with the intention of the historical legislator. Both the interpretation of agreements and 
statutory interpretation consist of a legal assessment and not fact-finding.6219   
Although in both regimes, the parties' actual intention is not considered, the German approach 
of complementary interpretation takes into account their presumed intention. This is done by 
applying the good faith principle and customary practice. Hence, it can be said that the German 
judge has to undertake an interpretational effort in order to find out the parties' presumed 
intention, whereas South African courts can rely on a ready-made scheme in the form of the 
rules mentioned above. The South African approach is thus more paternalistic. It should be 
noted that tertiary rules of interpretation play a minor role in South Africa since the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has adopted a new contextual approach to interpretation in which all evidence 
in order to determine the meaning of a word or phrase is permitted. 
3. The interpretation of standard business terms 
a) Modified interpretational standard 
For the interpretation of German standard terms, the recipient's standpoint is irrelevant.6220 
Instead, one has to consider the standpoint of an average customer without legal knowledge, 
and under consideration of the relevant public which is generally confronted with the terms 
and conditions in question.6221 This means that the interpretation does not take into account the 
circumstances of an individual case or the individual understanding of a party.6222 In other 
words, certain means for the interpretation of standard terms are not applicable, such as the 
history of the instrument. Therefore, the wording of a clause becomes more critical.6223  
                                                             
6217 Brox and Walker BGB-AT 68. See BGHZ 16, 71 (77 et seq) = BGH NJW 1955, 337.  
6218 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 9, Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 51. 
6219 Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 51. 
6220 See discussion in Part II ch 4 para 3.4. 
6221 BGH NJW 2002, 285 (286); 2007, 504 (505); 2008, 2172 (2173). 
6222 BGHZ 33, 216 (218); 84, 268 (272), BGH NJW 1992, 2629; 2001, 2165 (2166), BAG NZA 2006, 324 (327), 
UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 73 et seq, Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
6223 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 73. The courts have different views on this point, though. For an 
objective interpretation oriented towards the wording of a clause: BGH NJW 1988, 3149 (3150); 2002, 441. 
Standard terms of insurance companies have to be interpreted in line with the understanding of an average insured 
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As they are designed for a significant number of customers, the use of standard terms is 
characterised by the lack of individual particularities.6224 This becomes clear in institutional 
actions where no reference to individual circumstances exists. In the context of individual 
proceedings too, usually, individual circumstances do not have to be taken into consideration 
for interpretational purposes.6225 There are good reasons for the modification of the 
interpretational standard for standard contracts. The lack of individual particularities 
characterises the use of pre-formulated clauses as they serve for a significant number of 
customers.6226 In addition, the rationalising effect of standard provisions would be jeopardised 
if suppliers had to fear that their terms and conditions would not be applied in a unified manner 
because of differing interpretations.6227  
It is arguable whether the objective standard of interpretation must also be applied to consumer 
contracts under § 310(3) no. 3 where 'in judging an unreasonable disadvantage under section 
307(1) and (2), the other circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must also be 
taken into account.' As discussed,6228 the wording and the position of this provision do not 
support the view that the objective standard is inapplicable in this case. Furthermore, § 310(3) 
no. 3 is a provision in the context of content control and not interpretational control. 
Interpretational and content controls have to be carried out separately, though. This means that 
the consideration of 'other circumstances' belongs to content control.  
The Consumer Protection Act also modifies the interpretational standard for terms and 
conditions. Section 4(4) prescribes an interpretation to the benefit of the consumer. 
Both pieces of legislation thus apply a different standard for terms and conditions compared to 
other agreements. The German approach is more objective in that the perspective of an average 
customer without legal knowledge is applied. In contrast, the Consumer Protection Act applies 
a more paternalistic attitude by applying a construction to the consumer's benefit. The reason 
for this difference is that §§ 305 et seq. are no consumer protection provisions (with the 
exception of consumer contracts) and therefore apply an abstract-universal approach, whereas 
the Act's objective is consumer protection. 
                                                             
applying reasonable care when reading carefully the terms, taking into account how he or she had to understand 
them in their context: BGH NJW 1993, 2368; 1999, 1633, 1634;  NJW 2001, 3406. 
6224 Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
6225 Stoffels AGB-Recht 134. 
6226 Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
6227 UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 306c para 75. 
6228 See Part II ch 4 para 4. 
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b) Order of the interpretational and content controls 
Naudé is of the opinion that interpretational control takes place after content control.6229 It is 
arguable though if the opposite approach where interpretational control takes place before 
content control would not be more efficient.6230 
Before assessing whether a clause in a standard contract bears up against the catalogue of 
forbidden or 'sensitive' clauses in terms of section 51, regulation 44, or the general clause of 
section 48, it is reasonable to ascertain its actual meaning first. If this order is reversed, one 
risks either to undertake a lengthy discussion on whether or not and why a clause is unfair, 
before even knowing its exact meaning. In most cases, the interpretation will cause no problems 
because many clauses are unambiguously formulated. Even though standard terms are 
generally sophisticated provisions that have been formulated by experts, formulations 
contained therein might be not clear or ambiguous, or the contract concluded on the basis of 
standard business terms is incomplete.6231 Apparently unambiguous declarations must be 
interpreted too by taking into consideration all surrounding circumstances, i.e., the context. 
Therefore, the statement that construction is superfluous where both parties' true intentions are 
concordant is mistakable because the assessment of the parties (concordant) intention 
inevitably requires an interpretation.6232 
Furthermore, it is recommended that the interpretation of a term and the control of its contents 
are strictly separated so that one cannot be undertaken within the other. Otherwise, one risks 
assessing whether a term is unfair or not, without having precisely determined what a word or 
phrase means. Moreover, this approach is 'economic' because it saves unnecessary and 
unstructured arguments. Hence, interpretation control 'prepares' content control.6233  
This is also the approach of the German legislature who was in favour of an 'open content 
control', which means that the reasons of the inadequacy of standard terms must be unfolded 
within the content control, and not 'concealed' within the interpretational control, which then 
would serve as a 'correction' of standard terms.6234  
                                                             
6229 Naudé 2009 SALJ 506 
6230 See Part I ch 4 para 4.2 and Part II ch 4 para 3.2. 
6231 Stoffels AGB-Recht 131. 
6232 Palandt/Ellenberger § 133 para 8, Schiemann in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler C para 45. 
6233 See Stoffels AGB-Recht 131. See also BGH NJW 1999, 1108; 1633 (1634). 
6234 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634). 
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For these reasons, Naudé's view that the content control comes before the interpretation control 
has to be rejected. Interpretational control should thus always take place before content control. 
Furthermore, interpretational and content control must be strictly separated. 
c) Individual versus abstract approach 
It is submitted that section 4(4)(b) introduces a different standard of consumer protection. At 
first sight, it is not clear what a 'reasonable person' means and what this person 'would 
ordinarily contemplate or expect'. As suggested in Part I,6235 a reasonable person in terms of 
this provision cannot be a vulnerable consumer under section 3(1)(b). Vulnerable are those 
consumers who are inexperienced and do not know what to expect or not to expect in a standard 
form contract. For the determination of a person's reasonableness, a more objective standard 
should thus be applied, such as a bystander or an average consumer. 
Also in German law, such an approach is applied. When interpreting standard terms, the 
recipient's perspective is irrelevant, i.e., how he or she had to interpret a clause or a contract 
while applying reasonable care. Instead, the standpoint of an average customer without legal 
knowledge, and under consideration of the relevant public which is usually concerned with 
these terms and conditions, is considered.6236 This means that the interpretation does not take 
into account the circumstances of an individual case or the individual understanding of a 
party.6237 Therefore, the BGH decided, for instance, that the standard terms of an investment 
company must be interpreted equally for someone who has no experience in investing and for 
a shrewd investor.6238  
Unlike sections 48 and 49, which only consider the parties involved, section 4(4)(b) therefore 
widens the perspective in terms of what a reasonable person can or cannot expect. It would go 
too far though to qualify this approach as abstract-universal according to the BGB, where the 
circumstances of the parties involved in a particular transaction are not taken into account but 
rather the transactions of the type and classes of the participants.6239 After all, the circumstances 
of the agreement or transaction as well as the manner and form in which the document was 
presented have to be considered under section 4(4)(b). For example, if it is not clear whether a 
price expressed in 'Dollars' means U.S.-American, Australian or Canadian Dollars, and the 
                                                             
6235 See Part I ch 4 para 4.2. 
6236 BGH NJW 2002, 285 (286); 2007, 504 (505); 2008, 2172 (2173). 
6237 BGHZ 33, 216 (218); 84, 268 (272), BGH NJW 1992, 2629; 2001, 2165 (2166), BAG NZA 2006, 324 (327), 
UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305c para 73 et seq, Roth WM 1991, 2126. 
6238 BGH NJW 1980, 1947. 
6239 BGHZ 22, 91 (98); 17, 1 (3). 
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seller acquired the items in Canada, one can conclude that the stipulated price is expressed in 
Canadian Dollars.6240 
d) Construction in favour of the consumer 
Section 4(4) of the Act provides that any standard form, contract or other document prepared 
or published by or on behalf of a supplier, or required by the Act to be produced by a supplier 
must be interpreted to the benefit of the consumer so that any ambiguity that allows for more 
than one reasonable interpretation of a part of such a document is resolved to the benefit of the 
consumer.6241 
Although section 4 provides that 'any standard form, contract or other document' must be 
construed in the manner set out in this section, it is submitted that the Tribunal or court has to 
interpret the individual clauses of the given agreement rather than the contract as a whole. This 
must be done in the light of the contract as a whole, i.e., its object, as well as the interaction 
between individual clauses. Section 4 expresses this indirectly by the phrases 'interpretation of 
a part of such a document' (subsection (a)) and 'any restriction, limitation, exclusion or 
deprivation of a consumer's legal rights set out in such a document' (subsection (b)). The latter 
can only be set out in individual clauses, not in an agreement as a whole.6242 
Section 4(4)(a) must be read against the backdrop of the contra proferentem rule.6243 The 
rationale of this rule is that the party who formulated or imposed the provision should suffer 
from an adverse construction as it had the opportunity to articulate the terms clearly.6244 The 
same rationale can be found in the quod minimum rule.6245 These maxims normally serve as a 
last resort6246 since they do not take into consideration the parties' actual intentions. In standard 
form contracts, this consideration is of no importance because the terms included in such 
agreements are rarely negotiated or even read by the consumer.6247 
                                                             
6240 Example from Brox and Walker BGB-AT 60. 
6241 See Part I ch 4 para 4.2. 
6242 This is expressed in the heading of § 305c 'Surprising and ambiguous clauses'. 
6243 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
6244 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268, De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 17. See also Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 (3) SA 33 (A) at 38E and Drifters Adventure Tours CC v 
Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 (SCA).  
6245 Hutchison et al Law of Contract 268. 
6246 According to the ordinary classification of interpretational rules, these rules are tertiary rules of interpretation 
'which are applied as a last resort, without any pretence at attempting to find the real intention of the parties'. See 
Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles (2007) 304. 
6247 De Stadler ‘Section 4’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. 
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The same approach can be found in the so-called 'rule of ambiguity' of § 305c(2), according to 
which any doubts in the interpretation of standard business terms are resolved against the user 
(supplier).6248 If the content of a clause cannot be clearly determined, the supplier bears the 
risk. This means that the supplier has the responsibility for the content of its standard terms.6249 
§ 305c(2) sets out an interpretational rule which prepares the content control, but which cannot 
serve as a standard for the content control.6250 
German courts tend to restrict the application of the ambiguity rule6251 of § 305c(2) as otherwise 
too many problematic clauses would already be mitigated at this stage in favour of the 
consumer, without the possibility to assess their adverse effect within the content control.6252 
The courts apply § 305c(2) only where despite the application of all other interpretational 
methods, an irremovable doubt and at least two legally justifiable interpretational possibilities 
remain.6253 The South African legislator rightly expressed this idea in section 4(4)(a) in that 
'any ambiguity that allows for more than one reasonable interpretation (…) is resolved to the 
benefit of the consumer.'6254 
Even though the practical relevance of the ambiguity rule of § 305c(2) is high,6255 the courts 
tend to circumvent it by the application of the 'transparency requirement'6256 of § 305c(1).6257 
Where an inadequate disadvantage arises from an ambiguous term, there is no need to construe 
this term according to § 305c(2). Hence, the scope of application of the rule of ambiguity in 
terms of § 305c(2) is limited to cases in which an objective ambiguity of a clause does not also 
infringe the transparency requirement.6258 
                                                             
6248 This provision corresponds to art 5 2nd sent. of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
6249 Stoffels AGB-Recht 136. 
6250 Report of the Law Commission BT-Drs. 7/5422 at 5, Roth WM 1991, 2086. Therefore, the BGH wrongly 
states in BGH NJW 1985, 53 that a certain clause 'infringes' § 305c(2). 
6251 Unklarheitenregel. 
6252 This problem had already be seen by Raiser (Recht der allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen at 264 et seq) and 
later in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 15 and 60. 
6253 BGH NJW-RR 1995, 1303 (1304), BGH NJW 1997, 3434 (3435); 2002, 3232 (3233); 2007, 504 (506), BAG 
NZA 2006, 923 (926). See also Palandt/Heinrichs § 305c para 18. 
6254 Emphasis added. 
6255 Roth WM 1991, 2086, Stoffels AGB-Recht 136. 
6256 Transparenzgebot. 
6257 Thamm/Pilger AGBG § 5 para 4. 
6258 Stoffels AGB-Recht 137, BGH NJW 1994, 1060 (1062) where the rule of ambiguity was applied and an 
infringement of the transparency requirement negated. 
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§ 305c(2) cannot be waived or circumvented by standard terms, which is made clear in § 307(2) 
no. 1.6259 The ambiguity rule applies without restrictions to B2B agreements,6260 and the 
Bundesarbeitsgericht consequently applies this rule to employment contracts.6261 
Interpretation in favour of the other party or the consumer takes thus place in both regimes. 
German courts apply § 305c(2) rather to cases where an objective ambiguity does not also 
affect the transparency requirement in terms of § 305c(1) though. Therefore, the construction 
in favour of the other party is more restricted in Germany than in South Africa. In practice, this 
different scope of application should not lead to different results, though, as in most cases, a 
clause will be struck down either in terms of the transparency requirement or under the 
ambiguity rule. 
e) Consideration of foreign law 
As discussed in Part I,6262 section 2(2) provides that when interpreting or applying the Act, a 
person, court or Tribunal or the Commission may consider appropriate foreign and 
international law. These bodies can also consider any precedents of a consumer court, ombud 
or arbitrator in terms of the Act, to the extent that such decision has not been set aside, reversed 
or overruled by a higher court.6263 This provision is not mandatory ('may').6264 As we have seen, 
the law of the EU and the rulings of the European Court of Justice fall under this provision.  
The BGB does not contain a similar provision. However, a norm adopted in execution of an 
EU Directive must always be interpreted in conformity with the Directive, i.e., in case of doubt, 
in accordance with the EU Directive. The principle that an interpretation must be undertaken 
in favour of European law prevents the courts from disregarding decisions of the ECJ. EU law 
must be interpreted in such a way that it is fully effective.6265 
The two regimes are not comparable, though. EU Directives must be transposed into national 
law, whereas 'foreign law' in the sense of section 2(2) of the Consumer Protection Act has no 
direct or indirect connection with South African law. The South African regime is an original 
approach which probably has its reason in the fact that the country does not have an extensive 
body of appropriate decisions in terms of consumer protection yet. This must be seen against 
                                                             
6259 BGH NJW 1999, 1865 (1866 et seq). 
6260 BGH NJW-RR 1988, 113 (114). 
6261 See, for example, BAG DB 1992, 383 (384). 
6262 Chapter 4 para 2.2. 
6263 Interestingly, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 restricts the considerations of the court to appropriate foreign 
and international law and does not contain provisions similar to paras (b) and (c) of s 2 CPA. 
6264 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. 
6265 Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Auslegung' f) and g). 
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the backdrop of the consideration that foreign and international law may influence not only the 
interpretation of the Act but also its application, however.6266 With regard to language barriers, 
the consideration of foreign laws will most likely be limited to legal orders where English or 
Dutch (which has similarities with Afrikaans) are official languages (including the EU). In any 
event, section 2(2) should be applied with precaution. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine, even 
if applied with precaution, how considerations developed in the context of a supra-individual 
and generalising approach – which is an international standard – can be applied within a 
framework applying a particular-individualised approach. 
 
4. Conclusion  
For the interpretation of the provisions of the Act, a purposive approach must be applied. This 
paternalistic and flexible approach is alien to German construction because §§ 305 et seq. 
generally cannot be qualified as pure consumer protection provisions. Purposive construction 
must also apply other techniques though in order to assess the purpose of a norm. These are 
systematic, historical and teleological interpretation. Grammatical interpretation is applied to 
the Act only after the purposive construction of the given norm. However, the constructional 
techniques cannot be separated from each other and are overlapping to a certain degree. 
The South African and the German regimes apply different legislative techniques as regards 
the definitions contained in the Act and the BGB. Both approaches have pros and cons. The 
grouping together of definitions in section 1 of the Act has not been performed properly. The 
legislator should therefore revise certain definitions and insert all definitions in section 1. 
A specific provision like section 2(3) does not exist in the BGB. However, the BGB provides 
in §§ 125 to 129 for a form requirements regime. It seems that provisions falling under the Act 
may be signed or initialled in various ways, including by the use of electronic signatures. In 
contrast, the BGB provisions provide that if a specific formality is prescribed by statute or 
agreement, the parties have to adhere to the given conditions for the given form (written, text, 
notarial form, electronic signature etc.). The Act is thus more flexible in this regard. 
Section 2(6) of the Act contains a provision for the calculation of business days. In contrast, 
the German BGB provisions have a vaster scope of application because they concern the 
calculation of periods of time in general, which is similar to the South African Interpretation 
                                                             
6266 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 14. 
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Act. What is more, for the calculation of the beginning and the end of a time-period, §§ 187 
and 188 are more complex than their South African counterparts as they distinguish between 
two scenarios and specific periods of time. The different calculation methods in both regimes 
are however clear enough to achieve legal certainty. 
For the interpretation of agreements and the enquiry of the parties' intention, both regimes start 
with the construction of the words of a provision. Grammatical interpretation is inseparably 
linked with the context in which the given words have been used, however. Thus, systematic 
and grammatical interpretation applies in tandem in both regimes. The abolition of the 
distinction between background and surrounding circumstances in South African legislation 
and the permission of all evidence (e.g., extra-textual elements) in order to determine the 
meaning of a word or phrase approaches both regimes and enhances the determination of the 
parties' intention. 
Both pieces of legislation apply secondary rules of interpretation (general principles of 
interpretation) where the primary rules of interpretation do not lead to a satisfactory result. The 
respective statutes contain words, such as 'unless' that point out how a provision must be 
construed in case of doubt. Furthermore, the courts of both countries have developed 
interpretational maxims, such as the protestatio facto contraria maxim. Even though certain of 
these rules might not be applicable in one or the other legislation, they assist the courts to a 
great extent. 
In South African legislation, tertiary rules of interpretation apply as a last resort. The objective 
of these rules is not the finding of the parties' intention, but a fair outcome. German courts fill 
unintentional gaps by performing complementary interpretation instead. Although in both 
regimes, the parties' actual intention is not considered, the German approach of complementary 
interpretation takes into account their presumed intention. German judges thus must undertake 
an 'interpretational effort' in order to find out the parties' presumed intention. In contrast, South 
African courts can rely on a ready-made scheme of tertiary rules. Hence, the South African 
mechanism is more paternalistic. 
The Consumer Protection Act and the BGB apply different interpretational standards for terms 
and conditions in relation to other agreements. The German approach takes the perspective of 
an average customer without legal knowledge. It is thus more objective than the more 
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paternalistic attitude of the South African regime. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the 
different objectives of both pieces of legislation. 
Interpretational control should take place before content control. This is an economic approach 
because long discussions on whether or not a clause is unfair before knowing its meaning are 
avoided beforehand. What is more, the interpretational and content controls must be strictly 
separated and cannot be performed within one another.  
It is suggested that section 4(4)(b) introduces a different standard of consumer protection in 
relation to other provisions of the Act by taking into consideration a more objective standard 
like in the German regime. Hence, this provision of the Act widens the perspective as to what 
a reasonable person can or cannot expect. This approach cannot be qualified as abstract-
universal in terms of §§ 305 et seq. though. 
Both the South African and the German regimes apply interpretation in favour of the other 
party/consumer. German courts apply § 305c(2) rather to cases where the objective ambiguity 
of a standard provision does not also affect the transparency requirement under § 305c(1). 
Hence, the construction in favour of the other party is more restricted in Germany than in South 
Africa. In practice, this different scope of application should not be relevant though since 
because in the majority of cases, a clause will be struck down either for transparency reasons 
or under the ambiguity rule. 
The South African regime provides for an original approach according to which foreign law 
can be taken into consideration when interpreting or applying the Act. This provision must be 
seen against the backdrop of the consideration that foreign and international law may influence 
the interpretation as well as the application of the Act. Even though EU law must be considered 
in German law, the two regimes are not comparable. EU Directives must be transposed into 
national law, whereas 'foreign law' in the sense of section 2(2) of the Act has no direct or 
indirect connection with South African law. In any event, section 2(2) should be applied with 
precaution. With regard to language barriers, the consideration of foreign laws will most likely 
be limited to legal orders of which English or Dutch are official languages (including the EU). 
However, the different approaches of the Act and other regimes (individual-personalised vs 
abstract-general) could be an obstacle for the application of foreign concepts in South African 
law. 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONTENT CONTROL  
INTRODUCTION 
The use of a general clause, as well as lists of outright prohibited terms and those that are unfair 
under certain circumstances has been legislated in both countries (sections 48 and 51 as well 
as regulation 44(3) CPA, and §§ 307 to 309 BGB, respectively). This corresponds to 
international standards and has proven the most effective measure against unfair standard 
provisions. The advantages of black- and greylists, supplemented with a general clause, have 
been discussed in detail above.6267 There are some differences between the two regimes, 
however. These differences concern the general rationale of content control in the two countries 
(1.), but also the items contained in the blacklists (2.), the greylists (3.) as well as the general 
clauses (4.).  
1. Differences concerning the rationale of content control 
In Germany, content control is legal control, i.e., the courts exercise this kind of control ex 
officio as an incidental control. In other words, the judge decides whether a standard business 
clause is valid within the given proceedings (individual action).6268  
This is not the case in the South African regime. Section 52(1), for instance, provides that the 
court may only make an order contemplated in this provision if 'a person alleges' contravention 
of the general clause. Since section 51 and regulation 44(3) are merely concretisations of the 
general clause of section 48 of the Act, this also applies to the black- and greylists. 
Content control in South Africa is equity control,6269 whereas in Germany equity considerations 
do not form part of content control. Content control in terms of §§ 307 et seq. applies a supra-
individual and generalising approach. In contrast, equity control provides for fairness in 
individual cases, which is not a suitable standard for mass contracts.6270 The Act and the 
enforcement procedures created by the South African legislator focus on individual consumers 
and their protection. In contrast, German content control does not primarily aim to protect the 
weaker party and its inferior bargaining power.6271 German standard business terms legislation 
is oriented towards general contract law and is therefore not limited to consumer protection. Its 
purpose is to prevent abuse of freedom of contract-drafting. It thus protects all parties against 
                                                             
6267 See Part I ch 3 para 1.2. 
6268 See Part II ch 6 para 1.1. 
6269 See, e.g., regulation 44(3)(q) where the court has to consider equity. See discussion of this item in Part I ch 3. 
6270 Staudinger/Rieble § 315 para 305. See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) cc). 
6271 Stoffels AGB-Recht 29. 
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the misuse of standard terms.6272 Equity control in the context of §§ 307 et seq. is possible 
though where standard business terms grant a right of specification of performance to one of 
the parties. Then, the specification must be determined by taking into account equity 
considerations in terms of § 315.6273 This is the case for companies providing public services 
(utilities) on a contractual basis.6274 As discussed earlier,6275 in German standard business law, 
equity control is unsystematic with respect to content control because of the supra-individual 
and generalising (abstract) approach of content control. What is more, § 315 provides for 
judicial correction of the given contract clause ('contractual assistance'),6276 whereas §§ 307 et 
seq. already provides for the legal consequences that cannot be deviated from.6277  
Equity control as applied in the South African regime is thus a consequence of the 
individualised approach. German legislation takes an abstract stance when assessing the 
fairness of standard terms, which does not allow for equity considerations. 
Section 2(10) of the Act provides that no provision of the Act must be interpreted so as to 
preclude a consumer from exercising common-law rules. This means that contracts that are 
contrary to public policy are void under the common law.6278 
In German legislation, the principle of public policy is codified in § 138. As discussed earlier, 
a parallel application of §§ 305 et seq. and 138 is possible because both have different 
evaluative standards. The threshold for § 138 is higher than for §§ 305 et seq., and the legal 
consequence is voidness in terms of § 139, i.e., the remainder of the contract does not remain 
in effect unlike in § 306. What is more, for § 138, all circumstances are taken into account. 
This means that an abstract-general approach is not applied as in §§ 305 et seq.6279  
The same applies to good faith, a common-law principle in South Africa. In Germany, § 242 
provides that '[a]n obligor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith 
['Treu und Glauben'], taking customary practice into consideration'. § 242 is more specific than 
                                                             
6272 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. See Part II ch 1 para 2.3. 
6273 § 315: '(1) Where performance is to be specified by one of the parties to the contract, then in case of doubt it 
is to be assumed that the specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of the party making it. 
(2) The specification is made by declaration to the other party. (3) Where the specification is to be made at the 
reasonably exercised discretion of a party, the specification made is binding on the other party only if it is 
equitable. If it is not equitable, the specification is made by judicial decision; the same applies if the specification 
is delayed.'  
6274 BGH NJW-RR 2006, 133 (134). 
6275 See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) cc). 
6276 Vertragshilfe. Staudinger/Coester § 307 para 41. 
6277 See § 306. 
6278 See Part I ch 3 para 1.3. 
6279 See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) aa). 
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§ 305 et seq. and plays a role for areas that are excluded by § 310(4), such as company law, the 
law of succession or family law.6280 
Recently, the South African Constitutional Court decided in Beadica 231 CC and Others v 
Trustees for the time being of the Oregon Trust and Others6281 on the constitutional approach 
to the judicial enforcement of contractual terms and the public policy grounds upon which a 
court may refuse to enforce these terms.6282  
In the majority judgment, Theron J confirmed Barkhuizen6283 in that the determination of public 
policy is now rooted in the Constitution and the objective, normative values it embodies.6284 
According to the Constitutional Court, public policy imports values of fairness, reasonableness 
and justice. What is more, Ubuntu,6285 which comprises these values, is now also recognised 
as a constitutional value that inspires the constitutional compact, which in turn informs public 
policy.6286 These values play a crucial role for the notion of public policy, and they perform 
creative, informative and controlling functions in that they underlie and inform the substantive 
law of contract. In fact, many established contract law doctrines are the embodiment of these 
values, such as the rules as regards fraud, duress, misrepresentation, estoppel, implied terms 
and rectification.6287 According to the court, they play a fundamental role in the application 
and development of rules in this field of law and give effect to the spirit, purport and objects 
                                                             
6280 See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) bb). 
6281 [2020] ZACC 13 (17 June 2020). In this case, the applicants, all franchisees who had acquired their businesses 
in terms of a black economic empowerment initiative, and had rented premises from Sale's Hire CC, the second 
respondent, argued that the strict enforcement of the renewal clause of their lease agreements would be contrary 
to public policy, or unconscionable in the circumstances of this case. The enforcement of the renewal clause would 
be inimical to the right of equality contained in section 9(2) of the Constitution (at paras [10] and [13]). See also 
Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Unit Trust 2018 (1) SA 549 (WCC) and Trustees of the Oregon Trust v 
Beadica 231 CC 2019 (4) SA 517 (SCA). 
6282 In this context, see also Beadica 231 CC v Sale's Hire CC (1191/2018) [2020] ZASCA 76 (30 June 2020) 
where the SCA had to decide whether a party to a contract freely and voluntarily concluded can deny the other 
party to that contract its entitlement to enforce contractual obligations freely and seriously undertaken by the 
former on the grounds that the latter, in asserting contractual rights, in truth seeks to achieve an illegitimate 
purpose, namely to gain access to sensitive confidential information under the guise of exercising the inspection 
rights that are explicitly provided for in the agreement in order to conduct in an anti-competitive manner designed 
to deliberately restrict or prevent the commercial viability of Beadica's business. 
6283 Barkhuizen v Napier (2007) (5) SA 323 (CC) at para [28].  
6284 Beadica at para [71]. 
6285 In the second minority judgement, Victor AJ stresses the importance of Ubuntu in the South African law of 
contract. According to Victor AJ, Ubuntu is a constitutional value that adds a value of substance, and together 
with other values, forms a transformative basis in the adjudicative process when deciding whether an unfair 
contract term has to be enforced or not. Ubuntu has a greater and context-sensitive reach, especially where there 
is inequality in the bargaining power between the parties. This concept is wider than fairness. Victor AJ is of the 
view that adjudicating fairness cannot be done within a set of neutral legal principles, but in a manner that ensures 
objective, reasonable practicality and certainty. Ubuntu thus does not exclude or undermine certainty in contract, 
but remains a central consideration in harmony with the other values. See Beadica at paras [206]-[216]. 
6286 Beadica at para [72], with further references. 
6287 Beadica at para [73]. 
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of the Bill of Rights. In fact, courts must consider the transformative mandate of the 
Constitution.6288 The courts' power to develop the common law must nonetheless be exercised 
incrementally with regard to the facts of each case, and the development of new doctrines must 
be able of a generalised application beyond the particular facts of a given case.6289 
It should be noted that the concept of Ubuntu has been critically analysed in Part I and 
considered as too vague and not helpful.6290 
The Constitutional Court went on by analysing the perceived divergence between the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal regarding the role of abstract values in 
the law of contract and whether these values can be directly applied in order to invalidate, or 
refuse to enforce, the terms of a contract. The 'divergence' in this matter does however not exist 
anymore after the clarification expressed by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen and 
Botha.6291 Both jurisdictions agree that abstract values are not a free-standing foundation upon 
which courts may interfere in contractual relationships, but they rather perform creative, 
informative and controlling functions.6292 The Constitutional Court thus comes to the 
conclusion that the 'divergence' between the SCA and the CC is more perceived than real.  The 
courts can thus not refuse to enforce contract terms for equity considerations, such as good 
faith, fairness and reasonableness because these values have no self-standing status. Only 
where contractual terms or their enforcement would be so unfair, unreasonable or unjust that 
they are contrary to public policy, a court has the right to refuse to enforce them.6293 
Theron J went on by saying that the rule of law requires that courts, in developing the common 
law, must establish clear and ascertainable rules and doctrines in order to ascertain that the law 
of contract is substantively fair, and that the outcomes are predictable for the parties. This is 
stressed by the fact that the enforcement of contract terms does not depend on an individual 
judge's sense of what is fair, reasonable and just.6294 In Pridwin,6295 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal laid out the most important principles governing the judicial control of contract terms 
through public policy. One of these principles is that public policy demands that contracts 
freely and consciously entered into must be honoured. The pacta sunt servanda principle 
                                                             
6288 Beadica at para [74]. 
6289 Beadica at para [76]. 
6290 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 c). 
6291 Botha v Rich N.O. 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC). 
6292 Beadica at para [79]. 
6293 Beadica at para [80]. 
6294 Beadica at para [81]. 
6295 AB v Pridwin Preparatory School 2019 (1) SA 327 (SCA) at para [27]. 
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therefore still plays a crucial role in the context of the control of contracts by the courts through 
the principle of public policy. The pacta sunt servanda principle ensures that the parties can 
trust that the other party will be bound by its obligations. The protection of this maxim is 
therefore indispensable for the achievement of the objectives set out in the Constitution.6296 
This principle is not absolute, though, and there is no basis for privileging pacta sunt servanda 
over other constitutional values. In instances where several constitutional rights and values 
must be considered, for the determination of whether enforcement of the terms would be 
contrary to public policy in the given case, these must be carefully balanced against each 
other.6297 
The Constitutional Court also analysed the principle of 'perceptive restraint' in terms of which 
a 'court will use the power to invalidate a contract or not to enforce it, sparingly, and only in 
the clearest of cases'.6298 In Beadica, the Constitutional Court specifies that this principle must 
not hinder the courts from shying away from their constitutional duty to infuse public policy 
with constitutional values. Hence, the degree of necessary restraint must be balanced against 
the backdrop of the constitutional rights and values. What is more, 'harm to the public' as a 
prerequisite for the notion of public policy is alien to the South African law of contract.6299 
In other words, in the South African and German regimes, the principles of public policy and 
good faith are applied concurrently with the standard business terms legislation. It should not 
remain unmentioned in this regard that in his minority judgment of Beadica, Froneman J, citing 
Lubbe, contends that South Africa could learn much from the German approach of the 
Fallgruppen methodology, consisting of typified categories, which has served to translate 
§ 242 (good faith) into a set of perceptible legal rules.6300 These Fallgruppen are: dishonest 
acquisition of one's own legal position, breach of one's own obligations, absence of a legitimate 
personal interest, minor infringement of interests/disproportionality and contradictory conduct 
(venire contra factum proprium).6301 Indeed, as Theron J points out by citing Du Plessis, '[The] 
application [of the German good faith clause] rather requires a careful weighing up of relevant 
interests, which enables specific new legal instruments to be developed. (…) [T]he good faith 
clause works because specific rules give effect to it. Those rules were hammered out on the 
                                                             
6296 Beadica at paras [83]-[85]. 
6297 Beadica at para [87]. 
6298 Beadica at para [88]. This principle has been set out in a number of cases, e.g., Pridwin at para [27]. 
6299 Beadica at para [90]. 
6300 Beadica at para [179]. See Palandt/Grüneberg § 242 para 2. 
6301 See Palandt/Grüneberg § 242 paras 42-59. 
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anvil of concrete cases and incremental scholarly analysis.'6302 The development of such 
Fallgruppen by the courts would thus assist them in the development of the common law and 
prevent 'piecemeal solutions'. As already discussed in Part I, it is submitted that the concept of 
Ubuntu is not helpful in this regard.6303 The development of Fallgruppen should lead to better 
results.  
In both countries, specific pieces of legislation containing consumer protection provisions are 
applicable concurrently with sections 48 et seq. and §§ 305 et seq. respectively. In South 
Africa,6304 these are the Rental Housing Act6305 or the Conventional Penalties Act,6306 for 
example. The National Credit Act, another consumer protection statute, is also applicable 
concurrently with the Consumer Protection Act.6307 As §§ 305 et seq. do not primarily aim at 
consumer protection, except for § 310(3) (consumer contracts),6308 §§ 305 et seq. cannot be 
qualified as pure consumer protection provisions.6309 Nonetheless, the BGB also contains 
consumer protection provisions, such as §§ 4756310 or 312a.6311 These are specific legislative 
interventions that are applicable in addition to §§ 305 et seq.6312 
The legislative interventions concerning standard business terms legislation in both countries 
can therefore not be seen in vacuo. The Consumer Protection Act as well as §§ 305 et seq. are 
thus not stand-alone provisions but must be seen in synergy with other provisions and, 
especially in the case of the Act, with the common law. 
Under § 307(3) BGB, the general clause as well as §§ 308 and 309 apply only to provisions in 
standard terms on the basis of which arrangements derogating from legal provisions, or 
arrangements supplementing those legal provisions, are agreed. Hence, for the application of 
§§ 305 et seq., a derogation from legal provisions is necessary. There is thus no content control 
for performance specifications, price agreements and declaratory clauses.6313 
                                                             
6302 Beadica at para [62], Du Plessis 2018 Stell LR 383. 
6303 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 c). 
6304 See Part I ch 3 para 1.3. 
6305 50 of 1999. 
6306 15 of 1962. 
6307 See s 121, read with Schedule 1, and s 5(2)(d) CPA. 
6308 Eith NJW 1974, 16, 17. 
6309 Locher JuS 1997, 390. See Part II ch 1 para 2.3. 
6310 Concerning deviating agreements. 
6311 Concerning the restriction of certain payment clauses as regards the means of payment. 
6312 See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) ee). 
6313 BGH NJW 1998, 383, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 14, Soergel/Stein (1987) § 8 AGBG para 1, Palandt/Grüneberg 
§ 307 para 41, Locher Recht der AGB 85. See Part II ch 5 paras 1.2.4 and 1.2.5. 
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The stipulated price for a good or service as well as the specification of the performance are 
part of the core terms. Performance specifications concern the main subject matter, as well as 
the type, volume, quality and quantity of the goods or services in question. Unlike the German 
legislator, the South African legislator chose to include not only terms contained in so-called 
standard-term contracts, but also negotiated clauses into the fairness enquiry.6314 This also 
concerns the core terms (price, subject matter of the contract, warranty etc.).6315  
The inclusion of negotiated terms as well as the core terms pertaining to the price and the 
performance can be justified in the South African context to a certain degree with the relative 
inexperience of consumers. The Act considers this in its purpose (section 3). One must consider 
though that consumers tend to check the price and performance first. The possibility to 
overreach consumers in this regard cannot be excluded however, which is why the fairness 
enquiry of such terms might be justified. The courts must consider all the relevant factors in 
this enquiry, and the fact that these terms may have been negotiated should be factored in.6316 
In this regard, content control in both regimes should thus come to the same results.  
The BGH subjects modifications of the main performance to content control. The court puts 
forward the protective purpose of §§ 305 et seq. since § 307(2) no. 2 makes clear that the other 
party (consumer) must be protected from clauses that limit essential rights or duties inherent in 
the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the purpose of the contract is 
jeopardised.6317 
In this regard, both regimes apply content control to the core terms, even though in German 
legislation this is done in a rather restricted area (modifications of the principal performance). 
Stoffels correctly alleges that the BGH's criterion for the demarcation between clauses that are 
subject to content control and those that are exempt from it, i.e., whether the given clause 
restricts, modifies or undermines the main subject matter of the contract, is not suitable for the 
determination of the control-free area of the principal obligations in terms of § 307(3). In his 
                                                             
6314 The concept of 'non-negotiated terms' is wider than the one of 'standard terms'. Under art 3(2) of the Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, '[a] term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it 
has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, 
particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.' In terms of § 305(1) BGB, '[s]tandard business 
terms are all contract terms pre-formulated for more than two contracts which one party to the contract (the user) 
presents to the other party upon the entering into of the contract.'  
6315 Naudé 2009 SALJ 531, Naudé ‘Introduction to sections 48-52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary 
para 5, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 364.  
6316 See Part I ch 3 para 1.3. 
6317 BGH NJW 1987, 1931 (1935). 
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view, such a criterion does not sufficiently consider the normative purpose of § 307(3).6318 In 
order to decide whether such a clause is subject to content control, one therefore has to keep in 
mind the legislator's objective, i.e., the consumer's protection in areas where the market does 
not offer sufficient protection against abuse by the user. Where a standard clause is subject to 
the market's forces and competition in a way that the average client takes notice of it and can 
include it in its decision, one can assume that the market regularly offers a fair balance of the 
parties' interests so that any government intervention is superfluous.6319 
South African courts should also consider this point when distinguishing between negotiated 
and non-negotiated terms. Stoffel's argument must be taken with a pinch of salt though in the 
South African context because the 'average' South African consumer is more vulnerable than 
an 'average' German customer. 
So-called 'declaratory clauses' that have the same content as legal provisions ('regulatory 
identity') are also subject to content control in South Africa. This is not the case in Germany. 
Naudé6320 correctly suggests that control of these clauses should be excluded because it is a 
constitutional question of whether a legal provision has to be declared void.6321 
Section 48(1)(a)(i) of the Act provides that unfair prices are forbidden. As discussed in 
Part I,6322 the courts should not interfere in this field since they have not sufficient expertise in 
terms of fair pricing. What is more, excessive pricing control falls under the competency of the 
competition authorities, which are more qualified for empirical market and pricing analysis.6323 
Naudé legitimately maintains that the Act goes too far by including core terms, such as the 
price, into the fairness review. The stricter common-law and constitutional control 
mechanisms, such as the requirement of legality and the principles concerning undue influence 
and misrepresentation as well as section 40 on unconscionable conduct would still provide for 
sufficient control over unfair core terms.6324 As discussed in Part I,6325 it is however unlikely 
                                                             
6318 Stoffels AGB-Recht 170 and 171. 
6319 Fastrich Inhaltskontrolle 265. See also Canaris NJW 1987, 613. See Part II ch 5 para 1.2.5 a) bb). 
6320 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. 
6321 See s 167(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
6322 See Part I ch 3 para 1.3. 
6323 See s 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 which prohibits a dominant form to charge an excessive price to 
the detriment of consumers, that is a price for a good or service which bears no reasonable relation to the economic 
value of that good or service and is higher than that value. This must be determined by empirical analysis. 
Concerning the elements in order to determine such a price, see Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited and 
Another v Mittal Steel South Africa Limited and Another [2007] CPLR 37 (CT).  
6324 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. 
6325 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.1 a). 
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that the legislator wanted to introduce a direct price-control mechanism in the Act. Price control 
can thus only take place where also other factors, such as unconscionable conduct, are present. 
German courts apply price control in terms of §§ 305 et seq. only where a legal price regulation 
exists and a standard clause differs from it.6326 The threshold for court intervention is very high 
though and typically requires usury.6327 According to the BGH,6328 ancillary price agreements 
are subject to content control too. These are agreements on the calculation or modification of 
the price, payment conditions, the stipulated due date or indexation clauses.6329 Content control 
is also possible for German courts if a clause passes on charges for the fulfilment of legal 
obligations to the client.6330 
For the application of price control, the thresholds are thus very high in both regimes, and price 
control is rather the exception than the rule. 
Another notable difference between the South African and the German regimes is that the 
German legislator favours an 'open' content control.6331 This means that the reasons for the 
inadequacy of standard terms must be unfolded within the content control, and not 'concealed' 
within the interpretational control, which then would serve as a 'correction' of standard terms. 
Hence, in German law, interpretational control takes place before content control.6332 
Otherwise, too many problematic clauses would already be mitigated in the interpretational 
control in favour of the other party. There would thus be no possibility to assess their 
disadvantageous effect within the content control.6333 On the other hand, South African 
legislation does not know the concept of an 'open' content control. One could argue though that 
because in the context of the Act, interpretational control usually takes place after content 
control, the same result is achieved. This is because the interpretational control does not 
anticipate the result of the content control by excluding too many clauses from it.6334 This 
argumentation is misleading though. Both controls should be strictly separated, and in order to 
                                                             
6326 Erman/Roloff § 307 para 45. 
6327 Under § 138(2), in order to fulfil the conditions of usury, the price must not only be excessive 
('disproportionate'), but the other party must also fulfil subjective conditions that are linked to its person. 
6328 BGH NJW 2000, 577 (579); NJW-RR 2004, 1206. 
6329 See Part II ch 5 para 1.2.5 b) bb). 
6330 See Part II ch 5 para 1.2.5 b) cc). 
6331 Offene Inhaltskontrolle. 
6332 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634). 
6333 This problem had already be seen by Raiser (Recht der allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen at 264 et seq) and 
later by the government in BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 15 and 60. See Part II ch 4 para 3.4. 
6334 See Part I ch 4 and Part II ch 4. This point has been discussed more in detail in chapter 4 of Part III. 
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know the content of the clauses that are subjected to of content control, one must interpret the 
given standard terms before their content is assessed.6335 
South African courts should therefore also aim at an open content control in which the 
interpretational control takes place before the content control.  
A further difference between the two regimes is that the question of the validity of German 
standard business terms is purely a question of law so that fact questions play a negligible role. 
Therefore, no taking of proof takes place and the assessment can be abstract-general and 
objective.6336 In the enquiry within the German regime of whether a standard term is 
'reasonable', the courts refer to fundamental principles, such as necessity6337 or proportionality 
instead.6338 The determination of whether a disadvantage is unreasonable is purely a matter of 
law and allows for no taking of proof.6339 
In contrast to the German legislation, the Act applies an individual approach in that the 
individual circumstances of the case are taken into consideration. The Act therefore allows the 
taking of proof. This is expressed, for instance, in several factors mentioned in section 52(2) 
(e.g., the circumstances of the transaction (c), the supplier's conduct (d), or the value of 
identical goods ((i)) and the fact that the terms listed in regulation 44(3) are presumed to be 
unfair. This means that the supplier has to prove that they are fair. 
The possibility of taking of proof is therefore a consequence of the individual approach applied 
in South Africa, and only consequent.  
The items set out in the greylist of regulation 44(3) presume that the given terms are unfair, 
whereas § 308 requires an evaluation by the court of whether specific terms create an 
unreasonable disadvantage to the other party. Here again, merely questions of law are taken 
into account. Regulation 44(2)(a) provides however that the items contained in the greylist are 
indicative only, so that a term listed therein may be fair in view of the particular circumstances 
of the case. This also shows that the South African regime does not rely purely on questions of 
law but also considers factual questions. This is in concert with the individual approach and 
consequent. 
                                                             
6335 See discussion of this topic in Part III ch 4 para 3.4. 
6336 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 153, with further references. 
6337 Erforderlichkeit. 
6338 Verhältnismäßigkeit. 
6339 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 153 and 154. 
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According to subregulation (2)(b) of regulation 44, the greylist is non-exhaustive, so that other 
terms may also be unfair under section 48. The South African legislature considered it 
necessary to insert this provision in order to avoid that non-lawyers consider subregulation 
44(3) exhaustive and cast in stone.6340 Although § 308 does not have a similar provision, 
standard clauses that are not invalid in terms of § 308 are still to be assessed under the general 
clause of § 307. The phrase 'are in particular ineffective' ('ist insbesondere unwirksam') 
indicates that the enquiry undertaken within § 308 is not finished without considering the 
general clause. Hence, the result is the same in the two regimes. 
Only consumer agreements (B2C contracts) fall into the ambit of regulation 44. Its scope of 
application is thus narrower than that of the Act itself. Therefore, regulation 44 does not apply 
to franchise agreements.6341 The exclusion of B2B contracts from the ambit of regulation 44 
does not mean though that a court may not use the list contained therein as a guideline in 
relation to section 48, especially for smaller, unsophisticated businesses vis-à-vis bigger 
companies. The reasoning behind this idea is that smaller businesses are often comparable to 
individual consumers in terms of their vulnerability. Hence, regulation 44 might also have a 
reflective or radiating effect in terms of B2B contracts where smaller businesses are involved, 
particularly if the transaction is not related to the small business's core expertise, or where it 
had not much bargaining power.6342 
The same applies to the items contained in §§ 308 and 309 that have a radiating effect on the 
general clause. Under § 310(1) 1st sent., the prohibitions of §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309 do not 
apply to B2B contracts. Since these prohibitions are a specific manifestation of the evaluative 
standard laid down in the general clause, based on the principle of good faith, it is not excluded 
though that clauses that raise concern in terms of §§ 308 or 309 could be ineffective pursuant 
to § 307. This is explicitly expressed in § 310(1) 2nd sent.6343 
Thus, the reflective effect in both regimes ensures that also B2B agreements are included in 
the content control under the general clause. 
                                                             
6340 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 9. 
6341 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 267. See also ‘consumer agreements’ in s 1 which 
expressly excludes franchise agreements. 
6342 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 6. This is also the case in Germany 
or the Netherlands, for instance. 
6343 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. As regards the radiating effect, see discussion on the general clause in Part II ch 5 
passim. 
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2. Blacklisted clauses 
Section 51 of the Consumer Protection Act contains prohibited clauses. In contrast to regulation 
44, section 51 applies to all agreements covered by the Act, which means that also franchise 
agreements are included,6344 as long as the threshold requirements of section 5 are met. § 309, 
on the other hand, applies to all standard clauses, with the exceptions mentioned in § 310(1).  
Regarding the blacklists, the only difference between the two pieces of legislation in terms of 
the personal scope of application lies in the fact that for the application of the Act, the threshold 
of section 5 must be met, whereas for the German regime, such a requirement is inexistent. 
As discussed, section 51(1)(a) and (b) is unnecessarily verbose and imprecise and contains 
interrelations with the purpose of the Act. This makes it difficult to determine whether a term 
is prohibited or not. Hawthorne remarks that this provision 'works from the general to the 
specific'6345 so that subparagraphs (a) and (b) could be seen as a sort of 'general clause', which 
does not make it more tangible, however.6346 On the other hand, § 309 contains a precise and 
succinct enumeration of prohibited provisions in standard business terms in no. 1 to 15 without 
an 'introduction'.  
Black- or greylists should be drafted in a simple and clear language so that consumers, 
consumer advisers and businesses who are not lawyers can understand them.6347 The South 
African blacklist does not fulfil this standard. The legislator should therefore reformulate the 
blacklist so that it conforms to international standards. 
Section 51(1)(c) to (j) and 51(2) contains an enumeration of forbidden clauses that will be 
discussed as follows in a comparative perspective. 
2.1 Exemption clauses for gross negligence etc. 
Section 51(1)(c) prohibits the limitation or exemption from liability concerning goods or 
services for any loss directly or indirectly attributable to the gross negligence of the supplier or 
any person acting for or controlled by the supplier. The interplay between sections 51(1)(c) and 
61 has already been discussed earlier: The principal difference between these two provisions 
is that in terms of section 51, the supplier is also answerable before the delivery of goods or 
services; the latter does not need to be defective. Moreover, section 51 does not require a 
                                                             
6344 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 1. 
6345 Hawthorne 2012 THRHR 363. 
6346 See Part I ch 3 para 2.1. 
6347 Naudé 2007 SALJ 146. 
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contractual nexus, and section 61 expands its application to all members of the supply chain, 
whereas section 51(1)(c) comprises merely the supplier and persons acting for or controlled by 
him or her.6348 
Section 51(1)(c) also prohibits terms imposing the assumption of risk or liability by the 
consumer for a loss as well as any obligation to pay for damages to goods displayed by the 
supplier. Since the assumption of risk or liability ultimately leads to an exemption of liability 
of the supplier, this prohibition is consequent. The second case, prohibiting so-called 'you-
break-it-you-buy-it' policies, except for damage resulting from the consumer's gross 
negligence, recklessness, malicious behaviour or criminal conduct under section 18(1) 
ascertains a high degree of consumer protection, especially for vulnerable consumers.6349 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. b) also prohibits pre-formulated restrictions or exclusions of the user's liability 
for damage arising from a grossly negligent breach of duty by the user or from an intentional 
or grossly negligent breach of duty by a legal representative of the user or a person used to 
perform an obligation of the user.6350  
The South African and the German norm are thus similar to the extent in that they exclude both 
restrictions and exclusions of the user's/supplier's liability, and that no contractual nexus is 
necessary. What is more, they extend the supplier's liability to other persons involved in the 
agreement. The South African formulation 'any person acting for or controlled by the supplier' 
is similar to the German phrase 'by a legal representative (…) or a person used to perform an 
obligation of the user'. That no contractual nexus is required is expressed by the fact that also 
liability for breach at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement (culpa in contrahendo) 
under §§ 280 and 311(2) and for tortious acts in terms of § 823 et seq. are included.6351 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. b) provides for an exception concerning the transport and tariff rules for regular 
public transport services on the road, as well as state-approved lotteries and gaming contracts. 
The insertion of these exceptions in the German provision is based on German idiosyncrasies, 
especially concerning the mentioned transport and tariff rules, which are predicated on an 
Order with normative character containing restrictions for liability.6352 It is hence not 
astonishing that the Act does not contain a similar provision in section 51.  
                                                             
6348 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2 a). 
6349 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2 a). 
6350 See discussion of this item in Part II ch 5. 
6351 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 a) aa). 
6352 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 a) bb). 
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On the other hand, § 309 no. 7 BGB does not expressly prohibit the assumption of risk or 
liability by the other party, unlike section 51(1)(c) of the Act. The German provision does not 
require though that the exclusion be mentioned explicitly in the standard clause. It suffices if 
the clause gives the impression that it has the object or effect of excluding liability. This is the 
case where the objective obligation that is the basis for liability is excluded, and the risk is 
transferred solely to the other party.6353 Hence, both pieces of legislation come to the same 
result. 
Section 51(1)(c) only prohibits the supplier's exclusion or limitation from liability based on 
gross negligence. Damage based on the supplier's intention is not mentioned. This is not 
necessary because one can make the argument that if the supplier's liability cannot be excluded 
or restricted for gross negligence, the less it can be restricted for intentional conduct. Such 
exclusion or restriction would also be contrary to section 48, read in conjunction with section 
3 of the Act. In any event, it would be contrary to public policy. 
The fact that § 309 no. 7 lit. b) mentions intentional breach only concerning the legal 
representatives or persons used to perform the user's obligations but not the user is due to the 
fact that under § 276(3), the obligor may not be released in advance from liability for 
intention.6354 
The German provision expressly states the exclusion or limitation of liability. It also applies to 
restrictive modalities for the assertion of a given claim by the other party, though.6355 These 
are formal hindrances, such as a very short preclusion period, which create an obstacle for the 
user's liability. In order to ensure adequate consumer protection, such restrictive modalities 
should also apply in terms of section 51(1)(c). What is more, in practice, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between objective and formal liability restrictions.6356 
As discussed,6357 the prohibition of exemption clauses with regard to gross negligence does not 
mean that the exemption of ordinary negligence is always permitted. This is because the general 
clause of section 48 establishes an overarching fairness framework that also applies to 
exemption clauses that comply with the formal requirements set out in section 49.6358 
                                                             
6353 BGH NJW 2001, 751 (752). See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 d). 
6354 Stoffels AGB-Recht 382. 
6355 BGH NJW 2007, 674 (675). 
6356 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 7 para 28. See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 d) cc). 
6357 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2 a). 
6358 Naudé ‘Section 51’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5.  
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Based on § 307, the BGH has determined a prohibited area 'proceeding' the forbidden domain 
in terms of § 309 no. 7. Therefore, also clauses excluding or restricting simple negligence under 
lit. b) can be ineffective.6359 This is namely the case where a provision erodes essential rights 
or duties inherent in the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the purpose 
of the contract is jeopardised in terms of § 307(2) no. 2. Moreover, the user is not allowed to 
restrict its liability by exempting itself from obligations that are necessary for the fulfilment of 
the agreement and that the other party regularly can rely on ('cardinal obligations').6360 The 
standard of control is § 307(2) no. 2, i.e., the specification of the general clause.6361 
Hence, both regimes refer to the respective general clause in order to prohibit simple 
negligence. 
As a result, the South African and German provisions merely differ in that § 309 no. 7 lit. b)  
contains exceptions concerning the transport and tariff rules for regular public transport 
services on the road, due to German idiosyncrasies. All other aspects are similar in that they 
come to the same results. 
2.2 Transfer of the consumer's claim to the Guardian's Fund 
Section 51(1)(f) of the Act has no counterpart in §§ 305 et seq.6362 A person who manages the 
funds of another person in its quality as a custodian or executor of a will is subject to the 
German civil-law provisions, however. Hence, §§ 305 et seq. apply to these persons too in 
cases where the custodian or executor of a will acts within its functions on behalf of the person 
he or she represents. An equivalent of a Guardian's Fund does not exist in Germany. 
Under § 1964(1), if the heir is not determined within a period appropriate to the circumstances, 
the probate court must determine that there is no existing heir other than the treasury. § 1965(1) 
provides that the determination must be preceded by a public invitation to notify the rights of 
succession, laying down a period for notification. Finally, according to § 1965(2), a right of 
succession is not taken into account if it is proved to the probate court within three months after 
the expiry of the notification period that the right of succession exists or that it has been asserted 
against the treasury in a legal action. In other words, if an heir cannot be found, there is no need 
                                                             
6359 BGH NJW 2013, 2502 (2503). 
6360 Kardinalpflichten. See, e.g., BGH NJW 2002, 673 (674); 2005, 1774. 
6361 Stoffels AGB-Recht 384. See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.2. 
6362 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2 b). 
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to have administered the decedent's estate by another person, except where the testator 
determines an executor (§§ 2197 et seq.).  
If a person of full age cannot in whole or in part take care of his affairs, by reason of a mental 
illness or a physical, mental or psychological handicap, the custodianship court, on his 
application or of its own motion, appoints a custodian for this person.6363 The custodianship 
includes all activities that are necessary to attend to the affairs of the person under 
custodianship from a legal point of view. The custodian must attend to the affairs of the person 
under custodianship in a manner that is conducive to his welfare.6364 In his or her group of 
tasks, the custodian represents the person under custodianship in court and from court.6365 For 
some legal transactions, the custodian requires the custodian court's approval, e.g., for medical 
treatments, accommodation, abandonment of a rented home.6366 
§ 1909 provides that a person who is subject to parental custody or guardianship is given a 
curator for matters which the parents or the guardian are prevented from carrying out. In 
particular, he or she is given a curator to manage the property that he acquires as a result of 
death or that is given to him or her free of charge inter vivos if the testator by testamentary 
disposition or the donor when making the disposition stipulated that the parents or the guardian 
were not to manage the property. For curatorship, the family court is competent.6367  
Thus, the protection granted by section 51(1)(f) is achieved in Germany especially by 
provisions contained in Books 4 and 5 of the BGB, i.e., family law and the law of successions. 
2.3  False acknowledgements 
The 'deeming provision' of section 51(1)(g) deals with fictional declarations and fictional 
receipts of documents, goods or services.6368 It prohibits entire agreement clauses6369 to the 
extent that they exclude additional warranties as well as no-representations clauses.6370  
The first part of item (g) of section 51 has almost the same regulatory content as regulation 
44(3)(v), except that the item of the regulation is more comprehensive and catches more clauses 
                                                             
6363 § 1896(1). 
6364 § 1901(1) and (2). 
6365 § 1902. '(…) gerichtlich und außergerichtlich'. 
6366 These are set out in §§ 1904 to 1908. 
6367 § 1909(2). 
6368 Naudé 2007 SALJ 161. 
6369 Clause stating that the document in question is the sole record of the contract and no reliance may be placed 
on any warranties, promises, undertakings and conditions not contained in this document. Sometimes referred to 
as ‘integration clause’.  
6370 Clause excluding liability for pre-contractual representations made by or on behalf of the other party. Sharrock 
2010 SA Merc LJ 319, Sharrock Judicial control 141. 
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in that it does not contain any timeframe ('before the agreement was made'). Naudé correctly 
asserts that also regulation 44(3)(c) catches more types of terms that aim to achieve the same 
effect as section 51(1)(g).6371 Section 51 also applies to businesses so that B2B contracts afford 
protection too. Besides, item (c) of regulation 44(3) only applies to commitments undertaken 
by the supplier's agents, and not to the supplier itself, unlike section 51(3)(g). 
Item 44(3)(v) corresponds to § 308 no. 5 which will be discussed later in this chapter. The fact 
that entire agreement and no-representation clauses that are targeted by section 51(1)(g)(i) as 
well as acknowledgements in terms of section 51(1)(g)(ii) have the effect of modifying the 
burden of proof6372 means that § 309 no. 12 lit. b) could cover the same cases as section 
51(1)(g). In terms of no. 12 lit. b), provisions having the other party to the contract confirm 
certain facts are prohibited if they modify the burden of proof to its disadvantage. These clauses 
lead to a factual shift of the onus of proof, and users have no legitimate interest to require such 
a declaration from their clients.6373 The confirmation of certain facts requires a modification of 
the burden of proof with regard to legally significant facts, the other party's knowledge about 
certain facts or factual events.6374  
As discussed earlier,6375 completeness clauses (or entire agreement clauses) may prevent 
customers from referring to possible verbal agreements.6376 This means that to this extent, an 
indirect shift of the burden of proof exists, or at least a modification of the requirements for the 
production of evidence.6377 Such a broad comprehension of the phrase 'modification of the 
burden of proof' is the law's objective and the German legislator's intention.6378 The objective 
of the provision is to prohibit clauses by which a contrary assertion of the client is 'impeded or 
made impossible'.6379 Hence, such clauses are also prohibited under § 309 no. 12 lit. b). 
Many (invalid) clauses concern the circumstances in which the contract has been concluded ('I 
have received a copy of the contract').6380 Section 51(1)(g)(ii) prohibits clauses that falsely 
express that the consumer has received a document that is required by the Act. Section 51 is 
                                                             
6371 Naudé 2009 SALJ 523. 
6372 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.12.4. 
6373 Stoffels AGB-Recht 288. 
6374 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.12.4. 
6375 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.12.4 b) aa). 
6376 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 22. 
6377 Stoffels AGB-Recht 289. 
6378 The BGH also referred to this fact, but in another context. See BGH NJW 1987, 1634 (1635). 
6379 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 39. 
6380 BGH NJW 1987, 2012 (2014). 
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therefore narrower in this regard because the given document has to be required by the Act, 
whereas § 309 no. 12 lit. b) applies to all kinds of facts, including the confirmation having 
received any document. 
§ 309 no. 12 lit. b) in fine contains an exception for pre-formulated acknowledgements of 
receipt for which the user has a legitimate interest.6381 This provision applies to receipts in the 
sense of § 368,6382 i.e., written confirmation that the other party has received performance.6383 
The German provision is thus not contrary to the South African item since the receipt under 
§ 368 is established after reception of the given goods or services. Such an acknowledgement 
of receipt does therefore not 'falsely express an acknowledgement' in the sense of section 
51(1)(g). 
Therefore, with regard to false acknowledgements, both regimes are similar in that such clauses 
have the effect of modifying the burden of proof, which is prohibited under § 309 no. 12 lit. b). 
The prohibition also extends to entire agreement clauses. The South African provision is 
somewhat narrower as the document in question must be required by the Act, which is not the 
case for the German regime. In both regimes, receipts are not considered false 
acknowledgements as these are established after the customer has received the given goods or 
services. 
2.4  Forfeiture of money to the supplier 
§§ 305 et seq. do not contain a similar item to section 51(1)(h). Under this provision, a supplier 
cannot require a consumer to forfeit money to the supplier if the consumer exercises any right 
in terms of the Act. An example is a deposit that the supplier must pay back to the consumer if 
the latter cancels an advance booking under section 17(2) or the price which the supplier has 
to refund if the consumer returns a defective good in terms of section 56(1).6384 
The German BGB contains several provisions elsewhere than in §§ 305 to 309 in terms of 
which a party has to refund the other party. According to § 651h, for instance, if the traveller 
revokes the travel package agreement before commencement of travel, the travel organiser 
loses its claim to the agreed package price. The travel organiser may demand appropriate 
                                                             
6381 Stoffels AGB-Recht 290. 
6382 § 368: 'Upon receiving performance, on demand, the obligee must issue a written acknowledgement of receipt 
(receipt). If the obligor has a legal interest in having the receipt issued in another form, he may demand issue in 
that form.' 
6383 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 12 para 61. 
6384 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2 d). 
 996   
 
compensation, though. In the case of a defective good that the purchaser returns, the seller must 
refund its client under § 437 no. 2, read in conjunction with § 346(1). 
Even though §§ 305 et seq. do not contain a similar provision to section 51(1)(h), similar 
protection is granted by other BGB provisions. 
2.5 Unfair enforcement clauses 
a) Authorisation to enter premises in order to repossess goods 
This prohibition contained in section 51(1)(i)(i) aims to prevent that suppliers enforce sanctions 
that generally have to be authorised by court order.6385 That only 'persons acting on behalf of 
the supplier’ are included, and not the supplier itself is probably an unintended loophole.6386  
The requirement of a court order is expressed, e.g., in section 4(3)(c) of the Rental Housing 
Act,6387 according to which the tenant’s rights against the landlord include his or her right not 
to have his or her possessions seized, except in terms of a law of general application and having 
first obtained an order of court.6388  
In German law too, a court order is generally needed to enter another person's premises in order 
to repossess goods. An example for such a case is §§ 562 et seq. in terms of which the lessor, 
for his claims under the lease, has a security right6389 over things contributed by the lessee. The 
requirement of a court order for the enforcement of the lessor's right is impliedly expressed in 
§ 562b. Under this provision, the lessor may prevent the removal of the things that are subject 
to his or her security right, even without having recourse to the court, to the extent that he or 
she is entitled to object to removal. This means that only if the tenant wants to remove the given 
things, the lessor may intervene without recourse to the court. If the lessee moves out, the lessor 
may take possession of these things.6390 
Hence, the German and the South African law come to the same result, even though the German 
law does not contain a similar item in §§ 308 or 309. The South African provision is more 
general and covers more cases than §§ 562 et seq. in terms of repossession Under no 
circumstances, the lessor may enter the tenant's premises without a court order, except to 
                                                             
6385 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.3.2 at 74. 
6386 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2 e) aa). 
6387 50 of 1999. 
6388 Emphasis added. 
6389 Pfandrecht des Vermieters or Vermieterpfandrecht. 
6390 Emphasis added. 
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prevent the removal of things falling under its security right. In any event, such enforcement 
clauses would be illegal in terms of the German general clause. 
b) Undertaking to sign documents relating to enforcement 
Provisions in terms of which the consumer has to sign in advance documents relating to 
enforcement of the agreement, irrespective of whether such documentation is complete or 
incomplete at the time it is signed, are blacklisted under section 51(1)(i)(ii). 
The German provisions of §§ 308 or 309 do not contain a similar item. Such clauses are 
ineffective in terms of the general clause of § 307, however. Suppliers that do not take all 
necessary steps after the consumer is in default in order to enforce the agreement create an 
unreasonable disadvantage in the sense of § 307, e.g. by depriving him or her from a warning 
notice pursuant to § 286. What is more, such a clause would be ineffective under § 309 no. 4 
which provides that a provision by which the user is exempted from the statutory requirement 
of giving the other party to the contract a warning notice or setting a period of time for the latter 
to perform or cure is invalid.6391 
Hence, both provisions make such clauses subject to content control by different mechanisms, 
i.e., by blacklisting them, or by application of the general clause, respectively. 
c) Deposit of documents with the supplier, provision of a PIN etc. 
The German black- or greylists do not contain a similar item to section 51(1)(j)(i) and (ii) of 
the Consumer Protection Act.  
If personal data is collected from an identity card or passport for identification purposes and/or 
stored as a copy, the principles for processing personal data from article 5 GDPR6392 must 
                                                             
6391 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.4.1. 
6392 GDPR = Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Article 5 GDPR: '(Principles 
relating to processing of personal data) 1. Personal data shall be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent 
manner in relation to the data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); (b) collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further 
processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes 
(‘purpose limitation’); (c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which 
they are processed (‘data minimisation’); (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are 
processed, are erased or rectified without delay (‘accuracy’); e) kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal data 
may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in 
the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) 
subject to implementation of the appropriate technical and organisational measures required by this Regulation in 
order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject (‘storage limitation’); (f) processed in a manner that 
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always be observed, however. In this area, the principles of data minimisation and storage 
limitation in accordance with article 5(1) lit. c) and e) GDPR are of paramount importance. The 
principle of data minimisation stipulates that personal data must be adequate and relevant to 
the purpose and limited to what is necessary for the purposes of the processing. On the other 
hand, according to the principle of storage limitation, personal data should be stored in a form 
that allows the identification of data subjects only for as long as necessary for the purposes for 
which they are processed. 
If copies of the data are no longer needed, they shall be deleted or destroyed immediately after 
the necessary information has been established. Exceptions to this rule may result from special 
statutory retention periods. 
It will often not be necessary to make a copy of the identity card. A typical case is the 
employer's driver's license check which has to be carried out twice a year, e.g., for professional 
lorry drivers. It is sufficient for the respective employee to show his or her driving licence, and 
the employer can then take note that the employee has shown a valid driver's licence. The 
additional preparation and filing of a copy of an identity card would infringe the principle of 
data minimisation because the same purpose could be achieved without copying the identity 
card and storing it. 
The supervisory authority acknowledges that especially outside of 'mass transactions', the 
identity of the contracting party may be important when concluding a contract (e.g., a lease 
agreement). In this case, it will usually be sufficient to prove the identity by presenting the 
identity card. The data contained in the document can also be extracted and noted, but only to 
the extent that they are relevant to the contractual relationship and identification. The notation 
of further information (e.g., the serial number of the ID card) would be inadmissible under data 
protection law. 
Frequently, the obligation of those responsible for collecting and storing copies of ID cards for 
identity and documentation purposes arises from the GwG6393 (in particular § 8 GwG). Liable 
parties within the meaning of the GwG must identify their contractual partners to establish the 
business relationship or carry out the transaction. Since 26 June 2017, credit and financial 
                                                             
ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing 
and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures 
(‘integrity and confidentiality’). 2. The controller shall be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate compliance 
with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’).'  
6393 GwG = Geldwäschegesetz (Money Laundering Act). 
 999   
 
services institutions, insurance companies, accountant, real estate agent and so-called 
commodity traders are obliged to make a complete copy of the identity card or to record it 
entirely optically digitised. Records made in this way must be deleted immediately and 
regularly 5 years after the end of the business relationship.  
Telecommunications providers may require the production of an official identity document to 
verify the information provided by the customer if this information is necessary for verification 
purposes. In this context, a copy of the ID card may also be made and used to establish identity. 
This must be deleted by the telecommunications provider immediately after the data required 
for the contract have been established. 
According to § 29(2) BMG,6394 hotels are obliged to document specific details about the person 
accommodated in a registration form, such as name, date of birth and address. There is no 
obligation to check for accuracy though. There is thus no legal basis for collecting identity data 
from identity documents. An exception to this rule applies under § 29(3) BMG, according to 
which foreign persons to be listed on the registration form must be identified by presenting a 
valid identity document. In this case, there is an obligation to check, but not to copy the identity 
card. Making a copy could constitute a violation of article 5(1) lit. c) GDPR. 
Companies that lend or hire out an object may make a note of the contact details and, if 
applicable, the period of validity of the identification document. It will not be permitted to 
make a copy or scan the identification document. The deposit of the identity card is already 
inadmissible according to § 1(1) 3rd sent. PersAuswG.6395 
The provision of a personal identification code or number to be used to access an account is 
not prohibited in terms of the BGB. The banks' standard business terms systematically contain 
a provision according to which the provision of the PIN or other means of identification is not 
allowed though. If the bank's client provides its PIN to another person and this person 
illegitimately withdraws money from the other's bank account, the account holder is liable.6396 
                                                             
6394 BMG = Bundesmeldegesetz (Federal Registration Act). 
6395 Gesetz über Personalausweise und den elektronischen Identitätsnachweis (PersAuswG) = Identity Card Act. 
§ 1(1) PersAuswG: 'Germans as defined in Article 116 (1) of the [Grundgesetz] shall be required to possess an 
identity card once they have reached the age of 16 and are subject to the general registration requirement, or if not 
subject to this requirement, then if they mainly reside in Germany. They must present their identity card at the 
request of an authority entitled to check identification. Identity card holders may not be required to deposit their 
identity card or otherwise surrender possession. This shall not apply to authorities entitled to check identification 
nor in case of withdrawal or confiscation.' See 'Personalausweis kopieren oftmals nach DSGVO verboten' at 
https://www.datenschutzbeauftragter-info.de/ldi-nrw-personalausweis-kopieren-oftmals-nach-dsgvo-verboten. 
6396 See decision of LG Cologne of 10 September 2019 (21 O 116/19) at https://www.online-und-
recht.de/urteile/Haftung-wegen-PIN-Weitergabe-Landgericht-K%C3%B6ln-20190910. 
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Both regimes thus prohibit the deposit of an ID and the provision of personal identification 
codes by different means. The provision of the data contained in an ID is not prohibited per se 
but subject to the principles of data minimisation and storage limitation in the EU. It is 
recommended that the South African legislator inserts a mechanism in the Act similar to the 
GDPR in which also the provision (i.e., not the deposit) of data contained in IDs etc. is 
regulated in terms of data minimisation and storage limitation. 
2.6 Other provisions contained in section 51 
Section 51(1)(d) prohibits negative option marketing and is a restatement of section 31 of the 
Act. The failure of the consumer to respond to an offer of the supplier does thus not amount to 
acceptance. This is also true for the common law.6397 
In German law, for a valid agreement, an offer has to be expressly or impliedly, e.g., by nodding 
or paying, accepted. Laxer rules apply to business people who maintain a commercial 
relationship. Under § 362(1) HGB, if a merchant receives an offer from someone with whom 
he or she has a business relationship, he or she is obliged to reply immediately. His or her 
silence shall be deemed to constitute acceptance of the application. 
Under § 241a BGB, the supply of movable things that are not being sold by way of an execution 
of judgment or otherwise by authority of law (goods), or the provision of other services to the 
consumer by a trader, does not create a claim against the consumer if the consumer has not 
ordered these goods or other services. There may be no derogation from the stipulations of this 
provision to the disadvantage of the consumer. The stipulations apply even if other 
constructions circumvent them. 
The South African and German regimes thus come to the same results regarding consumers. 
Section 51(1)(e) prohibits terms that require the consumer to enter into a supplementary 
agreement or sign a document prohibited by subsection (2)(a). The German lists do not contain 
a similar item. 
                                                             
6397 Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 (1) SA 413 (A) 422: ‘Quiescence is not necessarily acquiescence 
and one party cannot, without the assent of the other, impose upon that other a condition to that effect.’ 
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3. The South African greylist in comparison to the German provisions 
3.1  Introduction 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, regulation 44(3) and § 308 contain so-called 
'greylists'. Nonetheless, the two regimes differ in that the items contained in the South African 
regulation are presumed to be unfair, whereas the German list contains evaluative elements in 
the form of indeterminate legal terms.6398 This is in keeping with the respective individual-
personalised and abstract-general approach. In the following, the items of the South African 
list will be put in comparative perspective to the German provisions. 
3.2  The greylisted clauses 
a) Regulation 44(3)(a) 
Regulation 44(3)(a) greylists terms that exclude or limit the supplier's liability for death or 
personal injury caused to the consumer.6399 
'Death or personal injury' in regulation 44(3) is similar to 'injury to life, body or health' in § 309 
no. 7. However, § 309 no. 7 lit. a) blacklists these terms, unlike the South African regulation. 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. a) provides that the exclusion or restriction of liability for the violation of 
highest-ranking legal rights, i.e., injury to life, body or health,6400 is not possible, not even when 
committed negligently.6401 
Terms that exclude or limit any liability for death or personal injury should be blacklisted 
instead of greylisted where the supplier is at fault, with simple negligence as a threshold. The 
fact that the limitation or exclusion of the supplier’s liability for any loss attributable to gross 
negligence is blacklisted in section 51(c)(i), and that the limitation or exclusion of its liability 
for death or personal injury – unless it concerns section 61(1) – is ‘only’ presumed to be unfair 
is a systemic weakness that should be corrected. In this context, it must be considered that the 
common law and the Constitution attribute a very high rank to the sanctity of life.6402 Naudé's 
argument according to which in a developing country such as South Africa the outright 
prohibition of excluding or restricting liability for companies could have disastrous effects on 
                                                             
6398 Unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe. See Part II ch 5 para 2.1. 
6399 See discussion on regulation 44(3)(a) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 a). 
6400 The definition of these terms corresponds to § 823(1). See Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 43. 
6401 See discussion on § 309 no. 7 lit. a) in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7. 
6402 See discussion on reg 44(3)(a) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 a). 
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businesses because of high insurance costs, for instance,6403 is not convincing because of 
practical problems and the systematic imbalance mentioned earlier.6404 
The unfairness standard of the Act is likely to be fulfilled more easily than the one which 
indicates that a clause is against public policy or unconstitutional (under section 2(1), the 
consumer may still rely on the common law).6405 The greylisting of clauses that exclude injury 
or death is an indication in that sense as the Act shifted the onus from the consumer to the 
supplier.6406 This could suggest that even though the item is greylisted in South Africa, in most 
cases terms falling under this provision will be declared unfair. Despite the fact that one could 
argue that for this reason, blacklisting is not necessary because in practice, courts will declare 
such terms unfair in any event, greylisting of such terms sends the wrong signal. 
Furthermore, unlike § 308 no. 7 lit. a), regulation 44(3)(a) does not include the supplier's 
representatives and is thus narrower in its scope of application. On the other hand, regulation 
44(3)(d) applies to the supplier's vicarious liability under the residual common law, as section 
113(1) applies to the supplier's joint and several liability under the Act.6407 Therefore, the 
supplier's agents are also included in its liability, and the two regimes come to a similar result. 
Regulation 44(3)(a) refers to injury or death caused by a reason other than a defective good. 
Under section 61, it is not permitted to exclude liability for harm caused by defective, unsafe 
or hazardous goods or those that suffer from a product failure.6408 When reading section 
51(1)(c)(i) together with regulation 44(3)(a), it becomes clear that the latter only refers to 
exemption clauses excluding liability which is not based on gross negligence and which does 
not fall into the ambit of section 61.6409  
The German legislator regulated gross negligence for other damages than those set out in lit. a) 
in § 309 no. 7 lit. b). Hence, in terms of regulation 44(3)(a) and § 309 no. 7 lit. a), both regimes 
only apply to personal injury and death. 
The wording of section 49(2) in fine indicates that as long as the supplier has fulfilled the 
formal requirements set out in this provision, the clause excluding its liability for injury or 
                                                             
6403 Naudé 2007 SALJ 156, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 24. 
6404 See discussion on reg 44(3)(a) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 a). 
6405 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
6406 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 20. 
6407 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 48. 
6408 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
6409 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
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death is deemed fair.6410 The exclusion of the supplier’s liability only by having initialled or 
signed the clause in question seems to be too oppressive as regards the consumer’s fundamental 
right to life, however. It could thus be contrary to public policy. Such a clause will be presumed 
to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(a), unless the supplier can convince the court why such a 
clause is fair in the particular circumstances.6411 The wording of section 49(2)(c) could still 
make sense, though, as this provision could have a warning function in that it aims to incite 
consumers to take adequate precautions against the risk of injury or death that should be 
specifically pointed out and initialled or signed.6412  
The German regime does not contain a similar 'disclaimer' provision. 
According to § 310(1) 1st sent., § 309 no. 7 is not directly applicable to B2B contracts, but its 
valuations have a radiating effect on the general clause.6413 Since the corresponding item is 
greylisted in South Africa, it only applies to B2C contracts (regulation 44(1)). The reflective 
effect of regulation 44 on the South African general clause, especially for small businesses, has 
been discussed above. The personal scope of application of both regimes is therefore similar. 
The exceptions set out in § 309 no. 7 in fine  concerning the transport and tariff rules for regular 
public transport services on the road, as well as state-approved lotteries and gaming contracts 
are also applicable to lit. a) of this provision. The reasons for these exceptions in German 
legislation have been discussed in Part II.6414 Because of certain idiocrasies in the German 
regime, there is no similar provision in South African consumer protection legislation. 
In summary, the South African legislator should blacklist the contents of regulation 44(3)(a) 
because the greylisting of such terms is a systemic weakness with regard to the Constitution 
and the common law. Even though the scope of application of item (a) is narrower than the one 
of § 308 no. 7 lit. a), the two regimes come to the same result concerning the supplier's 
representatives because the latter are included in regulation 44(3)(d). South African and 
German legislation only apply to personal injury and death but not to other damages. These are 
covered by section 61 and § 309 no. 7 lit. b). The formal requirements contemplated in section 
49(2) in fine should in practice not free suppliers from liability. The provision could 
nonetheless have a warning function and should not function as a disclaimer provision. The 
                                                             
6410 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
6411 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
6412 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 19. 
6413 Stoffels AGB-Recht 385 and 386. 
6414 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 a) bb). See also discussion on s 51(1)(c) in this chapter. 
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personal scope of application in relation to B2B contracts is similar in both regimes because of 
the radiating effect on the general clause of both items. The main differences between both 
regimes lie thus in the grey- versus blacklisting of the respective item, and the fact that, at least 
in theory, a supplier can exclude its liability by having signed or initialled the given provision. 
In practice, this should make no difference because the courts will most likely declare such 
terms unfair because of public policy.   
b) Regulation 44(3)(b) 
This item of the greylist can be divided into two parts when comparing it with the German 
standard business terms legislation. 
The first part of item (b) is more general and does not have a similar provision in §§ 307 to 
309. According to this provision, the supplier may not exclude or restrict the legal rights or 
remedies of the consumer in the event of total or partial breach. This item does not concern 
non-derogable rights that are afforded under other legislation, such as the tenants' rights under 
the Rental Housing Act, or rights afforded under sections 19(6)(c), 54(2) or 56(2) of the 
Consumer Protection Act.6415 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) applies to clauses that provide that claims against the user due to defects 
in their entirety or in regard to individual parts are excluded, limited to the granting of claims 
against third parties or made dependent upon prior court action taken against third parties. The 
provision expresses the principle that the customer must remain entitled to warranties, and that 
its contractual partner, the user, must remain the primary obligated party for any warranty.6416 
The concept of breach in terms of regulation 44(3)(b) is wider though since it means failing to 
perform any term of a contract, written or oral, without a legitimate legal excuse.6417  
The same applies to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) which concerns provisions limiting the other party's 
claim to cure. 
On the other hand, in terms of § 309 no. 8 lit. b) cc), a provision that excludes or limits the duty 
of the user to bear the expenses necessary for cure, in particular, to bear transport, workmen’s 
travel, work and materials costs is ineffective. The seller or contractor must usually bear these 
expenses in terms of §§ 439(2) or 635(2), respectively. 
                                                             
6415 See discussion of this item in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 b). 
6416 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) para 1. 
6417 See 'breach of contract' at http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=93. 'Breach' can also be defined as 
a civil wrong that may give rise to a duty to pay damages as compensation. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 39. 
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In terms of section 56(2) of the Act, the consumer may return the defective goods to the supplier 
within six months after delivery, without penalty and at the supplier's expense. 
A term stipulating that consumers have to bear their expenses in connection to the transport of 
a defective good related to a service contract could be prohibited by section 54(2). This 
provision does not prohibit clauses under which the consumer has to bring the defective good 
to the supplier’s place of business if the consumer exercises this right under section 54. A term 
under which the consumer has to do so at his own expense falls under regulation 44(3)(b) 
though because it excludes the consumer’s common-law right to claim damages for breach by 
the supplier in cases where the consumer can show that it acted reasonably by incurring costs 
in transporting the goods for the repair, which would have been avoided had the service been 
adequately performed.6418  
With regard to such expenses, the German and the South African provisions come to the same 
result. 
The second part of regulation 44(3)(b) concerns set-offs. Unlike the South African provision, 
§ 309 no. 3 requires that the claim be uncontested or has been finally and non-appealably 
established. A claim is uncontested when its legal basis and amount are not disputed (cum 
certum est an et quantum debeatur).6419 The German legislator did not outlaw clauses that 
prohibit the exertion of a right to set-off claims per se, but only cases in which this right is 
uncontested or has been finally and non-appealably established. What is more, the other party 
does not suffer a total loss of its legal rights in the case where set-offs are prohibited.6420 Thus, 
the blacklisting of this item in the German regime approaches somewhat the greylisting of the 
South African regulation. 
A claim has been finally and non-appealably established in case of an enforceable and final 
judgement in terms of § 704, read in conjunction with § 794 ZPO.6421 According to the majority 
view, also claims that are ripe – or ready – for judgment6422 are equal to those that have been 
finally and non-appealably established.6423 What is more, uncontested claims are a sub-
                                                             
6418 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 32. 
6419 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 3 para 31. 
6420 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 29. 
6421 Stoffels AGB-Recht 346.  
6422 Entscheidungsreif. 
6423 BGH WM 1978, 620 (621), Erman/Roloff § 309 para 29, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 3 para 31, 
Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 17. 
 1006   
 
category of finally and non-appealably established claims since both are not contestable 
anymore.6424 
The BGH held that the prohibition of such clauses also applies to those that restrict the right to 
set off to claims that have been recognised by the user.6425 The same applies to regulation 
44(3)(b) in that the debt must be capable of easy and speedy proof, a prerequisite for a 
compensatio.6426 This is notably the case where the plaintiff admits a debt.6427  
The other requisites for set-off are similar in both regimes: the debts must be mutual, the 
performances must be due and of the same nature, and the compensatio must not be excluded. 
Like in South Africa, alimonies cannot be set off in Germany,6428 but a set-off with owed tax 
vis-à-vis the tax administration with a refund claim is not excluded in Germany (§ 226 AO).6429 
In South Africa, taxes due to the fiscus, i.e., SARS, cannot be set-off.6430  
In both regimes, the clause must not necessarily use the word ‘set-off’. It is sufficient that its 
effect amounts to exclusion or restriction of a compensatio. This is namely the case where the 
consumer is requested to pay promptly and in full and without deduction as soon as the supplier 
chooses to consider its side of the bargain as finished.6431 The same applies to standard clauses 
by which only payment in cash is accepted. These can be seen as an implied exclusion of set-
off. Other examples are 'net-cash clauses' or provisions that establish that the customer must 
pay in advance. They have the effect that the client cannot set off claims because of defects of 
the merx.6432  
In Part I6433 of this thesis, it was submitted that regulation 44(3)(b) must be interpreted widely, 
so that also clauses by which a supplier may require full payment before it has delivered the 
                                                             
6424 BGH NJW 1989, 3215 (3216). 
6425 BGH NJW 1994, 657 (658); 2007, 3421 (3422). See also Smith v Morum Bros (1877) 7 Buch 20 where it is 
also admitted that a set-off is possible in these cases because there is 'easy and speedy proof'. 
6426 Treasurer-General v Van Vuren 1905 TS 582 at 589. 
6427 Smith v Morum Bros (1877) 7 Buch 20. 
6428 BGHZ 197, 326. 
6429 AO = Abgabenordnung (German Fiscal Code). § 226 AO ('Set-off): '(1) Unless otherwise stipulated, the 
provisions of civil law shall apply mutatis mutandis with regard to using both claims from the tax debtor-creditor 
relationship and counterclaims to set off claims. (2) Claims arising from the tax debtor-creditor relationship may 
not be used as set-off where they have lapsed through limitation or the expiry of a period of exclusion. (3) 
Taxpayers may set off claims arising from the tax debtor-creditor relationship only with counterclaims which are 
uncontested and have been established as final and binding. (4) The political subdivision that administers the tax 
shall also be deemed to be creditor or debtor of a claim from the tax debtor-creditor relationship with respect to 
any set-off.' 
6430 See Christie and Bradfield Law of Contract 497, with further references. 
6431 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 2.5.3 at 28. 
6432 BGH NJW 1985, 550 and 1998, 3119 et seq.  
6433 See discussion on reg 44(3)(b) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 b). 
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agreed service, such as the installation, are unfair. This similar treatment to the German regime 
seems also justified in South Africa. Otherwise, the consumer bears the risk in case of the 
supplier's insolvency, which is not rare in South Africa, especially for artisans. A different 
treatment seems appropriate where the monies to be paid by the client are held under secure 
arrangements (deposit account).  
The first part of regulation 44(3)(b) has no similar provision in §§ 307 to 309. § 309 no. 8 lit. 
b) aa) and bb) have a different scope of application. Both regimes come to the same result 
regarding expenses related to the transport of defective goods. With regard to the second part 
of item (b), most conditions for a set-off are similar in both regimes. The greylisting of the 
South African provision comes to the same results as the blacklisting of the German item since 
the German legislator did not outlaw set-offs per se, but only in certain cases. The user's 
recognition of a claim means that the debt is capable of easy and speedy proof, which is also a 
prerequisite for a compensatio in the South African regime. In Germany, a set-off with owed 
tax vis-à-vis the tax administration is possible however, unlike South Africa. In both countries, 
set-offs with alimonies are forbidden though. 
c) Regulation 44(3)(c) 
Under this item, a term is presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect of limiting the 
supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his or her agents or making his or 
her commitments subject to compliance with a particular condition that depends exclusively 
on the supplier. This provision targets entire agreement clauses and non-variation clauses.6434 
The German standard terms legislation does not contain a comparable item. § 309 no. 11 
applies to provisions by which the supplier imposes a liability or duty of responsibility on an 
agent, and therefore has another scope of application. No. 13 of § 309 concerns clauses that 
provide that declarations are tied to a more stringent form than written or text form, or to special 
receipt requirements. 
On the other hand, according to the BGH and legal literature, written-form clauses cannot 
prevent the validity of an individually agreed term if the parties expressly agreed that their oral 
agreement should prevail over the pre-formulated written-form clause.6435 This even applies if 
the written-form clause is valid in terms of the general clause of § 307.6436 If there is a need for 
                                                             
6434 See discussion on reg 44(3)(c) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 c). 
6435 BGH NJW 1985, 320 (322), WLP/Hau § 305b para 33, with further references. 
6436 BGH NJW 2006, 138 et seq; NJW-RR 1995, 179 (180); UBH/Ulmer and Schäfer § 305b para 33. 
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clarification and proof, e.g., in life-insurance contracts, the written form clause may be valid, 
however.6437 It may also be valid if it is made before the conclusion of the contract in order to 
protect the supplier from agreements made by its agents that go beyond their power of 
representation.6438 In any event, the user's and the other party's interests have to be balanced 
against each other.6439 
In other words, the fact that regulation 44(3)(c) greylists such clauses whereas German courts 
take a nuanced stance as to the parties' mutual interests means that in many cases, both regimes 
come to the same result. The German regime seems to be more stringent however since it only 
accepts the validity of such clauses in some instances. 
d) Regulation 44(3)(d) 
Item (d) of regulation 44(3) applies to the supplier's vicarious liability for its agents. This 
provision only applies to the supplier's vicarious liability under the residual common law since 
section 113(1) applies to the supplier's joint and several liability in terms of the Act, e.g., the 
liability for defective goods pursuant to section 61.6440 
Vicarious liability of the employer is given where the employee fulfils three requirements. 
First, a particular relationship, e.g., employment, is necessary at the time when the delict is 
committed. Second, the delict must have been committed by the employee, and third, the latter 
must act within the scope of its employment when committing the delict or must have been 
engaged in any activity reasonably incidental to it.6441 
§§ 308 or 309 do not contain a similar item. § 309 no. 11 pertains to the other party's and not 
to the supplier's agents6442 and therefore has another ambit. 
Under § 831, a person who uses another person to perform a task is liable to make compensation 
for the damage that the other unlawfully inflicts on a third party when carrying out the task. 
German legislation only allows the user to exculpate itself if it exercises reasonable care when 
selecting the person deployed and, to the extent that it is to procure devices or equipment or to 
                                                             
6437 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634 et seq). 
6438 BGH NJW 1991, 2559. 
6439 See Part II ch 3 para 3.3 c). 
6440 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 48. 
6441 F v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Institute for Security Studies and Others as Amici Curiae) 
2012 (3) BCLR 244 (CC). 
6442 See discussion on reg 44(3)(c) and (d) in Part I ch 3 paras 3.4.1 c) and d). See also item (n) in the Annex of 
the EU Unfair Terms Directive that largely corresponds to item (c) of reg 44(3). 
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manage the business activity, in the procurement or management, or if the damage would have 
occurred even if this care had been exercised.6443 
Hence, the content of regulation 44(3)(d) is not reflected in §§ 308 or 309, but in § 831 dealing 
with tort. Both regimes thus come to the same results. 
e) Regulation 44(3)(e) 
Item (e) greylists clauses that force the consumer to assume liability for obligations that the 
supplier has in terms of the Act, e.g., a claim for harm caused by defective goods under section 
61.6444 Such terms are an inappropriate transfer of risks to the consumer.6445  
The German standard business terms legislation does not contain a similar item. § 309 no. 8 
lit. b) aa) prohibits clauses providing that claims against the user due to defects in their entirety 
or in regard to individual parts are excluded, limited to the granting of claims against third 
parties or made dependent upon prior court action taken against third parties.6446 
The German provision only applies to the supply of newly produced things and relating to the 
performance of work and is thus narrower. Both regimes are somehow congruent though in 
that the entire or partial exclusion of claims against the supplier/user with regard to individual 
parts is prohibited. In terms of the BGB, the client must be allowed to the minimum standard 
set out in §§ 434 and 634 and be entitled to free itself from the agreement.6447  
One could make the argument that § 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) concerning the exclusion of the other 
party's rights is more similar to section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii). This item blacklists clauses that 
purport to waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of the Act (i) or avoid a supplier's 
obligation or duty in terms of the Act (ii). Such rights are afforded to the consumer in terms of 
sections 54, 55 and 56. 
What is more, § 309 no. 8 lit. b) bb) has a broader scope of application in the sense that it also 
prohibits clauses by which the user refers its client to a third party in order to assert his or her 
rights. In addition, clauses that require prior court action against third parties are also forbidden 
by this provision. 
                                                             
6443 Palandt/Sprau § 831 paras 10-15. 
6444 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 50. See also discussion on reg 
44(3)(e) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 e). 
6445 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 18.2.7 at 73. 
6446 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.8.4.2 a). 
6447 Stoffels AGB-Recht 367. 
 1010   
 
Both the South African and the German provisions are thus only congruent in that the entire or 
partial exclusion of claims with regard to newly produced things or work performances is 
concerned. The German provisions have a broader scope of application in that they also 
prohibit clauses by which the user refers its client to a third party in order to assert his or her 
rights as well as clauses that require prior court action against third parties. 
f) Regulation 44(3)(f) 
Item (f) greylists clauses of a consumer agreement if they have the purpose or effect of 
excluding or restricting the consumer's right to rely on the statutory defence of prescription.6448 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) contains a somewhat similar, but narrower provision.6449 
Under section 11(d) of the South African Prescription Act, claims in connection with contracts 
prescribe after three years. 
Prescription periods are generally subject to the principle of freedom of contract in 
Germany.6450 On the other hand, for the sale of consumer goods, new provisions on the 
limitation have been inserted which aim to preserve the consumer's rights in the case of 
defects6451 with respect to the limitation period and the beginning of this period (§ 438).6452 A 
shortening of the limitation period of two years to one year is therefore only permissible for 
                                                             
6448 See discussion on reg 44(3)(f) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 f). 
6449 See Part II ch 5 para 2.2.8.2.4 f). Pursuant to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff), even to the extent that a deviation from the 
statutory provisions is permissible, 'the limitation of claims against the user due to defects in the cases cited in 
[§] 438 (1) no. 2 and [§] 634a (1) no. 2 is made easier, or in other cases a limitation period of less than one year 
reckoned from the beginning of the statutory limitation period is attained' is ineffective. 
6450 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. 
6451 § 437: 'If the thing is defective, the buyer may, provided the requirements of the following provisions are met 
and unless otherwise specified, 1. under [§] 439, demand cure, 2. revoke the agreement under [§§] 440, 323 and 
326 (5) or reduce the purchase price under [§] 441, and 3. under [§§] 440, 280, 281, 283 and 311a, demand 
damages, or under [§] 284, demand reimbursement of futile expenditure.'  
6452 § 438: '(1) The claims cited in [§] 437 no. 1 and 3 become statute-barred 1. in thirty years, if the defect consists 
a) a real right of a third party on the basis of which return of the purchased thing may be demanded, or b) some 
other right registered in the Land Register, 2. in five years a) in relation to a building, and b) in relation to a thing 
that has been used for a building in accordance with the normal way it is used and has resulted in the defectiveness 
of the building, and 3. otherwise in two years. (2) In the case of a plot of land the limitation period commences 
upon the delivery of possession, in other cases upon delivery of the thing. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) no. 
2 and 3 and subsection (2), claims become statute-barred in the standard limitation period if the seller fraudulently 
concealed the defect. In the case of subsection (1) no. 2, however, claims are not statute-barred before the end of 
the period there specified. (4) The right of revocation referred to in [§] 437 is subject to [§] 218. Notwithstanding 
the fact that a revocation is ineffective under [§] 218 (1), the buyer may refuse to pay the purchase price to the 
extent he would be so entitled on the basis of revocation. If he makes use of this right, the seller may revoke the 
agreement. (5) [§] 218 and subsection (4) sentence 2 above apply with the necessary modifications to the right to 
reduce the price set out in [§] 437.'  
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the sale of used goods (§ 476). Excepted from the prohibition of disadvantageous limitation 
periods in consumer sale contracts are claims for damages (§ 476(3)).6453 
With regard to consumer sale contracts, both regimes thus consider an exclusion or restriction 
of the prescription period suspicious. The German prescription period is one year shorter, 
though (2 years). 
In respect of consumer sale contracts, § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) finds no application, and other 
contracts require a differentiation.6454 
The German provision is more extensive in the sense that the formulation 'making limitation 
easier' does not only include a shortening of the limitation period but also any measures that 
have the same direct or indirect result, such as an earlier beginning of the limitation period.6455 
Hence, to some extent, § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) is similar to item (f). With regard to consumer sale 
contracts, both regimes consider an exclusion or restriction of the prescription period 
suspicious. The German prescription period is one year shorter, though. Moreover, the German 
regime is more comprehensive because the formulation 'making limitation easier' does not only 
apply to a shortening of the limitation period but also to any measures that have the same result. 
The South African legislator should thus consider including such facilitations of the limitation 
period into the greylist as the consumers' need for protection is similar in these cases. 
g) Regulation 44(3)(g) 
Regulation 44(3)(g) greylists terms which have the purpose or effect of modifying the normal 
rules regarding the distribution of risk to the detriment of the consumer. As discussed in 
Part I,6456 for the meaning of 'normal rules', the approach by which the naturalia of an 
agreement in the absence of express terms6457 is convincing. 
The common law provides a rule under which the risk of destruction or damage to sold goods 
rests on the purchaser when the parties agreed that the seller has to deliver goods at a place 
other than the place of sale or manufacture. Consumers will have difficulties to prove that the 
supplier took reasonable steps in order to avoid any damage to the goods, which makes this 
                                                             
6453 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373.   
6454 In relation to a building or building materials, the limitation period is five years (§§ 438(1) no. 2 and 634a (1) 
no. 2)) because defects in this area often show very late so that the customer must have a period long enough to 
ascertain his or her rights. Standard clauses making the limitation period in these cases easier are therefore not 
permissible. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. 
6455 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 95. 
6456 See discussion on reg 44(3)(g) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 g). 
6457 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 278 and 279. 
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common-law rule unfair.6458 In the absence of any statutory provision, this would be a ‘normal 
rule regarding the distribution of risk’ in terms of regulation 44(3)(g). 
§§ 308 and 309 do not contain a similar provision. The BGB contains several provisions on the 
distribution of risk, however.  
Under § 286, the obligor who fails to perform, following a warning notice from the obligee that 
is made after the performance is due, is in default as a result of the warning notice. § 287 
provides that while he or she is in default, the obligor is responsible for all negligence. The 
obligor is liable for performance in the case of chance as well unless the damage would have 
occurred even if the performance had been made in good time. On the other hand, if the obligee 
is in default, the obligor is, during the period of the default of the obligee, only responsible for 
intent and gross negligence (§ 300). For sales shipments, the distribution of risk is set out in 
§ 447. According to this provision, if the seller, at the request of the buyer, ships the thing sold 
to another place than the place of performance, the risk passes to the buyer as soon as the seller 
has handed the thing over to the forwarder, carrier or other person or body specified to carry 
out the shipment. If the buyer has given a particular instruction on the method of shipping the 
thing and the seller, without a strong reason, does not adhere to this instruction, the seller is 
liable to the buyer for the damage arising from this. 
Since the distribution of risk is exhaustively regulated by statutory law, the German legislature 
did not need to insert a provision dealing with the distribution of risk into §§ 308 or 309. Both 
regimes offer a balanced distribution of risk for both parties. 
h)  Regulation 44(3)(h) 
According to regulation 44(3)(h), a provision allowing the supplier to increase the price agreed 
with the consumer when the agreement was concluded without giving the consumer the right 
to terminate the agreement, is presumed to be unfair.6459 Hence, a clause may be fair if the 
consumer is granted a right to cancel the agreement.6460  
§ 309 no. 16461 prohibits price increases within the first four months after the conclusion of the 
contract per se. Price increases occurring after this period are assessed under the general clause. 
Naudé contends that such a definite time scale seems unwise and prefers the approach of 
                                                             
6458 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 53. 
6459 See discussion on reg 44(3)(h) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 a). 
6460 See BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 28. 
6461 See discussion on § 309 no. 1 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.1. 
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greylisting.6462 A fixed time scale gives certainty to the consumer, however. If it is not too long 
for the supplier, it can adjust its prices quickly when necessary, e.g., because of price increases 
in raw materials. 
The South African provision does not explicitly exclude contracts concerning continuing 
obligations (open-ended agreements) from its scope of application, unlike § 309 no. 1. The 
protection granted by the German general clause for price increases concerning continuing 
obligations would not fall short of item (h) though. What is more, the BGB grants an ordinary 
right to revoke an agreement as well as an extraordinary right of withdrawal for continuing 
obligations in terms of § 314 for a compelling reason. An unacceptable price increase is such 
a compelling reason.6463 
Insurance contracts, leases, subscriptions or loan agreements, but also apportioned contracts6464 
and recurring obligations6465 are qualified as continuing obligations in the sense of § 309 
no. 1.6466 German courts apply a more generous standard for continuing obligations, though. 
They argue that price increase clauses in this type of contracts are an 'appropriate and accepted 
instrument to keep in balance price and performance'.6467 
Prohibited price increase standard clauses infringe the pacta sunt servanda principle and are 
an obstacle for price comparisons and competition. Price increases concern not only the actual, 
nominal price but also ancillary performances and VAT. This also applies to the South African 
regime.6468 
§ 309 no. 1 covers all types of transactions save those concerning immovable objects.6469 Item 
(h) of regulation 44(3) applies to consumer agreements, i.e., agreements between a supplier 
and a consumer other than a franchise agreement.6470 Both regimes therefore have an extensive 
scope of application and exclude each only a particular type of transactions. 
Section 5(2)(d) excludes the application of the Act for credits which are governed by the 
National Credit Act. Thus, price increase clauses in such credit agreements, e.g., for interest 
                                                             
6462 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 60 note 3. 
6463 Stoffels AGB-Recht 331. 
6464 Sukzessivlieferungsverträge or Teillieferungsverträge. 
6465 Wiederkehrschuldverhältnisse.  
6466 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 27. 
6467 BGH NJW 2012, 2187 (2189). 
6468 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 62. 
6469 Stoffels AGB-Recht 333. 
6470 See definition of 'consumer agreement' in s 1. 
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and fees, are not covered by regulation 44(3).6471 The German regime does not provide for such 
an exception, with the exception of the excluded fields contemplated in § 310(4). 
§ 309 no. 1 contains an absolute prohibition for price increases in the given cases, i.e., without 
the possibility for the user to justify price increases. Therefore, price increases on the user's 
side (e.g., price increase for material, raw materials, salaries etc.) do not allow for a passing on 
to the consumer.6472 This is not necessarily the case for regulation 44(3)(h) as this provision is 
merely greylisted. Clauses allowing for price increases because of ‘increased labour or material 
costs’, ‘costs as a result of industrial dispute’, external factors beyond the supplier’s control’ 
or ‘price increases by the supplier’s subcontractors’ are likely to be qualified as unfair though. 
This is especially true if they do not allow the consumer to cancel the agreement. Besides, the 
consumer is less able in these cases to control and anticipate such changes than the supplier.6473 
Moreover, regulation 44(4)(b) provides for some exceptions in which item (h) does not apply. 
These exceptions are legitimate because they are beyond the supplier’s control when operating 
in uncertain markets that contain variable pricing elements.  
For so-called 'cost element clauses'6474 in long-term consumer contracts (over 4 months) for 
which the general clause of § 307 is applicable, the BGH requires that the clause contain the 
different cost elements and their weighting for the calculation of the total price.6475 Where such 
a concretisation is not possible, the clause must contain the right to cancel the agreement in the 
case of a price increase.6476 An exception applies for price adjustment clauses in energy supply 
contracts. If these do not contain the various cost elements and their weighting with regard to 
the price calculation, they do not become valid. This applies even if they contain the consumer's 
right to cancel the agreement when the supplier adjusts its prices, and if the cancellation is only 
possible for the time after the price increase or is tied to unacceptable costs for the client.6477  
This also applies to the South African regime. Clauses by which suppliers can unilaterally 
increase their prices without giving their consumers the possibility to cancel the respective 
agreement are usually unfair. This applies especially when the clause does not contain clear 
                                                             
6471 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 63. 
6472 BGH NJW 1985, 855 (856), WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 1 para 52. 
6473 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 12.3 at 67, Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen 
(eds) CPA Commentary para 61. 
6474 Kostenelementeklausel. 
6475 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (361). 
6476 BGH NJW 1986, 3134 (3135). 
6477 BGH NJW 2007, 1054. 
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indications as regards the modus operandi for the calculation of the new price and the events 
triggering such an increase.6478  
The strict evaluations of no. 1 cannot be applied to B2B contracts and have no indicative 
effect.6479 This is because business partners can be expected to assess such clauses and refuse 
them if they are unfair.6480 Regulation 44(3)(h) does not apply to B2B contracts either. 
In summary, regulation 44(3)(h) concerns price increases and corresponds to some extent to 
the blacklisted item of § 309 no. 1. The German provision contains a fixed time scale, which 
means that price increases are not prohibited per se. This norm excludes open-ended 
agreements from its scope of application. The BGB grants an ordinary right to revoke an 
agreement as well as an extraordinary right of withdrawal for continuing obligations, however. 
Hence, both regimes offer a balanced solution. Both include ancillary performances and VAT 
into their understanding of price increases and have a wide scope of application. Although the 
South African item is merely greylisted, price increases due to certain factors that lie in the 
supplier's sphere are likely to be qualified as unfair so that the same result is achieved in these 
cases as in the absolute prohibition of the German item. Furthermore, both pieces of legislation 
require that the supplier must indicate the modus operandi for the calculation of the new price 
(in Germany, this applies for price increases after 4 months). Neither regime is applicable to 
B2B contracts. 
i) Regulation 44(3)(i) 
Regulation 44(3)(i) of the Act provides that terms by which the supplier may unilaterally alter 
the terms of the agreement including the characteristics of the product or service are presumed 
to be unfair.6481 
§ 308 no. 4 contains a similar item.6482 The German provision contains a reasonableness 
qualification, though. This means that the modification of the performance must be reasonable 
('zumutbar') for the client. According to the BGH, pre-formulated and unilateral modification 
clauses of the user are only effective if the clause indicates serious grounds for the 
                                                             
6478 See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 12.1 at 57. 
6479 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 1 para 45. 
6480 Stoffels AGB-Recht 338. 
6481 See discussion on reg 44(3)(i) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 b). 
6482 See discussion on § 309 no. 4 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.4.1. 
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modifications, and if the conditions and implications for the other party are reasonably 
considered.6483  
The clause must enable the other party to be prepared for a possible modification of the initially 
agreed performance.6484 This is the case where the modification or deviation is due to the 
particularity of the performance, or inevitable due to serious circumstances. A rise of the user's 
costs is irrelevant however because this would lead to a significant shift of the risks to the 
customer's disadvantage.6485 In any event, the balance between performance and 
consideration6486 must not be disturbed.6487 
In terms of regulation 44(4)(c)(iv), open-ended agreements6488 are excluded from the scope of 
application of regulation 44(3)(i) provided that the supplier informs the consumer thereof and 
the consumer is free to dissolve the agreement immediately. On the other hand, certain types 
of long-term agreements are always excluded from the application of the Act, such as 
employment contracts6489 or long-term insurance contracts.6490 Contrary to § 308 no. 3, no. 4 
is also applicable to continuing obligations (open-ended agreements) since the danger inherent 
to modifications or deviations is the same in this type of contracts.6491 The South African 
legislature was probably of the view that suppliers should be able to modify their performances 
in longer engagements. The German legislator, on the other hand, aims to protect the other 
party because it should receive what it contracted for, also in long-term contracts, ergo open-
ended agreements. 
Under regulation 44(4)(c), item (i) of regulation 44(3) does not apply to a term under which a 
supplier of financial services reserves the right to alter the interest rate payable by the consumer 
or due to the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where 
there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier informs the consumer immediately thereof 
and the consumer can dissolve the agreement at the earliest opportunity.  
                                                             
6483 BGH NJW 2000, 515 (521). According to the OFT, variation clauses allowing minor technical amendments 
which do not affect the performance of the product, or amendments required by law should not be considered 
unfair. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.3 at 54. 
6484 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (362), WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 para 24. 
6485 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 9, Stoffels AGB-Recht 328. 
6486 Äquivalenzverhältnis. 
6487 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 4 para 7. 
6488 These are contracts of indeterminate duration. See Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA 
Commentary para 64. 
6489 See s 5(2)(e). 
6490 Schedule 2 item 10 read with s 1 s.v. 'service' (c)(ii). 
6491 Stoffels AGB-Recht 327. 
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This partly corresponds to no. 4 of § 308 because this item only concerns modifications of the 
user's performance.6492 For modifications of the other party's performance, the given clause has 
to be assessed under the general clause.6493  
The South African regime thus excludes performances related to interests outright, no matter 
which party owes the interests. On the other hand, the exception of regulation 44(4)(c)(i) only 
concerns suppliers of financial services. Other suppliers that do not fall under this category 
therefore seem to be subject to regulation 44(3)(i). The German legislation takes a more general 
stance by excluding all performances of the client and includes all standard business terms 
users, and not only financial services suppliers. 
Regulation 44(4)(c) also excludes transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments 
and other products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange 
quotation or index or a financial market rate that the trader does not control. It applies as well 
as to an agreement for the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller’s cheques or 
international money orders denominated in foreign currency. 
§ 308 no. 4 does not contain a similar caveat, which is however balanced by the fact that the 
German provision contains a reasonableness requirement. This is because a clause that 
excludes the aforementioned transactions must enable the other party to be prepared for a 
possible modification of the initially agreed performance.6494 This is the case where the 
modification or deviation is due to the particularity of the performance, or inevitable due to 
serious circumstances. For the type of transactions mentioned above, this can be assumed 
because clients of transferable securities or those buying shares are aware of fluctuations of the 
given markets and prepared to non-foreseeable performances. 
Regulation 44(3)(i) greylists alterations of the terms of the agreement, including the 
characteristics of the product or service, whereas § 308 no. 4 speaks of the 'performance 
promised'. The prohibition in the German provision does not only cover the principal obligation 
though as the wording ('modify the performance promised') covers any modifications of 
                                                             
6492 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 4 para 4. Regulation 44(3)(i) read in conjunction with reg 44(4)(c) comes to the same 
result in the case of interest rates and other financial charges payable by the consumer by simply excluding them 
from the application of reg 44(3)(i). 
6493 Stoffels AGB-Recht 326. In this context, the BGH decided that a pre-formulated interest adjustment clause by 
which the bank can modify the interest rate payable in the context of a saving contract at will infringes § 308 
no. 4. In this case, the interests are the client's, and not the bank's performance (BGH NJW 2004, 1588 (1589)). 
On the other hand, an interest rate adjustment clause in a mortgage contract by which the bank is entitled to modify 
the interest rate if it deems necessary to do so is ineffective under § 307 (BGH NJW 2009, 2051 (2053 et seq)). 
6494 BGH NJW 2008, 360 (362), WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 para 24. 
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ancillary obligations and performances as well as the modalities of the performance.6495 
Clauses by which the user is entitled to render part performance (§ 266) are also subject to 
no. 4. 
Despite the different wording, both regimes are formulated wide enough to cover all sorts of 
'performances'. 
Item (i) thus corresponds partly to § 308 no 4 with the exception that the German provision 
contains a reasonableness qualification. The South African item does not apply to open-ended 
agreements, however. Excluded are also modifications of the interest rate payable by the 
consumer or due to the latter. This corresponds to some extent to § 308 no. 4 in that the German 
item only concerns a modification of the user's performance. The German provision is more 
general because it excludes all performances of the client and includes not only suppliers of 
financial services but all standard business terms users. The fact that the German item does not 
contain a similar caveat as in regulation 44(4)(c) is balanced by the reasonableness requirement 
of § 308 no. 4. Even though both regimes chose a different wording, they are worded wide 
enough to cover all sorts of 'performances'. 
j) Regulation 44(3)(j) 
§§ 308 or 309 do not contain a provision similar to regulation 44(3)(j), according to which a 
term is presumed to be unfair if it gives the supplier the right to determine whether the goods 
or services supplied are in conformity with the agreement, or the exclusive right to construe 
any term of the agreement.6496 
§ 309 no. 2 lit. b) mentions the acknowledgement of defects by the user but only in the context 
of a right of retention in terms of § 273.6497 This provision is therefore much more restrictive 
in its application that item (j) of the South African regulation. 
Such terms are thus assessed in terms of the German general clause of § 307. Even though the 
seller might exclude or restrict the buyer's rights with regard to a defect in terms of §§ 434 et 
seq. insofar as the seller did not fraudulently conceal the defect or gave a guarantee of the 
quality of the thing (§ 444), clauses that give the supplier the right to determine whether the 
goods or services supplied are in conformity with the agreement are likely to be unfair. This is 
                                                             
6495 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 4 paras 5 and 7. 
6496 Item (m) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 has the 
same wording as reg 44(3). See discussion on reg 44(3)(j) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 c). 
6497 See discussion on § 309 no. 2 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.2. 
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because they are not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provisions from which 
they deviate, i.e., §§ 434 et seq. A standard clause by which the seller unilaterally is entitled to 
determine whether he or she has supplied in conformity with the contract is not compatible 
with the principle that the buyer should not be subject to a clause which gives the supplier the 
right to carry out its own tests or inspections in order to determine whether the client’s 
complaint is well-founded. Such clauses would be a restriction of the consumer’s right to 
declare a dispute as to whether the supplier has performed its part of the agreement. In this 
case, the supplier would be the judge in its own affair, place its conduct above the law, and 
confer a judicial authority which is usually performed by the courts.6498  
The same applies to clauses by which the other party has the exclusive right to interpret the 
terms of the contract. 
Thus, the German regime achieves the same level of protection by applying the general clause. 
k) Regulation 44(3)(k) 
Item (k) greylists terms allowing the supplier to terminate the agreement at will where the same 
right is not granted to the consumer.6499 
This item is comparable with § 308 no. 3, read in conjunction with no. 8.6500 No. 3 of § 308 
provides that an agreement of a right of the user to free himself from his obligation to perform 
without any objectively justified reason indicated in the contract is ineffective. Under no. 8, 
the reservation of the user's right to free itself from its duty to perform in the absence of 
availability of performance is ineffective if the user does not agree to inform the other party 
without undue delay of the unavailability and reimburse the latter immediately for 
consideration. 
Neither the South African nor the German regimes apply to open-ended agreements. 
Continuing obligations subject to the German provision must thus be assessed in terms of the 
general clause of § 307. In this regard, the evaluations of the provisions of the Annex of the 
Unfair Terms Directive must be taken into account, namely items (c), (f) and (g).6501 The 
                                                             
6498 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 294. 
6499 See discussion on reg 44 (3)(k) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 d). 
6500 See discussion on § 308 no. 3 and 8 in Part II ch 5 para 2.3.3. 
6501 Item (c) of the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive 93/13/EEC: Terms which have the object or effect of: 
'making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or supplier is subject 
to a condition whose realization depends on his own will alone' are ineffective. Item (f): Terms 'authorizing the 
seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis where the same facility is not granted to the 
consumer, or permitting the seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where 
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German legislator was of the view that it is the characteristic of open-ended agreements to be 
ended without any particular reason, by ordinary termination. According to the legislature, an 
ordinary termination would be an objectively justified reason for this type of agreements. If 
standard business terms provided for an ordinary termination of continuing obligations, it 
would not make sense to require also the indication of a justified reason.6502 
Regulation 44(3)(k) of the Act does not apply to open-ended agreements either (see regulation 
44(3)(l)) for fixed-term agreements; for the latter, section 14(2)(b) applies in terms of 
cancellation). Hence, item (k) is only applicable to ‘once-off’ transactions. As section 14 does 
not apply to juristic persons, regardless of their annual turnover or asset value, juristic persons 
do not seem to have the protection of section 14.6503 
Item (l) of the South African regulation deals with the termination of open-ended agreements. 
The legislator does not greylist terminations 'at will' like in item (k), but the supplier must not 
terminate the contract without reasonable notice (except in case of material breach).6504 
Although in terms of the wording of regulation 44(4)(a), paragraph (k) of subregulation 44(3) 
does not apply to a term by which a supplier of financial services reserves the right to terminate 
an open-ended agreement without notice unilaterally, this qualification was actually meant to 
qualify item (l) in regulation 44(3), which deals with termination clauses for open-ended 
agreements.6505 This editorial error should be corrected. For open-ended agreements, item (l) 
of the regulation is lex specialis to item (k). 
Compared to § 308 no. 3 and 8, regulation 44(3)(k) has another legal purpose. The main 
criterion for greylisting terms according to which the supplier may terminate the contract at 
will where the same right is not granted to the consumer is the excessive one-sidedness,6506 
whereas § 308 no. 3 and 8 aim at ensuring compliance with the pacta sunt servanda 
principle.6507 
§ 308 no. 3 requires that a clause in terms of which the user is entitled to free itself from the 
contract be transparent and that the reason for the disengagement be indicated explicitly in the 
                                                             
it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract' are ineffective. Item (g): Terms 'enabling the seller 
or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration without reasonable notice except where there are 
serious grounds for doing so' are ineffective. 
6502 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26. 
6503 Section 14(1). 
6504 Item (l) will be discussed later. 
6505 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 79. 
6506 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 75. 
6507 Stoffels AGB-Recht 319. 
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clause so that an average client can assess when the user is entitled to use this right.6508 Clauses 
such as 'operational problems of any kind'6509 or 'for compelling reasons'6510 are too vague and 
therefore insufficient. On the other hand, indications like 'in the case of force majeure, strike 
or shortage of raw materials'6511 sufficiently restrict the cases in which the user may free itself 
from the contract and give the other party a clear understanding. 
The former UK Office of Fair Trading took a similar stance. According to the Office, a clause 
which does not merely allow the supplier to cancel at will may be fair if it would be impractical 
or impossible to complete the contract, provided that it clearly and accurately describes the 
circumstances in which the supplier may terminate the contract, and require that the supplier 
find out and inform the consumer as soon as possible. The circumstances must be beyond the 
supplier’s control. In such circumstances, it may also be fair only to return prepayments without 
any further liability.6512 This position corresponds to § 308 no. 8 lit. b) according to which the 
other party's counter-performance must be reimbursed immediately if the performance is not 
available. 
Under the German provision, the specifically indicated reason for the user's disengagement 
must also be objectively justified. This means that the reason mentioned in the contract must 
concern – in an abstract manner – significant interests of the user in order to be legitimate. 
No. 3 thus requires a weighing of both parties' interests, and the user can only free itself from 
the contract if it has an outweighing or at least a reasonable interest to end the agreement.6513  
This corresponds to the South African formulation 'at will' in item (k). Clauses that are subject 
to this item must clearly and specifically describe the circumstances in which the supplier may 
cancel. They must also require that the supplier find out and inform the consumer as soon as 
possible if such circumstances do apply, and explain the reasons for the proposed cancellation 
if they are not obvious. The circumstances must be beyond the supplier’s control.6514 
Regulation 44(3)(k) does not apply to clauses which allow a termination of the contract for 
stated reasons, like breach. A cancellation clause (lex commissoria) allowing termination for 
breach, even when minor, or a clause allowing a termination upon stated but vaguely worded 
                                                             
6508 BAG NZA 2006, 539 (541). 
6509 See BGH NJW 1983, 1320 (1321). 
6510 See OLG Cologne NJW-RR 1998, 926. 
6511 See OLG Koblenz NJW-RR 1989, 1459 (1460). 
6512 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 6.1.5 at 44. See also § 308 no. 8. 
6513 BGH NJW 1987, 831 (833), BAG NZA 2006, 539 (541). 
6514 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 6.1.5 at 44. 
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general grounds, must be assessed under section 48. Some pieces of legislation (e.g., the Hire-
Purchase Act,6515 the Alienation of Land Act6516 and the National Credit Act6517) set out criteria 
that must be met before a contract may be cancelled. Then, a cancellation by the supplier merely 
reflects the ordinary law and should be qualified as a cancellation ex lege, and not as ex 
contractu.6518 
Both the South African and the German items concern the termination of agreements by the 
supplier and do not apply to open-ended agreements. The fact that for the German provision, 
the specifically indicated reason for the user's disengagement must be objectively justified is 
reflected by the South African formulation 'at will'. The editorial error contained in regulation 
44(4)(a) should be corrected as this provision was meant for item (l) of regulation 44(3).  
l) Regulation 44(3)(l) 
Regulation 44(3)(l) refers to terms enabling the supplier to terminate an open-ended agreement 
without reasonable notice save where the consumer has committed a material breach of 
contract.6519 
The exception regulated in regulation 44(4)(a) and the editorial error contained therein have 
already been discussed further above. 
§§ 308 or 309 do not contain a similar provision. As discussed under item (k) above, the 
German legislator was of the view that open-ended agreements are characterised by the fact 
that they can be terminated without any particular reason by ordinary termination. § 3146520 
provides for an exception where open-ended agreements may be terminated for compelling 
reasons without giving notice. Compelling reasons are, for instance, a cancellation of a gym 
                                                             
6515 36 of 1942, s 12(b). 
6516 68 of 1981, s 19. 
6517 34 of 2005, s 123. 
6518 Vessio LLD thesis 429. 
6519 See discussion on reg 44(3)(l) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 e). 
6520 § 314: '(1) Each party may terminate a contract for the performance of a continuing obligation for a compelling 
reason without a notice period. There is a compelling reason if the terminating party, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the specific case and weighing the interests of both parties, cannot reasonably be expected to 
continue the contractual relationship until the agreed end or until the expiry of a notice period. (2) If the compelling 
reason consists in the breach of a duty under the contract, the contract may be terminated only after the expiry 
without result of a period specified for relief or after a warning notice without result. Section 323 (2) number 1 
und 2 applies, with the necessary modifications, as regards the dispensability of specifying a period for such relief 
and as regards the dispensability of a warning notice. Specifying a period for relief and issuing a warning notice 
can also be dispensed with if special circumstances are given which, when the interests of both parties are weighed, 
justify immediate termination. (3) The person entitled may give notice only within a reasonable period after 
obtaining knowledge of the reason for termination. (4) The right to demand damages is not excluded by the 
termination.' 
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membership due to the member's pregnancy. The cancellation of a life insurance policy due to 
the insolvency of the insured person is not considered a compelling reason in the sense of this 
provision, though.6521 A wrongful act, or breach, is not necessary for § 314. 
The German provision thus offers the possibility to both parties, and not only the supplier, to 
cancel an open-ended agreement without reasonable notice under certain circumstances. What 
is more, a wrongful act such as breach is not necessary. This difference of both regimes can be 
explained by their underlying dogmatic foundations. The Act is a pure consumer protection 
statute which aims to protect consumers, whereas the BGB provisions strive at a balanced 
solution for both parties. 
m) Regulation 44(3)(m) 
In terms of regulation 44(3)(m), a clause is presumed to be unfair if it has the purpose or effect 
of obliging the consumer to fulfil all his or her obligations where the supplier has failed to fulfil 
all his or her obligations.6522 
Even though item (m) reflects several items of the EC Unfair Terms Directive, such as items 
(b), (n) and (o), the German grey- or blacklists do not contain a similar provision. § 309 no. 8 
lit. b) dd)6523 has a different scope of application since regulation 44(3)(m) mainly concerns 
provisions by which the consumer has to continue paying although the goods or services he or 
she had contracted for are not provided as agreed. Item (m) therefore concerns the supplier's 
principal obligation and not secondary claims such as warranties. 
On the other hand, § 309 no. 2 has the same effect as item (m). According to the German 
provision, exclusions or restrictions of the other party's right to refuse performance under § 320 
or its right of retention in terms of § 273 are prohibited. 
§ 320 contains a right to refuse performance. It regulates that a person who is a party to a 
reciprocal contract may refuse his or her part of the performance until the other party renders 
consideration unless he or she is obliged to perform in advance.  
The right of retention of § 2736524 is also based on the principle of contractual fairness. This 
provision grants a right of retention for all rights originating from the same legal relationship 
                                                             
6521 Palandt/Grüneberg § 314 para 7, with further references. 
6522 See discussion on reg 44(3)(m) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 f). 
6523 See discussion on § 309 no. 8 lit. b) dd) in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.8.2.4 d). 
6524 § 273: '1) If the obligor has a claim that is due against the obligee under the same legal relationship as that on 
which the obligation is based, he may, unless the obligation leads to a different conclusion, refuse the performance 
owed by him, until the performance owed to him is rendered (right of retention). (2) A person who is obliged to 
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on which the obligor's obligations are based. The legislator considered the legislator's broad 
interpretation of 'same legal relationship' too far-reaching for § 309 no. 2 which is why this 
provision only applies to a right of retention that is based 'on the same contractual 
relationship'.6525 It is irrelevant whether the right of retention refers to principal or secondary 
obligations, or if the agreement is synallagmatic.6526 
§ 309 no. 2 does not apply where the user's standard terms set out an obligation for the other 
party to pay in advance.6527 In such a case, the given clause is subject to the general clause.6528  
Hence, item (m) partly corresponds to § 309 no. 2 with respect to the effect of both provisions. 
Under the German provision, exclusions or restrictions of the other party's right to refuse 
performance or its right of retention are prohibited. The German norm does not apply to 
standard clauses stipulating advance payment, however. These are assessed under the general 
clause. It can thus be said that both regimes afford the same level of protection. 
n) Regulation 44(3)(n) 
This subregulation refers to clauses which, e.g., entitle the supplier to deliver only partially 
whereas the consumer would have to pay in full.6529 
The practical relevance of this subregulation is however limited as item (b) already greylists 
clauses excluding or limiting the consumer’s right in the event of breach of contract by the 
supplier. Other terms will already be prohibited outright by mandatory provisions in the Act 
concerning the quality of the goods or services, e.g., sections 54, 55 56 and 61, read with 
section 51.   
Regulation 44(3)(n) partly corresponds to § 309 no. 2. In this context, reference is made to the 
discussion on § 309 no. 2 under regulation 44(3)(m). Both regimes offer a comparable level of 
protection. 
                                                             
return an object has the same right, if he is entitled to a claim that is due on account of outlays for the object or on 
account of damage caused to him by the object, unless he obtained the object by means of an intentionally 
committed tort. (3) The obligee may avert the exercise of the right of retention by providing security. The 
providing of security by guarantors is excluded.' 
6525 Stoffels AGB-Recht 339. Emphasis added. 
6526 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 paras 34-36. 
6527 BGH NJW 2006, 3134. 
6528 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 2 para 12 et seq. 
6529 See discussion on reg 44(3)(n) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 g). 
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o) Regulation 44(3)(o) 
Item (o) of the South African regime concerns one-sided renewal terms and greylists clauses 
in terms of which the supplier, but not the consumer, is permitted to renew or not renew the 
agreement. Section 14 of the Consumer Protection Act sets out the maximum duration of fixed-
term agreements and other formal requirements for the supplier.6530 
This provision aims to ensure that the contractual equilibrium between the parties is not 
distorted. Consumers and suppliers should be on an equal footing as regards their right to end 
or withdraw from the contract.  
§§ 308 or 309 do not contain a similar item. § 309 no. 9 protects customers from entering into 
contracts with too long durations by limiting the initial duration to two years, tacit extensions 
to one year and notice periods to three months for certain continuing obligations (open-ended 
agreements).6531 The German provision has therefore another and narrower scope of 
application. 
Hence, such clauses must be assessed in terms of the general clause of § 307, especially by 
taking into consideration the essential principles or duties of statutory provisions from which 
the standard clause deviates and the essential rights or duties inherent in the nature of the 
contract (§ 307(2)). 
Such principles, rights and duties are set out in various provisions throughout the BGB. § 622, 
for example, deals with notice periods for employment relationships. Under this norm, for 
notice of termination by the employer, certain notice periods are applicable, depending on the 
duration of the employment relationship. For notice of termination of employment by the 
employee, no longer notice period may be agreed than for notice of termination by the employer 
(§ 622(6)). This provision ensures the balance between the parties' rights with respect to notice 
periods. Under § 489, the borrower may terminate a loan contract with a pegged lending rate, 
in whole or in part under certain conditions. He or she may terminate a loan contract with a 
variable rate of interest at any time, giving three months’ notice of termination. The right of 
termination of the borrower may not be excluded or made more difficult by contract. 
                                                             
6530 See discussion on reg 44(3)(o) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 h). 
6531 Stoffels AGB-Recht 301. See discussion on § 309 no. 9 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.9.1. 
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In German law, the balance between the parties' rights and obligations in terms of the renewal 
or termination of agreements is thus ascertained by § 307(2) in conjunction with the applicable 
statutory provisions. The level of protection is thus comparable in both regimes. 
p) Regulation 44(3)(p) 
Item (p) of regulation 44(3) greylists a term allowing the supplier an unreasonably long time 
to perform.6532 § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. contains a similar provision.6533 
In terms of section 19(2), the supplier, ‘unless otherwise expressly provided or anticipated in 
an agreement’,6534 is obliged to deliver the goods or perform the services on the agreed date 
and at the agreed time, if any, or otherwise within a reasonable time after concluding the 
transaction or agreement. In German law, where no time for performance has been specified 
or is evident from the circumstances, the other party may demand performance immediately, 
and the user may effect it immediately (§ 271(1)).6535 In both regimes, the parties may agree 
on different periods of time for performance. The greylisting of item (p) and § 308 no. 1 is 
justified though as otherwise, it would be difficult for the other party to serve notice of 
default6536 because the user's standard terms provide for a lax determination of the period for 
performance and the performance is not due (yet). The customer could not free itself from the 
contract and would be restricted, whereas the user could freely determine the time of 
performance.6537 What is more, clients often face harsh consequences if they do not pay in time, 
whereas a too long period of time for the user's performance would lead to an obvious 
imbalance.6538 
In order to achieve maximum protection, it is recommended that the South African item 
applies, like the German provision, to all sorts of periods for performance (e.g., for the delivery 
of goods, the payment or the obligation to accept a work produced) as well as grace and 
extension periods that provide an additional period of time after the expiry of the actual period 
                                                             
6532 See discussion on reg 44(3)(p) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 i). 
6533 See discussion on § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. in Part II ch 5 para 2.3.1.2. 
6534 Emphasis added. 
6535 Stoffels AGB-Recht 315. § 271(1): '(Time of performance) Where no time for performance has been specified 
or is evident from the circumstances, the obligee may demand performance immediately, and the obligor may 
effect it immediately. (2) Where a time has been specified, then in case of doubt it must be assumed that the 
obligee may not demand performance, but the obligor may effect it prior to that time.'  
6536 See § 280(3) read in conjunction with § 281; § 280(2) read in conjunction with § 286; § 323. 
6537 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 12. 
6538 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 24. 
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of time for performance,6539 or those applicable after a particular event (e.g., strike6540 or force 
majeure6541).6542  
Unlike the South African provision, § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. distinguishes between 
unreasonably long periods for performance and insufficiently specific periods for performance. 
Item (p) only covers 'an unreasonably long time to perform' and is thus formulated a bit 
narrower. 
What is more, the German provision contains an exception for consumer contracts. The user is 
therefore entitled in these cases to withhold its performance until the other party's right to 
withdraw has expired in order to avoid an unnecessary back and forth of the performance.6543 
This exception does not apply to distance contracts6544 and distance learning contracts6545 
where the right of withdrawal only begins after delivery.6546 Such an exception does not exist 
in the South African regime. 
Lastly, § 308 no. 1 also covers other cases that have no equivalent norm in the South African 
regime. The German norm includes clauses that stipulate an unreasonably long or insufficiently 
specific period for acceptance or refusal of the offer by the user (this applies above all to 
situations where the customer has to use an order form of the user containing an acceptance 
period). Furthermore, no. 1a and 1b of this provision deal with standard clauses by which the 
user reserves the right to unreasonably long periods of time for the performance of his or her 
payment to his or her contractual partner by which the user reserves the right to unreasonably 
long periods of time for review and acceptance of the counter-performance. 
Unlike item (p), the German norm distinguishes between unreasonably long periods for 
performance and insufficiently specific periods for performance. Furthermore, the German 
item contains an exception for consumer contracts. § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. also covers 
other cases that have no equivalent in the South African provision. Thus, the German item 
                                                             
6539 BGH NJW 1982, 331 (333); 1983, 1320. 
6540 The former OFT was of the view that factors such as shortage of stock, labour problems, strike or labour 
shortage may be attributable to the supplier. Hence, clauses in terms of which these factors allow the supplier an 
unreasonably long time to perform are likely to be unfair. See OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) paras 
2.6.1-2.6.7 at 31-32. 
6541 In a South African context, Hawthorne and Kuschke are of the view that terms such as 'force majeure' or 'Act 
of God' should be avoided since they are legal jargon. See Hutchison et al Law of Contract 412. 
6542 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 1 para 34.  
6543 MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 1 para 23. 
6544 Fernabsatzverträge. See § 312d. 
6545 Fernunterrichtsverträge. See § 4 FernUSG. 
6546 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 9. 
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covers more instances than the South African regime. It is also formulated in a more nuanced 
way. In order to achieve better protection, the South African item should also apply to all sorts 
of periods for performance, like the German provision, and include insufficiently specific 
periods for performance. 
q) Regulation 44(3)(q) 
Regulation 44(3)(q) of the Act greylists one-sided forfeiture clauses.6547 This item includes 
parts of § 309 no. 6.6548 In terms of § 309 no. 6, a provision by which the user is promised the 
payment of a contractual penalty in the event of non-acceptance or late acceptance of the 
performance, payment default or in the event that the other party to the contract frees himself 
from the contract is invalid. Thus, the German norm is not entirely congruent with regulation 
44(3)(q), but equal protection can be achieved by applying §§ 308 no. 7, 309 no. 6 or 307.6549 
The German term for such clauses is 'asymmetric retention clauses'.6550 In South Africa, they 
are referred to as 'one-sided forfeiture clauses'.6551 Asymmetric retention/one-sided forfeiture 
clauses allow the supplier to retain payment in the case of non-compliance without giving the 
consumer the right to be compensated in the same amount if the supplier commits a breach.  
Contrary to the South African regime, the German provision only focuses on the supplier. This 
could be the reason why the German provision is blacklisted. Under the South African regime, 
forfeiture clauses may be fair if they are counter-balanced by giving the consumer the right to 
be compensated in the same amount as the supplier in case of breach of the supplier. 
Penalty clauses in the sense of §§ 339 et seq. are regulated in South Africa in the Conventional 
Penalties Act. If the amount is out of proportion of the actual harm suffered by the supplier, 
the court may reduce it in terms of section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act.6552 This 
provision is comparable to § 343.6553  
                                                             
6547 See discussion on reg 44(3)(q) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 a). 
6548 See discussion on § 309 no. 6 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.6. 
6549 WLP/Pfeiffer Anhang RiLi para 44. 
6550 Stoffels AGB-Recht 361. 
6551 See, e.g., Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 95. 
6552 15 of 1962. Section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act: ‘If upon the hearing of a claim for a penalty, it 
appears to the court that such penalty is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the creditor by reason of the 
act or omission in respect of which the penalty was stipulated, the court may reduce the penalty to such extent as 
it may consider equitable in the circumstances: Provided that in determining the extent of such prejudice the court 
shall take into consideration not only the creditor's proprietary interest, but every other rightful interest which may 
be affected by the act or omission in question.’ 
6553 § 343: '(1) If a payable penalty is disproportionately high, it may on the application of the obligor be reduced 
to a reasonable amount by judicial decision. In judging the appropriateness, every legitimate interest of the obligee, 
not merely his financial interest, must be taken into account. Once the penalty is paid, reduction is excluded. (2) 
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According to section 1 of the Conventional Penalties Act,6554 terms incorporated in a contract 
shall be deemed penalty stipulations, when the clause provides that any person shall, in respect 
of an act or omission in conflict with a contractual obligation, be liable to pay a sum of money 
or deliver or perform anything for the benefit of any other person, either by way of penalty or 
as liquidated damages.6555 In terms of this provision, all penalty stipulations are prima facie 
enforceable once the existence of a valid and enforceable contract is established, and a penalty 
stipulation is contained therein and there is a breach of the given contract.6556 
A drawback of penalty clauses, as opposed to forfeiture clauses, is that the proactive and extra-
judicial effect of the items of the greylist is circumvented because financial penalties under the 
Conventional Penalties Act are not submitted to content control according to regulation 44(3) 
of the Consumer Protection Act. Suppliers will therefore probably tend to put an unreasonably 
high penalty into their contracts and hope that the consumer will not go to court. If they do so, 
they bear the cost risk.6557 Moreover, item (q) only operates in circumstances which are not 
covered by section 17 and only applies in situations where the forfeiture clause was intended 
to operate when the contract is cancelled after breach of one of the parties.6558 In practice, item 
(q) of regulation 44(3) should thus be of minor relevance.  
Penalty clauses have a double function. They shall motivate the debtor to perform and enable 
the creditor to be indemnified in a simple manner. § 309 no. 6 is tailored to so-called 'dependent 
penalty agreements' which depend on the main obligation. This provision can also be applied 
by analogy to 'independent penalty clauses' though. Since the economic implications for the 
debtor are the same in the case of dependent penalty agreements and forfeiture clauses, no. 6 
applies to both.6559  
Contrary to item (q) of the South African regulation, no. 6 of § 309 has thus a wider scope of 
application. However, as the economic consequences are the same for both types of penalty 
                                                             
The same also applies, except in the cases of [§§] 339 and 342, if someone promises a penalty in the event that he 
undertakes or omits an action.' 
6554 Section 1(1) of the Conventional Penalties Act: ‘A stipulation, hereafter referred to as a penalty stipulation, 
whereby it is provided that any person shall, in respect of an act or omission in conflict with a contractual 
obligation, be liable to pay a sum of money or to deliver or perform anything for the benefit of any other person, 
hereafter referred to as a creditor, either by way of a penalty or as liquidated damages, shall, subject to the 
provisions of this Act, be capable of being enforced in any competent court.’  
6555 See Vessio LLD thesis 463. 
6556 Belcher 1964 SALJ 84. 
6557 The same arguments apply in Germany in terms of § 339 et seq (see discussion below in this chapter and on 
reg 44(3)(q) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 a).  
6558 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 98. 
6559 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 33, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 16 et seq. 
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clauses, South African courts should apply regulation 44(3)(q) by analogy also to independent 
penalty clauses. 
Another difference between the two regimes is that the German provision enumerates several 
cases. i.e., non-acceptance or late acceptance of the performance, payment default and 
termination of the agreement. The South African provision merely speaks of 'if [the supplier or 
the consumer] fails to conclude or perform the agreement'. In practice, this should make no 
difference because both regimes apply to breach, with the caveat that the German item only 
focuses on the consumer's breach. 
Penalty clauses for which § 309 no. 6 does not apply can nonetheless be ineffective in terms of 
the general clause if they are unreasonably disadvantageous for the other party.6560 This 
concerns, e.g., penalty clauses of which the amount is unreasonable. The possibility to reduce 
the amount by judicial decision in terms of § 343 does not prevent an assessment under the 
general clause because §§ 339 et seq. are tailored for individual agreements. What is more, 
content control under the general clause refers to the stipulated amount, and not to the payable 
amount.6561 The amount agreed upon in a penalty clause is unreasonable if it is disproportionate 
in relation to the violation of the contract and the consequences for the user.6562 The amount 
must particularly not be disproportionate in relation to the damage that typically must be 
expected.6563 
In summary, both regimes differ in that one-sided forfeiture/asymmetric retention clauses are 
greylisted in regulation 44(3)(q) and blacklisted in § 309 no. 6. Although the German provision 
is not entirely congruent with the South African item, equal protection can be achieved by 
§§ 308 no. 7, 309 no. 6 or 307. The German provision focuses only on the supplier, whereas 
the South African item includes both parties. This could be a reason why this item is blacklisted 
in Germany. In both regimes, a penalty that is out of proportion can be reduced by the courts. 
The German provision has a wider scope of application than the South African item since it 
directly applies to dependent penalty clauses, and by analogy to independent penalty clauses. 
South African courts should apply item (q) to both cases too. The fact that the German item, 
contrary to item (q), enumerates specific applications does not does make any difference as 
both provisions apply to breach.  
                                                             
6560 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 6 para 12, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 6 para 30. 
6561 BGH NJW 1983, 385 (387 et seq). 
6562 BGH NJW 1998, 2600 (2606). 
6563 BGH NJW 2012, 2577. 
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r) Regulation 44(3)(r) 
In terms of item (r), clauses are considered unfair if the consumer has to pay higher 
compensation for a breach than a reasonable pre-estimate of the actual loss caused to the 
supplier.6564 
§ 309 no. 5 contains a similar item,6565 although the German legislator chose the formulations 
'exceeds the damage expected under normal circumstances' and 'the customarily occurring 
decrease in value'. This indicates a more abstract-general approach, whereas item (r) of 
regulation 44(3) takes into consideration the given case ('harm suffered by the supplier').  
The comparative standard of § 309 no. 5 lit. a) replicates § 252 2nd sent.6566 which applies to 
the compensation of lost profit. The average damages of the given branch6567 or the average of 
the decreased value serves as the applicable comparative standard. 
According to lit. b) of § 309 no. 5, a lump-sum claim is invalid if the other party is not expressly 
permitted to show that damage or decrease in value has either not occurred or is substantially 
less than the lump sum. The South African item does not contain a similar provision. For the 
blacklisted German item, it is sufficient if the clause makes clear for not legally trained 
customers that they can show that the damage or decrease in value is non-existent or 
substantially less than the required lump sum.6568 As the South African item is greylisted, the 
burden of proof lies with the supplier. The supplier thus has to prove that the damages required 
do not significantly exceed the harm suffered. 
Moreover, the German item not only covers damages but also compensation for a decrease in 
value. The South African item should also cover both cases though since the term 'damages' 
comprises both, which is also indicated by the word 'harm' in fine of this provision. 
Incidentally, note should be taken that German literature refers to 'lump-sum claims' in the 
context of § 309 no. 5, and not to penalties. The distinction is made by applying functional-
typological aspects. A penalty is given where the objective is the fulfilment of the main claim 
                                                             
6564 See discussion on reg 44(3)(r) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 b). See also OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance 
(2008) para 5.1 at 40. 
6565 See discussion on § 309 no. 5 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.5. 
6566 BGH NJW 1984, 2941. § 252 2nd sent.: 'Those profits are considered lost that in the normal course of events 
or in the special circumstances, particularly due to the measures and precautions taken, could probably be 
expected.'  
6567 UBH/Fuchs § 309 no. 5 para 21. 
6568 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 309 no. 5 para 36, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 5 para 100. 
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and exerting effective pressure on the other party.6569 On the other hand, there is a lump-sum 
agreement where the objective is instead a simplified execution of the given claim. A penalty 
is therefore rather a 'harsh additional sanction' (and thus higher), whereas a lump-sum claim is 
more a ' simplified normal sanction' (which is orientated towards actual damage).6570 
Under regulation 44(4)(d), item (r) does not apply to any penalty, fee or compensation which 
the supplier is entitled to charge under the provisions of the Act or any other law. These are 
cancellation fees in terms of section 17 or sums payable for fixed-term agreements under 
section 14, for instance. The German blacklisted item of no. 5 does not contain such a caveat. 
German courts apply no. 5 also to travel package standard terms though in which compensation 
in terms of § 651(h)6571 is stipulated in the case of a revocation by the client.6572 Hence, by the 
application of no. 5 to these contracts, the possibilities of the travel organiser to claim 
compensation are mitigated. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the fact that in Germany, the other party must be able to show 
that the damage or decrease in value has not occurred or is substantially less than the lump-
sum is mitigated in the South African item by the fact that the latter is greylisted so that the 
burden of proof lies with the supplier. Both regimes should apply to damages as well as to 
compensation for a decrease in value since the term 'harm' in the South African provision is 
wide enough to cover both. § 309 no. 5 does not contain a caveat similar to regulation 44(4)(d). 
As German courts apply no. 5 also to travel package standard terms in which compensation is 
stipulated in the case of the client's revocation, the possibilities of the travel organiser to claim 
compensation are mitigated, however. By and large, both pieces of legislation offer the same 
level of protection. 
s) Regulation 44(3)(s) 
The wording of regulation 44(3)(s)6573 and § 308 no. 76574 is almost similar. Both items are 
greylisted. 
The South African provision uses the term 'termination of the agreement', whereas the German 
item refers to a revocation of the contract or notice of termination. § 308 no. 7 covers a 
                                                             
6569 Stoffels AGB-Recht 357. 
6570 Stoffels AGB-Recht 357. 
6571 § 651(h)(1): 'Prior to commencement of travel, the traveller may revoke the contract at any time. If the traveller 
revokes the contract, then the travel organiser loses his claim to the agreed package price. He may, however, 
demand appropriate compensation.'   
6572 BGH NJW 1985, 633 (635). 
6573 See discussion on reg 44(3)(s) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 c). 
6574 See discussion on § 308 no. 7 in Part II ch 5 para 2.3.7. 
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rescission, i.e., the setting aside of a voidable contract ex tunc, and cancellation, i.e., the 
termination of the agreement ex nunc. It is irrelevant whether the right to cancel the agreement 
is based on statutory or contractual provisions, or if it is an ordinary or extraordinary 
termination of the agreement.6575 The terminology used by the user is also irrelevant since 
merely the type of termination that actually applies is decisive.6576 
What is more, where there is an undeniable need for protection of the other party in cases where 
the user terminates the contract by using another type of cancellation, and where such 
termination is more attractive to it than execution, no. 7 can be applied by analogy (e.g., 
voidability,6577 the occurrence of a resolutory condition, or revocation of a mandate under 
§ 671).6578 The termination of the contract by mutual agreement is not covered by no. 7 
though.6579  
It is thus suggested that 'termination' is congruent to 'revocation' and 'cancellation' and that both 
regimes have the same scope of application. The wording of the South African provision is 
somewhat broader so that an analogous application of item (s) should not be necessary in cases 
such as voidability. 
In terms of the German item, when assessing the reasonableness of the amount of the 
remuneration or the reimbursement, the statutory clauses that would apply if the given clause 
were inexistent serve as applicable standard.6580 For the enquiry, the circumstances of the 
concrete case are not relevant, but only the typical situation for the given type of contract in 
the case of early termination.6581 Since the Act and its regulation do not apply a supra-individual 
and generalising approach, for item (s) of regulation 44(3), the concrete circumstances of the 
given case must be considered. 
§ 308 no. 7 is interpreted in that the other party must have the possibility – by analogy to § 309 
no. 5 lit. b) – to prove that the actual amount was lower than the demanded sum.6582 Item (r) of 
the South African regulation does not include such a possibility, unlike § 309 no. 5. This is 
                                                             
6575 Stoffels AGB-Recht 391. 
6576 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 8. 
6577 §§ 119 et seq. 
6578 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 39, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 7. 
6579 OLG Hamburg NJW-RR 1990, 909. Dammann is of the view that in these cases, § 308 no. 7 has to be applied 
by analogy (WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 11). 
6580 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 642 (643), UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 1 para 1. 
6581 BGH NJW 1983, 1491 (1492). 
6582 Erman/Roloff § 308 para 60, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 7 para 4. 
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mitigated by the fact that because of the greylisting of regulation 44(3)(s), the burden of proof 
lies with the supplier. 
Under regulation 44(4)(d), item (s) does not apply to any penalty, fee or compensation which 
the supplier is entitled to charge under the provisions of the Act or any other law. This item is 
therefore not applicable to compensation for use according to section 20(6)(c). Section 20(6) 
determines in which cases the supplier may impose a charge upon the consumer if the latter 
returns any goods.6583  
The German item does not contain a similar provision. However, the BGB contains several 
statutory provisions for a rescission of an agreement (§ 346) or its cancellation (§§ 628, 649) 
which aim at a balancing of the parties' interests.6584 § 308 no. 7 aims to reflect the statutory 
model and to achieve a fair balancing of the parties' interests, which is why this provision is an 
emanation of § 307(2) no. 1.6585 In principle, these statutory provisions cover all claims for 
remuneration or reimbursement in case of early termination of the agreement, except for lump-
sum damages and contractual penalties.6586  
On the other hand, also § 3576587 concerns the reversal of contracts, namely the legal 
consequences of withdrawal from off-premises contracts and distance contracts (save contracts 
                                                             
6583 The supplier may not charge the consumer if the goods are returned in the original unopened packaging 
(s 20(6)(a)). If the goods are in their original condition and repackaged in their original packaging, the supplier 
may charge the consumer a reasonable amount for use of the goods during the time they were in its possession, 
or any consumption or depletion of the goods, unless that consumption or depletion is limited to a reasonable 
amount necessary to determine whether the goods were acceptable to the consumer (s 20(6)(b)). In any other case, 
the consumer may charge a reasonable amount for the use of the goods or any consumption or depletion, and for 
necessary restoration costs to render the goods fit for re-stocking, unless the consumer had to destroy the 
packaging in order to determine whether the goods conformed to the description or sample provided, or were fit 
for the intended purpose (s 20(6)(c)). 
6584 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 26. 
6585 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 7 para 2a. 
6586 See § 309 no. 5 and 6. 
6587 § 357: '(1) The performance received is to be restituted at the latest after fourteen days. (2) The trader must 
also restitute any payments the consumer may have made for the delivery. This does not apply inasmuch as the 
consumer has incurred additional costs because he opted for a type of delivery other than the least expensive type 
of standard delivery offered by the trader. (3) In making the repayment, the trader must use the same means of 
payment that the consumer used in making the payment. Sentence 1 does not apply if the parties expressly have 
agreed otherwise and the consumer does not incur any costs as a result. (4) In the case of a sale of consumer goods, 
the trader may refuse to make repayment until he has received the returned goods or the consumer has provided 
proof that he has dispatched the goods. This does not apply if the trader has offered to collect the goods. (5) The 
consumer is not obliged to arrange for the return shipment of the goods received if the trader has offered to collect 
the goods. (6) The consumer bears the direct costs of return shipment of the goods if the trader has informed the 
consumer pursuant to Article 246a [§] 1(2) sentence 1 number 2 of the [EGBGB] of this obligation. Sentence 1 
does not apply if the trader has stated that he is prepared to bear these costs. In the case of off-premises contracts, 
in the context of which the goods were delivered to the consumer’s dwelling at the time the contract was 
concluded, the trader is obliged to collect the goods at his own costs if, by their nature, these goods cannot be 
returned by post. (7) The consumer shall be liable for any diminished value of the goods if 1. the diminished value 
results from the handling of the goods in any other manner than that necessary to establish the nature, 
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relating to financial services). § 4 FernUSG6588 is also a consumer protection provision. It 
provides that in a distance education contract, the client is entitled to rescind from the contract 
according to § 355, and that §§ 356 und 357 apply by analogy.6589 Any infringement of these 
consumer protection provisions makes the clause void in terms of § 1346590 so that the 
application of § 308 no. 7 is not necessary.6591 For the German legislature, a clause similar to 
regulation 44(4)(d) was thus not necessary. 
In summary, the South African item's formulation is broader so that an analogous application 
similar to the German regime is not necessary in cases such as the occurrence of a resolutory 
condition or voidability, and where the termination of the agreement is more attractive for the 
supplier than its execution. Unlike § 308 no. 7, the South African item does not provide for the 
possibility to prove that the actual amount was lower than the demanded sum. This is not 
necessary though since because of the greylisting of item (s), the burden of proof lies with the 
supplier. The German item does not contain a caveat such as regulation 44((4)(d), but other 
BGB provisions balance the parties' interests in terms of rescission or cancellation. Therefore, 
a clause with the content of regulation 44(4)(d) was superfluous in the German regime. The 
level of protection in both regimes is therefore comparable. 
t) Regulation 44(3)(t) 
Under item (t) in the South African greylist, standard clauses by which the supplier may transfer 
its obligations to the detriment of the consumer without the latter's consent are presumed to be 
unfair.6592 
                                                             
characteristics, and functioning of the goods, and 2. the trader has informed the consumer pursuant Article 246a 
[§] 1 (2) sentence 1 number 1 of the [EGBGB] of his right of withdrawal. (8) Where the consumer withdraws 
from a contract for the provision of services or the supply of water, gas, or electricity, without their supply having 
been offered for sale in a limited volume or set quantity, or for the supply of distance heating, the consumer shall 
owe the trader compensation for the value of the performance provided until the time of the withdrawal in those 
cases in which the consumer has expressly demanded that the trader begin with the performance prior to expiry 
of the withdrawal period. The claim pursuant to sentence 1 exists only in those cases in which the trader has 
properly informed the consumer pursuant to Article 246a [§] 1 (2) sentence 1 number 1 and 3 of the [EGBGB]. 
For off-premises contracts, the claim pursuant to sentence 1 exists only in those cases in which the consumer has 
transmitted his request pursuant to sentence 1 on a durable medium. In calculating the compensation for value, 
the total price agreed upon is to be used as a basis. If the total price agreed upon is excessive, the compensation 
for value shall be calculated on the basis of the market value of the performance provided. (9) Where the consumer 
withdraws from a contract for the supply of digital content that is not contained in a tangible medium, he shall not 
compensate for value.'  
6588 Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am Fernunterricht (Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz - FernUSG). 
6589 Stoffels AGB-Recht 394. 
6590 § 134: 'A legal transaction that violates a statutory prohibition is void, unless the statute leads to a different 
conclusion.'  
6591 Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 308 no. 7 para 4, MüKo/Wurmnest § 308 no. 7 para 3. 
6592 See discussion on reg 44(3)(t) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.4 a). 
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Contrary to the corresponding German item in § 309 no. 10,6593 the South African provision 
merely refers to the transfer of obligations but not to the transfer of rights. The issue of free 
assignability of claims, i.e., rights, which is an essential factor in the credit economy, is 
therefore not concerned by item (t).6594 The free assignability of rights could be problematic. 
Hence, the South African legislature should include the transfer of claims too because also in 
these cases, consumers should be protected from an unfettered change of their contractual 
partners.  
On the other hand, the German item does not contain the phrase ‘to the detriment of the 
consumer’. Contrary to the BGB provision which prohibits such clauses (with the exceptions 
mentioned in lit. a) and b)), regulation 44(3)(t) greylists clauses giving the supplier the 
possibility of transferring his or her obligations under the agreement to the detriment of the 
consumer, without the consumer's agreement. The German legislator considers all transfers of 
rights and obligations without the other party's consent detrimental to the other party (with the 
exceptions mentioned earlier). In contrast, the South African item presumes such a clause 
unfair if the consumer relied on the supplier's market reputation, goodwill, or a personal 
relation with the supplier (e.g., in a contract with an architect or lawyer). 
What is more, the South African provision covers all types of agreements. It is not limited to 
certain contract types, unlike the German BGB provision which is applicable only to purchase, 
loan or service agreements or agreements to produce a result. Not expressly mentioned, but 
also included in the German item, are contracts dealing with the supply of movable things to 
be produced or manufactured.6595 If clauses concerning other contract types are not already 
surprising under § 305c(1), content control takes place by applying § 307.6596 For leases 
concerning apartments and farm leases as well as employment contracts, the transfer of the 
contractual partner occurs ex lege.6597 A clause in such a contract is thus merely declaratory 
and not submitted to content control.6598 Despite the fact that the application of the German 
item is restricted to certain contract types, for other agreements, a high level of protection is 
                                                             
6593 See discussion on § 309 no. 10 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.10. 
6594 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 104. 
6595 Werklieferungsvertrag, § 650 (ex-§ 651). WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 para 10. 
6596 Stoffels AGB-Recht 310. 
6597 In terms of §§ 566(1) for apartment leases, 581(2) for farm leases and 613a for employment contracts.  
6598 See § 307(3). Bamberger/Roth/Becker § 309 no. 10 para 5, Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 10 para 10. 
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thus achieved by § 305c(1) and the general clause, except where the transfer of rights and 
obligations occurs by law. 
The German item is blacklisted, unlike the South African item. However, according to the 
German provision, the concerned clauses are not prohibited if they identify the third party by 
name (lit. a), or the other party is granted the right to free itself from the contract (lit. b). These 
caveats mitigate this provision tremendously.6599 They have the objective to protect the other 
party from dealing with suppliers he or she does not know and has not chosen. When exerting 
the right to free itself from the contract, the other party must not suffer any adverse 
consequences or enter into a contractual relationship with the third.6600 Hence, a clause which 
provides for a term of notice of one month is ineffective because the customer would be obliged 
to maintain a contractual relationship with the third party until the expiry of this period. 
Therefore, he or she must have the right to terminate the contract immediately.6601 
There may be exceptions where a transfer of obligations can be considered fair under the South 
African item. This is the case where the consumer is entitled to cancel the agreement, the 
supplier remains liable for performance of the third party, or the transfer occurs in connection 
of the transfer of the supplier's business by which all obligations and rights are transferred.6602 
In this regard, both regimes are similar to a certain extent. 
Both regimes concern the transfer of all the obligations (and rights in the German item), i.e., a 
change of the contractual partner. A mere transfer of single obligations (and/or rights) does not 
fall under the respective provision. Typical cases are the transfer of the agreement,6603 which 
is a subrogation of the rights and obligations by the third party, or substitution where the user 
is merely responsible for a careful selection of the third party.6604 The legislative purpose of 
regulation 44(3)(t) and § 309 no. 10 is fulfilled in these cases since the other party shall be 
protected from a change of the contractual partner so that he or she is always certain with whom 
conducting business.6605 
In conclusion, it can be stated that contrary to the South African item, § 309 no. 10 also covers 
the transfer of rights. In both regimes, the transfer of the entirety of the given obligations 
                                                             
6599 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 1. 
6600 Palandt/Grüneberg § 309 para 99, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 para 34. 
6601 LG Cologne NJW-RR 1987, 885 (886). 
6602 These ‘exceptions’ are listed, for instance, in art 6:236(e) BW. 
6603 Vertragsübernahme. 
6604 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 paras 12-15. 
6605 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 10 para 6, WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 10 paras 12-15. 
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(and/or rights concerning the German item) is required, and not only a transfer of single rights 
and/or obligations. Therefore, the free assignability of claims is not covered by item (t). This 
could be problematic, which is why the legislator should include the transfer of claims too. 
Since the German legislator generally considers all transfers of rights and obligations without 
the other party's consent detrimental to the other party, a phrase such as 'to the detriment of the 
consumer' was not necessary. Hence, under the South African item, a clause by which the 
consumer's obligations are transferred is presumed to be unfair only under certain 
circumstances. Even though the German item's scope of application is limited to certain 
contract types, protection for other types of agreements is achieved by § 305c(1) (surprising 
clauses) and the general clause. Unlike the South African item, § 309 no. 10 is blacklisted. 
Because of the caveats contained in lit. a) and b) of this provision, this fact is largely mitigated, 
however. Both regimes thus offer a comparable level of protection only in terms of the transfer 
of obligations. 
u) Regulation 44(3)(u) 
Terms restricting the consumer's right to re-sell the goods by limiting the transferability of any 
commercial guarantee provided by the consumers are greylisted under regulation 44(3)(u).6606 
The German grey- or blacklists do not contain a similar item. 
Under § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) in pr., clauses providing that claims against the user due to defects 
in their entirety or regarding individual parts are excluded are prohibited. The provision 
expresses the principle that the customer must remain entitled to warranties, and that its 
contractual partner, the user, must remain the primary obligated party for any warranty.6607 This 
provision thus only concerns the customer-supplier relationship. 
The same principle is expressed in § 443,6608 according to which only the buyer can make a 
claim in terms of a commercial guarantee vis-à-vis the seller, producer or another third party. 
                                                             
6606 See discussion on reg 44(3)(u) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.4 b). 
6607 WLP/Dammann § 309 no. 8 lit. b) aa) para 1. 
6608 § 443: '(1) Where the seller, the producer or some other third party enters into obligation, in addition to his 
statutory liability for defects, by way of making a declaration or in relevant advertising that was available prior to 
the purchase agreement being concluded or at the time of its conclusion, such obligation being in particular to 
reimburse the purchase price, to exchange the thing, to repair it or to provide services in this context should the 
thing not exhibit the quality or not fulfil other requirements than those concerning its freedom from defects, in 
each case as described in the declaration or in the relevant advertisement (guarantee), the buyer shall be entitled, 
in the case of a guarantee having been given, and notwithstanding his statutory claims, to the rights under the 
guarantee in relation to the person who has given the guarantee (guarantor). (2) To the extent that the guarantor 
gives a guarantee as to the thing having a specified quality for a specified period (guarantee of durability), the 
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Similar protection for German standard clauses is therefore achieved by applying the general 
clause of § 307, especially where the standard provision is not compatible with essential 
principles of the statutory provision from which it deviates (§ 307(2) no. 1). 
v) Regulation 44(3)(v) 
Apart from a different choice of the wording6609 and the grammatical structure,6610 the content 
of regulation 44(3)(v)6611 and § 308 no. 56612 dealing with fictitious declarations is identical. 
Both provisions require a reasonable period of time to make an express declaration and the 
information of the consumer as regards the meaning of the given declaration. 
The BGH decided that the fulfilment of the two aforementioned cumulative conditions is not 
sufficient. For fictitious declarations, the user must also have a legitimate interest concerning 
such a clause.6613 This is the case if such fictitious declarations facilitate the execution of mass 
contracts, such as transactions with banks and insurance companies.6614 It is suggested that this 
factor should also be considered in terms of the greylisted item of regulation 44(3)(v). 
According to paragraph (ii) of regulation 44(3)(v), the supplier has to draw the consumer’s 
attention to the meaning that will be attached to his or her conduct. Naudé contends that this 
wording is not explicit enough and should be revised according to the German legislation. In 
her opinion, the provision would be clearer if the supplier itself must draw the consumer's 
attention to the meaning that will be attached to his or her conduct.6615 However, § 308 no. 5 
lit. b) BGB merely provides: '(unless) the user agrees to especially draw the attention of the 
other party to the contract to the intended significance of his behaviour at the beginning of the 
period of time.' Apart from the use of synonyms in the official translation (‘commencement of 
the period’/’beginning of the period of time’, ‘draws the intention of the consumer’/’agrees to 
especially draw the attention of the other party to the contract’, ‘to the meaning that will be 
attached to his or her conduct’/significance of his behaviour”), the German phrase ‘to 
especially draw the attention’ seems to be a bit stronger than the South African ‘draws the 
                                                             
presumption will be that a material defect which appears during the guarantee period triggers the rights under the 
guarantee.' 
6609 E.g., 'statement or acknowledgement' or 'conduct' (CPA) vs 'declaration' (BGB/KSchG) or 'behaviour' 
(BGB)/'conduct' (KSchG). 
6610 Active vs passive voice. 
6611 See discussion on reg 44(3)(v) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.5 a). 
6612 See discussion on § 308 no. 5 in Part II ch 5 para 2.3.5. 
6613 WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 5 para 67, UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 9, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 31. 
6614 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 7. 
6615 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 105. 
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attention’. The German phrase 'der Verwender sich verpflichtet' (literally 'the user obligates 
him- or herself') has been translated in the official translation6616 by 'the user agrees'; the 
German text is thus a bit stronger here again. As the South African text is written in the active 
voice ('the supplier draws the attention'), it is clear enough that it is the supplier who has this 
obligation, and not another person. There is hence no need for another formulation of item (v). 
Regulation 44(3)(v) only applies to terms relating to acknowledgements which are not already 
prohibited elsewhere in the Act (such as sections 51(1)(g), 31(1)(b), 49(1)(d) or 49(2)).6617 
Section 51(1)(g), for instance, blacklists a term if 'it falsely expresses an acknowledgement by 
the consumer that (i) before6618 the agreement was made, no representations or warranties were 
made in connection with the agreement by the supplier or a person on behalf of the supplier, 
or (ii) the consumer has received goods or services, or a document that is required by th[e] Act 
to be delivered to the consumer.' When excluding the provisions mentioned earlier, the scope 
of application of item (v) is limited to terms purporting to apply to acknowledgements deemed 
to have been made after the conclusion of the agreement and which do not relate to amendments 
of the agreement itself.6619 This item is therefore of a rather narrow ambit. 
The same applies to § 308 no. 5. The prohibition only applies to fictitious declarations 
concerning the execution of the contract, but not concerning its conclusion.6620 For the 
conclusion of the contract, the legal provisions set out in §§ 145 et seq. apply. Standard business 
terms cannot restrict these.6621 Furthermore, clauses concerning the renewal of an agreement 
that the parties agreed to when concluding the contract are not prohibited in terms of § 308 
no. 5 either. The renewal is not based on a fictitious declaration but on an agreement that in 
case of the other party's silence, the contract is tacitly renewed.6622 The validity of such clauses 
must be assessed under § 307, however.6623 
                                                             
6616 Available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. 
6617 See reg 44(2)(d). 
6618 Emphasis added. 
6619 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 106. 
6620 OLG Koblenz NJW 1989, 2950 (2951), Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
6621 Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
6622 BGH NJW 2010, 2942 (2943). 
6623 Stoffels AGB-Recht 278. 
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Both regimes only concern fictitious declarations of the consumer/other party. Declarations of 
the supplier/user must thus be assessed in terms of the general clause of section 48 or § 307, 
respectively.6624 
No. 5 of § 308 and regulation 44(3)(v) only concern fictitious declarations. These are clauses 
that set out that a specific declaration has been made, or has not been made; the actual behaviour 
of the other party is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, under the German regime, fictitious facts where certain facts or 
circumstances are deemed to exist or not to exist are assessed under § 309 no. 12. If the 
confirmation of fact is a particular form of a fictitious receipt, the enquiry is undertaken in 
terms of § 308 no. 6.6625 If the declaration is of substantive significance, no. 5 applies.6626 
Moreover, fictitious declarations are characterised by the fact that evidence to the contrary is 
not possible.6627 
Concerning the South African regime, for fictitious receipts, regulation 44(3)(w) is applicable. 
However, item (y) of the greylist does not contain a provision similar to § 309 no. 12 lit. b), 
according to which a provision by which the user modifies the burden of proof to the 
disadvantage of the other party, in particular by having the other party confirm certain facts is 
invalid. Thus, for confirmation of facts in South African standard clauses, section 48 applies. 
In summary, the content of item (v) of the South African regime and the German provision of 
§ 308 no. 5 is identical. For item (v), the fulfilment of the two cumulative conditions of 
subparagraphs (i) and (ii) should not be sufficient because the user should in addition have a 
legitimate interest concerning clauses dealing with fictitious declarations. This corresponds to 
the BGH's position. Both regimes merely apply to fictitious declarations of the consumer or 
other party but not to the supplier's/user's declarations. These must be assessed in terms of the 
respective general clause. In both regimes, the respective items apply merely to fictitious 
declarations that concern the execution of the contract but not its conclusion. The legislation 
of both countries differs in that fictitious facts are assessed under § 309 no. 12 in the German 
regime, whereas for confirmation of facts, section 48 applies to South African clauses. For 
fictitious receipts too, other provisions are applicable in both pieces of legislation. 
                                                             
6624 See WLP/Dammann § 308 no. 5 para 25. 
6625 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 5 para 9, Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 28. 
6626 Palandt/Grüneberg § 308 para 28. 
6627 Stoffels AGB-Recht 279. 
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w) Regulation 44(3)(w) 
Item (w) of the South African greylist6628 concerns fictitious receipts. A similar provision can 
be found in § 308 no. 6.6629 
The German provision is also applicable by analogy to 'acts similar to legal transactions'6630 
such as overdue notices6631 or notifications of defects6632 in terms of § 377 HGB. As such legal 
acts are also of particular interest to the consumer, they should also be covered by item (w). It 
seems that a direct application is possible as the South African wording ('statement') is wider 
than the German term 'declaration'. 
According to the South African item, clauses dealing with fictitious receipts are not considered 
unfair if such statement has been sent by prepaid registered post to the chosen address of the 
consumer. The German provision does not contain a similar exception. On the contrary, there 
is no prima facie proof that a registered letter has actually reached the person for which it was 
intended.6633 Hence, it is not sufficient to present the transmission confirmation for the 
reception of an e-mail6634 or fax.6635 Thus, the discussions related to whether the South African 
item should be completed by also inserting other means of communication, such as e-mail, as 
Naudé suggests,6636 or the deeming provision of section 23 ECTA,6637 is irrelevant for § 308 
no. 6. Nonetheless, the South African legislator should include these means of communication. 
The German regime knows only two legal exceptions of this principle, set out in §§ 132 BGB 
and 13 VVG.6638 § 132 BGB provides for two possibilities by which the sender can substitute 
the receipt by service. Under paragraph (1) of this provision, a declaration of intent is deemed 
to have been received if it is served through a bailiff as an intermediary. The service is effected 
                                                             
6628 See discussion on reg 44(3)(w) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.5 a). 
6629 See discussion on § 308 no. 6 in Part II ch 5 para 2.3.6. 
6630 Geschäftsähnliche Handlungen. 
6631 Mahnungen. 
6632 Mängelrügen. 
6633 BGH NJW 1996, 2033 (2035). 
6634 This is only different if the confirmation of receipt and the read receipt can be presented. See Mankowski 
NJW 2004, 1901. 
6635 BGH NJW 1995, 665 (667) sees the transmission confirmation merely as an indication for the reception but 
not as a prima facie proof. 
6636 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 107. 
6637 Section 23 ECTA: 'A data message (a) used in the conclusion or performance of an agreement must be 
regarded as having been sent by the originator when it enters an information system outside the control of the 
originator or, if the originator and addressee are in the same information system, when it is capable of being 
retrieved by the addressee, (b) must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the complete data 
message enters an information system designated or used for that purpose by the addressee and is capable of being 
retrieved and processed by the addressee; and (c) must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual 
place of business or residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual place of business or residence.' 
6638 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz. 
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under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). § 132(2) provides that if the person 
declaring is unaware, through no negligence on his part, of the identity of the person to whom 
the declaration is to be made, or if the whereabouts of this person are unknown, service may 
be effected in accordance with the provisions of the ZPO relating to service by publication. In 
the former case, the local court (Amtsgericht) competent for the approval is the one in whose 
district the person declarant its residence,6639 or in the absence of a residence within the country, 
its abode.6640 In the latter case, the local court competent for the approval is the one in the 
district of which the person to whom service is required to be effected had its last residence, 
or, in the absence of a residence within the country, its last abode. 
§ 13 VVG is relevant in cases where the policyholder changes its address or name. Pursuant to 
this provision, if the policyholder has not informed the insurer of a change of address, the 
dispatch of a letter sent recorded delivery to the policyholder's last known address shall suffice 
in respect of a declaration of intention to be made to the policyholder. The declaration shall be 
deemed to have been received three days after the letter was dispatched. The first and second 
sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of a change of the policyholder's name.6641 
Consequently, for these two legal exceptions, content control does not take place in terms of 
§ 307(3) since standard clauses reflecting these provisions do not derogate from the law.6642 
In conclusion, it can therefore be said that because 'acts similar to legal transactions', such as 
overdue notices, are also of particular interest to consumers, they should also be covered by 
the South African item. Unlike the South African regime, German legislation does not accept 
the prima facie proof that a registered letter has actually reached the person for which it was 
intended. §§ 132 BGB and 13 VVG are the only exceptions in this regard. The South African 
legislature should also insert other means of communication in this item though. 
x) Regulation 44(3)(x) 
According to regulation 44(3)(x), terms are presumed to be unfair if they exclude or hinder the 
consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, including by requiring 
                                                             
6639 Wohnsitz. 
6640 Aufenthalt. This is usually where someone has its temporary residence, e.g., on holiday. See Creifelds 
Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Aufenthalt, gewöhnlicher'. 
6641 § 13(1) VVG. 
6642 UBH/Schmidt § 308 no. 6 para 3. 
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the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by the Act or other 
legislation.6643  
§ 309 no. 14 contains a similar item.6644 Here too, the given clause must make arbitration 
mandatory. Although item (x) does exclusively mention arbitration, it is submitted that it also 
applies to mediation, as otherwise the objective of the norm would not be attained, i.e., 
greylisting clauses that are an obstacle for the consumer to take legal action. Item (x) of 
regulation 44(3) seems to be more restrictive than § 309 no. 14 however in that it regulates that 
the clause requires the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration. Therefore, it targets 
permanent exclusions of a judicial dispute resolution. In contrast, no. 14 merely requires a 
dilatory clause, i.e., a temporary exclusion. 
No. 14 of § 309 is not applicable to standard terms that provide for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution on a voluntary basis, or those referring to such proceedings.6645 From the wording 
of item (x) of the South African greylist, it is clear that arbitration covered by the Act, such as 
the involvement of an applicable industry ombud accredited for the particular sector,6646 is not 
regarded as unfair. What is more, clauses by which a consumer agrees to have settled a dispute 
that has already arisen to arbitration instead of submitting it to a court are not suspicious if he 
or she has been informed in advance of the potential costs involved.6647 
Both regimes therefore do not prohibit voluntary arbitration. 
It should be noted that item (x) does not greylist terms requiring compulsory arbitration covered 
by the Act or other legislation. § 309 no. 14 does not provide for such a caveat. What is more, 
terms providing that consumers first take disputes to the applicable industry ombud under 
section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act are not greylisted either. 
A differentiation between arbitration and mediation clauses is not necessary under § 309 no. 14 
as both are prohibited to the extent that ADR is mandatory before any court action. Mediation 
often takes place in relationships that are characterised by a personal relationship between the 
parties, such as company law or family law. These areas are excluded from the application of 
                                                             
6643 See discussion on reg 44(3)(x) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 a). 
6644 See discussion on § 309 no. 14 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.14. 
6645 § 36 Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz (VSBG) provides, among other things, that a user of standard 
business terms must inform the consumer 'together with its standard business terms' of the possibility of such 
proceedings. § 36 VSBG came into effect on 1 February 2017 (see § 24(1) 2nd sent. of the Umsetzungsgesetz of 
19 February 2016, BGBl. 2016 I 254). 
6646 See s 69. 
6647 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 109. 
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no. 14 by § 310(4), so that mediation clauses have practically no relevance in this regard. On 
the other hand, the use of arbitration clauses in standard terms has more relevance in practice. 
The emphasis of no. 14 thus lies here.6648 
Because of the wide wording of § 309 no. 14, this provision applies to all types of claims of 
the client. A restriction of an 'ADR standard clause' to specific claims of the customer does 
therefore not exclude its application.6649 
Although the title of § 309 no. 14 ('waiver of action') indicates that the provision only concerns 
actions in court, it also includes other proceedings, such as for the preservation of evidence,6650 
dunning procedures6651 or preliminary injunctions.6652 A restriction to court actions would not 
sufficiently honour the normative objective of the provision.6653 It is recommended that the 
same should apply to the South African regime. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that item (x) greylists not only arbitration but also mediation as 
otherwise, the objective of the South African provision would not be achieved. The scope of 
application of the South African item is more restrictive as it sets out that the clause must 
require that the consumer take disputes exclusively to arbitration, i.e., a permanent exclusion 
of a judicial dispute resolution. Voluntary arbitration is permitted in both regimes. Item (x) 
should also apply to other proceedings, like in Germany, such as preservation of evidence or 
preliminary injunctions, because a restriction to court actions would not sufficiently honour the 
normative objective this provision.  
y) Regulation 44(3)(y) 
Item (y) of the South African regulation greylists clauses restricting the evidence available to 
the consumer or imposing on him or her a burden of proof which, according to the applicable 
law, should lie with the supplier.6654 
Item (q) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts served as a model for this 
greylisted item. Under the Directive, the clause must be 'unduly' restrict the evidence 
                                                             
6648 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 9. See also Jauernig/Stadler § 309 para 23. 
6649 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 12. 
6650 Beweissicherungsverfahren. 
6651 Mahnverfahren. 
6652 Verfahren des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes. 
6653 UBH/Schmidt (2016) § 309 no. 14 para 13. 
6654 See discussion on reg 44(3)(y) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 b). 
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though.6655 § 309 no. 12 also concerns the modification of the burden of proof, but instead of 
'unduly' restricting the evidence, the German item requires a modification of the burden of 
proof 'to the disadvantage of the other party'.6656 With regard to the rationale of no. 12, it is 
suggested that 'unduly' in the Directive corresponds to 'to the disadvantage of the other party'. 
This is because rules concerning the burden of proof are not merely considerations of 
expediency, but an emanation of substantive principles of fairness and justice. A modification 
of these principles by standard business terms might jeopardise the other party's situation in 
that it might make its legal defence more difficult or even impossible.6657  
The German legislator aimed to exclude any disadvantageous modification of the burden of 
proof. Thus, a modification of the burden of proof not only exists where the onus is reversed6658 
but also where other aggravations exist. A distinction between a reversal of the onus and other 
obstructions in terms of no. 12 is not necessary. Other aggravations are restrictions to certain 
evidence (e.g., a clause requiring the consumer to provide the original invoice in order to have 
corrected a defect on the good he had purchased)6659 as well as modifications of the principle 
of prima facie evidence.6660 On the other hand, also facilitations of the burden of proof 
concerning the user fall under this provision.6661  
Thus, 'modifying' the burden of proof in terms of no. 12 of § 309 also entails 'restricting' the 
evidence available to the consumer in terms of regulation 44(3)(y). Both regimes expressly 
mention that the imposition of the burden of proof on the consumer/other party which, 
according to the applicable law, should lie with the supplier/user is suspicious or even 
prohibited. The South African item seems to treat this case as an alternative ('or') within the 
given item, whereas the German provision mentions lit. a) of no. 12 as a specific example ('in 
particular'). In practice, the different wording should have no relevance, however. The South 
                                                             
6655 Under item (q) of the Annex to the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 
5 April 1993 clauses '(…) unduly restricting the evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof 
which, according to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract' may be regarded as unfair. 
6656 See discussion on § 309 no. 12 in Part II ch 5 para 2.2.12.1. 
6657 § 309 no. 12 is the transposition of item (q) of the Annex of the Unfair terms Directive 93/13/EEC. 
6658 BGH NJW 1987, 1634 (1635), UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 8. 
6659 See Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ 
Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005)191. 
6660 UBH/Habersack § 309 no. 12 para 11 et seq. This is also applicable in South African law because reg 44(3)(y) 
expressly greylists 'clauses restricting the evidence available to the consumer'. 
6661 Stoffels AGB-Recht 405. 
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African legislature should consider a widening of item (y) towards a 'modification of the burden 
of proof' in order to include other aggravations.  
‘Conclusive proof certificates’ under South African common law, i.e., certificates established 
by the creditor and purporting to be conclusive proof of a certain balance due by the debtor, 
are invalid as they are against public policy, contra bonos mores and unenforceable.6662 Such 
certificates are unilaterally established by the creditor and are therefore no equivalent to 
promises to fulfil an obligation6663 or declaratory acknowledgements of a debt6664 according to 
German law. The latter are 'contracts' between the parties.6665 Hence, so-called 'conclusive 
proof certificates' should always be considered unfair.6666 
Section 65 provides that when a supplier has possession of any property belonging to or 
ordinarily under the control of a consumer, the supplier is liable to the owner of the property 
for any loss resulting from a failure to comply with the supplier’s obligation to treat that 
property as being its own and to handle, safeguard and utilise that property with the degree of 
care, diligence and skill that can reasonably be expected of a person responsible for managing 
any property belonging to another person. This provision seems to place the burden of proof 
on the consumer of whether the loss or damage of the goods in the supplier’s possession was 
caused by the supplier’s failure to take reasonable care. Section 65 thus deviates from the 
common-law rule according to which the supplier who takes the goods of the consumer into its 
safekeeping in the context of a depositum or bailment for reward6667 will be presumed to be at 
fault if the goods are damaged. According to section 2(10), a consumer can rely on the 
aforementioned residual rules though, and a term which excludes such common-law rules and 
places the onus on the consumer will be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(y). 
Naudé argues that terms changing the onus of proof in contracts for safekeeping may 
sometimes be fair because the Act itself seems to allow such a shift.6668 On the one hand, the 
                                                             
6662 Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 15A, Ex parte Minister of Justice: in re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd & Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1995 (3) SA 1 (A). 
6663 Abstrakte Schuldversprechen. See BGH NJW 1991, 1677. 
6664 Deklatorische Schuldanerkenntnisse. See BGH NJW 2003, 2386 (2388). 
6665 See wording of §§ 780 and 781. 
6666 In this regard, see discussion in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 b). 
6667 Bailment describes the transfer of the possession of goods from one person (the 'bailor') to another person (the 
'bailee') who subsequently has possession of the property. It arises when a person gives property to someone else 
for safekeeping, hiring of goods, the loan of goods, the pledge of goods, and the delivery of goods for carriage or 
repair. It is a cause of action independent of contract or tort. See Law Oxford Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Bailment'. 
6668 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 119. 
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party giving the good under the control of another will have difficulties to prove how the good 
was dealt with. For the party who has the control of the good it will be easy to prove the 
measures it took for keeping the good safe, and the circumstances which lead to its damage or 
destruction. The praetor’s edict on seamen, innkeepers and stablekeepers provides that when 
goods are lost or damaged by such suppliers, the latter will be liable, except if they can prove 
one of a limited number of defences, such as vis maior.6669 There is no reason why innkeepers, 
for instance, should bear the onus of proof for goods 'occasionally' placed in their sphere of 
influence, whereas a party who agreed in safekeeping a good in terms of a depositum or 
bailment, i.e., a contract which expressly has the object of keeping goods safe, should have the 
possibility to shift the onus onto the consumer. A term placing the burden of proof on the 
consumer will thus be presumed to be unfair under regulation 44(3)(y). Interestingly, the BGH 
held in a landmark decision of 19646670 concerning a standard clause by which the depositor 
(client) had to prove the responsibility of the warehouse keeper's staff after stored items had 
disappeared that the user could not relieve itself from circumstances lying in the sphere of its 
own responsibility to the client's disadvantage. This principle is now expressed in § 309 no. 12 
lit. a).6671 Both regimes should therefore apply the same standard in terms of clauses that shift 
the burden of proof in instances where the supplier has control of the given item. 
In summary, the German provision is wider since a modification of the burden of proof does 
not only exist where the onus is reversed but also where certain evidence is restricted, or where 
the burden of proof is facilitated. The South African legislator should consider a broader 
application of this provision in order to include other aggravations. Conclusive proof 
certificates are not an expression of the parties' mutual consent, contrary to promises to fulfil 
an obligation or declaratory acknowledgements of a debt under German law and should thus 
always be considered unfair. Standard clauses which modify or restrict the burden of proof of 
suppliers who have control of the other's items should systematically be declared unfair. 
z) Regulation 44(3)(z) 
Item (z) of the South African regulation greylists clauses imposing a limitation period that is 
shorter than otherwise applicable under the common law or legislation for legal steps to be 
taken by the consumer.6672 
                                                             
6669 See Davis v Lockstone 1921 AD 153, Essa v Divaris 1947 (1) SA 753 (A). 
6670 BGH NJW 1964, 1123. 
6671 Stoffels AGB-Recht 404. 
6672 See discussion on reg 44(3)(z) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 c). 
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As discussed in Part I, the Consumer Protection Act is an Act of Parliament in terms of section 
11(d) of the Prescription Act.6673 This provision sets out that the general prescription period, 
save where an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, is three years 'in respect of any other debt' 
than debts mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of this provision. Section 11(d) of the Prescription 
Act includes consumer contracts. Provisions contained in the Consumer Protection Act dealing 
with prescription periods are sections 56(2) or 61(4)(d). 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) ee) and ff) cover the scope of application of item (z) partly.6674 
Item ee) of no. 8 lit. b) concerns cut-off periods for notice of defects. In terms of this provision, 
standard clauses by which the user sets a cut-off period for the other party to the contract to 
give notice of non-obvious defects which is shorter than the permissible period of time under 
double letter (ff) of § 309 no. 8 lit. b) are ineffective. Especially for non-obvious defects, the 
economic result is actually a shorter limitation period.6675 For this reason, the legislator 
designed item ee) in tandem with item ff) dealing with limitation periods.  
The general permissible period of time is one year (see item ff). For purchase agreements, it is 
five years in relation to a building, and in relation to a thing that has been used for a building 
in accordance with the normal way it is used and which has resulted in the defectiveness of the 
building (§ 438(1) no. 2). The permissible period in the context of a contract to produce a work 
is also five years in the case of a building and for a work of which result consists in the 
rendering of planning or monitoring services for this purpose (§ 634a(1) no. 2). Clauses setting 
out shorter cut-off periods are hence ineffective, even if the loss of the rights due to a missed 
deadline is not expressly mentioned in the standard clause. Hence, the clause 'the buyer must 
notify the company of any defects after they have been discovered' is ineffective according to 
the BGH.6676 
A contrario, a clause containing a cut-off period for notice of obvious defects that is shorter 
than the permissible limitation period might be effective, except in consumer contracts. A 
defect is obvious when it can be discovered without further ado by an average non-
                                                             
6673 68 of 1969.  
6674 See discussion on § 309 no. 8 in Part II ch 5 paras 1.2.8.1-1.2.8.6. 
6675 Stoffels AGB-Recht 372. 
6676 BGH NJW 2001, 292 (300). 
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entrepreneurial customer.6677 Such clauses are subject to the general clause.6678 In this regard, 
standard business terms should distinguish between latent and patent defects.6679 
Regulation 44(3)(z) of the Act greylists clauses imposing a limitation period that is shorter than 
otherwise applicable under the common law or legislation for legal steps to be taken by the 
consumer. Section 56 of the Act is 'legislation' in terms of this regulation. The parties may not 
deviate from such provisions by agreement. 
Under section 56(2), the consumer may return defective goods within six months to the supplier 
who in return must repair or replace the defective item or refund the consumer. It is submitted 
that returning defective goods can be qualified as giving notice to the supplier of the 
defectiveness. According to section 55(5)(a), it is irrelevant whether a defect was latent or 
patent, or whether the consumer could have detected it before taking delivery of the item. 
Hence, the 'cut-off period' of item (z) is at least six months in terms of defective products, 
irrespective of whether the defects are obvious or non-obvious. This is notably shorter than the 
limitation periods set out in §§ 438 and 634a (two to five years) and the minimum limitation 
period of one year in § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) for other cases. It is also shorter than the one-year 
minimum limitation period for the sale of consumer goods (§ 476). 
The consumer's right to good quality goods under section 55 of the Act does not apply to goods 
bought at an auction in terms of section 45. Because of the interplay between sections 55 and 
56, it is suggested that this exclusion also applies to section 56. § 474(2) excludes the 
application of provisions concerning contracts on the sale of consumer goods to used things 
bought at an auction. Section 55(1) does not distinguish between used and unused goods bought 
at an auction. In practice, this differentiation should however only be relevant where new, 
unused things are offered at an auction, e.g., the warehouse stock of a company to be liquidated. 
According to § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff), a supplier must not set a limitation period of less than one 
year after the start of the statutory limitation period.6680 This limitation for suppliers entails 
more balanced clauses in the context of standard terms where consumers only have limited 
                                                             
6677 UBH/Christensen § 309 no. 8 para 92. 
6678 Stoffels AGB-Recht 372. 
6679 Stoffels AGB-Recht 373. 
6680 § 309 no. 8: '(…) (b) [A] provision by which in contracts relating to the supply of newly produced things and 
relating to the performance of work (…) (ff) the limitation of claims against the user due to defects in the cases 
cited in [§] 438 (1) no. 2 and [§] 634a (1) no. 2 is made easier, or in other cases a limitation period of less than 
one year reckoned from the beginning of the statutory limitation period is attained' is ineffective. 
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bargaining power. The South African legislator did not opt for such a minimum period but 
referred to the limitation periods applicable under the common law or legislation.  
The formulation 'making limitation easier' in § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) includes a shortening of the 
limitation period as well as any measures that have the same direct or indirect result, such as 
an earlier beginning of the limitation period.6681 The South African item is more restrictive in 
this regard as it applies merely to a shortening of the limitation period. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that the scope of application of item (z) is partly covered by 
§ 309 no. 8 lit. b) ee) and ff). The cut-off period of item (z) of at least 6 months for defective 
products is notably shorter than the limitation periods set out in §§ 438 and 634a (2 to 5 years), 
and the minimum limitation period of one year under § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ff) in other cases. What 
is more, the South African provision is more restrictive because it only applies to a shortening 
of the limitation period and not to other clauses that 'make limitation easier'. Item (z) should be 
amended in this regard in order to include all sorts of negative modifications of the limitation 
period for consumers. 
aa) Regulation 44(3)(aa) 
Regulation 44(3)(aa) provides that a term is presumed to be unfair if it entitles the supplier to 
claim legal or other costs on a higher scale than usual, where there is not also a term entitling 
the consumer to claim such costs on the same scale.6682 
German legislation does not black- or greylist similar legal provisions because their regulatory 
content is limited by other norms dealing with tariffs.  
In Germany, the 'principle of the unity of costs'6683 prevails. This means that the court costs and 
fees,6684 as well as the so-called extra-judicial fees, such as lawyers' fees6685 are determined by 
the court ex officio in a so-called 'basic decision on the costs' (order on the costs)6686 in terms 
of §§ 308(2) and 91 et seq. ZPO. This decision only concerns the question of who has to bear 
the costs and in which proportion but not the actual amount. Under § 11(1) and (2) 
                                                             
6681 Staudinger/Coester-Waltjen § 309 no. 8 para 95. 
6682 See discussion on reg 44(3)(aa) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 d). As to the different formulations for these clauses 
and further explanations, see 'The difference between party-and-party costs and attorney-and-client costs are 
becoming a problem.' at http://billsofcosts.co.za/component/content/article.html?catid=1:latest&id=19:problem-
p-a-p--a-a-c&Itemid=2. 
6683 Einheit der Kostenentscheidung. 
6684 Gerichtskosten and Gebühren.  
6685 Außergerichtliche Kosten. 
6686 Kostengrundentscheidung. 
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Gerichtskostengesetz (GKG),6687 read with Annex 1 and 2 to the GKG, the court costs and fees 
as well as the lawyer's costs are calculated on the basis of the amount in dispute.6688 The 
calculation itself is done by applying the so-called Baumbach formula.6689 The actual amount 
of the court's costs and fees as well of the lawyers' fees is decided by a registrar/officer of 
justice in a taxation of costs procedure6690 according to §§ 103 and 104 ZPO, read in 
conjunction with §§ 19 GKG and 21 no. 1 and 3 RPflG.6691 The amount a lawyer can require 
is set out in the RVG.6692 Since 1 July 2006, lawyers can negotiate their fees for extra-judicial 
services. For all other services before the courts, their fees are set out in the GKG.6693  
A similar item was thus not necessary in the German grey- or blacklists. 
bb) Regulation 44(3)(bb) 
Under regulation 44(3)(bb), a term providing that a law other than that of South Africa applies 
to a consumer agreement concluded and implemented in South Africa, where the consumer 
was residing in South Africa at the time when the agreement was concluded, is presumed to be 
unfair.6694  
The reason for the greylisting of such terms is that consumers should not be prevented from 
taking legal action in their local courts. It would not be fair if they were forced to travel long 
distances and use procedures that are unfamiliar to them.6695 
In German contract law, the parties have the free choice as to which law should apply to their 
agreement. Article 3(1) of the Rome-I Regulation provides that the parties can freely select the 
law applicable to the contract. The parties or the contract do not need to have any relation to 
the chosen law. Under certain circumstances, the law applicable to the standard business terms 
of the user can be freely chosen.6696 
The law applicable to the contract according to a choice of law or objective connectivity 
criterion means that only the provisions of the legal system in question apply to the contract 
                                                             
6687 GKG = Court Fees Act. 
6688 Streitwert or Gegenstandswert. 
6689 Baumbach'sche Formel. 
6690 Kostenfestsetzungsverfahren. 
6691 RPflG = Rechtspflegergesetz (Act on the Competencies of Officers of Justice). 
6692 RVG = Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz (Lawyers' Compensation Act), formerly the Bundesrechtsanwalts-
gebührenordnung (BRAGO). 
6693 See Creifelds Rechtswörterbuch s.v. 'Kostenentscheidung', 'Kostenfestsetzung' and 'Rechtsanwaltsgebühr'. 
See also 'Kostenquotelung' at www.juratexte.de. 
6694 See discussion on reg 44(3)(bb) in Part I ch 3 para 3.4.7. 
6695 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 17.4 at 68. 
6696 See discussion in Part II ch 2 para 3. 
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'from the cradle to the grave'. The applicable legal provisions determine the coming into being 
and validity of the contract,6697 its formal validity,6698 as well its scope and performance of the 
contractual obligations, its interpretation and the consequences of breach (damages).6699  
This means that if German law applies, the customer benefits from §§ 305 et seq.6700  
Notwithstanding article 6(1) of Rome I (law of the habitual residence of the consumer), the 
parties may choose the law applicable to a contract which fulfils the requirements of 
paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3 (freedom of choice). Such a choice may thus not 
have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded by provisions that cannot 
be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, would 
have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1. Hence, in consumer contracts, one must 
assess if the national law contains mandatory provisions from which the parties must not 
derogate. In practice, German companies often choose foreign law, e.g., Swiss law, in B2B 
contracts.6701  
In order to enhance consumer protection and because of a lack of a similar mechanism such as 
in the EU, the South African legislature rightly opted for the solution set out in item (bb). A 
recourse to section 2(2), i.e., the consideration of foreign law, would not be possible in this 
regard since for a mechanism similar to the Rome-I Regulation, other countries must adhere to 
the same mechanism, which is not the case. 
4. Provisions subject to the general clause 
4.1   Structural aspects 
As discussed in Part I,6702 the South African general clause contained in section 48 of the Act 
is lengthy and verbose. Usually, general clauses in other regimes are rather straightforward. 
According to Kötz, 'the precise formulation of the general clause does not cause any excessive 
difficulties. The formulation of the general clause should be as accurate and precise as possible'. 
                                                             
6697 Article 10(1) of Rome I: 'The existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be 
determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.' 
6698 Article 11(1) of Rome I: 'A contract concluded between persons who, or whose agents, are in the same country 
at the time of its conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it in 
substance under this Regulation or of the law of the country where it is concluded.' 
6699 Article 12(1) of Rome I: 'The law applicable to a contract by virtue of this Regulation shall govern in 
particular: (a) interpretation; (b) performance; (c) within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its 
procedural law, the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations, including the assessment of damages 
in so far as it is governed by rules of law; (d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and 
limitation of actions; (e) the consequences of nullity of the contract.' 
6700 Stoffels AGB-Recht 77. 
6701 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. See Part II ch 5 para 3.5.1. 
6702 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1. 
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Thus, general clauses that merely contain terms such as 'inequitable' or 'inadequate' without 
further qualification are too vague. The general clause should instead express that an imbalance 
between the rights and obligations of the parties leads to ineffectiveness.'6703 A formulation of 
the general clause such as in Germany would thus have been more advantageous regarding 
clarity and application. 
The South African general clause uses the terms 'unfair, unreasonable or unjust', which are not 
defined in the Act. These three adjectives mean more or less the same. At least, no 
differentiation emanates from the Act, e.g., from sections 1 or 3. Moreover, the Act contains 
even more synonyms for ‘unfair’ in other instances in section 48, such as ‘inequitable’6704 or 
‘unconscionable’.6705 The German general clause in § 307 does not contain a term such as 
'unfair' and focuses instead on an imbalance between the parties' rights and obligations 
('unreasonably disadvantage'). 
The general clauses of both regimes contain concretisations, however. § 307(2) with its two 
concretisations is concisely formulated, whereas section 48 contains a 'general unfairness 
standard (section 48(1)), a 'basic unfairness standard' (section 48(2)(a) and (b)), as well as a 
'deceptive standard' (section 48(2)(c)) and a 'procedural standard' (section 48(2)(d)). The two 
last mentioned standards are out of place and should not appear in a general clause. The 
legislator should consider a reformulation of the general clause in this regard too. 
As discussed in Part I,6706 section 48(2) of the Act is not lex specialis to subsection (1) as these 
two provisions complete each other. It is suggested that subsection (2) has a radiating effect on 
subsection (1), however. Hence, when assessing whether a clause is excessively one-sided in 
terms of subsection (2)(a), one has to take into consideration whether the consumer had to 
waive any rights in favour of the supplier, or if any terms have been imposed onto the 
consumer, for instance.6707  
The same approach can be found in the German general clause where § 307(1) has a guiding 
function vis-à-vis paragraph (2). Only where cardinal obligations are restricted, the legislator 
                                                             
6703 Kötz Gutachten 50. DJT 63. My own translation. 
6704 Section 48(2)(b). 
6705 Section 48(2)(d)(i). 
6706 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.2. 
6707 Section 48(1)(c)(i) and (iii). 
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expressly stated that paragraph (2) takes precedence over paragraph (1).6708 Only insofar, 
§ 307(2) is lex specialis to paragraph (1).6709 
The prevailing opinion which classifies paragraph (2) of § 307 as legal rule examples for 
paragraph (1) of § 307 has significant disadvantages though.6710 According to this view, 'in 
case of doubt' is to be read as 'in general', which means that an unreasonable disadvantage 
exists if the conditions of paragraph (2) are fulfilled, save where there are indications in the 
concrete case that this rule does not lead to fair results.6711 
The drawback of this opinion is that it is hardly imaginable that a clause creating an 
unreasonable disadvantage under paragraph (2) can become valid under paragraph (1). A 
correction of the evaluation obtained with regard to paragraph (2) by assessing the clause 
against the background of paragraph (1) is excluded from a methodological point of view. 
Because of the many open concepts contained in paragraph (2), this provision is able to 
integrate the given transactions and allow a final evaluation. Paragraph (2) should thus be 
regarded as a self-contained provision of content control which determines unequivocally 
whether there is an unreasonable disadvantage.6712 Hence, the phrase 'in case of doubt' is 
superfluous.6713 
The formulation '[w]ithout limiting the generality of subsection (1)' in section 48(2) of the Act 
must be read as an indicator of the radiating effect of subsection (2) to subsection (1). In 
contrast, the German wording 'in case of doubt' that, according to the (incorrect) prevailing 
view, must be read as 'in general' has, according to the correct view, no meaning because 
§ 307(2) is a self-contained provision with respect to paragraph (1) of the general clause. 
When enquiring the fairness of standard terms, the potential unfairness or ‘tendency’ should 
be assessed, and not the actual use of a term.6714 On the other hand, the interpretation of these 
terms has to be done on a case-to-case basis.6715 Although the Consumer Protection Act focuses 
on the individual consumer, contrary to §§ 305 et seq., it is suggested that the Act should apply 
                                                             
6708 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 23. 
6709 Stoffels AGB-Recht 204. 
6710 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 238, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 790. 
6711 See Part II ch 5 para 3.3.1. 
6712 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 226. 
6713 Schmidt-Salzer AGB para F 46 ('superfluous or ineffective'), Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 19 
('virtually without any relevance'). See Part II ch 5 para 3.3.1. 
6714 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer 
Protection Law 249. 
6715 Van Eeden Guide to the CPA 182, Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 249. 
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elements of an abstract-universal approach in that the tendency of a clause, i.e., whether the 
term allows the supplier to act in an unfair manner vis-à-vis the consumer, and not its actual 
application must be assessed.  
In the German regime, a radiating effect also exists with regard to § 308 on B2B contracts. 
According to § 310(1) 1st sent., the prohibitions contained in §§ 308 no. 1, 2 to 8 and 309 do 
not apply to B2B contracts. Since these prohibitions are a specific manifestation of the 
evaluative standard laid down in the general clause, based on the principle of good faith, it is 
not excluded though that clauses that are problematic in terms of §§ 308 or 309 could be 
ineffective under § 307. This is explicitly expressed in § 310(1) 2nd sent.6716 
§ 308 contains prohibitions based on a significant disadvantage for a contractual party. The 
result depends here on an evaluation which takes into account the contract type, the parties and 
their typical needs. These considerations can be integrated without problems into B2B 
relationships so that the evaluations contained in § 308 are not problematic for this kind of 
contracts.6717 On the other hand, § 309 contains more restricted formulations which make their 
application for B2B contracts more difficult. Therefore, it would be better to comprehend the 
prohibitions of § 309 as criteria for encompassing content control.6718 
Since the greylist contained in regulation 44(3) of the Act does not apply to B2B contracts 
(regulation 44(1)), the factors mentioned in this list do not have a radiating effect on the general 
clause. The Act does not contain a similar clause to § 310(1) 2nd sent. In such cases, section 48 
applies, and the consumer has the onus of proof.6719 On the other hand, the blacklist of section 
51 applies to B2B contracts, provided that section 5(2)(a) does not apply.6720 
As submitted in Part I,6721 section 48(2)(b) requires a two-part enquiry in which the adverseness 
to the consumer, on the one hand, and the inequitableness, on the other, are examined. This is 
the same approach as for § 307 in which first a disadvantage, and then the unreasonableness of 
the disadvantage must be assessed.6722 It is submitted that the adverseness in section 48(2)(b) 
                                                             
6716 Stoffels AGB-Recht 233. 
6717 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 383, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 40. 
6718 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 382. See Part II ch 5 para 3.5.2. 
6719 Naudé ‘Regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 5. 
6720 See discussion of the scope of application of the CPA in Part I ch 2. 
6721 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.2 b). 
6722 Stoffels AGB-Recht 192 and 193. 
 1057   
 
is comparable to the 'disadvantage' in § 307(1) 1st sent. For this purpose, a comparison between 
the legal situation with and without the clause in question has to take place.6723  
In summary, the South African general clause is verbose, unsystematic, lacks clarity and does 
not correspond to international standard and good legal practice. It also contains 
'concretisations' that do not have their place in a general clause. A more concise provision with 
some precise guidelines, such as § 307, would have been more effective. Even though the Act 
is built around individual consumers, it contains elements of an abstract-universal approach in 
that the tendency of a term and not its actual application must be assessed. Contrary to § 308 
(greylist) which has a radiating effect on B2B contracts, regulation 44(3) finds no application 
to these agreements. On the other hand, the South African blacklist applies to B2B contracts, 
whereas the application of § 309 to B2B contracts is excluded so that the general clause applies 
in these cases. The reason for this difference is that the Act is a pure consumer protection statute 
that also protects small businesses, whereas the BGB provisions take into account that between 
companies laxer rules may apply because they do not deserve the same level of protection. 
Both regimes apply a two-part assessment for their general clause. This logical approach allows 
for a differentiating scrutiny. 
4.2   Moment of evaluation 
According to section 52(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, the court also has to consider 
circumstances that existed when the agreement was made, irrespective of whether the Act was 
in force at that time. The fairness enquiry is thus shifted temporally forward. In practice, this 
could be relevant for agreements for the continuous supply of goods or services but should 
have less and less relevance. This applies only to factual circumstances but not to regulatory 
changes.6724 
In the German regime, the time of the conclusion of the contract is the relevant moment for the 
enquiry in individual proceedings.6725 For consumer contracts, this is expressly stated in 
§ 310(3) no. 3.6726 This does not only apply to factual circumstances but also evaluative 
elements. Therefore, regulatory changes can neither make a clause valid if it was invalid at the 
                                                             
6723 See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.1. 
6724 See discussion on s 52(2)(c) in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) cc). 
6725 BGH NJW 2000, 1110 (1113), Medicus NJW 1995, 2579 et seq, Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 100, 
Schmidt BGB-AT 431. 
6726 § 310(3): 'In the case of contracts between an entrepreneur and a consumer (consumer contracts) the rules in 
this division apply with the following provisos: (…) 3. In judging an unreasonable disadvantage under [§] 307(1) 
and (2), the other circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must also be taken into account.' 
Emphasis added. 
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time of the conclusion of the contract or vice versa.6727 In contrast, in institutional actions 
(abstract challenges) where no concrete contract has been entered into, the moment of the last 
oral proceedings is relevant.6728 
Since the Act has been in force for over a decade now, the two regimes should not differ 
anymore in this regard. 
4.3   Clauses subject to the general clause 
a) Negotiated terms, price control, performance 
The general unfairness standard of section 48(1) even applies to terms specifically agreed after 
negotiations, and not only to terms in standard-form contracts or non-negotiated terms.6729 In 
contrast, § 305b excludes content control for individually negotiated clauses.6730 As discussed 
earlier,6731 the courts must consider all the relevant factors in the fairness enquiry, and the fact 
that certain terms have been negotiated should be considered by the courts. 
It is unclear whether section 48(1)(a)(i) of the Act aims at a price control mechanism and a tool 
to control general price levels. As discussed in Part I,6732 such price control would raise 
complex practical and theoretical questions. Competition law and the rules on improper 
conduct in the pre-contractual phase already provide sufficient and effective price control.6733 
Furthermore, sections 40, 41 and 29 offer sufficient protection against unconscionable conduct 
and false, misleading or deceptive representations as well as reprehensible marketing methods.  
As mentioned further above,6734 German courts apply price control in terms of §§ 305 et seq. 
only where a legal price regulation exists and a standard clause differs from it.6735 The threshold 
for court intervention is very high though.6736 In South Africa, such a high threshold for court 
intervention could be achieved by following Van Eeden's and Naudé's argumentation. 
According to these authors, section 48(1)(a)(i) is appropriately applied in instances where an 
unfair price is applied and other factors, e.g., unconscionable conduct or deception, are 
                                                             
6727 Stoffels AGB-Recht 184. 
6728 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 119. See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.2. 
6729 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 307, Sharrock Judicial control 128. 
6730 § 305b: 'Individually agreed terms take priority over standard business terms'. 
6731 See Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
6732 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.1 a). 
6733 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
6734 See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.5 e). 
6735 Erman/Roloff § 307 para 45. 
6736 Under § 138(2), in order to fulfil the conditions of usury, the price must not only be excessive 
('disproportionate'), but the other party must also fulfil subjective conditions. 
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present, 6737 or where the agreement was concluded on the basis of misrepresentation or other 
unconscionable conduct under sections 40 and 41, for instance.6738 Price control without further 
qualification should in any event not be possible under the Act. The South African legislature 
should nonetheless make clear that it did not wish to introduce a price-control mechanism in 
the Act as such. 
b) Declaratory clauses 
As discussed earlier,6739 so-called 'declaratory clauses', i.e., provisions that have the same 
content as legal provisions ('regulatory identity'), are also subject to content control in South 
Africa. This is not the case in Germany. Naudé6740 correctly averts that control of these clauses 
should be excluded since it is a constitutional question of whether a legal provision has to be 
declared void.6741 
4.4  Aspects of content control 
As the Consumer Protection Act applies an individualised approach, the fairness enquiry under 
the general clause also has to be performed by considering the factors listed in section 52(2). 
§§ 305 et seq. do not contain a similar list of factors to be taken into account. § 310(3) no. 3, 
which deals specifically with consumer contracts, merely provides that 'in judging an 
unreasonable disadvantage under section 307(1) and (2) [general clause], the other 
circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must also be taken into account.' 
§§ 305 et seq. do not define these 'other circumstances attending the entering into of the 
contract'. Recital 16 of the EU Unfair Terms Directive gives some guidance though and makes 
clear what has to be taken into consideration (e.g., the parties' respective bargaining position, 
the existence of an inducement for the consumer, or a special order of the consumer).6742 
Section 52(2) focuses mainly on procedural unfairness, as opposed to substantive 
unfairness.6743 In some instances, control on substantive unfairness alone would also be 
justified though because the use of standard contract terms creates procedural unfairness due 
to the lack of incentives for the consumer to read and bargain about terms.6744 This applies 
                                                             
6737 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 259 and 260. 
6738 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 8. 
6739 See para 1, above. 
6740 Naudé 2009 SALJ 534. 
6741 See s 167(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
6742 See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.4 b). 
6743 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 11. 
6744 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
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irrespective of whether the consumer ‘could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or 
services from a different supplier’6745 as it is highly unlikely that a consumer will shop around 
and compare the goods and standard terms in question. In many cases however, procedural and 
substantive unfairness cannot be separated as there is often an interplay due to the structural 
inequality caused by the use of standard form contracts.6746 For example, the prominence of a 
term must be considered in conjunction with its content.6747  
Many instances are not mentioned in the list but considered in foreign legislation. They can 
thus be taken into account by South African courts under section 2(2). Therefore, other factors, 
such as those which serve as the best international model of relevant factors, should also be 
considered by the courts.6748 The Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law Commission 
of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission in 2005, for example, contains such 
a list of factors.6749 
Predictability and certainty would be enhanced if a court would be prepared to declare a term 
unfair per se in a particular industry, or based on the ‘tendency of the clause’. Such an objective 
finding, which does not consider the parties of the particular case, would be in the interest of 
the consumers and the suppliers of the trade sector in question. It would also advance 
predictability and eliminate unfair terms in the given sector and most probably in other related 
and unrelated sectors as well. This is because some unfair terms are so repugnant that they 
rarely can be fair.6750  
The same approach can be found in the German regime where the circumstances of the parties 
involved in a particular transaction are not taken into account, but rather the transactions of the 
type and classes of the participants.6751 Therefore, in the fairness control, one has also to 
consider the socio-economic context in which a term is used. This also applies to so-called 
                                                             
6745 See s 52(2)(i). 
6746 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. See also Barkhuizen v Napier at 
para [149] where Sachs J already recognised this in his minority judgment, and BVerfG NJW 1993, 36. 
6747 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a). 
6748 See s 14(4) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill published in Law Commissions of England and Wales and the 
Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)(2005). 
6749 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 13, Naudé 2006 Stell LR 373 and 374. 
6750 See also Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 17. In Johannesburg Country 
Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA), the SCA decided in an obiter dictum that a term excluding liability for death 
caused negligently would probably be contrary to public policy because it conflicts with s 11 of the Bill of Rights, 
namely the right to life. It should be noted that terms excluding or limiting the liability for death or personal injury 
are presumed to be unfair under reg 44(3)(a). 
6751 BGHZ 22, 91 (98); 17, 1 (3). 
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‘abstract’ or ‘general use’ challenges brought by consumer organisations or regulators, where 
no individual consumer is involved in the given dispute.6752 
Hence, South African courts should not only apply the factors contained in section 52(2), but 
also those taken into account in foreign legislation. Even though the German regime does not 
provide for a list of factors, in consumer contracts, the 'other circumstances attending the 
entering into of the contract must also be taken into account'. For the definition of these 'other 
circumstances', the EU Unfair Terms Directive gives guidance. In order to enhance 
predictability and certainty, South African courts should also be able to declare terms unfair 
per se in a particular industry, or based on the 'tendency of the clause'. Such an objective finding 
is the German approach and the basis of institutional actions. 
4.4.1 Factors listed in section 52(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 
a) Fair value of the goods or services 
South African courts can consider the fair value of the given goods or services in terms of 
section 52(2)(a). The fact that a price exceeds the market price of the relevant goods or services 
is in itself not sufficient to declare it unfair because, as discussed before, the South African 
legislator did not intend to introduce a price control mechanism in the Act.6753 There are 
instances though where the price of a product reflects the existence of exemption clauses or 
extended warranties or guarantees and their influence on the price. When assessing the fairness 
of a price, also other clauses should hence be considered.6754  
As the German regime applies an abstract-universal approach, this factor is not relevant under 
§§ 305 et seq. What is more, the so-called 'price argument'6755 in terms of which an unfair 
clause might become fair by compensating it with a lower price, is generally irrelevant.6756 An 
exception exists where the consumer has a real choice between different versions of a contract 
entailing different prices, e.g., with or without the seller's liability.6757 The BGH also puts some 
weight on the price argument and the exclusion of the supplier's liability in the electricity 
                                                             
6752 Naudé ‘Section 48’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
6753 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 309, Sharrock Judicial control 131. 
6754 Naudé ‘Introduction to Sections 48-52 and regulation 44’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 
5. See Part I ch 3 para 2.1. 
6755 Preisargument. 
6756 BGH NJW-RR 2008, 818 (820), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 145.  
6757 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 148, Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 18. 
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supply sector.6758 In other instances, the German regime does not consider price issues so that 
both regimes are only comparable to this extent.6759 
b) Nature of the parties 
The nature of the parties, their relationship to each other and their relative capacity, experience 
and bargaining position etc. are factors that relates to procedural fairness.6760 
Because of the general-abstract approach of the German regime, these factors are not 
considered under the general clause. An exception exists for consumer contracts under § 310(3) 
where also 'the other circumstances attending the entering into of the contract' must be 
considered. Such 'other circumstances' are personal characteristics of the contractual partners 
which may influence their respective bargaining position, their knowledge and experience and 
the dependence on the contractual performance. For practical reasons and legal certainty, only 
apparent deviations are taken into account in standard contracts. Furthermore, the 
particularities of the concrete situation at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement must 
be taken into account (information provided by the user before the conclusion of the contract, 
duration and intensity of the negotiations, or tactics to surprise and overpower the other party). 
Lastly, the existence of untypical particular interests of the consumer belongs to such 'other 
circumstances' that have to be considered where they are visible for the user.6761 
In the German regime, the characteristics mentioned in section 52(2)(b) of the Act thus only 
apply in consumer contracts. For legal certainty and practicability, only apparent characteristics 
should be considered in both regimes. 
c) Circumstances of the transaction 
The circumstances that existed or were reasonably foreseeable when the contract was 
concluded (section 52(2)(c)) are also a procedural aspect that the German law can only take 
into account in the context of consumer contracts under § 310(3). The German provision limits 
the scope of application to circumstances 'attending the entering into of the contract' ('die den 
Vertragsschluss begleitenden Umstände') though. If circumstances that were merely 
'foreseeable', i.e., those that were not yet existent, must also be taken into account is not clear. 
It is suggested that such foreseeable circumstances can only be considered when they had an 
influence on the conclusion of the contract and have been known by both sides. This is 
                                                             
6758 BGH NJW 1998, 1640 (1644). 
6759 See discussion of the price argument in Part II ch 5 para 3.2.5 e). 
6760 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) bb). 
6761 UBH/Fuchs § 307 paras 406-409. See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.4 b). 
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congruent with Sharrock's view in the South African context, according to which only 
circumstances of which both parties knew about or should have reasonably foreseen are 
relevant in terms of section 52(2)(c).6762  
Unlike German law6763 and other legal systems, the South African regime does not recognise a 
doctrine of ‘change of circumstances’ or ‘hardship’ allowing the cancellation or adaption of a 
contract when unforeseeable circumstances arise. Since the South African legislator seems to 
be 'paralysed with indecision' on this topic, the common law should be developed in this 
regard.6764 This could be done by introducing a definition of hardship in order to cover 
frustration of purpose and impracticability.6765 Sharrock opines that a possible solution would 
be the reliance on a tacit resolutive condition.6766 Then, ‘a contract terminates, even though it 
is not physically or legally impossible to perform if circumstances change so fundamentally as 
to remove the basis of the contract and negate the purpose or object that the parties had in mind 
when they contracted’.6767 Ideally, the legislature should introduce a doctrine of 'change of 
circumstances' or 'hardship'. 
d) Conduct of the parties 
The conduct of the parties when concluding their agreement (section 52(2)(d))6768 is a 
procedural factor too that in the German regime can only be taken into account for consumer 
agreements in terms of § 310(3). 
                                                             
6762 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 311, Sharrock Judicial control 132. 
6763 In German law, this is called ‘interference with the basis of the transaction (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage)’ 
(§313 BGB), which is based on the former doctrine of 'cessation of the basis of the transaction (Wegfall der 
Geschäftsgrundlage). This doctrine was originally developed by the courts and is similar to the English doctrine 
of frustration. See Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 312 note 99, Sharrock Judicial control 133 note 99. § 313 BGB: 
'(1)If circumstances which became the basis of a contract have significantly changed since the contract was entered 
into and if the parties would not have entered into the contract or would have entered into it with different contents 
if they had foreseen this change, adaptation of the contract may be demanded to the extent that, taking account of 
all the circumstances of the specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory distribution of risk, one of the 
parties cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without alteration. (2) It is equivalent to a change of 
circumstances if material conceptions that have become the basis of the contract are found to be incorrect. (3) If 
adaptation of the contract is not possible or one party cannot reasonably be expected to accept it, the disadvantaged 
party may revoke the contract. In the case of continuing obligations, the right to terminate takes the place of the 
right to revoke.' The English doctrine of frustration, on the other hand, provides for the possibility that a contract 
may be discharged on the ground of frustration when something occurs after the formation of the contract which 
renders it physically or commercially impossible to fulfil the contract or transforms the obligation to perform into 
a radically different obligation from that undertaken at the moment of the entry into the contract. See Law Oxford 
Dictionary of Law s.v. 'Frustration of contract'. 
6764 Hutchison PhD thesis 245, Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 24. 
6765 Hutchison PhD thesis 232 et seq. 
6766 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 312 note 99, Sharrock Judicial control 133 note 99. 
6767 Sharrock Judicial control 133 note 99. 
6768 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) dd). 
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As suggested in Part I,6769 conduct may also take the form of an omission, e.g., where the 
supplier did not fully answer pertinent questions of the customer so that the latter did not obtain 
a full picture of his or her rights and obligations. This also applies to cases where the supplier 
puts pressure on the consumer to sign the contract without allowing him or her to read it. 
This is in line with the German legislation in terms of consumer contracts where the type and 
the scope of the information given by the standard terms user before the entering into the 
contract as well as the refusal to inform the consumer appropriately are taken into account as 
'other circumstances' in terms of § 310(3).6770 Pressure too can be considered as tactics to 
overpower the other party.6771 
For the consideration of the conduct of the parties, a wide stance should thus be taken that also 
considers withheld information, any form of pressure and other tactics to overpower 
consumers. 
For the consideration of the conduct of the parties, South African courts should take a wide 
stance which also considers withheld information or other omissions, any form of pressure and 
other tactics to overpower consumers. 
e) Existence of negotiations and their extent 
Item (e) of section 52(2) concerns negotiated terms. South African legislation does also include 
these in the fairness enquiry.6772 
In German law, § 305b sets out that individually agreed terms take priority over standard terms 
and therefore are not controllable in terms of fairness (§ 305(1) 3rd sent.).6773  
What is more, according to § 305(1) 3rd sent., contract terms do not become standard terms to 
the extent that they have been negotiated in detail between the parties. German courts apply a 
very high standard for that standard terms can be considered negotiated in detail in the sense 
of § 305(1) 3rd sent. The fact that the parties 'negotiate' is not sufficient. The BGH requires that 
the parties meet the conditions of an 'Aushandeln' and not only of a 'Verhandeln'.6774 
'Aushandeln' requires that the user places the clauses that differentiate from the statutory 
provisions seriously at the other party's disposal and allows the client the liberty to shape the 
                                                             
6769 Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) dd). 
6770 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 408. 
6771 In this sense: UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 408. 
6772 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) ee). 
6773 See Part II ch 2 para 1.1.4 b). 
6774 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1040; NJW 2013, 856; 2014, 1725 (1727). 
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content of these terms.6775 Hence, the user must be ready to modify its standard terms 
accordingly. It is not sufficient that the user expresses its general and diffuse willingness to 
modify specific clauses if the other party wishes so,6776 or that the client is 'free' to sign the 
contract or to step away.6777 
The Act does not define the term ‘negotiation’. With regard to other factors, it is assumed that 
this factor has to do with choice. The question therefore is whether the consumer had a real 
opportunity to influence the contents of the contractual terms. The mere fact that a supplier 
presents the consumer with more than one pre-formulated alternative to choose from does not 
qualify as ‘negotiation’.6778 It is my submission that real negotiation only takes place where the 
parties have the liberty to alter terms without being limited to pre-formulated clauses.  
The German regime excludes negotiated terms from content control per se, whereas these are 
included in terms of section 52(2). To which extent is unclear, however. In any event, the South 
African courts should distinguish between negotiated and non-negotiated terms. 
f) No legitimate interest of the supplier 
A corresponding provision to item (f) of section 52(2)6779 cannot be found in the German 
regime. Even for consumer contracts under § 310(3), the user's interests cannot be considered 
'other circumstances' attending the conclusion of the contract. 
A factor for the fairness enquiry in the German context is the insurability of the risk though. 
Hence, it is crucial to know whether the risks involved can be insured better by the user 
(supplier) or the other party (consumer).6780 In this context, the economic analysis of the law 
refers to the 'cheapest insurer'.6781 Not only the possibility to insure the risk is relevant in this 
regard, but also the premiums to be paid as well as the coverage offered. In addition, the claims 
settlement must be acceptable for the party in question and be a widespread practice.6782 Where 
it is common practice that the consumer insures the risk inherent to a particular business sector, 
the supplier can rely on this practice, and the exclusion of the risk is not an unreasonable 
                                                             
6775 BGH NJW 2013, 856; 2014, 1725 (1727); BAG NZA 2006, 40 (44); 2008, 229, Brox and Walker SchuldR-
AT 40. 
6776 BGH NJW-RR 2005, 1040 (1041). 
6777 BGH NJW 2005, 2543. 
6778 Stoop LLD thesis 152. 
6779 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) ff). 
6780 BGH NJW 1991, 1886 (1888); 2002, 673 (675), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 156 et seq, von Hoyningen-Huene 
§ 9 AGBG para 216 et seq. 
6781 Schäfer and Ott Ökonomische Analyse 407 et seq. 
6782 BGH NJW 1992, 1761 (1762), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 159. 
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disadvantage for the consumer.6783 A shift of the supplier's liability onto the consumer does 
thus not raise concern where usually the clients insure the risk(s) in question.6784  
For the fairness control of a clause which passes a certain risk onto a party, it is relevant to 
enquire in whose sphere the risk is passed onto, and if the realisation of the risk can be avoided 
better and cheaper by the consumer or the supplier. This will generally be the person 
controlling the risk.6785 This criterion is confirmed by the economic analysis of the law which 
aims at allocating the risk of a breach or default of the contract to the 'cheapest cost avoider'.6786  
According to section 52(2)(f) of the Consumer Protection Act, the court must consider whether, 
as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the consumer was required to do anything 
that was not reasonably necessary for the legitimate interests of the supplier.6787 
In the South African regime, the enquiry of the legitimate interest of the supplier begs the 
question of whether a term represents a proportionate response to the supplier’s interest. Such 
an interest is, for instance, a risk faced by it, other possible ways by which it could have 
protected its interest as well as market practice.6788 Where the supplier limits its liability, one 
must consider whether it was reasonable to expect it to insure itself against the liability and 
whether the consumer could be expected to insure him- or herself. Regarding the consumer, 
the question of whether the supplier had advised the consumer timeously to take insurance, or 
whether the consumer should otherwise have realised that he or she needed insurance, are 
essential factors for this enquiry.6789  
The factor contained in section 52(2)(f) thus only plays a role in the German regime with regard 
to insurance. The aspect of risk control and the concept of the cheapest insurer should apply in 
the South African regime too. 
                                                             
6783 BGH NJW 1992, 1761 (1762). 
6784 BGH NJW 2002, 673 (675). 
6785 BGH NJW 2005, 422 (424), von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 190 et seq. 
6786 Schäfer and Ott Ökonomische Analyse 227 et seq, Stoffels AGB-Recht 192. 
6787 Two factors of the SA Law Commission's list implicitly refer to the legitimate interest criterion: '(m) whether 
a term is unduly difficult to fulfil, or imposes obligations or liabilities on a party which are not reasonably 
necessary to protect the other party' and '(n) whether the contract or term excludes or limits the obligations or 
liabilities of a party to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to protect his or her interests'. Emphasis added. 
6788 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 28. 
6789 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 30. 
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g) Plain language / transparency 
The plain language requirement of section 52(2)(g),6790 read in conjunction with section 22, is 
also expressed in § 307(1) 2nd sent. According to the German provision, '[a]n unreasonable 
disadvantage may also arise from the provision not being clear and comprehensible.'  
In the Act, the transparency requirement is set out in various other provisions, such as section 
48(2)(c), read with section 41 (false, misleading or deceptive representations), or section 
48(2)(d)(ii), read with section 49 (terms must be drawn to the consumer's attention). 
Fuchs and Stoffels legitimately argue that incompliance with the transparency requirement 
leads to ineffectiveness of a provision if the intransparency leads to an unreasonable 
disadvantage.6791 The determination of such an unreasonable disadvantage is dispensable 
though if there is an irrefutable presumption that such a disadvantage exists.6792 Since the 
enquiry of the existence of an unreasonable disadvantage is performed without having a 
particular consumer in mind, there is an irrefutable presumption of an unreasonable 
disadvantage in cases where an abstract danger of the loss of market opportunities exists.6793 
This is even more so where intransparency results in the concealment of the real legal position 
as the customer might be deterred to claim his or her rights.6794 The actual realisation of this 
danger is not necessary because under § 307(1) 2nd sent., an unreasonable disadvantage is 
already given if the provision is unclear. Hence, it can be argued that intransparency leads to 
ineffectiveness of a standard clause where the determination of a disadvantage due to 
intransparency is not necessary. This view is covered by the wording of § 307(1) 2nd sent. and 
by the governmental argumentation, according to which intransparent clauses are to be 
considered ineffective per se without a material unreasonable disadvantage.6795 In Stoffel's 
view, this formulation is misleading, though, because the unreasonableness of a disadvantage 
is necessarily a consequence of the clause's intransparency.6796 
In practice, it should not matter whether the plain language or the transparency requirement are 
assessed on an abstract-general manner or with having the individual consumer in mind. This 
applies even more because of the fact that the determination of a disadvantage due to 
                                                             
6790 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) gg). 
6791 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 330, Stoffels AGB-Recht 236. 
6792 Stoffels AGB-Recht 236. According to Fuchs (UBH § 307 para 331), this view goes too far. Coester 
(Staudinger (2006) § 307 para 174) opines that this irrefutable presumption exists 'as a general rule'. 
6793 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 175 et seq, OLG Celle NJW-RR 1995, 1133. 
6794 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 178. 
6795 BT-Drs. 14/6014 at 154. 
6796 Stoffels AGB-Recht 237. 
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intransparency is unnecessary under the German regime, and in terms of the Consumer 
Protection Act, the plain language requirements of section 22 are applied to 'an ordinary 
consumer of the class of persons for whom the [document] is intended'.6797 
According to the Act, plain language is merely a factor that the courts must consider, and does 
not lead automatically to voidness of a clause. Since standard clauses that are written in an 
incomprehensible manner are unfair vis-à-vis consumers, the courts will most likely strike 
down such provisions though. This is in line with German legislation where an unreasonable 
disadvantage ('unfairness') exists in the case of unclear or incomprehensible provisions. 
h) Knowledge of unfair terms 
In terms of section 52(2)(h), a court must consider whether the consumer knew or ought 
reasonably to have known of the existence and extent of any particular provision of the 
agreement that is alleged to have been unfair, having regard to any custom of trade, and any 
previous dealings between the parties. This item hence concerns procedural fairness taking 
precedence over substantial fairness.6798 
Besides the fact that the BGB applies a supra-individual and generalising approach, 
§ 305(2)6799 provides that the user simply must explicitly refer to the contract terms at the time 
when the parties enter into a contract in an acceptable manner, and the other party has to have 
the opportunity to take notice of their contents.6800 If the reference to such terms is only possible 
with disproportionate difficulty, it is sufficient to post the terms in a visible manner at the place 
where the contract is concluded. In special cases (transportation, telecommunications, 
information services etc.), § 305a allows incorporation without compliance with these 
requirements if the consumer agrees to their applying. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the 
clauses do not become part of the contract.6801 It is thus irrelevant if the consumer took the 
opportunity to take knowledge of the given terms.6802 In German law, it is not necessary to 
expressly point out unfair terms, as long as the entire legal instrument of standard terms has 
                                                             
6797 Emphasis added. 
6798 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) hh). 
6799 § 305(2): 'Standard business terms only become a part of a contract if the user, when entering into the contract, 
1. refers the other party to the contract to them explicitly or, where explicit reference, due to the way in which the 
contract is entered into, is possible only with disproportionate difficulty, by posting a clearly visible notice at the 
place where the contract is entered into, and 2. gives the other party to the contract, in an acceptable manner, 
which also takes into reasonable account any physical handicap of the other party to the contract that is discernible 
to the user, the opportunity to take notice of their contents, and if the other party to the contract agrees to their 
applying.' 
6800 WLP/Pfeiffer § 305 para 62. 
6801 See discussion in Part II ch 3 paras 1.1-1-3. 
6802 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 para 145, Stoffels AGB-Recht 99. 
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been duly incorporated into the contract. It is also not relevant whether the consumer has read 
or understood the terms. 
For consumer agreements in terms of § 310(3) an individual approach must be applied by 
taking into consideration the circumstances attending the conclusion of the given contract, 
however. The standard business terms user has to inform its client about the terms of the 
agreement and answer pertinent questions.6803 Hence, if the other party knew about terms that 
are disadvantageous for him or her, one might conclude that the given terms are not unfair.  
The Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission take the same 
stance.6804 It should also be applied to the South African context. According to these 
commissions, courts should consider if the party understood a term's meaning if a person in a 
similar position as the consumer would usually expect a similar transaction in the given 
situation, the information given to the consumer before he or she signed the contract as well as 
further explanations made by the supplier. Furthermore, the courts should assess whether the 
consumer had a reasonable opportunity to absorb provided information as well as the 
complexity of the transaction, and whether it was transparent and if the consumer took 
professional advice or was reasonable to expect to have done so. It is noteworthy that the UK 
Law Commissions refer to the 'knowledge and understanding' instead of merely 
'knowledge'.6805 
Other considerations, such as customs of trade or previous dealings between the parties, which 
are set out in section 52 of the Act, are not part of these considerations in the German regime, 
however. In the German context, knowledge of unfair terms is thus only relevant in consumer 
contracts. In any case, South African suppliers should ensure that their customers understand 
their standard terms and give, where necessary, additional explanations 
i) Possibility to acquire identical goods or services elsewhere at a better price 
Item (i) of section 52(2) refers to goods or services from another supplier at a better price. This 
factor creates many practical problems that have been discussed earlier.6806 For instance, the 
phrase 'could have acquired' is problematic as the mere theoretical possibility of better terms 
or a better price is difficult to assess. With regard to the general irrelevance of the price 
                                                             
6803 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 408. 
6804 Paragraph 45 of the Explanatory Notes to the Unfair Contract Terms Bill, set out in Unfair Terms in Contracts 
– Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 
199)(2005) at 161. 
6805 Emphasis added. 
6806 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) ii). 
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argument in German standard business terms legislation6807 and the fact that the price is not 
subject to content control under German law in terms of § 307(3), considerations concerning 
factor (i) are not part of German standard business terms legislation. This is because in a market 
economy, the price for goods or services is agreed between the parties and not determined by 
law, which is why the German legislator did not want to submit price control to the courts.6808 
Prices that are charged for a performance for which the supplier is obligated by law6809 or which 
he or she charges in its own interest are subject to content control though.6810  
As discussed earlier in Part I,6811 in practice, this factor should have not much relevance. 
j) Special order goods 
Section 52(2)(j) contains a factor concerning special order goods (services are not included in 
this item).6812  
Even though German standard business terms legislation applies an abstract-general approach, 
the considerations contained in the South African provision could be taken into account in 
consumer contracts (§ 310(3)). Indeed, it is recognised that the consumer's special interests fall 
under the definition of 'other circumstances attending to the entering into of the contract'. If the 
user is aware of a special interest or a very special purpose that the consumer associates with 
the contract, the user may be obliged, pursuant to the principle of good faith, to consider this 
when drawing up the contract. This may have the consequence that certain clauses, which are 
usually unobjectionable, do not fit in this individual case, and their use may thus be unfair.6813 
It is suggested that for other contracts than consumer contracts, the application of § 307(2) 
no. 2 allows for a more lenient approach for special order goods. 
The German considerations do not contribute to new considerations in terms of the South 
African regime though.  
                                                             
6807 See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.5 e). 
6808 BT-Drs. 7/3919 at 22, Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 784. 
6809 BGH NJW 2000, 651; 2001, 1419 (notification of the client that a debit order has not been honoured; banks 
have a duty to notify their clients of these facts in terms of § 666). 
6810 BGH NJW 2001, 1419; 2002, 2386 (deactivation fee for a telephone line). See Part II ch 5 para 3.1. 
6811 Chapter 3 para 4.1.4 a) ii). 
6812 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) jj). 
6813 UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 409. 
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4.4.2 Other factors not listed in section 52(2) of the Act 
Since the factors listed in section 52(2) are not exhaustive, South African courts may take into 
consideration also other factors.6814 
a) Nature of goods or services 
One of the factors not listed in the Consumer Protection Act, but mentioned in recital 18 of the 
EU Unfair Terms Directive is the nature of the goods or services that is taken into consideration 
when assessing the fairness of a standard clause.6815 
Under article 3(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive, '[a] contractual term which has not been 
individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirements of good faith, 
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer.' Article 4 concretises which elements have to be considered 
for the fairness enquiry, such as the nature of the goods or services, and the circumstances 
attending the conclusion of the contract.6816  
The nature of the goods or services is a crucial characteristic of the goods or services sold, 
having a direct impact on the formulation of the terms and conditions. Since the German 
general clause is a widely formulated catch-all clause, most authors agree that a (theoretical) 
divergence between the Unfair Terms Directive and § 307 can be resolved by applying the 
methods of interpretation.6817 This approach would not be contrary to the abstract-universal 
approach of §§ 305 et seq. because not the nature of the parties, but the nature of the goods or 
services are subject to the enquiry. 
Because of the importance of this factor, it should be taken into account in South Africa too. 
b) Balance of the parties' interests 
In a synallagmatic contractual relationship, the parties’ rights and obligations should be 
balanced.6818 Thus, an overall view of all contractual terms is necessary.6819 Article 3(1) of the 
EU Unfair Terms Directive takes into account 'a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer'. § 307(1) 1st sent. 
                                                             
6814 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) (Other factors not listed in section 52(2)). 
6815 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) aa). 
6816 See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.4 a). 
6817 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 80. 
6818 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) bb). 
6819 See s 14(4)(c) and (d) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law Commission of England and 
Wales and the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of 
the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005). 
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contains a similar provision, but instead of a 'significant imbalance', an 'unreasonable 
disadvantage' is required.6820 In German literature, content control is justified by the concept 
of 'warranted rightness',6821 which is based on the premise that contracts reflect an 'objectively 
righteous order' that is disturbed in the case of a structural imbalance. This imbalance has to be 
mended by legal control.6822 The balance of the parties' interests thus seems to be the foundation 
of every contract and should be considered in the fairness enquiry of South African courts too. 
c) Inter-dependent terms 
This factor means that the provisions of a contract must not be seen in isolation, but that also 
the circumstances and the context of the agreement must be taken into account.6823  
Under section 48(2) in pr. of the Act, the fairness review does not only cover individual clauses 
but also transactions or agreements as a whole.6824  
Contrary to the South African regime, content control under §§ 305 et seq. always refers to a 
specific contractual clause and never to the entire contractual agreement.6825 This emanates 
from the wording of § 307(1) ('provisions in standard business terms'). An exception to this 
rule exists for § 307(2) no. 2 because for the determination of the jeopardising of the purpose 
of the contract, the assessment of the entire agreement and not only parts of it is necessary. In 
this regard, one must consider that compensatory clauses can also reach the contractual 
purpose.6826 
The disadvantageous effect of a clause that itself is still acceptable can be intensified by another 
clause so that the interplay between the two provisions creates an unreasonable 
disadvantage.6827 In general, this leads to the ineffectiveness of both clauses,6828 irrespective of 
                                                             
6820 WLP/Wolf § 307 para 74. 
6821 Richtigkeitsgewähr. 
6822 Schmidt-Rimpler AcP 147 (1941) at 149, Lieb AcP 178 (1978) 203. 
6823 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) cc). See also s 52(2)(c) and (e). See also art 4 of the 
EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 and art 83(2) of the Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common European Sales Law COM (2011) 
635 final of 11 October 2011 and art 32(2) of the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Consumer Rights COM (2008) 614 final, submitted on 8 October 2008. 
6824 Section 48(2): '(…) a transaction or agreement, or a term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a 
notice to which a term or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if (…)'. 
6825 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 171. Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 89. 
6826 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 280. See Part II ch 5 para 3.3.4 b) cc). 
6827 BGH NJW 2006, 2116 (2117); 2007, 997 (999), UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 155, PWW/Berger § 307 para 10, 
von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 177. 
6828 BGH NJW 2007, 997 (999), Palandt/Grüneberg § 307 para 13. 
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whether one clause was a standard clause and the other individually agreed.6829 In German law, 
this phenomenon is referred to as 'accumulative effect'. 
On the other hand, the compensational effect refers to cases where a clause presenting a 
disadvantage for the consumer might be compensated by other, advantageous contractual 
provisions so that the interaction between these clauses does not constitute an unreasonable 
disadvantage. The consideration of such an advantageous clause is only permitted though if 
there is a material connection between the two provisions, and the advantageous clause has 
sufficient weight for adequate compensation.6830 
The idea of the compensational effect has also been expressed in Barkhuizen v Napier: ‘[T]he 
idea of balance suggests that an advantage obtained in ancillary terms, such as an exclusion of 
liability or a fixed measure of damage for breach, should be matched by corresponding benefits 
to the other party.'6831 
More generally, also in terms of the Act, contract terms must not be seen in isolation but also 
the circumstances and the context of the agreement must be considered.6832 In other words, the 
contract ‘as a whole’ must be taken into account because a provision of the agreement that 
confers a benefit on the consumer might be commensurate with the detriment caused by the 
provision alleged to be unfair.6833 The accumulative and compensational effects are thus also 
applicable in South African legislation. 
                                                             
6829 BGH NJW 2006, 2116 (2117). 
6830 See discussion on the accumulative and compensational effects in Part II ch 5 para 3.2.5 a). BGH NJW 2003, 
888 (890 et seq), Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 125, PWW/Berger § 307 para 10. Von Hoyningen-Huene 
§ 9 AGBG para 173 does not require such a connection. 
6831 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para [165], where Sachs J cites Collins Law of Contract 253. 
6832 See s 52(2)(c) and (e). See also art 4 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC 
of 5 April 1993 and art 83(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Common European Sales Law COM (2011) 635 final of 11 October 2011 and art 32(2) of the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COM (2008) 614 final, submitted 
on 8 October 2008. 
6833 Sharrock 2010 SA Merc LJ 314, Sharrock Judicial control 136. 
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d) Extent to which a term differs from statutory provisions 
This factor has been formulated by the South African Law Commission.6834 Another factor is 
the extent to which the term differs from what would have been in the case of its absence.6835  
The German BGB chose a much more comprehensive formulation by which unfairness is 
presumed if a term ‘is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision from 
which it deviates’.6836 This refers to the residual rule in the relevant part of the BGB.6837 With 
the insertion of this provision, the legislator built on Ludwig Raiser's work and the preceding 
case law6838 concerning the guiding function of the ius dispositivum, serving as a concretisation 
of the content control standard.6839 
The term 'statutory provision' from which a clause deviates is interpreted widely both by the 
courts and legal literature. According to this view, not only the norms contained in the BGB 
but also all unwritten legal principles, the principles developed by the courts as well as the 
rights and obligations resulting from the nature of the given agreement or the gap-filling 
interpretation in terms of §§ 157 and 242 fall under this term.6840  
Others plead for a more restrictive interpretation of the term 'statutory provision' in the context 
of § 307.6841 This has an impact of the content control of not codified contract types because 
the normative standard for those agreements are not laid down in written laws.6842 
Under article 2 EGBGB,6843 a 'statute' of the BGB includes any legal rule, i.e., substantive 
provisions.6844 The function of content control, i.e., the protection against the realisation of 
                                                             
6834 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) dd). Factors (w) and (x) read as follows: ‘(w) whether, 
to the prejudice of the party against whom the term is proffered, the party proffering the term is otherwise placed 
in a position substantially better than that in which the party proffering the term would have been under the 
regulatory law, had it not been for the term in question; (x) the degree to which the contract requires a party to 
waive rights to which he or she would otherwise be entitled’.  
6835 This is the formulation of s 14(4)(g) of the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law 
Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts ─ Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 
1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199) (2005). 
6836 § 307(2) no. 1. 
6837 For the discussion what the phrase 'essential principles of the statutory provision' means, see, e.g., Stoffels 
AGB-Recht 197 et seq, with further references. 
6838 Raiser Recht der AGB 293 et seq. See also the chapter 'Historical overview' in Part II ch 1. 
6839 Larenz and Wolf BGB-AT 787, Boecken BGB-AT 312. 
6840 BGH NJW 1993, 721 (722); 1998, 1640 (1642), WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 66, UBH/Brandner (2001) § 9 
AGBG para 140. See Part II ch 5 para 3.3.3. 
6841 Von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG para 245 et seq, Zöllner RdA 1989, 159 et seq. 
6842 Stoffels AGB-Recht 199. 
6843 Article 2 EGBGB: '“Statute” under the Civil Code and under this Act means any legal rule.' 
6844 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 4. 
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freedom of contract to the benefit of only one party,6845 could not properly be fulfilled though 
if 'statutory provision' would exclusively include provisions of the ius dispositivum.  
General legal principles are only included in the term 'statute' of article 2 EGBGB if they are 
reliably developed from positive law by means of analogy and can be regarded as a legal 
rule.6846 Judicial rulings are thus excluded from the meaning of 'statute' because they have no 
mandatory general effect for an undetermined number of persons.6847 As discussed in 
Part II,6848 general legal principles should be regarded as 'statutory provisions' only – like in 
article 2 EGBGB – if they deviate from positive law by means of a methodologically reliable 
procedure. This is not the case, e.g., for principles that the courts base on the principle of good 
faith.6849 On the other hand, principles that have attained such a degree of concretisation that 
they are no longer distinguishable from legal provisions can be regarded as 'statutory 
provisions' in the sense of § 307(2) no. 1.6850  
In the South African context, the common law is considered residual rules that have been 
developed during a long period of time and represent a fair balancing of interests of typical 
suppliers and consumers, with regard to the given type of contract. The residual rules do not 
always represent a fair balancing of the parties’ interests however as those may differ in the 
different industries. A deviation from residual rules in itself is therefore not automatically 
unfair but can establish a fair balancing of the parties' interests. One should also consider that 
the generalised naturalia of a contract, i.e., the terms included ex lege, do not necessarily ensure 
a fair balancing of the parties' interests. It might be justified to deviate from them in order to 
accommodate the realities of the given trade sector.6851 
The German provision is thus more restrictive in terms of the requirements for statutory 
provisions than the factor suggested by the South African Law Commission. In the German 
regime, judicial decisions are not recognised as general legal principles to be considered in the 
context of statutory provisions. 
                                                             
6845 PWW/Berger § 307 para 6. 
6846 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 112. 
6847 Staudinger/Merten (2006) Art 2 EGBGB para 40. 
6848 See Part II ch 5 para 3.3.3 b). 
6849 BGH NJW 1983, 1671 (1672). 
6850 These principles are referred to as 'rechtssatzförmige Prinzipien'. Larenz and Canaris Methodenlehre 479. 
6851 Naudé ‘Section 52’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 45. 
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e) Greater costs for the supplier if the term were omitted 
Higher costs for the supplier are inextricably linked to higher prices for the consumer. As 
discussed, in German law, the 'price argument' is generally not relevant. Furthermore, the 
advantage in terms of the price is not measurable with regard to the price that would be fair in 
the absence of the term.6852 
Hence, in the South African context, one should not lay too much importance on this factor 
because prices are always difficult to assess.6853  
f) Limitation of essential rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract 
Terms limiting essential rights and duties inherent in the nature or essence of the contract and 
therefore jeopardise the attainment of the contractual purpose are likely to be unfair.6854  
This principle is reflected in § 307(2) no. 2. According to this provision, a term is presumably 
unfair if it 'is not compatible with essential principles of the statutory provision from which it 
deviates’.6855 The type of contract in question defines the essential rights and duties.6856  
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez,6857 it was held that an exemption clause which ‘undermines the 
very essence’ of the type of contact in question should be clearly and pertinently brought to the 
attention of the consumer. Even if the consumer signs such an agreement knowing of the 
existence of such an exemption clause, the fact that it undermines the very essence of the type 
of contract is an indicator that it may be contrary to public policy. This is an indication for the 
consumer's compromised bargaining power because the supplier took advantage of its client's 
position. A term might be fair though when considering other circumstances.6858 It is suggested 
that it is problematic to sanction terms that put at stake the nature or essence of the contract 
and the attainment of the contractual purpose since they distort the contract as a whole. Such 
terms should thus never be fair. 
                                                             
6852 See Part II ch 5 para 3.2.5 e). UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 144 and 145. 
6853 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) ee). 
6854 See discussion of this factor in Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 b) ff). See also § 307(2): 'An unreasonable disadvantage 
is, in case of doubt, to be assumed to exist if a provision 1. is not compatible with essential principles of the 
statutory provision from which it deviates (…)'. See also Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank 
[2002] 1 All ER 97 para [54]: 'It may also be necessary to consider the effect of the inclusion of the term on the 
substance or core of the transaction'. 
6855 For the discussion what the phrase 'essential principles of the statutory provision' means, see, e.g., Stoffels 
AGB-Recht 197 et seq, with further references. 
6856 See Part II ch 5 para 3.3.4. 
6857 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA). 
6858 Naudé/Lubbe 2005 SALJ 441. 
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4.4.3 The role of good faith and public policy 
As discussed in detail in Part I,6859 various judgements of South African courts as well as 
principles based on these decisions give guidance for the revetment of the concepts of 
unfairness and unreasonableness, together with the role of the principle of good faith. As 
mentioned earlier, the common law is still applicable under section 2(10) so that common-law 
jurisprudence is still a valuable source in the context of the Act.  
Under the common law, agreements or clauses that are contrary to public policy are 
unenforceable. As confirmed many times by the courts, public policy is anchored in 
constitutional values.6860 Therefore, a term that offends against a constitutional value will also 
be unfair under the Consumer Protection Act. The notion of public policy is important as it is 
inseparably linked to other concepts, such as fairness, justice, equity and reasonableness.6861  
As discussed above, in Beadica, the Constitutional Court confirmed that courts cannot refuse 
to enforce contract terms for equity considerations, such as good faith, fairness and 
reasonableness as these values have no self-standing status. Only where contractual terms or 
their enforcement would be so unfair, unreasonable or unjust that they are contrary to public 
policy, a court has the right to refuse to enforce them.6862 
The pacta sunt servanda principle still plays a crucial role in the context of the control of 
contracts by the courts through the principle of public policy. The protection of this maxim is 
indispensable for the achievement of the objectives set out in the Constitution.6863 This 
principle is not absolute though, and where several constitutional rights and values must be 
considered for the determination of whether enforcement of the terms would be contrary to 
public policy in the given case, these must be carefully balanced against each other.6864 
In Beadica, the Constitutional Court also specified that the principle of 'perceptive restraint' 
must not hinder the courts from shying away from their constitutional duty to infuse public 
policy with constitutional values. Hence, the degree of necessary restraint must be balanced 
against the backdrop of the constitutional rights and values.  
                                                             
6859 Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 c). 
6860 See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) and Afrox Healthcare.Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
6861 Barkhuizen v Napier para [51]. 
6862 Beadica at para [80]. 
6863 Beadica at paras [83]-[85]. 
6864 Beadica at para [87]. 
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Even though there seems to be some ambivalence on the exact role of fairness in the case law 
decided before the Act came into force, the ideas and arguments contained in these cases can 
serve the courts when deciding whether a clause has to be struck down because of unfairness 
in terms of the Act, and in order to curtail the principle of freedom of contract where 
necessary.6865 
Inequitableness under section 48(2)(b), for instance, can be assessed with the help of evaluative 
elements, such as good faith. It is suggested that section 52 contains elements which emanate 
from the principle of good faith, which in the German regime is expressly anchored in the 
general clause.6866  
Hence, although the principle of good faith is not expressly mentioned in the Act, its provisions 
are infused with this maxim and must be interpreted accordingly when assessing the fairness 
of a standard clause. 
4.5   Burden of proof 
Under section 48, the consumer carries the risk of non-persuasion and therefore has to convince 
the court that a term is unfair, unlike regulation 44, where the burden of proof lies with the 
supplier. Some authors defend this solution by stating that the greylist of regulation 44 is 
already very extensive and that it might be too drastic to lay the onus on the supplier under 
section 48.6867 Others favour the model suggested by the UK Law Commissions,6868 which 
distinguishes between litigation where individual consumers are involved, and general use 
challenges. In the first case, the burden of proof should lay on the business, whereas in the 
second case, the consumer organisation, regulator or National Consumer Commission should 
bear the onus. These institutions are in a stronger position than 'true' consumers to argue their 
case and in terms of the familiarity with the legislation. According to Naudé, in B2B 
transactions the onus of proof should always remain on the complainant, .6869 
In the context of the German regime, some authors assert that § 307(2) is a provision governing 
the burden of proof.6870 According to this view, the user bears the onus of proof if he or she 
wants to assert that there is no unreasonable disadvantage for the other party. This view is 
                                                             
6865 Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 295. 
6866 See § 307(1) 1st sent. 
6867 See Naudé 2009 SALJ 535-536, with further references. 
6868 Section 16(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill published in Law Commissions of England and Wales and 
the Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts – Report on a reference under s 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)(2005). 
6869 Naudé 2009 SALJ 535. 
6870 L/GvW/T/Löwe § 9 AGBG para 20, WHL/Wolf § 9 AGBG para 58. 
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contrary to the essence of proof though, which can only concern facts, and not legal evaluations 
or the weighing of interests. The question of whether the other party suffers an unreasonable 
disadvantage is a question of law that the courts have to answer. Factual questions do therefore 
not concern the fairness of a clause. Factual are questions that concern the enquiry of whether 
the contract clauses are standard business terms, or whether or not specific clauses of the 
agreement have been individually negotiated, for example.6871 In other words, content control 
is always legal control.6872 In practice, this means that the standard clause in question has to be 
compared with the position in which the other party would be without this clause.6873 This is 
underlined by the fact that in general, 307(2) no. 1 takes precedence over no. 2, for instance.6874 
The distinction between questions of fact and legal problems should be adhered to also in South 
Africa. Excessive one-sidedness of an agreement (section 48(2)(a) or the adverseness of a 
transaction (section 48(2)(b)), for instance, are legal questions for which no proof is possible. 
On the other hand, the question of whether a consumer relied on a false or misleading 
representation (section 48(2)(c)), or whether the fact, nature and effect of a term was not drawn 
to the consumer's attention (section 48(2)(d)) are factual questions which are capable of proof. 
 
5. Conclusion  
South African and German legislation use a blacklist, a greylist and a general clause, 
respectively. This triad is an international standard and has proven to be the most effective tool 
for content control.  
Nonetheless, both regimes show some notable differences in respect of content control. Content 
control for individual actions in Germany is legal control, performed ex officio within a lawsuit, 
whereas South African consumers have to allege a contravention of the Act. Content control in 
South Africa is equity control, applying an individualised approach. In contrast, the German 
regime applies a supra-individual and generalising approach. Since equity control caters for 
fairness in individual cases, it is not the most effective tool for fighting unfair standard terms 
in mass contracts. Both regimes apply the principles of public policy and good faith 
concurrently with their standard business terms legislation. The development of Fallgruppen, 
                                                             
6871 UBH/Ulmer and Habersack § 305 paras 60 et seq. 
6872 Stoffels AGB-Recht 182. 
6873 Staudinger/Coester (2006) § 307 para 90, BGH NJW 1994, 1069 (1070). 
6874 Staudinger/Schlosser (1980) § 9 AGBG para 28. Tending to the same result: von Hoyningen-Huene § 9 AGBG 
para 282, UBH/Fuchs § 307 para 198. 
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or typified categories, by South African courts, according to the German model, would 
tremendously assist them in the development of the common law and prevent 'piecemeal 
solutions'. Besides, in both countries, standard business terms legislation cannot be seen in 
isolation but in synergy with other provisions and the common law. The latter especially applies 
to South Africa. 
Content control in terms of the German regime does not include performance specifications, 
price agreements, declaratory clauses or negotiated provisions. In contrast, the South African 
legislator chose to include the core terms and negotiated clauses. The courts must consider all 
the relevant factors in this enquiry though, and the fact that these provisions may have been 
negotiated should be factored in. In this regard, content control in both regimes should thus 
come to the same results. On the other hand, declaratory clauses should be excluded from 
content control in South Africa since this area contains constitutional questions.  
Price control by German courts is only allowed in specific cases. Section 48(1)(a)(i) is 
ambiguous with regard to a price control mechanism. It is however unlikely that the legislature 
wished to introduce such a mechanism in the Act.  
In German standard business terms legislation, an 'open' content control is performed. South 
African courts should also aim at an open content control in which the interpretational control 
takes place before the content control so that the content of the clauses that must be assessed is 
entirely clear before the content control takes place. 
As discussed, the validity of standard terms is purely a question of law in the German regime, 
and questions of fact play a minor role. This is not the case for South Africa, where questions 
of fact and the taking of proof are crucial for content control. This is a consequence of the 
concrete-individual approach of the Act. The same applies to the presumption that the terms in 
regulation 44(3) are unfair. This too is a consequence of the individual approach, as opposed 
to the evaluative standard applied in Germany. 
Even though regulation 44 only applies to B2C agreements, this provision might have a 
reflective effect on B2B contracts, especially where smaller businesses are involved. The same 
applies to §§ 308 and 309 as these prohibitions are a specific manifestation of the evaluative 
standard of § 307. Thus, the reflective effect in both regimes ensures that also B2B agreements 
are included in the content control in terms of the general clause. 
 1081   
 
With regard to the blacklists, the main difference between the two pieces of legislation in terms 
of the personal scope of application lies in the fact that for the application of the Act, the 
threshold of section 5 must be met, whereas for the German regime there is no such 
requirement. 
The blacklist of prohibited clauses is wordy and unnecessarily complicated, unlike § 309. The 
South African legislator should therefore reformulate section 51 so that it conforms to 
international standards. 
In some instances, there are only minor differences between certain items of the South 
African blacklist and the German regime: 
With regard to exclusions or restrictions of the user's/supplier's liability (section 51(1)(c) and 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. b), respectively), the South African and German provisions merely differ in that 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. b) contains exceptions concerning the transport and tariff rules for regular public 
transport services on the road, due to German idiosyncrasies. In order to achieve effective 
consumer protection, the South African regime should also include restrictive modalities, i.e., 
formal hindrances, in terms of section 51. 
Fictional declarations and fictional receipts of documents, goods or services are prohibited 
under section 51(1)(g). In terms of false acknowledgements, both regimes are similar in that 
such provisions have the effect of modifying the burden of proof. The South African provision 
is somewhat narrower as the document in question has to be required by the Act, which is not 
the case for the German regime ('any document').  
Other blacklisted provisions do not have a counterpart in §§ 307 et seq., but their 
regulatory content can be found in other provisions:  
Germany has no equivalent of the South African Guardian's Fund in terms of section 51(1)(f). 
The protection granted by this provision is achieved in Germany particularly by provisions of 
family law and the law of successions. 
Furthermore, §§ 305 et seq. do not contain a similar item to section 51(1)(h) concerning the 
forfeiture of money to the supplier. The BGB contains provisions elsewhere with the same 
regulatory content, however, e.g., for travel package agreements or defective goods. 
Even though the German regime does not contain a similar item to section 51(1)(d) with regard 
to negative option marketing, both pieces of legislation come to the same result in respect of 
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consumers, in particular in terms of § 241a. In the German regime, laxer rules apply to business 
people who maintain a commercial relationship, however. 
On the other hand, the legal result of other items of the South African blacklist is achieved 
by applying the German general clause or other provisions: 
The Consumer Protection Act contains several provisions prohibiting specific enforcement 
clauses. In both regimes, a court order is generally needed in these cases. In any event, such 
enforcement clauses would be invalid in Germany under § 307.  
The German regime does not contain a similar item to section 51(1)(i)(ii) relating to 
undertakings to sign documents relating to enforcement. The same results are achieved by 
applying the general clause of § 307 though. A similar item concerning the deposit of 
documents with the supplier or the provision of a PIN etc. does not exist in the BGB. The 
GDPR, a European Regulation, applies instead. This means that the principles of data 
minimisation and storage limitation (art. 5(1) lit. c) and e) GDPR) apply. Both regimes thus 
prohibit the deposit of an ID and the provision of personal identification codes by different 
means. It is recommended that the South African legislator inserts a mechanism in the Act 
similar to the GDPR in which also the provision (i.e., not the deposit) of data contained in IDs 
etc. is regulated with regard to data minimisation and storage limitation. 
The greylists of both pieces of legislation differ in that the items of the South African list are 
presumed to be unfair, whereas the German provisions contain evaluative elements in the form 
of indeterminate legal terms. This is in line with the respective individual-personalised and 
abstract-general approach. 
As we have seen, despite the fact that both regimes chose different formulations and qualify 
specific items differently, notably with regard to their grey- or blacklisting, the level of 
protection is similar, and a balanced solution is offered in most cases. This is achieved by 
different means (1.-4.). Other provisions are more restrictive than their counterparts (5.), or 
have no counterpart at all (6.). In some instances, the South African item offers a lower level 
of protection than the corresponding German provision (7.) Overlaps between these categories 
are possible.  
1. Mostly, the two regimes offer a comparable standard for certain standard clauses in their 
respective black- or greylists and come to the same results, even if this means applying several 
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items in concert to achieve a comparable level of protection (e.g., items (a), (b), (c), (h), (i), 
(k), (m), (n), (q), (r), (s), (v), (w)).  
The South African legislator should however blacklist the contents of regulation 44(3)(a) 
because the greylisting of such terms is a systemic weakness with regard to the Constitution 
and the common law.  
The editorial error contained in regulation 44(4)(a), with regard to item (k) should be corrected 
as this provision was meant for item (l) of regulation 44(3).  
One-sided forfeiture clauses are greylisted in regulation 44(3)(q) and blacklisted in § 309 no. 6. 
The German provision is not entirely congruent with the South African item, but equal 
protection can be achieved by §§ 308 no. 7, 309 no. 6 or 307. The German item focuses only 
on the supplier, whereas the item of the South African greylist includes both parties. This could 
be a reason why this item is blacklisted in Germany.   
Fictitious receipts are dealt with in item (w) and § 308 no. 6. Since 'acts similar to legal 
transactions', such as overdue notices, are also of particular interest to consumers, they should 
also be covered by the South African item. Unlike the South African regime, German 
legislation does generally not accept the prima facie proof that a registered letter has actually 
reached the person for which it was intended. The South African legislature should insert also 
other means of communication in this item, however. 
2. In some instances, the respective general clause is applied where the other regime grey- or 
blacklists a specific item (e.g., concerning items (j), (o), (u) and (v)). 
This is, for instance, the case for item (v). The legislation of both countries differs in that 
fictitious facts are assessed under § 309 no. 12 in the German regime, whereas for confirmation 
of facts, section 48 applies to South African clauses. For fictitious receipts, other provisions 
are applicable in both pieces of legislation. 
3. In some instances, other German provisions contained elsewhere in the BGB or other pieces 
of legislation are applied (e.g., concerning items (d), (g), (l), (t), (aa)).  
The German regime does not contain a similar item to regulation 44(3)(l), dealing with the 
termination of open-ended agreements. This is because the German legislator was of the 
opinion that continuing obligations are characterised by the fact that they can be terminated 
without any particular reason by ordinary termination. § 314 provides for an exception where 
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open-ended agreements may be terminated by both parties for compelling reasons without 
giving notice though. This difference of both regimes can be explained by their underlying 
dogmatic foundations: the Act is a pure consumer protection statute that aims to protect 
consumers, whereas the BGB provisions strive at a balanced solution for both parties. 
Even though the German item's scope of application is limited to certain contract types, 
protection for other types of agreements in terms of item (t) is achieved by § 305c(1) 
(surprising clauses) and the general clause. Unlike the South African item, § 309 no. 10 is 
blacklisted. Because of the caveats contained in lit. a) and b) of this provision, this item is 
mitigated to a great extent, however. Both regimes thus offer a comparable level of protection 
only in terms of the transfer of obligations. 
4. Although the two regimes qualify specific items differently (e.g., the counterparts of items 
(f) and (y) are blacklisted in Germany, whereas they are merely greylisted in South Africa), 
this is counter-balanced by other factors, e.g., by the fact that the burden of proof lies with the 
supplier (item (r)). 
5. On the other hand, some items are more restrictive than their German counterparts (e.g., 
items (c), (e), (f), (i), (p), (q), (t), (x), (y), (z)).  
In terms of item (f), the South African legislator should consider including facilitations of the 
limitation period, i.e., measures that have the same result as a shortening of the limitation 
period, into the greylist because the consumers' need for protection is similar in these cases.  
Since a restriction to court actions would not sufficiently honour the normative objective of 
item (x), this provision should, similar to the German item, also apply to other proceedings, 
such as preservation of evidence or preliminary injunctions.  
§ 309 no. 6 has a wider scope of application than item (q) (one-sided forfeiture clauses) as it 
directly applies to dependent penalty clauses, and by analogy to independent penalty clauses. 
Since the economic implications are the same for both types of penalty clauses, South African 
courts should apply item (q) by analogy also to independent penalty clauses.   
§ 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. contains a provision that is similar to regulation 44(3)(p). Both 
deal with long performance periods. However, the German item covers more cases than the 
South African regime and is formulated in a more nuanced way. In order to achieve better 
protection, the South African item should also apply to all sorts of periods for performance and 
include insufficiently specific periods for performance. 
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Item (t) of the South African greylist merely concerns the transfer of obligations, whereas 
§ 309 no. 10 also covers the transfer of rights. Therefore, the free assignability of claims is not 
covered by item (t). The South African legislature should include the transfer of claims too 
because also in these cases, consumers should be protected from an unfettered change of their 
contractual partners.  
A similar item to regulation 44(3)(x) can be found in § 309 no. 14. As otherwise the objective 
of the South African provision would not be achieved, it is suggested that item (x) greylists not 
only arbitration but also mediation. The scope of application of the South African item is more 
restrictive though as it sets out that the clause must require that the consumer take disputes 
exclusively to arbitration. Both regimes permit voluntary arbitration, however. Since a 
restriction to court actions would not sufficiently honour the normative objective of item (x), 
this provision should, similar to the German item, also apply to other proceedings, such as 
preservation of evidence or preliminary injunctions. 
Item (y) has a somewhat similar but blacklisted item in § 309 no. 12. The German provision is 
wider though. The South African legislator should therefore consider a widening of this 
provision towards a 'modification of the burden of proof' in order to include other aggravations. 
Conclusive proof certificates should always be considered unfair. Standard clauses which 
modify or restrict the burden of proof of suppliers who have control of the other's items should 
systematically be declared unfair. 
The imposition of shorter limitation periods than otherwise applicable under the common law 
or legislation for legal steps is greylisted in item (z) of regulation 44(3). The scope of 
application of this provision is partly covered by § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ee) and ff). The cut-off 
period of item (z) is notably shorter than in the German regime, however. The South African 
item is more restrictive and should be amended so as to include all sorts of adverse 
modifications of the limitation period for consumers. 
6. A provision such as item (bb) is absent in the BGB. In German contract law, the parties 
have the free choice as to which law should apply. Furthermore, the Rome-I Regulation 
provides for a balanced mechanism. In order to enhance consumer protection, and because of 
a lack of a mechanism similar to the one in the EU, the South African legislator rightly opted 
for the solution set out in item (bb). A recourse to section 2(2) would not be possible in this 
regard because for a mechanism similar to the Rome-I Regulation, other countries must adhere 
to the same mechanism, which is not the case. 
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7. For item (p) dealing with clauses allowing suppliers an unreasonably long time to perform 
there seems to be a need for better protection, and the South African legislature should 
intervene accordingly. This item should apply to all sorts of periods of performance like the 
German provision and include insufficiently specific periods for performance.  
A need for improvement with regard to better consumer protection also exists for items (f), (t), 
(w), (x), (y) and (z). 
The South African general clause of section 48 of the Act is verbose and lacks clarity. It is 
also unsystematic and does not correspond to international standard and good legal practice. It 
contains 'concretisations' that do not have their place in a general clause, such as the procedural 
and deceptive standards. A more concise and explicit provision with some precise guidelines, 
such as § 307, would have been more effective.  
Even though the Act is built around individual consumers, unlike §§ 305 et seq. which cater to 
a supra-individual and generalising approach, the Act should use elements of an abstract-
universal approach in that the tendency (or potential unfairness) of a term and not its actual 
application must be assessed. The tendency enquiry of a provision concerns the question of 
whether the term allows the supplier to act in an unfair manner vis-à-vis the consumer, and not 
its actual application.  
Contrary to the German regime where § 308 (greylist) has a radiating effect on B2B contracts, 
the greylist of regulation 44(3) finds no application to agreements between entrepreneurs. On 
the other hand, the South African blacklist (section 51) applies to B2B contracts, whereas the 
application of § 309 is excluded under § 310(1) 1st sent. so that the general clause applies in 
these cases. The reason for this difference is that the Act is a pure consumer protection statute 
that also protects small businesses, whereas the BGB provisions take into account that between 
companies laxer rules may apply because they do not necessarily deserve the same level of 
protection. 
The moment of evaluation in individual proceedings differs in both regimes. As the Act has 
been in force for over a decade now, the two regimes should not differ anymore in this regard 
though. 
Unlike South African legislation, § 305b excludes content control for individually negotiated 
clauses. Since South African courts have to consider all relevant factors in their fairness 
enquiry, they should factor in that specific clauses might have been negotiated, however. Both 
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regimes apply a mechanism where price control is undertaken only in specific circumstances. 
The South African legislature should make clear though that it did not wish to introduce a price-
control mechanism in the Act as such. 
Content control of clauses having the same content as legal provisions (declaratory clauses) 
touches constitutional questions, and should therefore be excluded from content control in 
South Africa too. 
As the Act applies an individualised approach, the fairness control is performed by considering 
the factors of section 52(2). South African courts should also apply factors considered in 
foreign legislation which serve as the best international model. The German regime does not 
provide for a list of factors. Only in consumer contracts, the 'other circumstances attending the 
entering into of the contract must also be taken into account'. In order to enhance predictability 
and certainty, South African courts should be able to declare terms unfair per se in a particular 
industry, or based on the 'tendency of the clause'. Such an objective finding is also the German 
approach, without which institutional actions would not be possible. 
The comparison of both regimes as regards the factors contained in section 52(2) of the Act 
has revealed that because of the general irrelevance of the price argument in the German 
regime, both pieces of legislation are only comparable to the extent that the price is considered 
by taking other factors or clauses into account. 
Because of the general-abstract approach of the German regime, the nature of the parties 
(section 52(2)(b)) is only considered in consumer contracts (§ 310(3)). For legal certainty and 
practicability, only apparent characteristics should be considered in both regimes. The same 
applies to the circumstances of the transaction (subsection (c)). These are taken into account in 
the German regime only in consumer contracts. Contrary to Germany, South African 
legislation does not recognise a doctrine of 'change of circumstances' or 'hardship' for 
unforeseeable circumstances. Such a mechanism would be useful, however. The parties' 
conduct (item (d)) can be taken into account in the German regime for consumer agreements 
only. Behaviours that should be considered in South Africa too are omission (e.g., withheld 
information), pressure, or any other tactics to overpower consumers. 
The German regime excludes negotiated terms from content control per se. In contrast, these 
are included in terms of section 52(2)(e). South African courts should distinguish between 
negotiated and non-negotiated terms, however. In the German regime, the factor contained in 
section 52(2)(f) only plays a role with regard to insurance. The aspects of risk control and the 
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cheapest insurer should apply in the South African regime too. The plain language requirement, 
a factor contained in section 52(2)(g), is also expressed in the German general clause in the 
form of the transparency requirement. In practice, it should not matter whether the plain 
language or the transparency requirements are assessed in an abstract-general manner or with 
having the individual consumer in mind. This applies even more when considering that the 
determination of a disadvantage due to intransparency is unnecessary under the German 
regime, and under the Act, the plain language requirement of section 22 is applied to 'an 
ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the [document] is intended'. According to 
the Act, plain language is merely a factor that the courts have to consider and does not lead 
automatically to voidness of the given clauses. Courts will most likely strike down such 
provisions, however. This is thus in keeping with German legislation where an unreasonable 
disadvantage ('unfairness') exists in the case of unclear or incomprehensible provisions. 
In German law, it is not necessary to expressly point out unfair terms, as long as the entire legal 
instrument of standard terms has been duly incorporated into the contract. It is also irrelevant 
if the consumer has read or understood the terms. For consumer agreements (§ 310(3)), an 
individual approach must be applied by taking into consideration the circumstances attending 
the conclusion of the given contract, however. Only then, 'knowledge of unfair terms' in the 
sense of section 52(2)(h) is relevant.  
Factor (i), pertaining to the possibility to acquire identical goods or services elsewhere at a 
better price, entails many practical problems. With regard to the fact that the 'price argument' 
is generally irrelevant in the German regime, such a factor is not considered in Germany. The 
consideration of whether goods are special order goods (item (j)) is relevant for consumer 
contracts in Germany. If the user is aware of a special interest or a very special purpose, the 
user must consider this. For other contracts, § 307(2) no. 2 allows for a more lenient approach. 
Besides the factors contained in section 52, other factors may also be taken into consideration. 
The nature of the goods or services in question can be assessed under the widely formulated 
German general clause and should be considered as a factor in South Africa too. The balance 
of the parties' interests is the foundation of every agreement and is thus also considered in 
§ 307. Since the balance of the parties' interests is crucial for fairness, this factor should also 
apply in South Africa. 
Although in terms of the German regime, the individual clauses of a standard terms contract 
are assessed, and not the agreement as a whole, this principle is mitigated due to the 
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accumulative and the cumulative effects. These two 'effects' also apply in South Africa. The 
German provision of § 307(2) no. 1 is more restrictive in terms of the requirements for statutory 
provisions than the factor suggested by the South African Law Commission. The limitation of 
essential rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract is reflected in § 307(2) no. 2. 
Such terms should never be fair. 
We have also seen that even though the principle of good faith is not expressly mentioned in 
the Act, its provisions are infused with this maxim and must be interpreted accordingly when 
assessing the fairness of a standard clause. The principle of good faith is expressly anchored in 
the German general clause. In this regard, both regimes have the same foundations. 
In respect of the South African general clause, the consumer carries the risk of non-persuasion 
and bears the onus of proof. In German legislation, the question of whether the other party 
suffers an unreasonable disadvantage is a question of law and not a factual question that can 
be subject to evidence. The South African regime too should distinguish between legal 
questions and those that concern facts and are susceptible of proof. 
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CHAPTER 6 – ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
INTRODUCTION 
The underlying enforcement mechanisms of the South African and German regimes entail 
different jurisdictions and procedures. South African legislation focuses on individual 
procedures, whereas the German regime offers, besides the possibility of an incidental control 
within individual court actions, a powerful tool in the form of institutional actions. These are 
substantial differences that make a comparison challenging because the respective mechanisms 
cannot easily be contrasted with one another. Nonetheless, this chapter tries to highlight, where 
possible, some of the fundamental differences. This should lead to a better understanding of 
both regimes and their underlying principles. 
1. Jurisdiction  
As discussed earlier,6875 South Africa presents a unique socio-economic context that has to be 
seen against the backdrop of the country's history. Large sections of the population are not 
well-educated, poor, and thus vulnerable. The redress system against unfair terms therefore 
must ideally be speedy and cost-efficient because conflict resolution offered by the courts is 
generally costly, complex and time-consuming, however.6876 
The implementation of various fora has advantages because the most appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism depends on the circumstances of the particular complaint, e.g., the value 
and complexity of the claim.6877 The different entities must work in concert, which is why their 
functions must be clearly defined and co-ordinated. What is more, both the already existing 
and the new fora must be streamlined6878 in order to avoid unnecessary confusions, duplications 
and ineffective mechanisms.6879  
Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act contains the entities that have jurisdiction for the 
enforcement of the Act. This provision contains an implied hierarchy between the Tribunal, 
ombuds with jurisdiction, industry ombuds, provincial consumer courts, alternative dispute 
resolution agents, the National Consumer Commission as well as the courts.6880 Since the 
                                                             
6875 In Part I, passim. 
6876 Paleker 2003 ADR Bulletin 48, Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 55. 
6877 Centre for European Economic Law 2007 Final report: 'An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of 
consumer redress other than redress through judicial proceedings' (Study for the European Commission) at 
ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress/reports.../comparative_report_en.pdf (last retrieved on 28 October 2019). 
6878 See Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 39, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 
of 9 September 2004. 
6879 See Part I ch 5 para 1. 
6880 See Part I ch 5 para 3. 
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jurisdiction of these entities largely varies from the German courts' competences, a comparison 
between the two regimes is valuable not in terms of the various entities in place but rather with 
regard to the tools at their disposal to enforce the law. 
1.1  The National Consumer Commission 
The National Consumer Commission6881 has many roles besides enforcement. It is considered 
a 'watchdog' with regard to the enforcement of the Act.6882 This role is performed by promoting 
informal resolution between consumers and suppliers. However, the wording of section 99(a) 
shows that dispute and complaints resolution activities are not part of the Commission's 
functions.6883 The Act thus draws a distinction between enforcement on the one hand and 
conciliation/dispute resolution on the other.6884  
The Commission may issue compliance notices in order to ensure that a supplier is informed 
of its non-compliance with the Act and given the opportunity to change its terms and 
conditions. Compliance notices serve as a quick and straightforward enforcement tool in cases 
of apparent transgressions.6885 In complex matters, the NCC refers the case to the Tribunal or 
a consumer court. Once a compliance notice has been issued, the Commission cannot 
investigate the matter further as it is functus officio.6886 Compliance notices should be used in 
exceptional circumstances or obvious cases, and if there are no compelling reasons for the 
issuance of a consent order or a referral to the Tribunal or a consumer court.6887  
The Commission may also negotiate and conclude undertakings and consent orders with 
suppliers that the Tribunal or a court may confirm.6888 This avoids legal actions in cases where 
a complainant agrees to a damages award. Consent orders are an essential dispute resolution 
tool. They avoid civil actions in cases where a complainant agrees to a damages award.6889 
In German law, warnings ('Abmahnungen') issued by eligible bodies have in part the same 
function as compliance notices issued by, or undertakings concluded with the Commission. 
These warnings have the function to warn the user before the consumer organisation initiates 
                                                             
6881 See discussion on the NCC in Part I ch 5 para 3.2. 
6882 See Part I ch 5 para 3.2. 
6883 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 446. 
6884 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law (2013) 425. 
6885 Murray, Cloete et al v The National Consumer Commission et al NCT/4454/2012/101(1)(P) CPA;  Auction 
Alliance v The National Consumer Commission and Others Case No 7798/2012 (WCC); CJ Digital SMS 
Marketing CC v The National Consumer Commission (NCT/3584/2011/101) [2012] ZANCT 22 (1 October 2012). 
6886 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 434. 
6887 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 438. 
6888 Sections 74 and 99(f). 
6889 Van Heerden ‘Section 99 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 7.  
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court proceedings so that the user can resolve the dispute by incurring the obligation to cease 
and desist subject to a reasonable contractual penalty. A warning is dispensable if it is in vain 
or unreasonable, for example, where the infringement is so significant that the claimant cannot 
be expected to issue a warning before going to court.6890 The issuing of a warning is not 
mandatory6891 and has no impact on the admissibility and merits of the court action.6892 The 
statutes of most eligible bodies make the issuing of a prior warning mandatory though.6893 This 
is also because a warning can avoid negative cost consequences.6894 More importantly, most 
incriminated standard clauses where consumer associations are involved are eliminated after 
the given organisation has issued a warning, and not after involving the courts.6895 This means 
that warnings have a significant deterrent effect. 
Hence, a warning is issued, compared to a compliance notice, not only in exceptional 
circumstances and in cases of apparent transgressions but almost systematically. It is a step 
before taking legal action, if necessary. The reason for this lies in the fact that compliance 
notices serve as a quick tool for more uncomplicated matters, whereas warnings are issued for 
both simple and complex affairs, and to avoid negative cost consequences. Common to both is 
their function to avoid the involvement of the judicial system and their deterrent effect. 
In Germany, warnings issued by eligible bodies contain an invitation to cease the use or the 
recommendation of unfair standard terms as well as the invitation to the user to promise to pay 
a contractual penalty in case of infringement.6896 This is different from South African 
compliance notices where the supplier has to agree to pay damages in order to avoid civil-law 
proceedings.6897 The payment of a contractual penalty in the German context only takes place 
if the user or recommender disregards the invitation to cease the use or the recommendation of 
unfair terms, and is thus intended for future infringements. In contrast, damages in terms of a 
consent order are meant to be a remedy for past infringements. Hence, the German approach is 
more proactive and suitable to avoid further violations. 
Another difference between compliance notices and warnings is that the eligible German body 
can still monitor and investigate the matter after having issued a warning. The German entity 
                                                             
6890 Palandt/Bassenge § 5 UKlaG para 7, WLP/Lindacher § 5 UKlaG para 12. 
6891 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 1. 
6892 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 5 UKlaG para 9, Maxeiner 2003 J. Yale Int. Law 158. 
6893 Stoffels AGB-Recht 492. 
6894 Stoffels AGB-Recht 492. 
6895 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
6896 See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6. 
6897 See Part I ch 5 para 3.2 b) ee). 
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does hence not become functus officio, unlike the Commission after having issued a compliance 
notice.6898 This ensures that the eligible entity can intervene at any time, which has a deterrent 
effect. 
Before issuing a compliance notice, the Commission must consult with the regulatory authority 
that issued a licence to the regulated entity in question.6899 This is similar to § 8(2) UKlaG. 
Under this provision, the court must hear the competent regulator for financial services6900 
before the ruling if the action relates to provisions contained in general insurance standard 
terms. The judge has no discretion in this regard. The reason for such a hearing is that the court 
should benefit from the administration's insight and technical knowledge.6901 
The consultation of the South African and the hearing of the German regime are both 
mandatory. The main difference lies in the entity which has to perform the hearing. The 
Commission is, unlike a court, not a judicial body and does not directly intervene or adjudicate 
disputes. A reason for a consultation at such an early stage could be that the Commission is, 
like regulators, an administrative body, unlike eligible entities such as consumer organisations 
in the German context. Privately organised institutions or associations, such as consumer 
organisations, are not entitled to exert sovereign rights such as the performance of official 
hearings. The same applies to other eligible bodies, such as the chambers of trade and industry. 
When issuing warnings, they do not issue administrative but civil-law acts.6902 Another 
difference between the two regimes lies in the fact that section 100(2) of the Act applies to 'the 
regulatory authority', whereas § 8(2) UKlaG merely refers to the 'regulator for financial 
services' ('Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht'). The German provision is thus 
narrower in its personal scope of application than its South African counterpart. Since German 
courts can hear experts any time for evidence in order to benefit from the necessary technical 
knowledge,6903 the restricted personal scope of application should not make any difference in 
practice, however. This applies especially to expert witnesses in terms of § 414 ZPO.6904 
                                                             
6898 See Part I ch 5 para 3.2 ee). 
6899 Section 100(2). 
6900 Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (www.bafin.de). 
6901 Staudinger/Schlosser § 8 UKlaG para 13, WLP/Lindacher § 8 UKlaG para 11. 
6902 See 'Abmahnung- was nun?' at  https://www.hannover.ihk.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/ 
Merkblatt_Abmahnung-was_nun_2012_01.pdf. 
6903 §§ 402-414 ZPO. 
6904 § 414 ZPO: 'Insofar as knowledgeable persons are to be examined in order to obtain evidence regarding past 
facts and circumstances, or situations given in the past, which required special technical competence in order to 
be perceived, the rules governing the taking of evidence by hearing witnesses shall be applicable.' 
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If a person does not agree with the compliance notice the Commission has issued, it may apply 
to the Tribunal to review that notice within 15 business days after receiving that notice, or such 
longer period as may be allowed by the Tribunal on good cause shown.6905 If the Tribunal 
confirms or modifies all or part of the notice, the applicant must comply with that notice as 
confirmed or modified, within the timeframe specified in it.6906 A compliance notice remains 
in force until it is set aside by the Tribunal, or a court upon a review of a Tribunal decision 
concerning the notice, or, if the requirements of the compliance notice have been satisfied, the 
Commission issues a compliance certificate.6907 
Since warnings under the UKlaG are not administrative acts but rather a pre-trial step issued 
by eligible bodies, they cannot be set aside but by the issuing entity itself. Although the 
chambers of trade and industry and the chambers of crafts and labour are eligible bodies in 
terms of § 3 UKlaG and corporations under public law,6908 the warnings they issue are no 
administrative acts per se but civil-law acts.6909 Furthermore, a standard terms user cannot 
formally oppose a warning at court. If he or she does not agree with the content of the warning, 
the eligible body will file a court action. It seems that the deterrent effect of compliance notices 
is somewhat watered down by the fact that the supplier can apply for modification at the 
Tribunal. With a view to the fact that compliance notices should only be issued in clear cases, 
it is surprising that such a review by the Tribunal is possible. The deterrence of the German 
regime seems to be more comprehensive in this regard because standard terms users who do 
not agree with a warning expose themselves to an expensive lawsuit. What is more, since 
neither party wishes to go to court, this is also an incentive for eligible bodies to investigate 
their cases thoroughly. German legislation does not provide for the issuing of a certificate when 
a standard terms user has complied with the content of a warning. The reason for this might be 
that eligible bodies tend to monitor their affairs closely even after they dealt with them. This is 
highlighted by the fact that contractual penalties set out in warnings are due for future, and not 
past infringements. This is in stark contrast to the South African situation where there is not a 
history of strong and vibrant private consumer bodies. 
                                                             
6905 Section 101(1). 
6906 Section 101(3). 
6907 Section 100(4) and (5). 
6908 § 3(1) Gesetz zur vorläufigen Regelung des Rechts der Industrie- und Handelskammern of 18 December 1956 
(BGBl. 1956 I 920), as amended, and § 90(1) HwO. 
6909 See https://www.hannover.ihk.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Merkblatt_Abmahnung-was_nun_ 
2012_01.pdf. 
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The Commission has to assist consumers in formulating their complaints, if necessary.6910 This 
prevents not only abusive complaints, but the Commission can also advise consumers to drop 
their complaint if there is no basis for a successful outcome.  
The Commission's assistance in the formulation of complaints corresponds to § 139(3) 
ZPO,6911 under which the court may indicate to a party any inconsistencies. German courts do 
however not 'replace' the parties' lawyers in that they help to reformulate statements. If an 
application is – and remains – incomplete after the court's indication, the action is 
inadmissible.6912 Here again, in the South African regime, the assistance takes place at an 
earlier stage, namely by the Commission. This has the advantage that the Commission serves 
as a 'filter' with regard to other enforcement entities. This filtering function does not exist with 
respect to the court's assistance in terms of § 139(3) ZPO since a lawsuit is already sub judice. 
In conclusion, it can be said that warnings are issued almost systematically, unlike compliance 
notices. Common to both is their function to avoid the involvement of the judicial system and 
their deterrent effect. The German approach is more proactive and suitable to avoid further 
violations as the payment of contractual damages refers to future violations, and not to those 
committed in the past. The fact that the German entity is not functus officio after its 
investigation, unlike the Commission, ensures that it can intervene any time, which has also a 
deterrent effect. Concerning mandatory consultation procedures, the German regime's personal 
scope of application is narrower than the South African one. As German courts can hear experts 
for evidence in order to benefit from the necessary technical knowledge, the restricted personal 
scope of application should not make any difference in practice though. The deterrent effect of 
warnings seems to be higher since unlike compliance notices, they can be set aside only by the 
issuing entity itself. If a standard terms user does not agree with a warning, the issuing entity 
will most likely go to court. The deterrent effect of compliance notices is even lesser due to the 
fact that the Tribunal can modify them. With regard to deterrence, warnings seem thus to be 
more powerful than compliance notices. On the other hand, the filtering function of the 
Commission's assistance in the formulation of complaints does not exist for a German court's 
assistance since a lawsuit is already sub judice.  
                                                             
6910 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law (2013) 397. 
6911 § 139(3) ZPO: 'The court is to draw the parties’ attention to its concerns regarding any items it is to take into 
account ex officio.' 
6912 Erman/Roloff § 8 UKlaG para 1, Palandt/Bassenge § 8 UKlaG para 1. 
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1.2 The National Consumer Tribunal 
The National Consumer Tribunal (NCT) is an ad hoc body that was established in terms of the 
National Credit Act. The German regime does not have a comparable entity. The Tribunal has 
adjudicative functions and is a tribunal of record.6913 Since the Tribunal has jurisdiction over 
matters concerning the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act, it is to be 
expected that it will deal with those matters in a similar way, e.g., in respect of compliance 
notices, consent agreements and administrative fines.6914 Since the Tribunal deals both with 
cases concerning the Consumer Protection Act and the National Credit Act, the establishment 
of two separate and specialised chambers may be advisable. 
Although the Tribunal is an administrative body and not a court of law, it may grant interim 
relief. This ensures an affordable consumer redress because consumers are not obliged to 
approach ordinary courts that are more expensive. The Tribunal is not a 'point of first entry' 
and cannot be approached directly.6915 The legislator favours ADR and settlements by 
provincial consumer courts. What is more, the 'filtering function' of the Commission ensures 
that the Tribunal with its limited capacity is not flooded with too many matters. 
The requirement that the NCT must be staffed with sufficient persons with legal training 
(section 28(1)(b)) is too vague, and the restriction to two consecutive terms of five years each 
(section 29(1)) has the disadvantage that valuable specialised skills are lost after the expiry of 
these terms. It is thus recommended that the legislator enables members of the Tribunal to serve 
longer than two terms. What is more, the legislator should define the phrase 'sufficient persons 
with legal training', e.g., by requiring a law diploma of a recognised university.  
1.3 Consumer courts 
As consumer protection is a matter of concurrent jurisdiction, the provinces can establish 
consumer courts.6916 These are no common-law courts but administrative bodies. Their 
jurisdiction extends beyond the traditional rules of geographic jurisdiction, which may cause 
problems.6917 
                                                             
6913 See discussion on the NCT in Part I ch 5 para 3.3. 
6914 Having cost-efficiency concerns in mind, the legislator expanded the Tribunal's function to other areas of 
consumer protection. Hence, the Tribunal can also hear matters of general consumer protection. See Vessio LLD 
thesis 125 note 779, GenN 1957 in GG  26774 of 9 September 2004 at 44. 
6915 See Part I ch 5 para 3.3 b). 
6916 See discussion on consumer courts in Part I ch 5 para 3.4. 
6917 See Part I ch 5 para 3.4 a). 
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The fact that not all provinces provide for consumer courts means that many South Africans 
have no access to them.6918 Moreover, the provinces' consumer protection legislation differs 
from province to province. This is unfavourable to the consumer and hampers the transfer of 
matters from one province to another. Consumer courts have extensive powers, but the 
enforcement and execution of their orders remain unaddressed.6919 A drawback of this 
phenomenon is that matters which could usually be handled by provincial consumer courts end 
up at national level in order to achieve adequate prosecution.6920 The only sanction in provincial 
legislation in a case where a respondent (supplier) fails to comply with a consumer court order, 
is that the latter can be found guilty of an offence. A person who is found guilty of an offence 
can be convicted to pay the penalties set out in the legislation.6921 Although the members of 
most consumer courts have legal experience, the fact that they do not necessarily need a law 
diploma, with the exception of the chairperson (e.g., in Gauteng), raises some concerns. The 
legal complexity of consumer protection legislation requires adjudicative bodies consisting 
solely or mainly of lawyers.6922  
The issues mentioned above do not exist in Germany because only the civil courts and no other 
semi-professional bodies deal with disputes concerning standard business terms legislation. 
Some of these problems could be addressed by creating a common legislative framework for 
consumer courts. This approach has been very successful in Germany with the Administrative 
Procedure Acts of the federal states that used the National Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz as a 
common model. What is more, the legislator should address the urgent need for proper 
enforcement and execution procedure in this field. Different solutions are suggested, but they 
reveal the over-complicated redress mechanism of the Act. It would also be helpful if consumer 
courts were mainly staffed with lawyers. This should be a requirement for the appointment of 
the members. 
1.4 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act contains an implied hierarchy in terms of which 
consumers are encouraged to first approach an alternative dispute resolution agent before 
approaching the Commission.6923 The Commission may promote informal dispute resolution 
                                                             
6918 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 18. 
6919 Du Plessis 2010 SA Merc LJ 517. 
6920 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 39, published in GenN 1957 in GG 26774 of 
9 September 2004. 
6921 See, for instance ss 30 and 31 of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996. 
6922 See Part I ch 5 para 3.4 a). 
6923 See discussion on ADR in Part I ch 5 para 3.5. 
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by first referring the matter to an alternative dispute resolution agent according to section 
72(1)(b).6924 The South African legislator encourages alternative dispute resolution procedures 
and self-regulatory activities,6925 given the prominence of these mechanisms in the Act, inter 
alia by industry codes of conduct6926 and the accreditation of industry ombuds.6927 The 
Department of Trade and Industry was of the view that there is a need for ADR mechanisms in 
the form of industry-funded procedures. Only where voluntary mechanisms have 'not been 
effective or where the industry is of such a nature that greater regulation is required should 
statutory mechanisms be considered.'6928 With a view of traditional dispute resolution in 
African cultures, they could be a better choice than more adversarial redress mechanisms. What 
is more, consumers can still go to court if they are not satisfied with the ombud's decision.6929 
Despite these advantages, an ombud might not be the appropriate forum in cases that involve 
complicated facts, legal uncertainty or expert witnesses. One could therefore argue that in such 
matters, other fora, like the courts, are probably more suited.6930 In practice though, industry 
ombuds have proven to be very effective as the process is informal, cheap for the consumer. 
Moreover, suppliers who are members of the industry tend to adhere to the decisions of the 
ombuds. 
Directive 98/27/EC6931 does not require that the national legislator implement a pre-trial 
conciliation procedure. The German legislature did therefore not provide for a mandatory 
procedure (arbitration, conciliation, mediation and so forth). This is in contrast to the current 
tendency to encourage such procedures.6932 Before going to court, German consumers quite 
often use the path of alternative dispute resolution though. In Germany, many industries have 
implemented ombuds procedures, such as banks and insurance companies.6933 Their procedure 
                                                             
6924 Naudé 2010 SALJ 524. 
6925 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 403. 
6926 Sections 82 and 93. 
6927 Section 82(6). 
6928 Draft Green Paper on the Consumer Policy Framework 2004 at 37 and 47, published in: GenN 1957 in GG 
26774 of 9 September 2004. 
6929 See Part I ch 5 para 3.5 a). 
6930 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 57. 
6931 Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests. 
6932 E.g., § 15a(1) 1st sent. in pr. EGZPO: 'The laws of the federal States may stipulate that an action may only be 
brought after an attempt has been made  to settle the dispute amicably before a conciliation office that is 
established or recognised by the administration of justice of the federal State.' (My own translation). Stoffels AGB-
Recht 496. 
6933 Ombudsmann der privaten Banken (https://bankenombudsmann.de), Ombudsmann der Öffentlichen Banken 
(www.voeb.de), Ombudsmann der genossenschaftlichen Bankengruppe (www.bvr.de), Schlichtungsstelle beim 
Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverband (www.dsgv.de/schlichtungsstelle), Schlichtungsstelle der Deutschen 
Bundesbank (www.bundesbank.de), Versicherungsombudsmann (www.versicherungsombudsmann.de), 
Ombudsmann Private Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung (www.pkv-ombudsmann.de), Ombudsstelle 
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is quite similar. If the clients do not agree with the decisions of the ombud, the path to the 
ordinary courts remains open for them. Although there are no statistics on the number of 
ombuds procedures concerning §§ 305 et seq., pre-trial dispute resolution undoubtedly relieves 
the courts from many proceedings.6934 Hence, in both regimes, ADR plays a prominent role in 
dispute resolution. The difference lies in the fact that in Germany, ADR is not actively 
encouraged or promoted, unlike in South Africa. De facto, in both regimes, consumers 
nonetheless benefit from such procedures to a large extent. 
An industry ombud in terms of the Act is an industry-specific ombud which either is subject to 
a scheme of alternative dispute resolution provided for in the relevant industry code, or subject 
to some degree of regulation if the scheme has been accredited under the Act.6935 South African 
examples are the ombuds of insurance companies and banks dealing with client complaints,6936 
or the Wireless Application Service Providers' Association (WASPA) Ombudsman.6937 This 
kind of alternative dispute resolution usually involves codes of conduct.  
§ 14(3) UKlaG provides that, upon request, the Federal Office of Justice shall recognise a 
conciliation office as a private consumer conciliation office if the following conditions are met:  
Firstly, the institution of the conciliation body is a registered association.6938 Secondly, the 
conciliation body is responsible for certain disputes, and thirdly, the organisation, financing 
and rules of procedure of the conciliation body comply with the requirements of the UKlaG 
and the statutory ordinance issued on the basis of this Act. The rules of procedure of a 
recognised conciliation body may be amended only with the consent of the Federal Office of 
Justice.  
Both regimes thus require accreditation for industry ombuds. The German regime seems to be 
stricter in that the conciliation body must be composed of at least two conciliators who are 
qualified to hold judicial office, i.e., lawyers who have successfully passed the First and Second 
State Exams in Law.6939 This allows for handling more complicated matters, which relieves the 
                                                             
geschlossene Fonds (www.ombudsstelle-gfonds.de), Ombudsleute der Privaten Bausparkassen 
(www.schlichtungsstelle-bausparen.de), Büro der Ombudsstelle des BVI - Bundesverband Investment und Asset 
Management e.V. (www.ombudsstelle-investmentfonds.de), Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(www.bafin.de), to name but a few. 
6934 See Part II ch 6 para 1.2. 
6935 Van Heerden ‘Section 69 in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 16. 
6936 In order to avoid confusion, South African financial institution may not employ the word 'ombud', unless they 
are authorised by the Council to do so. See s 18(5)(a) of the Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004. 
6937 Melville 2010 SA Merc LJ 58. 
6938 Eingetragener Verein (e. V.). 
6939 Erste und Zweite juristische Staatsprüfung. Lawyers who hold these two diplomas are referred to as 
'Volljuristen' as they can practice any legal profession (advocate, judge, prosecutor, counsel, jurist etc.). 
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courts. It would thus be beneficial if the South African ADR mechanism had a similar 
requirement. As ADR seems to be closer to traditional dispute resolution, more consumers 
could then benefit from this system. 
If the ADR agent has resolved or assisted the parties in resolving their dispute, the agent may 
(a) record the resolution of that dispute in the form of an order, and (b) if the parties to the 
dispute consent to that order, submit it to the Tribunal or the High Court to be made a consent 
order, in terms of its rules.6940 The German procedure does not know such a formalisation since 
the procedure applicable to ombuds in Germany is independent of judicial proceedings at court. 
A formalisation by the Tribunal or the High Court undoubtedly strengthens the ombud's 
decision. 
Section 70(1) grants locus standi only to consumers but not to the other entities mentioned in 
section 4(1). This could be an editorial error of the legislator. On the other hand, it could be its 
intention to submit only smaller affairs to ADR agents and to reserve class actions that are 
more complex or those where consumer protection groups are involved for the other 
entities.6941 The legislator should make this clear.  
It is important to note that the South African ombud's recommendations usually are not legally 
binding. Because of the political pressure and the status of the office, they usually are followed, 
so that they are factually binding.6942 In the German context, the ombud's decisions are binding 
on the company (e.g., a bank) if the amount in dispute between the bank and the customer does 
not exceed EUR 10,000. This shall not apply to the customer though. If the customer does not 
agree with the ombud's decision, he or she may continue to pursue the case in court.6943 Thus, 
both regimes offer the same level of protection in that consumers can still go to court if they 
do not agree with the ombud's decision. 
In the South African context, a concern is the variety of different ombuds and the fact that the 
Act only recognises 'ombuds with jurisdiction' and 'industry ombuds'. For consumers, it will 
not be easy to distinguish between those ombuds and to know why some of them are accredited, 
whereas others are not.6944 It could be beneficial in the South African context to merge several 
ombuds of a particular sector, such as the financial industry, telecommunications or the 
                                                             
6940 Section 70(3). 
6941 See Part I ch 5 para 3.5 c). 
6942 See Part I ch 5 para 3.5 a). 
6943 See https://bankenombudsmann.de/ombudsmannverfahren/haeufige-fragen. 
6944 See Part I ch 5 para 3.5 a). 
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insurance industry. Overlapping jurisdictions would then be eliminated and economies of scale 
could be achieved. Moreover, the given ombud's profile would be raised, and consumers would 
exactly know whom they have to approach.6945  
In summary, unlike the South African legislator, the German legislator does not actively 
encourage ADR procedures, although many consumers benefit from this system. Both regimes 
require accreditation for industry ombuds. The fact that German ombuds offices must be staffed 
with at least two lawyers allows handling more complicated matters, which relieves the courts. 
In South Africa, for more complex cases, other fora are probably a better choice. It is therefore 
suggested that South Africa should adopt a similar stance in order to establish an ADR system 
also for more complex cases in order to relieve the other entities. The German regime does not 
have formalities with regard to judicial entities. Since ADR is embedded in the South African 
redress mechanism, the choice of further formalities was logical, however. The South African 
legislature should make clear if the other entities mentioned in section 4(1) have locus standi, 
or if ADR is only intended for smaller affairs. Both regimes offer the same level of protection 
in that consumers can still go to court if they do not agree with the ombud's decision. The South 
African legislator should merge several ombuds of a particular sector. By and large, the 
German ombuds regime is far less complex, more transparent and also suited for more complex 
cases than the South African regime.  
1.5 The civil courts 
The term 'courts' in the Act refers to civil courts.6946 Small Claims Courts offer cost-efficient 
redress. Despite the contradiction between sections 69(d) and 52 with regard to the accessibility 
of civil courts, section 4(3) offers a solution in terms of which consumers may approach a 
Small Claims Court as a first port-of-call if this is the more efficient solution regarding 
consumer protection. This solution has the benefit that the Act applies and that the consumer 
is not obliged to trod the path of the common law but can enjoy the benefits of the Act. It is 
also beneficial in terms of procedural economy.6947 
It has to be underlined that the Minister has no direct power to bring legislative changes on the 
provincial level because consumer protection is subject to concurrent jurisdiction.6948 It is 
                                                             
6945 See 'A public service ombudsman: Government response to consultation' at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/public-service-ombudsman at 'A public service ombudsman: 
Government response to consultation' at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/public-service-
ombudsman (no longer available). 
6946 See discussion on the civil courts in Part I ch 5 para 3.6. 
6947 See Part I ch 5 para 3.6 a). 
6948 See Schedule 4 Part A of the Constitution. 
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suggested that concurrent jurisdiction is an obstacle to effective consumer protection since 
transactions are made across provincial borders. 
As we have seen, the South African regime consists of various entities for the enforcement of 
the Act. German legislation is much more streamlined in this regard. In individual actions, the 
civil court that has jurisdiction for the proceedings in question performs an incidental control. 
Regarding institutional actions, the civil chambers of the Regional Court in whose district the 
defendant has his or her place of business or domicile have sole competence for actions under 
the UKlaG, irrespective of the amount in dispute.6949 This provision establishes exclusive 
jurisdiction. Hence, choice-of-court agreements are not permitted.6950  
In the interests of efficient proceedings or speedier litigation, the Land governments are 
empowered to assign, by statutory order, competence for the districts of several Regional 
Courts for cases under the UKlaG to a single Regional Court.6951 It is suggested that this leads 
even more to a concentration of the competent entities and harmonisation of judicial rulings. 
This model should not be implemented in South Africa though because the assignment of 
competence to certain courts would hamper the access to justice for many consumers, 
especially those who live in remote areas. 
Contrary to other civil actions, the amount in dispute in institutional actions is not calculated 
on the basis of the interest of a party concerning the matter in dispute. The public has the 
interest to have eliminated illegal standard terms though.6952 Thus, consumer protection 
associations are protected from the risk of costs involved.6953 Under § 3 ZPO, the court assesses 
the value at its sole discretion. The maximum amount for disputes in the context of the UKlaG 
is EUR 250,000.6954 The relatively low amounts have a somewhat symbolic significance.6955 
In practice, the courts have developed 'flat fees'. These are often criticised because no clear line 
is visible as regards their determination and the economic impact of the given clauses.6956 In 
any event, they efficiently lower the costs involved. 
                                                             
6949 § 6(1) UKlaG. Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. 
6950 § 40(2) 1st sent no. 2 ZPO. Stoffels AGB-Recht 496. 
6951 So far, Bavaria, Hesse, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Northrhine-Westphalia and Saxony have made use of 
this empowerment. Stoffels AGB-Recht 496, with further references. See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6 c) aa). 
6952 BGH NJW-RR 2007, 497. 
6953 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 29. 
6954 § 48(1) 2nd sent. GKG. 
6955 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 29 ('mere symbolic value'). 
6956 UBH/Witt § 5 UKlaG para 30. 
 1103   
 
In other words, German legislation chose another path to make the battle against unfair terms 
more affordable, by applying lower amounts in dispute. Thus, the complex mechanism of the 
South African regime to make disputes more affordable was not the only option for the South 
African legislator. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that concerning civil-law procedures, the German legislator made 
lawsuits that involve standard terms more affordable, at least for institutional actions, by 
lowering the amounts in dispute. The complex mechanism of the Act was thus not the only 
option for South Africa. Instead, it could have lowered the costs involved in matters related to 
the Act. The South African regime is very complex, which is partly due to the concurrent 
legislation in consumer matters. Nonetheless, the over-complicated redress mechanism of the 
Act could have been avoided by streamlining it, for instance, by giving Small Claims Courts a 
more predominant role. Sufficient staffing and financing of Small Claims Courts, paired with 
a lowering of the amounts in dispute according to the German model, would have been 
beneficial in this regard. Admittedly, this would have been a shift from a more administrative 
towards a more judicial redress mechanism, which was not the legislator's intention. On the 
other hand, the German model with respect to the assignment of competence to certain courts 
should not be implemented in South Africa as it would hamper the access to the courts for 
many consumers.  
2. Individual proceedings versus abstract challenges and class actions 
As discussed earlier,6957 the German legislature aimed to design a mechanism that is able to 
prevent the use of unfair terms rather than eliminating them ex post facto. Where individual 
parties are involved, the court decides whether a standard business clause is effective in a so-
called 'incidental control', i.e., within the individual proceedings. Hence, the legal force of the 
judgement only applies inter partes, and where other individuals wish to attack the same clause, 
they have to bring a new court action.6958 In order to prevent the use of unfair terms and achieve 
'positive enforcement', individual proceedings were not considered sufficiently effective in 
Germany, which is why the procedure of the institutional action has been introduced.6959 § 11 
UKlaG enhances the effect of the court's decision in the context of institutional actions 
tremendously because it grants an extension of the legal force of the judgment beyond an inter 
partes effect. This is important because it prevents suppliers from avoiding legal proceedings 
                                                             
6957 See Part II ch 6 para 1.1. 
6958 Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E para 20.   
6959 Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 157. 
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with 'difficult clients' by giving in to their complaints.6960 Individual consumers that are 
concerned with the given clauses can assert a substantive objection.6961 This 'extension of the 
legal force of the judgment' does however only apply to rulings reached within institutional 
actions that have reached the state of legal force, and not to those that can still be subject to an 
appeal. Although provisional injunctions may have the form of a judgment, the extension of 
the legal force does not apply to them because they have not the same binding effect as final 
judgments.6962 
The Consumer Protection Act focuses instead on individual proceedings and leaves it to 
individual consumers to fight unfair terms.6963 Although section 77 of the Act sets out various 
support mechanisms for consumer protection groups which may represent consumers in court 
'either specifically or generally', the Act does not provide for any proceedings similar to 
institutional actions.6964 Hence, the battle against unfair terms is a lonely one for the consumer 
who is faced with a more powerful and most of the time financially stronger supplier. This 
particular-personalised (i.e., individualised) approach applied in South African individual 
actions, coupled with equity control, is diametrically opposed to the German abstract-universal 
approach. A supra-individual and generalising approach is more suited for standard business 
terms because they have been drafted for mass contracts.6965 In a particular-personalised 
approach, the individual client has to go to court. The following decision only has an inter 
partes effect, and other consumers cannot benefit from the judgment. Experience has shown 
that individuals rather shy away from court proceedings as they often think that standard 
business terms have quasi-legislative authority. They also cannot evaluate the risks and are 
afraid of the costs involved with individual proceedings.6966  
Even though the South African regime is geared towards individual actions between suppliers 
and consumers, section 52(3)(b)(iii) provides that the court may also 'make any further order 
[it] considers just and reasonable in the circumstances, including, but not limited to, an order 
(…) requiring the supplier to cease any practice, or alter any practice, form or document, as 
required to avoid a repetition of the supplier's conduct.' Naudé correctly points out that this 
allows for preventative control in the view of future contracts between the given supplier and 
                                                             
6960 Medicus BGB-AT 163. 
6961 Erman/Roloff § 11 UKlaG para 7, Stoffels AGB-Recht 503. 
6962 UBH/Witt § 11 UKlaG para 4, Erman/Roloff § 11 UKlaG para 4. See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6 g). 
6963 See Part I ch 5, passim. 
6964 See discussion in Part I ch 5. 
6965 Staudinger/Rieble § 315 para 305. See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 b) cc). 
6966 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 2. 
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other consumers (who were not a party to the procedure). She suggests that section 52 should 
be redrafted in order to include ex-ante challenges.6967 Since the involvement of an individual 
contract is not necessary, Naudé refers to 'abstract', 'ex ante' or 'general use' challenges in this 
regard.6968 Even though the wording of section 52(3) is wide enough, Naudé's view is correct 
in that the legislator should expressly insert a mechanism for abstract challenges in the Act. 
Other consumers could benefit from a ruling reached within an abstract challenge by inserting 
a provision similar to § 11 UKlaG. 
Section 4(1)(c) to (e) deals with class actions. These are typically used in order to recover 
similar claims of numerous plaintiffs against few defendants.6969 Although the members of the 
given class are not parties in the formal sense, the judgment is binding on all class members. 
Class actions serve the procedural economy as they protect the courts from having to rule on 
numerous claims referring to the same cause of action, and facilitate access to the courts, 
especially by people living in remote areas.6970 
It raises some concern though that there are no procedural provisions for class actions, neither 
in the Constitution nor in the Consumer Protection Act, despite the introduction of class actions 
in both pieces of legislation. Thus, legislation is necessary with regard to harmonisation, 
substantiation and legal certainty. This could be done by the introduction of a Public Interest 
and Class Actions Act, as suggested by the Law Commission.6971 The requirements established 
by the courts are too vague in order to ensure a harmonised approach to class actions.6972  
It is suggested that class actions cannot compensate for the lack of a general use challenge 
mechanism in the Consumer Protection Act. Decisions reached in class actions merely concern 
the parties (in the broader sense) involved but not consumers who did not join the lawsuit. 
The 'model declaratory proceedings' (Musterfeststellungsklage) is a civil law action introduced 
into German law in 2018.6973 The Musterfeststellungsklage is no class action in the sense of 
South African or US-American law, however. German law generally requires the infringement 
                                                             
6967 Naudé 2010 SALJ 531. 
6968 Naudé 2010 SALJ 518. The Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG) refers to 'Verbandsklage' which is referred 
to as 'institutional action' in this thesis. 
6969 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law 532, with further references. 
6970 Nkala and Others v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd and Others (Treatment Action Campaign NPC and 
Another as Amici Curiae) [2016] 3 All SA 233 (GJ) at para [98]. 
6971 SALRC Report on the Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law (Project 
88) (1998) at 111 et seq. 
6972 See Part I ch 5 para 2. 
6973  Gesetz zur Einführung einer zivilprozessualen Musterfeststellungsklage of 12 July 2018.  
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of one's own subjective rights in order to initiate legal proceedings and to be admissible 
(principle of individual legal protection).6974 The interest of a group or class of affected persons 
in the sense of section 4(1)(b) is thus irrelevant for this type of German court proceedings.6975 
If the court should decide in favour of the associations representing the plaintiffs, each 
consumer entered in the specifically set up 'register of claims'6976 must then enforce its claim 
for damages individually in court. For consumers not entered in the register of claims, a 'model 
declaratory decision' has no effect. In a judgement in the context of a Musterfeststellungsklage, 
the court thus only decides whether there are facts that entitle the consumer to payment of 
damages by the defendant. The Musterfeststellungsklage has more resemblance with an 
institutional action according to the UKlaG than with a class action.6977 The locus standi 
provisions of § 4 UKlaG, for instance, apply to the Musterfeststellungsklage.6978 
It is also suggested that the lack of abstract challenges in the South African regime cannot be 
balanced by a co-operation between the Commission and trade associations with the objective 
to establish voluntary codes of practice.6979 Such voluntary codes of practice hardly have the 
same impact as the threat of an institutional action because they are merely voluntary. Besides, 
there is a risk that suppliers' organisations or industries tend to negotiate terms with the 
Commission that favour more the suppliers than their clients. 
The wording of section 4(1) suggests that a consumer's rights must have been infringed, 
impaired or threatened, or that prohibited conduct has occurred or is occurring. This means that 
the legislator only provides for an ex post facto redress and not for a preventative or proactive 
control mechanism. A proactive approach would however be essential in a country like South 
                                                             
6974 Verletzung eigener subjektiver Rechte = Prinzip des Individualrechtsschutzes. 
6975 For a Musterfeststellungsklage, in order to file a complaint with a competent Oberlandesgericht, a group of at 
least 10 aggrieved consumers is required. The court can then allow or dismiss the action. When the action is 
admitted, affected consumers then enter their names in a 'register of claims' (Klageregister) which is set up by the 
Federal Office of Justice in accordance with § 609(1) ZPO and § 1 of the Musterfeststellungsklagenregister-
Verordnung (MFKRegV), i.e., the Regulation on Registers of Claims for Model Declaratory Proceedings. This 
requires at least 50 aggrieved parties within two months. Such an entry has the effect of inhibiting the statute of 
limitations for the individual consumer (§ 204(1) no. 1a BGB). There is no risk of litigation costs for the consumer. 
If the court should however decide in favour of the plaintiff associations, each consumer entered in the register of 
claims must then enforce its claims for damages individually in court. For consumers not entered in the register 
of claims, a 'model declaratory decision' has no effect. In a judgement in the context of a Musterfeststellungsklage, 
the court therefore only decides whether there are facts that entitle the consumer to payment of damages by the 
defendant. In the case of the Volkswagen emissions scandal ('Dieselgate'), this is based, among other things, on 
the fact that the consumer's vehicles in question are to be distinguished individually according to model, type 
approval, age, etc.  
6976 Klageregister. 
6977 See §§ 606-614 ZPO. Unfortunately, there is no official translation of these relatively new provisions. 
6978 See 'Musterfeststellungsklage' at https://www.musterfeststellungsklagen.de. 
6979 Section 93. 
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Africa with a large number of vulnerable consumers who cannot afford litigation, or who 
simply do not know that their rights are being or have been infringed. Preventive control is 
independent of an individual contract or consumer and exercised by consumer organisations 
endowed with preventative powers.6980 Such proactive control by consumer organisations and 
administrative watchdog entities would, therefore, be very effective, as shown by international 
experience.6981  
The institutional action is a core element of German standard business terms legislation. The 
type of institutional action this thesis is concerned with is set out in § 1 UKlaG, a statute 
containing the procedural aspects in relation to §§ 305 et seq. BGB. Institutional actions have 
a broader effect than individual actions and incite standard terms users to use clauses that are 
in keeping with the law. Its objective is to make content control more efficient and to allow for 
a broader effect. The UKlaG protects not individual consumers, but the public in general.6982 
For the enquiry of the given standard clauses, a strict abstract-general approach is applied. The 
given standard terms are not declared invalid, but the user is required to refrain from further 
using them, and recommenders of standard provisions must withdraw any recommendation 
made. Moreover, institutional actions have the effect of inciting standard terms users to use 
irreproachable clauses, and they often step in when customers refrain from taking legal action 
because of the wording of specific clauses. That a concomitant application of a particular-
personalised approach (for consumer contracts) and an abstract-universal approach for 
institutional actions is possible has been shown in the context of § 310(3) dealing specifically 
with consumer contracts.  
In German law, institutional actions aim to prevent the use of invalid clauses. It is therefore not 
necessary that a given clause has been incorporated into the agreement, and it is sufficient that 
the intention of incorporating the standard provisions into contracts in the future is apparent.6983 
This broad interpretation corresponds to article 7(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive according 
to which the abstract control must be designed for 'contractual terms drawn up for general 
                                                             
6980 Naudé 2010 SALJ 517. 
6981 Article 7 of the Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts requires 
adequate and effective means to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers 
by 'provisions whereby persons or organisations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protection 
consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before competent 
administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that 
they can apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms.' 
6982 Consistent case law. See, e.g., BGH NJW 1994, 2693. 
6983 Palandt/Bassenge § 1 UKlaG para 7, UBH/Witt § 1 UKlaG para 24. 
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use'.6984 Therefore, a commercial offer or the invitation to make an offer concluding standard 
business terms,6985 or an invoice on which standard terms are printed, without the latter being 
incorporated,6986 can be challenged by eligible entities. 
This shows that the eradication of unfair standard business terms within an abstract challenge 
at an early stage, i.e., before their actual use for the public, is a more effective instrument than 
the elimination of standard provisions of an individual agreement. The implementation of a 
mechanism that does not consider a specific consumer-supplier relationship but rather applies 
a proactive approach would enhance consumer protection in South Africa. The warnings that 
German consumer protection associations usually send to standard terms users contain, inter 
alia, a deadline to comply with the association's complaint and a threat to take legal action. The 
threat of taking legal action can be an effective tool.6987 The fact that specific entities have the 
power to 'negotiate' with suppliers or the issuing of a 'warning' is often sufficient to change 
their unfair terms and comply with the warning so that litigation becomes superfluous.  
Although this tool has not realised its full potential,6988 the creation of the institutional action 
has not been in vain because many standard business terms are more in line with the legislation 
than before.6989 The adaption of the locus standi for consumer organisations for cross-border 
transactions and the creation of a registration procedure for eligible organisations6990 as well as 
the punctual extension of active legitimation for transnational transactions by the insertion of 
§ 4a UKlaG6991 enforce this procedural tool.6992 
It is a well-established principle that courts may decide on issues that have been overlooked by 
the parties, where this is required in the interest of justice.6993 Naudé legitimately argues that it 
would be advisable to include an explicit provision in the Act according to which courts are 
empowered to raise the issue of unfairness on their own initiative.6994 This is the case in 
                                                             
6984 WLP/Pfeiffer Art 7 RiLi para 7. Emphasis added. 
6985 MüKo ZPO/Micklitz § 1 UKlaG para 20. 
6986 LG Munich BB 1979, 1789. 
6987 Naudé 2010 SALJ 518. See UK DTI Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate Commission Review of 
Council Directive 93/13(EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Consultation Paper) (2000). 
6988 From 2000 to 2005, for instance, there were only 62 appeals on points of law (Revisionen) where consumer 
associations were involved. In the same period, there were 354 court actions in total, which is not a very high 
number either. This trend continued in subsequent years. The very active Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband, 
for example, issued in 2009 105 warnings and 15 court actions. See UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
6989 UBH/Witt before § 1 UKlaG para 8. 
6990 § 3 UKlaG. 
6991 Currently, there is no official English translation of this provision. 
6992 See Part II ch 6 para 2.2. 
6993 See Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund Inc v Industrial Credit Corporation Africa Ltd 2008 (6) 
SA 468 (W). 
6994 Naudé 2009 SALJ 536. 
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Germany, where the courts assess the fairness of standard business terms 'incidentally,' within 
a so-called 'incidental control'.6995 
In summary, one can conclude that the 'positive enforcement' by institutional actions for which 
an abstract-general approach is applied is a much more efficient tool to fight unfair terms than 
the South African individual approach, mainly consisting of individual proceedings. Class 
actions or a co-operation between the Commission and trade association with regard to 
voluntary codes of practice cannot compensate for the lack of a general use challenges 
mechanism. The legislator should introduce procedural provisions for class actions (this must 
not be necessarily in the Act) though. The South African legislator should expressly provide 
for abstract challenges in the Act in order to offer a proactive procedural mechanism, and 
introduce a provision that overcomes the inter partes effect, similar to § 11 UKlaG. This would 
improve consumer protection. South African courts should also have the possibility to raise the 
issue of unfairness on their own initiative, i.e. incidentally. 
3. Entities involved 
In the South African context, the parties typically involved in consumer protection matters are 
the supplier and the consumer. As discussed, the Act is geared towards individual actions and 
does not provide for abstract challenges (institutional actions).  
The Act sets out extensive locus standi provisions in section 4(1) and therefore enhances access 
to redress. This is particularly true for low-income persons as class actions facilitate their access 
to redress in terms of affordability.6996 As discussed earlier in this chapter, class actions cannot 
compensate for a non-existing general use challenges mechanism in the Act though. In terms 
of section 4(1)(c), a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
affected persons also has locus standi. From sections 78, 71(2)(b)(iii) and 10(1) which all speak 
of 'accredited consumer groups' one can conclude that such a consumer group must be 
accredited in order to have standing, despite the wording of section 4(1)(c). Under section 
4(1)(e), an association acting in the interest of its members also has standing.  
As suggested in Part I,6997 Naudé's view to require accreditation is only correct in respect of 
consumer protection groups.6998 Other associations, not primarily concerned with consumer 
                                                             
6995 See discussion in Part II ch 6 para 1.1. 
6996 Van Heerden ‘Section 69’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 4. 
6997 Chapter 5 para 2. 
6998 Naudé 2010 SALJ 515. 
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protection matters, are not contemplated in section 1. The legislator should however amend 
section 4(1) in order to bring clarification of whether also non-accredited consumer protection 
groups have locus standi.6999 
Section 71(1) broadens the locus standi to any person who is not a consumer concerned with a 
supplier's terms and conditions. This provision has a deterring effect on suppliers and facilitates 
the eradication of unfair terms.7000  
The German regime requires a distinction between individual and institutional proceedings. In 
individual actions, the validity of a user's standard terms is assessed within an incidental 
control. The legal force of the judgement merely has an inter partes effect. The parties in 
individual actions are typically the given standard terms user and its client. In contrast, in 
institutional actions, a standard terms user is the opponent of a qualified entity in terms of § 3 
UKlaG, e.g., a consumer protection organisation or a chamber of commerce and industry.7001 
Hence, the actors involved within individual proceedings are the supplier/user, on the one hand, 
and the consumer/other party, on the other. In the South African regime, the supplier's 
counterpart in class actions is an (accredited) consumer protection group. The same applies to 
German institutional actions. The fact that South African legislation does not provide for 
abstract challenges in the Act is somewhat, though not sufficiently balanced by section 71(1) 
which gives locus standi to any person who is not a consumer concerned with the supplier's 
standard terms. 
The eligible bodies for institutional actions are contemplated in § 3(1) UKlaG. In this regard, 
consumer associations that are inscribed in the list of the European Commission are equal to 
German associations with regard to their standing. In order to be inscribed in these lists, the 
given association must have legal personality, e.g., being a registered association under § 21 
BGB, and promote consumers' interests by education and advice on a non-commercial and non-
temporary basis. Their functions must at least include the promotion of consumers' interests by 
education and advice on a non-commercial and non-temporary basis. This does not need to be 
their central role, however. Associations promoting commercial and independent professional 
                                                             
6999 Van Heerden ‘Section 78’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 3. 
7000 See Part I ch 6 para 3.2 e). 
7001 See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.5. 
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interests, or those that have obtained their legal personality by State awarding, e.g., the 
chambers of commerce and industry, are eligible too.7002 
Unlike consumer protection groups as defined by the Consumer Protection Act in section 1, 
read in conjunction with section 77, the Act seems not to include associations that are not 
primarily concerned with consumer protection. Hence, 'accreditation' in terms of the Act and 
'certification' under the UKlaG are not congruent concerning the associations concerned. In 
order to improve consumer protection, it is recommended that the South African legislator 
should also include associations which are not primarily concerned with consumer protection. 
The Directive 2009/22/EC of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' 
interests7003 aims to enable the 'free movement of actions for an injunction'7004 within the EU 
and to improve consumer protection in cross-border transactions. The German legislator chose 
the option given by the Directive by which not independent public bodies but private consumer 
organisations are competent for consumer protection.7005 This has historical, systemic and 
practical reasons.7006 Preventive control by administrative bodies has not reached the expected 
efficiency where it had been established.7007 Stoffels argues not without good reason that the 
tendency within EU law to shift the execution of consumer protective measures more towards 
administrative organisations7008 has to be seen with scepticism.7009 As discussed, preventive 
control by the administration is not compatible with the German 'private law society' and has 
not reached the same efficiency where it has been implemented.7010  
In contrast, with the involvement of the National Consumer Commission, which can be seen 
as the centrepiece of the consumer protection mechanism, South Africa opted for a mixed 
solution with administrative7011 and civil-law actors, such as consumer protection associations. 
                                                             
7002 See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.5, with further references. 
7003 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers' interests. This Directive replaced Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests. 
7004 This phrase was coined in the Green Paper of the Commission of the European Communities on access of 
consumers to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the single market of 16 November 1993 (KOM 
(93) 576 at 77 et seq. 
7005 Article 3 of the Directive. 
7006 See Part II ch 6 para 2.2. 
7007 See MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 13, with further references. 
7008 E.g., by the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of 27 October 2004. 
7009 Stoffels AGB-Recht 480. 
7010 See Part II ch 6 para 2.2. 
7011 For instance, the Tribunal is a 'specialist administrative tribunal' the functions and activities of which constitute 
'administrative action' in terms of section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (Van Eeden Consumer 
Protection Law (2013) 444); the Commission is to be located within the administrative branch of government (see 
s 87(1) and (6) dealing with the appointment of its members by the Minister). 
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The choice of a central administrative body entails indeed more bureaucracy than the German 
solution. However, the co-existence between the NCC and consumer organisations is not a 
contradiction and could lead to more effective consumer protection if these organisations 
would be supported financially. In this regard, it is reminded that also in Germany, these 
organisations are chronically under-financed.7012  
In conclusion, it can be said that in order to improve consumer protection, the South African 
legislator should include associations that are not primarily concerned with consumer 
protection. In any event, it should make clear whether non-accredited consumer protection 
groups have standing. The fact that any person who is not a consumer has locus standi in terms 
of section 71(1) does not sufficiently balance the non-existing abstract challenges mechanism 
in the Act. Consumer organisations should financially and otherwise be supported in order to 
enhance consumer protection. 
4. Limitation period 
Under section 116(1) of the Act, a complaint in terms of the Act may not be referred or made 
to the Tribunal or a consumer court more than three years after (a) the act or omission that is 
the cause of the complaint; or (b) in the case of a course of conduct or continuing practice, the 
date that the conduct or practice ceased.7013 This is in line with the general prescription period 
contained in the Prescription Act for debts generally. 
For lack of special limitation periods in the UKlaG due to the revision of the limitation periods 
in the BGB,7014 §§ 194 et seq. BGB apply. Hence, for claims for injunction and withdrawal of 
recommendation, the standard 3-year limitation period of § 195 applies7015. § 199(1) provides 
that unless another commencement of limitation of is determined, the standard limitation period 
commences at the end of the year in which: 1. the claim arose and 2. the obligee obtains 
knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the claim and of the identity of the obligor, or 
                                                             
7012 Many German authors thus advocate for better financial resources of consumer protection organisations in 
order to improve their work in the long term. See Stoffels AGB-Recht 481, Wendland in: Staudinger/Eckpfeiler E 
para 20, MüKo ZPO/Micklitz (2001) before § 13 AGBG para 12 notes 27 and 42. Wendland argues that the biggest 
obstacle for an effective work of consumer associations is their weak financial resources, and Micklitz qualifies 
consumer protection associations as 'overstrained' due to their weak financial allocation. See also discussion in 
Part II ch 6 paras 2.2 and 2.3.6 i). 
7013 See Part I ch 5 para 3.3 b). 
7014 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 275. 
7015 § 195 BGB: 'The standard limitation period is three years.'  
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would have obtained such knowledge if he had not shown gross negligence. Since § 195 
provides for the standard limitation period, it also applies to individual actions.7016 
Both regimes thus apply the same limitation period of 3 years. Only the calculation of the 
beginning of this period varies. The calculation of the German limitation period seems to be 
more consumer-friendly in that it also contains a subjective element, i.e., knowledge of the 
claim. 
5. Publication 
Consumer court orders must be published in the Provincial Gazette.7017 The publication serves 
as a record as the hearings and arrangements are recorded entirely, but also for future 
reference.7018 These publication requirements are more far-reaching than those of § 7 of the 
German UKlaG that requires that only the operative part of judgement may be published. The 
benefit of this provision is somewhat limited though since the reach of such a publication is 
restricted in terms of the number of readers.7019 Publication in newspapers or other media is 
only efficient if not only the operative part, like in German law but the entire decision is 
published. This is because read in isolation, the publication of the operative part of a court 
ruling is not always very conclusive. Furthermore, the costs for the publication are to be borne 
by the claimant. Consumer protection groups with rather limited resources might thus tend to 
do without a publication.7020 
Naudé suggests that suppliers should be obliged to publish the NCC decisions concerning 
unfair terms on their website or in other media. A useful, less circuitous and less expensive 
procedure could consist in the establishment of a register of undertakings by the 
Commission.7021 The latter would have to keep a record of all undertakings in respect of unfair 
terms and publish them, for instance, on its website and/or other media. Naudé also suggests 
that the Commission should have the duty to inform any person on request about the contents 
                                                             
7016 See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.4. 
7017 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 77. See, e.g., s 21(3) of the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) 
Act 7 of 1996. 
7018 Du Plessis 2008 SA Merc LJ 77. 
7019 Staudinger/Schlosser § 7 UKlaG para 2, WLP/Lindacher § 7 UKlaG para 4, Stoffels AGB-Recht 503. 
7020 See Part II ch 6 para 2.3.6 f). 
7021 In the UK, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 do not provide for undertakings to be 
made court orders, but the OFT had simply to keep a record of all undertakings in respect of unfair terms which 
were published on its website. See para 10(3) read with para 15 UTCCR. 
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of a particular undertaking and amendments made to them.7022 This might not be very practical 
since the Commission might soon experience a work overload if it had to take on such a task. 
The register of decisions provided for in the former AGBG has not been inserted into the 
UKlaG because of data protection concerns and the loss of its significance due to other forms 
of publication.7023 What is more, this register was never very efficient because it was only 
useful ex post facto. What is more, a register of decisions has a limited effect because it might 
be difficult to find specific clause-related answers that apply to particular circumstances. A 
register of undertakings by the Commission might thus have the same fate. An information 
pool using a 'matrix approach' as applied in German legal commentaries could thus be more 
effective7024 in both countries. Such a pool could consist of a website where anyone can easily 
find rulings concerning consumer matters by headwords and a filter function, e.g., the name of 
a supplier, the concerned area (e.g., 'limitation period' or 'cancellation') and/or the adjudicating 
body and the date of the decision. 
In summary, the publication of consumer-related decisions in some form is necessary in respect 
of information and transparency. A register of decisions has a limited effect however because 
it might be challenging to find specific clause-related answers that apply to particular 
circumstances. An information pool using a 'matrix approach' would be more effective in both 
countries. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Because of the many idiosyncrasies in both regimes, a comparison of their enforcement 
mechanisms is difficult and only makes sense to a certain extent. One reason is that the 
Consumer Protection Act bases its redress mechanism on individual actions, whereas German 
legislation also offers the possibility of institutional actions. Furthermore, the Act provides for 
various fora that are linked in a complex manner, which is not the case for the BGB and the 
UKlaG. A comparison between the two regimes is nonetheless prolific with regard to the tools 
at the disposal of the various entities in order to enforce the law. 
                                                             
7022 Naudé 2010 SALJ 529.  
7023 BT-Drs. 14/6040 at 276. 
7024 Stoffels AGB-Recht 481. See also Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 156. 
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Compliance notices issued by the National Consumer Commission under section 100 have 
been compared in this chapter to warnings in terms of the UKlaG. Unlike compliance notices, 
warnings are issued not only in exceptional circumstances and cases of apparent transgressions 
but almost systematically. The reason for this lies in the fact that compliance notices serve as 
a quick tool for simpler matters, whereas warnings are issued for both simple and complex 
affairs, and to avoid negative cost consequences. Common to both is their function to avoid the 
involvement of the judicial system and their deterrent effect. The payment of damages in terms 
of a compliance notice has the function to avoid a civil-law action and refers to past 
infringements, whereas the payment of a contractual penalty in the German regime refers to 
future infringements. Hence, the German approach is more proactive and suitable to avoid 
further violations. The fact that the German entity is not functus officio after its investigation, 
unlike the Commission, ensures that it can intervene any time, which has a deterrent effect.  
Both regimes provide for a mandatory consultation procedure in specific cases by the 
Commission or the court, respectively. The German regime's personal scope of application is 
narrower than the South African one though because only the competent regulator for financial 
services can be heard. As German courts can hear experts any time for evidence, and especially 
expert witnesses in terms of § 414 ZPO, in order to benefit from the necessary technical 
knowledge, the restricted personal scope of application should not make any difference in 
practice, however. Unlike compliance notices, warnings cannot be set aside by a judicial body 
but only by the issuing entity itself. If a standard terms user does not agree with a warning, the 
issuing entity will most likely go to court. Hence, the deterrent effect of warnings is very high. 
On the other hand, the fact that the Tribunal can modify compliance notices lessens the 
deterrent effect somewhat in the South African regime. This is even more the case for standard 
terms users that do not agree with a warning. They expose themselves to an expensive lawsuit, 
which they ultimately wish to avoid. For the reasons mentioned above, the deterrent effect of 
warnings is higher than for compliance notices. On the other hand, the Commission's assistance 
in the formulation of complaints serves as a filter regarding other enforcement entities. This is 
not the case for the court's assistance in terms of § 139(3) ZPO because the given lawsuit is 
already sub judice. 
The German regime does not have a comparable body to the National Consumer Tribunal. It 
is recommended that the legislator enables members of the Tribunal to serve longer than two 
terms and that the phrase 'sufficient persons with legal training' in section 28(1) of the National 
Credit Act is defined. Since the Tribunal deals both with matters concerning the Consumer 
 1116   
 
Protection Act and the National Credit Act, the establishment of two separate and specialised 
chambers is advisable. 
Some of the problems encountered with consumer courts could be addressed by creating a 
common legislative framework for consumer courts, as it was the case in Germany with the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz. The legislator should address the urgent need for proper 
enforcement and execution procedure in this field. It would also be helpful if consumer courts 
were mainly staffed with lawyers. Besides, the problems related to consumer courts, such as 
different consumer legislation in the various provinces, the unaddressed enforcement and 
execution of consumer court orders and the semi-professional nature of these entities, do not 
exist in the German regime where only the civil courts deal with disputes concerning consumer 
legislation.  
ADR might often be the better choice in the South African context than more adversarial 
redress mechanisms. Unlike the South African legislator, the German legislature does not 
actively encourage ADR procedures. Nonetheless, consumers often benefit from the ombuds 
procedures that have been implemented by many industries, especially by banks and 
insurances. Hence, in both regimes, ADR plays a predominant role in dispute resolution. Both 
regimes require accreditation for industry ombuds. The fact that German ombuds offices must 
be staffed with at least two lawyers allows handling more complicated matters, which relieves 
the courts. In South Africa, in more complex cases, other fora are probably a better choice.  
With a view to traditional dispute resolution, South Africa should adopt a similar stance in that 
also more complex matters can be handled by ADR agents so that more consumers could 
benefit from ADR. The German regime does not have formalities with regard to judicial entities 
(i.e., submission to the Tribunal or the High Court for a consent order) since the German ombud 
procedure is independent of judicial proceedings. As ADR is embedded in the South African 
redress mechanism, the choice of further formalities was logical, however. A formalisation by 
the Tribunal or the High Court undoubtedly strengthens the ombud's decision. The South 
African legislator should make clear if the other entities mentioned in section 4(1) have 
standing, or if ADR is only intended for smaller affairs.  
The decisions of South African ombuds are usually not legally, but factually binding. In 
contrast, the decisions of German ombuds are legally binding on the company up to a certain 
amount. They are never binding to the consumer, though, who still can go to court. Therefore, 
the two regimes offer the same level of protection in this regard. The South African legislator 
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should merge several ombuds of a particular sector in order to eliminate overlapping 
jurisdictions, achieve economies of scale, raise the ombuds' profile and make the whole system 
more transparent. By and large, the German ombuds regime is far less complex, more 
transparent and also suited for more complex cases than the South African system. 
Concerning civil law procedures, the German legislator chose another path to make the fight 
against unfair terms more affordable: it merely lowered the amounts in dispute so that 
consumer protection organisations are protected from the risk of costs involved. Therefore, the 
complex mechanism of the Act was not the only option for South Africa. Instead, it could have 
lowered the costs involved in matters related to the Act. In general, the South African regime 
is very complex, which is partly due to the concurrent legislation in consumer matters. 
Nonetheless, the over-complicated redress mechanism could have been avoided by 
streamlining it, for instance, by giving Small Claims Courts a more prominent role. Sufficient 
staffing and financing of these judicial bodies, paired with a lowering of the amounts in dispute 
according to the German model would have been beneficial in this regard. Admittedly, this 
would have been a shift from a more administrative towards a more judicial redress mechanism, 
which was clearly not the legislator's intention. On the other hand, the German model 
concerning the assignment of competence to certain courts would hamper the access to justice 
of South African consumers and should not be implemented.  
Unlike the South African legislator, the German legislator's objective was to eliminate unfair 
terms from the beginning by 'positive enforcement'. This is done by institutional actions for 
which a supra-individual and generalising approach is applied. This tool is by far more efficient 
and effective in the battle against unfair terms than the South African particular-personalised 
approach within individual proceedings who merely have an ex post facto as well as an inter 
partes effect, and where other consumers do not benefit from the given decision. Other 
consumers could benefit from a ruling reached within an ex-ante challenge by inserting a 
provision similar to § 11 UKlaG. Even though the Act provides for the possibility of class 
actions (which do not exist in Germany; the Musterfeststellungsklage has more resemblance 
with an institutional action) and a co-operation between the Commission and trade association 
with regard to voluntary codes of practice, these cannot compensate the lack of an abstract 
challenges mechanism.  
Nevertheless, the legislator should introduce procedural provisions for class actions (e.g., in a 
Public Interest and Class Actions Act) in order to ensure a harmonised application of this tool. 
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Hence, the South African legislature should expressly provide for general use challenges in the 
Act in order to provide for a proactive procedural mechanism. The implementation of a 
mechanism which does not consider a specific consumer-supplier relationship but applies a 
proactive approach instead would enhance consumer protection in South Africa. That a 
concomitant application of a particular-personalised approach (for consumer contracts) and an 
abstract-general approach for institutional actions is possible has been shown in the context of 
§ 310(3) dealing with consumer contracts. South African courts should also have the possibility 
to raise the issue of unfairness on their own initiative, i.e. incidentally. 
'Accreditation' under the Act and 'certification' in terms of the UKlaG are not similar with 
respect to consumer protection organisations. The South African legislator should include 
associations that are not primarily concerned with consumer protection in order to enhance 
consumer protection. It should make clear whether non-accredited consumer protection groups 
have standing. The fact that any person who is not a consumer has locus standi under section 
71(1) balances the fact that the Act does not provide for an abstract challenges mechanism to 
a certain, though not sufficient extent. What is more, the South African regime opted for a more 
administrative solution in terms of consumer redress, which is mitigated by the involvement of 
private actors, such as consumer protection organisations. These organisations should 
financially and otherwise be supported in order to enhance consumer protection. 
Both regimes apply the same limitation period, but their calculation is different. The calculation 
of the German limitation period seems to be more consumer-friendly in that it also contains a 
subjective element and starts only after the person obtains knowledge of the circumstances 
giving rise to the claim. The publication of consumer-related decisions in some form is 
necessary regarding information and transparency. A register of decisions has a limited effect 
however because it might be difficult to find specific clause-related answers that apply to the 
circumstances of a given case. Thus, an information pool using a 'matrix approach' would be 
more effective in both countries. 
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The present and final Part IV provides in its Conclusion (I.) an overview highlighting the main 
issues that had been dealt with in Parts I to III. The following Recommendations (II.) contain 
specific assessments and suggestions as to where and how the South African legislator should 
take action in order to ensure better consumer protection, on the one side, and as to how the 
courts should deal with specific issues, on the other. Finally, in the Overall Conclusion (III.) 
an overall assessment of the findings of this thesis will be presented. 
2. Historical development 
In both countries, the courts had very different roles to play from the beginning. This is 
foremost due to the fact that South Africa has a much more developed common-law tradition 
than Germany does. In contrast, the role of German courts in developing the law is much more 
restricted because the basis of their decisions is the codified law. Nevertheless, the rich body 
of decisions of German jurisprudence developed over the years was the basis of the provisions 
of the former AGBG (now §§ 305 to 310 BGB). In this sense, the German courts too played a 
crucial role regarding the standard business terms regime. 
In spite of various judicial developments in both countries, the need to legislate the field of 
consumer protection in a broader sense, on the one side, and the area of standard business 
terms, on the other, was palpable: In South Africa there was an apparent need for protection of 
vulnerable consumers, and in Germany, only the most apparent abuses were brought before the 
courts whose rulings merely had an inter partes effect. These reasons led to the codification of 
the German AGBG of 1976 and the South African Consumer Protection Act of 2008. 
Before the codification of the aforementioned statutes, a more systematic and dogmatic view 
in terms of the pacta sunt servanda principle prevailed in Germany, whereas the South African 
development in this regard was guided by historical and practical considerations. This dogmatic 
approach in Germany is also reflected in the principles of good faith and public policy, where 
a more normative context prevails for these codified maxims. In contrast, in South Africa, these 
principles were developed by the courts, which apply a contextual bona fides standard.  
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3. Scope of application 
With regard to the territorial scope of application, the South African provisions ascertain that 
the Consumer Protection Act applies in a wide range of cases in international transactions. 
In contrast, the German provisions are part of a complex mechanism of European and 
international law. Both pieces of legislation achieve a high level of consumer protection. This 
also applies to e-commerce transactions.  
Concerning the material scope of application, the Act grants a higher level of protection to 
consumers than the common law or other legislation. The provisions of the Act have a different 
rationale than the provisions of the BGB in that the BGB provisions do not only apply to 
consumer contracts, but to contracts in general. The scope of application is only extended to 
consumers by § 310(3).  
The protection of sections 48 et seq. is not granted to once-off transactions. The same applies 
to §§ 305 et seq. For consumer contracts in terms of § 310(3) no. 2, a non-recurrent use on one 
occasion is sufficient for the application of §§ 305 et seq. though. Therefore, the BGB widens 
the material scope of application as regards consumer contracts.7025 
The German provisions do not contain any requirement of consideration, unlike the Act, where 
the exchange of consideration is a condition for a transaction under section 1, except for section 
5(6)(a). 
In terms of utilities, the BGB provisions are more restrictive than the provisions of the Act 
because the German legislation only allows the application of the general clause. The scope of 
application of the Consumer Protection Act in respect of goods is however broader than in 
German law since it unrestrictedly includes immovable property and utilities. On the other 
hand, the German understanding of 'service' is more inclusive as it does not positively 
enumerate the performances included in the definition, unlike the Consumer Protection Act. 
Under the Act, also intermediaries are included in the definition of 'services'.7026 Although in 
German law, a cessio legis is possible, a direct recourse against a person who did not directly 
participate in a transaction is generally excluded in contract law.7027   
With regard to the personal scope of application, the more formalistic approach of the Act in 
respect of the threshold provision of section 5 seems more appropriate for South Africa than 
                                                             
7025 Concerning once-off transactions, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7026 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 a) bb) and Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
7027 See Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
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the more flexible German regime. This is an emanation of the fact that the Act is foremost 
consumer protection law and has a different purpose than §§ 305 et seq. 
The South African legislator did not include employment contracts into the scope of 
application of the Act because other pieces of legislation already offer extensive protection for 
employees. Both regimes exclude collective agreements from content control because 
employees are already sufficiently protected in this regard. 
The areas of the law of succession and family law are excluded in terms of the BGB 
provisions. The South African regime excludes de facto also contracts concluded in the areas 
of the law of succession and family law, with certain exceptions applying to family law. Both 
regimes thus come to the same result. An exclusion of company law, like in the German 
regime, would not have been necessary in the context of the Act since the parties cannot be 
defined as suppliers and consumers under section 1. Franchise agreements are an exception 
under the Act. In contrast to the Act, content control for franchise agreements is possible in 
Germany as long as they do not concern the company's organisational structure. 
The German term of 'other party' and its synonyms are more restrictive in that the South 
African regime expands the notion of 'consumer' to persons who are not directly involved in 
the transaction as well as to any natural person in terms of section 65. This expansion aims to 
balance deficiencies of the common law of delicts and the fact that no other legislation dealing 
with product liability exists in South Africa.7028 In Germany, these areas are already covered 
by §§ 823 et seq. and the ProdHaftG. On the other hand, a 'consumer' in the Act merely relates 
to agreements related to goods or services. In contrast, for the German regime, such a restriction 
does not exist. As in practice, most contracts deal with goods or services, the majority of 
transactions should be covered in the South African regime, however. The South African 
definition of 'supplier' is more restrictive than the German term 'user' in that it only includes 
activities performed in the ordinary course of business and related to goods or services. 
4.  Incorporation control 
The incorporation requirements for terms and conditions set out in section 49 of the Consumer 
Protection Act merely concern notices to consumers or provisions in respect of certain risks 
or liability. Insofar they have not been amended by this provision, the incorporation 
requirements of the South African common law still apply. They are laxer than those of the Act 
                                                             
7028 See Part III ch 2 para 3.1. 
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because reasonable reliance on the part of the supplier that the consumer had accepted the terms 
is sufficient. For electronically concluded transactions under the ECTA, additional 
incorporation requirements must be met. The ECTA is thus stricter as regards the incorporation 
requirements than the Consumer Protection Act. 
In contrast, the German legislator chose a more formalistic approach by requiring that specific 
incorporation requirements apply to all kinds of standard business terms, except where a 
functional reduction of § 305(2) is necessary, or other provisions contain laxer incorporation 
rules.7029 In some instances, the parties can conclude a framework agreement in order to 
facilitate the incorporation of the terms, which is not possible under the South African regime.   
The level of protection of section 49 is higher than the one offered by the BGB provisions 
since the consumer must not only be informed of the existence of the given provision but also 
of the 'nature and potential effect' of it. § 305 merely requires that the user refer to its standard 
terms. This difference is justified because for section 49, a higher standard is necessary with 
regard to potentially harmful effects. What is more, German standard terms users do not have 
a similar obligation for standard terms applying to potentially dangerous activities or objects.  
Even though the South African provision gives more leeway and flexibility to suppliers in that 
the surrounding circumstances are considered regarding the conspicuous manner and form 
in which the consumer's attention must be attracted, this might cause interpretational 
problems.7030  
Similar to both regimes is the fact that the reference to the user's standard terms under § 305(2) 
and the notice or provision in terms of section 49 must meet the transparency and plain 
language requirements. 
In the German regime, the other party does not necessarily need to receive a copy of the 
standard terms. Both regimes are alike in that a granting of an (adequate) opportunity to take 
notice or to understand the terms and conditions is sufficient; the actual comprehension of the 
terms is not required. 
Except for transactions with significant implications where the agreement has to be drafted in 
the client's language, the German regime offers less protection for customers who do not 
understand German and who are confronted with documents written in this language. The Act 
                                                             
7029 See Part II ch 3 para 1.1 a) and Part III ch 3 para 1. 
7030 See Part III ch 3 para 2.1. Concerning the weaknesses of section 49, see also the recommendations in this 
chapter. 
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provides at least protection under section 40(2) by which the non-existing requirement that 
documents have to be written in the consumer's language is somewhat counter-balanced. 
The requirement of signing or initialling of certain provisions in South African consumer 
protection legislation is inexistent in the German regime. This requirement is a double-edged 
sword that entails more disadvantages than advantages. The more formalistic German regime 
offers a more balanced solution in this regard.7031 
Both provisions differ in terms of the moment in which the supplier's client must have an 
'opportunity to take notice' of the contents of the standard terms (BGB) or an 'adequate 
opportunity (…) to receive and comprehend the provision or notice' (CPA). 
In South African and in German law alike the principle of freedom of form prevails. Specific 
form requirements have to be fulfilled in the German regime in exhaustively regulated cases, 
or if the parties agree on a specific form. The written form under section 50(2) is comparable 
to the text form in § 126b, but the latter is mostly allowed for quasi-contractual acts. In South 
Africa, such a restriction does not exist, which might create some evidential problems.  
For the free electronic access to a copy of the (South African) consumer agreement, it seems 
to be sufficient that the supplier provides the given document on its website; subsequent 
changes of the agreement made by the supplier are thus possible. The German regime excludes 
this possibility by requiring a durable medium. The South African regime is also weaker in that 
only access to the electronic copy is to be granted; a printable copy is not required. Unlike 
§ 126b, there is no requirement that the consumer must be able to retain or store the copy. 
However, as long as the conditions of § 126b are met in the form of a data message containing 
the given document, which can be retained or stored, the German provision is similar to section 
19(1) ECTA which considerably extends the meaning of 'copy' by including data messages.7032 
The financial breakdown required by section 50 would not make sense in the German regime, 
where text form applies mostly to quasi-contractual acts, which typically do not contain 
financial information. On the other hand, such a breakdown assists South African consumers 
in their understanding of their financial obligations. The introduction of such a requirement 
was thus a wise choice of the South African legislature. 
                                                             
7031 See Part I ch 2 para 3.2 b) cc) and Part III ch 3 para 2.3. Concerning this requirement, see also the 
recommendations in this chapter. 
7032 See Part I ch 2 para 4.2 b) and Part III ch 3 para 2.5. With regard to subsequent modifications of documents, 
see also the recommendations in this chapter concerning a durable medium. 
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Both the South African and the German regimes restrict the validity of non-variation (written-
form) clauses. While in South Africa, this restriction serves to ensure the principle of freedom 
of contract and to avoid harsh and unfair results, the German legislator aims to ascertain that 
individually agreed written-form clauses cannot overturn stipulations made orally. 
Unlike § 305c, the Consumer Protection Act does not provide for a provision dealing with 
surprising terms. This principle is recognised by the common law, however. Since surprising 
terms need not necessarily constitute an unreasonable disadvantage, Naudé's and Lubbe's 
argument in respect of the 'essential obligations' to be determined in the context of surprising 
terms – which in the German regime is an element of the general clause – cannot be applied to 
German incorporation control, but within the content control. The Act achieves similar 
protection in respect of surprising terms where the supplier does not comply with the plain 
language requirement.7033  
Concerning the legal consequences of infringements of incorporation requirements, both 
regimes differ in that German courts are not allowed to take the parties' position and alter the 
agreement in the case of invalid clauses. Both pieces of legislation aim to maintain the 
agreement, however. In the case of non-compliance with written-form requirements, such as 
text form, the German regime entails a stricter legal consequence than South African literature, 
which considers this form requirement not constitutive. 
Section 52 seems to allow for partial retention of a clause, which is not permitted according 
to the BGH.7034 
5.  Interpretational control 
For the interpretation of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, a purposive 
approach is applied. This paternalistic though flexible approach is alien to German 
construction. In order to assess the purpose of a norm, purposive construction must also apply 
other techniques though, such as systematic, historical and teleological interpretation. The 
constructional techniques can thus not be separated from each other and are overlapping to a 
certain degree. 
The South African and the German regimes apply different legislative techniques as regards 
the definitions contained in the Consumer Protection Act and the BGB. Unfortunately, the 
                                                             
7033 See Part I ch 2 para 3.2. c) and Part III ch 3 para 3. 
7034 See Part II ch 3 para 4 and Part III ch 4 para 4. 
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South African legislature has not stringently performed its technique and scattered many 
definitions elsewhere in the Act instead of grouping them all in section 1.7035  
The Act contains in section 2(3) a provision concerning signatures. Such a specific provision 
does not exist in the BGB. On the other hand, §§ 125 to 129 provide for a form requirements 
regime. It seems that provisions falling under the Consumer Protection Act may be signed or 
initialled in various ways, including by the use of electronic signatures. In contrast, the BGB 
provisions provide that if a specific formality is prescribed by statute or agreement, the parties 
have to adhere to the specifically prescribed form. The Act is hence more flexible in this regard. 
Section 2(6) of the Act contains a provision for the calculation of business days. In contrast, 
the German BGB provisions have a vaster scope of application as they concern the calculation 
of periods of time in general, similar to the South African Interpretation Act. What is more, for 
the calculation of the beginning and the end of a time-period, §§ 187 and 188 are more complex 
than their South African counterparts. The different calculation methods in both regimes are 
however clear enough to achieve legal certainty. 
For the interpretation of agreements and the enquiry of the parties' intention, both regimes 
start with the construction of the words of a provision. Grammatical interpretation is 
inseparably linked with the context in which the given words have been used, however. Thus, 
systematic and grammatical interpretation applies in tandem in both regimes. The abolition 
of the distinction between background and surrounding circumstances in South African 
legislation and the permission of all evidence in order to determine the meaning of a word or 
phrase approaches both regimes and enhances the determination of the parties' intention. 
Both pieces of legislation apply secondary rules of interpretation (general principles of 
interpretation) where the primary rules of interpretation do not lead to a satisfactory result. 
Furthermore, the courts of both countries have developed interpretational maxims. Although 
certain of these rules might not apply in one or the other legislation, they assist the courts to a 
great extent. 
In South African legislation, tertiary rules of interpretation apply as a last resort. The 
objective of these rules is not the finding of the parties' intention, but a fair outcome. German 
courts fill unintentional gaps by performing complementary interpretation instead. Although in 
                                                             
7035 See Part I ch 4 para 2.1 and Part III ch 4 para 1 b). Concerning the definitions in the Act, see also the 
recommendations in this chapter. 
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both regimes, the parties' actual intention is not considered, the German approach takes into 
account their presumed intention. German judges thus must undertake an 'interpretational 
effort' in order to find out the parties' presumed intention. In contrast, South African courts can 
rely on a ready-made scheme of tertiary rules.7036 The latter play a minor role however since 
the Supreme Court of Appeal has adopted a new contextual approach to interpretation in which 
all evidence in order to determine the meaning of a word or phrase is permitted. 
The Act and the BGB apply different interpretational standards for terms and conditions in 
relation to other agreements. The German approach takes the perspective of an average 
customer without legal knowledge. It is thus more objective than the South African regime 
where a more paternalistic attitude is applied to the consumer's benefit. The reason for this 
discrepancy lies in the different objectives of both pieces of legislation. 
It is suggested that section 4(4)(b) introduces a different standard of consumer protection 
in relation to other provisions of the Act, by taking into consideration a more objective 
standard similar to the German regime. Hence, this provision of the Act widens the perspective 
with regard to what a reasonable person can or cannot expect. This approach cannot be qualified 
as abstract-universal in the sense of §§ 305 et seq. though. 
Both the South African and the German regimes apply interpretation in favour of the other 
party/consumer. German courts apply § 305c(2) rather to cases where the objective ambiguity 
of a standard provision does not also affect the transparency requirement in terms of § 305c(1). 
Hence, the construction in favour of the other party is more restricted in Germany, as opposed 
to South Africa. In practice, this different scope of application should not be relevant however 
since in most cases, a clause will be struck down either because of the transparency requirement 
or under the ambiguity rule.7037 
The South African regime provides for an original approach according to which foreign law 
can be taken into consideration when interpreting or applying the Act. This provision must be 
seen against the backdrop of the consideration that foreign and international law may influence 
not only the interpretation of the Act but also its application. 'Foreign law' in the sense of 
section 2(2) of the Act has no direct or indirect connection with South African law, contrary to 
EU law that must be considered in German law. What is more, it is not clear how considerations 
developed in the context of an abstract-generalised approach – which is an international 
                                                             
7036 See Part I ch 4 para 4 c), Part II ch 4 para 3.3 b) and Part III ch 4 para 2 c). 
7037 See Part II ch 4 para 6.1, Part III ch 4 para 3 d). 
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standard – can be applied within a framework whose system is diametrically opposed. In any 
event, section 2(2) should be applied with precaution. With regard to language barriers, the 
consideration of foreign laws will most likely be limited to legal orders of which English or 
Dutch (which has similarities with Afrikaans) are official languages (including the EU).7038 
6. Content control 
This triad of a blacklist, a greylist and a general clause used in both regimes is an 
international standard and has proven to be the most effective tool for content control.  
Both regimes show nonetheless some notable differences with regard to content control. 
Content control for individual actions in Germany is legal control, performed ex officio within 
a lawsuit, whereas South African consumers have to allege a contravention of the Act. Content 
control in South Africa is equity control, applying an individualised (particular-
personalised) approach. In contrast, content control in Germany applies a supra-individual 
and generalising (abstract-general) approach. Since equity control caters for fairness in 
individual cases, it is not the most effective tool for fighting unfair standard terms in mass 
contracts, unlike the abstract-general approach applied in the German regime7039  
Both regimes apply the principles of public policy and good faith concurrently with their 
standard business terms legislation.7040 Besides, in both countries, standard business terms 
legislations cannot be seen in isolation but in synergy with other provisions and the common 
law. The latter especially applies to South Africa.7041  
The German standard terms regime does not include performance specifications, price 
agreements, declaratory clauses or negotiated provisions into content control. In contrast, the 
South African legislator chose to include the so-called 'core terms' and negotiated clauses. 
The courts must consider all the relevant factors in this enquiry though, and the fact that these 
terms may have been negotiated should be factored in. In this regard, content control in both 
regimes should thus come to the same results.7042  
                                                             
7038 See Part I ch 4 para 2.2 and Part III ch 4 para 3 e). 
7039 See Part II ch 1 para 1.2 and Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
7040 With regard to good faith and public policy, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7041 See Part II ch 5 para 1.1.1 a) and Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7042 See Part I ch 3 para 1.3, Part II ch 5 paras 1.2.4 and 1.2.5 and Part III ch 5 para 1. With regard to negotiated 
and declaratory clauses, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
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Price control by German courts is only allowed in specific cases. Section 48(1)(a)(i) is 
ambiguous as to a price control mechanism. It is however unlikely that the legislator wished to 
introduce such a mechanism in the Act.7043  
Unlike the South African regime, in German standard business terms legislation, an 'open' 
content control is performed in which the interpretational control takes place before the 
content control, and suspicious clauses are not declared invalid in this stage, but where possible 
within the content control. This means that the reasons of the inadequacy of standard terms 
must be unfolded within the content control, and not 'concealed' within the interpretational 
control, which otherwise would serve as a 'correction' of standard provisions.7044 This ensures 
a more balanced argumentation and weighing of the pros and cons.7045 
As discussed, the validity of standard terms is purely a question of law in the German regime, 
and questions of fact play a minor role. This is not the case for South Africa, where questions 
of fact and the taking of proof are crucial for content control. This is a consequence of the 
concrete-individual approach applied by the Act. The same applies to the presumption that the 
terms in regulation 44(3) are unfair.7046 
Even though regulation 44 only applies to B2C agreements, this provision might have a 
reflective effect on B2B contracts, especially where smaller businesses are involved. The 
same applies to §§ 308 and 309 as these prohibitions are a specific manifestation of the 
evaluative standard of § 307. Thus, the reflective effect in both regimes ensures that also B2B 
agreements are included in the content control in terms of the general clause.7047 
With regard to the blacklists, the main difference between the two pieces of legislation with 
respect to the personal scope of application lies in the fact that for the application of the Act, 
the threshold of section 5 must be met. In contrast, for the German regime there is no such 
requirement.7048 
The blacklist of prohibited clauses of section 51 is wordy and unnecessarily complicated, 
unlike § 309.7049 
                                                             
7043 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.1 a) and Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7044 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634). See Part II ch 4 para 3.2 and Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7045 See Part III ch 5 para 1. With regard to an open content control, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7046 See Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7047 See Part II ch 5 para 3.5.2 and Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7048 See Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7049 With regard to the re-wording of the blacklist, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
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In some instances, there are only minor differences between certain items of the South 
African blacklist and the German regime: 
For instance, concerning exclusions or restrictions of the user's/supplier's liability (section 
51(1)(c) and § 309 no. 7 lit. b), respectively), both regimes merely differ in that § 309 no. 7 
lit. b) contains exceptions concerning the transport and tariff rules for regular public transport 
services on the road, due to German idiosyncrasies.7050  
Other blacklisted provisions do not have a counterpart in §§ 307 et seq., but their 
regulatory content can be found in other provisions:  
Germany has no equivalent of the South African Guardian's Fund in terms of section 51(1)(f), 
for example. Similar protection is achieved by provisions of family law and the law of 
successions, however.7051  
On the other hand, the legal result of other items of the South African blacklist is achieved 
by applying the German general clause or other provisions: 
The German regime does not contain a similar item to section 51(1)(i)(ii) in respect of 
undertakings to sign documents relating to enforcement. The same results are achieved by 
applying the general clause of § 307, however. A similar item concerning the deposit of 
documents with the supplier or the provision of a PIN etc. does not exist in the BGB. The 
GDPR, a European Regulation, applies instead. This means that the principles of data 
minimisation and storage limitation (art. 5(1) lit. c) and e) GDPR) apply. Both regimes thus 
prohibit the deposit of an ID and the provision of personal identification codes by different 
means.7052  
The greylists of both pieces of legislation differ in that the items of the South African list are 
presumed to be unfair, whereas the German provisions contain evaluative elements in the form 
of indeterminate legal terms. This is in line with the respective individual-personalised and 
abstract-general approach. 
Even though both regimes chose different formulations and qualify specific items differently, 
notably with regard to their grey- or blacklisting, the level of protection is similar, and a 
                                                             
7050 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2, Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 d) and Part III ch 5 para 2.1. In this regard, see also the 
recommendations in this chapter. 
7051 See Part III ch 5 para 2.2. 
7052 See Part III ch 5 para 2.5 b) and c). With regard to a mechanism similar to the GDPR, see also the 
recommendations in this chapter. 
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balanced solution is offered in most cases. This is achieved by different means, whereby 
overlaps between the different categories are possible: 
Mostly, the two regimes offer a comparable standard for certain standard clauses in their 
respective black- or greylists and come to the same results, even if this means applying several 
items in concert to achieve a comparable level of protection (e.g., items (a),7053 (b), (c), (h), 
(i), (k), (m), (n), (q),7054 (r), (s), (v), (w)7055). In some instances, the respective general clause 
is applied where the other regime grey- or blacklists a specific item (e.g., concerning items 
(j), (o), (u)7056 and (v)). In some cases, other German provisions contained elsewhere in the 
BGB or other pieces of legislation are applied (e.g., concerning items (d), (g), (l), (t), (aa)). 
Although the two regimes qualify specific items differently (e.g., the counterparts of items 
(f) and (y) are blacklisted in Germany whereas they are merely greylisted in South Africa), 
this is counter-balanced by other factors, e.g., by the fact that the burden of proof lies with the 
supplier (item (r)). 
On the other hand, some items are more restrictive than their German counterparts (e.g., 
items (c), (e), (f),7057 (i),7058 (p),7059 (q),7060 (t),7061 (x),7062 (y),7063 (z)7064).  
For some of these items, there is a need for improvement with regard to better consumer 
protection. This concerns items (f), (p), (t), (w), (x), (y) and (z).7065  
Other provisions, such as item (bb) are absent in the BGB. 
The South African general clause of section 48 of the Act is verbose and lacks clarity. It is 
also unsystematic and does not correspond to international standard and good legal practice.7066   
Contrary to the German regime where § 308 (greylist) has a radiating effect on B2B contracts, 
the greylist of regulation 44(3) finds no application to agreements between entrepreneurs. On 
                                                             
7053 With regard to item (a), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7054 With regard to item (q), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7055 With regard to item (w), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7056 With regard to item (u), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7057 With regard to item (f), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7058 With regard to item (i), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7059 With regard to item (p), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7060 With regard to item (q), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7061 With regard to item (t), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7062 With regard to item (x), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7063 With regard to item (y), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7064 With regard to item (z), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7065 Concerning these items, see the recommendations in this chapter. 
7066 With regard to the wording of the general clause, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
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the other hand, the South African blacklist (section 51) applies to B2B contracts, whereas the 
application of § 309 is excluded in terms of § 310(1) 1st sent. so that the general clause applies 
in these cases. The reason for this difference is that the Act is a pure consumer protection statute 
that also protects small businesses, whereas the BGB provisions take into account that 
companies do not necessarily deserve the same level of protection. 
As the Consumer Protection Act applies an individualised approach, the fairness assessment 
is undertaken by considering the factors of section 52(2).7067 South African courts should also 
apply those factors considered in foreign legislation which serve as the best international 
model. The German regime does not provide for a list of factors. Only in consumer contracts, 
the 'other circumstances attending the entering into of the contract must also be taken into 
account'. In order to enhance predictability and certainty, South African courts should also be 
able to declare terms unfair per se in a particular industry, or based on the 'tendency of the 
clause'. Such an objective finding is also the German approach, without which institutional 
actions would not be possible. 
The comparison of both regimes with regard to the factors contained in section 52(2) of the 
Act has revealed that because of the general irrelevance of the so-called 'price argument' in the 
German regime, both pieces of legislation are only comparable to the extent that the price is 
considered by taking other factors or clauses into account.7068 
Besides the factors contained in section 52, other factors may also be taken into consideration. 
Examples are the nature of the goods or services in question or the balance of the parties' 
interests.  
Although in the German regime, the individual clauses of a standard terms contract are 
assessed, and not the agreement as a whole, this principle is mitigated due to the accumulative 
and the cumulative effects. These two 'effects' also apply to South Africa.7069  
7.  Redress mechanism 
Because of the many idiosyncrasies in both regimes, a comparison of their enforcement 
mechanisms is difficult and only makes sense to a certain extent because besides individual 
actions, the German regime is also designed for institutional actions. On the other hand, the 
                                                             
7067 Concerning the factors of section 52(2), see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7068 In terms of price control, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7069 See Part III ch 5 para 4.4.2 c). 
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Act provides for various fora that are linked in a complex manner, which is not the case in 
Germany.  
Unlike compliance notices pursuant to section 100, warnings under the UKlaG are issued 
almost systematically. Compliance notices serve as a quick tool for simpler matters, whereas 
warnings are also issued for complex affairs. Common to both is their function to avoid the 
involvement of the judicial system and their deterrent effect. The German approach is more 
proactive and suitable to avoid further violations since the payment of a contractual penalty 
refers to future infringements. The fact that the German entity is not functus officio after its 
investigation has a deterrent effect too.7070  
If a standard terms user does not agree with a warning, the issuing entity will most likely go to 
court. On the other hand, the fact that the Tribunal7071 can modify compliance notices lessens 
the deterrent effect somewhat in the South African regime. Standard terms users that do not 
agree with a warning expose themselves to an expensive lawsuit. For the reasons stated above, 
the deterrent effect of warnings is higher than for compliance notices.  
Besides, the problems related to consumer courts, such as different consumer legislation in 
the various provinces, the unaddressed enforcement and execution of consumer court orders 
and the semi-professional nature of these entities do not exist in the German regime where only 
the civil courts deal with disputes concerning consumer legislation.7072  
ADR might often be the better choice in the South African context than more adversarial 
redress mechanisms. Unlike the South African legislator, the German legislator does not 
actively encourage ADR procedures. Despite this fact, consumers often benefit from the 
ombuds procedures that have been implemented by many industries. Hence, in both regimes, 
ADR plays a predominant role in dispute resolution. Both regimes require accreditation for 
industry ombuds. The fact that German ombuds offices must be staffed with at least two 
lawyers allows handling more complicated matters, which relieves the courts. In South Africa, 
other fora are probably a better choice in more complex cases.7073  
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The two regimes offer the same level of protection as regards ombuds procedures. The German 
ombuds regime is nevertheless far less complex, more transparent and also suited for more 
complex cases than the South African regime.7074 
Concerning civil law procedures, the German legislator made the fight against unfair terms 
more affordable by lowering the amounts in dispute, which protects consumer protection 
organisations from the risk of costs involved. Therefore, the complex mechanism of the Act 
was not the only option for South Africa. The over-complicated redress mechanism of the Act 
could have been avoided by streamlining it, e.g., by giving Small Claims Courts a more 
prominent role. Sufficient staffing and financing of these judicial bodies, paired with a lowering 
of the amounts in dispute according to the German model would have been beneficial in this 
regard. Admittedly, this would have been a shift from a more administrative towards a more 
judicial redress mechanism, which was not the legislator's intention.7075   
The German legislature aimed to eliminate unfair terms from the beginning by institutional 
actions for which an abstract-general approach is applied. This tool is by far more efficient and 
effective than the South African individual approach within individual proceedings who merely 
have an ex post facto and an inter partes effect. The possibility of class actions and a co-
operation between the Commission and trade associations regarding voluntary codes of 
practice cannot compensate for the lack of an abstract challenges mechanism.7076  
'Accreditation' under the Act and 'certification' in terms of the UKlaG are not similar as regards 
consumer protection organisations. The fact that any person who is not a consumer has locus 
standi according to 71(1) balances the fact that the Act does not provide for an abstract 
challenges mechanism to a certain, though not sufficient extent. What is more, the South 
African regime opted for a more administrative solution in terms of consumer redress, which 
is mitigated by the involvement of private actors, such as consumer protection organisations.  
Both regimes apply the same limitation period, but their calculation is different. The calculation 
of the German limitation period seems to be more consumer-friendly as it also contains a 
subjective element. The publication of consumer-related decisions in some form is necessary 
regarding information and transparency.7077  
                                                             
7074 See Part III ch 6 para 2.4. 
7075 See Part III ch 6 para 2.5. 
7076 See Part III ch 6 para 3. With regard to the introduction of an abstract challenges mechanism in the Act, see 
also the recommendations in this chapter. 
7077 Regarding the publication of consumer-related decisions, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
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II. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Scope of application 
As South African courts have to consider all relevant factors in their fairness enquiry, they 
should factor in the fact that certain terms have been negotiated, and treat negotiated and non-
negotiated terms differently. Consumers that can negotiate specific terms are in a stronger 
bargaining position than those who have to accept a set of terms. The need for protection is not 
the same.7078 
In order to afford better consumer protection, the fairness enquiry should include once-off 
transactions, similar to the German regime, which provides for consumer contracts that 
specific provisions apply to pre-formulated contract terms even if the latter are intended only 
for non-recurrent use on one occasion, and to the extent that the consumer, by reason of the 
pre-formulation, did not influence their contents. German law thus renounces the condition of 
a use 'for a multitude of contracts' (§ 305(1)) in consumer agreements. This applies to terms 
'which ha[ve] not been individually negotiated' and 'drafted in advance'. Individual agreements 
are not included in the scope of application of § 310(3) no. 2. If the other party itself suggested 
a clause which is subsequently inserted into the contract, it deserves no protection, however.7079 
The South African legislator should hence broaden the meaning of 'transaction' in section 48. 
The following additional subsection for section 48 is suggested: 
'This section also applies to transactions between a supplier and a consumer where the supplier's 
terms and conditions are intended only for non-recurrent use on one occasion, and to the extent 
that the consumer, by reason of the pre-formulation, had no influence on their contents.' 
What is more, the South African legislator should balance the deficiencies of the personalised-
individual approach of the Act by introducing an abstract challenges mechanism similar to 
the German institutional action. By doing so, the courts would apply an approach that is 
detached from individual consumers, and unfair terms could be eradicated for all the given 
supplier's customers.7080 Other consumers could benefit from a decision reached within an 
abstract challenge by inserting a provision similar to § 11 UKlaG, providing for an extension 
of a decision's legal force to other consumers.7081 
                                                             
7078 See Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
7079 In this regard, see discussion in Part II ch 2 para 1.1.1 b) cc). 
7080 See Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
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For B2B agreements, the knockout approach in the context of the so-called 'battle of forms' 
has undeniable advantages over other doctrines and should be applied both in Germany and in 
South Africa.7082 The knockout approach assures that the transaction is not destroyed because 
of conflicting standard terms, and that colliding terms are replaced by statutory provisions.  
Opposed to many other legislative regimes, the Act does not contain a definition of 'terms and 
conditions'. From a legislative point of view, the legislator should insert the following (or 
similar) definition of 'terms and conditions' into section 1:  
'"Terms and conditions” means any general and special arrangements, provisions, 
requirements, rules, specifications and standards contained in an agreement between a 
consumer and a supplier, irrespective of their denomination, content and presentation.'  
Such a definition would cover all possible kinds of standard terms, ascertain a uniform 
application of the Act and unfairness control and remove all ambiguities of whether certain 
terms and conditions are part of an agreement.7083 
Although the question of whether the definition of 'State' in section 1 includes organs of state 
or merely comprises departments of state at the national, provincial and local level has little 
practical relevance since parastatals are most likely excluded from the application of the Act 
due to their annual turnovers or asset values, the legislator should clarify this question and 
insert a definition of 'State' in the Act.7084  
Item 2 of the Schedule in GN 2947085 defines the annual turnover as the gross revenue of the 
juristic person from income in, into or from the Republic, whereas certain transactions are 
expressly included and specific amounts excluded from this calculation. The following addition 
should be made under (c) as not all juristic persons, especially small businesses, conclude credit 
agreements but work on a cash-in-cash-out basis. Most of them file tax returns though.  
'If audited financial statements are not required by law and therefore not available, for the 
determination of the annual turnover or the asset value, the most current tax return or balance 
sheet is used as a basis for the calculation of the assets or turnover. If the juristic or natural 
person has concluded a credit agreement during the relevant period for its business, the turnover 
or the asset value mentioned in this credit agreement is used as a basis for this calculation.'7086 
The Consumer Protection Act has not repealed section 90 of the National Credit Act dealing 
with unfair contract terms. Generally, sections 89 and 90 of the National Credit Act offer less 
                                                             
7082 See Part II ch 3 para 1.5. 
7083 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 ff) and Part II ch 2 para 1.1. 
7084 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 b) aa). 
7085 GN 294 in GG No. 34181 of 1 April 2011. 
7086 See Part I ch 2 para 2.2 b) bb). 
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protection than sections 48 and 51 of the Consumer Protection Act. Better consumer protection 
in terms of the NCA could therefore be achieved by amending section 90 and aligning it with 
the CPA provisions. Section 121, read with Schedule 1 of the Consumer Protection Act, and 
section 172, read with Schedule 1 of the National Credit Act would have to be amended for 
this purpose. The amendment of section 90 NCA is preferable over a repealing of section 90 
of the NCA and making it subject to an amended Consumer Protection Act because a cross-
referencing between the two pieces of legislation is avoided.7087 
2. Incorporation control 
Section 49 shows some weaknesses.7088 The legislator should thus make the three following 
modifications concerning section 49(2) and (4):  
Firstly, it should give more guidance to suppliers as regards the 'conspicuous manner and 
form' in which the consumer's attention must be attracted, and prescribe some guidelines for 
this requirement. As this has to be done with regard to the surrounding circumstances, a 
minimum standard would be sufficient. This would avoid interpretational problems. 
The following sentence, based on the model of § 305(2) no. 1, should be inserted at the end of 
section 49(4): 
'In order to satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph (a) of this subsection, the user must at 
least post a clearly visible notice at the place where the transaction is entered into.' 
Secondly, the legislator should abandon the requirement of signing or initialling provisions 
regarding activities or facilities that are subject to any risk by virtue of section 49(2). Initialling 
or counter-signing of exemption clauses can be a double-edged sword as the supplier could 
ultimately argue that they are always fair. The courts should instead be able to enquire the 
fairness of such terms regardless of whether the consumer has signed or initialled the given 
provisions. In tandem with the minimum standard for the requirement of 'conspicuous manner 
and form' suggested above, consumers can be expected to be sufficiently aware of the risks 
involved when engaging in such a risky activity. 
Only then, the phrase 'or otherwise acting in a manner consistent with acknowledgement 
of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance of the provision ' in section 49(2) can 
develop its full sense. Consumers engaging in risky activities for which specific and clearly 
visible warning signs have been installed presumably agree with the given notice or provision. 
                                                             
7087 See Part III ch 2 para 2.2 e). 
7088 See Part I ch 2 para 3.2 b). 
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Evidential problems should not be expected at this stage because such consumers act in a 
manner consistent with acknowledgement of the notice, awareness of the risk and acceptance 
of the provision. 
Thirdly, in order to strengthen the consumer’s position, the following sentence, which follows 
the example of § 305c BGB, should be inserted in section 49(2) in fine:  
'A provision or notice which in the circumstances, in particular with regard to the 
outward appearance of the contract, is so unusual that the consumer need not expect to 
encounter it, is not valid.' 
This would apply irrespective of whether the provision or notice is drafted in plain language as 
it would be so surprising that one cannot expect a normally alert consumer to encounter it.7089 
With these three measures, consumers would be sufficiently alerted about the risks involved so 
that signing or initialling would be superfluous and a more objective standard would apply. 
The current wording of section 50(2) is prone to manipulations by the supplier. Subsequent 
modifications of documents that are available on the supplier's website with regard to written 
consumer agreements (section 50) should hence be made impossible by requiring that the 
given declaration must be made on a durable medium in the sense of § 126b, such as paper, or 
electronic mediums (e.g., USB sticks, CD-ROM, DVD, hard or external disks).7090  
3. Interpretational control 
As regards the interpretational control, the legislator should revise some definitions and 
insert all definitions into section 1 in order to take a more stringent approach.7091 
The definition of 'used goods' in section 1 appears nowhere else in the Act and should be 
deleted.  
South African courts should also aim at an open content control in which the interpretational 
control takes place before the content control so that the content of the clauses that must be 
assessed is entirely clear before the content control takes place.7092 Unnecessary discussions on 
whether or not a clause is unfair before knowing its meaning as well as the risk that the reasons 
of the inadequacy of the clause are 'concealed' within the interpretational control, which then 
would serve as a 'correction' of the provision, are then avoided beforehand.7093 The 
                                                             
7089 See Part I ch 2 para 3.2 b). 
7090 See Part I ch 2 para 4.2 b) and Part III ch 3 para 2.5. 
7091 See Part I ch 4 para 2.1 and Part III ch 4 para 1 b). 
7092 See Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7093 BGH NJW 1999, 1633 (1634). See Part II ch 4 para 3.2 and Part III ch 5 para 1. 
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interpretational and content controls must be strictly separated and cannot be performed within 
one another.7094  
Purposive interpretation in terms of section 2(1) should not only consider the consumer's 
position because the interests of the parties are not always competing. If a court favours the 
consumer's interests in a particular case, this may ultimately lead to higher prices or even make 
the product or business unprofitable. The courts should therefore also consider the broader 
economic impact of their decisions by taking into account the interests of both parties.7095 The 
National Credit Act7096 deals with this problem in a more nuanced way than the Consumer 
Protection Act.'7097 Thus, the legislator should insert the following additional phrase into 
section 2(1):  
'(…) and by taking into consideration the broader economic impact that any interpretation of 
the Act might have.'  
4. Content control 
The South African and the German regimes apply the principles of public policy and good 
faith concurrently with their standard business terms legislation. The development of typified 
categories, or Fallgruppen, by South African courts would tremendously assist them in the 
development of the common law and prevent 'piecemeal solutions'.  
Declaratory clauses, i.e., those that merely reflect legal provisions, should be excluded from 
content control in South Africa too since this area contains constitutional questions.7098 
In order to conform to international standards, the South African legislator should reformulate 
the wordy and unnecessarily complicated blacklist of section 51. 
§ 309 no. 7 lit. b), the counterpart to section 51(1)(c), not only expressly states the exclusion 
or limitation of liability, but also applies to restrictive modalities for the assertion of a given 
claim by the other party, such as a very short preclusion period. These create an obstacle for 
the user's liability. In order to ensure adequate consumer protection, such restrictive modalities 
should thus also apply in terms of section 51(1)(c).7099 
As regards section 51(1)(j), it is recommended that the South African legislator inserts a 
mechanism in the Act similar to the GDPR in which also the provision (i.e., not only the 
                                                             
7094 See Part I ch 4 para 4.2, Part II ch 4 para 3.2 and Part III ch 4 para 3 b). 
7095 De Stadler ‘Section 2’ in Naudé and Eiselen (eds) CPA Commentary para 12. 
7096 34 of 2005. 
7097 Section 3 NCA. 
7098 See Part III ch 5 para 1. 
7099 See Part I ch 3 para 2.2, Part II ch 5 para 2.2.7.1 d) and Part III ch 5 para 2.1. 
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deposit) of data contained in IDs etc. is regulated with respect to data minimisation and storage 
limitation. This would avoid the unnecessary provision of data and enhance consumer 
protection.7100 
Concerning the items contained in regulation 44(3), the South African legislator should 
blacklist the contents of regulation 44(3)(a) because the greylisting of such terms is a systemic 
weakness with regard to the Constitution and the common law.7101  
Furthermore, the editorial error contained in regulation 44(4)(a), referring to item (k), should 
be corrected because this provision was meant for item (l) of regulation 44(3).7102  
With regard to item (f), the legislator should consider including any facilitation of the 
limitation period, i.e., measures that have the same result as a shortening of the limitation 
period, into the greylist as the consumers' need for protection is similar in these cases.7103  
Item (i) should be amended according to the wording of § 6(2) no. 3 of the Austrian KSchG, 
so that variation clauses are fair  
'unless the consumer may be reasonably expected to accept the alteration or variation, 
particularly because it is negligible and factually justified'.  
This is because the possibility for the consumer to cancel an agreement with substantially 
altered terms does not make it fair. The consumer should not be in the situation where he or 
she has to choose between accepting the given product or service which he or she had not 
agreed to initially, or refusing it and suffering the inconvenience of not getting what he 
immediately needed, just because it is more convenient for the other party not to supply what 
was initially agreed.7104 The Austrian formulation ensures better consumer protection than § 
308 no. 4 where a variation is of no effect 'unless the agreement of the modification (…) can 
reasonably be expected of the [consumer] when the interests of the [supplier] are taken into 
account'.7105 
Regulation 44(3)(p) deals with long performance periods. § 308 no. 1 1st sent. 2nd var. covers 
more cases though and is formulated in a more nuanced way. In order to achieve better 
                                                             
7100 See Part III ch 5 para 2.5. 
7101 See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 a) and Part III ch 5 para 3.2 a). 
7102 See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.2 d) and Part III ch 5 para 3.2 k). 
7103 See Part III ch 5 para 3.2 f). 
7104 OFT Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (2008) para 11.7 at 55. 
7105 See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.1 b). 
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protection, the South African item should also apply to all sorts of periods for performance 
and include insufficiently specific periods for performance.7106 
§ 309 no. 6 has a broader scope of application than item (q) (one-sided forfeiture clauses) as it 
directly applies to dependent penalty clauses, and by analogy to independent penalty clauses. 
Since the economic consequences are the same for both types of penalty clauses, South African 
courts should apply item (q) by analogy also to independent penalty clauses.   
In the context of item (q), better consumer protection under section 17(5) would be achieved 
by redrafting this provision and inserting a more extensive and better-defined range of reasons, 
such as: 
'… because of the death of the person for whom, or for whose benefit the booking, reservation 
or order was made, or for any other medical, psychological or psychiatric reason or treatment 
which was not known by the consumer at the time of his or her booking, reservation or order 
as well as any case of force majeure which makes it objectively impossible for the consumer to 
honour his or her agreement'.7107 
Item (t) of the South African greylist merely concerns the transfer of obligations, whereas 
§ 309 no. 10 also covers the transfer of rights. Therefore, the free assignability of claims is 
not covered by item (t). The South African legislature should include the transfer of claims too 
because also in these cases, consumers should be protected from an unfettered change of their 
contractual partners.7108  
The limitation of the transferability of commercial guarantees is greylisted in item (u). These 
guarantees add substantial value to the purchased good. However, item (u) should not only 
apply to the re-sale, but also to other types of transactions, irrespective of whether the initial 
purchaser had used the good in question. There is no reason why a re-sale should be greylisted 
but not a donation. Otherwise, the consumer or donee is deprived of part of what was paid for, 
and the supplier has an economic benefit. The wording of this item should thus be amended 
accordingly.7109 
The South African legislature should insert other means of communication into item (w), 
such as e-mail, and not limit this provision to prepaid registered mail. According to Naudé, the 
following words should thus be added at the end of paragraph (w):  
'(…) or by another means of communication chosen by the consumer for such statements'.  
                                                             
7106 See Part III ch 5 para 3.2 p). 
7107 Suggested modification of s 17(5) emphasised. See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.3 a). 
7108 See Part III ch 5 para 3.2 t). 
7109 See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.4 b). 
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With a view to the SAPO's unreliable service, the inclusion of other means of communication 
would be an advantage in order to avoid unnecessary frustration and disputes.7110  
As otherwise the objective of regulation 44(3)(x) would not be achieved, it is suggested that 
this item greylists not only arbitration but also mediation, similar to § 309 no. 14. Since a 
restriction to court actions would not sufficiently honour the normative objective of item (x), 
this provision should also apply to other proceedings, such as preservation of evidence or 
preliminary injunctions.7111 
The South African legislator should consider a widening of item (y) towards a 'modification 
of the burden of proof' in order to include other aggravations, similar to § 309 no. 12. 
Conclusive proof certificates should always be considered unfair. Standard clauses which 
modify or restrict the burden of proof of suppliers who have control of the other's items 
should systematically be declared unfair.7112 
Item (z) is more restrictive than § 309 no. 8 lit. b) ee) and ff) and should be amended so as to 
include all sorts of adverse modifications of the limitation period for consumers.7113 
Due to the many shortcomings of the South African general clause, the legislator should 
redraft section 48 in a way that corresponds to international standard and good legal practice.  
Most general clauses in other jurisdiction make clear that a clause is 'unfair' if there is some 
imbalance between the parties' rights and obligations, that is if the clause 'unreasonably 
disadvantage[s] the other party',7114 'constitute[s] a severe disadvantage for one of the 
parties',7115  'is unreasonably burdensome for the counterparty'7116, or 'causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract'.7117  
A more concise South African general clause could thus be worded by following the example 
of the German and the European provisions: 
'A term of a consumer agreement which has not been individually negotiated is unfair if it 
unreasonably disadvantages the consumer. An unreasonable disadvantage notably exists where 
                                                             
7110 See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.5 a) and Part III ch 5 para 3.2 w). 
7111 See Part I ch 3 para 3.4.6 a), Part II ch 5 para 2.2.14 and Part III ch 5 para 3.2 x). 
7112 See Part I ch 3 para 1.4.6 b), Part II ch 5 para 2.2.12 and Part III ch 5 para 3.2 y). 
7113 See Part III ch 5 para 3.2 z). 
7114 § 307(1) 1st sent. BGB (Germany). 
7115 § 879(3) ABGB (Austria). 
7116 Article 6:233 BW (Netherlands). 
7117 Article 3(1) of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/ECC of 5 April 1993 and Art 
3(1) of the Australian Consumer Law. 
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a term causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
agreement, to the detriment of the consumer.' 
This formulation is succinct, contains a concretisation and would also distinguish between 
negotiated and non-negotiated standard terms. This is in keeping with the suggested insertion 
of an additional subsection of section 48 (see under II.1 above). 
Even though the Act is built around individual consumers, the Act should use elements of an 
abstract-universal approach in that the tendency (potential unfairness) of a term, and not its 
actual application, must be assessed.7118  
Both regimes apply a mechanism where price control is undertaken only in specific 
circumstances. The South African legislature should make clear though that it did not wish to 
introduce a price-control mechanism in the Act as such.7119 
Since content control of clauses having the same content as legal provisions (declaratory 
clauses) touches constitutional questions, they should be excluded from content control in 
South Africa too.7120 
As regards the factors to be taken into account by the court under section 52(2), the nature of 
the parties is only considered in consumer contracts (§ 310(3)) because of the general-abstract 
approach of §§ 305 et seq. For legal certainty and practicability, only apparent characteristics 
should be considered in both regimes. The same applies to the circumstances of the 
transaction. The legislator should introduce a doctrine of 'change of circumstances' or 
'hardship' for unforeseeable circumstances, similar to the German regime. This would enhance 
consumer protection in terms of section 52(2)(c).7121 
For the sake of a better understanding and a direction to the courts, the legislator should make 
clear that the courts must consider also other circumstances than those mentioned in section 
52(1), and that the list in section 52(2) is not exhaustive. It should therefore reformulate the 
first sentence in subsection (2) as follows: 
'(2) In any matter contemplated in subsection (1), the court must consider, 
inter alia, the following factors, if applicable –7122 
                               (a)…'7123 
                                                             
7118 See Part III ch 5 para 4.1. 
7119 See Part III ch 5 para 4.3 a). 
7120 See Part III ch 5 para 4.3 b). 
7121 See Part III ch 5 para 4.4.1 c). 
7122 My own suggestion emphasised. 
7123 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1 a). 
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The term ‘circumstances’ in section 52(2)(i) is ambiguous in the given context. Logically, it 
can only refer to the terms under which the consumer could have acquired identical or 
equivalent goods or services from a different supplier. The legislator should make this clear by 
replacing 'circumstances' by 'terms and conditions'.7124  
The German regime excludes negotiated terms from content control per se. In contrast, these 
are included in section 52(2)(e). South African courts should distinguish between negotiated 
and non-negotiated terms, however. Non-negotiated terms are rarely considered the proper 
expression of the self-determination of the parties, which is why fairness intervention is 
justified in these cases.7125 Where a supplier effectively claims freedom of contract for it alone, 
whereas the consumer has no influence on the wording of non-negotiated terms, and where the 
‘balancing’ of the parties' rights and obligations is purely formalistic and meaningless, real 
freedom of contract does not exist.7126 On the other hand, consumers that can negotiate specific 
terms are in a stronger bargaining position than those who have to accept a set of terms. The 
need for protection is thus not the same.7127 
In terms of the South African general clause, the consumer carries the risk of non-persuasion 
and bears the onus of proof. In German legislation, the question of whether the other party 
suffers an unreasonable disadvantage is a question of law and not a factual question that can 
be subject to evidence. The South African regime too should distinguish between legal 
questions and those that concern facts and are susceptible of proof.7128 
5. Redress mechanism 
The reference in section 71(1) to section 69(1)(c)(ii) or (2)(b) is wrong since these provisions 
do not exist in the Act. The legislator should correct the wording of section 71(1) 
accordingly.7129 
It is recommended that the legislator enables members of the Tribunal to serve longer than 
two terms and that the phrase 'sufficient persons with legal training' in section 28(1) of the 
National Credit Act is defined. Since the Tribunal deals both with matters concerning the 
                                                             
7124 See Part I ch 3 para 4.1.4 a) ii). 
7125 See BVerfG NJW 1990, 1469, Zimmermann New German Law of Obligations 206. 
7126 Naudé 2006 Stell LR 366, Maxeiner 2003 Yale J. Int. Law 143 and 147, Lewis 2003 SALJ 348. 
7127 See Part III ch 2 para 2.1. 
7128 See Part III ch 5 para 4.5. 
7129 See Part I ch 5 para 3.2 e). Regarding section 69, see also the recommendations in this chapter. 
 1144   
 
Consumer Protection Act and the National Credit Act, the establishment of two separate and 
specialised chambers is advisable. 
Some of the problems encountered with consumer courts could be addressed by creating a 
common legislative framework for consumer courts, as it was the case in Germany with the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz. The legislator should address the urgent need for a proper 
enforcement and execution procedure in this field. It would also be helpful if consumer 
courts were mainly staffed with lawyers.7130  
With a view to traditional dispute resolution, South Africa should adopt a similar stance to the 
German regime in that German ombuds offices must be staffed with at least two lawyers. Then, 
also more complex matters can be handled by ADR agents and more consumers could benefit 
from it. The South African legislator should make clear if the other entities mentioned in section 
4(1) have standing, or if ADR is only intended for smaller affairs. 
The South African legislator should merge several ombuds of a particular sector in order to 
eliminate overlapping jurisdictions, achieve economies of scale, raise the ombuds' profile and 
make the whole system more transparent.  
Even though the Act provides for the possibility of class actions and a co-operation between 
the Commission and trade association with regard to voluntary codes of practice, these cannot 
compensate the lack of an abstract challenges mechanism.   
In this regard, the legislator should redraft section 52(2) also having general-use challenges 
in mind in order to allow for an abstract-universal approach and provide for a proactive 
procedural mechanism. Other consumers could benefit from a decision reached within an 
abstract challenge by inserting a provision similar to § 11 UKlaG.7131 
The legislator should also introduce procedural provisions for class actions (e.g., in a Public 
Interest and Class Actions Act) in order to ensure a harmonised application. South African 
courts should also have the possibility to raise the issue of unfairness on their own initiative.7132 
Moreover, the legislator should include associations that are not primarily concerned with 
consumer protection in order to enhance consumer protection. It should make clear whether 
non-accredited consumer protection groups have standing. The South African regime opted 
                                                             
7130 See Part III ch 6 para 2.3. 
7131 See Part III ch 6 para 3. 
7132 See Part III ch 6 para 3. 
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for a more administrative solution for consumer redress, which is mitigated by the involvement 
of private actors, such as consumer protection organisations. These organisations should 
financially and otherwise be supported in order to enhance consumer protection.7133 
With respect to the publication of consumer-related decisions, a register of decisions has a 
limited effect. Thus, an information pool using a 'matrix approach' would be more effective in 
both countries.7134 
Section 69 infringes the consumer's constitutional right of access to court, which is an 
unintended consequence of the legislature's desire to ensure quick, effective and efficient 
redress of disputes for consumers. Hence, there is a contradiction between section 69(d) and 
section 52. Referring consumers to other bodies before they can institute action with a small 
claims court is inefficient with regard to procedural economy. This is an anomaly that should 
be corrected by extending the same powers to the Tribunal. 
 
 
III. OVERALL CONCLUSION 
We have seen that the content control performed according to the Act offers a comparable level 
of protection to the German regime. With respect to the South African blacklist, the legislator 
should amend some provisions though in order to be in line with other regimes and enhance 
consumer protection. In terms of the greylist of regulation 44(3), there is a need for 
improvement, especially with regard to provisions that are more restrictive than their German 
counterparts. The legislature should also redraft the general clause in order to conform to 
international standards. 
Despite this comparable level of protection for individual consumers, the lack of an abstract 
challenges mechanism, similar to institutional actions in Germany, and the fact that the South 
African courts apply a particular-personalised approach, coupled with equity considerations, 
are an obstacle for effective consumer protection and the eradication of unfair terms. As shown, 
the South African approach is not suited for mass contracts. Class actions, voluntary codes of 
practice, or the extension of the locus standi under section 71(1) cannot compensate for the 
lack of such a mechanism. The introduction of a supra-individual and generalising approach 
                                                             
7133 See Part III ch 6 para 4. 
7134 See Part III ch 6 para 6. 
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and an abstract challenges mechanism, in tandem with the possibility for an extension of a 
decision's legal force to other consumers, similar to § 11 UKlaG, would therefore enhance 
consumer protection tremendously. 
Given that the Act applies a particular-personalised approach, the possibility to consider 
foreign and international law under section 2(2) seems somewhat out of place. It is hard to 
imagine, even if applied with precaution, how considerations developed in the context of an 
abstract-generalised approach – which is an international standard – can be applied within a 
framework whose system is diametrically opposed. 
It has also been demonstrated that in order to avoid unnecessary complications and to ensure a 
more balanced argumentation, the interpretational control should take place before the content 
control. Thus, an 'open' content control is favourable to an approach where the interpretational 
control takes place after the content control, or where both controls are merged.  
The South African enforcement mechanism is unnecessarily complicated and intransparent. A 
streamlining of the redress system, e.g., by giving Small Claims Courts a more predominant 
role, or by lowering the amounts in dispute in order to ensure more affordable access to the 
court system, would be beneficial in this regard. Moreover, the German approach is more 
proactive than the South African regime. This is not only due to the fact that the UKlaG offers 
the possibility of institutional actions, but also because specific mechanisms and tools in the 
German regime, such as warnings, have a deterrent effect.   
What is more, some procedural amendments should be undertaken in this regard, such as the 
splitting of the Tribunal into two separate specialised chambers, or the introduction of a 
common legislative framework for consumer courts. The need for a proper enforcement and 
execution procedure should be addressed urgently. Furthermore, the merger of several ombuds 
and their staffing with trained lawyers would enable ombuds also to handle more complicated 
matters and relieve the courts. 
Associations that are not primarily concerned with consumer protection should be included in 
order to improve consumer protection. Moreover, the financial and otherwise support of 
consumer protection organisations is a key prerequisite for the battle against unfair terms. 
Besides editorial errors, the Act contains some uncertainties that should be clarified. In this 
respect, the legislator should make clear that it did not wish to introduce a price-control 
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mechanism in the Act, introduce some specific definitions ('terms and conditions', 'State') and 
insert all definitions contained in the Act in section 1. 
 
--- *** --- 
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DAR .........................................Deutsches Autorecht (Journal) 
DB ............................................Der Betrieb (Journal) 
DNotZ .......................................Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift (Journal) 
DR ............................................Deutsches Recht (Journal) 
DRiZ .........................................Deutsche Richterzeitung (Journal) 
DStR .........................................Deutsches Steuerrecht (Journal) 
DTI ...........................................Department of Trade and Industry 
DZWiR .....................................Deutsche Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Insolvenzrecht (Journal) 
ECJ ...........................................European Court of Justice 
ECTA........................................Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
ed(s) ..........................................editor(s) / edition 
EFZG ........................................Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz (Act on Continued Employment  
                                                     Remuneration) 
EGBGB .....................................Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (Introductory Act 
to the Civil Code) 
EGZPO .....................................Einführungsgesetz zur Zivilprozessordnung (Introductory Act to the  
Code of Civil Procedure) 
EnWG .......................................Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (Energy Industry Act) 
et al. ..........................................et alii (and others) 
et seq. ........................................et sequentes / et sequentia (and the following) 
EuZW .......................................Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (Journal) 
e. V. ..........................................eingetragener Verein (registered association) 
EWS .........................................Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (Law Jounal) 
FAIS .........................................Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
FernAbsG ..................................Fernabsatzgesetz (Distance Selling Contracts Act) 
FernUSG ...................................Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am Fernunterricht (Distance 
Learning Protection Act) 
FS .............................................Festschrift (commemorative publication) 
GBO .........................................Grundbuchordnung (Land Registry Code) 
GG ............................................Government Gazette, Grundgesetz (German constitution) 
GenG ........................................Genossenschaftsgesetz (Cooperatives Act) 
GenN ........................................General Notice 
GKG .........................................Gerichtskostengesetz (Court Fees Act) 
GN ............................................Government Notice 
GVG .........................................Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Judicature Act) 
GWB .........................................Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Act against Restraints of 
Competition) 
GwG .........................................Geldwäschegesetz (Money Laundering Act) 
Harv LR ....................................Harvard Law Review 
HGB .........................................Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code) 
HL Deb .....................................Debate of the House of Lords (UK) 
HRefG.......................................Handelsrechtsreformgesetz (Commercial Law Reform Act) 
HwO .........................................Handwerksordnung (Trade and Crafts Code) 
InvG .........................................Investmentgesetz (Investment Act) 
IFRS .........................................International Financial Reporting Standards 
in pr.. ........................................in principio (at the beginning) 
Int. J. Private Law .....................International Journal of Private Law 
IPRax ........................................Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (Journal) 
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JA .............................................Juristische Ausbildung (Journal) 
J. Appl. Psychol.........................Journal of Applied Psychology (USA) 
JICLT........................................Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 
JuS ............................................Juristische Schulung (Journal) 
JW ............................................Juristische Wochenschrift (Journal) 
JZ ..............................................JuristenZeitung (Journal) 
KAGB.......................................Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (Investment Companies Code) 
KG ............................................Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court of Berlin) 
KSchG ......................................Konsumentenschutzgesetz (Consumer Protection Code) (Austria), 
Kündigungsschutzsgesetz (Protection Against Dismissal Act) 
(Germany) 
KWG ........................................Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act) 
LAG .........................................Landesarbeitsgericht (State Labour Court) 
MDR .........................................Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht (Journal) 
MEC .........................................Member of the Executive Council 
MFKRegV ................................Musterfeststellungsklagenregister-Verordnung (Regulation on 
Registers of Claims for Model Declatory Proceedings) 
NachwG ....................................Nachweisgesetz (Evidence Act for Employment Relationships) 
NCA .........................................National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
NCC ..........................................National Consumer Commission 
NCT ..........................................National Consumer Tribunal 
NJW ..........................................Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (Journal) 
NJW-RR ...................................Neue Juristische Wochenschrift – Rechtsprechungsreport (Journal) 
No./no. ......................................Number 
NPA ..........................................National Prosecuting Authority 
NZA ..........................................Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (Journal) 
NZA-RR ...................................Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport (Journal) 
NZBau ......................................Neue Zeitschrift für Baurecht und Vergaberecht (Journal) 
NZG ..........................................Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (Journal) 
NZM .........................................Neue Zeitschrift für Miet- und Wohnungsrecht (Journal) 
ObLG........................................Oberstes Landesgericht (Bavarian Supreme Court) 
OFT ..........................................Office of Fair Trading (UK) 
OJ .............................................Official Journal (EU) 
O.J.L.S. .....................................Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
OLG ..........................................Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) 
PAngV ......................................Preisangabenverordnung (Price Indication Regulation) 
para(s) .......................................paragraph(s) 
PatAnwO ..................................Patentanwaltsordnung (Patent Lawyers' Act) 
PBefG .......................................Personenbeförderungsgesetz (Passenger Transportation Act) 
PDLV........................................Postdienstleistungsverordnung (Post Service Regulation) 
PersAuswG ...............................Personalausweisgesetz (Identity Card Act) 
PELJ / PER ...............................Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal / Potchefstroomse electroniese 
regsblad) 
p(p). ..........................................page(s) 
ProdHaftG .................................Produkthaftungsgesetz (Product Liability Act) 
RdA ..........................................Recht der Arbeit (Journal) 
rec. ............................................recital 
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reg. ............................................regulation 
RG ............................................Reichsgericht (Supreme Court of the German Reich) 
RGZ ..........................................Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen  
                                                     (Collection of the decisions of the Reichsgericht in civil law matters) 
RheinSchifffahrtsOG .................Rheinschifffahrtsobergericht (Supreme Court for the Navigation on 
the River Rhine) 
RHPflG .....................................Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (Liability Act oft he German Reich) 
RIW ..........................................Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (Journal) 
RPflG ........................................Rechtspflegergesetz (Act on the Competencies of Officers of 
 Justice) 
RVG .........................................Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz (Lawyers' Compensation Act) 
SAICA ......................................South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
SAJHR ......................................South African Journal for Human Rights 
SALJ .........................................South African Law Journal 
SALRC .....................................South African Law Reform Commission 
SA Merc LJ ...............................South African Mercantile Law Journal 
SAPS ........................................South African Police Service 
s(s) ............................................section(s) 
SCA ..........................................Supreme Court of Appeal 
sent. ..........................................sentence 
SigG ..........................................Signaturgesetz (Signature Act) 
StBerG ......................................Steuerberatungsgesetz (Tax Consultancy Act) 
Stell LR .....................................Stellenbosch Law Review 
s.v. ............................................sub verbo (under the heading of) 
TEC ..........................................Treaty establishing the European Community 
Tex. J. Cons. & Comm. Law......Journal of Consumer and Commercial Law (Texas, USA)  
TFEU ........................................Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
THRHR .....................................Tydskrif vir hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg / Journal of  
                                                     Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 
TSAR ........................................Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse reg /Journal of South African Law) 
TVG ..........................................Tarifvertragsgesetz (Collective Bargaining Act) 
TzBfG .......................................Teilzeitbefristungsgesetz (Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment 
Act) 
UCPD .......................................EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
ÜG ............................................Überweisungsgesetz (Cashless Payment Transactions Act) 
UKlaG.......................................Unterlassungsklagengesetz (Injunctions Act) 
UNECIC ...................................United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts, 2005 
UNICITRAL .............................United Nations Commission on International Trade Law  
UTCCR .....................................Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UK) 
UWG ........................................Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act against Unfair 
Competition) 
v / vs ..........................................versus 
VAG .........................................Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (Insurance Supervision Act) 
var. ............................................variation 
VDG .........................................Vertrauensdienstegesetz (Trust Services Act) 
VersR ........................................Zeitschrift für Versicherungsrecht, Haftungs- und Schadensrecht 
(Journal) 
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VGG .........................................Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten 
Schutzrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften (VGG) (Act on the 
Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights by Collecting 
Societies) 
VJ .............................................Vindobona Jounal of International Commercial Law & Arbitration 
VOB/B ......................................Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen (Teil B)  
(Construction Tendering and Contract Regulations, Part B) 
VSBG .......................................Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz (Act on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Consumer Matters) 
VuR ..........................................Verbraucher und Recht (Journal) 
VVG .........................................Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Insurance Contract Act) 
WEG .........................................Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (Act on the Ownership of Apartments 
and the Permanent Residential Right) 
WiB ..........................................Wirtschaftsrechtliche Beratung (Journal) 
WiPrO .......................................Gesetz über die Berufsausübung der Wirtschaftsprüfer  
                                                     (Wirtschaftsprüferordnung) (Certified Accountants' Act) 
WM...........................................Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (Journal) 
WRV .........................................Weimarer Reichsverfassung (Constitution of Weimar) 
WuM .........................................Wohnungswirtschaft und Mietrecht (Journal) 
Yale J. Int. Law .........................Yale Journal of International Law (USA) 
ZAG .........................................Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz (Payment Services Supervison Act) 
ZEuP .........................................Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (Journal) 
ZfA ...........................................Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (Journal) 
ZHR ..........................................Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (Journal) 
ZIP ............................................Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (formerly 'Insolvenzrecht – 
Zeitschrift  
                                                     für die gesamte Insolvenzpraxis') (Journal) 
ZKG ..........................................Zahlungskontengesetz (Payment Accounts Act) 
ZPO ..........................................Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure) 
ZRP...........................................Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (Journal) 
§(§) ...........................................paragraph(s) (sections in German codes)  
  






1. South African statutes and regulations 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 
 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 
Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964 
Business Names Act 27 of 1960 
 
Collective Investments Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 
Commissions Act 8 of 1947 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices Act) 71 of 1988 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) 
Conventional Penalties Act 15 of 1962 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 
Co-operative Banks Act 40 of 2007 
Corporation for Public Deposits Act 46 of 1984 
Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 
Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 
 
Eastern Cape Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 5 of 1998 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
Financial Markets Act 19 of 2002 
Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013 
Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004 
Free State Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 14 of 1998  
 
Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996 
General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 
General Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013 
 
Harmful Business Practices Amendment Act 23 of 1999 
Hazardous Chemical Substances Regulations, 1995 
Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942 
 
Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 
Interpretation Amendment Act 45 of 1961 
 
Kwa-Zulu Natal Consumer Protection Act 4 of 2013  
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Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Limpopo Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 8 of 1996 
Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 
Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 
 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944  
Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941 
Mpumalanga Consumer Affairs Act 6 of 1998 
Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993 
 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
National Small Business Act 102 of 1996 
Northern Cape Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996 
Northern Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 8 of 1996 
Northern Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 2 of 2003 
North-West Consumer Affairs Act 13 of 1995 
North-West Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 4 of 1996  
 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 
 
Pensions Funds Act 24 of 1956 
Prescription Act 18 of 1943 
Prescription Act 68 of 1969 
Price Control Act 25 of 1964 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000  
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 
Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 
Public Service Act, 1994 
 
Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 
 
Sale and Service Matters Act 25 of 1964 
Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 
South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 
Stamp Duties Act 77 of 1968 
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 
 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
 
Western Cape Province Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices Act 10 of 2002 
Wills Act 7 of 1953 
 
 
2. German statutes and regulations 
AGB-Gesetz (AGBG) of 09/12/1977, as last amended on 26/11/2001 
Aktiengesetz (AktG) of 06/09/1965, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (ArbGG) of 02/07/1979, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
 
Bausparkassengesetz (BauSparkG) of 15/02/1991, as last amended on 25/03/2019 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) of 11/10/1952, as last amended on 18/12/2018 
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Bundesmeldegesetz (BMG) of 03/05/2013, as last amended on 17/02/2020 
Bundesnotarordnung (BNotO) of 01/03/1937, as last amended on 30/11/2019 
Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebührenordnung (BRAGO) of 07/07/1879, as last amended on 12/03/2004 
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO) of 01/10/1959, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) of 18/08/1896, as last amended on 19/03/2020 
 
Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (EGBGB) of 18/08/1996, as last amended on 
27/03/2020 
Einführungsgesetz zur Zivilprozessordnung (EGZPO) of 30/01/1877, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG) of 16/12/1935, as last amended on 05/12/2019 
 
Fernabsatzgesetz (FernAbsG) of 27/06/2000 
Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz (FernUSG) of 24/08/1976, as last amended on 29/03/2017 
 
Geldwäschegesetz (GwG) of 23/06/2017, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Genossenschaftsgesetz (GenG) of 01/10/1889, as last amended on 17/07/2017 
Gerichtskostengesetz (GKG) of 01/10/1879, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) of 01/10/1879, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) of 01/07/1896, as last amended on 18/04/2019 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) of 27/07/1957, as last amended on 25/03/2020 
Gesetz über die Inkraftsetzung von Rechtsvorschriften der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik of 21/06/1990 
Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten durch 
Verwertungsgesellschaften (VGG) of 24/05/2016, as last amended on 17/07/2017  
Gesetz zur Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes und der Insolvenzordnung of 19/07/1996 
Gesetz zur Beschleunigung fälliger Zahlungen of 30/03/2000 
Gesetz zur Einführung einer zivilprozessualen Musterfeststellungsklage of 12/07/2018  
Gesetz zur Reform des Bauvertragsrechts of 28/04/2017 
Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über alternative Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten 
und zur Durchführung der Verordnung über Online-Streitbeilegungen in Verbraucherangelegenheiten 
of 19/02/2016 
Gesetz zur vorläufigen Regelung des Rechts der Industrie- und Handelskammern of 18/12/1956, as last 
amended on 20/11/2019 
Grundbuchordnung (GBO) of 24/03/1897, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
 
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) of 10/05/1897, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Handelsrechtsreformgesetz (HRefG) of 22/06/1998 
Handwerksordnung (HwO) of 17/09/1953, as last amended on 06/02/2020 
 
Investmentgesetz (InvG) of 15/12/2003 
 
Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB) of 04/07/2013, as last amended on 19/03/2020 
Kreditwesengesetz (KWG) of 15/12/1934, as last amended on 27/03/2020 
 
Musterfeststellungsklagenregister-Verordnung (MFKRegV) of 24/10/2018 
 
Nachweisgesetz (NachwG) of 20/07/1995, as last amended on 11/08/2014 
 
Patentanwaltsordnung (PatAnwO) of 21/05/1900, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Personalausweisgesetz (PersAuswG) of 19/12/1950, as last amended on 21/06/2019 
Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG) of 21/03/1961, as last amended on 03/03/2020 
Postdienstleistungsverordnung (PDLV) of 21/08/2001, as last amended on 29/03/2017 
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Preisangabenverordnung (PAngV) of 18/09/1969, as last amended on 17/07/2017 
Produkthaftungsgesetz (ProdHaftG) of 15 December 1985, as last amended on 17 July 2017 
 
Reichshaftpflichtgesetz (RHPflG) of 07/06/1871 (from 1978: Haftpflichtgesetz (HPflG), as last amended 
on 17/07/2017) 
 
Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz of 26/11/2001 
Signaturgesetz (SigG) of 22/07/1997, as last amended on 16/05/2001 
Steuerberatungsgesetz (StBerG) of 16/08/1961, as last amended on 21/12/2001 
 
Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG) of 09/04/1941, as last amended on 18/12/2018 
Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz (TzBfG) of 21/12/2000, as last amended on 22/11/2019 
 
Überweisungsgesetz (ÜG) of 21/07/1999 
Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG) of 26/11/2001, as last amended on 17/07/2017 
 
Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz (VSBG) of 19/02/2016, as last amended on 30/11/2019 
Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Grundversorgung von Haushaltskunden und die 
Ersatzversorgung mit Elektrizität aus dem Niederspannungsnetz (Stromgrundversorgungsverordnung - 
StromGVV) of 26/10/2006, as last amended on 14/03/2019 
Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Grundversorgung von Haushaltskunden und die 
Ersatzversorgung mit Gas aus dem Niederdrucknetz (Gasgrundversorgungsverordnung - GasGVV) of 
26/10/2006, as last amended on 29/08/2016 
Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für den Netzanschluss und dessen Nutzung für die 
Gasversorgung in Niederdruck (Niederdruckanschlussverordnung – NDAV) of 01/11/2006, as last 
amended on 17/12/2018 
Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Versorgung mit Fernwärme (AVBFernwärmeV) of 
20/06/1980, as last amended on 04/11/2010 
Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Versorgung mit Wasser (AVBWasserV) of 
20/06/1980, as last amended on 11/12/2014 
Verordnung über die Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen für den Straßenbahn- und Obusverkehr 
sowie den Linienverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen (BefBedV) of 27/02/1970, as last amended on 
21/05/2015 
Verordnung über wohnungswirtschaftliche Berechnungen nach dem Zweiten Wohnungsbaugesetz 
(II. BerechnungsVO) of 17/10/1957, as last amended on 23/11/2007 
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG) of 01/04/2015, as last amended on 19/03/2020 
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG) of 30/05/1908, as last amended on 30/11/2019 
Vertrauensdienstegesetz (VDG) of 18/07/2017 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG) of 25/05/1976, as last amended on 21/06/2019 
 
Weimarer Reichsverfassung (WRV) of 11/08/1919 
Wirtschaftsprüferordnung (WiPrO) of 01/11/1961, as last amended on 20/11/2019 
Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (WEG) of 15/03/1951, as last amended on 05/12/2014 
 
Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz (ZAG) of 25/06/2009, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
Zahlungskontengesetz (ZKG) of 11/04/2016, as last amended on 17/07/2017 
Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) of 30/11/1877, as last amended on 12/12/2019 
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3. Other legislation 
Abortion Act 1967 (UK) 
Arbitration Act, 1996 (UK) 
 
Carriers Act 1830 (England) 
Competition and Consumer Act, 2010 (Australia) 
Connecticut General Statutes, 2009  
Convention of Geneva, 19 May 1956 as amended by the CMR Protocol of Geneva, 5 July, 1978) 
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) (1978 - the CMR 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (Rome Convention) 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I) 
 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts 
Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for 
the protection of consumers' interests 
Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of 
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (‘EC Consumer Sales Directive’) 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications)  
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (‘EU Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive – UCPD’) 
Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements 
for consumers 
Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale 
and exchange contracts 
Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating 
late payment in commercial transactions 
Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative 
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR) 
 
Konsumentenschutzgesetz (KSchG) (Austria) 
 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK) 
Ombudsman Act 1975 No. 9 (New Zealand) 
 
Pennsylvania Plain Language Consumer Contract Act (Pa Stat Ann Tit 73 (1997) 
 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters  
Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 October 2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
(Regulation on consumer protection cooperation) 
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Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR) 
Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) 
Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing 
Directive 1999/93/EC   
Report of the Commission concerning the application of Directive 93/13/EEC (KOM (2000)) 
 
Statute of Frauds of 1677 (England) 
 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome 1957) 
 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980 (CISG) 
 
 
4. Miscellaneous norms, guidelines and papers 
Allgemeine Beförderungsbedingungen für den gewerblichen Güternahverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen 
(AGNB)  
Allgemeine Beförderungsbedingungen für Fluggäste und Gepäck (ABB Flugpassage) 
Allgemeine Deutsche Spediteursbedingungen (ADSp)  
CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 13 Inclusion of Standard Terms under the CISG, Rapporteur: Sieg 
Eiselen, College of Law, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. Adopted by the CISG 
Advisory Council following its 17th meeting, in Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, on 20 January 2013 
(available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no13/) 
 
CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 16 Exclusion of the CISG under Article 6, Rapporteur: Doctor Lisa 
Spagnolo, Monash University, Australia. Adopted by the CISG Advisory Council following its 19th 
meeting, in Pretoria, South Africa, on 30 May 2014 (available at https://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-
opinion-no16/) 
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The different German types of court decisions have been translated as follows: 
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BVerfG NJW 1990, 1469 – court order of 07/02/1990, 1 BvR 26/84, 'Wettbewrebsverbot des 
Handelsvertreters' 
BVerfG NJW 1993, 36 – court order of 19/10/1993, 1BvR 567, 1044/89, 'Bürgschaftsbeschluss' 
BVerfG NJW 2001, 957 – judgement of 06/02/2001, 1 BvR 12/92, 'Unterhaltsverzichtsvertrag' 
BVerfG NJW 2001, 2248 – granting Chamber's order of 29/03/2001, 1BvR 1766/92 
BVerfG NJW 2005, 1036 – court order of 25/10/2004, 1 BvR 1437/02, 'Zahnarzthonorar' 
BVerfG NZA 2007, 85 – non-acceptance order of 23/11/2006, 1 BvR 1909/06 
 
Decisions of the Reichsgericht 
RGZ 11, 100 – judgement of 16/06/1883, I 242/261/81 
RGZ 20, 115 – judgement of 11/02/1888, I 380/87 
RGZ 62, 264 – judgement of 08/01/1906, I 320/05 
RGZ 81, 117 – judgement of 13/12/1912, VII 228/12 
RGZ 99, 107 – judgement of 15/05/1920, I 25/20 
RGZ 102, 396 – judgement of 01/10/1921, I 135/21 
RGZ 103, 82 – judgement of 26/10/1921, I 123/21 
RGZ 103, 84 – judgement of 26/10/1921, I 132/21 
RGZ 112, 253 – judgement of 22/12/1925, II 128/25 
RGZ 115, 218 – judgement of 08/11/1926, I 154/26 
RGZ 142, 353 – judgement of 06/12/1933, I 136/33 
RGZ 168, 321 – judgement of 14/08/1941, II 49/41 
RGZ 171, 43 – judgement of 26/03/1943, VI (VII) 144/42 
RG JW 1934, 2395 – judgement of 26/06/1934, II 28/34 
RG DR 1941, 1211 – judgement of 31/03/1941, VII 95/40 
 
Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof 
BGHZ 1, 83 – judgement of 19/01/1951, I ZR 53/50 
BGHZ 4, 153 – court order of 10/12/1951, GSZ 3/51 
BGHZ 5, 111 – judgement of 12/02/1952, I ZR 96/51 
BGHZ 7, 187 – judgement of 24/09/1952, II ZR 305/51 
BGHZ 13, 360 – court order of 31/05/1954, GSZ 2/54 
BGHZ 16, 71 – judgement of 18/12/1954, II ZR 76/54 ('Rückkehrverbot') 
BGHZ 17, 1 – judgement of 08/03/1955, I ZR 109/53 
BGHZ 18, 212 – judgement of 29/09/1955, II ZR 210/54 
BGHZ 22, 90 – judgement of 29/10/1956, II ZR 79/55 
BGHZ 24, 39 – judgement of 19/03/1957, VIII ZR 74/56 
BGHZ 33, 216 – judgement of 29/09/1960, II ZR 25/59 
BGHZ 38, 183 – judgement of 29/10/1962, II ZR 31/61 
BGHZ 40, 65 – judgement of 11/07/1963, VII ZR 120/62 
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BGHZ 41, 151 – judgement of 17/02/1964, II ZR 98/62 
BGHZ 48, 264 – judgement of 18/09/1967, VII ZR 52/65 
BGHZ 49, 84 – judgement of 06/11/1967, VIII ZR 81/65 
BGHZ 50, 200 – judgement of 29/05/1968, VIII ZR 77/66 
BGHZ 54, 106 – judgement of 04/06/1970, VII ZR 187/68 
BGHZ 62, 251 – judgement of 29/03/1974, V ZR 22/73 
BGHZ 64, 238 – judgement of 14/04/1975, II ZR 147/73 
BGHZ 70, 304 – judgement of 08/02/1978, VIII ZR 240/76 
BGHZ 72, 206 – judgement of 12/10/1978, VII ZR 220/77 
BGHZ 74, 383 – judgement of 11/06/1979, VIII ZR 224/78 
BGHZ 84, 11 – judgement of 03/05/1982, II ZR 78/81 
BGHZ 84, 268 – judgement of 16/06/1982, IVa ZR 270/80 
BGHZ 86, 284 – judgement of 20/01/1983, VII ZR 105/81 
BGHZ 91, 324 – judgement of 07/06/1984, IX ZR 66/83 
BGHZ 92, 363 – decision in rental matters, 30/10/1984, VIII ARZ 1/84 
BGHZ 102, 172 – judgement of 19/11/1987, II ZR 100/87 
BGHZ 103, 72 – judgement of 15/01/1988, V ZR 183/86 
BGHZ 104, 50 – judgement of 31/03/1988, II ZR 135/87 
BGHZ 106, 267 – judgement of 17/01/1989, XI ZR 54/88 
BGHZ 109, 171 – judgement of 02/11/1989, IX ZR 197/88 
BGHZ 114, 15 – judgement of 05/03/1991, XI ZR 75/90 
BGHZ 127, 138 – judgement of 31/09/1994, XII ZR 77/93 
BGHZ 197, 326 – court order of 08/05/2013, XII ZB 192/11 
 
BGH NJW 1951, 271 – judgement of 19/01/1954, I ZR 17/50 
BGH NJW 1954, 1153 – court order of 31/05/1954, GSZ 2/54 
BGH NJW 1955, 1794 – judgement of 29/09/1955, II ZR 210/54 
BGH NJW 1957, 17 – judgement of 29/10/1956, II ZR 79/55 
 
BGH NJW 1963, 1248 – judgement of 14/03/1963, VII ZR 257/61 
BGH NJW 1964, 1123 – judgement of 17/02/1964, II ZR 98/62 
BGH NJW 1965, 246 – judgement of 04/11/1964, VIII ZR 46/63 
BGH NJW 1969, 230 – judgement of 11/11/1968, VIII ZR 151/66 
 
BGH NJW 1971, 1036 – judgement of 24/02/1971, VIII ZR 22/70 
BGH NJW 1973, 1878 – judgement of 25/06/1973, II ZR 72/71 
BGH NJW 1976, 1934 – judgement of 02/07/1976, V ZR 185/74 
BGH NJW 1976, 2345 – judgement of 07/07/1976, IV ZR 229/74 
BGH NJW 1977, 624 – judgement of 15/12/1976, IV ZR 197/75 
BGH NJW 1978, 634 – judgement of 22/12/1977, VII ZR 45/77 
BGH NJW 1978, 886 – judgement of 18/01/1978, IV ZR 204/75 
BGH NJW 1979, 1886 – judgement of 11/06/1979, VIII ZR 224/78 
 
BGH NJW 1980, 1947 – judgement of 12/05/1980, VII ZR 158/79 
BGH NJW 1980, 2133 – judgement of 23/04/1980, VIII ZR 80/79 
BGH NJW 1980, 2518 – judgement of 11/06/1980, VIII ZR 174/79 
 
BGH NJW 1981, 117 – judgement of 24/09/1980, VIII ZR 273/79 
BGH NJW 1981, 569 – judgement of 04/1271980, VII ZR 217/80 
BGH NJW 1981, 1206 – judgement of 12/03/1981, III ZR 92/79 
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BGH NJW 1981, 1510 – judgement of 09/04/1981, VII ZR 194/80 
BGH NJW 1981, 2344 – judgement of 29/06/1981, VII ZR 259/80 
BGH NJW 1981, 2351 – judgement of 09/07/1981, VII ZR 139/80 
 
BGH NJW 1982, 178 – judgement of 07/10/1981, VIII ZR 214/80 
BGH NJW 1982, 331 – judgement of 07/10/1981, VIII ZR 229/80 
BGH NJW 1982, 644 – judgement of 01/12/1981, KZR 37/80 
BGH NJW 1982, 1388 – judgement of 01/03/1982, VIII ZR 63/81 
BGH NJW 1982, 1747 – judgement of 31/03/1982, VIII ZR 125/81 
BGH NJW 1982, 2309 – judgement of 17/05/1982, VII ZR 316/81 
 
BGH NJW 1983, 159 – judgement of 06/10/1982, VIII ZR 201/81 
BGH NJW 1983, 385 – judgement of 18/11/1982, VII ZR 305/81 
BGH NJW 1983, 816 – judgement of 16/12/1982, VII ZR 92/82 
BGH NJW 1983, 929 – judgement of 27/10/1982, V ZR 24/82 
BGH NJW 1983, 1320 – judgement of 26/01/1983, VUUU ZR 342/81 
BGH NJW 1983, 1322 – judgement of 20/01/1983, VII ZR 105/81 
BGH NJW 1983, 1489 – judgement of 10/03/1983, VII ZR 302/82 
BGH NJW 1983, 1491 – judgement of 10/03/1983, VII ZR 301/82 
BGH NJW 1983, 1671 – judgement of 28/04/1983, VII ZR 259/82 
BGH NJW 1983, 1853 – judgement of 28/04/1983, VII ZR 246/82 
BGH NJW 1983, 2817 – judgement of 25/05/1983, IVa ZR 182/81 
 
BGH NJW 1984, 48 – judgement of 19/09/1983, VIII ZR 84/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 171 – judgement of 29/09/1983, VII ZR 225/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 721 – judgement of 26/10/1983, IVa ZR 80/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 725 – judgement of 10/11/1983, VII ZR 373/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 871 – judgement of 07/12/1983, VIII ZR 257/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 1177 – judgement of 01/02/1984, VIII ZR 54/83 
BGH NJW 1984, 1182 – judgement of 21/12/1989, VIII ZR 195/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 1750 – judgement of 08/03/1984, VII ZR 349/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 1885 – judgement of 08/03/1984, VII ZR 177/82 
BGH NJW 1984, 2279 – judgement of 07/06/1984, IX ZR 66/83 
BGH NJW 1984, 2468 – judgement of 28/04/1984, VII ZR 276/83 
BGH NJW 1984, 2941 – judgement of 28/05/1984, III ZR 231/82 
 
BGH NJW 1985, 53 – judgement of 29/02/1984, VIII ZR 350/82 
BGH NJW 1985, 319 – judgement of 16/10/1984, X ZR 97/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 320 – judgement of 31/10/1984, VIII ZR 226/83  
BGH NJW 1985, 480 – decision in rental matters of 30/10/1984, VIII AZR 1/84 
BGH NJW 1985, 550 – judgement of 19/09/1984, VIII ZR 108/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 559 – judgement of 09/05/1984, IVa ZR 176/82 
BGH NJW 1985, 617 – judgement of 04/10/1984, III ZR 119/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 621 – judgement of 31/10/1984, VIII ZR 220/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 633 – judgement of 25/10/1984, VII ZR 11/84 
BGH NJW 1985, 850 – judgement of 23/05/1984, VIII ZR 27/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 855 – judgement of 06/12/1984, VII ZR 227/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 914 – judgement of 08/10/2013, XI ZR 401/12 
BGH NJW 1985, 1165 – judgement of 17/01/1985, VII ZR 375/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 1838 – judgement of 20/03/1985, VIII ZR 327/83 
BGH NJW 1985, 2271 – judgement of 03/06/1985, VIII ZR 150/84 
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BGH NJW 1985, 2329 – judgement of 19/06/1985, VIII ZR 238/84 
BGH NJW 1985, 3016 – judgement of 23/02/1984, VII ZR 274/82 
BGH NJW 1986, 43 – judgement of 19/09/1985, III ZR 214/83 
BGH NJW 1986, 46 – judgement of 19/09/1985, III ZR 213/83 
BGH NJW 1986, 1610 – judgement of 24/09/1985, VI ZR 4/84 
BGH NJW 1986, 1613 – judgement of 20/0371986, VII ZR 191/85 
BGH NJW 1986, 1757 – judgement of 17/02/1986, II ZR 285/84 
BGH NJW 1986, 1807 – judgement of 06/03/1986, 234/84 
BGH NJW 1986, 2428 – judgement of 05/05/1986, II ZR 150/85 
BGH NJW 1986, 2564 – judgement of 10/07/1986, III ZR 133/85 
BGH NJW 1986, 2574 – judgement of 26/05/1986, VIII ZR 229/85 
BGH NJW 1986, 3134 – judgement of 26/05/1986, VIII ZR 218/85 
BGH NJW 1986, 3199 – judgement of 10/07/1986, III ZR 19/85 
 
BGH NJW 1987, 487 – judgement of 08/10/1986, VIII ZR 342/85 
BGH NJW 1987, 831 – judgement of 10/12/1986, VIII ZR 349/85 
BGH NJW 1987, 1634 – judgement of 28/01/1987, IVa ZR 173/85 
BGH NJW 1987, 1931 – judgement of 12/03/1987, VII ZR 37/86 
BGH NJW 1987, 2011 – judgement of 09/04/1987, III ZR 84/86 
BGH NJW 1987, 2012 – judgement of 29/04/1987, VIII ZR 251/86 
BGH NJW 1987, 2235 – judgement of 13/05/1987, VIII ZR 137/86 
BGH NJW 1987, 2575 – decision in rental matters of 01/07/1987, VIII ARZ 9/86 
BGH NJW 1987, 2818 – judgement of 14/07/1987, X ZR 38/86 
BGH NJW 1987, 2867 – judgement of 02/07/1987, III ZR 219/86 
 
BGH NJW 1988, 258 – judgement of 08/10/1987, VII ZR 185/86 
BGH NJW 1988, 490 – judgement of 07/05/1987, VII ZR 366/85 
BGH NJW 1988, 558 – judgement of 30/10/1987, V ZR 174/85 
BGH NJW 1988, 969 – judgement of 09/11/1987, II ZR 100/87 
BGH NJW 1988, 1726 – judgement of 23/03/1988, VIII ZR 58/87 
BGH NJW 1988, 1785 – judgement of 03/03/1988, X ZR 54/86 
BGH NJW 1988, 1908 – judgement of 23/03/1988, VIII ZR 175/87 
BGH NJW 1988, 2465 – judgement of 27/04/1988, VIII ZR 84/87 
BGH NJW 1988, 3149 – judgement of 13/06/1988, II ZR 324/87 
 
BGH NJW 1989. 222 – judgement of 24/11/1988, III ZR 188/87 
BGH NJW 1989, 582 – judgement of 17/01/1989, XI ZR 54/88 
BGH NJW 1989, 1479 – judgement of 01/02/1989, IVa ZR 354/87 
BGH NJW 1989, 1602 – judgement of 23/02/1989, VII ZR 89/87 
BGH NJW 1989, 1724 – judgement of 24/10/1988, II ZR 311/87 
BGH NJW 1989, 2255 – judgement of 01/06/1989, X ZR 78/88 
BGH NJW 1989, 2383 – judgement of 22/06/1989, III ZR 72/88 
BGH NJW 1989, 2534 – judgement of 23/06/1989, V ZR 40/88 
BGH NJW 1989, 2683 – judgement of 29/05/1989, II ZR 220/88 
BGH NJW 1989, 3215 – judgement of 18/04/1989, X ZR 31/88 
 
BGH NJW 1990, 454 – judgement of 02/11/1989, IX ZR 1997/88 
BGH NJW 1990, 715 – judgement of 09/11/1989, VII ZR 16/89 
BGH NJW 1990, 761 – judgement of 09/11/1989, IX ZR 269/87 
BGH NJW 1990, 1601 – judgement of 09/02/1990, V ZR 200/88 
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BGH NJW 1990, 1784 – judgement of 13/12/1989, VIII ZR 94/89 
BGH NJW 1990, 2383 – judgement of 10/07/1990, XI ZR 275/89 
BGH NJW 1990, 3197 – judgement of 21/06/1990, VII ZR 308/89 
 
BGH NJW 1991, 843 – judgement of 16/11/1990, V ZR 217/89 
BGH NJW 1991, 1604 – judgement of 23/01/1991, VIII ZR 122/90 
BGH NJW 1991, 1677 – judgement of 05/03/1991, XI ZR 75/90 
BGH NJW 1991, 1750 – judgement of 15/05/1991, VIII ZR 38/90 
BGH NJW 1991, 1886 – judgement of 23/04/1991, XI ZR 128/90 
BGH NJW 1991, 2140 – judgement of 16/04/1991, XI ZR 68/90 
BGH NJW 1991, 2414 – judgement of 25/06/1991, XI ZR 257/90 
BGH NJW 1991, 2559 – judgement of 09/07/1991, XI ZR 72/90 
 
BGH NJW 1992, 575 – judgement of 10/10/1991, III ZR 141/90 
BGH NJW 1992, 746 – judgement of 30/10/1991, VIII ZR 51/91 
BGH NJW 1992, 1096 – judgement of 21/11/1991, I ZR 87/90 
BGH NJW 1992, 1232 – judgement of 12/02/1992, VIII ZR 84/91 
BGH NJW 1992, 1628 – judgement of 19/11/1991, X ZR 28/90 
BGH NJW 1992, 1751 – judgement of 14/04/1992, XI ZR 196/91 
BGH NJW 1992, 1761 – judgement of 01/04/1992, XII ZR 100/91 
BGH NJW 1992, 2160 – judgement of 14/05/1992, VII ZR 204/90 
BGH NJW 1992, 2283 – judgement of 26/02/1992, XII ZR 129/90 
BGH NJW 1992, 2629 – judgement of 25/06/1992, IX ZR 24/92 
BGH NJW 1992, 2817 – judgement of 12/06/1992, V ZR 106/91 
BGH NJW 1992, 3158 – judgement of 09/07/1992, VII ZR 7/92 
 
BGH NJW 1993, 57 – judgement of 05/10/1992, II ZR 172/91 
BGH NJW 1993, 326 – judgement of 04/11/1992, VIII ZR 235/91 
BGH NJW 1993, 335 – judgement of 11/11/1992, VIII ZR 238/91 
BGH NJW 1993, 532 – court order of 02/12/1992, VIII ARZ 5/92 
BGH NJW 1993, 657 – judgement of 20/10/1992, X ZR 74/91 
BGH NJW 1993, 721 – judgement of 10/12/1992, I ZR 186/90 
BGH NJW 1993, 779 – judgement of 22/12/1992, VI ZR 341/91 
BGH NJW 1993, 1786 – judgement of 28/01/1993, I ZR 294/90 
BGH NJW 1993, 2369 – judgement of 23/06/1993, IV ZR 135/92 
BGH NJW 1993, 2436 – judgement of 14/07/1993, VIII ZR 147/92 
 
BGH NJW 1994, 262 – judgement of 26/10/1993, XI ZR 42/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 318 – judgement of 30/11/1993, XI ZR 80/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 657 – judgement of 01/12/1993, VIII ZR 41/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 1060 – judgement of 12/01/1994 – VIII ZR 165/92 
BGH NJW 1994, 1069 – judgement of 26/01/1994, VIII ZR 39/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 1408 – judgement of 22/02/1994, VI ZR 309/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 2145 – judgement of 01/06/1994, XI ZR 133/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 2693 – judgement of 13/07/1994, IV ZR 197/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 2825 – judgement of 30/06/1994, VII ZR 116/93 
BGH NJW 1994, 3287 – judgement of 21/09/1994, XII ZR 77/93 
 
BGH NJW 1995, 45 – judgement of 14/10/1994, V ZR 196/93 
BGH NJW 1995, 192 – judgement of 10/10/1994, II ZR 32/94 
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BGH NJW 1995, 254 – judgement of 21/11/1994, XII ZR 150/93 
BGH NJW 1995, 583 – judgement of 28/11/1994, II ZR 11/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 589 – judgement of 23/11/1984, IV ZR 124/93 
BGH NJW 1995, 665 – judgement of 07/12/1994, VIII ZR 153/93 
BGH NJW 1995, 1212 – judgement of 31/01/1995, XI ZR 56/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 1488 – judgement of 15/02/1995, VIII ZR 93/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 1671 – judgement of 22/03/1995, VIII ZR 20/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 1675 – judgement of 06/04/1995, VII ZR 73/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 2034 – judgement of 24/05/1995, XII ZR 172/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 2224 – judgement of 04/05/1995, I ZR 90/93 
BGH NJW 1995, 2553 – judgement of 18/05/1995, IX ZR 108/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 2637 – judgement of 30/06/1995, V ZR 184/94 
BGH NJW 1995, 3117 – judgement of 04/05/1997, I ZR 70/93 
 
BGH NJW 1996, 455 – judgement of 22/11/1995, VIII ZR 57/95 
BGH NJW 1996, 988 – judgement of 10/01/1996, XII ZR 271/94 
BGH NJW 1996, 2032 – judgement of 07/05/1996, XI ZR 217/95 
BGH NJW 1996, 2033 – judgement of 24/04/1996, VIII ZR 150/95 
BGH NJW 1996, 2574 – judgement of 03/07/1996, VII ZR 221/95 
BGH NJW 1997, 135 – judgement of 26/09/1996, VII ZR 318/95 
BGH NJW 1997, 193 – judgement of 23/10/1996, XII ZR 55/95 
BGH NJW 1997, 259 – judgement of 10/10/1996, VII ZR 250/94 
BGH NJW 1997, 739 – judgement of 04/12/1996, XII ZR 193/95 
BGH NJW 1997, 1700 – judgement of 08/03/1997, XI ZR 117/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 2042 – judgement of 06/05/1997, XI ZR 108/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 2043 – judgement of 04/03/1997, X ZR 141/95 
BGH NJW 1997, 2677 – judgement of 24/06/1997, XI ZR 288/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 2753 – judgement of 15/07/1997, XI ZR 279/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 2944 – judgement of 03/07/1997, IX ZR 244/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3022 – judgement of 04/07/1997, V ZR 405/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3166 – judgement of 04/06/1997, VIII ZR 312/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3230 – judgement of 15/04/1997, IX ZR 112/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3233 – judgement of 07/05/1997, VIII ZR 349/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3309 – judgement of 23/07/1997, VIII ZR 134/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3372 – judgement of 18/09/1997, IX ZR 283/96 
BGH NJW 1997, 3434 – judgement of 11/03/1997, X ZR 146/94 
BGH NJW 1997, 3437 – decision in rental matters of 10/09/1997, VIII ARZ 1/97 
 
BGH NJW 1998, 309 – judgement of 21/10/1997, XI ZR 5/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 383 – judgement of 14/10/1997, XI ZR 167/96 
BGH NJW 1998, 454 – judgement of 08/10/1997, IV ZR 220/96 
BGH NJW 1998, 592 – judgement of 11/11/1997, XI ZR 13/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 671 – court order of 27/11/1997, GSZ 1/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 677 – judgement of 29/10/1997, VIII ZR 347/96 
BGH NJW 1998, 679 – judgement of 05/11/1997, VII ZR 274/96 
BGH NJW 1998, 904 – judgement of 04/12/1997, VII ZR 6/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 991 – judgement of 11/12/1997, IX ZR 46/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 1066 – judgement of 13/11/1997, X ZR 135/95 
BGH NJW 1998, 1640 – judgement of 25/02/1998, VIII ZR 276/96 
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BGH NJW 1998, 1786 – judgement of 19/02/1998, III ZR 106/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 2207 – judgement of 13/05/1998, VIII ZR 292/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 2280 – judgement of 02/04/1998, IX ZR 79/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 2286 – judgement of 15/04/1998, VIII ZR 377/96 
BGH NJW 1998, 2600 – judgement of 03/04/1998, V ZR 6/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 2815 – judgement of 02/07/1998, IX ZR 255/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 3114 – judgement of 03/06/1998, VIII ZR 317/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 3119 – judgement of 08/07/1998, VIII ZR 1/98 
BGH NJW 1998, 3188 – judgement of 02/07/1998, III ZR 287/97 
BGH NJW 1998, 3567 – judgement of 17/09/1998, IX ZR 237/97 
 
BGH NJW 1999, 276 – judgement of 05/11/1998, III ZR 226/97 
BGH NJW 1999, 647 – judgement of 18/11/1998, VIII ZR 334/97  
BGH NJW 1999, 864 – court order of 24/09/1998, III ZR 219/97 
BGH NJW 1999, 942 – judgement of 17/12/1998, VUU ZR 243/97 
BGH NJW 1999, 1105 – judgement of 14/01/1999, IX ZR 140/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 1259 – judgement of 25/11/1998, VIII ZR 259/97 
BGH NJW 1999, 1261 – judgement of 17/12/1998, IX ZR 151/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 1633 – judgement of 10/02/1998, IV ZR 324/97 
BGH NJW 1999, 1864 – judgement of 16/03/1999, XI ZR 76/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 1865 – judgement of 17/03/1999, IV ZR 218/97 
BGH NJW 1999, 1261 – judgement of 17/12/1998, IX ZR 151/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 2180 – judgement of 10/03/1999, VIII ZR 204/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 2279 – judgement of 24/03/1999, IV ZR 90/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 3260 – judgement of 10/06/1999, VII ZR 365/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 3261 – judgement of 08/07/1999, VII ZR 237/98 
BGH NJW 1999, 3558 – judgement of 23/06/1999, IV ZR 136/98 
 
BGH NJW 2000, 73 – judgement of 20/05/1999, I ZR 66/97 
BGH NJW 2000, 207 – judgement of 24/06/1999, VII ZR 229/98 
BGH NJW 2000, 515 – judgement of 06/10/1999, VIII ZR 125/98  
BGH NJW 2000, 577 – judgement of 16/11/1999, KZR 12/97 
BGH NJW 2000, 651 – judgement of 19/10/1999, XI ZR 8/99 
BGH NJW 2000, 658 – judgement of 28/10/1999, IX ZR 364/97 
BGH NJW 2000, 1028 – judgement of 27/09/1999, II ZR 377/98 
BGH NJW 2000, 1110 – judgement of 03/11/1999, VIII ZR 269/98 
BGH NJW 2000, 2103 – judgement of 22/03/2000, IV ZR 23/99 
BGH NJW 2000, 2106 – judgement of 20/01/2000, VII ZR 46/98 
BGH NJW 2000, 2677 – judgement of 27/01/2000, I ZR 241/97 
BGH NJW 2000, 3348 – judgement of 06/07/2000, VII ZR 73/00 
 
BGH NJW 2001, 292 – judgement of 27/09/2000, VIII ZR 155/99 
BGH NJW 2001, 303 – judgement of 13/09/2000, VIII ZR 34/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 751 – judgement of 12/12/2000, XI ZR 138/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 1132 – judgement of 22/11/2000, IV ZR 235/99 
BGH NJW 2001, 1270 – judgement of 27/11/2000, II ZR 218/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 1416 – judgement of 16/01/2001, XI ZR 84/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 1419 – default judgement of 13/02/2001, XI ZR 197/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 1934 – judgement of 28/03/2001, IV ZR 19/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 2012 – judgement of 05/09/2001, IV ZR 138/99 
BGH NJW 2001, 2014 – judgement of 09/05/2001, IV ZR 121/00 
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BGH NJW 2001, 2165 – judgement of 09/05/2001, VIII ZR 208/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 2331 – judgement of 24/05/2001, VIII ZR 135/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 2635 – judgement of 12/06/2001, XI ZR 274/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 2971 – judgement of 05/07/2001, III ZR 310/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 3186 – judgement of 19/07/2001, IX ZR 411/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 3406 – judgement of 21/02/2001, IV ZR 11/00 
BGH NJW 2001, 3480 – judgement of 30/05/2001, XII ZR 273/98 
 
BGH NJW 2002, 138 – judgement of 27/09/2001, VII ZR 388/00 
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Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz)  
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/2713 of 20/10/1995: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes  
Bundestagsdrucksache 13/8444 of 29/08/1997: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des 
Kaufmanns- und Firmenrechts und zur Änderung anderer handels- und gesellschaftsrechtlicher 
Vorschriften (Handelsrechtsreformgesetz)  
Bundestagsdrucksache 14/2658 of 09/02/2000: Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Fernabsatzverträge und 
andere Fragen des Verbraucherrechts sowie zur Umstellung von Vorschriften auf Euro  
Bundestagsdrucksache 14/6040 of 14/05/2001: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts - Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs  
Bundestagsdrucksache 14/6857 of 31/08/2001: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts  
Bundestagsdrucksache 14/7052 of 09/10/2001: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts – Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses (6. Ausschuss)  
Bundestagsdrucksache 16/9787 of 25/06/2008: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht  zu dem 
Gesetzentwurf des Bundesrates -16/511- Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Sicherung von 
Werkunternehmeransprüchen und zur verbesserten Durchsetzung von Forderungen 
(Forderungssicherungsgesetz - FoSiG)   
Bundestagsdrucksache 17/12637 of 06/03/2013:  Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der 
Verbraucherrechterichtlinie und zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung  
Bundestagsdrucksache 18/5760 of 12/08/2015:  Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 
über alternative Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten und zur Durchführung der Verordnung 
über Online-Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten  
 Bundestagsdrucksache 18/6904 of 02/12/2015:  Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 
über alternative Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten und zur Durchführung der Verordnung 
über Online-Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten - Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
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über alternative Streitbeilegung in Verbraucherangelegenheiten und zur Durchführung der 
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Allgemeiner Teil of 13 July 2012 B3) 
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Official Journal EC 1990 No. C 243 Notice No. 90/C 243/02: Proposal for a Council Directive on 
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'Abmahnung – was nun? Verhaltenstipps bei wettbewerbsrechtlichen Abmahnungen' at  
https://www.hannover.ihk.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Merkblatt_Abmahnung-
was_nun_2012_01.pdf  
'Abzocke Kaffeefahrt – Eingeladen und ausgenommen' (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, documentary 
film, accessible on the ZDF Mediathek until 4 October 2018 at 
https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/zdfinfo-doku/abzocke-kaffeefahrt-104.html  
and still accessible on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUL-Mu3hxBQ)  
 
'Actor Sequitur Forum Rei Law & Legal Definition' at  
http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/actor-sequitur-forum-rei 
 
'adequate' at http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/adequate?s=t 
 
Address of the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the General Assembly of the African 
Ombudsman Association (AOA): Misty Hills Conference Centre, Muldersdrift, Johannesburg (11 
April 2005) at https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/address-president-south-africa-thabo-mbeki-
general-assembly-african-ombudsman-association 
 
'Advanced electronic signatures' at 
https://www.lawtrust.co.za/e-signatures/advance-electronic-signatures (no longer available) 
 




'Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen (AGB-Banken)' at psdbank-ht.de/mb314/AGB.pdf 
 
'An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through judicial 
proceedings' (Centre for European Economic Law 2007 Final report: Study for the European 
Commission) at ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress/reports.../comparative_report_en.pdf 
 
'A public service ombudsman: Government response to consultation' at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/public-service-ombudsman (no longer available) 
 
'A summary of the consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008' at http://www.meumannwhite.co.za/news-
details/25 
 
'at will' at http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/at-will 
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'Better Regulation Guidelines' at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines.pdf 
'Breach of contract' at http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=93 
 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht at www.bafin.de 
 
Bundeskanzleramt ─ Rechtsinformationssystem (Austria) at 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer=ERV_1979_140  
 
Bundesjustizamt at https:// www.bundesjustizamt.de 
 
Büro der Ombudsstelle des BVI - Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V. at 
www.ombudsstelle-investmentfonds.de 
 
'Business unusual – 2016 South African Insurance Industry Survey' at 
https://home.kpmg.com/za/en/home/campaigns/2016/07/2016-south-african-insurance-survey.html 
 
'Bystander' at http://thelawdictionary.com/bystander 
 
'CFA' at https://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/CFA  
 




'CISG – Table of Contracting States' at http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/page/cisg-table-contracting-states 
 
'Consumer Protection Act, No. 68 of 2008' (South African Insitute of Chartered Accountants) at 
https://www.saica.co.za/Technical/LegalandGovernance/Legislation/ConsumerProtectionAct/tabid/19
11/language/en-ZA/Default.aspx (no longer available) 
 
'Consumer Protection Bill: Workshop Day 2' at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9055/  
 
‘Contactless Payments Are Here to Stay. Here’s How to Set Them Up on Your Phone' at 
https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/money/credit-cards/how-to-use-contactless-payments 
'continual' at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/continual, 
https://www.lexico.com/definition/continual 
 
'Damages' at http://dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=423 
 
'Deutscher Juristentag' at https://www.djt.de 
 
'Drafting Matters!: guidance' at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/02/17093804/0 
 
'Edictum translatitium' at https://dictionary.thelaw.com/translatitium-edictum 
 
'English language' at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_language#Word_origins  
 
'Exception v Exemption' at  
https://oilpatchwriting.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/exception-vs-exemption 
 
'False or Misleading Representations and Deceptive Marketing Practices Under the Competition Act' at 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03133.html  
 




FinMark Trust Landscape for Consumer Recourse in South Africa's Financial Services Sector (2007) at 
http://www.finmark.org.za/landscape-for-consumer-recourse-in-south-africas-financial-services-sector  
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'Forgotten schools in the Eastern Cape left to rot' at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-08-00-forgotten-schools-of-the-eastern-cape-left-to-rot 
 
Frankfurter Initiative zur Fortentwicklung des AGB-Rechts at 
www.zvei.org/Downloads/Recht/AGB-Recht-Positionspapier-Endfassung-20110210.pdf (no longer 
available) 
 
'free' at ‘http://www.thefreedictionary.com/free 
 
German Law Archive at http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org 
 
'Gestaltung rechtsgeschäftlicher Schuldverhältnisse durch Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen / Shaping 
contractual obligations by means of standard business terms' at 
'http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=632#b2s2  
'Glossary of Roman Law' at http://thelatinlibrary.com/law/glossary.html 
 
'Guardians and Custodians' at http://www.justice.gov.za/master/guardian.html 
 
'Haftung wegen PIN-Weitergabe' at https://www.online-und-recht.de/urteile/Haftung-wegen-PIN-
Weitergabe-Landgericht-K%C3%B6ln-20190910  
 
'How to resolve your legal problem in a small claims court' at 
https://www.lawforall.co.za/2017/07/small-claims-court-guide 
 




'In search of the plain language standard' at 
 https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review-april-2012-1 (no longer available) 
 
'It's about legibility' at  
http://www.fonts.com/content/learning/fontology/level-4/fine-typography/legibility 
 




'Kostenquotelung' at www.juratexte.de 
 
'KPMG: Business unusual - The South African Insurance Industry Survey 2016' at 
https://home.kpmg.com/za/en/home/campaigns/2016/07/2016-south-african-insurance-survey.html  
 
'Laesio enormis' at https://www.proverbia-iuris.de/laesio-enormis 
 
Law Reform Commission of Ireland 2008 at https://www.lawreform.ie  
 
'Legalese: Golden rules for drafting indemnities' at 
http://www.trinityllp.com/legalese-golden-rules-for-drafting-indemnities 
 
'Less Than a State, More Than an International Organization:The Sui Generis Nature of the European 
Union' Paper by Hlavac M, Georgetown Public Policy Institute December 2010 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719308 
 
'Litis contestatio' at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/litis+contestatio 
 
'More than just ‘plain’ words' at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-database_jun-2012-1-1-1-1-1-1 (no longer 
available) 
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'Musterfeststellungsklage' at https://www.musterfeststellungsklagen.de 
 
National Consumer Commission at http://www.thencc.gov.za 
 
'Negative Option Marketing' at 
http://www.nka.com/investigation/negative-option-marketing-3 (no longer available) 
 
Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers Annual Report 2004/2005 at 
http://www.itinews.co.za/pdf/FAIS_A_R_2005_32859.pdf (no longer available) 
 
'OFT launches code approval scheme to consumers' (press release) at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426 (no longer available) 
 
Ombudsmann der genossenschaftlichen Bankengruppe at www.bvr.de 
 
Ombudsmann der Öffentlichen Banken at www.voeb.de 
 
Ombudsmann der privaten Banken at https://bankenombudsmann.de 
 
Ombudsleute der Privaten Bausparkassen at www.schlichtungsstelle-bausparen.de 
 
Ombudsmann Private Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung at www.pkv-ombudsmann.de 
 
Ombudsstelle geschlossene Fonds at www.ombudsstelle-gfonds.de 
 
'Open market' at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open-market.asp  
 
'Opportunity' at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/opportunity 
 




'Plain language tip' at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review_01-jun-2014-2 (no longer available) 
 
'Post Office closes 221 outlets amid R1.1bn loss' (Mail & Guardian) at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-05-post-office-closes-221-outlets-amid-r11bn-loss  
 
'Post Office wins court order against strike' at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-28-post-office-wins-court-order-against-worker-strike  
 
'Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning' (Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec 
 
Proposals for Amendment of Consumer Protection Bill at 
www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/080826proftjakiesub.doc 
 
'Prescription' at http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prescription.aspx 
 
'Promote' at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/promote, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/promote  
 
'Quellen und Geltungsbereich des Rechts der Europäischen Union' at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/de/FTU_1.2.1.pdf 
 
'Roman law' at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-law#ref469058 
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'SA adults lag behind in global literacy stakes' at http://bit-ly/XeZSOw (no longer available)  
 
'SA’s ‘real’ matric pass rate: 42%' at 
http://businesstech.co.za/news/general/76561/sas-real-matric-pass-rate-41 
 
Schlichtungsstelle beim Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverband at www.dsgv.de/schlichtungsstelle 
 
Schlichtungsstelle der Deutschen Bundesbank at www.bundesbank.de 
 
'Sector' at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sector.asp  
 
'South Africa: Clearly Clear? Plain And Understandable Language In Terms Of The Consumer 
Protection Act' at http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/144478/Consumer+Law/Clearly+Clear+ 
Plain+ And+Understandable+Language+In+Terms+Of+The+Consumer+Protection+Act 
‘South Africa Unemployment Rate’ at 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate 
 




'Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds Offices' at 
https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/file/551/standards-establishment-and-operations-ombuds-offices  
 
'Stare decisis' at http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2005 
 
'Statute Law Review' at 
https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/3430/1/Bekink_Aspects%282007%29 pdf (no longer 
available) 
 
'Terms and conditions' at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/terms-and-conditions.html  
 
'Terms regarding the responsibilities and liabilities of insurance comparison websites for providing their 
service' at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/Regulated/uct/library/comparison_websites.shtml  
 




'The Pension Funds Adjudicator' at https://www.pfa.org.za/Pages/default.aspx 
 
'The Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation' at http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Purposive-
approach.php  
 
'Time-bar clause' at http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/T/TimeBarClause.aspx  
 
'Types of hazards' at http://fortresslearning.com.au/cert-iv-content/design/types-of-hazards  
 
Unesco eAtlas of Literacy at https://tellmaps.com/uis/literacy/#!/tellmap/-601865091 
 
'United Nations guidelines for consumer protection' at 
https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/UN-Guidelines-on-Consumer-Protection.aspx 
 




Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. at https://www.vzbv.de 
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Versicherungsombudsmann at www.versicherungsombudsmann.de 
 
'What is an Arm's-Length-Transaction?' at  
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-is-an-arms-length-transaction-398128 
 
'What is Balance of Convenience?' at http://thelawdictionary.org/balance-of-convenience 
 
'Wer in den Bus steigt, sitzt in der Falle' (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 April 2018) at 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/leben/kriminalitaet-wer-in-den-bus-steigt-sitzt-in-der-falle-1.3928107  
 
‘Withholding of property: Time crucial for parties’ by Sayed Iqbal Mohamed at 
www.ocr.org.za/weekly_column2011/Withholding%20of%20Property.pdf (no longer available) 
 
'Yet another missed opportunity to develop the Common Law of Contract? An analysis of Everfresh 
Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZACC 30' by Mupangavanhu, 
Brighton at https://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/1988?show=full 
'Zulu language' at www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulu-language 
 
'Zur Inhaltskontrolle des § 879 Abs. 3 ABGB' (Immolex 160, 2011 (05)) at 
https://www.onlinehausverwaltung.at/Portals/1/publikationen/immolex 2011-05 § 879 Abs 3 
ABGB.pdf (no longer available) 
 
'0900: Von sinnvoll bis Abzocke' at https://www.teltarif.de/i/sonderrufnummern-0900.html 
 
'10 ways to design better forms' at 
https://jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-law-review-june-2015 (no longer available) 
 




2. Other online sources used for research 
Bundesgerichtshof at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de 
 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) at https://www.nationallizenzen.de 
 
European Court of Justice at http://www.curia.europa.eu 
 
Gesetze im Internet (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz) at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de 
 
Juris at http://bundesrecht.juris.de 
 
Konsumentenschutzgesetz (Austria) - English translation at 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer=ERV_1979_140  
 
National Archives (UK) at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140525130048 
 
National Consumer Tribunal (judgments) at http://www.thenct.org.za/judgments 
 
Office of Fair Trading at https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-fair-trading (no longer 
available) 
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found in: Gouws 2010 SA Merc LJ 80 note 8 
 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants: Letter of 29 October 2010 to DTI: Comments on   
Consumer Protection Act Regulations 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants: Letter of 10 March 2011 to DTI: Comment on the 
Consumer Protection Act Draft Enforcement Guidelines 
Vincenzo Roppo 'Workshop 3: The definition of "unfairness": the application of Article 3(1), 4(1) – and 
of the annexes of the Directive' in European Commission Brussels Conference 1-3/7/1999 (1999)  
